Comment on Kuran and Collins

Author(s): James S. Coleman

Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 6 (May, 1995), pp. 1616-1619
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Comment on Kuran and Collins
JamesS. Coleman
UniversityofChicago

KURAN
Stimulatedby the East European revolutionsof the late 1980s, Timur
Kuran has in several papers addresseda puzzling question:Why was
everyone,fromoutsidepoliticalobserversand scholarsto citizensin East
Europe to the leaders of East European states to dissidentsin those
states,takenby surprise?His answerlies in the difference betweenpri-
vatelyheld opinionsofthecitizenry and theirpubliclyexpressedopinions
and in the conditionsunderwhichthe gap betweenthe two can remain
wide. The essentialcondition,in brief,is one in which repressionof
dissentis not onlycarriedout by the regimebut is diffusedthroughout
thesociety,so thatpeople in everydaylifeprofesssupportfortheregime
to friendsand neighbors,as a means of self-protection.This widespread
publicexpressionofsupportfortheregimegeneratesa formofpluralistic
ignorance,in which,despitewidespreadprivateoppositionto theregime,
each feelsisolatedand fearful,afraidthatany expressionof dissentmay
be reportedto authorities.
In this article,Kuran extendshis ideas by introducingthe idea that
each citizenhas a "revolutionary threshold,"based on the costs of ex-
pressingsupportfortheregimeand the costsof expressingoppositionto
the regime.He pointsto two principalsourcesof thesecosts:The costs
of expressingsupportare in the psychicdistressof living a lie, which
dependson how strongly opposed one's privateopinionis to the regime.
On theotherside, thecostsare theamountof harmone can expectfrom
the regimeforexpressingopposition.
I findKuran's thesisan attractiveone; it seemsto fitwell some of the
eventsin some Eastern European societiesbeforeand duringthe 1989
revolution-some, but not all. For example, the gap betweenprivate
and publicopinionis farmoredescriptiveof East Germanyin the 1980s
thanit is of Poland duringthatsame period.In Poland, the microstruc-
tureof societyhad forsome timebeen freedfromthefearsof expressing
oppositionto the regimeamong friendsand neighbors.The advent of
Solidarityin August 1980, followingearlierantigovernment demonstra-
tionsin 1968, 1970,and 1976,showedpubliclythewidespreadopposition

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 Symposium:Coleman

to the regime.It is incorrectto argue that in Poland the gap between

privateand public opinion,generatingpluralisticignoranceabout the
extentof opposition,was an importantdeterrentto overthrowingthe
regime.
Yet despitethispubliclyexpressedwidespreadopposition,the Com-
munistregimewas not overthrownuntil 1989. Why? The answer, I
believe,is simple:first,theuse offorceby thePolish Communistregime
underGeneralJaruzelski,in theformofmartiallaw instituted in Decem-
ber 1980, and second,the fearof a Soviet invasionto restoreorderand
propup theregime.Therewas extensivedebateamongSolidarityleaders
in the earlydays of the movementabout how far theyshould go. The
pointthatalwayswon thesedisagreements was thattheymuststopshort
of whateverwould bringabout intervention by the Soviet military.The
actionsof Solidaritydid not stop shortof inducingreprisalson the part
of the Polish government, thoughtheydid stop shortof inducingSoviet
intervention. It remainsa matterof debate withinPoland whetherJaru-
zelski was a traitorto Polish freedomby instituting martiallaw or was
a
the protectorof Polish freedomby forestalling Sovietmilitaryreprisal.
Kuran's notionof a revolutionary thresholdfitshere,but onlyone of
his proposedtwo determinants the thresholdis important,thatis the
of
cost of expressingoppositionto the regime.There was littleor no gap
betweenprivateand public opinionand thuslittlepluralisticignorance
about the extentof opposition.
What, then,broughtabout the revolt,firstevidencedin Poland, and
then elsewhere,with the most dramaticeventsoccurringin East Ger-
many?The answer again is simple:removalof the Soviet threat,with
Gorbachev'sunwillingness to commitSoviettroopsto supportEast Eu-
ropean Communistgovernments.This was most clearlyevidentwhen
GorbachevrefusedHonecker'srequestto use Soviet troopsstationedin
East Germanyto block the movementof East Germansto the West.
It seems, then,thatviewed appropriately, the overturnof repressive
regimesin situationslike thatof EasternEurope in the late 1980s is far
less puzzlingand farmorepredictablethan Kuran would have it. That
is, it is contingently
predictable,predictablecontingent upon the actions
of the repressiveregime.In this case, Gorbachevdeclinedto continue
to exerciserepressivemeasuresto maintainthe East European puppet
governments. Whenthethreatofrepressionwas removed,theopposition
overthrewa toothlessregime.This is not to say that the private-public
opiniongap did not play a rolein determining the revolutionarythresh-
olds in some of the societies,such as East Germany,Czechoslovakia,
and Romania. It does suggest,however,thatthe principaldeterminant
was the presenceor absence of the threatof reprisal.
This, of course,does not explain why Gorbachevrefusedto commit

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

Soviet forces.This is a differentquestionaltogether,with the answers

to be soughtperhapsin internalproblems,economicor military,such as
those confronted by the Soviet Union with the Afghanistanfiasco and
the economicdistressof the 1980s. What this analysis does imply,of
course, is that in predictingthe overthrowof repressiveregimes,the
centralelementto be predictedis the regime'srelinquishingthe use of
repressiveforce.I suggestthat successfulpredictionof this will allow
successfulpredictionof the overthrowof the regime.

COLLINS
Note thatit is theseactions,thatis, Gorbachev'srefusalto commitSoviet
troopsin 1989, that constitutea large part of what Collins attemptsto
predictwith his geopoliticaltheory.He also discusses consequencesof
theseactions.He pointsto Gorbachev'srelaxationon constraintsto emi-
grationof Jews to Israel and (in accord with the thesisI have argued
above) the responseby ethnicminorities withinthe Soviet Union to this
relaxationof repressionby spontaneousmigrationsacross republicbor-
ders. Collins'sdiscussionis at its mostconvincingat thispoint,showing
theconsequencesofrelaxationofrepression,less so in showingthecauses
ofthisrelaxation.I believeitis here,in predicting
thecauses ofrelaxation
of repression,thattheoriesdesignedto predictrevolutionsare weakest.
The conditions,militaryand economic,as discussedby Collins, Gold-
stone,Skocpol,and others,are clearlyimportantin bringingabout state
breakdown.However,thedecisionto relaxrepressivemeasuresis made
by one leader, or at most a few leaders, in repressiveregimes.Had
Andropovbeen succeededby someoneotherthan Gorbachev,the East
Europeangovernments and theSovietUnionmighthave remainedintact
forsome timebeyond 1989. There is an inherently lower predictability
of one person'sactionsgiventhe conditionsconfronting thatpersonthat
thereis of the actionsof a numberof persons,giventhe conditionscon-
fronting them.That is to say moregenerallythatgovernmentalactions
are less predictablethanthepopulation'sactions.If we knowtheformer,
thenthe latter,includingan eruptionof opposition,are predictable.

METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS HOLISM

There is one majordifference betweenKuran's approachto predictionof
revolutionsand thatof Collins. Kuran'sis an exampleof methodological
individualism,while Collins's is an example of methodologicalholism.
All the variablesthatCollins uses in his geopoliticalmodel characterize
the state or the societyas a whole (see, e.g., his fig. 1). There is no
attemptto characterize,predict,or explain the actions of those who

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 Symposium:Coleman

initiatea revoltor thosewho supporttherevolutionaries, despitethefact

thatit is theiractionsthatconstitutethe revolution.
Kuran's theoryfocusesprimarilyon the orientations of thesepersons,
the generalpopulation,and potentialrevolutionaries.There are state-
level or society-level variablesin thistheorythat are seen to be causes
of theseorientations (the degreeof repressiveness of the regimeand the
extentto whichthe regimehas successfully instilledfearof friendsand
neighborsas possibleagentsoftheregime),butthetheorymovesbetween
the level of the societyas a whole and the level of individualswhose
actionscan constitutea revolt.Perhaps the most ingeniouspart of the
theoryis the proposedprocessthroughwhichtheseorientationsof indi-
vidual citizenscan lead to an explosiverevolt,a self-propelling process
in whichthe thresholdforoppositionon the partof one persondepends
on the numberof othersalreadyactingin opposition.This produces a
positivefeedback,which can transform individual"thresholds"into a
systemwideconflagration.
It is, I believe,thiskindoftheory,whichmovesbetweenthemacroso-
cial level and the microsociallevel, ratherthan a theorythatremainsat
themacrosociallevel, thatconstitutes themorepromisingavenue forthe
developmentof social theory.

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