Afghanistan: Background and U.S.

Policy: In Brief

withdrawal.27 Some Afghan leaders have suggested that continued infighting among Afghan elites
may pose as much of a threat to the Afghan political system as the Taliban.28
Operations by the Taliban, whose strength has been estimated at 60,000 full-time fighters, against
Afghan government forces continue, including numerous attacks nationwide after the U.S.
withdrawal began on May 1. A major offensive by the Taliban in May 2021 prompted the United
States to launch airstrikes in support of Afghan government forces in southern Afghanistan’s
Helmand Province. The group controls or contexts more territory in 2021 than at any point since
2001 by many measures (see Figure 1).29
The United Nations mission in Afghanistan reported that while the number of civilian casualties
in 2020 fell below 10,000 for the first time since 2013, violence against civilians increased in the
months following the start of intra-Afghan negotiations in September 2020.30 Targeted attacks
have risen in recent months. The Taliban denied involvement in the January 2021 assassination of
female Supreme Court judges in Kabul and other attacks, but the United States and other
countries released a joint statement on January 31, 2021, charging that “the Taliban bears
responsibility for the majority of this targeted violence.”31 The Taliban also denied responsibility
for a May 8, 2021, attack targeting schoolgirls in a Kabul neighborhood populated mostly by
Hazaras (an ethnoreligious Shia minority); the attack killed more than 80 and wounded nearly
150. That attack was not claimed by the regional Islamic State affiliate, though that group has
often targeted Afghan Hazaras (see textbox).

Islamic State-Khorasan Province

Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations have been aimed at the local Islamic State affiliate, known
as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K). Estimates of ISKP strength generally ranged from
2,000 to 4,000 fighters until ISKP “collapsed” in late 2019 due to offensives by U.S. and Afghan forces and,
separately, the Taliban.32 ISKP and Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of
political or other differences.33 A number of ISKP leaders have been killed in U.S. strikes since 2016, and Afghan
forces arrested and captured two successive ISKP leaders in the spring of 2020. U.S. officials caution that ISKP
remains a threat, pointing to several high profile attacks attributed to the group in 2020. The United Nations
reports that casualties from ISKP attacks in 2020 decreased 45% from 2019.34 Some suggest that the Taliban’s

27 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghanistan Braces for the Worst as U.S. Troop Withdrawal
Accelerates,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2020; “Atta Noor threatens to ‘take action’ against security situation,”
Ariana News, December 24, 2020.
28 Anisa Shaneed, “Abdullah: Political Division Will Cause Collapse,” TOLOnews, June 3, 2021.

29 See also Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution

2557 (2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace and
stability of Afghanistan, United Nations Security Council, (S/2021/486), released June 1, 2021, which relays an
assessment from unspecified Member States that the Taliban “contest or control an estimated 50 to 70 per cent of
Afghan territory outside of urban centers, while also exerting direct control over 57 per cent of district administrative
centers.”
30 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed

Conflict, Annual Report 2020, February 2021.

31 U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnapping, and Destruction of Vital

Infrastructure,” January 31, 2021.

32 “ISIS Is Losing Afghan Territory. That Means Little for Its Victims,” New York Times, December 2, 2019.

33 See, for example, Shawn Snow, “ISIS loses more than half its fighters from US airstrikes and Taliban ground

operations,” Military Times, February 27, 2020.

34 UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, op. cit.

Congressional Research Service 5

 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

participation in peace talks or a putative political settlement could prompt disaffected (or newly unemployed)
fighters to join ISKP.35

The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected,
though they have in recent years conducted three limited truces during religious holidays
(including in mid-May 2021). Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to abandon
violence, arguably their main source of leverage, before an intra-Afghan political settlement,
though targeted reductions in violence could pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.36

Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown: Democracy and Human Rights

in Afghanistan
By all accounts, Afghanistan has made progress on recognizing and protecting Afghans’ rights
since Taliban rule ended in 2001. The scale of that progress is disputed, however, and
government-aligned entities are alleged to participate in a range of human rights abuses. Experts
differ over the extent to which the Taliban have changed since 2001, if at all. The Taliban have
not described in detail their plans for Afghan governance, but many expect social and political
gains to be reversed if the Taliban come back into power in some fashion following a U.S.
military withdrawal.
The 2004 Afghan constitution establishes a democratic political system in which basic freedoms,
including of religion, expression, assembly, and association, are guaranteed. In practice, elections
have regularly been fraught with accusations of fraud, and governing institutions are often weak
and ineffective. The constitution arguably creates an overly powerful executive branch,
disincentivizing compromise as various factions vie for the all-important presidency in a zero-
sum game. Endemic corruption in particular has long been identified as a potent threat that
undermines Afghan state institutions, delegitimizes the Afghan government in the eyes of many
of its citizens, and discourages private sector investment and development.37
Successive State Department annual reports on human rights practices indicate widespread
human rights abuses in government-held areas.38 Respect for human rights, including for the
equal rights of women, appears even more limited in areas outside of the government’s control.
The State Department reports that the Taliban conduct public executions, forced confessions, and
other abuses under their parallel justice system; that the group strictly polices expression and
routinely attacks journalists; and that it restricts girls’ access to education.39
There appear to be some changes to the Taliban’s rhetoric and actions since 2001, though experts
disagree about the extent and significance of such changes.40 One Afghan journalist’s April 2021
report from Taliban-controlled areas of Helmand Province indicates that, at least in some areas,

35 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Zabihullah Ghazi, “Foes in Afghan War See Common Threat of Islamic State’s Return,”
New York Times, March 22, 2021.
36 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “Fight and talk: Facing negotiations, Taliban almost took key Afghan city,” Reuters, September

14, 2020.
37 See “The State of Corruption in Afghanistan and the Role of Independent Institutions,” Prepared remarks of John

Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Integrity Watch Afghanistan Webinar Event, June
24, 2020.
38 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 30, 2021.

39 Ibid.

40 Thomas Ruttig, “Have the Taliban Changed?” CTC Sentinel, March 2021.

Congressional Research Service 6

 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

the group does not have either the inclination, willingness, and/or ability to enforce the kinds of
societal controls that it attempted to implement until 2001.41 Politically, some analysts posit the
Taliban are likely to push for clerical oversight of executive and legislative decision-making as a
“hybrid” of their 1996-2001 emirate and a more Western-style state.42
The Taliban, who have focused on securing the withdrawal of foreign forces, have not detailed
their proposals on governance issues. In remarks at the opening of intra-Afghan talks in
September 2020, Taliban deputy political leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said, “We seek an
Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and free—an Afghanistan with an
Islamic system in which all people of the nation can participate without discrimination.”43 In
February 2021, Baradar wrote that the group is committed to protecting certain rights with
conditions, such as “all rights of women afforded to them by Islamic law” and “freedom of
speech within the framework of Islamic principles and national interests.”44 In a June 2021
interview, a Taliban spokesman referred to establishing an “Islamic government” as the group’s
“second goal” (after the departure of foreign forces from Afghanistan), adding that “if this second
goal is not reached, we will be compelled to continue our war to achieve our goal.”45
Afghan leaders express a determination to preserve Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and its
constitution, which establishes Islam as the state religion but does not necessarily tie legislation
and national policymaking to religious jurisprudence. In a September 2020 interview, High
Council for National Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah said, “For me, one person, one
vote—I don’t call anything a red line—but that’s critical ... and compromises on these things will
not get us to peace.”46 President Ashraf Ghani has stated that his government will not conclude
any agreement that limits Afghans’ rights, adding that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that
did not include Kabul’s participation could lead to “catastrophe,” pointing to the 1990s-era civil
strife following the fall of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.47
Some Afghans and other international observers have proposed the formation of an interim
government, arguing that the Taliban’s continued refusal to recognize the Afghan government
might make such a step necessary.48 President Ghani and other Afghan officials have rejected
such proposals, including from the United States (see below).49
Press reports suggest that Afghans who have benefitted from the socio-political reforms of the
past two decades view the U.S. troop drawdown warily.50 In remarks announcing the withdrawal

41 Fazelminallah Qazizai, “After America: Inside the Taliban’s New Emirate,” Newlines, April 14, 2021.
42 Frud Bezhan, “Are the Taliban Seeking A ‘Sunni Afghan Version’ of Iran?” RFE/RL, October 2, 2020.
43 Ayaz Gul, “Afghan Rivals Begin Historic Peace Talks; US Cautiously Optimistic,” Voice of America, September 12,

2020.
44 Open letter to the people of the United States of America, February 16, 2021. Available at http://alemarahenglish.net/

?p=42767.
45 Lynne O’Donnell, “Taliban Map Out Future Vision for Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, June 8, 2021.

46 Susannah George, “The Taliban and the Afghan government are finally talking peace: What they’re negotiating and

what to expect,” Washington Post, September 12, 2020.

47 Philip Walter Wellman, “Ghani tells Afghan peace deal with Taliban will not compromise basic rights,” Stars and

Stripes, January 28, 2019; “Afghans Worry as US Makes Progress in Taliban Talks,” Voice of America, January 29,
2019.
48 Frud Bezhan, “Would an Afghan Interim Government Help or Hinder Peace Efforts?” Gandhara, January 14, 2021.

49 Pamela Constable, “Peace talks are faltering, violence has surged, and U.S. troops are pulling out. Can the Afghan

government withstand the pressure?” Washington Post, January 13, 2021.

50 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Afghans wonder ‘What about us?’ as U.S. troops prepare to withdraw,” New York Times,

April 14, 2021.

Congressional Research Service 7