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Infinite regress arguments

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D.M. Armstrong
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 Australasian Journal ol Philosophy
Vol 52, No 3; December 1974

D. M. ARMSTRONG

I N F I N I T E REGRESS A R G U M E N T S AND
T H E P R O B L E M O F UNIVERSALS
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I take the Problem of Universals to b e the problem of giving an account or

analysis of what it is for a particular to have a property or for two or
more particulars to stand in a certain relation to one another. Historically;
most of the accounts proposed may be said to be Relational accounts.
Confining ourselves to the case of properties, because this is the simplest
case, Relational accounts are those which analyze the situation where a
has the property F as a matter of a's having some relation, R, to some
entity ~. The nature of the relation and the nature of the entity to which
a is related differ in different Relational accounts.
Each Relational account is exposed to one or more arguments which
attempt to show that that account is involved in a vMous infinite regress.
In this paper I attempt both to bring out resemblances and differences
between these arguments and to assess their worth.

I. Classification oi relational analyses

Relational analyses may be subdivided into Nominalist and Realist
theories. (Whether all Nominalisms and Realisms are Relational is a
further question. It may be that all Nominalist theories are Relational.)
What makes a theory a Nominalist one is acceptance of the doctrine
that everything there is is a particular. I distinguish four main varieties
of Nominalism which I call Predicate Nominalism, Concept Nominalism,
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism, with the proviso that
the doctrine held by an actual Nominalist may involve some mixture of
these views.
nominalismo For the Predicate Nominalist, a's having the property F is analyzed as:
de predicado
a falls under the predicate "F"
The predicate "F" is a linguistic entity, a certain sort of expression. (But
the criterion of identity for such predicates I take to be a semantic one:
synonymy.) This relation of falling under (its converse being applying to
or being true oJ) is not at all a perspicuous relation: it stands in great

I should like to thank Susan Haack, Keith Campbell and Tom Rose for helpful
comments.
191
 192 Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals
need of philosophical elucidation. But there obviously is such a relation,
and so it can legitimately be used as a primitive in the Predicate
Nominalist's analysis.
nominalismo de
conceito
For the Concept Nominalist, a's having the property F is analyzed as:
a falls under the concept of F
The concept of F is a mental entity, a certain sort of thing in men's
minds. This relation of falling under (its converse being applying to)
is similar to, but systematically different from, the relation holding
between a and the predicate "F'. Concepts are a rather more obscure
entity than predicates, but all but the most extreme Behaviourist accepts
that there are such things. If there is a concept of F, it will stand in
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certain philosophically obscure, but quite clearly existent, relationships to

things which are F.
For the Class Nominalist, a's having the property F is analyzed as:
a is a member of the class of F's
There will be such a thing as the class of F's although, of course, a
m a y be its only member. The relation of a to the class of F's is the
relation of class-membership.
Objection may be taken to the phrase 'Class Nominalism'. Goodman
and Quine would say that once classes are introduced, Nominalism is
abandoned. But I think that their use of the term 'Nominalism' is idio-
syncratic. It does not matter that classes ar~"abstract entities', whatever
that vague phrase may mean. The Class Nominalist will admit nothing
more than classes of particulars, and classes of particulars, even if
'abstract', are themselves particulars. (See Section III of this paper.)
However, 'Class Nominalism' is no more than a label, and little hangs
on the retention of the label.
For the Resemblance Nominalist, a's having the property F is analyzed
as;
a resembles each member of a certain set of paradigm particulars
in an appropriate way
It is dearly true that, if a has the property F, a will resemble paradigm
instances of F in some degree. Using rather complicated constructions,
whose detail differs in different versions z, the Resemblance theorist
tries to use this resemblance to mark off the things that are F's from all
other things. Of all Relational theories, Resemblance Nominalism involves
the minimum of theft and the maximum of honest toil, even if the toil
is, as I think, largely misplaced. The necessity for this toil is the reason
for using the vague phrase 'in an appropriate way'. No precise version of
Resemblance Nominalism can be brief.
So much for Relational theories which are Nominalist. Relational
theories which are Realist may be covered by a single formula, a's having
the property F is analyzed as:

1 See, for instance, H. H. Price: Thinking and Experience (1953) Ch. 1.

 D. M. Armstrong 193
a 'participates' in the universal F
There is, of course, a notorious crux as to the nature of this relation
between a and the universal F. I will use Plato's term 'participation',
but intend no commitment to any particular view of the nature of partici-
pation. Again, although predicates, concepts, classes and resemblances,
upon which the different species of Nominalist rely, are reasonably
familiar entities, it is a controversial question whether there are such
things as universals. The universal F and the relation of participation
may plausibly be thought to be theoretical or postulated entities in a
way which the entities employed in Nominalist analyses are not. This
may be one reason why Nominalism has appealed to Empiricists, who
have a distrust of postulated entities. (We need not discuss here whether
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the distrust is healthy or unhealthy.)

This concludes my sketch of the five major types of Relational solution
to the Problem of Universals. Each solution faces numerous difficulties
and most of these difficulties seem to me to be insuperable. But in this
paper I discuss only one set of difficulties: those which seek to show
that each of these analyses is involved in one or more vicious infinite
regresses.

II. Predicate Nominalism and two infinite regresses

Predicate Nominalism may be attacked by two regress arguments, One
argument concentrates on the predicate, the other on the relation which
holds between the particular and the predicate. In order to have names
which will also apply to similar arguments against other Relational
analyses, the first will be called the Object regress, the second the Relation
regress.
The Object regress is developed in the following way. This analysis
of a's being F appeals to the predicate 'F'. It is clear, however, that this
predicate must be a type not a token. For the Predicate Nominalist, a is
F if, and only if, a falls under the right sort oJ predicate. But if this is so,
the same sort of problem which the predicate was introduced to solve is
reproduced in the predicate itself. What account can be given of the o
fact that a predicate-token is of the type 'F'? All things that exist are type não
é entidade
particulars, says the Nominalist, but a type is not a particular. It seems concreta
that to be consistent the Predicate Nominalist must analyze this situation
as a matter of the token falling under another predicate: ' ( ' F ' ) ' . But this
new predicate is also a type, so it must be treated in the same way, and predicado
so ad infinitum. The regress is vicious. And even were it not vicious it edoopredicado
predicado

would be ontologically uneconomical. Better to have stayed with the

se o regresso primitive type F than invoke the types 'F', ' ( ' F ' ) ' . . . etc.
não é vicioso, ele
não é econômico I think it is clear that the regress is vicious. The immediate object
was to give an account of what it is for a thing to be of the type F. The
answer is given in terms of a further type: the type 'F': But the general
object was to give a reductive account of all types. So, i f the Predicate
 194 Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals

Nominalist can never get rid of types of some sort from the right-hand
side of his analyses, then his account is radically defective: But even if
this is wrong and the regress is not vicious, it is uneconomical. The
Predicate Nominalist gets rid of the property F at the cost of an infinite
series of predicates.
So much for the Object regress. Now for the Relation regress. 'a is F'
is analyzed as 'a falls under the predicate 'F'.' Falling under, however, is
a certain sort of relation exemplified by an indefinite number of ordered
pairs consisting of a particular and a predicate. It too is a type as
opposed to a token. So, in default of admitting at least one type of relation
which is not analyzed in terms of predicates, the Predicate Nominalist F

must give an account of this falling under. He must say that it is a matter
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of the ordered pair a and 'F' falling under the two-place predicate a
'falling under'. The new predicate will lead to a further Object regress,
but this we may ignore. Our interest is in the relation of falling under
which has reappeared in the analysis. Is it the old relation which held
between a and 'F', or is it a new, second-order, falling under?
If it is a different or second-order falling under, then, since it is also
a type of relation, an account will have to be given of this n e w t y p e in
terms of a new predicate plus third-order falling under. If the Object
regress was vicious, then this regress is vicious too.
The alternative is to say that the ordered pair a and 'F' fall under
'falling under' in just the same sense that a falls under 'F'. But it does not
seem that this saves the situation either. Falling under remains a type
of relation and so ' < a , ' F ' > falls under 'Falling under',' must be expanded
to ' < < a , ' F ' > , 'falling under'> falls under !falling under'.' But this
expansion still involves using the unanalyzed type-notion of falling under,
and so itself requires expansion ad infinitum. The Predicate Nominalist
can never get rid of the notion of falling under from his analysis.
So it seems that both Object and Relation regress hold against Predicate
Nominalism.

III. Class Nominalism and two infinite regresses

The arguments against Concept Nominalism are not significantly different
from those against Predicate Nominalism. So we may pass on to consider
the Class analysis.
Is there an Object regress in the ease of the Class analysis? For the
Class Nominalist a is F if, and only if, a is a member of the class of F's,
where the right-hand side is taken to be an analysis of the left. The
Object in question will therefore be the class of F's. Now, it might be said,
the class of F's is a certain sort of thing, different from other sorts of
thing. It is therefore a type. So, if the analysis is not to be circular, a
class-account must be given of the class of F's. It must therefore be
treated as a member of that unit-class whose sole member is the class of
F's. A similar account must be given of the unit-class and so without
rest ad inllnitum.
 D. M. Armstrong 195
This argument seems invalid. The class of F's, say the class of white
things or the class of tigers, is not a type in the way that the predicate
'F' in the Predicate Nominalist's analysis is a type. It is a necessary con-
dition for a type that it shall be at least logically possible that there be
more than one token of the same type. But there cannot be more than
one class of all the white things or all the tigers. So these classes are not
types. They are in fact particulars, even if 'abstract' particulars. Hence
'the class of F's' is a term in which the class analysis can rest. Whatever
difficulties the Class analysis is involved in, it is not involved in an Object
regress.
The Relation regress is another matter. It is clear that class-membership
is a type of relation, so in consistency a Class-analysis must be sought
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for it. a is a member of the class of F's must therefore be analyzed by

saying that the ordered pair consisting of a and the class of F's is a
member of the class of all those ordered pairs whose first member is an
object said to have a property and whose second member is the class
of things said to have that same property. This analysis again appeals to
the notion of class-membership. T h i s relation is either different from
first-order class-membership or it is the same. If it is different, there is an
infinite regress of higher-order class-membership relations always with one
type of relation unanalyzed. If the relation is the same, then the usual
class-analysis must still be given of this relationship, an analysis which
must always appeal to the very notion of class-membership which we are
supposed to be analyzing.
So the Relation regress holds against Class Nominalism, although the
Object regress does not.

IV. Resemblance Nominalism and two infinite regresses

The Resemblance analysis faces an incipient Object regress. According
to this view, a has the property F if, and only if, a suitably resembles each
member of a set of paradigm objects. But what account, then, is to be
given of the F-ness of the paradigm objects? Must they not resemble
further paradigms and so ad infinitum?
But I think that this regress can be avoided. What we need are alter-
native sets of paradigm objects, The F-hess of a paradigm object is then
provided for by its suitable resemblance to each member of some other
class of paradigm objects. (We take advantage of the necessary symmetry
of the resemblance relation, as contrasted with the relation between parti-
cular and predicate, and between particular and class.) Other objects
outside the set of paradigm sets gain their F-ness by suitable resemblance
to each member of a paradigm set, This solution has the disadvantage that
the F-ness of a paradigm F seems te become something different from the
F-ness of a non-paradigm F. But perhaps this can be accepted. The
standard metre is a metre long, but not quite in the same sense that
other things are a metre long. It is true also that there are other problems
 196 Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals

about the paradigms which perhaps the Resemblance analysis cannot

solve. But it may be able to defeat the Object regress.
Once again, however, the Relation regress seems fatal. The argument
is well-known because it was advanced against the Resemblance analysis
by Russell in The Problems of Philosophy. H e wrote:
If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we
shall choose some particular patch of white or some particular
triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it has the
right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the
resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are
many white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs
of particular white things; and this is the characteristic of a universal.
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It will be useless to say that there is a different resemblance to each

pair, for then we will have to say that the resemblances resemble
each other, and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance
as a universal. (pp. 150-1)
Russell's argument against the Resemblance analysis is distinct from
his argument for universals. (His dichotomy: either attempt a Resem-
blance analysis or admit objective universals, is too simple.) The resem-
blance which holds between each individual white thing and the paradigm,
is a type of relation. It is therefore one of the sorts of entity of which the
Resemblance theory is committed to giving a reductive analysis. Each
resemblance-situation must therefore be said to have a suitable resem-
blance to some paradigm of resemblance. But this new resemblance of
resemblance-situations to the resemblance-paradigm is itself a type of
situation, and so the Resemblance analysis can never be completed. As
in the Relation regress against Predicate and Class Nominalism, it
matters not whether this new resemblance be treated as a different sort
from, or else as identical with, the original resemblance.
It has frequently been urged against Russell's argument that the infinite
regress it demonstrates is not vicious. 2 It simply shows us that there is
an ascending infinite h e i r a r c h y of resemblance-relations. Even if this
reply were correct, the Resemblance analysis would have been convicted
of gross lack of economy. But the reply seems not correct. At each step
in the analysis there is something left unanalyzed which, since the some-
thing left is a type, requires a Resemblance analysis. Successive applications
of the analysis never get rid of this residue. I think that the following is
a fair analogy. I have debts but no money in the bank. I write a cheque
to clear the debt. The cheque is challenged so I write another cheque to
cover the original cheque. I am prepared to do this indefinitely. My
procedure may postpone the evil day, but it never meets my debts.
So, as in the case of Class Nominalism, the Object regress appears to
fail against the Resemblance analysis, but the Relation regress succeeds.

-" For instance, Price, op. cit. pp. 23-6, and G. Kiing: Ontology and the Logistic
Analysis of Language (1963)13. 168.
 D. M. Armstrong 197
V. Platonic universals and the infinite regress
I come now to the last of the Relational analyses, which is a Realist
analysis, a's being F is accounted for by a's having the relation of
'participation' to the universal F or to the Form of F.
The Object regress appears to be completely blocked. The point of a
universal or Form is that it rolls up what is common to all objects
'having the same property' into a single, unique, ball. The peculiar nature
of whiteness is constituted by the universal, but if that nature is peculiar,
then there is no possibility of its being repeated: there cannot be 'many
tokens of that type'. And so the original problem of how many different
white things can nevertheless be white does not arise for the universal,
Whiteness.
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In passing, I take this to be the point of Plato's puzzling Third Bed

argument in the Republic (597). Plato says that there can only be one
Form of the Bed because, if there were two, a third Bed must appear
above the two, and this would be the Bed (better: bedness). This should
not be taken as an argument, but simply as an explanation of the essential
uniqueness of the Form. It is presented by Plato as an argument, but I
think that that was a mistake.
But the Relation regress is once again alive and well. To my know-
ledge, it was first presented by Ryle in his article on Plato's Parmenides
(Mind 48 (1939) p. 138). It seems to be exactly parallel to the argument
which Russell used against the Resemblance analysis and the Relation
regress used in this paper against Predicate and Class Nominalism.
a is F because it participates in the Form F. (It is a well-known, but
quite different, difficulty for the theory of Forms to explicate this relation
of 'participation' satisfactorily, Nothing in Ryle's regress depends upon
this other difficulty.) There are, however, many different situations where
an object participates in a Form. Participation is a type of situation.
So the question must arise what account we give of this type. Consistency
demands that we say that all the participation situations participate in
the Form of participation. This introduces further participation-situations.
If this second-order participation is a different type of relation from first-
order participation, then there will be an infinite regress of different Forms
of participation. But if second-order participation is the same as first-
order participation then we must analyze second-order participation
situations as involving participation in the original Form of participation.
But this yields further unanalyzed participation situations which the
theory is committed to analyzing?

In Philosophical Arguments (1961) pp. 19-25, John Passmore, following lohn

Anderson, produces a slightly different version of this argument. He takes the
relational property of participating in F which a and other particulars must be
supposed to have, and then argues that, in consistency, we must give an account
of this as a's participating in participation in F, and so on indefinitely. He also
notes that the same style of argument can be turned against other relational
solutions of the problem of universals (p. 23). I find this version a little less
 198 In]~nite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals

The Relation regress, then, appears to be an extremely powerful

argument. It refutes all Relational solutions to the Problem of Universals.
By contrast, the Object regress catches only Predicate (and Concept)
Nominalism. But the point I should chiefly like to insist upon is that it
seems very difficult to take a selective attitude to the Relation regress.
You cannot, for instance, consistently use it against a Resemblance theory
without turning it against the theory of Forms. Yet when Russell wrote
The Problems of Philosophy he accepted the theory of Forms.

VI. The Third M a n

But what of the most famous regress argument of them all: the
argument known to Aristotle as the Third Man? This argument against
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the theory of Forms is distinct from the Object or the Relation regress.
Particular F's are all F's because each of them participates in the Form
of F, which is distinct from the particulars. But, it is then urged, the
Form of F is also an F. In order to explain on the same principles what
it has in common with the particular F's it will be necessary to postulate a
second Form F t which is distinct from the particulars and the original
Form F. There is no end to this series.
It is most unfortunate that, historically, this argument is the infinite
regress argument brought against the theory of Forms. Its weakness has
served to draw attention away from the far more powerful Relation
regress. Plato and Aristotle p u t us on the wrong track here.
For it is well-known that, if our concern is simply with the problem
of universals, there is no reason to accept at least one of the assumptions
on which the Third Man rests: the 'Self-predication assumption' that the
Form of F is an F. Why should we assume that whiteness is a white thing
or that being a horse is an individual horse? These assumptions are very
peculiar. It seems that they should not be made. But then the Third
Man eoIlapses.
It is true that for Plato the Forms were not simply universals but
were at the same time ideal standards or paradigms which particulars
approximated to. It is therefore very difficult for him to reject the Self-
Predication assumption. The ideal X must surely be an X. So the Third
Man is a difficulty for Plato, although it is not a difficulty for Platonic
Realism.
At this point it is interesting to l o o k at the alternative Relational
analyses, that is, the Nominalist ones. In the case of Predicate Nominalism
the Third Man is not available because, in general at least, the predicate
'F' is not an instance of F. Nor, in general, will the concept of F be an F
or the class of F's be an F. In the case of homeomerous or 'smooth'
properties such as whiteness, it might seem plausible to say that the class
of white things is a great white thing, a scattered white thing and perhaps

clear, because it may be questioned whether participation in F is a genuine

universal.
 D. M. Armstrong 199
an infinite white thing, but still a white thing. But the Class Nominalist,
at least, will maintain that this confuses classes with aggregates. Ordinary
white things are parts of the great white thing but they are not members
of it. The great white thing, he will say, is just one more member of the
class of white things.
In t h e case of the Resemblance analysis the paradigms of F are them-
selves particulars of the type F. Here, the Self-predication assumption is
correct. But if we allow multiple paradigms, with the various sets of
paradigms taking in each other's washing, that is, resembling each other,
then the threatened Third Man regress can come round on its own tail.

VII. The Restricted Third Man

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So the Third Man is not only a flop in the case of the theory of Forms or
Universals, it is a flop against all the Relational analyses. Nevertheless,
there does Seem to be a special case of the Third Man which does create
more difficulty. I will call it the 'Restricted Third Man'.
Consider the Forms. Each of them is its own unique self. But they do
have something in common. They are different tokens of the one type.
They are all Forms. Formhood is a one which runs through this many.
So must there not be a Form of Formhood? By participating in this Form,
the lower-order Forms have the character of Forms. (If the supporter
of Forms refuses to make this move, then he can be challenged to say
why we are forced to make it in the case of ordinary particulars which
all have a common property.) Now while, in general, the Form of F
will not be an F , the Form of Formhood will, of course, be a Form.
The Self-predication assumption must hold for this special case.
The regress can now be developed. Consider the collection of first-
order Forms plus the Form of Forms: Does not this expanded collection
have something in common? The different tokens are all of the same
type. In consistency, therefore, they must all be said to participate in a
third-order Form of Formhood. The regress then continues.
However, the ordinary Third Man does not simply depend upon the
Self-predication assumption. It also depends upon a 'Non-Identity
assumption' that F 1 is distinct from the original form F. It may therefore
be suggested that, in the restricted case, the agreement in type between
the. first-order Forms and the Form of Formhood can be explained
without recourse to: a third-order Form. The first-order Forms all partici-
pate in the (second-order) Form of Formhood. But the Form of Form-
hood simply participates in itself. The regress will then go no. further.
Against this attempt to block the regress a version of Russell's paradox
may be advanced. If some Forms have the property of participating in
themselves, others, presumably, have the property of not participating in
themselves. This in turn demands a Form of being a Form not partici-
pating in itself. B u t if this Form is supposed not to participate in itself, then
it participates in itself, yet if it is supposed to participate in itself, then it
does not participate in itself.
 200 Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem ol Universals
I do not know how strong this counter-argument is, however, because
I think it could be argued that there are no negative Forms, as this Form
of being a Form not participating in itself would appear to be. At least,
however, it is clear that the Restricted Third Man is an argument with
more bite than the ordinary, classical, Third Man.
Furthermore, now that we are alerted to the parallelism so frequently
exhibited by infinite regress arguments against the different Relational
theories, we shall naturally look to see whether a special case of the
Third Man can be constructed in the case of the four Nominalist analyses.
The predicate 'F' is not in general an F. But consider the set of pre-
dicates 'F', 'G' . . . etc. Each of them is a predicate and the Predicate
Nominalist will analyze this fact by saying that each of them falls under
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the predicate 'predicate'. Unlike ordinary predicates, 'predicate' is an

instance of the objects to which it applies.
Consider, now, the set of first-order predicates plus the predicate
'predicate'. The members of the augmented set are all tokens of the same
type. Must they not fall under the higher-order predicate 'predicate?, and
so on indefinitely? The alternative will be to argue that 'F', 'G' etc. fall
under 'predicate', but 'predicate' falls under itself.
In this latter case, however, Russell's paradox seems unavoidable.
Since the predicate 'predicate' fails under itself, there is a predicate
'predicate falling under itself'. Equally, there must be a predicate 'pre-
dicate not falling under itself', under which most: predicates fall. But this
predicate can neither fall under itself nor can it not fall under itself.
One natural moral to draw would be that the assumption that the predicate
'predicate' falls under itself is in some way incoherent. If so, how is the
Third Man infinite regress to be stopped in this special ease?
Whatever holds for Predicate Nominalism will hold for Concept
Nominalism also, mutatis mutandis.
The situation seems the same for Class Nominalism. The class of F's
will not in general be a class. But any class of classes will be a class.
Consider now the situation where the first-order classes are augmented
by this class of classes. Each member of this enlarged class appears to be
a different token of a common type: for each of them is a class. We must
therefore give an account of this common nature in terms of membership
of a further class, and s o ad infinitum. The regress can be stopped if
it can be argued that the 'further' class is really the class of the first-order
classes all over again. The class-character of this class would be explained
by saying that it is a member of itself.
But if it is allowed that it is true that a class is a member of itself,
then it must equally be allowed that it is sometimes true that a class is
not a member of itself. Russell's paradox follows. So it may be that the
Third Man regress cannot be stopped for this restricted case. 4

4 Susan I-Iaack has pointed out to me that a Class Nominalist who takes this line
also faces Cantor's paradox.
 D. M. Armstrong 201
In the case of the Resemblance analysis, however, there is no point in
trying to formulate a Restricted Third Man argument. For the Self-
predication assumption is satisfied even in the unrestricted cases. We have
already argued, however, that no infinite regress is involved.

VIII. Conclusion
The Relation regress appears applicable to all Relational analyses of what
it is for a thing to have a property. It can be presented in a general way.
If 'Fa' is analyzed as ' a R ~ ; where q,p is a suitable entity such as 'F',
the concept of F, the class of F's, a set of paradigm instances of F or the
Form of F, and R is the appropriate relation such as falling under, class
membership, resemblance or 'participation', then the following difficulty
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arises.
We require an account of what it is for a and ~F to have a certain
sort of relation, R. We require an account of the type R. The account
must take the form of saying that the ordered pair <a, ~p> have R to q~e.
If this new R is a different type of relation from the original R, that is, if
it is R 1, then instances of R 1 will require to have R 1~ to ~RI and the
regress of relations can never be completed. But if it is the original relation
R, then ' < a , Cv> R ~ ' expands to ' < < a , ~F>, ~ > R ~ ' and so
on indefinitely without ever getting rid of the relation-type R. Russell
produced this regress against Resemblance Nominalism, Ryle against
Platonic Realism. If the argument is sound, no Relational solution to
the Problem of Universals can be correct.
The Object regress seems to hold also, but only against Predicate and
Concept Nominalism.
The most famous argument of them all, the Third Man, is unsound.
Worse, it has given infinite regress arguments against Relational solutions
to the Problem of Universals a bad reputation.
A special case of the Third Man, the Restricted Third Man, may have
some bite against all Relational analyses with the exception of Resem-
blance Nominalism.

University of Sydney Received July 1974