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3. Universals
4. Natural classes of tropes
a. The Natural Class theory and the Resemblance theory do not admit properties and
relations at the ground floor of their analyses.
They face the problem of giving an account of our easy and natural talk about
the properties and relations of things, yet using in the account only
nonuniversals.
The Realist admits properties and relations but holds that they are universals.
This suggests an interesting nominalist compromise.
o Admit properties and relations, but make them into
particulars.
Of two billiard balls, let each have its own color,
shade, mass, and so forth. If the balls are in contact
on the table, and two others are at the other end of
the table, let each pair have its own relations of
adjacency.
Following the U.S. philosopher, Donald C. Williams, we can call
properties and relations conceived of as particulars tropes.
This stand does not solve the Problem of Universals, but it does allow the
problem to be posed anew.
Consider all the red things. On the trope theory the redness of each
thing is a distinct trope. But then we have to face the question, Why
do we say that all red tropes have the same color? The identity is not
strict identity. So what unifies the class of all rednesses?
o Three answers stand out once again:
1. The natural class answer: The individual rednesses
form a closely unified natural class and that is all that
can be said.
This nominalist view was put forward by G.
F. Stout. He said that the class of the
rednesses have a “distributive unity.” It is a
trope version of Quinton’s view that natural
classes are primitive. But we will se later
that the trope version is in many ways quite
a new game (and a superior one).
2. Resemblance classes of tropes answer: Another
way of uniting classes of tropes is to appeal, as a
primitive, to the relation of resemblance, but now
between tropes, not ordinary things: Individual
rednesses resemble each other to a greater or lesser
degree.
This form of Resemblance Nominalism was
upheld by Donald Williams. I am inclined to
think that it is the most plausible of all forms
of Nominalism. It is a very moderate form of
Nominalism, just as the Realism I will
defend later is a rather moderate form of
Realism
3. Tropes plus universals: Finally, one might seek to
unify the class of rednesses, say, in a realist manner.
Each particular redness, each trope, instantiates the
single universal.
This view has been held by some good
philosophers, for instance, the Oxford
philosopher J. Cook Wilson. It may even
have been Aristotle’s view. But I think it is
of less interest than the first five positions.
Once one has accepted universals, the tropes
seem to become redundant (or vice versa).
This
principle of method, which may be summed up by saying that
entities are not to be postulated without necessity, is known as
Occam's razor, after the medieval philosopher William of
Occam, although this formulation is not actually found in his
works. Philosophers will often be found appealing to the
principle, particularly philosophers with empiricist or
reductionist sympathies.
For this reason I will pay a certain amount of attention to
how economical or uneconomical various theories are. Other
things being equal, I shall account the more economical theory
the better theory. A final section in each chapter will be
addressed to giving a list of the fundamental entities and
principles required by the theory examined in that chapter.