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VC Networking Presentation - Why The Distribution of VCs Returns Follows A Power Law and Network Effects
VC Networking Presentation - Why The Distribution of VCs Returns Follows A Power Law and Network Effects
• Degree centrality
– Degree: # of ties they have (i.e. syndication relationship);
– Indegree: # of ties they receive (i.e., are invited to be syndicate members
by many lead VCs);
– Outdegree: # of ties an actor initiates (i.e., lead syndicates with many
other VC members).
• Closeness
– Weighting an actor’s ties to others by the importance of the actors he is
tied to;
• Betweenness
– The extent to which a VC may act as an intermediary by bringing together
VCs with complementary skills or investment opportunities that lack a
direct relationship between them.
Network Analysis Methodology – Mapping
Relationships
Sample and Data
• Fivefold contribution:
1. This is the first paper to examine the performance consequences of the
VC industry’s predominant choice of organizational form: networks.
Previous work focuses on describing the structure of syndication
networks (Bygrave (1988), Stuart and Sorensen (2001)) and motivating
the use of syndication (Lerner (1994a), Podolny (2001), Brander, Amit,
and Antweiler (2002)).
2. The findings shed light on the industrial organization of the VC market.
Like many financial markets, the VC market differs from the traditional
arm’s-length spot markets of classical microeconomics. The high network
returns documented suggest that enhancing one’s network position
should be an important strategic consideration for an incumbent VC,
while presenting a potential barrier to entry for new VCs. The results add
nuance to Hsu’s (2004) finding that portfolio companies are willing to pay
to be backed by brand-name VCs and suggest that there are real
performance consequences to the contractual differences illustrated in
Robinson and Stuart’s (2004) work on strategic alliances.
Conclusions (2)
• Fivefold contribution:
3. The findings have ramifications for institutional investors choosing which
VC funds to invest in, as better-networked VCs appear to perform better.
4. The analysis provides a deeper understanding of the possible drivers of
cross-sectional performance of VC funds, and points to the importance of
additional fundamentals beyond those previously documented in the
academic literature.
5. It provides preliminary evidence regarding the evolution of a VC firm’s
network position.
Discussion
• Some thoughts to be discussed
– Taking into account the nature of venture capital investing, in which more
than half of the companies fail and only small section of portfolio
companies appear to be great investments, enlarging your portfolio by
syndicating and networking with other professionals makes sense.
– What does it really mean that networks matter in VC industry? This theory
is not comparable to for example portfolio theory, meaning that just
adding contacts would automatically improve your performance. Are
networks a primary or a secondary matter? What you buy, what you pay
and how you exit are still the primary matters?
– What are the most important networks for a VC company? Are other VCs
the most important or is it actually institutional investors, banks,
entrepreneurs, target companies, portfolio companies, service providers
or what? Perhaps VC industry is an ecosystem of value-adding
stakeholders?