Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
∙ Philippine SC by CJ Concepcion (grave abuse of discretion + judicial review only) > US SC
Marbury v Madison)
(Judicial review only,
∙ What’s the reason behind grave abuse? Political question doctrine as used in Martial Law.
∙ Grave abuse – Sinon v CSC (See below)
∙ Judiciary is not allowed to give advisory opinions (see separation of powers)
o Advisory opinion does not fall on judicial review
o Declaratory relief – under judicial review (See Primer page 331)
∙ Advisory Opinion
Declaratory Relief
response to a legal issue posed in the abstract involves real parties with real
in advance of any actual case in which it may be conflicting legal interests
presented
binds no one final one and is forever binding on the
parties
judicial act not a judicial act
A. Possessor (Sec. 1)
Ð Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law
In Re Laureta
* What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trialtype" proceeding.
"Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en
banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated
in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the
Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case
because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present.
No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information
Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired.
B. Definition (Sec. 1)
Ð Settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
∙ No right to be violated because there is no legislation on it
Ð
Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
∙ Power of Ombudsman is not absolute (See Article 11)
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
Ð
No law passed undermining security of tenure (Sec. 2) – Dean Bau is not a believer because
he wants people want you to be as good as your last performance; too many judges do not give
good quality decision
ü Hold office during good behaviour until 70 or become incapacitated
*Dela Llana v. Alba (Abolition) What is involved in this case is
not the removal or
separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the
abolition of their offices.
Wellsettled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.
∙ If you remove an office, you shall retain the members as they have security of tenure.
(Reassign in same level of position)
∙ Can’t abolish unless done in good faith
B. Congressional Oversight
Ð Congressional power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts
o Cannot make another SC
o Cannot question decisions of SC
o RTC and MTC – can be naturalized born
*Malaga v. Penachos (PD 1818) The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
governmentowned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socioeconomic life of the nation. Second, the
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the exofficio Treasurer of the state
college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that
the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the
said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the
injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of
Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
*Phividec v. Velez (Arbitration)
Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, P.D. No. 242 is not
unconstitutional. It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts but only prescribes an
administrative procedure for the settlement of certain types of disputes between or among
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, so that they need not always repair to
the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and application of
statutes, contracts or agreements . The procedure is not much different, and no less desirable,
than the arbitration procedures provided in Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in
Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code). It is an alternative to, or a substitute for, traditional
litigation in court with the added advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and expense of
court proceedings. Or, as P.D. No. 242 itself explains, its purpose is "the elimination of needless
clogging of court dockets to prevent the waste of time and energies not only of the government
lawyers but also of the courts, and eliminates expenses incurred in the filing and prosecution of
judicial actions
." (p. 21, Rollo.)
The notion that an administrative procedure such as is provided in P.D. No. 242, for the
settlement of quarrels between two administrative offices, departments, agencies, or government
corporations, would "emasculate" the jurisdiction of courts, is erroneous. In fact, Section 1,
subpar. (a), Rule 20 of the Rules of Court makes a pre-trial mandatory so that the parties to a suit
may meet in conference to consider, among other matters, "the possibility of . . . a submission to
arbitration."
P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an administrative arbitration procedure for certain
disputes among offices, agencies and instrumentalities under the executive control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines. Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against
PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through the administrative channel, the judicial action
was premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on that
account.
Ð But Congress cannot deprive Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 (Sec. 2)
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of
its Members.
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Ð Fiscal Autonomy (Sec. 3)
Radiowealth v. Agregado (Teletalk)
* The distribution of powers is a
fundamental maxim of constitutional law and essential to the separation of the three branches of
government, separation which, though incomplete, is one of the chief characteristics of our
Constitution. This principle is too well known to require elucidation. It suffices to say that in
accordance with this principle the Supreme Court is independent of executive or legislative
control as the Executive and the Congress are of the judiciary.
But it is said that the court's independence is limited to the exercise of Judicial functions and
that purchase of property does not belongs to this category. Contrary to the respondents' theory,
the prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures against interference includes not
only the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice. So, we believe, it is within its power free from encroachment by the
Executive to acquire books and other office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient
transaction of its business. These implied, inherent, or incidental powers are as essential to the
existence of the court as the powers specifically granted. Without the power to provide itself with
appropriate instruments for the performance of its duties, the express powers with which the
Constitution endows it would become useless. The court could not maintain its independence
and dignity as the constitution intends if the executive personally or through subordinate officials
could determine for the court what it should or use in the discharge of its functions, and when
and how it should obtain them. The court's independence of the legislative branch with regard to
the acquisition of fixtures, supplies and equipment is bound up with and subject to its
dependence upon the Congress for appropriation. The interrelation between the court and the
Congress in this regard is not so easy to define. (Fortunately there is no conflict between the
legislature and the court to complicate the issues in this case.) But it is our considered opinion
that this court is supreme and independent of the executive in this sphere. In the requisition for
fixtures, equipment and supplies both the executive and judicial departments are on the same
footing. They derive their authority from the same source and represent the sovereignty in equal
degree. It stands to reason that the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the
Supreme Court in the choice of the instruments needed to carry on its functions than the court
has to dictate to the executive what, when and how to get his. No one denies the power of the
Auditor General to audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, expenditures of
funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government or the provinces or
municipalities thereof. (Section 2, Article XI, Constitution of the Philippines.) Neither does the
court claim exemption from the authority vested in the Auditor General by the Constitution to
examine, audit and settle all accounts of the government or to bring to the attention of the
proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant. (Section 3, Article XI, Constitution of the
Philippines.)
On the other hand, it can not be pretended that this authority is absolute. The constitutional
provisions herein cited themselves define the limits of the Auditor General's powers, and the
Constitution provides a remedy against his actions when they transcend those bounds. The
Auditor General's decisions in cases affecting an executive department, bureau, office or officer
are appealable to the President, and in those affecting the rights of private citizens to the
Supreme Court. The Auditor General's authority to audit disapprove this court's expenditures
has to limited to the conditions prescribed by the Constitution, or statute, if there be one, which
did not invade the court's independence. Executive and administrative orders and regulations
promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction under the law or the Constitution over the
court, can give no justification or validity to the Auditor General's decision. In the absence of
express and valid legislation, (and by valid legislation we mean one which does not
unreasonably infringe upon the legitimate prerogatives of the Supreme Court), the Auditor
General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the words of the
organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." Outside of these exceptions
his duty to approve the payments is mandatory; and even when the objection is that the
expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant, his decisions are not final.
* Bengzon v. Drilon (Pension) Facts: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the
Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were
vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for
retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of
the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
Issue: Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act
Held: The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,
therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for
this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid inexpedient
riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What was
done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.
Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the socalled pocketveto
power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to
communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof
automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rule corrects the Presidential practice under
the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It
also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the
President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.
The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
üappropriations not reduced below amount appropriated for the previous year
ü appropriations automatically and regularly released
Section 4.
1.
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
∙ Composition
o Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices
2.
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3.
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc
∙ May sit en banc or divisions of three, five or seven members
∙ Vacancy filled within 90 days from occurrence (Sec. 4)
What’s the quorum? For 15 justices, 8 justices is the quorum (50% +1).
Section 5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1.
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
ÐCases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls [Sec. 5(1)]
Ð
Petitions for certiorari (review of jurisdiction), prohibition, mandamus (temporary restraining
order) , quo warranto (show of authority warrant) and habeas corpus (produce the body)
ÐReview, on appeal or certiorari, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
∙ Constitutionality or validity of any treaty or law
∙ Legality of any tax
∙ Jurisdiction of lower court in issue
∙ Criminal case in which penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher
∙ Error or question of law involved (2)
ÐWrit of Habeas Data
– access to information; produce the data 347 of Primer
üRight to informational privacy
üPleading, practice and procedure in Courts
ü
Velasco v Reyes – SC showed fast lane in decision making; abuse of judicial power;
Marinduque case
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
∙ Cannot expand SC jurisdiction
∙ Question of law: Direct to SC
ü Admission to the practice of law
In the Cunanan
* "UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules."
it’s unconstitutional
ü The Integrated Bar – not judicial power anymore
ü Legal assistance to the underprivileged
4. Writ of Amparo – page 347 primer;
inherent power to suspend its own rules in particular
cases in order to do justice
(Lim v. CA)
Ð Must pertain to right to life, liberty and security
(Canlas2008)
Ð Not a substitute for appeal or certiorari and not interfere with these processes
(Tapuz2008)
2.
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3.
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
∙
Assign temporarily judges to other stations, such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of judge concerned (3)
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
∙ Order a change of venue to avoid a miscarriage of justice
*Jalosjos, Misuari and Ecleo
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights (5)
§Promulgate rules concerning
o Protection and enforcement of Constitutional rights
Issues
Ð Standing (locus standi)
Ð Elements:
● petitioner must have suffered injury in fact which can be legal, economic, or environmental
● injury must be traceable to the governmental act challenged
● injury must be redressable by the remedy being sought by petitioner
Ð Personal and substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act
ü Exceptions are: when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a
governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds
Ð Ripeness – ready for adjudication
Requisites for judicial review: Actual and ripe
Ð Moot and Academic – actual case falls moot; painting (can’t get it anymore)
*Marcos v. Manglapus PRINCIPLE: The free use of the political question
doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional
difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequence or a fear that it was
extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down
an exercise of authoritarian power. The constitution was accordingly amended. We are now
precluded by its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a
convenient resort to the political question doctrine.
*Daza v. Singson The authority of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must
be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from
one political party to another.
*Estrada v. Arroyo The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review
the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both
Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following
Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an
issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x
branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
*Liang v. People (DFA) PRINCIPLE: The immunity granted to officers and staff
of the
ABD was not absolute but limited to acts performed in an
official capacity and could not cover the commission of a
crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of the
official duty
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
∙ Appoint officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with Civil Service Law (6)
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
ÐAdministrative supervision over all courts (Sec. 6)
*Maceda /Judge Caoibis (only SC) this Court ruled that an administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular
where a judicial remedy exists and is available and if subsequent developments prove the
judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.
∙ When the judge acts in good faith, he cannot be liable.
Meceda v. Vasquez
■ PRINCIPLE: It is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnel’s compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof.
○ Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman
■ involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises
over a piece of office furniture
■ PRINCIPLE: Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman cannot dictate, and bind the court, to its findings that a case before it does or does
not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned.
*People v. Gacott (Dismissal En Banc) Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon
and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand
would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for
the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters
pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the
Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members. 10
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a
thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only
when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.
∙ SC said that if the case is not as importmant, pls pls pls don’t raise it to En Banc to avoid
congestion.
Other Requisites for Judicial Review
○ People v. Vera
■ GENERAL RULE: The question of constitutionality must be raised by the pleadings, ordinarily
it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.
■
EXCEPTION: Courts, in the exercise of its discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting constitutionality of a statute should be presented
Section 7. (Read it as is according to RC)
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court
unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be
at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower
court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
2.
The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may
be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
3.
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
B. Qualifications (Sec. 7)
ÐNaturalborn citizen
Ð40
Ð15 years a judge or in the practice of law
ÐProven competence, integrity, probity and independence
ÐTeaching law is not regarded as a profession because it was deliberated
Heirarchy of Courts
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
Section 8.
1.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
ÐUnder the supervision of the Supreme Court
A. Composition
ÐChief Justice as ex officio chairman
ÐSecretary of Justice (ex officio)
ÐRepresentative of Congress (ex officio)
ÐRepresentative of the IBP
ÐProfessor of law
ÐRetired member of the Supreme Court
ÐRepresentative of private sector
ÐClerk of Court as ex officio secretary
B. Term
Ð4 years with consent of Commission on Appointments
C. Perks
Ð
Regular members shall receive such emoluments as determined by the Supreme
Court
D. Function
ÐRecommending appointees to the Judiciary
ÐSuch other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign
2.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
C. Appointment
ÐBy the President
ÐFrom a list prepared by the JBC of at least 3 names
ÐNo CoA confirmation necessary (Sec. 9)
ÐVacancy filled within 90 days from occurrence (Sec. 4)
3.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall
keep a record of its proceedings.
4.
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined
by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
∙ emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court
5.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
ÐNo CoA confirmation necessary (Sec. 9)
Vargas v Rillaroza
PRINCIPLE: There can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices required by Section 4 of Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution to compose the SC are
regular members of the Court indeed, a temporary member thereof would be a misnomer,
implying a position not contemplated by the Constitution .
Ð Salary fixed by law and cannot be decreased (Sec. 10)
*Nitafan v. Commissioner (w/Tax) The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to
the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of nondiminution´ of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and
judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in
government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees. The true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to make the salaries of
the members of the Judiciary taxable.
∙ Non taxable salaries
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon.
D. Removal
Ð Impeachment (Art. 11)
Cases decided En Banc
Ð Constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement or law
*Marbury v. Madison –
judicial review
Ð All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard En Banc
Ð Power to discipline judges or order their dismissal (Sec. 11)
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative function.
C. Separation of Powers
Ð Justices/Judges cannot be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or
administrative functions (Sec. 12)
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in
the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the
rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct &
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.
IV. OTHER COURTS
A. Coverage
Ð Members of lower collegiate courts (CA, CTA)
Ð Sandiganbyan functions as trial court and acts as lower collegiate courts
Ð Lower courts (RTC, MTC, MTC of City)
B. Qualifications
Ð Natural born citizen or not? For RTC and below– citizen only
Ð Member of Philippine Bar
Ð Congress to prescribe other qualifications
Ð Proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence
C. Appointment
Ð By the President
Ð From list prepared by the JBC (supervised by SC) of at least 3 names
Ð President to issue appointments within 90 days from the submission of list
Art 7 Sec 15; 2 months immediately before the next president; his was 70+ days
Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the decision
en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case the case assigned to a
Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served
upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower
collegiate court.
F. Cases decided in Division
Ð
Decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of Members who actually took part in
the deliberations but in no case without the concurrence of at least three Members
Ð When required number is not obtained in Division, the case to be decided En Banc
*
Fortich v. Corona (cases decided and matters resolved)
*
People v. Ebio
Ð
no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court En Banc or in Division may be modified
or reversed except by the Court En Banc
Ð a decision by a Division is a decision of the entire Court
*Firestone Ceramics v. CA (Referral to En Banc)
∙ Decisions of Divisions are final and not appealable, same weight as En Banc; except when
you did not reach the quorum of the division
H. Rules
Ð
Conclusion in any case shall be reached in consultation before case is assigned to a Member
for writing of opinion
Ð
Certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice attached to the record of the case and
served upon the parties
Ð Member who took no part, dissented or abstained from a decision must state reason
Ð Same requirements observed by all lower collegiate courts (Sec. 13)
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
D. General Rules
Ð
Any decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
(Sec. 14)
ü Minute resolution dismissing a petition provided a legal basis is provided
(Solid Homes v. Laserna2008) The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based," does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals
. In Yao v. Court of Appeals, this Court has sanctioned the use of "memorandum
decisions," a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the
provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality,
convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court likewise declared that "memorandum
decisions" comply with the constitutional mandate. In Permskul,31 this Court laid down the
conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, to wit:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper
examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed
statement should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also
understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII,
Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used
lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity
that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main
accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The
memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection
cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.
xxxx
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both
as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will
summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the
flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience. It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the
case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article
VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the
judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of
executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under
Section 14, Article VIII. However, it bears observation that while decisions of the Office of the
President need not comply with the constitutional requirement imposed on courts under Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Rules of Court may still find application, although
suppletory only in character and apply only whenever practicable and convenient. There is no
mandate that requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.
ü does not apply to administrative cases
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court
in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam
decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the
Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not
required.
x no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore (Sec. 14)
Period to Decide Cases (SEC. 15)
Section 15.
1.
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twentyfour months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.
All cases or matters filed after effectivity of Constitution must be decided or
resolved from date of submission (1)
∙ SC 24 months
∙ lower collegiate courts 12 months
∙ lower courts 3 months
2.
A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
∙ Case or matter deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon filing of last pleading, brief
or memorandum (2)
3.
Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
∙ Upon expiration of corresponding period, certification by Chief Justice or presiding judge
shall state why decision or resolution not rendered and attached to the record (3)
4.
Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
Responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the
case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
∙ Despite expiration of period, the court, without prejudice to responsibility incurred, shall
decide the case without further delay (4)
Ð
Submit annual report on operations and activities of Judiciary to President and
Congress within 30 days from opening of regular session (Sec. 16)
ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Scope:
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit (Sec. 1)
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of
his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
General Prohibitions (Sec. 2)
§ Not hold any other office or employment during tenure
§ Not engage in the practice of any profession
§
Not engage in the active management or control of any business which may be affected by
the functions of his office
§ Not financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any Government contract, franchise or
privilege
Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall
not be decreased during their tenure.
General Characteristics
§ Independent
Salary fixed by law and not decreased during tenure (Sec. 3)
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.
General Powers
§ Appoint officials and employees in accordance with law (Sec. 4)
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
§ Fiscal autonomy
Appropriations automatically and regularly released (Sec. 5)
* (CSC v DBM (2005) – “no report, no release policy” /
appropriations may be reduced) Issue: is the no report, no release policy validly enforceable
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy?
Principle: The
no report, no release policy (unconstitutional) cannot be enforced against offices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article 9(A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
Automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petition, a constitutional commission
which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should be construed to mean that no condition to fund
releases to it may be imposed. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the even of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place [CSC] and the
other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted
the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
Funds of entities vest with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a
shortfall in revenues notwithstanding.
* Commission of Human Right does not enjoy fiscal autonomy
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights.
§ Promulgate rules concerning pleadings and practice (Sec. 6)
Not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
*Aruelo v. CA (conflict with Rules of Court) I ssue: conflict with rules of court
Principle: Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the SC. An election protest does not merely
concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the
candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For this
reason, it is a wellestablished principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally
construed to the end that the popular will, expressed in the election, will not, by purely technical
reasons, be defeated.
∙ Rules of COMELEC prevails; as long as you’re within the scope of the commission, the
rules of the commissions prevail
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
§ Decide cases (Sec. 7)
by a majority vote of all its Members
*Cua v. Comelec (21/321) Issue: 21/321 votes
Principle: Court holds that the 21 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision
under Article 9A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to
affirm the First Division constituted majority of the 5 members who deliberated and voted
thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited decisions was a valid act
that entitles him now to assume his seat in the HOR.
∙ En Banc happens only when there is an appeal
as a body and not as individuals
*Orocio v. COA;
Isssue: not even a commission’s legal counsel may make a
decision for the commission
Principle: The COA, both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is a collegial body. It must
resolve cases presented to it as such its general counsel cannot act for the commission for he
is not even a commissioner thereof. He can only offer legal advice or render an opinion in order
to aid the COA in the resolution of a case or a legal question.
Mison v. COA Issue: no individual member may make a decision for the Commission, much
less may cases be decided by subordinates of the commission
Principle: …the Espiritu decision by the Acting COA Chairman was inconsequental. Ratification
cannot validate an act void ab initio because done absolutely without authority, The act has to
be done anew by the person or entity duly endowed with authority to do so.
within 60 days from date of submission (upon filing of last pleading, brief or memorandum
required by the Rules)
*Mateo v. CA Issue: decisions appealable to the SC
Principle: For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties. One of the indispensable elements in order for a tenancy
agreement to take hold over a dispute is that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. It must be noted that the petitioners failed to adequately prove ownership of
the land. They merely showed tax declarations. As against a transfer certificate of title, tax
declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs of ownership. Hence, it is the MeTC that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter there being no proof of tenancy relationship. ** [not really
sure, I read it over and over again and I couldn’t really find the principle. :\]
∙ Certiorari to the Supreme Court only after
ü re consideration (i.e., decisions of Commission En Banc)
*
Reyes v. RTC Issue: regarding reconsiderations of COMELEC decisions
Principle: It is now settled that in provding that in decision, orders and rulings of COMELEC
“may be brought to the SC on certiorari” the Constitution in its Article 9, A, Section 7, means the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1. Since a basic condition for bringing
such action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it follow that petitioner’s
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is
fatal to his present action. Also, provisions of the Constitution state that all election cases,
including preproclamation, controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division.
Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc,
that, in accordance with Article 9, A, Section 7, “may be brought to the SC on certiorari.”
*ABSCBN v. Comelec Issue: w/n COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining
ABSCBN from conducting exit polls?
Principle: The absolute ban by the COMELEC cannot be justified. It does not leave open any
alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through the exit
polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the
COMELEC end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by
exit surveys. The court holds that the assailed minute resolution no. 981419 issued by the
COMELEC en banc on April 21, 1998 is nullified and set aside.
ü grave abuse of discretion *Reyes v. COA)
(
o Issue: grave abuse of discretion
o Principle: Article 9A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of
rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the SC on certiorari by the aggrieved
party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgement or final order of the
Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was fied on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the
Commission on Audit to this court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided
by the 1987 Constitution. The judgements and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this court entertain a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the SC under Rule
44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, rulling or decision of
the COA.
(
ü exercise of quasi judicial power *Garces v. CA)
o Issue: exercise of quasijudicial power
o Principle: Section 7, Article 9A of the Constitution is inapplicable as there was no case or
matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC’s resolution that
triggered this controversy. The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC (it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is
that the decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the SC on certiorari
under Section 7, Article 9A are those relation to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasijudicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.
retirement of Commissioner before promulgation
*Ambil v. Comelec Issue: retirement of Commission before promulgation
o Principle: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and
not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final
decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much
more could he be the ponente of the resolution of the resolution or decision. The resolution or
decision of the devision must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from office but
when he vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been promulgated, his
vote was automatically invalidated. Before that resolution or decision is so signed and
promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision to speak of.
*Dumayas v. Comelec – Issue: in view of retirement of commissioners Gorospe and Guiani
before the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on March 2, 2000, should said
resolution be deemed null and void for being violative of Article 9A Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution?
o Principle: A decision becomes binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is
promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his
vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled.
Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as
withdrawn for the reason that their retirement preceded the resolutions promulgation. The effect
of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and only
the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy. However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect
the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaing the
decision a nullity.
Section 8.
Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
● other functions as may be provided by law (Sec. 8)
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Section 1.
1.
The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
1. Composition (Sec. 1)
∙ Chairman and 2 Commissioners
∙ natural born citizens
∙ at least 35 at the time of appointment
∙ proven capacity for public administration
∙ not candidate in immediately preceding election
2.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years,
and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
2. Appointment (Sec. 1)
§Term of 7 years without reappointment
Common starting point of Feb. 2, 1987 (date of 1987 Constitution took effect)
*
Galindez v. COA *Gaminde v COA
§Consent of Commission on Appointments needed
§Appointment to any vacancy shall be for unexpired term
§No Member appointed in a temporary or acting capacity
Section 2.
1.
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Does the DOL have a role over civil service members?
2.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policydetermining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
Civil Service Appointments
§
According to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, by competitive
examination [Sec. 2(2)]
∙
Competitive position according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable,
by competitive examination
∙
Noncompetitive position – Not determined by competitive examination, but merit and fitness
are required.
∙ Career – can’t fire
∙ Noncareer
career/noncareer/competitive/noncompetitive
Do appointees to the foreign service who do not belong to the Career Corps enjoy security of
tenure like the Career Corp?
*Astraquillo v. Manglapus No. Political appointees in the Foreign Service possess tenure
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure.
*Achacoso v. Macaraig (POEA) – Administrator of the POEA is not the same
rank as
undersecretary; his position is noncareer; The respondents assert he is not entitled to
the guaranty because he is not a career official (the petitioner did not possess the necessary
qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of the POEA in 1987). The mere fact that a
position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant
except positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical
ü merit and fitness requirement
ü security of tenure
*Hernandez v. Villegas (not removal but expiration of term) Persons occupying
noncompetitive positions are also covered by the guarantee of security of tenure. The
distinction between competitive and noncompetitive is significant only for purposes of
appointment. The termination of the official relation of officials and employees holding primarily
confidential positions on the ground of loss of confidence can be justified because in that case
their cessation from office involves no removal but expiration of the term of office.
*Gloria v. CA
(temporary transfer)
FACTS :
Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of QC. DECS
Secretary Ricardo Gloria recommended Icasiano to be reassigned Superintendent of the
Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill vacant position. It was found out later
that his “reassignment” was indefinite in nature and appeared more than temporary
ISSUE: WN violated security of tenure
HELD:
YES. Security of tenure is fundamental and constitutionally granted in civil service. Extends
not only to employees removed w/o cause but also unconsented transfer w/c tantamount to
illegal removal.
Temporary transfer is allowed w/o prior consent but not allowed if it is seen to be
preliminary step to his removal.
ü
primary confidential means close intimacy which insures freedom of
(*Borres vc. CA
intercourse )
*Santiago v. CSC
(“next in rank“)
FACTS:
Narcisco Santiago, Customs Collector I, was appointed by Customs Commissioner Tanada
as Customs Collector III w/c was approved by CSC. This appointment was questioned by
Leonardo Jose being that he is next in line as Customs Collector II.
ISSUE: W/N appointing authority is bound by the restrictions of statutory next in rank rule
HELD:
NO. Nothing in the Civil Service Law requires or mandates that persons next in rank are
entitled to preference in appointment. Next in rank merely has preferential consideration for the
higher vacancy but dont follow that they are the only ones that can be appointed. Rule dont vest
rights or ministerial duty on appinting authority to promote such
Person.
3.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
4.
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
Prohibitions
§engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign [Sec. 2(4)]
prohibition does not apply to department secretaries
*Santos v. Yatco
FACTS:
Judge Yatco disallowed Defense Secretary Alejo Santos from campaigning for Governor
Tomas Martin in Bulacan. At the time Santos was an acting member of the Cabinet.
ISSUE: W/N department secretaries are prohibited from campaigning for political candidates
HELD:
NO. Prohibition of participation in partisan political activities dont apply to department
secretaries. Department secretaries are not embraced and w/in the terms officers and
employees in the Civil Service.
does not prevent expression of views or mentioning names of candidates
supported
5. The right to selforganization shall not be denied to government employees.
6.
Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided
by law.
Basic Rights of Civil Servants (Sec. 2)
§ cannot be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law
substantive and procedural due process
*De los Santos v. Mallare
FACTS:
Eduardo de los Santos was appointed city engineer of Baguio. A few years later, Gil Mallare
was extended ad interim appointment by the president to Santos’ position. Santos refused to
vacate his office after being reassigned to the Bureau of Public Works. He was being ignored by
the mayor and other officials and Mallare was being paid the salary corresponding to his
position.
ISSUE: W/N Santos is entitled to remain in his position as city engineer
HELD:
YES. He can remain in office until her resigns or removed for a just cause. Just cause
means which the law and sound public polity recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, by a
legal cause. cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be
restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public
“Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed
in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state”
abolition of office including reorganization is allowed if made (1) in good faith, (2)
not for personal or political reasons and (3) not in violation of the law
*Roque v. Ericta
DOCTRINE:
For abolition of office to escape the taint of unconstitutionality, it must be made with:
1. In good faith
2. Not for political or personal reasons
3. Not in violation of the law
reprimand, unlike warning or admonition, is administrative penalty
*Tobias v. Veloso
§right to self organization
§temporary employees to be given such protection as provided by law
temporary employees may be removed without cause
*Mendiola v. Tancinco
DOCTRINE:
It is a wellsettled rule that temporary employees maybe terminated at any time even
without just cause. They have no fixed tenure
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit
and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall
submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
4. Functions of CSC (Sec. 3)
§ establish a career service
§
adopt measures to promote moral, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and
courtesy in the civil service
§ strengthen the merit and rewards system
§ integrate all human resources development programs
§ institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability
§ submit an annual report on its personnel programs
Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and
defend this Constitution.
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government
officials and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations with
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for, their positions.
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the Government or any Governmentowned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
§
no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any GOCC or any of their subsidiaries (Sec. 6)
no
§ elective official eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
during tenure (Sec. 7)
§ no
appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in Government
§ except if allowed by law or primary functions of position (Sec. 7)
§ CPLC and PCGG Chair
§
(Elma20 Art. VII, Sec. 13
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double,
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent
of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
§
no elective or appointive official shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law
pensions or gratuities not considered additional compensation (Sec. 8)
*Peralta v. Mathay
per diem or allowance given as reimbursement for expenses is allowed ( )
*Santos v. CA (double retirement)
§
no elective or appointive official shall accept any present, emolument, office or title of any kind
from any foreign government (Sec. 8)
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 1.
1.
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Composition (Sec. 1)
§Chairman and six Commissioners
§natural born citizens
§at least 35
§not candidate in immediately preceeding election
§
a majority of the Commission, including the Chairman shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
*Cayetano v. Monsod
Principle: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
o
court. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
2. Appointment (Sec. 1)
§7 year term without reappointment
§consent of Commission on Appointments needed
§appointment to any vacancy only for unexpired term
§no Member appointed in a temporary or acting capacity
*Brillantes v. Yorac
The constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the COMELEC,
o
foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC by designation of the
President.
2.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Section 2.
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
1.
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
2.
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions,
final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
3.
Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall
not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means,
or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration. Financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to
other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
6.
File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7.
Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
8.
Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive, order, or decision.
9.
Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Powers (Sec. 2)
§enforce and administer all election laws
includes power to annul elections because of terrorism
(
*Biliwang v. Comelec
)
(
call for a special election *Sanchez v. Comelec)
Principle: Under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election “results in
o
a failure to elect the COMELEC may call for the holding or continuation of the
election as soon as practicable.” Court construes this to include the calling of a
special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC
truly effective in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978
Election Code, supra, specifically allows the COMELEC to call a special election
for the purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created position, as the case may
be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call a special
election when there is a failure to elect.
§decide election cases
original jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of regional, provincial and city officials
*1993 Comelec Rules)
ü 5 day period for taking an appeal (
o Rule 19 – Motions for Reconsideration
§
Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration – A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed
within 5 days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not proforma,
suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution,
order or ruling.
Principle: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurrisdiction to issue writs
o
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The
Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.
appellate jurisdiction over contests involving barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction
*Flores v. Comelec
ü only questions of fact; questions of law to SC ( )
Principle: The provision of Article 9C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that
o
“decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contects
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory and nor
appealable” applies only to questions of fact and not law. That provision was not
intended to divest the SC of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in
the judicial power conferred upon it by the Constitution.
appellate decisions shall be final, executory and not appealable
ü preproclamation – administrative process
ü contest – judicial process
§decide all questions affecting elections (but not to be voted for)
except the right to vote
only popular elections
*Alunan v. Mirasol (SK)
Principle: As already states by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the
o
SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to the
respodents contention, this did not contravene Article 9, C, 2(1) of the
Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Elections for SK officers are not
subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have
recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
*
Taule v. Santos (Barangay federation)
contempt power only pursuant to quasijudicial function
*Masangcay v. Comelec
§deputize law enforcement agencies and Government instrumentalities to ensure CHOPFE
covers criminal and administrative cases
*Tan v. Comelec
merely recommends disciplinary action to the President ( )
act of deputy is act of Comelec *People v. Basilia
( )
§ register political organizations
must present platform or program of government
not religious denominations and sects
antiviolence and proConstitution
not supported by foreign governments (including financial contributions)
§ file, on its own or upon complaint, petitions for inclusion or exclusion of voters
§ investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws including election frauds
§
RTC has authority to try and decide criminal cases involving elections (
*People v.
Delgado)
§ Exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation for purposes of a)
filing information and b) help judge in determining whether warrant of arrest
should be issued ( *Kilosbayan v. Comelec)
§ recommend to Congress
measures to minimize election spending
measures to prevent and penalize all forms of election fraud
§ recommend to the President
removal of any deputized person
imposition of any disciplinary action
● submit comprehensive report
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
● promulgate rules of procedure (Sec. 3)
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any governmentowned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
● supervise or regulate franchises or concessions granted by the Government (e.g.,
media, transportation and public utilities) (Sec. 4)
equal opportunity in time and space
reasonable rates
meet CHOPFE objectives
*Sanidad v. Comelec (plebiscite)
*Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec (print)
*Telebap v. Comelec (broadcast)
§ recommend pardon for election offenses (Sec. 5)
check on Presidential Power
. Administrative Matters
§ en banc
may sit
or in two divisions
§
preproclamation cases shall be decided in division provided that MRs shall be decided
en banc
PARTY MATTERS (6, 7, 8)
● free and open party system (Sec. 6)
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
● party list registration (Sec. 7)
● no representation in voter boards (Sec. 8)
may appoint poll watchers
OTHER MATTERS (9, 10, 11)
§ Election period
90 days before election day and 30 days thereafter (Sec. 9)
Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
§ Bona fide candidates free from harassment (Sec. 10)
Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for holding
regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in
the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon
certification by the Chairman of the Commission
§ Election expenses provided in regular or special appropriations and released
automatically upon certification by the Commission Chairman (Sec. 11)
§ *Loreto v. Brion
Second placer rule (
)
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Section 1.
1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners,
who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirtyfive years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.
Composition (Sec. 1)
§ Chairman and 2 Commissioners
§ natural born citizens
§ at least 35
§ not candidates in immediately preceding election
§ CPA or lawyer with 10 year auditing or practice of law experience
§ not all Members belong to the same profession
2.
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years,
and the other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Appointment (Sec. 1)
§ 7 year term without re appointment
§ consent of Commission on Appointments needed
§ appointment to any vacancy only for unexpired term
§ no member appointed in a temporary or acting capacity
Section 2.
1.
The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly,
from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit
to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of
the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including
temporary or special preaudit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by
law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
2.
The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
3. Powers
§
examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to the revenue, receipts of or uses of
funds
pertaining to the Government of GOCCs with original charters (preaudit)
a) Constitutional bodies and offices granted fiscal autonomy, b) autonomous state
colleges and universities, c) other GOCCs and their subsidiaries and d) nonGovernmental
entities receiving subsidies from the Government (postaudit) (Sec. 2)
settle accounts means power to settle liquidated accounts which may be
adjusted simply by an arithmetical process
ü law appropriating funds for a purpose
ü contract entered into by proper officer pursuant to law whether goods or
services covered by contract have been delivered payment has been authorized by proper
officials (
*Guevara v. Gimenez )
§ define scope of audit and promulgate accounting and audit rules
Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time
fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government,
its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled
corporations, and nongovernmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures
necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as
may be required by law.
submit annual report to President and Congress (Sec. 4)
Cases
§ COA has authority to interpret “failure of public bidding”
*Danville v. COA
( )
§ COA has authority to promulgate rules to prevent “irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenses”
*Dingdong v. Guingona, Polloso v. Gangan
( )
ARTICLE X
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Scope
• territorial and political subdivisions (Sec. 1)
• provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
Section 2.
The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
local autonomy (Sec. 2)
ü subject to power of control by Congress and power
of general supervision by President
(Dadole2002)
• autonomous regions
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
Implementing Legislation
• Local Government Code (Sec. 3)
responsive and accountable local government
decentralized structure
ü decentralization of administration v. decentralization
of power
effective mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum
allocate among LGUs their powers, responsibilities and resources
provide for qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions, and duties of local
officials
other matters relating to the organization and operation of LGUs
RA 7160
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Supervisory Authority (Sec. 4)
• difference with control
ensure that acts are within scope of powers and functions
ensure that laws are faithfully executed
• President over LGUs
• Provinces over component cities and municipalities
• Cities and municipalities over component barangays
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Powers (Sec. 5)
• autonomy
*
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties (casino)
*LLDA v. CA (pollution)
● Principle: The charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law, while the
charter of the LGU is a general law. Where there is a conflict between a
general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence
of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. The specific power
of the LLDA must prevail over the general power of the local governments.
The power given by the Local Government Code to local governments was
a revenue generating power and not a regulatory power.
*San Juan v. CSC (recommendation for budget officer)
● Principle: The person recommend by the provincial governor did not
posses the qualification so the Secretary of Budget Management appointed
someone else on his own. The Secretary should have asked for a new set
of recommendees with the necessary eligibility. The exercise by local
government of meaningful power has been a national goal but it seems that
legislation cannot seem to let go of centralised powers. There must be an
interplay, a balancing of view points and a harmonization of proposals from
both the local and national officials.
• create own sources of revenue
• levy taxes, fees and charges
subject to Congressional limitations and guidelines but
cannot be limited by administrative order
*
PPC v. Pililla
consistent with policy of local autonomy
Rights
• just share in national taxes (Sec. 6)
automatically released
as determined by law
*
Pimentel v. Aguirre – AO 372/IRA
● Principle: The administrative Order no. 372 was challenged as an
attempt to control the local government and to encroach on their
autonomy. The Court ruled that Section 1 of the Administrative
Order was merely advisory and therefore not an attempt to exercise
control over local governments. But Section 4 was said to violated
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release of the share
of the local government in national revenue.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner
provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
their respective areas (Sec. 7)
in the manner provided by law
LGU Officials
(8 & 9)
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
• Term (Sec. 8)
3 years
not more than 3 consecutive terms
ü elected and served three consecutive terms
*
Borja v. Comelec
● Principle: For service to be counted as one term for the purpose of the
threeterm limit, two essential elements are required. First, the official must
have been elected to the position three consecutive times and second, he
must have served three full terms. Conversely, if he is not serving a term
for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior
to its expiration. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
voluntary renunciation
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may
be prescribed by law.
• Sectoral Representation (Sec. 9)
Cities
• Highly urbanized, as determined by law
• Component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial officials
independent of province
Residents cannot run for a provincial elective office
*
Abella v. Comelec
● Principle: Cities that have charters which prohibit their voters from voting
in the provincial elections are independent of the province. Since they are
independent of the province, residents of such office are not qualified to
run for provincial positions.
• Component cities whose charters contain no prohibition
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
• nonalteration of political units (Sec. 10)
creation, merger, abolishment or boundary substantially altered
in accordance with criteria established in LGC
subject to approval in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
*
(Tan v. Comelec
)
● Principle: If what is involved is the creation of a barangay, the plebiscite
should be municipalitywide or citywide, and if municipality or component
city, provincewide or citywide, and if municipality or componentcity,
provincewide; and if a portion of a province is to be carved from another
province, the plebiscite should include the mother province. Initial step is
within the Congress
Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions,
subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities
shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
• special metropolitan subdivisions (Sec. 11)
created by law
subject to a plebiscite
components retain basic autonomy
jurisdiction limited to basic services requiring coordination
ü MMDA’s function are administrative in nature; it does not possess police power
*
MMDA v. Bel Air
● Principle: MMDA was created by RA7924 to render 7 basic services. The
law did not grant it any general police power nor legislative power. MMDA
was not a municipal government endowed with police power, nor eminent
domain power, and was therefore without authority to order the Village to
yield its property for general public use. It is an administrative agency go
the government and as such it may only exercise powers that are given to it
by law.
Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of
the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in accordance with
law.
• LGU voluntary groupings (Sec. 13)
consolidate efforts for purposes commonly beneficial
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar
bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the
region.
• Regional Development Councils (Sec. 14)
created by President
strengthen autonomy
accelerate economic and social growth
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Scope
• Muslim Minadanao and the Codilleras
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common characteristics
ü one province cannot constitute an autonomous region
*
Ordillo v. Comelec (Ifugao)
● Principle: An Autonomous Region has to consist more than one
province. Hence, if only one province ratifies the Organic Act drafted
by Congress, the creation of an autonomous region does not
succeed.
Powers
(16, 17, 20, 21)
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
• President exercises general supervision (Sec. 16)
ensure that laws are faithfully executed
• limited authority conferred by Congress (Sec. 17)
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
Organic Act (Sec. 18)
• Congress with assistance from regional consultative commission
Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months
from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
• within 18 months (Sec. 19)
• basic structure of government
consistent with Constitution and national laws
• creation of autonomous region effective when approved in plebiscite
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region.
• legislative powers over economic and social issues (Sec. 20)
Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of
the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
• peace and order responsibility of local police agencies in accordance with law (Sec. 21)
• defense and security, foreign relations, foreign trade, currency and banking responsibility
of National Government
ARTICLE XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
1. Rationale:
Public office is a public trust “mere agents not rulers of people”
Accountable
manner that flaunts his wealth
2. Removal
For cause
Career service or coterminous
Impeachment
Section 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Impeachable officers (Sec. 2)
President and Vice President,
Members of Supreme Court,
Members of Constitutional Commissions,
Ombudsman
• Impeachable offenses (Sec. 2)
Culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason,
bribery,
graft and corruption,
other high crimes,
betrayal of public trust
Impeachment Process
Section 3.
1.
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
2.
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
∙ Complaint filed by Representative or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Representative (House has exclusive power to initiate cases of impeachment)
3.
A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4.
In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
∙ Complaint filed by 1/3 of House constitutes Articles of Impeachment
ü Can the complaint be amended?
ü Creeping impeachment
5.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
7.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
8.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.
n Order of Business within 10 session days and referred to proper Committee within 3 session days
ü referral ministerial?
• Committee conducts hearing and by majority vote submits its report to the House within
60 session days with resolution
• form
• substance
• probable cause
• calendared for consideration by House within 10 session days
• 1/3 of all Representatives needed to affirm or override Committee resolution
• Senate tries and decides cases of impeachment
• Presiding officer
Senate President
Chief Justice
• Conviction requires concurrence of 2/3 of all Senators
• purpose of impeachment is not to punish but only to remove
Impeachment Safeguards
vote of each Representative recorded
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation
no impeachment proceedings initiated against the same official more than once within a
Francisco v. House of Representatives)
period of 1 year (*
judgment
in case of impeachment shall not extend further than removal and
disqualification to hold other office but party convicted shall still be subject to prosecution
and punishment
Congress to promulgate rules on impeachment
Sandiganbayan
Section 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
a
statutory not a constitutional court – created not by the Constitution but by statute,
although its creation is mandated by the Constitution
to the Sandiganbayan not only over graft and corrupt practices but also over “such
other
offenses committed by public officers and employees , including those in government
owned or controller corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law.”(*Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan)
Private
person may be charged in the Sandiganbayan only if he is a coprincipal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer (
*Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan)
Office of the Ombudsman
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of
the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may
likewise be appointed.
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the
Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.
Officials
Ombudsman or Tanodbayan
Overall Deputy
Deputy for Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao and the Military
Special Prosecutor
ü Special prosecutor may investigate and file cases only when so authorized by the
Ombudsman ( *Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan)
What is the power of the Ombudsman over his office?
the Ombudsman, except his deputies.
the Office
∙ Vested with the power of administrative control and supervision of the Office
o
Authority to organize such directorates for administration and allied services as may be
necessary for the effective discharge
∙ CSC has no power over this
Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines,
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years
or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article 1XA of this Constitution.
Qualifications (Sec. 8)
natural born citizen
40
recognized probity and independence
member of the Philippine Bar who has been a judge or in the practice of law
for 10 years
not a candidate in the immediately preceding election
Disqualifications (Sec. 8)
not hold any other office or employment
not engage in the practice of any profession
not engage in the active management or control of any business
which may be affected by the functions of his office
not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any Government contract,
franchise or privilege
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which
shall not be decreased during their term of office.
Privileges (Sec. 10)
rank of Chairman and Members of Constitutional Commissions
same salary as Con Com which shall not be decreased during term
Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
not run in election immediately succeeding cessation from office (Sec. 11)
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned
or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action
taken and the result thereof.
Powers and Duties
act promptly on complaints filed against public officials and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify complainants of action taken (Sec. 12)
investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission by a public official
which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
ü even if the offense committed by the official is not related to the performance of
his function ( *Deloso v. Domingo)
ü claim of confidentiality cannot bar the Ombudsman’s power to investigate unless
grounded on military, diplomatic or other national security concerns (
Almonte v.
Vasquez )
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
governmentowned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
required by law or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties
3.
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
∙ Direct officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official at fault and
recommend punishment thereof and ensure compliance therewith
4.
Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
∙ Direct officer concerned to furnish it with copies of documents relating to disbursement of
public funds and report any irregularity to COA for appropriate action
5.
Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge
of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
∙ Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary
6.
Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
∙ Publicize matters covered by its investigation
7.
Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
∙ Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and
∙ Corruption in government and make recommendations
8.
Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law.
∙ Promulgate rules of procedure (Sec. 13)
Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Independence of Office
fiscal autonomy
appropriations automatically and regularly released (Sec. 14)
Prohibitions on Impeachable Officers
(16,18)
Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any governmentowned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any
firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
no loan, guaranty or other form of financial accommodation, directly or indirectly granted by
government financial institution (Sec. 16)
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
the public in the manner provided by law.
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (Sec. 17)
Public officer or employee
Public officials of higher rank
disclosed to the public
Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
change citizenship or acquire status of an immigrant
shall be dealt with by law (Sec. 18) refers to incumbents not to
candidates ( *Caasi v. CA) *Green card holder and filed a certificate of candidacy, his
disqualification can be rooted from Section 68 or Omnibus Election Code as he’s not an
incumbent yet.
ARTICLE XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full of efficient use of human
and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all region s of the country shall be
given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their
ownership.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or productionsharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twentyfive years, renewable for not more than twentyfive years, and under such terms and
conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twentyfive years,
renewable for not more than twentyfive years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to
the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of
the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of
forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter,
such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor
diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine,
measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural wellbeing.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a naturalborn citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.
Section 9. The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed
by the President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various
private sectors, and local government units, recommend to Congress, and implement continuing
integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development.
Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall
function as the independent planning agency of the government.
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or
right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
citizens of the Philippines.
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino
scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, highlevel technical manpower and skilled
workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage
appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit. The practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by
law.
Section 15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Governmentowned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common
good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the
members of whose governing board must be naturalborn Filipino citizens, of known probity,
integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall
also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The
authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be
provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing
similar functions.
Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines operating under
existing laws, shall function as the central monetary authority.
Section 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government
shall be made available to the public.
Section 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be
considered inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be
provided by law.
*TO DO:
Get notes of BBL from Kats
Send notes to Nath
Kats: Add content for Phividec v Velez (Arbitration);
Manzano (RTC Ilocos); (Solid Homes v.
Laserna2008); Prudential Bank
Tabulated qualification for ALL (COMPOSITION)
RC: ask Sid for chart of the courts