Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy

Author(s): John L. Campbell

Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 28 (2002), pp. 21-38
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 Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002. 28:21-38
doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.141111
Copyright() 2002 by AnnualReviews. All rights reserved

IDEAS,POLITICS,AND PUBLICPOLICY

John L. Campbell
Departmentof Sociology,DartmouthCollege, Hanover,New Hampshire03755,
e-mail:john.l.campbell@dartmouth.edu

Key Words norms,frames,cognitiveparadigms,worldculture

* Abstract Scholarshave become acutelyinterestedin how behaviordrivenby
ideasratherthanself-interestdeterminespolicy-makingoutcomes.Thisreviewexam-
ines the literatureon this subject.It differentiatesamongthe types of ideas thatmay
affectpolicymaking(i.e., cognitiveparadigms,worldviews,norms,frames,andpolicy
programs)and identifiessome of the persistentdifficultiesassociatedwith studying
howideasshapepolicy.In particular, studiesoftendo a poorjob pinpointingthecausal
mechanismsthatlink ideas to policy-makingoutcomes.More attentionneeds to be
paid to articulatingthe causalprocessesthroughwhich ideas exerteffects. Sugges-
tionsforfuturescholarshipthatmightimprovethis situationareoffered.Theseinclude
identifyingthe actorswho seek to influencepolicymakingwiththeirideas, ascertain-
ing the institutionalconditionsunderwhich these actorshavemoreor less influence,
andunderstanding how politicaldiscourseaffectsthedegreeto whichpolicy ideasare
communicatedandtranslatedintopractice.

INTRODUCTION

Political sociology and political science have focused on how the pursuitof self-
interestaffectspolitics andpolicy makingin advancedcapitalistsocieties. This has
been true for pluralist,elite, neo-Marxist,historical institutionalist,and rational
choice theories. Scholarshave paid far less attentionto how ideas, that is, theo-
ries, conceptualmodels, norms, world views, frames, principledbeliefs, and the
like, ratherthan self-interests,affect policy making.This is surprisinggiven Max
Weber's(1946:280) famous dictumthatideas have profoundeffects on the course
of events, servinglike switchmenwho directinterest-basedactiondown one track
or another.Indeed, an earlier review of the literatureon public policy domains
lamentedthe fact that little was known aboutthe relativeimportanceof ideas for
policy making (Burstein 1991:332-34), and that althoughideas occasionally re-
ceived attentionin empiricalanalysis (e.g., Fumer & Supple 1990, Reich 1988),
they were rarelytheorized(Friedland& Alford 1991:237). This began to change
in the 1990s, often in reactionto rationalchoice theory (Jacobsen1995, Thelen &
Steinmo 1992), as researchersbegan to examine more carefullyhow ideas affect
policy making. Today, even some rational choice theorists have conceded that
ideas matter(Knight& North 1997, Levi 1997, North 1990, Ostrom1990:33-35),
0360-0572/02/0811-0021$14.00 21

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22 CAMPBELL

in partbecause they recognize that what actors believe may be just as important
as what they want (Vanberg& Buchanan1989:51).
This review takes stock of the new literatureon ideas and policy making. It
identifies differenttypes of ideas that have received attentionin policy research,
discusseshow they affectpolicy making,andaddressessome of the moreimportant
problemssocial scientistsneed to solve in studyingthem. In particular,this review
shows thatscholarsneed to betterspecify the causalmechanismsby which ideas of
varioussorts affect policy making,and it suggests some ways in which this might
be betterdone. The literaturereviewedhere is distinctfromthe more generalwork
on cultureand politics in that it focuses squarelyon public policy making rather
than social movements,revolutions,democratization,political development,and
other political phenomena(e.g., Berezin 1997, Brint 1994b, Somers 1995). The
literaturealso differsfromthelong-standingdebatebetweenidealistandmaterialist
theories,which assumedthateitherideas or interestsaffectedpublicpolicy,butnot
both (J. Hall 1993). The new literatureis more open to the possibility of interplay
between ideas and interests(e.g., Blyth 2002). For instance, as discussed below,
several researchersnow contend that the ideas that actors hold affect how they
define their interestsin the firstplace.

TYPES OF IDEAS AND THEIR EFFECTS

ON POLICY MAKING

Cognitive Paradigms and World Views

In recent extensions of the older literatureon national political cultures (e.g.,
Almond & Verba1963, Webber& Wildavsky1986), scholarsarguethatthe taken-
for-grantedworld views of policy makers constrainthe range of policy choices
they are likely to considerwhen formulatingeconomic, welfare,nationalsecurity,
andotherpublicpolicies. Morespecifically,we may speakof cognitiveparadigms,
taken-for-granteddescriptionsand theoreticalanalyses that specify cause and ef-
fect relationships,thatreside in the backgroundof policy debatesandthatlimit the
range of alternativespolicy makersare likely to perceive as useful (Block 1996,
1990, Heilbroner& Milberg 1995). Studies suggest that paradigmsvary signif-
icantly across countries (Berman 1998, Dobbin 1994, P. Hall 1989a,b, Ziegler
1997) and over time (P. Hall 1993, 1992, Hay 2001; McNamara1998) in ways
thatyield nationallyspecific policy responsesto common policy problems.
For instance,Esping-Andersen(1999) arguesthatdifferentassumptionsabout
the tasks families performfor their membersaffected the range of welfare state
programscreated after the Second WorldWarin Europe. In SouthernEurope's
Catholiccountries,policy makerstook for grantedthatthe family would perform
certaintasks for itself, such as providingchildcare.Hence, policy makersdid not
providedaycareor maternity-leaveprogramsbecause they assumedthat families
would notneed them.In Scandinaviancountrieswith differentfamily systems,pol-
icy makersmade no such assumptionand suppliedextensive childcareprograms.

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 IDEASANDPOLITICS 23

According to Esping-Andersen,until policy makerscan manage to break out of

these paradigms,it will be hardfor them to reformtheir welfare programsin or-
der to bettercope with the economic, social, and demographicchallenges of the
twenty-firstcentury.In other words, taken-for-grantedparadigmsconstrain the
range of policies thatpolicy makersare likely to consider.
Two problemshave pervadedmuch of this literature.First, it is not clear how
old paradigmsgive way to new ones and thus how policy undergoesfundamental
change (Blyth 1997, 1998). Recently, researchhas addressedthis issue by ar-
guing that paradigmshifts occur when policy makers suddenly find themselves
faced with unusualpolitical economic problemsfor which the currentparadigm
offers no clear-cutsolutions(Dobbin 1993, P. Hall 1993, Hay 2001). Forexample,
McNamara(1998) showed thatpolicy makersfaced new economic uncertainties
duringthe 1970s-persistent inflationcoupledwith sluggish economicgrowthand
high unemployment.This put severe pressureon fixed exchange rates and led to
the collapse of Keynesianismas the guidingparadigmfor monetarypolicy. A new
set of paradigmaticideas, monetarism,replacedKeynesianismafterpolicy makers
were convincedthatthey provideda more coherentexplanationof the stagflation
crisis. The fact that Germanyhad used monetarismand achieved comparatively
healthyeconomic resultswas pivotal, McNamarasuggested,in convincingpolicy
makersin othercountriesof the new paradigm'sutility.Thus,when shocks, crises,
andotherdisturbancescreatepolicy problemsfor which prevailingparadigmspro-
vide little guidance, policy makers search for new ones that help them envision
new policy solutions,especially if they believe thatthereis evidence that the new
one will work.
Second, although the language of constraintis often invoked, the literature
on cognitive paradigmsoften fails to specify just how paradigmsconstrainpolicy
makers'perceptionsof theiroptions.Why is it so difficultforpolicy makersto break
out of an old paradigmeven when evidence accumulatesthatit no longerprovides
the best policy guidance, and especially since a variety of policy paradigmsare
often availableat any given moment (Kingdon 1984:ch. 6)? At least two sorts of
responsesarepossible (Woods 1995). Psychologists might arguethatcertainideas
are adopted when they involve heuristic devices, metaphors,and analogies that
rendercomplex situationsmanageableorjustify actionsafterthe fact. Sociologists
wouldbe moreinclinedto suggest thatthese ideas become importantif they assign
blameforpoorperformance,providea vision for the future,creategroupsolidarity,
help buildpoliticalcoalitions,or furtherotherpoliticalpurposes.This is a complex
issue thatis dealt with in greaterdetail below.

Normative Frameworks
Normativeideas consist of taken-for-grantedassumptionsaboutvalues, attitudes,
identities, and other "collectively shared expectations" (Katzenstein 1996a:7).
These also lie in the backgroundof policy debates but constrainaction by limi-
ting the range of alternativesthat elites are likely to perceive as acceptableand
legitimateratherthan useful means to an end. Policy makers' values, norms, and

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24 CAMPBELL

principledbeliefs may affect their position on public policies by helping them

decide which policies arethe most appropriate-an especially importantconsider-
ationwhen, as is frequentlythe case, thereis no conclusive evidence aboutwhich
policy option is most likely to work best (Lipset 1996, Rein & Winship 1997,
Schon & Rein 1994). In this sense, policy makersoperateaccordingto a logic of
moral or social appropriateness,not a logic of consequentiality(March& Olsen
1989, Suchman1997).
Normativedifferencesmay accountfor cross-nationalvariationin macroeco-
nomic policy (Smith 1992), foreign policy (Rohrlich 1987), and national secu-
rity policy (Katzenstein 1993, Wendt 1992). They may also explain important
cross-nationalvariationsin partypolitics. Berman(1998) maintainedthatduring
the early twentiethcenturysocial democraticpartiesresisted forming cross-class
coalitions in Germany,but not in Sweden, because GermanMarxists valued a
pure worker'sparty and the revolutionaryoverthrowof bourgeois parliamentary
democracy,whereastheirSwedish counterpartsvalueda moreencompassingpeo-
ple's partyanda parliamentaryrouteto socialism. Occasionally,intractablepolicy
controversieswithin and between partiescan be tracedto the opposing taken-for-
grantedvalues of key policy makers(e.g., Sch6n & Rein 1994).
Normative beliefs may be so strong that they override the self-interests of
policy makers(Derthick& Quirk1985, Quirk1990). Forinstance,Skrentny(1996)
suggestedthatU.S. policy makers-most of whom were white males-passed af-
firmativeaction legislation, which grantedprivileges to minorities and women,
because they perceivedthatit was the appropriatething to do in a Cold Warmoral
climate where nationaland internationalaudiencesviewed the continuedrepres-
sion of minoritiesas illegitimate.Policy makersdid so, he maintained,even though
a majorityof the public favoredcolor-blindpolicies over those thatgrantedprefer-
ential treatmentto minorities.As a result,normativebeliefs trumpedself-interests
as is demonstratedby policy makerspassing legislationthatfavoredsocial groups
otherthantheirown, and also by riskingtheirelectoralfortunesin the process.
Identities may also affect policy making. Identities are the historically con-
structedideas thatindividualsor organizationshave aboutwho they are vis-a-vis
others. Of course, studies of nationalismhave long recognized the significance
of identity politics (e.g., J. Hall 1998, Hutchinson& Smith 1994). Researchon
identitiesis especially importantinsofaras it helps us betterunderstandhow actors
definetheirpolicy interests(J. Hall 1993, Jeppersonet al. 1996, Piore 1995, Thelen
& Steinmo 1992, Wendt1992). As a result,this workhelps fill a crucialvoid in our
knowledge about the policy-makingprocess. For instance,the identities of labor
unionsvarycross-nationallyandhave affectedwhichpolicies unionshaveaccepted
or resistedin nationaldebatesover how best to manageglobal competitionduring
the late twentiethcentury.The identity of Swedish unions was based historically
on theirabilityto engage employers'associationsin centralized,solidaristicwage
bargaining,so they saw it in their interestto fight employers' attemptsduringthe
1980s to decentralizethis system. In contrast,the identity of Italian unions was
constitutedthrougha long historyof protectingcost-of-living adjustments,which

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 IDEASANDPOLITICS 25

they fought to preservewhen employersmoved to rescindthem (Locke & Thelen

1995). Similarly,shifts in working-classidentity within a particularcountrymay
trigger shifts in working-classpolitics. Hattam(1993) showed that U.S. workers
priorto the Civil Warviewed themselves as partnerswith employers and sought
equal protectionthroughthe legislature and courts to organize collectively just
as employers were permittedto do. After the war, however,they repudiatedthis
Republicanidentity,redefinedthemselves as a class in conflict with employers,
andabandonedlegislativereformin favorof businessunionism-direct confronta-
tions with employers via strikes and other forms of protest.The point is that the
identities of political actors shape how they perceive their interestsand therefore
which policies and institutionsthey favor.
As with cognitive paradigms,scholarsdo not always specify clearly the causal
mechanisms whereby normativeframeworksaffect policy making. Sometimes,
this createsproblems.Skrentny(1996:9) explainedthat "legitimacyimperatives"
underliepolitical action and that they "enable,shape, and constrain"politics, but
he did not explain why, for instance, U.S. policy makers were so sensitive in
the firstplace to internationalperceptionsregardingracialinequality,or why that
sensitivity only seemed to have policy-making effects after the 1960s (but see
Skrentny1998). Nor do studies always identify the sources of normativechange.
Hattam(1993) neverexplainedwhatcausedthe identityshift withinthe American
working-classupon which subsequentpolitical changes depended.More work is
neededto understandhow normativebeliefs andpolitical identitiesareformedand
affect policy making(e.g., Wendt 1992).

World Culture
Whereas some studies invoke cognitive paradigmsand normativeframeworks
to account for differences in public policy, others do so to explain similarities.
Sociologists arguethat a Westernpolitical culturediffused aroundthe world and
homogenized nationalpolitical institutionsand policy-makingapparatuses(e.g.,
Meyer 1994, Meyeret al. 1987, Meyeret al. 1997a, Boli & Thomas 1999, Thomas
et al. 1987). By worldculturethesewritersmeantransnationalcognitiveparadigms,
normativeframeworks,or both (Jeppersonet al. 1996, Katzenstein 1996a:6)-a
signal thatthe analyticdistinctionbetween normativeand cognitive ideas is often
blurredin empiricalwork. For instance, Meyer and his colleagues (1997b) sug-
gested that nation states createdenvironmentalministriesafterthe Second World
Waras a result of an increasinginternationalscientific discoursethat drew atten-
tion to the fact that the earth is a fragile ecosystem. The diffusion of this world
environmentalculturewas facilitatedby the developmentof nongovernmentalor-
ganizations(NGOs)dedicatedto pressinggovernmentsto protectthe environment,
and by the creationof formal organizationalarenasby the United Nations where
these issues could be discussed by membersof the internationalcommunity.
This approachhas been adoptedin the field of internationalrelationsto explain
policies thataredifficultto understandwithinconventionalrealistor interest-based

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26 CAMPBELL

frameworks(e.g., Katzenstein1996b, Finnemore1996, Woods 1995). For exam-

ple, Eyre & Suchman,(1996) showed that countriesof vastly differentsizes and
securityneeds have adoptedsimilarhighly technical weapons systems. They ar-
gue thatthis is due to the fact thatweapons spreadnot as a technicalresponse to
perceivedmilitarythreats,but as a symbolic response to internationalnorms that
associate sophisticatedmilitariesand weapons systems with nation states that are
moder, independent,and socially legitimate within the community of nations.
Hence, tiny countrieswill buy a few fighterjets that do not appreciablyaugment
their defensive capabilitiesin orderto conform to internationalnorms regarding
the appropriatemilitarypractices of moder nation states. Similarly,others sug-
gested thatcountrieswith nuclearor chemicalweapons generallyrefuse to deploy
them in combat,even when the possibilityof retaliationin kind is nil andtheiruse
could ensurevictory,becausemilitarypolicy is guidedby internationalnormsthat
mitigateagainsttheirdeployment(Price & Tannenwald1996).
This literaturehas been criticizedon severalgrounds(Finnemore1996). First,
scholarshave characterizedit as excessively structuralistinsofaras it tends to ne-
glect the importanceof agency and actors. As a result, it is often unclearwhere
world culture comes from and who creates it. Even NGOs are often viewed as
"enactors"transmittingalready existing world culture, ratherthan actors creat-
ing it in the firstplace (Keck & Sikkink 1998:33). Second, this researchtends to
documentthe isomorphiceffects of world culturebut not the causal mechanisms
involved, often because detailedprocess-tracingcase studies are missing (but see
Keck & Sikkink1998, Risse et al. 1999; for a more theoreticalattempt,see Strang
& Meyer 1993). Indeed,much of the empiricalwork in this traditionis based on
data sets and methodologicaltechniquesthatmake it difficultto determinecausal
sequences(e.g., Meyer et al. 1997b). Third,this perspectivehas overlooked-and
in some cases denied explicitly-how the diffusion of Westerncultureoften in-
volves conflict, struggle,andpowerfulstate actorswho force it on othercountries
(but see Risse et al. 1999). Finally, world cultureis rife with deep internalcon-
tradictions(e.g., amongnormsfavoringequality,market-basedeconomic growth,
andbureaucraticrationality).These contradictionsmay constrainisomorphismby
triggeringattacks on Westernnorms and values and by underminingthe stabil-
ity of the behavioralconvergencedescribedin much of this literature(Mittelman
2000).

Frames
Ratherthanconcentratingon how ideasproducedifferencesor similaritiesin policy
makingeitherhistoricallyor cross-nationally,some researchers,drawingconcepts
from social movements theory (e.g., Gamson 1992, Snow et al. 1986, Snow &
Benford 1992, Swidler 1986, Tarrow1994), are concernedwith explaining how
policy makers frame policies in order to make them politically acceptable. By
framesthey mean normativeand sometimescognitive ideas thatare located in the
foregroundof policy debates. In order for their policy programsto be adopted,

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 IDEASANDPOLITICS 27

political elites strategicallycraft frames and use them to legitimize their policies
to the public and each other (Anthonyet al. 1994, Fligstein & Mara-Drita1996).
For instance, the concept of economic globalizationhas been used as a frame to
justify shifts towardconservative,neoliberalpolicies duringthe 1980s and 1990s
(e.g., Bourdieu 1998, Hirst & Thompson 1996, Krugman1994a,b, Piven 1995,
Piven & Cloward1996). Studentsof political advertising,rhetoric,and symbolic
politics pay close attentionto how ideas affect policy making in this way (e.g.,
Block 1996, Edelman 1964, Jamieson 1996).
By extension, refrainingbecomes an integralpartof policy change. Refraiing
U.S. welfare, taxation, and labor marketpolicies in racial terms has contributed
to importantshifts in these policy areas (e.g., Edsall & Edsall 1991, Weir 1992).
Notably,effortsto reform,if not dismantle,U.S. welfarepolicies duringthe 1970s
and 1980s were led by politicians who reframedmeans-testedwelfare programs
as stipendsand services thatwere being providedto AfricanAmericansand other
minorities, but paid for by allegedly exorbitanttaxes on working-class whites.
The idea was to frame the issue of welfare reform in such a way as to divide
the working class along racial lines and generate supportamong white voters
for reform(Quadagno1994). Conversely,failureto effectively frame new policy
proposals underminesthe political viability of these proposals in the first place
(Skocpol 1996, 2000, Schmidt2001, 2000).
Three importantproblems recur in this literature.First, argumentsabout the
importanceof having the properframe in orderto ensurethat a policy is adopted
often lack empiricalor counterfactualcomparisonsandthusappearto be function-
alist so faras causalityis concerned(Woods 1995). One way to avoid this problem
may be to comparedifferentpolicy positions and their frames in a single policy
debate to determinewhetherdifferentframes affected which policy received the
most support(e.g., Campbell 1998, Strang& Bradburn2001).
Second,researchersrarelyexplorethe processby which framesareconstructed,
tested, transformed,and fit to the prevailingnormativeframeworksand cognitive
paradigmsresiding in the backgroundof policy debates (but see Campbell 1998,
1997, Schmidt2001, 2000). An interestingexception is Fligstein & Mara-Drita's
(1996; see also Fligstein 1997) analysis of the strategiessurroundingthe develop-
ment of the single Europeanmarket(SMP), a projectthat was intendedto reduce
tradebarriersandharmonizethe Europeaneconomy throughpassage of hundreds
of regulationsat the Europeanlevel. This project had stalled for many reasons,
notablyconcernthatthe SMP threatenednationalsovereignty,until the European
Commissionand especially its president,JacquesDelors, framedit as an effort to
simply facilitatethe exchange of goods, services, and laborthroughoutEurope-
something that its memberswere alreadydoing-but in terms vague enough so
thatnationalpolitical andbusinesselites could readdifferentinterpretationsinto it
to suit their own interests.Once framedin this fashion, the SMP became increas-
ingly acceptableto Europeanpoliticians. Of course, this sort of analysis requires
carefulattentionto how discourseis craftedand mobilized, a subjectto which we
returnbelow.

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28 CAMPBELL

Third,insofaras policy makersact strategically,they may use framesto conceal

theirtruemotives from otherswhom they aretryingto persuade.However,it is of-
ten difficultempiricallyto determinewhen policy makersareexpressingtheirtrue
motivesratherthanframingtheirargumentsin termsthattheybelieve will conform
with what otherswant to hear.In short,how can researchersknow whetherpolicy
makersarebeing truthfulratherthanmanipulativeframers(e.g., Campbell1995)?
A few studies have tried to adjudicatebetween these possibilities by conducting
detailed textual analyses of policy debates in orderto map the causal arguments
presentedby participantsand then determinewhetherthereare inconsistenciesin
the logic of these argumentsthatviolate the principleof transitivity.If there are,
then they conclude thatactorsare behavingstrategicallyand tryingto frametheir
argumentsin ways thatconceal theirtruemotives (Anthonyet al. 1994). However,
if inconsistentlogic might also stem simply from the intricaciesof complex pol-
icy debate,then we are still left wonderingwhat is going on. Alternatively,some
scholarsarguethatpolicy makersmay not be quite so cautious aboutconcealing
theirinterests.Forinstance,Hooks andhis associates (1998) analyzedthe content
of speeches and position papers of U.S. Congressionalrepresentativesto deter-
mine the degree to which they favoredmilitary spendingin their districtseither
becauseit suitedthe interestsof theirconstituentsor becauseit servedsome loftier
purpose,such as nationaldefense or the advancementof science. It appearedthat
representativessupportedspendingin their districtsbecause of the local benefits
it entailed,but often framedtheir supportin rhetoricconsistentwith their party's
general ideological philosophies.Thus, the question was not whethermaterialist
or idealistic motivationsprevailed,but how the two were blended.

ProgrammaticIdeas
Policy changes may also stem from new programmaticideas. These are precise
causal (i.e., cognitive) ideas that facilitate policy making among elites by speci-
fying how to solve particularpolicy problems.Policy programsare often the de-
pendentvariablesfor politicalsociologists andpolitical scientistsandarecentrally
located in the foregroundof policy debate. In contrastto cognitive paradigms,
which providean overarchingunderstandingof how the world worksand,in turn,
how political institutionsand policy instrumentsought to be organizedin order
to achieve broad policy goals, programmaticideas are more precise guidelines
abouthow already-existinginstitutionsand instrumentsshouldbe used in specific
situationsaccordingto the principlesof well-establishedparadigms(P.Hall 1993).
Thus, policy makersadjustfiscal or monetaryinstrumentsto achieve macroeco-
nomic goals in ways thathave workedin thepast, such as when Congresssoughtto
stimulateeconomic growthafterthe FirstWorldWarby reducingincome tax pro-
gressivity,coverage,andrates-an approachentirelyconsistentwith the dominant
supply-sideparadigmof the early twentiethcentury(Campbell& Allen 2001).
Much has been written about how interest-basedstruggles determinewhich
programspolicy makerseventuallyadopt,but little attentionhas been paid to how

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 IDEASANDPOLITICS 29

the characterof policy programsper se affects the chancesthatone will be adopted

over another.A few researchershave arguedthat programmaticideas expressed
in the simplest and strongestterms are the ones policy makersare most likely to
embrace,in partbecause they will be the ones policy makersmost easily under-
stand(Campbell1998, Solow 1989). In otherwords,the most successfulprograms
provide the clearest road maps out of troublesomeor uncertainpolicy situations
(Goldstein 1993, Goldstein & Keohane 1993). As a result, clear policy programs
providepowerfulweaponsin publicpolicy struggles(Blyth 1998, Kingdon 1984).
Of course, determiningobjectively and empiricallywhich programsare simplest
or clearestcan be difficult.
Othershave suggested that programsthat provide focal points aroundwhich
policy makerscan most easily buildpoliticalcoalitionsarethose thatpolicy makers
are likely to adopt (Goldstein 1993, Kingdon 1984, Moore 1988). Hence, one
reason the RepublicanPartypursuedprotectionisttradepolicy between 1870 and
1930 was thatit provideda meansfor maintainingits fractiouspartycoalitioneven
though a more open tradepolicy might have betterservedthe interestsof most of
its members(Goldstein 1993:ch. 3). The importanceof ideas as focal points may
increase the more equal the power is among contendingpolicy-making actors,
and the more uncertainactors are about the consequences of differentpolicies
(Garrett& Weingast 1993). However,much more work needs to be done on the
subject, perhapsthroughdetailed analyses of particularpolicy-makingepisodes
where investigatorsprobe the rationalesof policy makersand their advisors who
advocatethe adoptionof one programratherthananother.

THE ISSUE OF CAUSAL MECHANISMS

As noted above, one of the most importantproblemswith the literatureon ideas

and policy makingis thatthe causal mechanismswherebydifferenttypes of ideas
affect policy making are often poorly specified (Yee 1996). However, scholars
have made some progress.

Actors and EpistemicCommunities

One way to explain how ideas affect policy making is to show throughcareful
processtracinghow specificactorscarriedcertainideas intothe policy-makingfray
andused themeffectively.These actorsareoften academicsandotherintellectuals
whose claim to knowledge and expertise enables their voice to be heard above
others (Brint 1994a). For example, Skowronek(1982) arguedthat an intellectual
vanguardof university-trainedprofessionals, economists, and other progressive
thinkers were among America's most valuable state-buildingresources during
the early twentiethcentury.They played key roles in the developmentof a more
professional, bureaucraticU.S. state by providing all sorts of new ideas about
how to betterorganizethe state and exercise state power.Intellectualswere also
importantin advancingvarious programmaticideas about how to build welfare

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30 CAMPBELL

states in Europeand NorthAmerica (Rueschemeyer& Skocpol 1996). Similarly,

thinktanks,researchinstitutes,and universityacademics-notably economists-
have affectedindustrialand macroeconomicpolicy making(Domhoff 1998:ch.4;
Ricci 1993; Stone 1996; Smith 1991, 1989).
At the internationallevel "epistemiccommunities"are responsiblefor gener-
ating new ideas and disseminatingthem among national policy makers as well
as othersin the internationalcommunity.Epistemiccommunitiesare networksof
professionalsandexpertswith an authoritativeclaim to policy-relevantknowledge,
who sharea set of normativebeliefs, causal models, notions of empiricalvalidity,
and a common policy enterprise(Haas 1992). Keck & Sikkink(1998) arguedthat
these networksareespecially importantbecausetheirmembersareoften responsi-
ble for generatingthe very ideas thatconstitutethe worldculture,discussedearlier,
to which sociologists attributeisomorphiceffects at the nationallevel. Moreover,
Keck & Sikkinkspecifiedmorecarefullythanmost worldcultureresearchershow
these transnationalnetworksmobilize and frame information,and how they con-
vince powerfulinternationalactors,such as the WorldBankandU.S. government,
to press nation states that are reluctantto adopt internationallyaccepted human
rights,environmental,andotherpolicies (see also Risse et al. 1999). As such, their
contributionis threefold.First,they delineatedseveralcausalmechanismsthrough
which world culture affects national policy makers, thereby injecting a degree
of agency into the otherwise structuralistworld culture literature.Second, they
addressedthe importantdebateover whethera few centralizedhegemonicorgani-
zations(e.g., McNamara1998, Pauly 1997) or decentralizednetworksof organiza-
tions andindividuals,each of which is ratherweak on its own (e.g., Boli & Thomas
1999), areresponsiblefor the diffusionof worldculture.ForKeck & Sikkink,both
matter.Third,they showed thatthe diffusionof worldcultureoften involves much
struggle,conflict,andeven repression.Indeed,diffusionis a muchmoreunevenand
contestedprocess thanmuch of the literaturesuggests (see also Mittelman2000).

InstitutionalFiltersand Embeddedness
Of course, actorsdo not operatein a vacuum.Many researchershave arguedthat
the formalrules and proceduresgoverningpolicy makingaffect which ideas pen-
etratethe policy-makingprocess and are adoptedand implementedas policy. In
other words, institutionsinfluence the degree to which academics, other intel-
lectuals, and thus new policy ideas can access policy-making arenas. This sort
of institutionalfilteringhas affected economic policy (P. Hall 1989a,b), welfare
policy (Weir& Skocpol 1985), energy policy (Campbell1988, Jasper1990), and
nationalsecuritypolicy (Risse-Kappan1994). Studies have paid less attentionto
the informalchannels throughwhich this occurs, but insofar as intellectualsand
policy makerstravel in the same social circles, social as well as political insti-
tutions can act as filters in this sense (Domhoff 1974, Rueschemeyer& Skocpol
1996). Forinstance,one reasonwhy nationalunemploymentinsurancewas passed
in Britainwas that liberal social scientists from OxfordUniversity,who favored

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 IDEASANDPOLITICS 31

such a program,mingled in the same clubs, associations,and other social venues

as London'spolitical elite and urgedthem to adoptthis idea. As a result,when the
LiberalPartycame to power in the early twentiethcentury,many of these intellec-
tuals were appointedto key administrativeposts where they helped formulatethe
program,which was passed in 1911 (Schwebber1996). Indeed,the ways in which
idea-producinginstitutions,such as the professionsand universities,are linked to
the state helps determinewhich ideas affect policy making (Ziegler 1997).
Anothercriticism of the world cultureliteratureis that the diffusion of policy
ideas is a more complex and institutionallymediatedprocess than generally ac-
knowledged. When new policy ideas diffuse internationally,they are translated
into national practice in unique ways that fit with prevailing national political
institutions.Soysal (1994) showed how governmentsincorporateda new inter-
national discourse on postnationalpersonhoodand human rights into policy to
assist immigrantsin variousEuropeancountries,buttailoredit to conformto their
pre-existingpolitical norms and institutions.Statist Franceprovided for the na-
tional governmentto handle immigrantaffairs, corporatistSweden providedfor
the organizationof centralizedimmigrantorganizationsto participatein national
policy bargaining,liberal Britainenacted laws against discriminationand racial
inequalitythatcould be deployedon an individualbasis throughthe courts.Similar
translationprocesses are evident as policy models are adoptedacross subnational
governments(Strang& Bradburn2001). As a result,the processof policy diffusion
does not always lead to as muchisomorphismor homogenizationas this literature
often claims (Campbell2001, Kitscheltet al. 1999).
Finally, some scholarshave arguedthatideas exert long-termeffects on policy
making by becoming embeddedin the law and institutionalizedin administrative
procedures,programs,andbureaucracies.They also claim thatonce programmatic
andparadigmaticideas areinstitutionalizedin these ways they generateconstituen-
cies that defend them wheneverthey come under attacklater. Consequently,in-
stitutionalizedideas help us understandthe prolongedstabilityor path-dependent
natureof public policy (e.g., Goldstein 1993, Goldstein& Keohane 1993, Pierson
1993, 1994, Skocpol 1992).
Howeverprovocativethese notions aboutthe relationshipsbetween ideas and
institutionsmay be, critics chargethatthey areflawed(Yee 1996, Jacobsen1995).
To begin with, the path-dependentargumentsuffersbecause once ideas have be-
come institutionalizedin rules, procedures,agencies, and the like, it is no longer
clear whetherthe ideas or the institutionswithin which they are embedded are
more importantfor future policy-makingepisodes. Similarly,the actor-centered
approachfails to differentiatethe effects of ideas themselves from the effects of
the actorswho bearthem.Researchershavefoundthatthe statusof the actorsbear-
ing new ideas affects the odds thatpolicy makerswill adopttheirideas (Goldstein
1993:15).In otherwords,the persuasivenessof ideas is assumedratherthananalyt-
ically partitionedandempiricallydemonstrated.In turn,some of these critics sug-
gest thatif we areconcernedwithunderstandinghow ideasthemselvesaffectpolicy
making,thena morefruitfulapproachis to focus on thenatureof politicaldiscourse.

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32 CAMPBELL

Discourse
Studies have triedto identifyhow the taken-for-granted paradigmsand normative
frameworksthatresidein the backgroundof policy-makingepisodes, andof which
policy makersare often unaware,constrainpolicy making,as is often claimed.To
do so, they have explored how the structureof political discourse and language
shapeshow policy ideas arecommunicatedandtranslatedinto practice.Typically,
they maintainthatpre-existingdiscursivestructures(i.e., concepts,metaphors,lin-
guistic codes, rules of logic, etc.) contain cognitive and normativeelements that
mediatewhich policy programspolicy makerscan best perceive,understand,artic-
ulate, and as a result, which policy ideas they are likely to adopt(e.g., Alexander
& Smith 1993, Block 1990, Bourdieu 1998, Go 1999, Hay 1996, 2001). Block
(1996), for instance, arguedthat a varietyof extraordinarilyvivid anti-statistim-
ages, metaphors,stories,andanalogies-notably thatof a "vampirestate"sucking
thebloodoutof theeconomy-underpin muchpolicy discoursein the UnitedStates
and,therefore,effectively impede discussion of alternativepolicy approachesthat
might favorincreasedor differentforms of state economic intervention.
However, claiming that discourse has these effects is one thing, empirically
proving it is another.Several approachesare available. First, some researchers
demonstratedthroughexperimentsthat political actors are more likely to favor
policy interpretationsthat best conform to their cognitive schema and political
beliefs. Because political decisions are made by people who are subject to the
limits of boundedrationality,they inevitablyuse cognitive and normativeheuris-
tics and short-cutsto form their opinions (e.g., Lau et al. 1991; for a review see
Jones 1999). Thus, following Block (1996), if advocates of a particularpolicy
position can saturatethe political landscapewith metaphorsand otherdiscursive
short-cutswell enough so thatthey become partof people's taken-for-granted cog-
nitive schema,then people will tend to prefertheirposition. Second, investigators
interviewedpolicy makersto maptheirpolicy preferencesandthendeterminehow
they interpretthe policy consequencesof policy-relevantevents, such as environ-
mentalaccidents.Resultshave suggestedthatthese maps were good predictorsof
policy makers' interpretationsof both simulatedand real events (Bonham et al.
1978, Shapiroet al. 1988). Finally, thereare qualitativeapproachesemphasizing
thick historicaldescriptionand process tracing.These studies use detailed anal-
yses of policy documents,debates, and histories to determine,for instance, how
policy makersdefine problemsand crises dependingon their normativeand cog-
nitivepresuppositions(Hay 1996, 2001, Rochefort& Cobb 1994), or the degreeto
which new policy ideas are blendedwith these presuppositionsto facilitatepolicy
change in different policy-making contexts (Kjaer & Pedersen 2001, Schmidt
2001, 2000). As such, the degree to which discursivestructuresinfluencepolicy
is said to be a functionof how closely a new policy initiativeresembleseitherthe
new ideal upon which it is based or the old policy principlesalreadyin use. For
example, Vogel (1996) showed that neoliberalprinciplesof marketderegulation
were translatedinto practice in very different ways across countries depending

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 IDEASANDPOLITICS 33

in parton the prevailingnationalpolicy discourses. Vogel notwithstanding,some

have criticizedthis approachbecause it fails to specify the processes wherebynew
ideas are blendedwith old ones, and it does not test ideationalhypothesesagainst
alternatives(Yee 1996:102).

CONCLUSION

Scholars have tried to synthesize some of the concepts and argumentsreviewed

here in orderto specify the conditionsunderwhich differenttypes of ideas matter
the most. Some sharethe view that differenttypes of ideas have differenteffects
at differentstages of the policy-makingprocess (e.g., Blyth 2002, 1998, Campbell
1998, Woods 1995). Forinstance,Goldstein(1993:ch. 1) suggestsfour stages:Old
policy programsaredelegitimizedwhen they areperceivedto fail for some reason;
a searchfor new ones resultswhen policy entrepreneursare attractedto programs
thatappearlogical and thatconformto theirnormativeframeworksand cognitive
paradigms;once identified,new programsare implementedandtested in practice;
if policy makersperceive thatthey work, then they will become institutionalized,
often through legal mechanisms, into formal governmentorganizations.Other
scholarshave arguedthatpolicy makersadoptnew policies only if they conform
to the contingencies of the moment. Peter Hall (1989, see also Kingdon 1984)
maintainedthat in orderfor new economic policy programsto be embraced,they
must simultaneouslyfulfill three conditions. First, they must be economically
viable insofaras they appearto resolve relevanteconomic problemsandbe consis-
tent with the nation's economic structure(i.e., its size, degree of tradeopenness,
sophisticationof financial system, etc.). Second, they must be administratively
viable insofaras they are feasible given the existing set of state capacities.Third,
they must be politically viable insofar as they do not fundamentallythreatenkey
interestgroupsand, conversely,providethe basis for buildingpolitical coalitions.
In eithercase, this work seeks to betterunderstandthe connectionsbetweenideas,
institutions,andinterestsand, as a result,constitutesan importantpartof the latest
work in the new institutionalanalysis in political sociology and political science
(Campbell& Pedersen2001).
Finally, it is importantto note that althoughmuch of the literatureon ideas,
politics, and public policy rejects the old idealist notion that ideas ratherthan in-
terestsmatter,manyresearchersstill begin by asking underwhat conditionsideas
mattermore or less thaninterests(e.g., Goldstein & Keohane 1993, McDonough
1997). This is certainly an importantquestion, but one that could lead back to
the old debate between idealist versus materialistexplanationsof politics in that
it holds open the possibility thatunderat least some conditionsideas may matter
substantiallymore than interests.A more fruitfulapproachwould ask how ideas
and interestsinteract(Campbell2002, J. Hall 1993, P. Hall 1993, Jacobsen 1995,
Risse et al. 1999, Suchman 1997). Researchon how identities influencehow ac-
tors, such as labor unions, define their interestsis one example of how this sort

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
34 CAMPBELL

of question provides insights into importantpolitical phenomena(e.g., Locke &

Thelen 1985, Hattam 1993). Anotherillustrationis the researchon transnational
advocacynetworksthat shows how an interest-basedrationalactormodel can be
combined with an idea-basedsocial constructionistmodel to provide significant
insights into the processes wherebynew policy programsare spreadinternation-
ally (Keck & Sikkink 1998, Risse et al. 1999). By asking how ideas and interests
connect and affect each other, scholars can avoid the pitfalls of the old idealist
versus materialistdebate aboutthe natureof public policy making.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanksgo to Michael Allen and John Skrentnyfor very helpful comments on a
previousdraft,andto Ove Pedersenfor stimulatingconversationaboutthis subject.

The AnnualReviewof Sociologyis online at http://soc.annualreviews.org

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