Course: Foreign Policy of Pakistan-II (4662)

Semester: Spring, 2021

ASSIGNMENT No. 1
Q. 1 The US policy towards South Asia was realistic as it keep India an Pakistan on board by providing
economic assistance to both the countries but Pakistan’s policy was unrealistic as in its effort to make
alliances with the West it antagonized the USSR. Make a critical analysis of Pakistan’s unrealistic
policy.
1. The rapid growth in Chinese Communist power and the intensification of the Soviet economic offensive in
South Asia, which seem likely to intensify the threat posed to Free World interests in Asia over the next decade,
underline the importance of developing in South [Page 30]Asia, particularly in India, a successful alternative to
Communism in an Asian context. In the nations of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, there is considerable potential
for achieving this goal.
2. The South Asian nations have a population equal to about one quarter of the Free World total. Strategically
located athwart the land and sea lanes of communication between the Middle and Far East, South Asia has
valuable natural resources, including India’s rich iron and coal deposits. India and Pakistan inherited from the
British a tradition of sound administration and a good civil service, and a common language, English, which
make possible communication among the various cultural groups inhabiting the sub-continent. India also
inherited an extensive rail network.
3. However, critical internal problems and strife among the area nations pose serious obstacles to the emergence
of a strong and stable South Asia. Despite an impressive volume of external assistance (roughly $4.5 billion
provided or pledged from Jan. 1, 1955 through June 30, 1959) 2 the area continues beset by a multitude of
political, social and economic problems. Living standards are extremely low and efforts to improve them are
seriously impeded by continued rapid population growth, low productivity, inadequate financial resources,
shortages in trained personnel, and inflation.
4. It is now evident that the Soviets have designated India as a primary target in Asia. While the ultimate goal of
Soviet policy in India remains the accession to power of a government strongly influenced or controlled by
the USSR, the Soviet stepped-up economic offensive is aimed at gaining maximum influence over the
development of India’s economy and the direction of its policies. The Soviet offensive takes three main lines,
all of which capitalize on some of India’s most pressing needs. These lines are: (a) project aid programs of large
magnitude to influence and impress the Indian peoples and Government; (b) trade programs which will be
significant economically as well as psychologically, and which will wherever possible create situations of
Indian dependence upon the Soviet Union; (c) technical assistance programs calculated to win the sympathies of
a maximum number of Indian officials, scientists, engineers and students and the Indian intelligentsia in
general. New Delhi announced on July 29, 1959, that it has [Page 31]accepted an additional Soviet offer of
$378 million in aid which would be for India’s Third Five-Year Plan (1961–66). This credit brings total Soviet
Bloc aid to India to $702 million.
5. Except for Pakistan, which is a member of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, the nations of the area have
adopted a policy of neutralism. In India and Ceylon, the problem of Communist strength is a serious one;
however, these governments and the major political parties appear to be becoming increasingly aware of their
own self-interest in blocking Communist subversion and maintaining anti-Communist policies domestically.
The Communist Chinese brutal repression of the Tibetan revolt has contributed to a greater awareness of the
threat from Communist China. The difficulties arising out of the Communist control of the government of the
Indian state of Kerala have highlighted the Communist problem in India.
6. A solid basis was laid for the Indian national state by a series of domestic political successes: in dealing with
the princely states, in conducting national elections, and in laying down a national constitution. But divisive
regional, linguistic, caste and religious differences still exist, despite Nehru’s partly successful efforts to
eradicate them. The cohesion and popular appeal of the Congress Party is gradually deteriorating with the
Communist party being the next strongest party presently in sight.
7. Moreover, India is confronted with a major problem of economic development. Despite the substantial
progress made to date under the First Five-Year Plan (1951–1955) and part of the Second Five-Year Plan
(1956–1961), the continuing problems of unemployment and underemployment, unabated growth of population,
recurrent food shortages, and the increasing public demand for economic improvement provide potential tinder
for political extremism and are apparently leading to higher targets for the third plan (1961–1966).
Unemployment is increasing in urban areas. As originally formulated, the current Second Five-Year Plan
overemphasized industrialization at the expense of the agricultural sector. Preliminary planning indicates that
the Third Plan will devote considerably more attention to agriculture though it will continue the general
emphasis on industrialization. Continued deficit financing and heavy pressure on Indian foreign exchange
holdings are expected. Early informal proposals by Indian Planning Commission officials have projected net
foreign aid requirements for the period of the Third Five-Year Plan at $2.1 billion which is the level originally
projected in the Second Five-Year Plan. (Actually $2.3 billion of external assistance has, to date, been pledged
in support of the Second Five-Year Plan.) However, there have also been estimates by Indian Ministry of
Finance officials as to the external assistance [Page 32]requirements for the Third Five-Year Plan which range
as high as $5.0 billion.3 Formulation of the plan is still in the preliminary stages and a final decision by the
Indian Government as to its objectives and probable financing requirements is not expected for many months.
8. Should India fail to achieve a substantial economic expansion during the crucial next five years and lose the
momentum it has gained under Nehru’s leadership, it is unlikely to regain this momentum during the
foreseeable future. A period of economic and political decline would almost certainly set in, popular support for
the Congress Party would further diminish, dissension would grow both inside and outside the Congress Party,
and serious unrest might ensue.
9. The extent of India’s economic development will have international political ramifications as well. Asia and
Africa will be watching and comparing what the Indian and the Chinese Communist regimes are achieving for

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their peoples, in terms of rapid industrialization, as well as in terms of the impact on human freedoms and living
standards. A strong India would be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in an Asian context
and would permit the gradual development of the means to enforce its external security interests against
Communist Chinese expansion into South and Southeast Asia. A weak India, on the other hand, would be less
able to exert effective influence to counter that of Communist China in South and Southeast Asia.
10. In relation to its size and population, India maintains a relatively modest though by no means negligible
military establishment. India’s abiding concern is to maintain a substantial margin of superiority over Pakistan.
Pakistan’s military strength has been of concern to India because of fear of armed conflict with Pakistan arising
from differences over Kashmir and the waters of the Indus River. Pakistan’s membership in Western collective
security organizations is also a matter of concern to India because of the possibility that the subcontinent will
thereby become involved in cold war issues. U.S. military support to Pakistan has been interpreted to India as
contributing substantially to the threat of Pakistani aggression. It can be expected, therefore, that India will
continue to purchase military equipment from abroad to the extent necessary to maintain its margin of
superiority over Pakistan. In addition, India has recently shown increasing concern over the security of its
northern borders and the Communist Chinese threat.
11. Despite some success in meeting the profound problems which confronted it at the outset, Pakistan after
twelve years of independent existence still lacks many of the basic elements of national integrity and lasting
political stability. The eastern and western wings of the country, separated by a thousand miles of Indian
territory, represent two widely disparate cultures, differing in ethnic structure, language, social and economic
patterns, and outlook. Chronic political instability coupled with persistent economic distress and rampant
corruption led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime under army control in October 1958. This
development, which many considered inevitable, was widely accepted, even welcomed, by most of the
Pakistani population. The advent of martial law and abolition of the existing political system brought a
temporary halt to the uncertain evolution of democratic processes in Pakistan under the parliamentary system.
In its place the new regime has introduced a deliberate program of “national reconstruction” in the political field
designed to promote an orderly evolution toward democracy through election of local councils, though not, for
the present, democratic government at higher levels.
12. Although its political institutions to date have failed to attain viability, Pakistan has nevertheless maintained
its national unity, and has made progress toward the resolution of basic economic problems. Pakistan has
achieved significant gains in industrial development, and will shortly undertake a new five-year development
plan expected to place heavy emphasis on improving the agricultural, power and transportation bases of the
economy. The plan’s goals are directed to a major extent to remedying the recurrent food crises in both East and
West Pakistan where poor marketing and storage facilities and inept administration have aggravated the
problems arising from chronic low productivity. In fulfilling the plan, the immediate bottlenecks seem likely to
be an unfavorable balance of payments and a shortage of technical and administrative skills. By its vigorous

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actions in the economic and financial spheres, the new regime in Pakistan has demonstrated a genuine
determination to overcome the basic ills of the economy, and offers a better hope than its predecessors of
raising general living standards in the country.
13. Over the longer term, however, there are a number of factors which may frustrate achievement of the
regime’s efforts to develop the political and economic foundations for enduring stability. There are possibilities
for rivalries and dissension within the military. Pressures are likely to build up among civilians, who will want
more participation in running the country’s affairs than Ayub is likely to give. These pressures are likely to be
stronger in East Pakistan, which is the main [Page 34]center of Communist activity and where the people resent
West Pakistan’s domination of the government. Should the regime’s firm grip on the country be loosened,
Communist influence in East Pakistan would probably expand, and could result in a serious threat to the
continued unity of Pakistan.
14. The present Pakistani regime is fundamentally anti-Communist and will probably continue to pursue a
foreign policy which is essentially pro-West in outlook and pro-U.S. in implementation. Pakistan’s role in
various UN councils has been helpful to U.S. objectives. However, its adherence to the Baghdad Pact
and SEATO is partly motivated by apprehension of India’s preponderant military position. Pakistan is also
concerned with its own differences with Afghanistan and with growing Communist influence in Afghanistan.
Pakistan, as a major Muslim and Asian power, can and does exert a moderating influence on the extreme
nationalism and anti-Western attitudes of some members of the Afro-Asian bloc, and it is in our interest to
continue to encourage Pakistan to do so.
15. Since 1954 Pakistan, with U.S. assistance, has greatly increased the military capability of its armed forces
which, however, are still one-third the size of those of its large neighbor, neutralist India. Many Pakistani
leaders regard their military establishment, including the U.S. supported portion thereof, primarily as a means of
defense against India. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s forces have been a major factor in maintaining Pakistan’s
stability and thereby contributing to Free World strength in the area.
16. The U.S. program for making up deficiencies in the Pakistan armed forces in accordance with the provisions
of the 1954 commitment is virtually completed, although deliveries will continue probably through 1960.
However, until international tensions in the area are relaxed, Pakistan may be expected to continue to place
great emphasis on its defense and to make substantial expenditures on its military establishment. U.S. policy
approved in January 1957 provided for U.S. assistance in support of Pakistan forces capable of maintaining
internal security, of offering limited resistance to external aggression, and of contributing to collective security
by these means and by the provision of token forces for collective military operations outside Pakistan. Current
U.S. strategic force goals established under this policy include 5½ army divisions. However, Pakistan maintains
an additional 2½ divisions which it uses to maintain internal security and to deter external aggression in East
Pakistan and for defense along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The maintenance of the present MAP-supported

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forces at an effective level of performance would require continuing U.S. military assistance and defense-
support.
17. Sufficient economic development to indicate continuing progress is believed to be a necessary ingredient in
maintaining reasonable political stability in Pakistan. The lack of natural resources, the shortage of technical
and administrative skills, the rate of increase in population, the dire shortage of domestic savings and the
financial burden of maintaining the military establishment, make the achievement of economic development
difficult. The development plan, which is being proposed from 1960 to 1965, will almost certainly require
substantial external assistance. The need for resources for economic development will compete with the costs of
maintaining the military establishment. This conflict in demand for Pakistan’s limited resources, both domestic
and foreign, could cause friction between the United States and Pakistan.
Q. 2 What was the plan of the USSR for the security of Asia? Why had Pakistan refused to join that plan
despite being invited by the USSR?
A review of Soviet diplomatic maneuvers since June 1969 when General Secretary Brezhnev tersely proposed
creating a system of collective security in Asia. Most observers speculated that the Soviets were seeking to
organize an anti-China united front; others suggested that they were preparing to move into the vacuum created
by the retraction of Western power from Southeast Asia. At first the Soviet purpose seemed clearly to elicit
reactions from potential members of the "system." Grounds for optimism were few. But following his
diplomatic successes in the Indo-Pakistan War, Brezhnev revived the proposal, this time elaborating lowest
common denominator principles for membership. India and the small states of Southeast Asia have been special
targets of Soviet blandishments, with little success. Thus far only Outer Mongolia and Iran have officially
endorsed the Soviet proposal. China's violent opposition has caused both North Korea and North Vietnam to
remain aloof and is regarded by the USSR as the major obstacle.
To be properly understood, Russia’s Asia policy and its peculiar, lopsided quality need to be considered in the
context of the country’s foreign policy overall and beyond the complementary nature of the Russian and
Chinese economies and political systems.
Much has been written about the legacy of the Mongol invasion and its impact on the development of the
Russian state, particularly in terms of the fear of what the late-nineteenth-century philosopher Vladimir
Solovyov described as the “yellow peril” and deep-seated concerns about Russia’s decline at a time in its
history when it is facing again a far more powerful civilization in the East. 3 The legacy of the invasion is
complex and multifaceted: the depiction of Mongols as brutal, ruthless invaders in Russian art has been
counterbalanced by the emergence of Eurasianism as a prominent intellectual current in post-Soviet Russia, as
well as by official statements comparing the influence of the Mongols favorably to European attitudes toward
Russia.4
However, it is Europe, rather than Asia, that has been the chief preoccupation of Russian foreign policy for over
400 years. Notwithstanding the importance of that historical legacy and its enormous geographic footprint—

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over 70 percent of its territory—in Asia, Russia fundamentally is a European country, and its foreign policy and
national security priorities are Eurocentric.5 Some three-quarters of its people live in Europe, and the population
of its vast Asian territory is declining. 6 Russia is, at best, a marginal and relatively new and inexperienced actor
in the Asia-Pacific; culturally, politically, historically, and strategically, it is bound to remain a European, rather
than an Asian or Eurasian, power. To further illustrate this point, more recently, Russia chose to close the
border with China at the end of January due to fears about the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Revealingly,
the Kremlin did not close its borders to travelers from Europe, where most of the infections came from, until the
middle of March. Evidently, the authorities considered Europe, despite its large number of infections and slow
response to the pandemic, much less of a threat than China.
Since the emergence of the modern Russian state and the rise of the Romanov dynasty, the country’s principal
foreign policy concerns have been in the European theater. After the turn of the seventeenth century, Russia
waged a seemingly endless chain of wars with a succession of major European powers—Poland, Sweden,
Turkey, France, the United Kingdom (UK), Austria, and Germany. Its two greatest wars in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries—against Napoleon’s France and Hitler’s Germany—are essential to Russia’s national
narrative. After suffering tremendous losses and coming perilously close to crushing defeats, Russia emerged
from both conflicts victorious and with its position as a great European power greatly enhanced. The narrative
of the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II has become the key element of the official Russian
national narrative of the Putin era. Tellingly, the campaign against Japan launched in August 1945 is largely
bypassed in that narrative. The Soviet Union’s contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, according to the
Kremlin, entitles Russia to a special role in the affairs of Europe and the world. 7 No such claim with respect to
Asia has ever been made.
Russia’s push into Asia with the conquest of Siberia and the expansion of the empire to the Pacific gets
relatively little attention in the country’s national narrative. It is treated largely as a sideshow undertaken by
small bands of enterprising adventurers as opposed to the push into Europe, a task which engaged all
instruments of national power.8 Siberia was the distant frontier, the place of exile for criminals, and the
unexplored, uncivilized part of the empire. Russia’s expansion into Central Asia in the nineteenth century is
usually treated as a secondary theater, an extension of the competition with the UK—often called the Great
Game.
Historically, the Russian terms for “Asia” and “Asians” were associated with perceptions of inferior culture and
civilization, so the terms were often used derogatorily, whereas Europe was considered the land of superior
culture and civilization for Russia to join and emulate.9 The ruling classes of the empire intermarried with
European aristocracy, and the Romanov dynasty was for generations part of the vast pan-European extended
royal family. Tsar Nicholas II, the last Romanov ruler, and the UK’s King George V were first cousins.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy efforts were concentrated in Europe, where the military
standoff between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact constituted the bloc’s

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principal national security concern. The Cold War’s other theaters—the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America—were derivative of the competition with the United
States and its European allies. The decade-long invasion and occupation of Afghanistan starting in 1979 was
also a byproduct of the Soviet Union’s confrontation with the West, principally the United States, but also
Western Europe.
Nonetheless, the tense relationship with China during much of the Cold War was undoubtedly one of the Soviet
Union’s top foreign policy and national security concerns, consuming vast military and economic resources.
But, even though it resulted in military clashes along their border, the rivalry with China never reached the scale
and intensity of the competition with the United States; nor was Beijing viewed as the same existential threat
represented by the United States and its NATO allies.10 As the United States and China moved to normalize
relations in the 1970s, the Sino-Soviet rivalry acquired an additional dimension, and the standoff with China
turned into yet another theater for the Soviet Union in the Cold War with the West.
Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, the Soviet Union’s reach was limited, with North Korea and Vietnam as its only
client states. However, those relationships, too, were byproducts of the Soviet-U.S. Cold War rivalry. Other
major regional actors—Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia—were firmly in the U.S.
sphere of influence.
The end of the Cold War resulted in relatively few changes in the geographic priorities of Russia’s foreign
policy. The normalization of relations with China was a major breakthrough that relieved the country of the
burden of having to secure the vast and heavily militarized border, but Moscow’s relationships with the West
remained by far the most important element of its foreign policy. The West had emerged dominant from the
Cold War, and throughout the early post-Soviet period, Russian domestic reforms—economic and political—
had the stated objective of making the country more like Western democratic capitalist societies. The West was
the principal source of assistance and technical know-how for these reforms. Whereas Russia’s relationship
with China was also of great importance, it was not as important as ties to the West—for China itself was
undergoing major reforms, some very similar to Russia’s, and Beijing could not yet compare to the partnership
with the West in terms of strategic and economic weight on the world stage.
Q. 3 Elaborate Pakistan’s relations with Iran from 1947 to 1953. Why the leadership of Pakistan could not
learning the lesson from the dislodging of Muhammad Mosaddegh government by CIA in 1953?
Pakistan-Iran bilateral relations are rooted in historical linkages and based on religious, linguistic, cultural
linkages and spiritual affiliation. Relations between Pakistan and Iran have by and large remained positive. Iran
was the first country to recognize Pakistan after independence. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran,
Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the new dispensation. The two countries have supported
each other at critical junctures in their history.
Bilateral Political Relations

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2. Bilateral relations between Pakistan and Iran are undergoing a transformative phase. There is a renewed
energy and growing positivity and desire to work together between the two countries. The growing warmth in
our relations and desire to re-engage can be measured from the fact that Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Javad
Zarif was the first foreign dignitary to visit on 31 August 2018 after formation of new government in Pakistan.
The Foreign Minister once again visited on 31 October 2018 and in May 2019. Foreign Minister Makhdoom
Shah Mahmood Qureshi also visited Iran on 24 December 2018.
3. The Prime Minister Imran Khan made his first official visit to Iran at the invitation of Iranian President
Dr. Hassan Rouhani on 21-22 April 2019. The timely and fruitful visit contributed to enhancing mutual
understanding on a range of issues in political, economic and security areas. The visit helped in setting a clear
policy direction for durable, mutually-beneficial relations with Iran. The key outcomes of the visit include;
Signing of Declaration for Cooperation in Healthcare Sector; initiation of the process for release of a number of
Pakistani prisoners; holding meetings of various bilateral mechanisms; opening of new crossing points; and
call for peaceful solution of Jammu &Kashmir dispute.
4. Iran has remained strong supporter of the Kashmir cause. It has openly voiced support for the innocent
Kashmiris under brutal siege of Indian forces. The Iranian high leadership has also repeatedly given statements
in support of people of Kashmir and condemned unjust Indian atrocities. Similarly, Pakistan’s support on Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and commitment towards Iran despite US’ unilateral sanctions has
been greatly appreciated in Iran.
5. Despite the excellent bilateral relations, the current trade volume between the two countries is below its
full potential. Currently, the volume of trade is US $ 392.08 million with $22.86 million Pakistani exports
comprising mainly of rice, meat, paper and paper board, chemicals, textiles, fruit & vegetables; major imports
from Iran comprise mainly of iron ore, hide & skins, and chemical products (Pakistani imports US$ 369.23
million).
6. Iran and Pakistan are working together at expert level to improve road and rail connectivity. This
includes upgradation of 700 kilometer Quetta-Taftan highway, improvement of facilities at border crossing
points, opening up of new border crossing points (Gabd-Reemdan and Mand-Pishin) and improvement of
facilities available to Zaireen during their visits to Iran, Iraq and other countries.
7. Pakistan-Iran border has been named “Border of Peace, Friendship and Love” by the leadership of
both countries. There are many border management mechanisms operational between the two countries.
8. There is a significant number of Pakistani diaspora living in Iran. Moreover, a large number of Zaireen
(0.3 million) visit holy places and shrines in Iran, Iraq and Syria via Quetta Taftan border. There is also a work
going on to further strengthen the bilateral relations with Iran through promotion of religious tourism by
enhancing tourism to historic religious sites in Pakistan including facilitation to Zaireen.
The Soviets accepted Amin's acquisition of power and tried to work with him. But Amin was, of course,
very wary of the Soviets. The Soviets wanted to put troops in Afghanistan because they feared there

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would be an American invasion of Iran as a result of the hostage crisis. Amin feared the Soviet troops
would be used to depose him.
Amin fearing for his survival and uncertain of whom he could trust started putting his relatives into
positions of power. Amin put one of his nephews in charge of the secret police, but that nephew was
assassinated. Amin moved his headquarters out of Kabul in concern for his own safety.
The Soviets decided to invade Afghanistan. They sent paratroops to capture and execute Amin. After
Amin was taken care of, a bogus call was make for Soviet troops to enter the country. According to the
Soviet's cover story they were only responding to a call for assistance from the Afghan Revolutionary
Central Committee. According to them they were only complying with the 1978 Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Good Neighborliness. The execution of Hafizullah Amin was, according to the Soviets,
the action of the Afghan Revolutionary Central Committee. That committee then elected as head of
government Barbrak Karmal, who was in exile in Moscow. Karmal returned to Afghanistan in a Soviet
transport plane. He presided over the occupation of Afghanistan by 115,000 Soviet troops.
Q. 4 Make a detailed analysis of ups and downs in Egypt Pakistan relations.
Pakistan's track record offers several parallels to this month's military takeover in Egypt, including both
cautionary tales and potentially useful strategies for transition. From the aftermath of the 1977 coup to the
peaceful transfer of power following elections this May, Washington (and Cairo) can glean several lessons from
Islamabad's efforts to implement true civilian rule against the persistent prospect of state failure.
LONG EXPERIENCE WITH COUPS
Like Egypt, Pakistan is geographically large, with a big population and high poverty rate. And in both countries,
colonial experience bequeathed Western-style bureaucracy and military forces. Since its creation in 1947,
Pakistan has been ruled by the military for the majority of its existence. Even now, with a civilian government,
the military is a major player, retaining apparent veto power over the nation's foreign and defense policies as
well as control of its nuclear weapons.
The military is assisted by Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy, particularly its intelligence and security forces. The
scope and reach of this military-bureaucratic elite defies definition; it often resembles the rumored Turkish
"deep state." For example, the resident New York Times correspondent was expelled during this year's elections
for unspecified "undesirable activities," despite protests to the country's political leadership.
Pakistan has undergone three "military eras." The first was from 1958 to 1971 -- Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan
initially seized power, later handing it to Gen. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan in 1968 due to ill health. In 1971,
after Pakistani forces lost control of the territory that became Bangladesh, Yahya Khan ceded power to Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, a civilian politician who was subsequently elected prime minister under a new constitution in 1973.
The second military era began in 1977, when Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq took over from Bhutto after disputed
elections spurred months of street protests. He remained in power until 1988, when he was killed (along with
the American ambassador) in a still-mysterious plane crash.

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The third military era lasted from 1999 to 2008. Prior to this period, the office of prime minister was held by
several politicians, including Benazir Bhutto (Zulfiqar's daughter) and Nawaz Sharif. In October 1999,
however, Gen. Pervez Musharraf overthrew Sharif after the prime minister tried to replace him as head of the
army. Musharraf was eventually forced to give up power in 2008 after Benazir Bhutto's party won elections,
though she herself was assassinated before the vote took place.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Of these military takeovers, Pakistan's 1977 coup most closely resembles the recent events in Egypt. At the
time, the Pakistani military was commanded by Zia-ul-Haq, whom Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had promoted to army
chief because he was not perceived as a threat. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party had become the country's best-
organized political group, and he had also established a paramilitary unit under his own control.
On July 4, 1977, Zia ordered his forces to temporarily detain not only Bhutto and his senior colleagues, but also
the country's motley collection of opposition leaders, including Islamists, conservatives, and members of
regional factions. The new martial-law administration justified its intervention by naming the coup "Operation
Fair Play" and claiming it wanted to quell social unrest. Zia also appointed technocrats as government ministers
while promising early elections, but it soon became clear that Bhutto would likely win any new vote.
Accordingly, the former premier was rearrested and prosecuted for ordering a 1974 political killing, and
eventually found guilty and hanged.
When the coup occurred, the Pakistani population was initially quiescent. Political activists lay low and, once
party leaders were released, devoted themselves to election campaigning rather than confronting the military.
The takeover itself involved classic coup methods: airports were closed, international telephone and telex lines
were cut, and newspapers went silent, then confined themselves to government communiques and sycophantic
editorials. Technological and social changes have made such techniques impossible today; in fact, they would
likely enrage the mass of ordinary Pakistanis who would otherwise want to keep their heads low. Although
domestic and cell phone connections rely on government assent, satellite telephones, while not common,
operate outside state control. Moreover, the Pakistani media is now vigorous in asserting its independence; the
government no doubt guides reporting on some subjects, but not to the point of full control.
LESSONS FOR EGYPT
Unique domestic factors aside, Egypt's military leaders would be foolish to ignore the experience of other
militaries in ruling a country and transferring power to civilians, along with the associated accoutrements of
elections, parliaments, and rule of law. Their first realization should be that armies are trained to fight battles,
not administer countries; concentrating on their security role may cause governance to suffer, and vice versa.
Second, although military elites confer high status on themselves, such respect has to be earned with civilians.
Poor administration and corruption can quickly damage the military's reputation. Third, properly timing a
political transition is very difficult; allowing even a little political activity creates its own momentum. Indeed,
the Egyptian military already mishandled the first post-Mubarak transition.

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Moreover, Pakistan's recent history shows how the personal qualities of -- and lingering contempt between --
military and political leaders can impede a stable transition. For example, President Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir
Bhutto's widower, had most of his powers stripped by the national assembly in 2010 and could face corruption
charges again this September, after his term ends and his immunity is lifted. For his part, Prime Minister Sharif
is renowned for his limited attention span and has accrued vast wealth, raising questions about his own business
probity. And Musharraf hugely overestimated his popularity by returning to stand in elections this year.
Ignominiously defeated, he is now under house arrest and could be tried for treason by Sharif, the prime
minister he overthrew in 1999; his army links may be the only thing saving him from execution. Similar
problems could rear their head in Egypt, where military leaders are likely contemptuous of some of the
politicians with whom they must now work. 
U.S. POLICY
As with Egypt, the United States has a long history of cooperation with Pakistan, particularly its military-
bureaucratic elite. For example, the ill-fated 1960 U-2 spying mission over the Soviet Union was launched from
a CIA facility at an air base in Peshawar. In 1971, national security advisor Henry Kissinger flew from Pakistan
to China on a secret mission to open diplomatic relations with Beijing. And during the 1980s, Pakistan was the
main U.S. partner in supplying arms to the mujahedin in neighboring Afghanistan, forcing the withdrawal of
Soviet forces.
Such cooperation has also had negative consequences, however, including the emergence of Osama bin Laden's
al-Qaeda, the decision to sometimes turn a blind eye to Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, and an
often awkward relationship with India, the regional power. U.S. relations with Pakistan's political leaders are
currently vexed by the CIA drone strikes against terrorist targets close to the border with Afghanistan, which
have outraged the populace because of civilian casualties and apparent abuse of Pakistan's sovereignty.
Nevertheless, Washington has repeatedly worked with Islamabad (as well as Pakistan's generals in nearby
Rawalpindi) to ease political transitions over the years. It has always been hard work, but Pakistan has
experienced significant periods of civilian rule, which is therefore easier to depict as an ideal (the same cannot
be said for Egypt, whose experience with civilian rule was very brief and negative). The success of the process
is best illustrated by Pakistan's peaceful postelection transition last month, from a government led by one party
to a new administration led by an opposition party. On the other side of the ledger is the perception that
Pakistan is no longer a U.S. ally (given the assumed help it gave to bin Laden during his years of hiding there)
and sometimes seems on the verge of becoming a failed state, the first with a nuclear weapons arsenal. These
factors suggest that the United States should work to maintain and even enhance its involvement with Cairo in
order to help manage the reemergence of a civilian-led democracy in Egypt.
Q. 5 What was West New guinea/West Iran dispute between Indonesia and Netherland and what was the
role of Pakistan in the resolution of this dispute?

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The territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) had been in the possession of the Netherlands since 1828. When
the Netherlands formally recognized the sovereign independence of Indonesia in 1949, the status of West Irian
remained unresolved. It was agreed in the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty C concluded between the
Netherlands and Indonesia at The Hague, Netherlands, in November 1949 C that the issue would be postponed
for a year, and that "the status quo of the presidency of New Guinea" would be "maintained under the
Government of the Netherlands" in the mean time. The ambiguity of the language, however, led the Netherlands
to consider itself the sovereign Power in West New Guinea, since this would be a continuation of the "status
quo". Indonesia, on the other hand, interpreted the Dutch role there to be strictly administrative, with the
implication that West Irian would be incorporated into Indonesia after a year.
The status of the territory was still being disputed when Indonesia brought the matter before the United Nations
in 1954. Indonesia claimed that the territory rightfully belonged to it and should be freed from Dutch colonial
rule. The Netherlands maintained that the Papuans of West New Guinea were not Indonesians and therefore
should be allowed to decide their own future when they were ready to do so. The future of the territory was
discussed at the General Assembly's regular sessions from 1954 to 1957 and at the 1961 session, but no
resolutions on it were adopted.
In December 1961, when increasing rancour between the Indonesian and Dutch Governments made the
prospect of a negotiated settlement even more elusive, Secretary-General U Thant, who had been appointed
Acting Secretary-General following the death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, undertook to resolve
the dispute through his good offices. Consulting with the Indonesian and Dutch Permanent Representatives to
the United Nations, he suggested that informal talks take place between the parties in the presence of former
United States Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who would act as the Secretary-General's representative. The
parties agreed, and talks were begun in early 1962.
A sharpening of tension between the two Governments occurred shortly thereafter, however, when Indonesia
landed paratroops in West New Guinea. The Netherlands charged that the landings constituted an act of
aggression, but Indonesia refuted this on the grounds that "Indonesians who have entered and who in future will
continue to enter West Irian are Indonesian nationals who move into Indonesia's own territory now dominated
by the Dutch by force". Secretary-General U Thant urged restraint by both parties but declined a Dutch request
to send United Nations observers to the scene, noting that such action could only be considered if both
Governments made the request. Further incidents were reported by the Netherlands during the first months of
1962, and there were intermittent lulls in the progress of Ambassador Bunker's talks.
The Acting Secretary-General was at last able to announce, on 31 July 1962, that a preliminary agreement had
been reached, and that official negotiations were to take place under his auspices. The final negotiations were
held at United Nations Headquarters under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, with Ambassador
Bunker continuing to act as mediator. An agreement was signed at New York by Indonesia and the Netherlands
on 15 August 1962. Ratification instruments were exchanged between the two countries on 20 September 1962

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and, the next day, the General Assembly took note of the agreement in resolution 1752 (XVII) of the same date,
authorizing the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein.
The agreement provided for the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) to be transferred by the
Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), to be headed by a United Nations
Administrator who would be acceptable to both parties and who would be appointed by the Secretary-General.
Under the Secretary-General's jurisdiction, UNTEA would have full authority after 1 October 1962 to
administer the territory, to maintain law and order, to protect the rights of the inhabitants and to ensure
uninterrupted, normal services until 1 May 1963, when the administration of the territory was to be transferred
to Indonesia.
The agreement also stipulated that the Secretary-General would provide a United Nations Security Force
(UNSF) to assist UNTEA with as many troops as the United Nations Administrator deemed necessary. In
"related understandings" to the main agreement, it was established that United Nations personnel would observe
the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority. The United
Nations was therefore entrusted with a dual peacekeeping role in addition to its administrative responsibilities
as the executive authority.
Arranging a ceasefire
To pave the way for the arrival in West Irian of UNTEA and UNSF, a ceasefire between Indonesian and
Netherlands forces had to be enforced. The memorandum of understanding concerning the ceasefire C
presented on 15 August 1962 in a note to the Acting Secretary-General from the representatives of Indonesia
and the Netherlands C requested that the Secretary-General undertake immediately some of the functions
outlined in the main agreement, so as to effect a cessation of hostilities as soon as possible. Such action would
constitute an "extraordinary measure", because the General Assembly would not be voting on the establishment
of UNTEA and UNSF until it convened in late September.
The Secretary-General responded promptly, stating that he was prepared to undertake the responsibilities
mentioned in the note. The memorandum on the cessation of hostilities specified that the Secretary-General
would assign United Nations personnel to perform certain tasks, including: observing the ceasefire; protecting
the security of Dutch and Indonesian forces; restoring the situation in the event of breaches of the ceasefire;
assisting in informing Indonesian troops in the jungle of the existence of the ceasefire; and providing a non-
military supply line to Indonesian troops.
Although there was no explicit reference to military observers in the memorandum, the Secretary-General
selected them to perform these tasks. Furthermore, he agreed to dispatch them without the prior authorization of
the General Assembly or the Security Council, a step never before taken by a Secretary-General. Reference was
made in the memorandum to UNSF and its law-and-order maintenance role, with the implication that the
Secretary-General should address this responsibility with all possible speed.

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The Secretary-General appointed Brigadier-General (later Major-General) Indar Jit Rikhye, his Military
Adviser, to head the military observer team that was to supervise all arrangements for the ceasefire. Six
Member States (Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden) agreed to provide 21 observers for this
purpose. They were drawn from troops of these nations then serving either in the United Nations Emergency
Force or the United Nations Operation in the Congo.
The observer force was assembled in West Irian within days of the signing of the agreement at United Nations
Headquarters. The observers were informed at that time that the Netherlands military command had proclaimed
a ceasefire as of 0001 GMT on 18 August 1962, and had ordered its ground forces to concentrate in the main
garrison towns, although air and naval forces continued to patrol the territory. After a visit to Djakarta by
General Rikhye, contacts were established with the Indonesian troops in the jungle. In this connection, frequent
radio broadcasts on both the Netherlands-owned and Indonesian stations told the troops that hostilities had
ceased. Printed pamphlets carrying the ceasefire message were dropped from airplanes over the jungle.
Besides supervising the ceasefire, the United Nations observers helped resupply the Indonesian troops with food
and medicines and helped them regroup in selected places. The effort was successful owing to the full
cooperation of the Indonesian and Netherlands authorities. Aerial support was given by the Thirteenth United
States Task Force for the Far East and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Most of the emergency supplies were
provided by the Netherlands military command, which also treated any Indonesian troops who were seriously
ill. United Nations aircraft landed supplies in four staging areas: Sorong, Fakfak, Kaimana and Merauke.
By 21 September 1962, General Rikhye was able to report that all Indonesian forces in West Irian had been
located and concentrated, that resupply had been assured and that over 500 Indonesian political detainees had
been repatriated in accordance with the memorandum. The observers' mandate had thus been fulfilled and all
actions concerning the cessation of hostilities had been completed without incident.

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