European Journal of Psychological Assessment, Vol. 19, Issue 1, pp.

40–53

Convergence of
Agents’ and Targets’
Reports on
Intraorganizational
Influence Attempts*
Gerhard Blickle
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany
Keywords: intraorganizational influence strategies, multitrait-multimethod analysis,
structural equation models, latent state-trait models

Summary: The object of the current study was to determine the convergent and discriminant validity of
agents’ and targets’ reports on intraorganizational influence attempts with a structural equation model using
latent state-trait analyses. To explain agent-target convergence, we linked the theory of formal organizations
to Cor- respondent Inference Theory. Managers (agents) were asked to describe how they try to influence
their boss, a coworker, and a subordinate. These targets also described how the agent tries to influence them.
Both agents and targets rated four types of influence attempts twice within 2½ months, namely, rational
persuasion, ingra- tiation, pressure, and upward appeals. In the multitrait-multimethod design, we analyzed
209 complete sets of questionnaires (one agent questionnaire, three target questionnaires, N = 836). The use
of structural equation models in analyzing multitrait-multimethod matrices has often resulted in severe
difficulties. In the present research, these problems were not encountered. On the whole, the agent-target
convergence was low but significant.

Introduction Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) postulated three basic

in- traorganizational influence dimensions, including
hard (e. g., assertiveness, appeals to higher authorities,
Social influence processes are generally acknowledged
coali- tion), soft (e. g., ingratiation), and rational
to be a pervasive aspect of organizational life. To be
tactics (e. g., reason, bargaining). This classification
effective, managers must influence subordinates, peers,
scheme has since been adopted by other researchers as
and superiors to support their proposals and plans, and
well (cf. Deluga, 1991; Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Thacker
to motivate them to implement their decisions. Within
& Wayne, 1995). However, this classification is not
the past two decades, organizational theory and
sufficient because it does not consider indirect
research have made substantial contributions to our
influence strategies. An indi- rect influence strategy is
understand- ing of the influence processes in
the attempt to influence a sec- ond target person by
organizations by which agents attempt to change the
first influencing a first target person. An example is
attitudes and gain compli- ance from other persons in
the upward influence strategy: In order to influence a
organizations (cf. Blickle, 2000a; Blickle, in press;
peer, a person may appeal to the peer’s boss. Many
Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988; Rao, Schmidt, & Murray,
studies of organizational influence have relied on self-
1995; Wayne & Liden, 1995; Wayne, Liden, Graf, &
rating scales (Ansari, 1990; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1982;
Ferris, 1997; Yukl & Tracey, 1992).
Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990; Yukl & Falbe, 1990).
Respondents are asked to describe retrospectively their

* The original data upon which this paper is based are available at http://www.hhpub.com/journals/ejpa
EJPA 19 (1), © 2003 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
DOI: 10.1027//1015-5759.19.1.40
 G. Blickle: Intraorganizational 41
Influence

acts of influence. Other studies have relied on target agent-target convergence was artificial.
re- ports (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl, Lepsinger, & Summing up these findings the following
Lucia, 1992; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). The object of the conclusions emerge. To examine the convergent and
current study was to determine the convergent and discriminant va-
discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) of
agents’ and targets’ reports on intraorganizational
influence attempts.
To date, only three published studies have examined
the convergent validity of agent and target reports on
intraorganizational influence attempts. Yukl and Falbe
(1990) compared the rank order of influence scale
means from the agent and target perspective.
Substantial agree- ment occurred between agents and
targets on the relative use of the influence tactics.
However, in the Yukl and Falbe (1990) study, agents
and targets were not directly related to each other. The
data were not drawn from real influence dyads;
instead, rank orders were correlated from different
samples.
Rao, Schmidt, and Murray (1995) examined the
rela- tionship between self-ratings of upward influence
tactics reported by subordinates and managerial
perceptions of their influence style. These data were
based on real sub- ordinate-superior dyads.
Subordinates’ questionnaires were matched with
managers’ questionnaires through a common code
number. No significant convergent corre- lations
emerged between agents’ self-ratings of influence
attempts and targets’ perceptions of this influence at-
tempts. These results profoundly put into question the
validity of either agents’ reports, targets’ reports, or
both kinds of reports on influence attempts in
organizations. However, this study had several
limitations. First, the sample was small (n = 67 dyads);
the convergent validity coefficients ranged between r =
.11 and r = .18. So, perhaps, the statistical power was
too low to detect sig- nificant correlations. Second,
agents and targets did not use parallel but rather
different scales. This could have artificially lowered
agent-target convergence. Third, the study examined
the upward influence direction only, so we do not
know whether the results can be generalized to the
lateral- and downward-influence direction.
Blickle (1998) requested agents to select randomly a
person at the same hierarchical level from the same de-
partment to rate their own influence attempts on that
person and vice versa to have this person rate the
agent’s influence tactic. Peers’ questionnaires were
matched through a common code number. A total of
228 dyads participated in the study. Agents and targets
used parallel scales (Yukl, 1997). The convergent
validity coefficients ranged between r = . 48 and r = .
68. However, the dis- criminant validity (Campbell &
Fiske, 1959) of the rat- ings was very low. The average
inter-factor correlation was r = .52. Hence, the high
EJPA 19 (1), © 2003 Hogrefe & Huber
Publishers
42 G. Blickle: Intraorganizational
Influence
lidity of agent and target reports on departs from the norm than when it is
intraorganizational influence attempts, matched
agent-target dyads, parallel scales, big samples, and
parallel data from upward-, lat- eral-, and downward-
influence attempts are needed. In addition, theoretical
considerations on the institutional context of behavior
and the mechanisms of forming dis- positional
attributions are necessary.
In the present research, four influence tactics were
selected, namely one that was hard, one that was soft,
one that was rational, and one that was indirect. To
explain agent-target convergence the Correspondent
Inference Theory (Jones & Davis, 1965) was linked to
the theory of formal organizations (Weber, 1947). The
theory of formal organizations explains which
expectations are normative in formal organizations.
Correspondent Infer- ence Theory explains the
conditions leading to disposi- tional attributions. One
important condition is whether behavior does or does
not conform to normative expec- tations.
Formal organizations are based on rules (Jablin,
1996; Mintzberg, 1973; Ouchi, 1980). In a formal
organization, an employee agrees to receive wages in
exchange for submitting to the legitimate right of the
organization to appoint superior officers who direct
the work activities of the employee from day to day.
Formal organizations have a hierarchy which
mediates the chain of command and the flow of
information. Members of formal organi- zations are
expected to cooperate with each other and to
communicate rationally with superiors.
When we ask people to describe behavioral
tendencies of the self of others they will resort to the
impressions formed of the self or others in memory.
Respondents automatically filter, cumulate, weight,
and integrate past experience (Block, 1977). These
behavioral tendencies attributed to specific persons
are called dispositional at- tributions. An example of a
dispositional attribution is when an observer reports:
“This person very often uses arguments to influence
peers.” or when the actor reports: “I tend to use
arguments to influence peers.” In the pre- sent
research it is assumed that the agent knows the re-
current tendencies of his actions and makes
dispositional attributions concerning himself or
herself because social influence is a deliberate
process. However, if the observ- er does not make
dispositional but situational attributions there can be
no convergence between actors and observ- ers if both
are asked for reporting recurrent actions of the actor.
The Correspondent Inference Theory (Gilbert,
1998) explains dispositional attributions. If targets
observe how an agent tries to influence them, they
make under certain conditions dispositional
attributions. One factor that leads targets to make
dispositional inferences is un- expected behavior. An
action tells the target more about an agent when it
EJPA 19 (1), © 2003 Hogrefe & Huber
Publishers
typical, part of a social role. Another factor that leads lateral and downward influence direction in formal
targets to make dispositional inferences are the organiza- tions rational persuasion is not normative but
outcomes of actions. Acts that produce many outcomes an option.
do not re- veal a person’s dispositions as clearly as acts
that pro- duce only a single outcome.
Using pressure in organizations is a hard influence
strategy. It means trying to influence others by setting
deadlines, refusing to take no for an answer, repeatedly
reminding the target, or openly defying the target.
Using pressure is not normative but members of formal
organi- zations are expected to cooperate (Ouchi,
1980; Weber, 1947). It is hard to imagine how this
tactic could be used by the agent automatically,
without thought and plan- ning. From the target’s
perspective, being put under pres- sure is also quite
obvious. In addition, targets will exhibit a trait
negativity bias, the tendency for negative informa- tion
to weight more heavily than positive information
(Coovert & Reeder, 1990). Therefore, it was expected,
that reports on pressure will converge in all three influ-
ence directions. These expectations can be summarized
in the following way.
Hypothesis 1: Agents’ and targets’ reports on the
use of pressure as influence attempts in formal
organizations will converge substantially in upward,
lateral, and down- ward influence direction.
Ingratiation is an example of a soft influence
strategy. Unlike pressure, ingratiation is a subtle form
of influ- ence. The agent expresses sympathy,
admiration, or per- sonal interest. The agent praises the
target, gives positive evaluations, and bolsters the
target’s self-esteem. How- ever, the agent tries to
disguise that he or she is acting with afterthought. The
agent demonstrates friendliness, but the flattery is
calculated. Often, it is successful if the target is not
aware it is being used. In addition, positive information
is weighted less heavily than negative infor- mation
(Coovert & Reeder, 1990). As ingratiation is a positive
information and a subtle form of influence only low
actor-target convergence is expected but it could even
be zero.
Rational persuasion is an example of a rational
influ- ence tactics. It means using facts, data, and
logical argu- ments to influence others. When agents
and targets ex- change arguments, this occurs with
thought and plan- ning, based on goals and scripts. So
agents and targets can easily describe persuasive
attempts as rational influ- ence attempts. One factor
that leads targets to make dis- positional inferences is
unexpected behavior. An action tells the target more
about an agent when it departs from the norm than
when it is typical, part of a social role. As rational
persuasion in upward influence is normative (Jablin,
1979, 1996) it does not lead superiors to make
dispositional inferences about subordinates. In the
Therefore, only in the lateral and downward influence measuring the use
direction significant convergence was expected.
Hypothesis 2: Agents’ and targets’ reports on the
use of rational persuasion in formal organizations will
con- verge substantially in lateral and downward
influence direction.
Appealing to higher authorities is an example of an
indirect influence strategy. It means invoking the
assis- tance of higher levels to back up requests. The
agent does not confront the target directly but turns to
one of the target’s superiors. It is normative
(Mintzberg, 1973), that the chain of command and the
flow of information be- tween a subordinate and a
higher up is mediated by the direct superior.
Therefore, if the subordinate tries to pass over his
immediate superior by appealing to higher au-
thorities this is unexpected behavior and will cause
dis- positional attributions.
Hypothesis 3: In the upward influence direction
agents’ and targets’ reports on the use of appealing to
higher authorities as influence attempts will converge
substantially.
The case in lateral and downward influence
attempts is different. The immediate target of upward
appeals in the lateral and downward influence
direction is the su- pervisor of the actor. The ultimate
targets are peers and subordinates. From the
perspective of the ultimate tar- gets there may be
many reasons why the actor talked to his supervisor:
Asking for help, getting information, or among many
others possible reasons, complaining about a peer or a
subordinate. Therefore, from the perspective of the
ultimate targets upward influence attempts of the
actor may have many different outcomes.
The Correspondent Inference Theory states that tar-
gets consider the effects or consequences of an
agent’s behavior. Acts that produce many outcomes
do not reveal a person’s dispositions as clearly as acts
that produce only a single outcome. Therefore, it is
difficult for the target in the coworker or subordinate
position to make an inference about the agent’s aim
and disposition. There- fore, no convergence
concerning upward appeals is ex- pected in the lateral
and downward influence direction.

Materials and Methods

Subjects
Table 1 contains the information on the subjects.
Since it was the intention in the present research to
analyze amounts of agent-target convergence using
struc- tural equation models, a sample size of at least
200 com- plete sets (one agent questionnaire and three
target ques- tionnaires) of the first and second wave
Table 1. The sample. ward-influence directions was needed. As statistical
First wave Second wave
sim- ulations demonstrate (Marsh, Ballah &
MacDonald, 1988), this sample size is necessary to
Distributed sets: 1412 Distributed sets: 267 interpret meaning- fully the fit-indices of structural
Agents Agents equation models.
returns: 494 q returns: 243 q In the first wave, 1,412 questionnaire sets were dis-
age: M = 44 years age: M = 44.6 years tributed. Of these, 267 complete sets (one agent and
male: 71 male: 74 his superior, one of his coworkers, and one of his
college: 52 college: 55 subordi- nates) were returned. In the second wave, 267
time in the org. M = 16 years time in the org. M = 17 question- naire sets were distributed. Of these, 210
years hier. pos.: M = 3.72, Range 1–5 hier. pos.: M =
3.70, Range 1–5 seemingly com- plete sets were returned, however only
209 were actually complete.
Superior targets Superior targets
returns: 335 q returns: 229 q
age: M = 47 years age: M = 47 years
male: 86 male: 86
college: 64 college: 62
Coworker targets Coworker targets
returns: 347 q returns: 232 q
age: M = 41.8 years age: M = 43.1 years
male: 68 male: 70
college: 53 college: 53
Subordinate targets Subordinate targets
returns: 376 q returns: 235 q
age: M = 38.1 years age: M = 38.7 years
male: 45 male: 43
college: 36 college: 35
Size of the organizations Size of the organizations
up to 10 p: 10.3 up to 10 p: 5.7

11–50 p: 22.3 11–50 p: 25.2

51–500 p: 36,0 51–500 p: 37.0
501–5000 p: 29.9 501–5000 p: 30.9
more than 5000 p: 1.5 more than 5000 p: 1.3
Branches Branches
Public adminis.: 41 Public adminis.: 45
Banking: 16 Banking: 12
Health: 15 Health: 15
Media: 6 Media: 6
Industry: 5 Industry: 12
Care services: 4 Care services: 6
Complete sets 267 Complete sets 209
Note. q: questionnaires, M = Mean, p: persons.

of influence tactics in the upward-, lateral-, and down-

Design variances.
In addition, four occasion-specific factors were as-
Managers were asked to select a coworker and a subor-
dinate. They were encouraged to select persons who al-
ready knew them and worked with them for some time.
Then, they were asked to describe on a questionnaire
how they try to influence their boss, the selected
cowork- er, and the selected subordinate. In the
following, these managers will be called agents. The
boss, the coworker, and the subordinate will be called
targets.
The agents were asked to distribute a questionnaire
to the targets. This questionnaire was a parallel version
of the agents’ questionnaire. Targets were asked to
describe how much the identified agent uses certain
types of in- fluence attempts in an effort to influence
the target. Tar- gets’ questionnaires were matched with
agents’ question- naires through a common code
number.
The agents and the targets also received prepared
en- velopes. They were instructed in the questionnaire
to mail back their questionnaires directly to the
researcher. Two weeks after the last questionnaire from
a set was mailed back to the researcher, the
participants were sent new questionnaires. Again, the
agents were asked to de- scribe how they try to
influence their targets and the targets were asked to
describe how the agent tries to influence them. Again,
the participants returned the questionnaires in prepared
envelopes to the researcher.
The questionnaire tapped four influence tactics,
namely rational persuasion, ingratiation, upward ap-
peals, and pressure. In the following, these tactics will
be called traits. Since these traits were measured from
dif- ferent data sources (agent, targets), these data
sources will be called measurement occasions. Thus,
we have a latent state-trait design to test Hypothesis 1,
2, and 3.
Latent state-trait models were proposed in the 90s
by Steyer (1989) and his coworkers (Eid, Notz, Steyer,
& Schwenkmezger, 1994; Steyer, Ferring, & Schmitt,
1992; Steyer & Schmitt, 1990; Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid,
1999). Latent state-trait theory is a generalization of
clas- sical test theory designed to take account of the
fact that psychological measurement does not take
place in a sit- uational vacuum.
The following structural equation model was speci-
fied: Four agent traits and four target traits were as-
sumed. They were called agent rational persuasion,
agent ingratiation, agent upward appeals, agent pres-
sure, target rational persuasion, target ingratiation,
tar- get upward appeals, and target pressure. Each
trait had two indicators, namely the two scales from
the first and second wave. It was assumed that both
scales were strict- ly parallel indicators of the same
trait, i. e., having the same loadings and the same error
 unequal factor loadings equal factor loadings

far ar
AR
sar δar
FA tr
ftr TR
str tr
ai
fai AI
sai ai
FT
fti ti
TI
sti ti
au
fau AU
δau
sau
SA tu
ftu TU
stu tu
fap ap
δap AP
sap
ST
ftp tp
TP
stp δpt
Figure 1. Structural equation diagram. Note. Scale names: first letter: f = first wave, s = second wave; second letter: a = agent, t = target; third
letter: r
= rational persuasion, i = ingratiation, u = upward appeals, p = pressure. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR = target rational
persuasion; AI = agent ingratiation, TI = target ingratiation; AU = agent upward appeals, TU = target upward appeals; AP = agent pressure, TP
= target pressure; FA
= first agent factor, SA = second agent factor; FT = first target factor, ST = second target factor; : measurement error, : convergent validity
coefficients.

sumed, namely the first wave agent factor on which all upward-influence direction are pre- sented in the
agent scales from the first wave loaded, the second appendix. Figure 1 presents the latent state- trait model.
wave agent factor on which all agent scales from the
second wave loaded, the first wave target factor on
which all target scales from the first wave loaded, and
the second wave target factor on which all target
scales from the second wave loaded. Finally, it was
assumed that all four occasion-specific factors were
uncorrelated with each other and that none of the
occasion-specific factors cor- related with a trait
factor. The SIMPLIS commands (Jöreskog & Sörbom,
1993) and the covariance matrix for this model in the
 This model specification is a realization of the
follow- ing basic assumptions which are also shared
by multi- trait-multimethod designs (Widaman,
1985): (a) all oc- casion-specific factors are assumed
to be independent from each other, (b) the trait and
occasion-specific fac- tors are assumed to be
independent of each other, and (c) each trait is
measured with two strictly parallel indica- tors. Thus,
the agent-target convergence correlation co- efficients
can be calculated without measurement error. Agents
were also asked to indicate the time of ac-
quaintance with the targets, the frequency of contact
with the targets, and the formality of their relation
with the target. Targets were asked to indicate the
time of acquain- tance with the agent, the frequency
of contact with the
Table 2. The translated wording of the influence items.
RATIONAL PERSUASION
Agent version
– I present him or her with detailed information in
support of my point of view to get my way.
– I explain in detail the reasons for my request to get my
way.
– I search for relevant information in support of my
point of view to get my way.
– I use logic to convince him or her to get my way.
Target version
To get his or her way this person [the agent]
– presents me with detailed information in support of his or
her point of view.
– explains in detail the reasons for his or her request.
– searches for relevant information in support of his or
her point of view.
– uses logic when he or she tries to convince me.
INGRATIATION
Agent version
– I use flattery to get my way.
– I praise him or her effusively to get my way.
– I act in a very friendly manner to get my way.
– I try to establish good personal relations to get my way.
– I give him or her the feeling of being very important
to get my way.
Target version
To get his or her way this person [the agent]
– uses flattery.
– praises me effusively.
– acts in a very friendly manner.
– tries to establish good personal relations with me.
– tries to give me the feeling of being very important.
UPWARD APPEALS
Agent version
– I try to obtain the informal support of higher-ups to get
my way.
– I make a formal appeal to higher levels to get my way.
– I try to get the back-up of superiors to get my way.
Target version
To get his or her way this person [the agent]
– tries to obtain the informal support of higher-ups.
– makes a formal appeal to higher levels.
– tries to get the back-up of superiors.
PRESSURE
Agent version
– I confront him or her openly to get my way.
– I threaten him or her with consequences if he or she does
not comply with my requests.
– I clearly express my anger to get my way.
– I use pressure to get my way.
Target version
To get his or her way this person [the agent]
– confronts me openly
– threatens me with consequences if I do not comply
– clearly expresses his or her anger
– uses pressure
agent, and the formality of their relation with the agent.
The dates on which the questionnaires were received
by the researcher were also registered. So, it was
possible to calculate return-time differences between
agents and tar- gets.
Instrument
Influence tactics were measured with an inventory
devel- oped by Blickle (1995). This inventory was
successfully validated (Blickle, 2000b) using the
Profile of Organiza- tional Influence Strategies (POIS)
developed by Kipnis and Schmidt (1982). The seven-
point items ranged from never (0) to always (6). The
translated wording of these items is presented in Table
2. Cronbach’s alphas of the influence tactics scales
were acceptable (s. Table 3).
Actors and targets also were asked to indicate their
sex, age, and educational level. In addition, actors were
asked to indicate their hierarchical position, the
number of persons in their organization, and the
branch of their organization.
Procedure
The present research was sponsored by the German
Re- search Foundation (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft) that is a government
organization and that has a high reputation in
Germany. The top management of private and public
organizations was approached and asked for support. If
the organization’s employee-council in the
organization approved, the organization sent the ques-
tionnaires, the prepared return envelopes, and a letter
of recommendation signed by the chief executive
officer and the head of the employee-council to all
members of the middle management of the
organization.
After having received the letter from the CEO it was
up to the middle managers to decide whether or not to
participate in the study. There was no control over
which manager participated. Those managers who
participated were asked to give their names and their
addresses. The second wave of the questionnaires were
sent directly to the managers who had participated in
the previous wave. To reduce in participants the
tendency to give socially desirable answers, the data
were neither collected before, during or after a
management development workshop, nor were the
data collected in a 360-degree appraisal feedback
process. Participants were informed in the let- ter of
recommendation that their ratings were for re-
 search purpose only and would not be seen by
anyone in their organization. On the top sheet of the
questionnaire participants were informed that it is
legally forbidden to provide personal research data to
a third party. These
Table 3. Agent-target correlation matrices (N =
209). Scale M SD
Agent-Superior Correlation Matrix
far 4.84 0.94 0.81
sar 4.92 0.83 0.75 0.84
fai 1.32 0.88 0.11 0.02 0.74
sai 1.42 0.96 0.05 0.07 0.77 0.78
fau 0.62 0.70 –0.05 –0.10 0.12 0.14 0.81
sau 0.58 0.72 0.05 –0.05 0.09 0.20 0.63 0.79
fap 1.48 0.91 –0.07 –0.20 0.12 0.07 0.38 0.33 0.68
sap 1.34 0.88 0.00 –0.16 0.14 0.11 0.32 0.35 0.81 0.72
ftr 4.75 0.79 0.00 0.07 –0.01 –0.04 –0.09 –0.19 –0.22 –0.20 0.77
str 4.77 0.88 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.04 –0.13 –0.23 –0.20 –0.17 0.79 0.83
fti 2.33 0.94 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.09 –0.10 –0.11 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.66
sti 2.35 0.94 0.00 –0.05 0.18 0.16 –0.05 –0.09 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.77 0.68
ftu 0.90 1.05 –0.07 –0.12 –0.08 –0.08 0.24 0.29 0.12 0.11 –0.37 –0.39 –0.14 –0.08 0.79
stu 0.74 0.94 –0.06 –0.13 –0.11 –0.11 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.10 –0.42 –0.41 –0.15 – 0.77 0.87
0.07
ftp 1.29 0.87 –0.01 –0.06 –0.02 –0.06 0.18 0.34 0.30 –0.31 –0.23 –0.05 0.32 0.30 0.66
0.12 0.00
stp 1.22 0.83 0.00 –0.08 –0.01 –0.03 0.16 0.31 0.28 –0.31 –0.23 –0.05 – 0.28 0.36 0.78 0.67
0.09 0.01
far sar fai sai fau sau fap sap ftr str fti sti ftu stu ftp stp
Agent-Co-Worker Correlation Matrix
far 4.71 0.95 0.79
sar 4.84 0.83 0.75 0.86
fai 1.74 0.98 0.10 0.06 0.74
sai 1.73 1.04 0.05 0.03 0.76 0.79
fau 1.05 0.92 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.80
sau 0.94 0.81 0.04 –0.02 0.07 0.12 0.69 0.77
fap 1.40 0.87 0.13 –0.02 0.16 0.07 0.50 0.37 0.64
sap 1.21 0.82 0.04 –0.08 0.07 0.14 0.33 0.40 0.73 0.68
ftr 4.58 0.94 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.14 –0.14 –0.07 –0.15 –0.16 0.76
str 4.60 0.97 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.14 –0.12 –0.06 –0.16 –0.18 0.84 0.85
fti 2.47 0.95 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.12 –0.05 –0.05 –0.06 –0.10 0.16 0.14 0.62
sti 2.47 0.96 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.18 –0.11 –0.01 –0.08 –0.10 0.14 0.12 0.78 0.67
ftu 1.27 1.20 –0.07 –0.15 –0.03 –0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 –0.35 –0.43 0.12 0.06 0.80
stu 1.13 1.10 –0.06 –0.14 –0.06 –0.06 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.06 –0.38 –0.47 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.82
ftp 1.21 0.79 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.13 –0.14 –0.12 0.07 0.10 –0.11 –0.18 0.11 0.06 0.38 0.33 0.49
stp 1.19 0.87 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.13 –0.04 –0.01 0.18 0.18 –0.19 –0.23 0.03 0.02 0.40 0.41 0.82 0.62
far sar fai sai fau sau fap sap ftr str fti sti ftu stu ftp stp
Agent-Subordinate Correlation Matrix
far 4.75 0.86 0.77
sar 4.89 0.74 0.64 0.81
fai 1.97 0.97 0.06 0.01 0.73
sai 1.99 1.05 –0.05 –0.06 0.74 0.76
fau 1.10 0.99 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.05 0.81
sau 0.93 0.84 0.00 –0.07 0.14 0.11 0.72 0.81
fap 1.51 0.89 0.06 –0.04 0.15 0.07 0.48 0.37 0.66
sap 1.48 0.87 0.00 –0.08 –0.01 0.05 0.41 0.48 0.75 0.69
ftr 4.36 1.03 0.12 0.17 0.02 0.05 –0.02 –0.03 0.02 0.02 0.75
str 4.29 1.15 0.15 0.18 0.04 0.01 –0.01 –0.03 0.04 0.00 0.80 0.81
fti 2.58 1.03 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.07 –0.02 –0.05 –0.02 –0.04 0.25 0.31 0.69
sti 2.59 1.00 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.01 –0.02 –0.04 –0.09 0.26 0.40 0.86 0.69
ftu 1.33 1.26 0.02 0.02 –0.06 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.07 –0.31 –0.25 –0.06 –0.05 0.78
stu 1.25 1.21 0.07 0.06 –0.03 –0.04 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.07 –0.37 –0.33 –0.10 –0.07 0.81 0.77
ftp 1.22 0.90 0.01 –0.06 –0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.24 –0.10 –0.11 –0.13 –0.12 0.40 0.36 0.54
stp 1.15 0.86 0.11 –0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.24 –0.21 –0.19 –0.17 –0.17 0.27 0.36 0.73 0.64
far sar fai sai fau sau fap sap ftr str fti sti ftu stu ftp stp
Note. Cronbach’s  in the main diagonal; if |r| = .14, p < .05
far = first wave, agent, rational persuasion scale; sar = second wave, agent, rational persuasion scale; fti = first wave, target,
ingratiation scale; ftu = first wave, target, upward appeal scale; stp = second wave, target, pressure scale.
 procedures were used to reduce the effects of social de- Table 4. Model fit in different influence directions (df = 76).
sirability since both the agents and the targets knew
that neither of them could read the answers of the other Influence direction
and that their organizations would not receive any Indices Good fit Upward Lateral Downward
informa- tion about their ratings.  2 75.15 107.01 100.78
In the letter of recommendation and on the top sheet p(²)  .05 .54 .011 .03
of the questionnaire it was stressed that participation in 2/df 2 .98 1.41 1.33
the study was voluntary. As an incentive to participate RMSEA  .05 .00 .044 .04
p(RMSEA )  .05 1.0 .67 .80
in
the study, agents were promised 10 Euros (20 Deutsche SRMR  .05 .035 .037 .035
Mark) and targets 5 Euros (10 Deutsche Mark). To remit AGFI  .95 .93 .90 .90

the money participants were asked to give the code of

their banking account. They received the money after the
first wave. Subjects were promised a general report
about the results of the study. Those subjects who indi-
cated that they were interested in this report received it
after the study was finished.
Note. p(²) = probability value of ², RMSEA = root mean
square error of approximation p(RMSEA) = probability value for
test of close fit (RMSEA < .05), SRMR = standardized root
mean square resid- ual, AGFI = adjusted goodness of fit
index.

Table 5a. Structural equation matrices of the agent-superior ratings.

Completely standardized scale loadings on latent constructs and standardized scale-error variances
Latent constructs
Scales AR TR AI TI AU TU AP TP FA SA FT ST error variances
far .81 .50* .09*
sar .94 .05 .12*
fai .92 .16* .12*
sai .84 .44* .10*
fau .81 –.12 .32*
sau .79 .27* .30*
fap .91 –.06 .17*
sap .91 .08 .17*
ftr .93 .03 .13*
str .86 .40* .11*
fti .88 –.01 .22*
sti .87 .15* .21*
ftu .84 .43* .11*
stu .93 .05 .14*
ftp .89 .15* .19*
stp .89 .05 .20*
Note. Scale names: first letter: f = first wave, s = second wave; second letter: a = agent, t = target; third letter: r =
rational persuasion, i = ingratiation, u = upward appeals, p = pressure. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR
= target rational persuasion; AI = agent ingratiation, TI = target ingratiation; AU = agent upward appeals, TU = target upward
appeals; AP = agent pressure, TP = target pressure; FA = first agent factor, SA = second agent factor; FT = first target factor,
ST = second target factor.
*: p < .05.
Trait correlations, retest reliability in the main diagonal, and convergent validity coefficients in the
subdiagonal AR AI AU AP TR TI TU TP
AR .85
AI .04 .88
AU –.09 .15 .94
AP –.18 .13 .49 .99
TR .08 .01 –.22 –.25 .90
TI –.02 .16 –.13 –.01 .17 .99
TU –.14 –.14 .32 .14 –.51 –.14 .89
TP –.07 –.05 .20 .39 –.36 –.04 .39 .98
Note. Convergent validity coefficients in italic face; if |r| > .15, p < .05. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR =
target rational persuasion; AI = agent ingratiation, TI = target ingratiation; AU = agent upward appeals, TU = target upward
appeals; AP = agent pressure, TP = target pressure
 The mean time difference within the same subjects
between the first and the second wave was 75.65 days
(SD = 52.23 days). This time difference ranged from
14 to 316 days.
Results
The agent-target correlation matrices are documented
in Table 3.
To test the convergent validity of the agent and
target ratings, three structural equation models were
calculated, one for each influence direction*. The
analyses started
from covariance matrices of 209 complete
questionnaire sets. The goodness-of-fit indices of the
latent state-trait model for the data in the upward-,
lateral-, and down- ward-influence direction are
presented in Table 4.
Generally, in all three samples, the fit-indices were
acceptable (Mueller, 1996; Tanaka, 1993).
In Table 5a-c the completely standardized scale
load- ings on the traits and occasion-specific factors
and the convergent validity coefficients are presented
for each influence direction. Due to the complete
standardization (all latent factor and manifest scale
variances are set to one), strictly parallel scales seem to
have unequal load- ings and unequal error variances,
but in fact all respective scales were strictly parallel.

Table 5b. Structural equation matrices of the agent-coworker ratings.

Completely standardized scale loadings on latent constructs and standardized scale-error variances
Latent constructs
Scales AR TR AI TI AU TU AP TP FA SA FT ST error variances
far .86 .16* .23*
sar .87 .08 .24*
fai .89 .29* .12*
sai .85 –.41* .11*
fau .79 .43* .19*
sau .86 –.18* .22*
fap .83 .39* .17*
sap .88 –.19* .19*
ftr .92 .00 .15*
str .92 .01 .15*
fti .87 .17* .20*
sti .89 .01 .21*
ftu .88 .37* .08*
stu .95 –.09 .09*
ftp .93 .08 .13*
stp .88 –.33* .11*
Note. Scale names: first letter: f = first wave, s = second wave; second letter: a = agent, t = target; third letter: r =
rational persuasion, i = ingratiation, u = upward appeals, p = pressure. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR
= target rational persuasion; AI = agent ingratiation, TI = target ingratiation; AU = agent upward appeals, TU = target upward
appeals; AP = agent pressure, TP = target pressure; FA = first agent factor, SA = second agent factor; FT = first target factor,
ST = second target factor.
*: p < .05.
Trait correlations, retest reliability in the main diagonal, and convergent validity coefficients in the
subdiagonal AR AI AU AP TR TI TU TP
AR .97
AI .07 .85
AU –.01 .08 .86
AP .00 .08 .49 .88
TR .18 .18 –.12 –.20 1.00
TI .13 .21 –.08 –.11 .18 .99
TU –.14 –.08 .04 .07 –.49 .03 .92
TP –.08 .16 .12 .17 –.21 .07 .42 .94
Note. Convergent validity coefficients in italic face; if |r| > .15, p < .05. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR =
target rational persuasion; AI = agent ingratiation, TI = target ingratiation; AU = agent upward appeals, TU = target upward
appeals; AP = agent pressure, TP = target pressure.
* I gratefully acknowledge valuable commentaries from Michael Eid.
Table 5c. Structural equation matrices of the agent-subordinate ratings.
Completely standardized scale loadings on latent constructs and standardized scale-error variances
Latent constructs
Scales AR TR AI TI AU TU AP TP FA SA FT ST error variances
far .78 .17* .36*
sar .80 –.02 .37*
fai .90 .29* .09
sai .93 .47* .08
fau .81 .40* .18*
sau .88 –.04 .22*
fap .84 .38* .15*
sap .90 .06 .18*
ftr .94 .14 .09
str .84 .46* .07
fti .94 .03 .12*
sti .92 .18* .12*
ftu .88 .29* .13*
stu .92 –.09 .14*
ftp .83 .38* .16*
stp .90 –.06 .18*
Note. Scale names: first letter: f = first wave, s = second wave; second letter: a = agent, t = target; third letter: r =
rational persuasion, i = ingratiation, u = upward appeals, p = pressure. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR
= target rational persuasion; AI = agent ingratiation, TI = target ingratiation; AU = agent upward appeals, TU = target upward
appeals; AP = agent pressure, TP = target pressure; FA = first agent factor, SA = second agent factor; FT = first target factor,
ST = second target factor.
*: p < .05.
Trait correlations, retest reliability in the main diagonal, and convergent validity coefficients in the
subdiagonal AR AI AU AP TR TI TU TP
AR .98
AI –.02 .83
AU –.04 .12 .90
AP –.06 .04 .55 .91

TR .22 .05 –.04 .03 .86

TI .15 .11 –.03 –.07 .32 .99
TU .10 –.04 .14 .07 –.41 –.09 .95
TP .05 .01 .18 .29 –.21 –.18 .42 .92
Note. Convergent validity coefficients in italic face; if |r| > .15, p < .05. Construct names: AR = agent rational persuasion, TR =
target

As Table 5a-c show, Hypothesis 1 was supported by means in the upward direction were high and were
the data. Agents’ and targets’ reports on the use of significantly higher than the means in the lateral and
pres- sure as influence attempts converged downward direction both
significantly in up- ward (r = .39), lateral (r = .17), and
downward influence direction (r = .29).
Hypothesis 2 was also supported by the data.
Agents’ and targets’ reports on the use of rational
persuasion con- verged significantly in lateral (r = .18)
and downward (r
= .22) influence direction but not in the upward (r = .
08) influence direction. This does not mean, that
superiors do not perceive rational influence as such but
they don’t attribute it to the influence style of an agent.
This reason- ing is supported when we look at the
means of the ratio- nal persuasion scales in Table 3: the
from the agent (F(2, 207) = 5.4, p < . 01) and the
target (F(2, 207) = 13.5, p < . 0005) perspective.
Thus, rational persuasion in upward influence is
normative.
Hypothesis 3 was also supported by the data. In the
upward influence (r = .32) direction agents’ and
targets’ reports on the use of appealing to higher
authorities as influence attempts converged
significantly (lateral: r =
.04; downward: r = .14).
Post-hoc, it was analyzed whether the time of
acquain- tance between agent and target, the
frequency of contact between the agent and the target,
the formality of the relationship between the agent
and the target, and the return-time difference between
agents’ and targets’ rat- ings moderated the degree of
agent-target convergence between agents’ and targets’
ratings. Since each potential moderator of the agent-
target convergence was mea-
sured twice, it could be verified whether the moderated
regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) yielded con-
sistent results over the first and second wave.
However, none of the potential moderators yielded
consistent, sig- nificant (p < .05) effects over the first
and second wave.
appraisal feed back process. In addition, other tools
were employed to reduce the tendency to give socially
desirable answers. Nevertheless, in the present study the
convergence coef-

Discussion
Influence attempts do not take place in a institutional
vacuum. Institutional settings such as markets, clans,
families, sexual encounters, or formal organizations
ex- plain which expectations are normative. To predict
agent-target convergence the theory of formal
organiza- tions was linked to Correspondent Inference
Theory. The theory of formal organizations explains
which expecta- tions are normative in formal
organizations. Correspon- dent Inference Theory
explains what will happen to dis- positional
attributions if behavior does or does not con- form to
normative expectations. The results confirmed the
hypotheses. The theory of formal organizations is
implicit in many papers on intraorganizational
influence strategies. However, it is necessary, to state
the theory explicitly to recognize the differences in the
effects of influence strategies in different institutional
settings. Further research is needed to compare
systematically in- fluence attempts in different
institutional settings.
In the present research, agent-target convergence
and targets’ consensus were analyzed with structural
equa- tion models. Using structural equation models in
analyz- ing multitrait-multimethod matrices has often
resulted in severe difficulties, such as out of range
estimates and convergence problems (Kenny & Kashy,
1992; Marsh, 1989) because the data did not meet the
necessary as- sumptions, i. e., method factors were not
independent of each other, and the trait and method
factors were not independent of each other. In the
present research, these kinds of problems were not
encountered. The structural equation model tested in
each of the three matrices had multifaceted, good fit
indices. Therefore, the present re- search yielded good
estimates of agent-target conver- gence. In addition,
this approach to analyze MTMM ma- trices can be
extended. The latent trait constructs of the same trait
from different data sources can be grouped together in
a second-order factor (Steyer, Ferring, & Schmitt,
1992). By this a strict test of discriminant valid- ity in
the latent state-trait framework is also possible.
In the present research, the data were neither
collected parallel to a management development
workshop nor were the data collected in a 360-degree
ficients did not increase in comparison to the Rao et structural equation models would not have been good
al. study. This builds confidence in the previous because the model specified implied independent data
findings of Rao et al. (1995) and in the present
findings.
The results show that the agent-target convergence
was significant at only a low level. This is consistent
with other field research on self-other agreement in
industrial and organizational settings (Gerstner &
Day, 1997; Har- ris & Schaubroeck, 1988). One
reason may be that the researcher has low control over
the data collection pro- cess. If self-other agreement is
studied in personality research it is not unusual to
invite college students and their room mates to the
laboratory of the psychology department. Doing this,
the researcher has complete con- trol over the data
collection process. However, in indus- trial and
organizational settings such data collection pro-
cedures are quite unusual.
The results show that the agent-target convergence
was significant at only a very low level, but the retest
correlations of the reports were very high. How can
this be explained? Burns (1954) studied the
communication of British executives. He found that,
of 165 outgoing messages classified by the executives
as directives, about half were perceived as mere
information by the receiver- subordinates. Influence is
a social act, and each party, including the target, may
have a different account of what happens when an
agent tried to cause a target to do something. This
idea is supported by Stohl and Redding (1987): “the
assumption of one objectively ‘correct meaning’ of a
message cannot be sustained. Interpreting messages is
a dirty business. From the simplest greeting to the
most complex rationalization, messages are inher-
ently ambiguous and sometimes intentionally
mislead- ing” (p. 483). As research on self-peer
agreement in per- sonality judgments demonstrates,
stimulus-ambiguity moderates strongly self-peer
agreement (Hayes & Dun- ning, 1997). The more the
stimulus-ambiguity increases, the more the self-peer
agreement decreases. And as we know from
experimental social perception research (Fis- ke &
Taylor, 1991) perceivers resort to already existing
impressions of others when the available information
is fragmented, incomplete, and ambiguous.
The present study has some limitations that need to
be acknowledged. First, only four influence tactics
were investigated. Further research is needed on
whether the present findings can be generalized to
other influence tactics such as coalition forming,
offering exchange, bar- gaining, consultation, and so
on (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Second, agents and targets
were not matched randomly since targets were
selected by the agents. Because the present field
research was based on voluntary participa- tion, this
was inevitable. However, if this self-selective process
had biased strongly the outcomes the fit of the
sources. Yet the model fit in the different samples was empirical analysis of the Kipnis and Schmidt subscales. Psy-
generally good. Third, although the sample was large, chological Reports, 86, 143–154.
it was neither representative nor random. However, the
present research shares this disadvantage with all other
studies on intraorganizational influence attempts. This
may have caused some range restrictions. So, in the
pop- ulation, the effects may be even stronger than in
the pre- sent study.
In summary, the findings provide important insights
into the validity of self-reports and target-reports on in-
traorganizational influence tactics. Influence attempts
do not take place in a institutional vacuum.
Institutional set- tings explain which expectations are
normative. Influ- ence acts that depart from the norm
give rise to disposi- tional attributions. In addition,
influence messages are inherently ambiguous and
sometimes intentionally mis- leading. Therefore, the
agent-target convergence was mostly significant but
very low. In the present research, the incentives for
giving socially desirable answers were kept low.
Further research is needed drawing on impres- sion
management theory to investigate how contextual
features of the data-collecting process, such as
manage- ment development workshops or 360-degree
appraisal feedback, influence the validity of self- and
target-re- ports on intraorganizational influence
attempts.

Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a grant of the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Bonn (AZ Bl 386/4–1). I
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kerstin Thi-
baut, Knuth Müller, and Lutz Wittmann in the data
col- lection process, and valuable commentaries from
Jenni- fer Stevens and Richard Henninge, who helped
me, to refine the English of a draft of this paper.

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Gerhard Blickle
Universität Mainz
Psychologisches Institut
Staudingerweg 9
D-55099 Mainz
Germany
Tel. +49 6131 392-2422
Fax +49 6131 392-4242
blickle@psych.uni-mainz.de

Appendix
SIMPLIS commands and covariance matrix in the upward influence direction
MTMM-Analysis: two agent and two target superior reports
Observed variables: avr1 avr2 avi1 avi2 avu1 avu2 avp1 avp2
tvr1 tvr2 tvi1 tvi2 tvu1 tvu2 tvp1 tvp2
Latent Variable: AR TR AE TE AU TU AD TD A1 A2
T1 T2 Covariance Matrix:
0.8930
0.5991 0.6962
0.0870 0.0143 0.7776
0.0482 0.0558 0.6570 0.9251
 –0.0377 –0.0630 0.0787 0.1029 0.4989
0.0326 –0.0364 0.0507 0.1368 0.3257 0.5174
–0.0710 –0.1596 0.1010 0.0608 0.2494 0.2196 0.8465
0.0026 –0.1219 0.1107 0.0955 0.2051 0.2227 0.6683
0.7893
–0.0024 0.0514 –0.0099 –0.0386 –0.0528 –0.1165 –0.1635
–0.1501 0.6376
0.0115 0.0493 0.0505 0.0280 –0.0811 –0.1549 –0.1733
–0.1426 0.5614 0.7775
–0.0022 0.0157 0.0889 0.0684 –0.0698 –0.0865 –0.0089
–0.0153 0.1296 0.1769 0.8749
–0.0131 –0.0477 0.1413 0.1367 –0.0380 –0.0694 –0.0076
–0.0015 0.0534 0.1503 0.6829 0.8841
–0.0772 –0.1116 –0.0912 –0.0927 0.1874 0.2205 0.1241
0.1077 –0.3173 –0.3781 –0.1520 –0.0892 1.1194
–0.0546 –0.1022 –0.0890 –0.0999 0.1395 0.1480 0.0990
0.0918 –0.3206 –0.3466 –0.1323 –0.0585 0.7792 0.8907
–0.0121 –0.0512 –0.0274 –0.0592 0.0785 0.1110 0.2763
0.2393 –0.2185 –0.1872 –0.0499 –0.0054 0.2987 0.2533
0.7688
0.0108 –0.0579 –0.0019 –0.0230 0.0568 0.1048 0.2416
0.2178 –0.2110 –0.1716 –0.0345 –0.0012 0.2566 0.2825
0.5802 0.6944
Sample Size: 209
Equation:
avr1 avr2 = 1*AR
avi1 avi2 = 1*AE
avu1 avu2 = 1*AU
avp1 avp2 = 1*AD
tvr1 tvr2 = 1*TR
tvi1 tvi2 = 1*TE
tvu1 tvu2 = 1*TU
tvp1 tvp2 = 1*TD
Set the error variances of avr1 avr2
equal Set the error variances of avi1
avi2 equal Set the error variances of
avu1 avu2 equal Set the error variances
of avp1 avp2 equal Set the error
variances of tvr1 tvr2 equal Set the
error variances of tvi1 tvi2 equal Set
the error variances of tvu1 tvu2 equal
Set the error variances of tvp1 tvp2
equal avr1 avi1 avu1 avp1 = A1
avr2 avu2 avp2 = A2
avi2 = (1)*A2
Let A1 A2 be
uncorrelated tvr1 tvi1
tvp1 = T1
tvu1 = (1)*F1
tvi2 tvu2 tvp2 =
T2 tvr2 = (1)*T2
Let T1 T2 be uncorrelated
Let A1 AR TR AE TE AU TU AD TD T1 T2 be
uncorrelated Let A2 AR TR AE TE AU TU AD TD T1
T2 be uncorrelated Let T1 AR TR AE TE AU TU AD
TD A1 A2 be uncorrelated Let T2 AR TR AE TE AU TU
AD TD A1 A2 be uncorrelated Options: ML
Options: IT = 1000
Options: AD = OFF
LISREL Output: SC ALL ND = 4
Path Diagram
End of Problem