Ethics

Module 3
Cultural Relativism and Ethics

Articles compiled and edited by

FREDERICK EDWARD T. FABELLA, Ph. D.

Cultural Relativism

The Global and the Local: Reconciling

Universal Human Rights and Cultural
Diversity

Human Rights and Cultural Values: A Literature Review

 RESEARCH STARTERS
ACADEMIC TOPIC OVERVIEWS

Cultural Relativism
Culture > Cultural Relativism

cognitive—they all have two features in common. First, they assert

Table of Contents that one thing (e.g. moral values, knowledge, meaning) is relative
to a particular framework (e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an
era, or a language). Second, they deny that any standpoint is
Abstract uniquely privileged over all others. While cultural relativism
provides a reflexive and critical tool for sociology (and other social
Keywords
science disciplines), political and moral conser-vatives tend to
Overview despair over the influence of cultural relativism on intellectual
thought and the shift away from objective, iden-tifiable standards
History as the measure for all truth-claims. However, some researchers
Philosophy of Science & Cognitive have argued that it is possible to adopt a cul-tural relativist stance
Relativism without abandoning a commitment to the idea of universal
Philosophy of Language & Cultural standards, or to human rights.
Relativism

Applications Overview
Cultural Relativism in Practice Cultural relativism is a complex concept that has its intellectual
Feminism & Cultural Relativism roots in discussions about relativism in the philosophy of sci-
Ethnocentrism ence and the philosophy of language. The general concept of
relativism in sociology is associated with critiques of positiv-
Viewpoints ism in science and concomitantly, social science, which largely
emphasize the differences between the focus and methods of
Conservatism & Cultural
inquiry associated with the natural and social sciences. Rela-
Relativism Conclusion tivism is typically viewed in contrast to realism, which is the
idea that what is true and real exists independently of the mind.
Terms & Concepts This opposition between realism and relativism was influenced
by the work of Immanuel Kant in his (1788) Critique of Pure
Bibliography Reason, who argued that the material and social world is medi-
ated through our minds: that people‟s experience of the world
Suggested Reading is mediated through the knowledge and ideas they hold about
the world. Consequently, this relative epistemology—or
cognitive relativism—makes it difficult to identify universal
experiences that hold true for everyone, because it is likely that
one person‟s experience of an event or activity will not be the
Abstract same as that of another person. Cognitive relativism, then,
Cultural relativism is a complex concept that has its intellectual refers broadly to an intellectual stance that rejects the idea of an
roots in discussions about relativism in the philosophy of science
absolute viewpoint and the existence of objective criteria for
making judgments about what is or is not real or true.
and the philosophy of language. Relativism is typically viewed in
contrast to realism, which is the idea that what is true and real Cultural relativism is associated with a general tolerance and respect
exists independently of the mind. Where there are many different for difference, which refers to the idea that cultural context is criti-cal
kinds of relativism—epistemological, moral, cultural, to an understanding of people‟s values, beliefs and practices.

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 Cultural Relativism
Keywords
Difference
Epistemology
Ethnocentric
Incommensurability
Objectivity
Positivism
Rationality
Realism
Relativism
Standpoint
It is viewed as a progressive stance that a researcher can take to
make sure that she does not privilege her own understanding of the
world in her explanation of what is happening in the context she is
studying—a stance that ensures her portrayal of a culture to which
she does not belong is faithful to its internal understandings.
Where there are many different kinds of relativism—episte-
mological, moral, cultural, cognitive—they have two features in
common:
• They assert that one thing (e.g. moral values, knowl-
edge, meaning) is relative to a particular framework
(e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an era, or a
language).
• They deny that any standpoint is uniquely privileged
over all others.
This latter feature of relativism has implications for how people
develop and test knowledge about the social world (methodol-
ogy) and how people make judgments about what kinds of
social practices are better than others.
While cultural relativism is celebrated by postmodernists and post-
structuralists, it is viewed negatively by moral conservatives, who
see cultural relativism as the demise of moral obligation; the trans-
formation of scientific endeavor into a random series of quixotic,
subjective decisions and choices and the end of participation in
civic affairs (Horowitz, 2004). The logic that sustains a
commitment to cultural relativism is itself based on a claim that is
relative to local (Western) criteria and begs the question: given the
cultural differ-ences in the world, how is it feasible to motivate
compliance and implement ethical norms, such as human rights
(Li, 2007)? Here, cultural relativism is seen to have an ethical
dimension (moral rela-tivism) that neutralizes people‟s ability to
criticize the beliefs and practices of other cultures (Johnson, 2007).
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Essay by Alexandra Howson, Ph.D.
History
The intellectual roots of cultural relativism within sociology lie in
philosophical debates about distinctions between reality and rela-
tivism. Although the concept of realism has a complex history, it is
generally accepted that it refers to the existence of a reality that
lies beyond our thoughts or beliefs about it (Marshall et al., 1994).
The main point of focus in debates about reality is whether univer-
sal truths or standards exist that we can use to measure or judge
whether something is real (or true). This focus has had particu-lar
implications for philosophers and sociologists of science, who
have studied the ways in which science makes claims about what
exists, what is true and what counts as knowledge.
Philosophy of Science & Cognitive Relativism
Debates about cognitive relativism developed in the work of
sociologists who engaged with the philosophy of science, which
examines what science is, what makes it a special kind of knowl-
edge and how scientists make claims that have authority and
credibility. Science, it is assumed, occurs within a laboratory con-
text that is free from bias, and which proceeds as a disinterested
endeavor that creates a neutral product—such as explanations for
differences between men and women. The aim of the scientific
method is to produce knowledge that can be trusted, because it is
based on empirical observation that can be repeated and tested by
other researchers. This approach to knowledge production is
known as positivism, which rejects knowledge based on belief,
speculation or faith in favor of knowledge based on systematic
observation and experiment that involves testing ideas against
reality (i.e. what we see). Moreover, conventional accounts of
science suggest that scientific knowledge grows cumulatively;
each new discovery adding to what is already known.
However, sociologists have criticized this view of science and in
particular, the role of objectivity and rationality (e.g. Feyera-bend,
1993). For instance, Thomas Kuhn (1996) argued that the history
of science was less linear than depicted because social beliefs and
personal interests shape the practice and context of science.
Moreover, researchers become attached to particular explanations
and theoretical traditions associated with the scien-tific
communities to which they belong, which influence whether new
ideas are accepted or rejected. Thus, scientific exchange is not
necessarily objective or rational and indeed, the criteria for
deciding the merits of a scientific theory could be philosophical, or
indeed political, as much as rational (Boudon, 2002). These
associations and attachments undermine the potential for objec-
tivity in science and for value-free inquiry. Kuhn suggests that the
truth claims underpinning scientific theories are relative to the
values and practices that shape scientific practice. Cognitive
relativism suggests that there is no objective knowledge, only
interpretations of what scientists observe and that no theory can be
said to be „true,‟ only probable (Boudon, 2002). Contempo-rary
versions of these arguments assert that the objects of study within
science are socially constructed and have no existence beyond the
instruments that measure them and the minds that interpret them
(Latour & Woolgar, 1979).
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 Cultural Relativism
Philosophy of Language & Cultural Relativism
Cultural relativism is linked to cognitive relativism through the
claim that social science cannot identify truth, but only customs
that vary from one society to another. While social scientists—
such as anthropologists, geographers and sociologists—can
observe and document such customs, explanations need to be
grounded by reference to the contexts in which they develop
and exist. This approach springs from applications of debates in
the philosophy of language to the practice of sociology that
rejected the universalist assumptions of classical theorists about
the methods and assumptions of social science.
For instance, Peter Winch, a philosopher concerned with logic,
reality and language, built on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein
and focused on developing an understanding of the catego-ries
available to social scientists to make distinctions between,
among other things what is real and what is unreal. The Idea of
a Social Science (1994) outlines some principles to guide how
social investigation might proceed. Winch argued that the social
sciences should not adopt the methodology of the natu-ral
sciences, but should instead focus their efforts on sensitively
interpreting which concepts exist in non-Western cultures and
how they are used by members of those cultures. He argued that
some concepts are consistently inexpressible among the lan-
guages of various cultures (they are incommensurable) and as a
result, the idea of rationality cannot be defined transculturally.
Indeed, different cultures have different criteria for rational-ity,
that is, for making judgments about what is true, real or good.
For instance, one contemporary study of rationality in the
context of decision making about child immunization after the
publication of research that linked vaccinations with autism
(Brownlie & Howson, 2005), noted that parents who did not
immunize their children (or who thought about not
immunizing) saw their choice as a rational response to what
they viewed as a government that couldn‟t be trusted, despite
the fact that child immunization is generally regarded as a
beneficial and necessary public health practice.
Applications
Cultural Relativism in Practice
The ideas developed by Winch influenced the methodologies of
ethnomethodology, phenomenology and ethnography, which all, to
a degree, proceed on the basis that researchers can‟t really
understand social practices, ideas and beliefs unless they look at
and immerse themselves in the context in which they naturally
occur. Moreover, fundamental to these approaches is the idea that a
person‟s sense of reality is constructed through prevailing cultural
frameworks and how these are expressed. Therefore, lan-guage
plays a critical role in cultural relativism, since language is seen as
a means of categorizing, and therefore constructing, experience,
and actively shaping what counts as reality. In this view there is no
social world, or reality, beyond or independent of a person‟s beliefs
about it (Rosa, 1996). Moreover, what counts as reality, or the
social, varies according to context.
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Essay by Alexandra Howson, Ph.D.
The insight that knowledge claims need to be understood by ref-
erence to the cultural contexts that produce them is common, but
has been interpreted in different ways by intellectual tradi-tions
such continental philosophy and feminism. For instance, Michel
Foucault, generally viewed as a poststructuralist, argued that what
counts as truth is associated with particular forms of social power.
His work focused on understanding how things come to be known
as facts (for instance in medicine) and on the conditions and
circumstances that enable some groups and not others to make
claims that come to be regarded as truth. His approach emphasized
the importance of understanding how language, practice and
perception shape the world in ways that enable some groups and
Feminism & Cultural Relativism
Cultural relativism provides a reflexive and critical tool for
sociology (and other social science disciplines). Feminists have
made common cause with cultural relativism because first, it
provides a tool for criticizing rationality and rejecting objectiv-
ity in science as a masculinist ideal and second, it provides a
way to challenge the seemingly fixed character of gender.
For many feminists, objectivity (which alludes to the neutral or
value-free position of the researcher in relation to what is being
researched) is problematic for women because it denies the subjec-
tive and emotional experiences of women and contributes to male
dominance. Objectivity is based on a presumption that subject and
object can be separated from each other, where subject refers to a
male observer and object refers, generally, to nature. In this way,
objectivity contributes to the objectification of nature and there-
fore women, who are viewed as part of nature (Jordanova, 1989).
Further, some feminists have argued that investigation, whether
scientific or social scientific, cannot be objective because objectiv-
ity itself reflects a predominantly white, middle class, male view of
the world. Hence, inquiry is a not a view from nowhere, since
people occupy standpoints and as such, explain phenomena from
„somewhere‟ (Harding, 1986).
Feminists (e.g. Oakley, 1985) have used cross-cultural studies of
adolescence and gender (notably Margaret Mead‟s Coming of Age
in Samoa, 1950) to challenge gender stereotypes and to argue that
gender is a social construct because different roles and ideas about
femininity are ascribed to women in different cultural contexts.
This insight has been developed within feminism as well. For
instance, feminists of color have argued that the development of
Western feminism has been based on the particular viewpoint of
white middle class women who occupy a privileged place in the
world. This viewpoint is connected with the development of West-
ern thought, a privileged system tied up with the colonialization of
non-Western societies. This process has contributed to a way of
thinking that is ethnocentric; being unable to see differences and
universalizing values and ideas from the subject‟s experience of
his or her own ethnic group (Humm, 1989).
Ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism stems from the way that Europeans conquered and
subdued the indigenous peoples of Africa, Central and South
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 Cultural Relativism
America and Australasia through the spread of colonialism
(Giddens, 1997). While Europeans, during periods of colonial
expansion and beyond, mostly believed they were „civilizing‟
and superior to the nations they colonized, this view has been
trenchantly criticized by scholars such as Edward Said, who
have used cultural relativism as a tool to highlight the social
and cul-tural effects of colonialism. These scholars draw
attention to the way that colonialists—through for instance art
and literature— privilege Western values and ideas above
indigenous values and beliefs and in so doing nullify
indigenous culture. In this sense, cultural relativism is used as a
tool to challenge ethnocentric Western views and practices and
to promote an appreciation of cultural diversity.
Viewpoints
Conservatism & Cultural Relativism
Political and moral conservatives tend to despair over the influ-
ence of cultural relativism on intellectual thought and the shift
away from objective, identifiable standards as the measure for all
truth-claims. Their concerns center on the way that cultural
relativism makes it difficult for people to assert how one set of
practices, or truths, is better (morally) than others because, conser-
vatives argue, cultural relativism asserts that systems of thought (or
morality) are incommensurate and equal. For instance, Azar Nafisi,
who wrote Reading Lolita in Tehran, has observed that no amount
of political correctness can “make us empathize with a woman who
is taken to a football stadium in Kabul, has a gun put to her head,
and is executed because she does not look the way the state wants
her to look” (Nafisi, 2006, p. 6).
Nafisi argues that we shouldn‟t be tolerant of such practices,
even though cultural relativism encourages tolerance of differ-
ence, which many liberals view as a socially desirable value in
a democratic society. In fact, Nafisi goes further, as do other
commentators, to argue that cultural relativism neutralizes
politi-cal action because it discourages criticism of practices
that are different from those associated with the culture that we
inhabit (Rachels, 1993). And others have similarly denounced
cultural relativism as anti-democratic (Perusek, 2007: 821) and
view interpretive theories that emphasize the “local,” have
abandoned the pursuit of truth and thus betray the canons of
scientific inquiry (Ulin, 2007: 803).
One contemporary example of the dilemma posed by cultural
relativism is that of female circumcision, frequently condemned by
Western commentators as a barbaric, patriarchal practice. On the
one hand, female circumcision is understood as a symbolic practice
that signals a right of passage embedded in culturally salient
idioms of purity, embodiment, sexuality, and fertility, while on the
other, it is viewed by many Westerners as a human rights
transgression (Silverman, 2004). If female circumcision is viewed
in its own, locally contextualized terms, then it is difficult to
criticize the practice as unethical, because what is ethical in a
Western context is not necessarily understood as ethi-cal in
another, non-Western context. Moreover, an extension of
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Essay by Alexandra Howson, Ph.D.
this argument is that when Westerners criticize practices such
as female circumcision, they do so not through any universal
standards of morality or understandings of pain and suffering,
but through a particular, local cultural framework (i.e. Western)
that universalizes experience and standardizes what is consid-
ered right and what is not; that views its reaction as universally
rational when, in the framework of cultural relativism, it is in
fact particular and local.
Conclusion
While these concerns tie cultural relativism to moral relativism,
some researchers, mainly anthropologists, have argued that it is
possible to adopt a cultural relativist stance without abandoning
a commitment to the idea of universal standards, or to human
rights (Li, 2007). Cultural relativism needs to be seen as a
meth-odological position that explains the practices and ideas
of other cultures within the terms of their own cosmologies,
without nec-essarily sanctioning them.
Terms & Concepts
Difference: Developed by feminists to highlight the different
experiences, voices and psychologies of women in comparison to
men and also to draw attention to the way these differences are
part of power relations and used to oppress women.
Epistemology: The theory of how we know what know.
Ethnocentric: Unable to see difference and
universalizing values and ideas from the subject‟s
experience of her own ethnic group.
Objectivity: A detached and impartial attitude associated
with scientific inquiry.
Positivism: Scientific method is viewed as objective because
its aim is to produce trustworthy knowledge based on empirical
observation that can be repeated and tested by other researchers.
Rationality: A mode of action or decision-making that is
tech-nical in character and based on reason.
Realism: the idea that what is true and real exists
indepen-dently of the mind.
Relativism: The idea that something (e.g. moral values,
knowledge) is relative to a particular framework (e.g. a
culture, a language) and that no standpoint is uniquely
privi-leged over others.
Standpoint: Using the experiences of social groups as
a ground for theory and explanation.
Bibliography
Boudon, R. (2003). Social science and the two types of relativ-
ism. Comparative Sociology. 2 (3): 423-440. Retrieved
May 29, 2008 from EBSCO online database, Academic
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 Cultural Relativism
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ect=true&db=aph&AN=11018550&site=ehost-live
Brownlie, J. & Howson, A. (2005). „Leaps of Faith‟ and MMR:
An empirical study of trust. Sociology. 39(2), 221-239.
Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against Method. London: Verso.
Giddens, A. (1997). Sociology. London: Polity Press.
Harding, S. 1986.The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Horowitz, I. L. (2004). Chronicle of Higher Education. 9th
April, 50(31).
Johnson, T. H. (2007). Cultural relativism: Interpretations of a
concept. Anthropological Quarterly. 80(3):791-802.
Retrieved May 29, 2008 from EBSCO online database,
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login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=26466791&site=eh
ost-live
Kuhn, T, (1996). The Social Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Latour, B. & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory Life: the Social
Construction of Scientific Facts. LA: Sage.
Li, X. (2007). A cultural critique of cultural relativism.
American Journal of Economics & Sociology. 66 (1):151-
171. Retrieved May 29, 2008 from EBSCO online data-
base, SocINDEX. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=sih&AN=24312366&site=ehost-live
Marshall, G. et al. (1994). Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Nafisi, A. (2006). Liberal education and the republic of the
imagination. Liberal Education. 92 (3): 6-13. Retrieved
May 29, 2008 from EBSCO online database, Education
Research Complete, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.asp
x?direct=true&db=ehh&AN=21791986&site=ehost-live
Oakley, A. (1985). Sex, Gender and Society. 2nd Ed. London:
Gower.
Essay by Alexandra Howson, Ph.D.
Alexandra Howson Ph.D. taught Sociology for over a decade at several universities in the UK. She has published books and peer reviewed
articles on the sociology of the body, gender and health and is now an independent researcher, writer and editor based in the Seattle area.
EBSCO Research Starters ® • Copyright © 2009 EBSCO Publishing Inc. • All Rights Reserved
Essay by Alexandra Howson, Ph.D.
Perusek, D. (2007). Grounding cultural relativism.
Anthropological Quarterly. 80(3): 821-836. Retrieved May
29, 2008 from EBSCO online database, SocINDEX http://
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&A
N=26466793&site=ehost-live
Rachels, J. (1993). The challenge of cultural relativism. In, J.
Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, pp. 22-36.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rosa, H. (1996). Cultural relativism and social criticism from
a Taylorian perspective. Constellations: An International
Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory. 3 (1): 39-51.
Retrieved May 29, 2008 from EBSCO online database,
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login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9507945&site=eho
st-live
Silverman, E. K. (2004). Anthropology and circumcision.
Annual Review of Anthropology. 33(1):419-445. Retrieved
May 29, 2008 from EBSCO online database, Academic
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rect=true&db=aph&AN=15310108&site=ehost-live
Ulin, R. C. (2007). Revisiting cultural relativism: Old pros-
pects for a new cultural critique. Anthropological
Quarterly. 80(3): 803-820. Retrieved May 29, 2008 from
EBSCO online database, SocINDEX http://search.ebsco-
host.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=26466792
&site=ehost-live
Winch, P. (1994). The Idea of a Social Science: And its
Relation to Philosophy. London: Sage.
Suggested Reading
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected
Essays. New York: Basic Books.
Griswold, W. 2004. Cultures and Societies in a Changing
World. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Turner, B. (2002). The problem of cultural relativism for the
sociology of human rights: Weber, Schmitt and Strauss.
Journal of Human Rights. 1(4):587- 605. Retrieved May
29, 2008 from EBSCO online database, Academic Search
Premier. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?di
rect=true&db=a9h&AN=14350315&site=ehost-live
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 HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN WELFARE

The Global and the Local: Reconciling

Universal Human Rights and Cultural
Diversity

By Amy Eckert

A review of Human Rights and Global Diversity edited by

Simon Caney and Peter Jones. Portland, OR: Frank Cass & Co.,
2001. 173 pp.

and

Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice by Monique

Deveaux. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. 205 pp.

Liberal models of human rights often exalt the individual at the expense of the group. The focus
on the equality of individuals jeopardizes the well being of cultural groups that sometimes require
different, rather than equal, protection. The problem of preserving minority cultural identities
assumes special importance in light of global transfers of information, capital, goods, and people,
and the potential of these globalizing forces to destroy attachments to ―local‖ cultural values.
Human Rights and Global Diversity, a collection of essays edited by Simon Caney and Peter Jones,
and Monique Deveaux’s Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice, examine the difficulty of
protecting cultural groups within the framework of universal human rights, while additionally
acknowledging the unique and often fragile nature of cultural traditions.
The collection of essays found in Human Rights and Global Diversity grew out of a colloquium
concerned with ―the development of norms that are global in scope, and recognition and concern
for the diversity of culture, belief and value to be found among humanity.‖ (p. 1) In attempting to
promote both respect for global norms and local cultures, though, we often work at cross-purposes.
The authors in this volume attempt to reconcile these two ends in such a way as to protect both the
universality of human rights and dignity and a reasonable diversity of human culture.

1
VOLUME 2:2 – SPRING/SUMMER 2002

Balancing Cultural Norms and Universal Principles: The Threat of Cultural Relativism

The pursuit of these twin goals presents a special challenge in light of the danger cultural
relativism poses to the protection of human rights. Cultural relativists reject the application of
universal human rights standards, which they frequently characterize as reflecting Western
imperialism, and that they claim conflict with cultural beliefs or principles. In seeking to protect the
sanctity of these cultural beliefs and principles, particularly in cases of genuine conflicts between
culturally-mandated practices and human rights practices, we may risk compromising the integrity of
global human rights standards. Yet rights to participate in the cultural life of one’s community1 and
to self-determination of peoples2 are also regarded as human rights. The conundrum that emerges is
how to preserve cultural norms and beliefs while protecting the universally recognized human rights
of those individuals who compose cultural groups.
Several of the authors in Human Rights and Global Diversity address the question of how to
reconcile global human rights standards and local cultural norms. Peter Jones attempts such
reconciliation by focusing on freedom of belief in his contribution, ―Human Rights and Diverse
Cultures: Continuity of Discontinuity?‖ Some liberal scholars accept only comprehensive liberalism,
which emphasizes the equality of individuals. Against this position, Jones defends the idea of diverse
ethical perspectives, which may justify rights on some basis other than individual equality or may
impose social responsibilities along with individual rights. Jones advocates respect for diversity of
human opinion by respecting the right of each individual to freedom of belief. This two level
approach separates individuals from their beliefs. While promising, this approach leaves some
significant questions unaddressed, including the problem of intolerant beliefs. To tolerate beliefs
indiscriminately based on the right of the holder to believe them, Jones asks us to tolerate the beliefs
of those who would deny those rights to others.
At least some of the conflicts between cultural beliefs and universal human rights are illusory. In
―Human Rights, Compatibility and Diverse Cultures,‖ Simon Caney examines different types of
relationships between cultural values and universal human rights. He correctly points out that many
culturally based beliefs do not actually come into direct conflict with international human rights
principles. Rather, the two enjoy some degree of compatibility. Caney articulates several types of
relationships between human rights and ethical traditions, including:
 Incompatibility, in which human rights norms prohibit actions required by the ethical
tradition in question;

 Compatibility, where ethical traditions require actions that are compatible with human rights
standards;

 Convergence, where human rights norms and ethical traditions require the same actions, but
for different reasons;

172. See, for example, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
173. See common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

2
 HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN WELFARE

 Identity, when both human rights and ethical traditions require the same conduct for similar
reasons, though the reasoning may be expressed differently, 

 Apparent incompatibility, when ethical traditions and human rights seem to prescribe
different conduct, but these differences arise because of different circumstances, and

 Potential compatibility/convergence/identity, which arises when certain elements of ethical
traditions can be developed in ways that support respect for human rights. 
Only in the case of incompatibility does an actual conflict exist. In the other instances, human
rights and ethical traditions are at least potentially compatible. Caney demonstrates his argument
with a case study of one non-Western ethical tradition, Theravada Buddhism.
Caney contends that the Buddhist conception of well-being coincides with liberal conceptions of
human rights. First, Buddhists believe that people can only bring fulfillment to themselves, and
second, they emphasize emancipation. Though these ideas differ from Western liberal ideas about
human rights, these values are not incompatible with human rights. Caney does not contend that
Buddhist values compel respect for human rights, merely that they allow it. Still, the convergence
between Buddhism and human rights possesses special significance because human rights are often
criticized as being alien to traditional non-Western values. The compatibility of human rights and
Buddhist principles provides concrete evidence against such claims and avenues for promoting
individual human rights in culturally-sensitive ways.
Deveaux also addresses the question of balancing universal norms and cultural rights in Cultural
Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Deveaux sees the polarization between cultural practice and
universal norms as stemming from the fundamental inability to incorporate cultural difference into
prevailing theories of liberal thought. Surveying models of toleration, neutrality, liberal
perfectionism, and deliberative democracy, she rejects these models in favor of her own version of
deliberative liberalism.
While political theory tends to treat cultural diversity as a problem to be overcome, Deveaux
seeks to fully integrate this diversity into a model of democracy that embraces difference. Before
proposing her own model of deliberative liberalism, Deveaux surveys dominant models of liberalism
and their resolution of the problems posed by cultural diversity. The first of these, political
liberalism, sharply divides public and private life, segregating political and cultural life. This school of
thought, as illustrated in the work of John Rawls, 3 conceives of people as individual citizens rather
than as members of cultural groups. These citizens make decisions and advance their interests based
on public reason. Such a model leaves no room for reasoning based on cultural values or beliefs.
Political liberals, then, propose toleration as the model for dealing with cultural groups. Deveaux
contemplates toleration as very limited, stating that tolerance implies ―refraining from interfering
with, and/or extending a kind of permission to, practices or beliefs with which they disagree.‖
(Deveaux, p. 43) She rejects toleration as inadequate in favor of a more robust model of respect for
culturally diverse groups, as discussed more fully below.

3 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

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VOLUME 2:2 – SPRING/SUMMER 2002

Liberal perfectionism, exemplified by the writing of Joseph Raz,4 shares political liberalism’s
view of cultural minorities as individual citizens who shed their cultural differences when entering
the political sphere. Unlike political liberals who remain neutral among different conceptions of the
good, liberal perfectionists take account of their particular view of the good, including values such as
personal autonomy. While this commitment to personal autonomy seems a promising mechanism
for the protection of cultural diversity, Deveaux ultimately rejects liberal perfectionism as well.
Liberal perfectionists condition their support for cultural diversity on the culture’s support for
individuals and their pursuit of the good life. Deveaux rejects this selective endorsement of cultures,
arguing that some cultural minorities restrict individual freedom in the name of preserving nonliberal
cultural norms as well as, in some cases, the existence of the minority group itself.
The model of deliberative democracy, based largely on the writings on Jurgen Habermas,5 offers
the greatest potential for incorporating cultural minorities, according to Deveaux. Unlike social
contract theories, which rely on assumed consent, deliberative democracy requires actual consent
arising out of discourse among individuals with differing interests, needs, and values. Nevertheless,
Deveaux argues that deliberative democracy, while offering the potential to incorporate the values
and needs of cultural minorities, still has some shortcomings. Discourse ethics still perceive
participants as individuals and not as members of cultural minorities. Deveaux proposes to amend
discourse ethics to include some individuals in a representative capacity in her alternative model,
deliberative liberalism, which is discussed in greater detail below.

Protecting Cultural Groups

In the presence of global norms, minority cultural groups often face actual physical extinction in
addition to potential destruction of their norms, beliefs and values. Different approaches to
preventing this destruction exist at the global and national levels. The authors of these two books
discuss several of these various approaches.
Chris Brown’s contribution to Human Rights and Global Diversity, ―Cosmopolitanism, World
Citizenship and Global Civil Society,‖ rejects the existence of a global civil society, which is often
touted as a more hospitable framework for the preservation of minority cultural identities. While
these groups often find themselves marginalized in states, a global civil society could provide
repressed minorities with an alternative source of human rights protection and political participation.
Despite this promise, Brown argues that it is only within the North Atlantic community
(coterminous with membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) where a true
transnational civil society exists. Other areas of the world lack the strong states that a global civil
society requires. Rather than attempting to construct a global civil society, the more appropriate
course of action at this point lies in a renewed focus on state-building. Once strong states emerge, a
global civil society can follow.
International mechanisms for protecting human rights must inevitably favor individuals or
groups. In ―The Pendulum Theory of Individual, Communal and Minority Rights,‖ Tom Hadden

4 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).

5 Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).

4
 HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN WELFARE

argues that the emphasis shifts between these two poles. Prior to the creation of the League of
Nations, individual rights predominated, as exhibited by the American Bill of Rights and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man. With the creation of the League of Nations and the minority
rights guarantees that accompanied it, the pendulum swung toward the rights of cultural groups. The
pendulum would later swing back toward individual rights with the creation of the United Nations
(UN) and the flurry of human rights lawmaking that ensued. More recently, group rights have again
reasserted themselves as the UN and the European Union have acted to protect cultural minorities.
While declining to select an optimal point on the pendulum swing, Hadden emphasizes that an
understanding of the pendulum’s cyclical motion is essential to the effective protection of both
individual and group rights. He likens human rights advocates’ need to understand and manage these
swings to economists’ need to understand business cycles.
As a right of peoples rather than of individuals, the right to self-determination presents special
challenges to balancing the rights of individuals with the rights of the national groups to which those
individuals belong. Nationalism—the desire of groups for self-rule based on feelings of
community—comprehends a wide variety of political arrangements, some of which inhibit
individual liberty by prescribing practices of values inconsistent with liberal human rights. Kimberly
Hutchings addresses these challenges from mainstream cosmopolitan, communitarian and post-
positivist theories in ―The Question of Self-Determination and its Implications for Normative
International Theory.‖ Liberals and communitarians remain deadlocked ontologically, as liberal
theorists tend to privilege the individual over the nation and, more specifically, the use of individuals
as a means to an end. Support of liberals for nationalism derives from and relies on the nation’s
support for individual autonomy. Nationalism based on non-liberal, or anti-liberal, ideas about
individual rights are therefore objectionable to liberal nationalists. Communitarians invert this
relationship, arguing that the group right to nationalism sometimes takes priority over the rights of
the individual.
Hutchings argues that critical theory, post-modernism, and feminism offer potential resolutions
of this conflict. While favoring the Kantian ideal of the autonomous individual as an end in him or
herself, critical theory challenges the conception of both the state and the nation as they appear in
liberal and communitarian theory. Critical theory departs from liberal nationalism by its faith in the
ability of individuals to transcend their particular identities through universal principles. While
acknowledging that national identities constitute individuals, critical theorists reject this identity as
exclusive. Rejecting knowledge outside of discourse, post-modernism raises an even more
fundamental challenge and questions the existence of objective identities for both individuals and
groups. Post-modernists challenge the constructs of states and nations as well as individuals, denying
the existence of selves outside of discourse that would be entitled to self-determination. The
identities of these selves, along with the obligations they owe to one another, are constructed out of
discourse. Feminism presents a more complex case due to the various strands of feminist theory. In
general, however, feminism generally addresses the overlay of gendered power relations on the
tension between national and individual rights. Post-positivism thus challenges mainstream theory’s
conceptions of the possible subjects of self-determination, while informing us that ―self-
determination‖ also determines others to varying degrees.
In the final essay of Human Rights and Global Diversity, ―Humanitarian Vigilantes or Legal
Entrepreneurs: Enforcing Human Rights in International Society,‖ Nicholas Wheeler examines a

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VOLUME 2:2 – SPRING/SUMMER 2002

specific example of intervention to protect a cultural group: NATO’s military intervention in

Kosovo. NATO intervened to protect minority Albanians in Kosovo from the more dominant Serb
ethnic group. Wheeler presents three models of humanitarian intervention: the posse, in which
individual states act with U.N. Security Council authorization; the vigilante, which acts without
authorization to enforce agreed-upon international norms, and the norm entrepreneur, which seeks to
advance new norms. Ultimately, Wheeler asserts that NATO acted as a vigilante in Kosovo. While
lacking specific authorization from the Security Council, which most legal scholars believe is legally
required for humanitarian intervention, NATO was enforcing resolutions adopted by the Security
Council. This vigilantism may have set a dangerous precedent for states taking the law into their own
hands and will likely engender caution in the adoption of future principles.
While Wheeler has created models of international action to protect minority groups, Deveaux
focuses instead on internal arrangements that might better protect cultural minorities and their
values. Deveaux’s model of deliberative liberalism differs from deliberative democracy by expanding
the range of considerations beyond public reason. Cultural beliefs should play a role in discourse and
public decision-making, though those same beliefs may prohibit the disclosure of these reasons. For
example, indigenous cultures may believe that discussing their beliefs with others outside of their
group is prohibited. Incorporating these cultural beliefs may mean abandoning deliberative
democracy’s requirement of strong consensus. Deveaux proposes replacing strong consensus with a
weaker version of consensus that requires all to have a chance to present their concerns but does not
require unanimity. Some minority groups, by virtue of their numbers and, perhaps, their unpopular
ideas, could become ―permanent minorities,‖ effectively deprived of representation. Deveaux
suggests that this problem could be rectified through altering representation or bargaining
techniques. Deliberative liberalism would also recognize that some citizens possess diminished
capacity for participation in discourse that leaves them marginalized vis-à-vis other groups. Deveaux
believes that these modifications to deliberative democracy will deepen liberalism’s appreciation for
and integration of cultural diversity.

Reconciling Conflicts

Ultimately none of these proposals constitutes a satisfactory explanation of how to both enforce
global human rights norms while preserving cultural beliefs in the event of a genuine conflict
between the two. While the principles proposed by Deveaux and the contributors to Human Rights
and Global Diversity provide useful frameworks for resolving apparent conflicts, they do little to
address circumstances where a genuine conflict exists between what universal human rights
standards require and what cultural norms demand. Ultimately, we must resolve these conflicts in
favor of universal human rights standards. To do otherwise would deprive those standards of their
universalism and undermine the rights and dignities of those members of the cultural groups.
While cultural diversity undoubtedly contributes to the rich tapestry of our world, granting too
much authority to cultural groups, particularly without discriminating between those that respect the
human rights of their members and those that do not, risks sending us down the slippery slope of
cultural relativism. Any global scheme for incorporating diversity and protecting cultural rights must
include some safeguards for the protection of universal human rights. Cultural minorities must
secure some measure of human rights for their members, and must provide some opportunity for

6
 HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN WELFARE

dissent. Certainly international human rights standards can be incorporated in a culturally-sensitive

manner, and dissent—to the extent that it may bring about change—can play a vital role in the
changes that cultures undergo over time.
It may ultimately be impossible to incorporate complete cultural diversity within the framework
of liberal governance. In the cases where a genuine conflict exists between cultural principles and
liberalism, resolving the conflict in favor of liberalism errs in favor of individual freedom for the
members of the cultural group in question. Resolving the conflict in this way therefore provides
these individuals with the greatest possible range of rights and freedoms. Resolving conflicts in favor
of the individual may also ultimately benefit the cultural group. Members who have the freedom to
determine the course of their lives, but choose to adhere to cultural traditions, provide the most
persuasive evidence for the legitimacy of those beliefs.

Amy Eckert is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver. She
is dissertating on Rawls’ Law of Peoples and issues of toleration.

© 2002, Center On Rights Development.

7
Human Rights and Cultural Values: A Literature Review *
HURIGHTS OSAKA
Introduction

Asia is a region with diverse cultures. This is coupled with the fact that political,
social and economic situations of people in the region are equally varied. This
situation raises a question on whether international concepts such as human rights
can relate meaningfully to the cultural values present in the region. In recent years,
there are reports of some governments arguing for an Asian concept of human rights.
One major justification for this view is the culture factor.

HURIGHTS OSAKA took the opportunity of helping facilitate a more in -depth

discussion on this matter through a research project that will identify and explain
cultural values found in several countries in the region. The research project will
analyze the relationship of cultural values to human rights to provide impartial bas es
for an appropriate appreciation of human rights in the context of Asia.

This initiative is deemed crucial in fashioning effective human rights education

programs that present human rights as ideas that relate to the cultures of peoples in
different parts of the region. HURIGHTS OSAKA sees the research project as an
essential first step in developing its regional human rights education program. It will
hopefully supply a sound basis for a need to have human rights education programs
that put primacy to people's cultures.

The following review of human rights literature provides some ideas that may help
clarify the relationship between cultural values in Asia and human rights.

Study Framework

A part of the human rights discourse at present is o n the question of concept of

human rights. The existence of international human rights instruments which have
been agreed to and ratified by most States failed to proscibe arguments that human
rights must be appreciated differently in the light of differen ces in economic,
political, social and cultural character of countries in the region. In view of this, there
is a differentiation made on the varying perceptions of human rights between
Western and non-Western societies.

The universality of human rights is thus in question. Views about this issue are quite
diverse. There are those who believe in cultural relativism 1 and thus would support
different conceptions of human rights based on dissimilar cultural contexts. Others
believe that human rights, by nature, should be considered universal despite differing
cultural contexts. And there are also those who consider both views and advocate a
middle ground that serves to accommodate varying cultural contexts and yet still
assert a certain degree of universality of human rights.

The debate along the lines of relativity versus universality continues. In most cases,
however, there is hardly an extensive nor in-depth discussion on the matter. This
situation forecloses a desirable conclusion. What exactly are the sociocultural and
political differences between Western and Asia -Pacific societies that can be the basis
of differing conceptions of human rights? Likewise, what are the sociocultural and
political commonalities that will support a universal understanding of human rights?

It must be borne in mind that this debate goes on against the backdrop of the
Vienna Declaration which restates the very principle of universality and indivisibility
of all human rights.

To be able to contribute to the clarification of this issue, this research project will
focus on one angle: cultural diversity and its relationship to human r ights. This issue is
the most cited reason for a differing view on human rights. Its significance need not
be overly emphasized.

One may ask, what is the significance of focusing on culture and its impact on
human rights? The answer is that culture is one significant factor that shapes human
thinking and behavior to a great extent. Thus its influence on human beings affects
their basic attribute: human rights. As one author wrote:

... culture is a primary force in the socialization of individuals and a major

determinant of the consciousness and experience of the community. The impact
of culture on human behavior is often underestimated precisely because it is so
powerful and deeply embedded in our self-identity and consciousness. (An-Naim
1992: 23)

A closer look at this issue is therefore needed. It is necessary to gather the elements
that constitute the different cultures in the region and examine how they relate to
human rights principles.

For purposes of having a framework in looking at this issue, following are some
important views propounded by several human rights scholars.
Different Trends on the Concept

Among human rights writers, there exists a clear range of views on the question of
human rights concept. The differing views refle ct the academic as well as political
debates on the definition and focus of human rights. Somehow some of the views
mirror the Cold War scenario and the north -south divide. One can also detect the
view that is fit for political expediency agenda of some go vernments.

The varying views, however, can also be seen as results of the different histories of
evolution of the idea of human rights. The writers trace the conceptualization of
human rights based on the ideas coming from people with dissimilar backgr ounds.

One author summarizes the different dimensions of the human rights

conceptualizations as follows:

a. Whether rights claims are based on status as an individual human being or

status as a member of some community or group of persons;
b. The extent to which differential treatment of persons is permitted on
grounds of achievement and ascription;
c. The emphasis on rights compared to duties or obligations and the extent to
which rights and duties are thought to be interdependent;
d. The emphasis on so-called economic and social rights compared to the
emphasis on civil and political rights, sometimes conceived as a difference
between positive rights of governmental obligation to provide economic and
social well-being and the negative rights of governmental obligation to refrain
from abridging political and civil rights;
e. The extent to which rights are viewed as absolute or relative. (Johnson
1988: 42-43). [emphasis ours]

It is said that these dimensions are inter -related though separately classified. This
classification can be used as an analytical framework.

Classical Western liberal notion of human rights emphasizes absolute individual

political and civil rights while most non -Western, Third World traditions place greater
emphasis on the community basis of rights and duties, on economic and social rights
and on the relative character of human rights. Marxist/socialist ideas highlight
economic and social rights and duties absolutely grounded in collectivist principles.
(Johnson 1988: 43)
 Traditional cultures do not always view the individual as an autonomous being
possessed of rights above society. The individual is often conceived as an integral
component of a group, or the family or clan, the tribe, or the local community, which
is regarded as the basic unit of society. (Pathak 1989: 8) This must not mean,
however, that the individual has to lose any protection from abuses of the society. As
one author puts it:

[F]acing the frequently overwhelming power of communities over the

individual, the individual certainly needs special protection in order to preserve
some independence. Communities, in turn, might benefit from critical
contributions made by their emancipated members and also comments by
outspoken dissidents. In any case, crit ical independence and solidarity do not
form an insurmountable contradiction, but rather, belong together in shaping
human life freely and responsibly. Hence, one should be suspicious of the
purportedly general antagonism between individualism and communit arianism
sometimes invoked by "liberals" and "communitarians". What is at stake in
human rights is not an abstract individualism but rather the principle of equal
freedom which, as a critical demand, always affects individuals and
communities simultaneously. (Bielefeldt 1995: 592 )

He further explains that the nature of human rights will not lead to excessive
individualism as portrayed of the Western individualism. He states that:

...although human rights clearly enlarge the scope of individual freedom, they
are by no means merely individualistic. They are not meant to lead to an
"atomistic society" devoid of communitarian solidarity. Against the widespread
confusion of human rights and Western individualism, human rights always
imply a social dimension because human freedom can unfold only in relation to
fellow persons. A purely individualistic concept of religious liberty, for
instance, would almost amount to a contradiction in terms, because religious
life is hardly conceivable outside of religious communities. Accordingly,
religious liberty entails not only the rights of individuals to hold and express
their personal creeds, but also includes the rights to worship together and to
organize religious communities independent of government interference. To
give another example, freedom of expression does not focus only in the private
discourse in civil society.

These examples are intended to demonstrate that the emancipatory claim to equal
freedom that underlies human rights does not entail the dissolution of communitarian
bonds. However, it does challenge authoritarian traditions within communities.
Undoubtedly, human rights are incompatible with some traditional practices such as
child marriage, the persecution of religious dissenters, and the social ostracism of
political dissidents. To put it in a different way, human rights can, and ought to,
reshape communities and societies critically, in accordance with the equal respect
owed to every person.

It remains an open question, though, how exactly this is to happen and how
conflicting interests between individuals and communities can be settled justly.
(Bielefeldt 1995: 591-592)

Considering the varied cultural contexts which are supposed to be the cause for the
different conceptualization of human rights, several opinions on the issue were
identified :

a. traditions other than Western liberalism lack concepts of human rights, the
Western liberal tradition is either the only or t he most legitimate concept of
human rights;

b. non-Western ideas about human rights are not only comparable but
compatible with the ideals of Western liberalism;

c. non-Western traditions may differ even to the point of incompatibility but it

is possible to reconcile various views;

d. human rights concepts differ and cultural relativism means that no

particular view can be held more valid than others. (Johnson 1988:43)

These opinions show the debate among human rights writers. One group would
submit that Western culture is much more advanced, in opposition to some elements
of the non-Western cultures, and thus would support human rights. This contention
provokes the accusation that Westerners do not understand non -Western cultures
and arrogantly impose their own culture on others on ground of superiority of ideas
(cultural imperialism). Others believe that there are principles that exist in non -
Western cultures that parallel human rights principles. And these principles are
realized using systems appropriate to these cultures rather than those developed in
the West.

Despite the differences in opinions about the Western and non -Western ideas on
human rights, there is a generally accepted notion that human rights as understood
today developed in the West, or at least highly influenced by Western thought. The
issue is whether or not the present conceptualization of human rights relate to all
people with diverse cultures.
Universality and Relativity

1. Universality

The universal character of human rights is based on the belief that human rights are
natural attributes of human beings. The abstract idea of inherent existence of rights
in all human beings is the key reason why human rights are possessed by all people,
and thus their universality.

Human rights therefore cannot be seen as valid only in certain contexts. Their
validity is derived from the very source of their existence, the nature of human
beings. The socio-economic-cultural and political conditions of peoples do not define
human rights.

It is likewise said that due to the formal agreement by most States to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent human rights instruments, as well as
their fulfillment of certain human rights, there is universal recognition of human
rights.

Others would argue that human rights principles are found in the doctrines of the
world's religions thus supporting the view that human rights are universal. Different
cultures would reveal that human rights concepts do exist:

Freedom, justice, solidarity are neither Western nor Eastern values; they are
universal. In fact, they stem from belief in a superior moral force - God. Loyalty
to these values transcends loyalty to particular ethnic groups, governments or
nations." (Francis Lok Kok Wah, University of Malaysia) Universal human rights
affirmations are expressed in indigenous cultural forms and can be grounded in
values common to the great religious traditions of the world.

The Persians have used the Arabic word hagg, the Hindi and Be ngali have their
adhikar and the Sanskrit svetve, the Thais their sitthi, the Koreans their kooahri (or
kwolni) and the Filipinos their karapatan - all mean rights." (Raul Manglapus,
Philippines). The Universal Declaration does not affirm the institutions Westerners
often equate with human rights, such as parliaments or supreme courts, but rather
allows for various cultural forms by simply setting forth those political, social, and
economic rights that contribute to the dignity of the individual person. "(T raer
1991:158)
 Some would argue that the human rights concept actually evolved in the West. But
this does not mean that human rights are not universal. 2

One author argues that while the concept of human rights actually originated in
Europe (but not designed to become universal due to exclusion of women and other
non-European races), universal human rights adopted after the second world war are
as "...new to the West as they are for China" and thus there has been only 50 years
since the two cultural spheres were confronted with such a universal conception for
the first time. (Senger 1993: 292). 3

And still others would argue that there exists a "common culture of modernity" that
has engulfed all societies by virtue of the rise of the concept of global economy.
States, regions, cities, families, patterns of li fe, are all shaped by this culture. Human
rights become part of a world social process, the institutional expression of which is
the international law of human rights. International law is seen as an inter -cultural
law, and appeal to international law is evidence of the existence of universal
standards of human rights. (Vincent 1986: 50) 4

Regardless however of the basis of justification for the universality a rgument, the
universality of human rights must be recognized in the context of the different
cultures that actually exist.

Human rights today are essentially universal, requiring only relatively modest
adjustments in the name of cultural diversity.

One author identifies three main sources of attacks on the universality of human
rights: proponents of the New World Order, developing country governments, and
leadership of religious fundamentalism movements and ethnic anarchists. He further
explained that these attacks are sustained for the following reasons:

a. to justify the denial of human rights to some sections of their people;

b. to deny new assertions of human rights by excluded groups such as women

and indigenous peoples;

c. to negate and destroy cultural pluralism;

d. to impose disabilities based on culture, religion, ethnicity, etc. upon

minorities. (Dias 1993:44-45)
The concept of universal human rights does not disregard the reality of varied
cultures in different societies. The con cept of human rights is not static. It relates to
all peoples and situations. As one author puts it:

The universality of human rights does not mean the global imposition of a
particular set of Western values, but instead, aims at the universal recognition
of pluralism and difference - different religions, cultures, political convictions,
ways of life - insofar as such difference expresses unfathomable potential of
human existence and the dignity of the persons. To be sure, pluralism and
difference apply also to the concept of human rights which itself remains open
- and must be open - to different and conflicting interpretations in our
pluralistic and multicultural political world. Without the recognition of such
difference within the human rights debate, t he discourse would amount to
cultural imperialism. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the very idea of human
rights precludes some political practices, such as oppression of dissidents,
discrimination against minorities, slavery and apartheid. (Bielefeldt 1 995: 594)

2. Relativity

The argument in favor of seeing human rights as relative concepts 5 is based on the
premise that human rights as presently conceived reflects the culture of the major
authors of human rights instruments starting with the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Pathak 1989: 7). Since the West is seen as having the
most influence on the modern-day human rights conceptualization, its culture
dominates the ideas behind the human rights instruments. It cannot therefore be
assumed that human rights are applicable to other regions.

As one author puts it:

... to a cultural relativist, a document such as the (Universal) Declaration (of

Human Rights) seems a futile proclamation derived from moral principles valid
in one culture and not entirely acceptable in others, and any attempt to
establish a congruency in different national systems appear bound to fail,
because any such attempt would be incapable of eroding the irreducible core of
cultural singularity in various social components of the world. There is a need
to remember that each culture insists on its o wn moral superiority, there being
few which tolerate a cultural egalitarianism. (Pathak 1989: 8)
Reality of cultural diversity

There is no argument that communities/countries/regions have separate cultures. It

is a given condition in examining this wh ole issue. It is also a fact that there was an
imposition of culture on other peoples done by Western countries during the height
of colonialism. It was an attempt at changing the cultures existing in colonized
communities.

The view that human rights are universal concepts is seen therefore as another
round of domination by one culture (Western culture) over the rest of the cultures in
this world. Several authors would consider this situation as simply cultural
imperialism. One author says that each culture has its own distinctive ways of viewing
and doing things. Each culture is uniquely worthy of respect. The distinctiveness
among cultures should not be blurred or mitigated. They should not be compared
favorably or unfavorably with one another. They sh ould be respected. To consider the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be universal could imply that all
contradictory concepts be eliminated and that the culture which has given birth to the
concept of human rights should also be called upon to becom e a universal culture.
(Holeman 1987: 209-211 ) He further states that:

The diversity of cultures and the failure of the Universal Declaration to be a

truly universal document suggests the difficulty of one culture dictating
morality to another. This can be insidious even if in the name of such a noble
ideal as human rights. Noble ideals can be twisted to serve ignoble purposes.
Throughout Western history, a number of injustices have been couched in
human rights jargon [such as in the colonial enterprise]. Within Western
nations, human rights have been around for some time but were once only
extended to whites, or males, or adults, or property owners, or heterosexuals,
or Christians [or Anglicans, or Puritans, or Catholics, as the case may be].
Deductive reasoning suggests that groups denied equal human rights must not
be fully human." (Holeman 1987: 209-211 )

The recognition of cultural diversity means that human rights can no longer rely on
their traditional sources of justification. Traditionally, t here have been four sources to
which theorists have referred:

a. divine authority;
b. natural law;
c. intuition (that human rights are self-evident);
d. ratification of international instruments.
The first and second are not in vogue and the third is increasingly questioned. Even
the claim that because political elites have ratified human rights documents human
rights are therefore universal is suspect. There is no guarantee that the elites ratify
for reasons other than political expediency. Moreover , it is far from clear that the
values of elites correspond to the traditional value systems in the countries they
represent. It is, therefore, necessary to try a different strategy to validate human
rights standards. (Renteln 1988: 9)

Relativist conception of human rights

The recognition of cultural diversity is not a justification, however, for some

authors, to totally discard the applicability of human rights to peoples with differing
cultures. There is a view that relativism should be seen from a practical viewpoint.

The significance of different cultural variations on human rights appreciation is seen

on the hierarchical levels of variation:

i. Substance of lists of human rights - this is the conceptual level, consisting of

human rights formulations such as the rights to political participation or work
which would justify very little cultural variability;

ii. Interpretation of individual rights - some interpretative variability seems to

be plausible for most internationally recognized human rights. For example, the
right to work can have many interpretations such as guaranteed job and
unemployment insurance;

iii. Form in which particular rights are implemented - considerable variation in

the particular form in which interpretation is impleme nted is justifiable.

In going to the level of implementation of human rights, there is further specifying

and interpreting (in the ordinary sense of the term) of the higher level, and the range
of permission at a given level is set by the next higher level. For example,
"interpretations" of a right are logically limited by the substance of a right; even the
range of variation in substance is set by the notions of human nature and dignity from
which the list of rights derives. (Donnelly 1993: 110)
Human rights and the non-Western societies

An examination of some cultures reveals some critical views on human rights such
as follows:

a. Hinduism - human rights are not universal since not every person is given
the same rights. And even if human rights is extended to all people, it would
still be unacceptable because of the insinuation that nonhuman sentient beings
are inferior to human ones and that their rights can be trampled on if only to
promote the rights of humans. [Holeman 1987: 211]

To compare with a Western culture, the US has evolved a philosophical conception

of human rights which draws heavily on Western liberal ideas and emphasizes
absolute principles of civil and political rights based on individualism and equality of
opportunity. The philosophical underpinnings of modern India, by contrast, rest on
group based rights and duties of a relative and differential nature with a substantial
emphasis on economic and social rights as well as civil and political rights. (Johnson
1988: 49)

b. Islam - rights remain subordinate to and determined by duties. (Vincent

1986: 43) The alleged human rights based on Islamic doctrine, prove only to be
duties of rulers and individuals, not rights held by everyone. The scriptural
passages cited as establishing a right to protection of life are in fact divine
injunctions not to kill and to consider life as inviolable. The right to justice
proves to be instead a duty of rulers to establish justice. The right to freedom
is merely a duty not to enslave unjustly. Economic rights turn out to be duties
to earn a living and help provide for the needy. And the purported right to
freedom of expression is actually an obligation to speak the truth - that is, the
"right" is not even an obligation of others, but an ob ligation of the alleged
right-holder. Muslims are regularly and forcefully enjoined to treat their fellow
men with respect and dignity, but the bases of these injunctions are divine
commands that establish only duties, not human rights.

The social and political precepts of Islam do reflect a strong concern for human
good and human dignity. Such concern is important in itself, and even a prerequisite
for human rights notions. But it is in no way equivalent to a concern for, or a
recognition of, human rights. (Donnelly 1989: 51).
 c. Chinese view - the word for human rights came to China from Japan in the
mid-19th century. From the current sinomarxists point of view, human rights
are not naturally given, but "commercially given", which is to say, they
developed at a certain stage of economic development. According to this view,
the human rights situation in China cannot appreciably improve until China's
level of economic development has been noticeably raised through "the
process of socialist modernization". In other words, human rights are posited in
a concrete framework and are not an abstract scheme. For this reason,
different periods and countries have different views of human rights and apply
them differently. It was also pointed out that under the an cient Confucian
philosophy, each human being existed as a bearer of a specific social role: as
father, as son, as wife, as ruler, as subject, as friend. Each role was assigned a
different status and a different pattern of behavior. This then became the bas is
of the ancient Chinese legal system that is characterized by inequality. (Senger
1993: 295,305, 309) 6

Asian regional setting

Some governments maintain that there are certain values found to be common in
Asia. These values are perceived to be contradictory to those of the West and thus
support the view that values are not universal and common to all people. Following
are some of these "Asian values":

a. placing society above the self, upholding the family as building block of
society;
b. resolving issues through consensus instead of contention;
c. importance of duty as counterpoint to right;
d. obligation of the community to look after its less advantaged members.
(Ghai 1994: 8-9)

Asia has the major religions of the world. Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam have
developed in the region. Christianity has thrived in some parts of the countries in
Asia. Each religion has varying set of beliefs and values, and the same religion does
not manifest itself uniformly in its discourse about human rights at all times in all
countries. Religion would not appear to hold a key to universalism. Indeed most
religions in some sense deny the claims of equality: traditionally Hindus found people
of other religions polluting, and most other religions accord the nonbeliever an
inferior status in both religious and secular systems.
 The various cultures in Asia seem to be upholding the importance of community.
Cultures, therefore, developed around this concern. This aspect of Asian cultures is
opposite to the Western emphasis on the individual.

It must be noted that China, Malaysia, and Singapore mainly espouse the views
above. (Ghai 1994: 8-14)

In opposition to the view about the existence of "Asian " values, it is argued that the
cultural diversity in Asia is based on profound differences in values. Thus the attempt
to identify concrete examples of "Asian" values is "... likely to lead to a degree of
selectivity and subjectivity." It is likewise mentioned that values perceived as Asian
are actually similar to values existing in other regions of the world. It is thus
questionable, to say the least, to assert that there are uniquely "Asian" values.
(Pelkmans 1996:9. 16-17)

Approaches in Reconciling the Two Views

Basic premises

A number of authors espouse the view that there is a common ground upon which
ideas on human rights coming from the West, East or other regions of the world can
be reconciled. There is no comprehensive agreement on all aspects of culture but
there are basic elements in all cultures, which sustain a common understanding of
human existence.

One author states that:

human rights do rely on the idea of human dignity which can also be found in
various cultural and religious traditions. Thus, although human rights do not
derive immediately from religious traditions, they are not alien to those
traditions that have recognized the idea of human dignity. Hence, with
reference to human dignity, a critica l reconciliation between competing
requirements of particular religious traditions and modern international human
rights standards might be conceivable. (Bielefeldt 1995: 601)
Another author states that:

[T]here is an apparent cross -cultural consensus on a few practices that cannot

be justified by even the hoariest of traditions, and certainly not by a new
custom (such as prohibition of torture, requirement of procedural due process
in imposing and executing legal punishments).

There is also a striking cross-cultural consensus on many values that today we seek to
protect through human rights, especially when those values are expressed in
relatively general terms. Life, social order, the family, protection from arbitrarily rule,
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the guarantee of a place in a life of
the community and access to an equitable share of the means of subsistence are
certain moral aspirations in nearly all cultures.

Authentic traditional cultural practices and values can be an imp ortant check on
abuses of arbitrary power. It can be illustrated as follows:

a. rights to life, liberty, and security of the person; the guarantee of legal
personality; and protection against slavery, arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile,
and inhuman or degrading treatment are so clearly connected to basic cross -
cultural requirements of human dignity, and restated in sufficiently general
terms, that any morally defensible contemporary form of social organization
must recognize them (although perhaps not n ecessarily as inalienable rights).

b. civil rights such as freedom of conscience, speech, and association may be a

bit more relative. Because they assume the existence and positive evaluation of
relatively autonomous individuals, they may be questionable applicability in
strong, thriving traditional communities. In such communities, however, they
would rarely be at issue. If traditional practices truly are based on and protect
culturally accepted conceptions of human dignity, then members of such a
community simply will not have the desire or need to claim such civil rights.
(Donnelly 1993: 112-113; 121-123)

One view, however, is that the development and understanding of rights are
contingent on a variety of factors, moral ideas as well as material co nditions, and that
differences in the perception of human rights are attributable to these ideas and
conditions rather than to any inherent notion of culture or community. This approach
does indeed provide a basis for reconciling the so -called Western and Eastern
perceptions of human rights. (Ghai 1994: 12) 7
Suggested approaches

With the understanding that there are common grounds for reconciling different
conceptualizations of human rights according to different cultures, many authors
suggest approaches to attain this objective. Each approach may constitute a part of
the same effort of finding a view of human rights that applies to varying cultural
contexts. Following are the suggested approaches:

a. Dialogue Between Cultures

Dialogue between cultures is the better way rather than an imposition of a

"universal idea" that is based on a specific culture. Each culture must therefore be
open to insights and criticisms of other points of view. A healthy pluralism of cultures,
as against global monoculture, means that each culture learns about itself by seeing
itself through the eyes of another. It does not preoccupy itself with hegemonic
ambitions. It enables cultures to benefit and borrow from the strengths of others. And
it helps clear up misconceptions about other cultures. (Holeman 1987: 214 -215)

In the same vein, a suggestion is made for the various cultures to have "rational
conversation about rights". This consists of rectifying mistakes by discussion and
experience. What is fixed on temporarily as right is the outcome of a collision of
opposing opinions. Even what is wholly true must be contested to avoid its becoming
a mere prejudice. This procedure does not allow the imposition of a moral truth, or
the coercion of those not seized of it because coercion is only legitimate for the
protection of the self and not for the enlightenment of others. But it does suggest a
view of the discussion of human rights in international politics as appealing to an
empire of reason, and not merely to that of power, or circumstance. It supposes,
more deeply, that no human being can seriously hold some ethical principle to be
right, or imperative, without wishing th at others too deem it right, or imperative.
(Vincent 1986:56)

Naming the process cross-cultural dialogue, it is of the view that since cross -cultural
interaction and mutual influence is always occurring, it should not be difficult to
introduce into it some elements of a human rights agenda.

There are already human rights implications to the processes of intercultural

relations, but these tend to be incidental and somewhat arbitrary. The proposed
approach to the cross-cultural legitimacy of universal human rights recommends that
the processes of intercultural relations should be more deliberately and effectively
utilized to overcome cultural antagonism to human rights norms that are problematic
in a given context... [T]his process must be both mutual bet ween cultures and
sensitive to the needs of internal authenticity and legitimacy. Those of one cultural
tradition who wish to induce change in attitudes within another culture must be open
to corresponding inducement in relation to their own attitudes and must be
respectful of the integrity of the other culture. They must never even appear to be
imposing external values in support of the human rights standards they seek to
legitimize within the framework of the other culture. This approach, however, does
not seek to repudiate the existing international standards of human rights. On the
contrary, it maintains that there are compelling reasons for accepting and working
with these standards. .. This approach is based on the belief that, despite their
apparent peculiarities and diversity, human beings and societies share certain
fundamental interests, concerns, qualities, traits and values that can be identified and
articulated as the framework for a common "culture" of universal human rights." (An -
Naim 1992: 4-5, 21)

This approach can succeed if people of differing cultures create an environment of

respect and openness to each other's perspective. Much of the conflict in viewing
human rights from a cultural vantage point stems from lack or misunderstanding of
the cultures involved. The first step therefore toward an effective dialogue with
people of different culture is the casting away of cultural blinders such as prejudices
and animosities, which may have developed through previous relationships or
inadequate knowledge of the other cultures.

b. Internal Dialogue in Cultures

A corresponding process of reconciling culture and human rights is dialogue within

the cultures. This is where the initiative to examine own culture comes from the
members of the community owning the culture. It proceeds from an honest
recognition of a need to review own culture with the hope of relating it to human
rights.

To be effective at local and community levels, the imposition of the universal must
be by way of an opening in the culture itself, not by external imposition on culture.
Therefore, it is of great importance to nurture cultural rethinking, reinterpretation,
and internal dialogue. (Falk 1992:49)

Virtually any cultural heritage is morally rich enough that it can, if appropriately
construed under some circumstances, make inspirational contributions to the struggle
for human rights, democracy, and social justice. The international protection of
human rights cannot proceed very far without liberating the culture itself to serve
these ends. There are no fixed points of normative reference, so that we are all
responsible for the discovery and protection of human rights, and must establish such
a process of inquiry as to be itself an expression of the integrity of a ny given cultural
identity. (Falk 1992:54, 60)
 Human rights enshrined in international law, and largely embodied in Western
cultural practice, cannot be effectively protected in some cultural settings. Indeed,
their attempted implementation may produce a devastating breakdown of social
order as well as a heightening of influence for restrictive or fundamentalist cultural
tendencies.

There may be room for changing a cultural position from within, through internal
discourse about the fundamental value s of the culture and the rationale for these
values. In view of the fact that such discourse is always taking place in relation to
moral, political, and social issues, it should not be difficult to focus attention on the
human rights implications of those issues. This public awareness can be achieved
through intellectual and scholarly debate, artistic and literary expression of
alternative views on those issues, and political and social action furthering those
views. It is imperative, however, that the prop onents of alternative cultural positions
on human rights issues should seek to achieve a broad and effective acceptance of
their interpretation of cultural norms and institutions by showing authenticity and
legitimacy of that interpretation within the framework of their own culture. (An-Naim
1992: 4)

Another author suggests that cultural reconstruction is linked to the prospects of

human rights. Such reconstruction must have open access communication, free from
dogmatic interference. It is only from wit hin the spiritual and humanistic core of civil
society that restorative energies can emerge to redress cultural imbalances. (Falk
1992: 57).

It is possible that systems for dialogue among the members of communities exist
and can be harnessed in looking at the relationship of human rights to their own
culture. In communities, however, where systems for dialogue are not present, effort
must be taken to support the development of the appropriate systems.

c. Emphasis on Global Cosmopolitan Culture

An extreme relativistic view is denied validity by the inescapable admission of basic

common elements found in moral value codes of large section of humanity. There is
also the undeniable fact that values change due to the penetration of cultures from
various sources in many societies as a result of the growing constellation of
commercial, technological, and communication enterprises around the world.
Increasing interaction among peoples in various capacities due to academic,
economic, political, social, health, environmental and cultural pursuits create a sense
of shared understanding of what are common values.
 It said that it is "...increasingly recognized that while absolute universals cannot be
found, it is possible, and indeed desirable, to seek com mon denominators across
cultures..." (Obermeyer 1995: 368) An author would even limit the common
denominators to political and legal standards. He states that:

...[H]uman rights constitute only limited normative demands in that they focus
on political and legal standards of international justice. At the same time,
however, they can potentially be connected with more comprehensive
doctrines or cultural values, insofar as they refer to the principle of human
dignity which itself might facilitate a critical mediation between the normative
requirements of human rights on the one hand and various religious or cultural
traditions on the other. Thus an overlapping normative consensus between
religions and cultures might be achievable." (Bielefeldt 1995: 594 -595)

It is also said that

[U]ltimately, the search for cross -cultural universals must be realistic. Even the
discovery of a moral principle embraced on a universal basis may not be
translated easily into a particular human rights. But this approach offer s the
possibility of grounding international human rights in reality instead of
naturalistic abstractions. By identifying principles that are shared we can
construct standards which could be implemented because they are based on
values meaningful in all cultural contexts. (Renteln 1988: 31).

e. Rethinking Human Rights Concept

There can be a rethinking of the concept of human rights drawing on common

threads in varied traditions. There are seeds of a reconciled concept of human rights
in the broad ideals of political participation, restraints on the use of force and
violence and sanctions against violators. The traditional synthesizing and absorptive
character of Indian culture, for example, may provide a vehicle for reconciling
divergent views of human rights. [Johnson 1988: 44-45] Also, identification of rights
that all cultures and jurisdictions subscribe to - the obvious candidates being right to
life, the prohibition of slavery and the prohibition of torture (but beyond this, lists
tend to diverge) can be one approach related to the rethinking of human rights
concept. (Ghai 1994: 14) 8
 f. Modified Cultural Relativism

The kind of cultural relativism that demands tolerance for dissimilar ways of
resolving rights problems in different cultures seems legitimate. Likewise, the cultural
relativism that calls for the West to forbear condemning intact traditional societies as
defective because they fail to protect human rights according to modern international
standards seems justifiable. What does not seem defensible is cultural relativism that
would insulate the conduct of modern nation -states from critical scrutiny because the
states claimed to be following the dictates of a religion or a local culture that
exempted them from duty to abide by the standards of international human rights.
(Mayer 1991: 21)

Harmonizing with Different Cultures with Human Rights

More recent thinkers propose a more positive view about the relations between
human rights and the different traditional cultures. Following are views about some
cultures:

1. Islamic culture

Understanding human rights to be an international and cross -cultural demand is

tantamount to the insight that these rights cannot be simply integrated into the
existing normative framework of the sha'ria. It has indeed to be admitted that there
are fundamental tensions between traditional sha'ria norms and the requirements of
human rights. These tensions need careful assessment, rather than premature
harmonization. What is at stake is a self -critical reevaluation of the sha'ria and its
underlying principles: an opportunity to seek out ways to genuinely mediate between
and reconcile the competing normative requirements.

...some reconciliation between the traditional sha'ria and the modern idea of human
rights conceivably could be accomplished in accordance with the well established
Islamic pragmatism...one should not underestimate the potential for Islam to cope
with new challenges and demands in a pragmatic way. In conformity with the humane
flexibility that has largely marked the sha'ria, some of the conflicts between different
normative requirements might be settled. (Bielefieldt 1995:610, 114 )

Rights must be linked to duties, and individual claims must be reconciled with the
common good. In the Islamic view human rights are universally true, and yet
implementation of these rights may require various forms. Challenged by the West,
Islamic societies are rediscovering their own tradition in new ways. While grounding
human rights in their own faith, Muslims nonetheless affirm the universality of human
rights. In addition, a number of Muslims have been stirred to action by the lack of
protection for fundamental human rights, in their own societies as well as in the rest
of the world. (Traer 1991: 123)

2. Chinese culture

In Chinese culture, human rights must be a matter of consensus because of the

Confucian culture which has shaped for centuries the life and understanding of the
people. Yet the Chinese also affirm individual rights and the rule of law. Chinese
intellectuals must have the responsibility for achieving the convergence of the two
political cultures and honor both a Chinese tradition and e xercise Western-inspired
human rights if they could use their freedom of thought to advance an appropriate
political theory sustaining human rights. (Hung -chao Tai, Taiwan). (Traer 1991: 162)

Neo-Confucian doctrines are in accord with the concept of freedom and human
rights. Each person is endowed by Nature with one universal moral principle. One
must be loyal to one's inner self and moral integrity. Otherwise, one loses humanity.
To be ethical and to be public-spirited is one and the same. Humanity and
benevolence are expressed by the same word (ren in Chinese, jin in Japanese). Rulers
are supposed to be models of morality and thus must reign over their subjects
benevolently in order to make people's lives secure and ethical, while humbly
listening to public opinion. If everybody realizes each one's inner principle under the
aegis of good rulers, there will be no conflicts and wars in the world. Based on this
view of Confucianism, the Western concepts of republicanism and democracy are seen
as embodying important Confucian values. This view is becoming quite prevalent
among the new Confucianists in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan.
(Hiroshi 1995: 429)

3. Buddhist culture

Buddhists do affirm human rights, as central to their understanding of dharma and

the living out of the Buddhist precepts. Despite the conceptual difficulties of
justifying human rights, as central to Buddhist faith, at least some Buddhists find
human rights language expressive of their religious commitment to the Three Re fuges:
the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha. Thus the Dalai Lama says that "... all have
equal right to be happy ... because of our common humanity." Thus "...the shared
aspiration of gaining happiness and avoiding suffering, as well as the basic right to
bring it about, are of prime importance." (Traer 1991: 140) It is also said that
Buddhism has principles consistent with specific human rights. (Peek 1995: 540) A list
of such rights, considered to be inherent and inalienable, has been suggested. 9
4. Hindu culture

Modern concepts of human rights are a reflection of Western influence and

interfere with traditional notions of dharma. Yet Hindu reformers seek to interpret
dharma in ways which support the notion of human rights. This is not easily done.
Perhaps this is why the Indian Constitution sets forth the major human rights affirmed
in the Universal Declaration without providing any philosophical foundati on for them.
The fact remains, however, that most educated Hindus not only accepted these
fundamental rights but insisted that they expressed age -old Hindu principles. Hindus
affirm both dharma and human rights. (Traer 1991: 133)

Conclusion

The Vienna Declaration (1993) states that

All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. Whi le the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic
and cultural systems, to promote and protect al l human rights and fundamental
freedoms. (Section 5, Part 1)

This is the latest consensus among States on the issue of universality and culture. It
is supposed to embody a compromise on the diverging views of States on the nature
of human rights and the cultural peculiarities (among other differences) of societies.
It reaffirms the universality of human rights and at the same time takes account of
the actual realities obtaining within each State.

This provision is a clue to where an examination of the present issue must lead. It is
a formal basis, at least, of an assumption that States in the Asia -Pacific region are not
contesting the premise that human rights are universal which can relate to the
specific situations of countries.

There remains an issue on whether such an international statement of agreement is

translated into concrete policies, programs and activities in the different countries in
the region.

In a regional conference held recently, several Asia -Pacific countries declared

support for human rights education that draws "... on the rich cultural heritage and
diversity in the region, including appropriate recognition of family and community
values." The same declaration states that "... human rights education must affirm not
only rights and freedoms but also responsibilities" , should "... promote the values
and practices of healing, reconciliation and conflict resolution", and should "...
cultivate participative values of governance, consensus building and accountability".
(Conference-Workshop on Asia-Pacific Human Rights Education for Development
1995) 10

One relevant recommendation is the development of appropriate human rights

teaching strategies that "... build on the liberating elements of indigenous concepts,
folk knowledge and cultural practices".

This document indicates a regional consensus among some States on the

proposition that human rights must be seen in the light o f the cultures obtaining in
the region. What particularly makes the document different, which is a normal course
for a regional declaration, from the Vienna Declaration is the citation of specific
principles that are descriptive of the elements of cultures in the region that States
want emphasized in any human rights education program, and the kind of perspective
that States must adopt in relating to indigenous concepts, folk knowledge and cultural
practices. There is clearly a strong stress on the positive aspects of culture.

This is yet another clue on how a study of human rights and the cultures in Asia -
Pacific should proceed.

The literature review presented here contains the different views on the
relationship between human rights and culture, and the possible approaches in
mediating two extreme views of universality and relativity. Most human rights writers
would espouse a middle ground that promotes the universal character of human
rights while respecting cultures. This middle ground aims at fin ding an
accommodation of differences in cultures by having a deeper clarification and
understanding of the meaning of human rights to people and communities with
varying histories and contexts.

The question of applying human rights principles to a part icular situation will always
invite a response that dwells on the content and the means of making this application.
Many writers seem to agree that a certain degree of relativity occurs when it comes
to the question of realizing human rights relating to specific issues.

The human rights literature writers have formulated a set of approaches to this
question. It is notable that these approaches are generally in agreement that human
rights and cultures can be reconciled through dialogue (within and betwee n cultures)
that would result in finding common bases of close interaction. There is a general
thinking that such dialogues will benefit both human rights and cultures as they
mutually develop. Basic guidelines on reconciling human rights and cultures exis t.
They can later on be expanded for purposes of making the approaches much more
effective.
 The issue that needs to be settled is on the content of such dialogue. Human rights
literature writers have cited some general examples of cultural elements, wh ich relate
to human rights. These examples, however, may still be subject to further
interpretation by the different communities. In such a case, cultural values would
need further clarification. This is more so when one considers the fact that cultural
values that may be identified with the Asia -Pacific region are mentioned in a general
sense. Dialogue within and between cultures on the issue of human rights will find
much more meaning when actual realities are taken into account.

The international and regional affirmations by governments of the universality of

human rights and their intrinsic link to the cultures of peoples provide the context for
these dialogues.

Therefore, the study of the cultural values in Asia should be able to identify and
examine their meaning as seen through the eyes of the members of the community
and find out how they can truly be linked to human rights. It is likewise important to
know if there has been any attempt at facilitating this link through means akin to any
of the proposed ways of reconciling the universality of human rights with the
particularity of cultures.

The discussion on universality and relativity suggests a situation of conflict of

values. In some cases, that conflict is seen in the opposite ideas bet ween some human
rights principles and some traditional systems. There is a ground, however, for saying
that on the whole human rights principles still need further refinement/interpretation
as they apply to concrete situations, while communities are not st atic and can have
the flexibility to incorporate ideas that are couched in an unfamiliar language. In
other words, present day societies are changing and will thus find a room for
discussion and adaptation to growing internationally -enunciated principles such as
human rights. It may not therefore be a case of conflict of values but a process of
clarification of the varying formulations of principles that aim to serve the needs of
people in their respective societies. What would be most important to know is the
result of this process. What adjustments have been made and how do they promote
human rights?

This is the task that goes beyond literature review.

References

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Human Rights," in Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives , An-Naim Abdullahi, ed., University of
Pennsylvania Press , Philadelphia, 1992.

Bielefeldt, Heiner (1995) "Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate," Human Rights Quarterly, John Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, November.
 Dias, Clarence J. (1993) "The Universality of Human Rights: A Critique" in Lokayan Bulletin , New Delhi, India,
volume 103.

Donnelly, Jack (1993), International Human Rights, Westview Press, Colorado, .

__________(1989) Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice , Cornell University Press, New York.

Falk, Richard (1992) "Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights," in Human Rights
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Ghai, Yash (1994) "Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate," in Center for Asian and Pacific Affairs ,
occasional papers, The Asia Foundation, San Francisco, November.
__________(1996) Rights, Duties and Responsibilities , unpublished.

Watanabe, Hiroshi (1995) "Comments on the Windsor Paper," in The End of the Century - The Future in the
Past, Japan Foundation, Center for Global Partnership, Kadansha International, Tokyo.

Holeman, Warren Lee (1987) The Human Rights Movement - Western Values and Theological Perspectives ,
Praeger, New York.

Johnson, M. Glen (1988) "Human Rights in Divergent Conceptual Settings - How Do Ideas Influence Policy
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Mayer, Ann Elizabeth (1991) Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics , West View Press, Colorado.

Obermayer, Carla Makhlouf (1995) "A Cross -Cultural Perspective on Reproductive Rights," Human Rights
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Pathak, Raghunadan Swarup (1989) Introductory Report on Universality of Human Rights, in Universality of
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Pelkmans, Jacques (1996) Understanding Values in Asia , Foundation Cini, Venice.

Plantilla, Jefferson R. (1996) National Human Rights Institutions and Human Rights Education , paper
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Source: https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/database/hr-cultural-values.html