The Qatar Crisis

Middle East freezes out Qatar: What you need to know

By Katie Hunt, CNN, June 7, 2017
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/06/middleeast/qatar-middle-east-diplomatic-
freeze/index.html

It's the biggest political crisis to hit the Middle East in years.

Qatari nationals are now officially on notice to leave neighboring countries within two
weeks after an unprecedented diplomatic freeze of the nation by key allies and
neighbors.

A total of nine nations have so far moved to indefinitely sever ties with Qatar --- a
country of nearly 2.3 million people, mostly foreign workers.

What's changed?
 The original list of five countries severing ties -- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen -- has now expanded to nine, with the
addition of Mauritius, Mauritania, the Maldives and Libya's eastern-based
government.

 Saudi Arabia has severed all land, sea and air links with Qatar, and the UAE has
closed its airports and harbors to Qatari flights and shipping.

 Etihad, Emirates, Fly Dubai and Gulf Air have halted all flights in and out of
Doha, the Qatari capital. Qatar Airways says it's halting flights to Saudi Arabia.

 Qatari diplomats have been given notice to leave their foreign posts.

 Qatari citizens have been told they have 14 days to leave Saudi Arabia, Bahrain
and the UAE, and those countries also banned their own citizens from entering
Qatar.

So what's behind it?

It's complicated.
 Gulf allies have repeatedly criticized Qatar for alleged support of the Muslim
Brotherhood, a nearly 100-year-old Islamist group considered a terrorist
organization by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

 The UAE accused Qatar of "funding and hosting" the group in its statement
announcing the severance of ties. However, analysts say the rift is also driven by
the belief that Qatar is too closely aligned with Iran.
  The diplomatic crisis came two weeks after Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and
Egypt blocked several Qatari media outlets -- including Al Jazeera -- over
comments allegedly made by Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim Al Hamad Al Thani.

 Al Thani reportedly hailed Iran as an "Islamic power" and criticized US President

Donald Trump's policy towards Tehran.

 Qatar said the website was hacked -- and on June 6, US officials told CNN that
US investigators believe Russian hackers were behind it.
 US officials said the goal of the Russians appeared to be creation of a rift among
the US and its allies.

 Saudi Arabia and Iran are at odds over a number of regional issues, including
Iran's nuclear program and what Saudis see as Tehran's growing influence in the
kingdom's sphere of influence -- especially in Syria, Lebanon and neighboring
Yemen.

 Qatar and Iran share the largest underwater natural gas field in the world. But
recent Gulf reports have charged the relationship goes beyond resource
management, accusing Qatari officials of meeting with the head of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps.

How will this affect people in Qatar?

 Qatar is rich in oil and gas but it doesn't really produce its own food -- almost all
of comes from Saudi Arabia. Now the borders have been shut, food prices could
skyrocket. Reports suggest that Qataris are stocking up on food in anticipation of
food shortages.

 Qatar Airlines is a major global airlines but it's not longer allowed to use the
airspace above Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE. That means flights to
Africa and North America may have to make big detours -- raising fuel costs,
flight times and potentially ticket prices.

 Stores are busy enough in #Doha, #Qatar during Ramadan. But #Saudi border
closures and looming food shortages are an even crazier scene
pic.twitter.com/Me3KgLryTD

— Allison Furlong (@AllisonFurlong) June 5, 2017

 However, the country has a big war chest -- a more than $300 billion sovereign
wealth fund that was founded in 2005 to grow the money made off the nation's
natural resources that should help it weather any financial hit.

 Qataris are a minority in their own country -- it's home to as many as two million
foreign workers, mainly from India, Nepal, Bangladesh and the Philippines.
  The Qatari embassy in the UAE advised its citizens to travel via Kuwait or Oman
if they are unable to fly direct. It also offered to pay for their tickets if they don't
have the means to purchase them.

 Some expats in the Gulf were also scrambling to find other ways of getting to,
and from, Doha. Many families live in Dubai and commute to Doha -- normally
just a 45-minute flight away.

How will it affect the rest of the world?

 Any kind of instability in the Middle East tends to send up oil prices, and the
longer prices stay high, the more likely it is that it will cost more to fill up your
tank. So far, oil and gas markets have been taking the crisis in their stride.

 However, Greg McKenna, chief market strategist at CFD and FX provider

AxiTrader, says that what happens next will be key.

 "Qatar is the world's biggest LNG exporter. It has pipelines in the Gulf and could
retaliate but cutting off supplies to its neighbors. (It's) something to watch."

 The diplomatic crisis is also the latest complication for the 2022 World Cup,
which Qatar is preparing to host. If the travel restrictions remain in place long
term, they could keep supplies, workers and eventually soccer fans from moving
freely in and out of the country.

 The tournament is already facing allegations of worker misconduct, and it had to

slash the budget for the soccer tournament by more than 40% because of the
falling price of oil.

What about the United States. Is it involved?

Yes and no.
On June 6, US President Donald Trump appeared to take credit for the Mideast split.

 "During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be
funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar - look," he tweeted.

 During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be
funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar - look!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) June 6, 2017

 Pentagon officials moved quickly to limit any damage, with spokesman Capt. Jeff
Davis telling reporters Tuesday that the US is "grateful to the Qataris for the
longstanding support for our presence and their enduring commitment to regional
security."
  Countries in the Gulf are key to the US-led coalition against ISIS, with Qatar
hosting the Al Udeid Air Base, the US military's main regional center for daily air
missions and coordination of all air operations.

 Trump visited Saudi Arabia in May as part of his first foreign trip as US President.
While there he announced a $110 billion arms deal with the Saudis, and sent a
message that nations there must take greater responsibility to rein in bad actors.

 However, Trump and his officials have also praised Qatar. US Secretary of
Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with their Qatari
counterparts in April and May. And at the May summit in Saudi Arabia, Trump
said US relations with Qatar were "extremely good."

What will Qatar do?

 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will now be in a position to demand
concessions from Qatar in return for restoration of diplomatic and economic ties.

 Analysts said that one of their demands could be the closure of television
network Al Jazeera. Established two decades ago in Doha, Al Jazeera helped to
expand Qatar's political influence by broadcasting Arabic-language programs that
were seen in millions of living rooms around the region.

 The network went on to launch English-language programming.

 "Qatar's Emir first gesture of good will likely be the shutting of Al Jazeera TV
network entirely, which could happen in months if not weeks," Sultan Al Qassemi,
a prominent regional commentator, said in a tweet.

 Will Qatar sacrifice Al Jazeera to mend regional ties?

Why key Arab countries have cut ties with Qatar — and what
Trump had to do with it
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/07/what-you-should-know-
about-qatar-now/?utm_term=.bfad749b18b9

The decision by five Arab states to sever ties with Qatar marks another chapter in a
multiyear saga of turbulent relations between Qatar and its neighbors. A split between
Doha and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was brewing for years. At the heart of
the problem lies an irreconcilable difference between the Persian Gulf countries
about how to interpret the events of the 2011 Arab Spring and, more important, how
to react to them.

In contrast to its GCC neighbors, Qatar actively promoted regime change across the
Arab world. The Qataris mobilized finances and offered favorable media coverage to
many Islamist actors, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza,
the Ennahda party in Tunisia and myriad militias in Libya and Syria.

In response, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia worked forcefully to block
Qatar’s interests in the region, helping to depose Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, funding rival opposition factions in Syria and
supporting the government of Gen. Khalifa Hifter in Libya.

A new Qatari emir, a difficult start

Although the Saudis and Emiratis began to resist Qatar’s regional activities, Qatar’s
rulers were no pushover. The emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, and his cousin,
Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jasim al-Thani, were seasoned operators on the
international stage. For 20 years, they built “Brand Qatar” by forming a crosscutting
swathe of alliances across the region, stretching from Mauritania to Afghanistan. And so
the decision by Hamad to hand power to his son Tamim in August 2013 presented an
opportunity for the Saudis and Emiratis to put pressure on the young monarch to force
him into line.

In an environment increasingly hostile to Qatari foreign policy, Tamim lacked the

experience of his father and uncle to handle the challenges. Al Jazeera was
hemorrhaging viewers regionally, and Qatari foreign policy increasingly struggled in
Libya, Syria and Egypt in the face of GCC pressure.

Sensing their opportunity, the Emiratis, Saudis and Bahrainis urged Tamim to scale
back Qatar’s regional activities. Following six months of failed negotiations, the three
countries pulled their ambassadors from Doha in protest in early 2014.

With the help of Kuwait’s emir, Qatar agreed to acquiesce to each of the three countries
in a series of bilateral negotiations, leading to a repair in relations by the GCC summit in
December 2014. But it was not until December 2016, when Saudi Arabia’s King Salman
bin Abdul Aziz came to Doha, that the rift was publicly mended.
Qatari ambitions remained
But for all the goodwill that was shown, the core problem that underlay the split had
never healed. While the Qataris had toned down Al Jazeera and evicted a few Muslim
Brotherhood members from Doha, their ambition to be a regional actor remained, as did
their myriad of friendships with a host of political Islamists across the region —
friendships that the UAE in particular found hard to accept.

In recent months, Qatar has once again drifted outside the GCC consensus. Particularly
galling for the UAE and Saudi Arabia has been Qatar’s interaction with Islamist groups
linked closely to the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. Worse still to them are its
business dealings with Iranian regional affiliates. In April, Qatar was involved in
communications with the al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al Sham organization to
guarantee population transfers in the country. Qatar appeared to have brokered the
deal by communicating with Iran, which in return managed to secure the release of 26
Qataris royals kidnapped in Iraq in return for a princely sum to be paid to Iranian client
militia Kataib Hezbollah.

The Trump factor

Qatar also helped Hamas publicly rebrand itself— and the group launched its new
policy objectives at a Doha hotel in May. Islamist rebranding has been a favored tactic
Qatar uses with Syrian opposition groups, particularly the Islamist Ahrar al Sham, and,
unsuccessfully, with the leader of the now defunct al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.
This attempt to legitimize Islamist groups is an issue the Emiratis in particular find
difficult to accept.

The United States has served as a key actor from which the Saudis can take their lead.
As Riyadh has moved closer to the United States in recent days, helped with a promise
of purchasing more American arms during President Trump’s visit in May, there is little
doubt the Saudis felt emboldened to ratchet up the pressure against the Qataris.

The Emiratis also have found themselves in favor with the new Washington
administration, whose strong dislike for both Iran and Sunni Islamists fits well with UAE
policy priorities. Accordingly, there is a newfound confidence in Saudi Arabia and the
UAE that strong measures to force the Qataris back into their box will find support in
Washington.

Qatar’s support for Hamas seems to have been a card the gulf states have played
effectively to curry favor with U.S. decision-makers amid the warming relations between
the gulf and the Israelis. The UAE and Saudi Arabia appear to be preempting U.S.
policy by sounding notes that will find favor with pro-Israel, anti-Iran, and anti-Islamist
legislators in Congress, albeit for reasons much more applicable to intra-GCC politics
than the regional strategic goals of the United States.

Upping the stakes

Given that diplomatic attempts to isolate Qatar in 2014 seem to have had no long-term
effect on Doha’s behavior, it is not surprising that the Saudis have decided to
dramatically up the stakes this time around by closing off Qatar’s only land border and—
along with the UAE and Egypt— blocking all air travel to the emirate, with Egypt denying
Qatar Airways the use of its airspace.

The closure of land borders and the disruption to air traffic will have serious
consequences for the Qatari economy and its society that will quickly prove prohibitively
expensive, even for a rich state like Qatar. And so, serious concessions will have to be
made if relations in the GCC are to normalize to the usual levels of mutually suspicious
friendship.