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CCPS 2003. Center for Chemical Process Safety, D.A. Crowl and J. F. Louvar 2001. Chemical
Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Process Safety: Fundamentals with Applications,
Incidents, 2nd Edition, NY: American Institute of 2nd Ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Chemical Engineers.
Chapter
1 Introduction
Chapter 12 • Accident Investigations
2 Designing an incident investigation management system 12.1 Learning from accidents
3 An overview of incident causation theories 12.2 Layered investigations
4 An overview of investigation methodologies
5 Reporting and investigating near misses 12.3 Investigation process
6 The impact of human factors 12.4 Investigation summary
7 Building and leading an incident investigation team 12.5 Aids for diagnosis
8 Gathering and analyzing evidence
9 Determining root causes – structured approaches 12.6 Aids for recommendations
10 Developing effective recommendations
11 Communication issues and preparing the final report
...
3 4
Incident investigation resources Incident Investigation and Reporting
CCPS 2007a. Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1. What is an incident investigation ?
Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, NY: 2. How does incident investigation fit into PSM?
American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 3. What kinds of incidents are investigated?
4. When is the incident investigation conducted?
Chapter 19 • Incident Investigation 5. Who performs the investigations?
19.1 Element Overview
19.2 Key Principles and Essential Features 6. What are some ways to investigate incidents?
19.3 Possible Work Activities 7. How are incident investigations documented?
19.4 Examples of Ways to Improve Effectiveness
19.5 Element Metrics 8. What is done with findings & recommendations?
19.6 Management Review 9. How can incidents be counted and tracked?
7 8
Have system Train team
in place before members before
incident Incident incident Learning from incidents
occurs
Implement actions
Communicate learnings
10
11 12
How does incident investigation fit into PSM?
Historical Potential
Risk-Based Process Safety (CCPS 2007a)
Commit to Understand Manage Risk Learn from
Process Safety Hazards and Operating procedures Experience Four perspectives for designing,
Risks
Process safety
culture Process
Safe work practices
Asset integrity and
Incident
investigation building and operating a
Compliance with
standards
knowledge
management
reliability
Contractor management
Measurement
and metrics
safe, secure and profitable facility
Process safety Hazard Training and Auditing
competency identification performance assurance
and risk
Management of change
Management
Hypo-
Actual
Workforce analysis review and
involvement
thetical
Operational readiness continuous
Stakeholder Conduct of operations improvement
outreach Emergency management
13 14
Historical Potential
Codes, Standards, Hazards,
RAGAGEPs Consequences
15 16
• The actual or real-time perspective can
• The hypothetical, or predictive,
inform us of previously unrecognized or
perspective looks at what could go
uncorrected problems, as they are
wrong, even if it has never happened
manifested in actual incidents and near
before. This is a probabilistic
misses, as well as by ongoing inspections
perspective, based on hypothetical
and tests that can detect incipient
loss event scenarios.
problems.
Hypothetical Actual
What-If, HAZOP, Incidents,
SVA Inspections, Tests
17 18
19 20
What kinds of incidents are investigated? What kinds of incidents are investigated?
Yes ?
21 22
Three categories of incidents, based on outcomes: Three categories of incidents, based on outcomes:
Loss event Near miss Operational Loss event Near miss Operational
interruption interruption
- Actual loss
or harm occurs - Actual impact
(also termed
Near miss: An occurrence in which an accident
on production
accident when (i.e., property damage, environmental impact, or
or product quality
not related to human loss) or an operational interruption could
occurs
security) have plausibly resulted if circumstances had been
slightly different. - CCPS 2003
(Same concept for security incidents also)
25 26
Safeguards
Give three or four examples of simple near-
Contain
Preventive Mitigative miss scenarios that would fit the graphic on
& Control the previous slide.
Hazards Regain control Include at least one related to facility security.
or shut down
(NEAR MISS) __
Deviation Mitigated
__
Loss Event Impacts __
__
Unmitigated
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Preventive safeguards revisited REVIEW
Preventive Operational Mode: Abnormal operation What are the equivalent of preventive
safeguards for facility security physical
Objective: Regain control or shut down;
Regain control
protection systems?
keep loss events from happening
or shut down
__
Examples of Preventive Safeguards:
– Operator response to alarm __
Loss Event – Safety Instrumented System __
– Hardwired interlock
__
– Last-resort dump, quench, blowdown
– Emergency relief system
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Challenges to starting as soon as possible: What might be done to overcome some of the
– Team must be selected and assembled challenges to starting an investigation sooner?
– Team may need to be trained
– Team may need to be equipped –
– Team members may need to travel to site
– Authorities or others may block access –
– Site may be unsafe to approach / enter
–
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35 36
Who performs the investigations? Who performs the investigations?
37 38
Train team
members before
incident Incident Investigation and Reporting
41 42
43 44
Analysis of facts Some analysis methods
45 46
• Find the most likely scenario that fits the facts • Location of fire ignition?
51 52
Incident Investigation and Reporting How are incident investigations documented?
53 54
55 56
Investigation Investigation
summary summary
example example
Source: S2S -
A Gateway for Plant
and Process Safety,
www.safety-s2s.eu
57 58
59 60
Findings and recommendations Findings and recommendations
What is the most important product of an What is the most important product of an
incident investigation? incident investigation?
1. The incident report 1. The incident report
2. Knowing who to blame for the incident 2. Knowing who to blame for the incident
3. Findings and recommendations from the study 3. Findings and recommendations from the study
4. The actions taken in response to the findings
and recommendations from the study
61 62
Example form to document recommendations: Overriding principles (Crowl and Louvar 2001, p. 528):
ORIGINAL STUDY FINDING / RECOMMENDATION
• Make safety [and security] investments on cost
Source: PHA Incident Investigation Compliance Audit Self-Assessment Other
Source Name
and performance basis
Finding No. Risk-Based Priority (A, B, C or N/A)
• Improve management systems
Finding / Rec-
ommendation
• Improve management and staff support
• Develop layered recommendations, especially
Date of Study or Date Finding / Recommendation Made to eliminate underlying causes
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Aids for recommendations
Overriding principles:
• Make safety [and security] investments on cost
and performance basis
• Improve management systems
• Improve management and staff support
• Develop layered recommendations, especially
to eliminate underlying causes and hazards
65
67 68
Incident Investigation and Reporting How can incidents be counted and tracked?
69 70
73 74