CPHL550, Module 7 - The Role of Believing in Ordinary Life, As A Part of Knowing, and in Philosophy in General

6/17/2021 CPHL550, Module 7 - The role of believing in ordinary life, as a part of knowing, and in philosophy in general
Learning Objectives
To acquire a clearer understanding of what it means to suggest that someone “believes” that something
is the case in order to come to a more accurate assessment of the role that believing plays in developing
a robust theory of knowledge.
Module Focus
Role of Belief, the Representational View of Belief, the Dispositional View of Belief
Introduction
In this section we will be taking a closer look at the idea of believing something to be the case. Our
purpose for doing this is two-fold. First, even a cursory look at many of the topics that command our
attention or pique our interest in daily life reveals that our attitude towards many of these topics, and our
subsequent behaviour, are rooted in what we believe. Second, just as the concept of truth turned out to
play an important role in developing a robust theory of knowledge, the idea of believing something to be
the case also plays a central role in developing a theory of knowledge. Consequently, we would be well
served by any effort to get a clearer perspective on what it means for a knowing subject to believe that
certain things are the case.
Readings
Reading
Selection from A.C. Grayling’s An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, Chapter 2 “The
Proposition” pp. 12-21.
Selection from
Robert Audi's "
Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe", from Nous, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp.
419-434 .
The role of believing in ordinary life, as a part of

knowing, and in philosophy in general
The Role of Believing in Ordinary Life
Try and imagine what aspect of our ordinary lives does not involve the act of believing something to be
the case. Even the most mundane activities we perform seem to rest upon our ability to act on certain
beliefs that we have about the world around us. Everything we do or think is predicated on our ability to
exercise belief. As Reid pointed out rather forcefully, I can’t act meaningfully in the world unless I believe
that certain facts are actually the case.
https://de.ryerson.ca/de_courses/templates/m/?c=9457FC28CEB408103E13533E4A5B6BD1&m=7&p=85026 1/18
Before I can go through the motions of my morning routine, I need to believe that the house I live in and
the objects that surround me are all real and I need to believe that many of the events that I have seen
occur with a certain degree of regularity in the past will continue to occur with a certain degree of
regularity. This observation alone seems to indicate that believing represents not just a topic of
philosophical interest, but that the activity of believing is a matter of practical importance.
There are several interesting aspects of believing that we are in a position to recognize even at this early
point in our examination of this notion simply based on reflections of our own experience.
Believing in “a Belief”
We can make a preliminary distinction between believing and the object of our belief. As a general rule
we usually indicate this distinction by referring to “the act of belief” as a verb and the “object of belief” as
a noun. So for example:
John believes that the ice on the lake will not support his weight.
In this case it is clear that John “believes” that “the ice on the lake will not support his weight” where the
expression “the ice on the lake will not support his weight” represents the object of John’s belief. Another
way to put this is to say that the expression “the ice on the lake will not support his weight” represents “a
belief” that John believes to be the case.
Believing as a Doxastic Attitude

We are also in a position to recognize that believing represents one example of what we referred to as a
“doxastic” attitude that we can take with respect to certain statements or propositions. This also invites
us to consider the idea that the exercise of belief is closely related to such mental acts as assenting or
“agreeing with” certain propositions as well as (at the opposite end) doubting or withholding assent from
certain propositions.
Looking at believing as a doxastic attitude also puts us in a position to recognize that we are capable of
assuming a variety of doxastic attitudes towards a proposition which distinguishes belief from a simple
assessment of truth in the sense that making a determination about the truth of a proposition is usually
an all or nothing affair (mainly due to the principle of excluded middle). If believing were tantamount to
(no different than) an assessment of truth, then John would only have two alternatives when it comes to
his belief in the condition of the ice on the lake; he would either believe that it will hold him up or that it
will not.
But we are in a position to see that these alternatives do not exhaust, by any means, John’s alternatives
when it comes to doxastic attitudes. One obvious alternative is that John could decide that neither of
these beliefs (the ice on the lake will/will not support his lake) may represent a reasonable doxastic
attitude in the absence of certain evidence. In this case, John may believe that the appropriate doxastic
attitude is to doubt whether the ice on the lake will hold up his weight, in which case John's position will
be to withhold belief when it comes to the issue of whether or not the ice on the lake will support his
weight.
This puts us in a position to recognize that there are four different doxastic attitudes that John could take
up on this issue (also expressed in the shorthand form we referred to in our earlier discussion on
doxastic attitudes).
1. John believes that the ice on the lake will support his weight. (S believes that p)
2. John believes that the ice on the lake will not support his weight. (S believes that not p)
3. John doubts that the ice on the lake will support his weight. (S does not believe that p)
4. John doubts that the ice on lake will not support his weight. (S does not believe that not p)
At this point in our analysis we are also in a position to recognize that although doxastic attitudes are
related to assessments concerning the truth of certain statements or propositions, they are not identical
with a straightforward assessment of truth. In other words, John can easily recognize (and admit as
such) that although he may believe one thing to be the case, it may very well turn out not to be so.
This would seem to suggest that the act of believing, or adopting a specific doxastic attitude, may reflect
more of a personal disposition toward endorsing the truth of a particular statement or proposition than a
straightforward determination regarding whether it happens to be the case not. In other words, it is no
contradiction to suggest that it is possible for someone to have a strong belief in something and yet
remain unsure regarding whether or not it is in fact the case. This could go a long way, perhaps, toward
explaining why we initially found “true belief theory” an unsatisfactory theory of knowledge. This brings
us to another aspect of believing.
Belief as a Matter of Degree

Believing also seems to represent an activity that admits of degrees. For example, an individual can
believe in something very strongly to the point where they would not hesitate to act on or endorse a
particular belief. On the other hand, an individual can also believe in something rather weakly in the
sense that they might only find themselves in a position to endorse or act on a particular belief under
rather pressing circumstances. In some cases this assessment may be tied to certain evidential
considerations that would affect an individual’s assessment of the truth (or probable truth) of a particular
belief. Another common way to express this is to refer to the amount of confidence that an individual
may have regarding the truth of their beliefs. We can illustrate this by returning to John's assessment
regarding the ice on the lake.
By proportioning his belief to the information that he has about the lake John could decide to take a
variety of positions with respect to what he believes about the ice on the lake.
For example, if John was familiar with the weather conditions that serve to affect the lake and if he was
also familiar with the lake itself (perhaps he lived next to the lake all of his life), then John might be in a
very good position to believe on a cold winter’s day that the ice on the lake would support his weight.
Likewise, if the circumstances involved were different and if John were faced with the same lake late in
the fall or early in the spring, John would probably be in a better position to doubt whether the ice on the
lake would support his weight even though it might look (at first glance) no different than it does in the
middle of winter. And finally, if John is looking at the same lake early in the fall or late into the spring he
would probably serve himself well by believing that the ice on the lake will probably not support his
weight.
In many cases it becomes convenient for us to express these contingencies in terms of probabilities. For
example, the ice that forms on a lake in the middle of winter has a high probability of supporting the
weight of an average adult, whereas the ice that forms on the lake late in the spring as a fairly low
probability of supporting the weight of an average adult. In this sense, it is not at all unusual for
individuals, as believing agents, to assess or endorse many of the beliefs that we hold in accordance
with certain crude calculations concerning their probability and to adjust the amount of confidence that
they have in these beliefs (and their willingness to act on them) accordingly.
Belief as a Matter of Value

There is also an axiomatic dimension to believing in the sense that we sometimes hold people
responsible or accountable when it comes to how diligently they attend to the activity of proportioning
their acts of belief in accordance with the evidence for the belief that they hold. As a general rule, we
tend to place a higher value on the practices of individuals (and perhaps on individuals themselves) who
are diligent in proportioning their acts of belief in accordance with the relevant evidence at hand,
whereas we have a tendency to devalue the practices of individuals who either do not proportion their
acts of belief in accordance with the relevant evidence at hand or, in certain isolated circumstances,
engage in certain acts of belief based on little or no evidence whatsoever.
This particular value assessment can also be said to have a distinctively pragmatic dimension in the
sense that we tend to apply these particular value judgments more stridently in cases where the
pragmatic consequences of believing can have a notable impact on our lives. For example, John's belief
in the condition of the ice on the lake could be said to have serious pragmatic consequences depending
on the context of that particular belief.
For example, if John were to decide late into the spring (when the ice was likely to be too weak to
support very much weight) to go for a walk across the lake believing that, in spite of the relevant
evidence, the ice on the lake would support his weight, it would be difficult for most reasonable
individuals not to regard John's act of belief in this case as an extremely imprudent and, perhaps,
irrational case of believing. If John were to be imprudent enough to invite someone else to go along with
him, not only would this particular case of imprudent believing be imputed to his intelligence (or more
likely a lack thereof), but we would also probably be inclined to suggest that John's act of believing
under the circumstances represented a moral failure. In other words, we have a tendency to hold people
responsible not only for their actions, but also with respect to the process whereby they come to
formulate and act on certain beliefs.
At this point we are in a position to recognize that, even from a casual perspective, the very notion of
belief itself is much more nuanced than we are likely to realize at first glance. As we might expect, some
of these nuances will end up getting revisited and re-examined as we take a closer look at the role that
belief seems to play with respect to knowledge.
Believing as an Intentional Act

At an earlier point in our discussion we noted that the act of believing usually involved a corresponding
object of belief whether it is an idea, a sentence, or a proposition. We are now in a position to recognize
that the act of believing is also, at least in many cases, a focused or a directed form of behaviour. That is
to say, believing represents a case of intentional behavior in the sense that it needs to be directed or
specifically focused on something in order to represent a cogent or intelligent form of behaviour. Another
way to raise this point is to suggest that in order for John to believe that the ice on the lake would
support his weight it is necessary for John, at some point, to have directed his thinking specifically
toward the idea (sentence, or proposition) that the ice on the lake would hold up his weight in order to for
him to assent to (or to decide to withhold assent from) this particular belief.
But as soon as we raise the point regarding the intentionality of belief it becomes apparent that our
emphasis on this particular aspect of believing raises an additional consideration that may need to be
addressed later in our discussion since it is fairly obvious that many people hold a variety of beliefs but it
would be less than accurate to suggest that most individuals, if anyone, spend the majority of their time
consciously reflecting on the beliefs that they hold. As I noted in my light bulb story at the beginning of
this course, in the course of a routine day I perform a variety of activities on the basis of certain beliefs
that I have about the world around me but I do not mentally review or even consciously reflect on these
beliefs on a daily basis.
This would seem to suggest that although believing represents a form of behaviour that is both
intentional and focused in nature, it may not always represent an event that is occurent , or taking place,
within our conscious minds. That is to say, while it is accurate to describe me as someone who is
confident in the belief that my bedroom floor will hold me up every morning when I get out of bed, it may
be less than accurate to suggest that I am always mentally entertaining this particular belief, especially
on a conscious level. This particular insight into human behavior has led some philosophers to suggest
that it might be more accurate to describe believing as a type of disposition in the sense that we can
determine what someone believes based on the disposition of their behavior more accurately, perhaps,
than we can by attempting to discern what they may or may not be consciously reflecting on at any given
moment. In other words, there may be more to a clearly developed perspective on what it means to
believing that something is the case than we are likely to capture by focusing exclusively on someone's
conscious state of mind.
The Role of Believing in Knowing

As our examination of Justified True Belief Theory (JTB Theory) revealed, the act of believing
represented one of the key aspects of this particular definition of what it means to know that something
is the case. If we will recall, the JTB Theory stipulates that:
S knows that p (if and only if)
1. p is true,
2. S believes that p, and
3. S is justified in believing that p.
In this instance the phrase "if and only if" is meant to convey the fact that each of these three conditions
represents essential aspects of what it means for "S to know that p". In other words, according to the
JTB Theory, these represent the necessary conditions that must all be satisfied. In an earlier discussion
in one of our previous modules it was noted that a complete approach to this particular subject needed
to recognize the central role that human agency plays in this particular matter. At this point it would seem
apparent that it is our unique ability to “act as believers” or believing agents that puts us in a position
where we can be said, on certain occasions, to know that something is or is not the case.
Although this point may seem rather elementary in comparison to some of the other insights we will
encounter on this issue, it might be useful to point out that the more we are inclined to minimize this
particular aspect of human agency (believing) when it comes to developing a robust theory of
knowledge, the more likely we are to find, or recognize, that this particular concept can be applied rather
broadly to the point where it becomes plausible to describe even nonhuman entities as "knowers".
If, for example, it were no longer necessary to believe “that p” but to simply state or assert “that p is the
case” under certain conditions (causal perhaps) that were favorable to confirming the truth value of p,
then our truncated theory of knowledge would simply be:
S knows that p (if and only if)
1. p is true,
2. S is justified in asserting that p.
The lingering issue in this particular case, as we noted in the case of the rocking horse winner, is that
even if we grant certain entities with the power to make reliably true assertions of fact, this still seems to
leave us with a less than satisfactory perspective on what it means to know that something is the case.
As we pointed out earlier, if producing reliable and true results represented the only measure of what it
means to know that something is the case, then we could be said to occupy a world where we are
surrounded by “knowing entities” such as sensors, computer programs, cell phones, meat
thermometers, etc. all of which are capable of producing reliable information.
But so long as we retain the nagging intuition that the truly knowing subject is one who not only
produces reliable results whenever they state or affirm that p is the case, but they are also fully aware
(to a reasonable degree) of the conditions that are favourable to affirming that p is the case, then we are
likely to find the suggestion that the requirement of a believing subject, who is capable of bringing a
certain degree of human agency into this process, represents a dispensable requirement less than fully
persuasive.
At this point it can almost go without saying that although the second condition of the JTB Theory
represents a necessary condition for knowledge, our earlier discussion of the insufficiency of relying on
merely true beliefs as a basis for knowledge represented an insufficient condition for knowing. Mainly,
as we pointed out earlier in this discussion (and in previous discussions) because even the most
sincerely held beliefs can turn out to be false, and it is equally possible to have a sincere and true belief
that is the product of little more than sheer luck or random circumstance. So while the element of belief
plays an important role in coming to understand what it means to say that we know that something is the
case, this particular doxastic attitude represents more of a firm point of departure for a robust theory,
then a sufficient condition upon which to build such a theory.
The Role of Believing in Philosophy

Much like the role of believing in everyday life and the role of believing when it comes to developing a
robust theory of knowledge, the notion of believing something to be the case also plays a central role in
philosophy in general as a topic of interest in its own right in the sense that many philosophers are likely
to be suspicious of this particular concept until they have had a chance to puzzle out in detail what
exactly it means “to believe” that something is the case. One basic example of the kind of philosophical
question that arises from looking at this notion in more detail presents itself as soon as we recognize
that there is a distinction to be made between the act of believing something to be the case and what is
believed to be the case.
At the beginning of our discussion I suggested that one way to look at this particular distinction was to
view a believing is an act of assenting to, or endorsing the truth of, a particular statement or proposition.
One of the issues that a critical philosopher is likely to have with this particular outlook is that it presents
a rather imprecise description when it comes to what exactly it is, that is the object of someone's belief.
Another issue that a critical philosopher is likely to have with this particular approach is that this
particular description seems to skip past, or give rather short shrift to, the idea that believing is usually
understood as a mental activity which would seem to indicate by extension that when someone believes
that “something” is the case, the “something” in this particular case should be understood as the kind of
entity that can be grasped by means of a mental operation and this would seem to indicate that the kind
of entity we are referring to is something like a mental concept or idea that is entertained in the mind of a
believing subject.
At this point we can begin to see that working through a clear perspective on believing will require, to a
certain degree, that we not only address certain issues regarding what it means to entertain or consider
a particular belief but that we make some kind of effort toward attempting to figure out with a certain
degree of precision what exactly we are referring to when we suggest that a believing subject has “a
belief” that something is the case. Another way to put this is to ask ourselves exactly what kind of “item
of thought” we are referring to.
Representation as an Object of Belief

Ideas as the Objects of Belief
Although it could be said to represent a bit of a holdover from folk psychology, the notion that the object
of the belief is an idea is not necessarily a bad starting point. In fact, this particular outlook has a distinct
advantage in the sense that it tends to represent what many individuals have in mind when they initially
reflect on what it means to believe that something is the case. But even at this level certain questions
begin to present themselves for our consideration. The most basic question being, what exactly is an
idea?
One quick answer to this particular question could be to suggest that an idea is a particular thought that
is entertained by the mind. But of course this particular answer only invites the critical philosopher to ask
what exactly we are referring to when we use the term "thought". Another question seems to suggest
itself as soon as we reflect on the fact that what people have "beliefs about" are not necessarily ideas
per se. That is to say, people tend to have beliefs about the world around them, or to put it differently,
they have beliefs regarding certain facts about the world around them. This raises the metaphysically
sticky issue of what it means for a belief or an idea "to represent" some aspect of the world or some fact
about the world.
These particular questions concerning what it means for a belief to represent some aspect of the world
or some fact about the world should immediately bring to mind some of the issues that we covered in our
discussion of correspondence. It should also bring to mind some of the issues that were raised in our
discussion of Berkeley’s arguments in favour of adopting an immaterialist perspective in order to help
avoid, among other things, dealing with the issue of how an immaterial idea or thought can be said to
relate to, or correspond to, or represent an aspect of the world or a fact about the world around us.
Instead of going back in covering this particular discussion again it should suffice, at least for now, to
recognize the fact that any discussion that involves the suggestion that the objects of belief are
comprised of mental entities, or mental objects, such as ideas and thoughts will entail a great deal of
supplemental discussion in order to deal with a number of metaphysical issues that seem to arise
whenever we embrace an outlook that is predicated on the idea that we can present a cogent
explanation of how certain immaterial entities can be said to relate to some aspect of the world, or some
fact about the world around us.
This has led some philosophers to suggest that although the exercise of belief does represent a mental
process, it might be more constructive to focus on a particular type of mental skill that raises (relatively)
fewer metaphysical issues. In this respect, our ability and our skills at using language seem to represent
a promising avenue of discussion when it comes to thinking through the process of believing.
Sentences (or Claims Expressed in Language) as the

Objects of Belief
As we noted above, shifting the focus of our discussion from mental entities to the use of language does
help us to avoid some of the awkward difficulties that seem to present themselves when we attempt to
explain belief in terms of certain problematic concepts within folk psychology. Another advantage that
seems to come our way by focusing our attention on language use is that this still represents a relatively
straightforward treatment of the subject that does not require a great deal of specialized knowledge in
order to make its main points.
Although there are still going to be some lingering metaphysical questions with respect to how exactly a
claim or a statement expressed in a particular language corresponds to (or represents) some aspect of
the world, or some fact about the world, we still seem to be on firmer ground in the sense that although
there are still going to be certain metaphysical wrinkles to be ironed out under this view, most people are
going to be inclined to suspect that some kind of answer to this particular question will be forthcoming
since language use represents one of the most ubiquitous practices on the planet. In other words,
everyone uses language to think, to reason, to conduct their affairs, and even to express and affirm their
beliefs. If there were no connection whatsoever between our language use and the world around us, this
particular practice would represent one of the greatest mysteries ever encountered.
For now we should be able to move our discussion forward simply by recognizing the fact that one of the
main skills that we rely on in order to act (and think) purposefully in the world are those that come with
our ability to use language. As we noted in our previous section on the coherence theory of truth, many
of the thoughts and beliefs that we acquire about the world come to us as a direct result of our ability to
use language. Our ability to use language not only explains how it is that we come to acquire information
about the world around us, but it can also go a long way toward explaining many of the ways that we
come to think about the world around us. That is to say, a great deal of our reasoning is performed
through the use of language.
The vast majority of our beliefs can be expressed in terms of language, and as a general rule we tend to
express these beliefs in the form of statements or sentences. For example, if we were to ask John why
he prefers to walk around the lake rather than directly across the lake in late March his explanation
would probably include a statement to the effect that:
“The ice on the lake will not hold my weight at this time of year.”
In this case, this particular statement would represent John's belief that the ice on the lake is in no
condition to hold him up. The fact that we can express this particular belief fairly straightforwardly in
terms of language and in terms of John's ability to use language, only seems confirm our intuition that
the prospects for outlining an intelligible view of belief in terms of our ability to use language represents
a definite improvement over the attempt to explain the same process in terms of the mental entities
represented in folk psychology.
Another positive aspect of this particular approach is that it is completely consistent with everything that
we have noted so far regarding doxastic attitudes. John is still in a position to affirm or assent to the truth
of a particular sentence or statement that he believes to be the case and he is equally capable of
withholding his assent to a particular sentence or statement or, if he so chooses, to affirm the negation
(or denial) of what this particular statement or sentence expresses.
Nevertheless, even this rather intuitive handling of this particular issue raises some rather awkward
questions. One of these questions presents itself as soon as we reflect back on an issue that was raised
earlier. It is still likely to be the case that although an individual may possess a variety of beliefs, they
may not always be consciously entertaining these particular beliefs. In other words, even if we change
the basis of our explanation with respect to the act of believing toward the direction of language use, we
are still left with a difficult fact that while we possess a variety of beliefs that can be expressed in terms
of language, the majority of these beliefs are simply not a part of our conscious reflection.
John may decide on a cold winter day to take his girlfriend ice-skating on the lake. Although it is clear to
any observer who may be watching John's behavior on such a day that John believes that the ice will
support his weight (and that of his girlfriend), it may very well be the case that John has given no thought
whatsoever to the statement that “The ice on the lake will support his weight.” Suggesting once again
that even an explanation involving the use of language still seems to suggest that parsing out what it
means to believe something is the case in terms of language use may not provide us with a complete
picture of what is going on here.
Another puzzle that seems to present itself by thinking of belief in terms of language use comes to mind
when we think about certain ways in which language is used. For example, the local elementary school
in my town has a French immersion program which means that on any given day some of the students
at the school receive their instructions in French while the rest of the students receive their instructions
in English. With this in mind imagine the following scenario.
On Monday my two sons Alexander and Jonathan (who are in different grades) attend school with their
friend Zack who is in the French immersion program. This means that it is possible (in theory) for all
three boys to be sitting in different classrooms and discussing the same subject but under conditions
where the use of language is slightly different than it would be if they were all sitting in the same
classroom. If each boy is attending a different class then the following scenario could arise:
Alexander is reading a statement on the Learning Management System which says: "Snow is
white."
Jonathan is reading a statement on the Learning Management System which says: "Snow is
white."
Zack is reading a statement on the Learning Management System which says: "La neige est
blanc."
Presuming that each boy believes what is stated on the Learning Management System, we can ask a
variety of questions regarding their beliefs. For example,
1. Do all three boys share the same belief?
2. Do all three boys have different beliefs?
3. Do Alexander and Jonathan share the same belief in common?
4. If the answer to the previous question is yes, then is the belief that they share in common different
from Zack’s belief?
In a way, the answers to some of these questions can be as puzzling as the questions themselves. If the
answer to question one is yes, then we need to ask ourselves what it means for three separate
individuals to believe the same thing (or to have the same belief). Clearly we have three separate uses
of language which would seem to suggest that we have three separate statements that have occasioned
three separate cases of belief. On the other hand, we are also in the position to recognize that even if
we are presented with a case where three separate individuals are each entertaining beliefs of their own,
these beliefs seem to have something in common.
One rough and ready way of cutting through the Gordian knot here would be to simply suggest that
although each boy is being presented with a different statement or sentence, the end result is that they
all end up believing the same thing because all three statements have the same meaning in common. A
more nuanced way of clearing up this particular issue is to suggest that there is a distinction that can be
made between sentence tokens and sentence types and that this distinction can go a long way toward
clarifying our thoughts in this area.
Sentence Tokens are the physical instantiations we take to be sentences. For example:
the written phrase "Snow is white" is an example of one sentence token, so is the written
phrase "Snow is white". Under this distinction we have here two sentence tokens. A similar
point can be made regarding sentence tokens that are expressed in different languages. In
other words, the written phrase "Snow is white" is an example of one sentence token, so is
the written phrase "La neige est blanc ".
Sentence Types refer to what the sentence tokens denote as distinct from any
particular physical instantiation of a sentence we might encounter. For example the
sentence tokens "Snow is white" and "Snow is white" both express the same sentence type.
In other words, this non-tangible object of denotation is separate from any particular
expression of it. Again, a similar point can be made regarding sentence tokens that are
expressed in different languages. In other words, the sentence tokens "Snow is white" and
the sentence token "La neige est blanc " express the same sentence type.
In the case of the classroom example presented above what we have is a case of three separate
sentence tokens that express the same sentence type. With the type/token distinction in hand we can
now suggest that the proper object of belief is not a sentence token, but rather, a sentence type (what is
expressed in any given sentence token).
However this particular distinction seems to take us back to an earlier point of difficulty as soon as we
bear down on this idea and ask ourselves exactly what kind of object is a "sentence type"? If it is a non-
tangible mental entity like a thought, or an idea that inspired our move toward language use as a basis
for explaining the process of belief, then our move toward language use has not taken us too far away
from the same difficulties that we encountered when we reflected on the mental entities involved in folk
psychology.
Likewise, by suggesting that sentence types reflect what a sentence token denotes, we seem to be
suggesting that the object of belief is the "denotation" of a particular sentence and not the sentence
itself, which is simply an indirect way of saying that the object of belief is the meaning of a given
sentence and in the next section we will attempt to address this issue by fully embracing this particular
idea. If we will recall, near the beginning of our discussion of Justified True Belief Theory of knowledge,
we noted that many philosophers found it convenient to refer to "propositions" as the proper object of
belief. We are now in a position to recognize that what philosophers have in mind when they refer to
propositions is, roughly speaking, we just refer to as sentence types. In other words, the use of the term
"proposition" is usually reserved in order to refer to what is meant, or denoted by certain expressions.
Whether the use of this particular term can make a constructive contribution to our discussion in such a
way as to throw some light on our intuitions about what it means to believe that something is the case
remains to be seen.
Propositions as the Objects of Belief

Up to this point we have reviewed two different candidates as possible objects of belief (ideas and
sentences) neither of which seemed to provide us with the basis for a satisfactory explanation when it
came to the question regarding exactly what it is that is the object of belief. The notion of ideas that
came to us from folk psychology ended up raising more questions than it answered the closer we got to
trying to figure out how mental objects such as ideas related to the world (Berkeley’s critique). At this
point we shifted gears and focused on sentences (as linguistic units) as a objects of belief, but this
particular analysis also proved to be problematic in the sense that some of our examples seem to
suggest that the true objects of our belief are not sentences or any linguistic units per se, but the content
or meaning that the sentences are meant to signify.
This final transition from any particular sentence token presented in language form towards
concentrating on its content brings us rather naturally to what many philosophers refer to when they talk
about propositions. One common way of approaching this particular subject is to simply follow the lead
of many philosophers by suggesting that the term "proposition" refers to that which we mean to express
through the use of any given sentence. In other words, talk about propositions helps us to direct our
attention at the meaning or content of a particular declarative sentence.
At the same time, however, as useful as it may be to be able to refer to the meaningful abstract content
of a particular sentence by referring to it as a proposition, this particular notion can only be understood in
specific cases by expressing it in linguistic terms. Another way to put this is to suggest that sentences
express propositions, or that our understanding of the specific propositions comes to us in the form of
sentences. So while proposition talk helps us by giving us the conceptual tools (so to speak) to be able
to distinguish between sentences and their abstract content (much like the type-token distinction
mentioned earlier), we need to bear in mind that the very notion of a proposition or “pure” propositional
content represents nothing more than a theoretical abstraction and that our knowledge or and our grasp
of propositions must always be mediated through the use of language.
Proposition Talk
At first glance it would seem that nothing could be a more obvious candidate to serve as an object of
belief than a proposition as we have presented the notion here. Clearly the object of our belief tends not
to be limited to the mere written or verbal expression of an idea which would seem to give us more than
a clear basis to suppose that whenever we are affirming, or doubting, that something is the case, the
something that we have in mind is our understanding of what is conveyed by any instance of a sentence.
Like the type/token distinction, talking about belief in terms of propositions (proposition talk) helps us to
clear up certain puzzles regarding what it means for people to have shared beliefs, or certain beliefs in
common.
But as helpful as proposition talk can be for helping us cut through these issues in order to get a clear
perspective on what it means to suggest that someone believes that something is the case and that the
object of this belief is a particular proposition, certain specific questions arise that seem to call in to
question the cogency of the idea that propositions represent the objects that our intentional exercises of
belief are directed toward.
One serious puzzle that arises comes to our attention as soon as we ask ourselves whether it is possible
for a proposition to be an object of belief mainly due to the fact that propositions do not present
themselves to us in their pure form. As we noted earlier, we can only grasp or understand a particular
proposition when it is conveyed to us through some form of language use. Another way to come at this
particular issue is to ask ourselves the following questions when we reflect on the idea that the object of
our belief is the meaning or the propositional content of a particular sentence, namely,
1. Is the object of our belief the propositional content of a particular sentence? or,
2. Is the object of our belief based on what we take to be the propositional content of a particular
sentence?
At first glance it would seem that the answer to the first question is obvious since, as a general rule, we
tend to believe that the object of our belief is the propositional content of a given sentence. But as we
noted earlier our grasp of propositions, and propositional content, is always (as a matter of necessity)
mediated by the use of language. As a result, we do not think about or have beliefs about pure
propositions per se, but about propositions as they are conveyed to us through the use of language.
Although our understanding would seem to indicate to us that we can have some kind of awareness of a
sentence’s propositional content as something that is distinct from a particular expression of that
content, we are reminded (again) that our ability to grasp and comprehend this propositional content is
entirely dependent upon the use of language.
In other words our comprehension of propositional content will always be limited to the mediating
influence of language and as much as we would like to think that language can serve as a transparent
medium for the expression of propositions and propositional content, a variety of examples can be found
which would seem to indicate that this is far from the case. Here is one common example which would
seem to indicate that our beliefs may not be directed at propositions per se.
Believing De Dicto and Believing De Re or Does Lois Lane

Have True Beliefs About Clark Kent?
To those who are at all familiar with the comic book character of Superman, it is common knowledge that
mild-mannered Clark Kent and Superman, an alien with superpowers from the planet Krypton, are the
same person. But in the comic book series this particular fact is not known to everyone. At the beginning
of the comic book series a fellow reporter at Clark Kent's workplace, Lois Lane, is not aware that Clark
Kent and Superman are the same person. Although she is acquainted with Clark Kent in his capacity as
one of her co-workers at the local newspaper, and although she has encountered Superman on a variety
of occasions (usually as he is rescuing her from some kind of peril) she does not identify Superman as
Clark Kent, nor Clark Kent as Superman. As a result, Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent and Superman
are two different individuals (although we are well aware that they are the same person).
At this point it would be pretty safe to suggest that Lois Lane probably believes the following claim is
true:
Superman is stronger than Clark Kent.
Based on Lois's understanding of the meaning, or the propositional content, of this particular claim,
Lois's belief is completely understandable, and it would seem that she is quite justified in believing that
Superman would be stronger than Clark Kent. Of course, anyone who is familiar with the Superman
story would be in a position to recognize that this claim cannot be true because it makes no sense to say
that any given individual could be described as being "stronger than" him or herself. This particular
circumstance also puts Lois Lane in a position where she would be inclined to withhold belief from
certain propositions that we would readily recognize as being true such as:
Clark Kent is an alien from another planet.

Clark Kent can fly.
Clark Kent is bulletproof.
In all these cases, Lois Lane would be well justified in thinking that none of these particular claims are
true based on her understanding of these claims and even based on her ability to grasp of appreciate
the propositional content of these statements, whereas we would be in a position to recognize that each
one of these claims is true. In response to examples such as these, some philosophers have suggested
that we need to distinguish between de dicto beliefs and de re beliefs. Although this can be a rather
detailed distinction, for our purposes we can narrow down this particular distinction as follows:
1. Belief de dicto is belief that relates to a particular dictum. It relates to belief insofar as that belief
relates to a particular statement or expression.
2. Belief de re is belief about a particular res (or thing). It relates to belief directed toward that aspect
of statements that could be described as extra-linguistic, or related to its (abstract) propositional
content.
At this point we are in a position to distinguish between Lois Lane’s de dicto belief that “Superman is
stronger than Clark Kent” and the de re belief that Superman is not stronger than Clark Kent. From an
epistemological standpoint, we should find this particular example a little troubling in the sense that all of
us, to an extent, stand in Lois Lane's shoes when it comes to belief. As much as we would like to think
that the objects of our belief are propositions, it is more likely the case that the object of our beliefs is
something much more modest in the sense that our beliefs are more likely to turn out to be based on
our grasp of the propositional content of any particular sentence or statement which presents
itself to us, as we noted earlier, indirectly through our use of language.
At this point it is tempting to suggest that the only problem here in terms of belief is not really
philosophical (or even linguistic) in any deep sense of the word, but that it is more situational in nature.
For example, it is possible to propose that if Lois Lane were in a position to know what we know about
Clark Kent, then she would be in a better position to develop certain beliefs about Clark Kent de re.
Following this particular line of thought we can suggest, somewhat modestly, that so long as we ensure
that Lois Lane is optimally situated in such a way as to ensure that her beliefs are likely to be supported
on the basis of propositions (or on the basis of propositional content) rather than having to rely on beliefs
that are merely based on her grasp of propositions (or her grasp of propositional content), then our
difficulty is solved.
But exactly what would this particular optimal perspective look like? One advantage of relying on a
literary example (from a comic book series) is that our understanding of the situation between Lois Lane,
Clark Kent, and Superman comes to us from a perspective as readers that we would normally not have
in real life. As a reader of a particular literary work, we have the privilege of enjoying something like a
God’s eye view of the lives (and details of) various characters in this work, which represents an outlook
that we could hardly hope to approximate in real life. At this point if our talk of fictional characters in
comparison to real life seems to remove this particular difficulty from any practical consideration,
consider the following claims:
1. The earth is not flat.
2. The sun does not move around the earth.
Both of these statements are capable of representing true beliefs that we are capable of holding de re
since we are capable of recognizing (unlike many individuals who lived before the 15th, century) that the
earth is not flat and that (in spite appearances to the contrary) we do not actually see the sun move
around the earth.
In other words, it would seem that as long as our understanding of the world comes to us in the form of
propositions that are always conveyed to us indirectly through certain forms of language use and that
our understanding of the propositional content of propositions is always bound by the limits of our finite
resources and our finite intellectual capacities, our beliefs will always be (to one degree or another)
limited to our understanding of the propositional content of any given statement or claim under less than
optimal conditions.
Although this may sound less than optimistic, this particular distinction does seem to put us in a better
position to explain why Gettier’s case against Justified True Belief is unlikely to be set aside any time in
the near future. If we will recall, Gettier’s reasoning in support of his contention that justified true belief
was not knowledge was based on the fact that in both cases he argued that Smith was justified in
reaching the conclusions that he did, even though we are in a position to seriously question whether
Smith could be said to know that his conclusions were the case (because his understanding of the
conditions surrounding his arguments was defective).
We are now in a position to suggest that what Gettier had in mind was something like the distinction
between de dicto and de re beliefs regarding whether Smith was in fact justified in believing in the truth
of his conclusions. We are now in a position to recognize that Smith's de dicto belief that he was
justified in reaching his conclusions is completely understandable given Smith’s circumstances (as they
are described by Gettier), but at the same time we are also in a position to recognize that our de re
beliefs about Smith's lack of justification (based on further information provided by Gettier to us, but
beyond Smith's awareness) places us in a position where our basis for questioning Smith's justification
would be just as well grounded.
Once again, it would seem that the only solution out of this epistemological cul de sac would be to
ensure that all of our beliefs are based on unmediated and direct access to propositions (or propositional
content), and that all of our beliefs are formulated under optimal circumstances, but in the absence of a
God’s eye overview of our circumstances, this will have to remain an ideal rather than a feasible goal or
even a realistic expectation.
At this point we should turn our attention to one more explanation of belief that was once quite popular
mainly because it seemed to avoid some of the conceptual puzzles that seem to present themselves
whenever we rest an explanation of the process of belief on the idea that we can make clear sense of
the idea that there is something that we can refer to as "the object of belief".
Belief as a Specific Disposition

In this section we will be taking a quick look at one particular view which suggests that attempting to
provide an explanation of what it means for someone to believe that something is the case by focussing
on something like "the object of belief" represents a misguided approach to the act of believing in
general. Rather than retreating backward toward a certain metaphysics of belief, or toward a linguistic
understanding of belief that ends up presenting us with a rather complicated account of the limits of our
understanding in terms of language, what is needed is an account that can take us in a new direction by
accounting for belief in terms of something that is readily understood by everyone: human behaviour, or
more precisely, people’s dispositions toward certain forms of behaviour.
Some advantages of viewing belief as a type of

disposition
This view of belief falls under what has been called philosophical behaviourism [HYPERLINK on "
philosophical behaviourism " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism] and is usually associated with the
philosopher Gilbert Ryle who in his book “The Concept of Mind” attempted to give an account of beliefs
strictly in terms of dispositions to perform certain kinds of behavior. Ryle’s focus on a behaviourist
approach could be seen as an attempt to supply an explanation of certain issues in the philosophy of
mind , such as the nature of belief, with an explanation that did not need to postulate the existence of
metaphysical entitles. In this sense, Ryle behaviourist approach could also be described as an effort to
supply a naturalized theory of belief.
Belief, Ryle argued, is not (strictly speaking) a term that represents a mysterious kind of mental act, but
a term that we have found useful to describe the fact that humans have tendencies to behave in certain
ways. That is to say, the actions that we perform are an indication that we have certain beliefs but, as
Ryle would maintain, it was a mistake to try and track down the notion of believing as if it were some
special kind of mental activity that we could dissect into simpler parts. In other words, the general effort
to uncover the act of believing by locating a special kind of mental action in response to an equally
special kind of mental object represented a kind of confusion in thinking as far as Ryle was concerned.
Dispositional theorists often use the analogy of "brittleness" to make their point clear. For example, when
we say that the glass vase is “brittle” we are not saying that within the glass vase there is some quality
that we can point to and say "there is the vase's brittleness". Ryle's argument was to suggest that
attempts to do this ended up committing a “category mistake” by assuming that the property of
“brittleness” was something that we could locate and identity as if it represented a thing or an entity.
According to Ryle, what we are actually referring to when we say that the vase is brittle is that we are
expressing our conviction that were the vase to be struck against a hard surface it would shatter and
break. In this sense, the term "brittleness" expresses a disposition that the glass vase would exhibit
under certain conditions, but this disposition is not to be understood as a non-physical thing that we
could hope to isolate and analyze in abstraction.
Ryle believed that a similar behavioural explanation could be applied to the phenomenon of belief. That
is to say, Ryle asserted that when we ascribe a belief to an individual we are merely stating our
conviction that under certain conditions this individual will behave in a distinct manner and no more - it
presumes nothing about any possible "state" the subject might be in.
To return to our example again, when we state that “John believes that the ice on the lake will not
support his weight", we are affirming nothing more than the conviction that were John to find himself in
the relevant circumstances (on the edge of the lake) he would behave in a certain manner. If he were to
approach the lake he would not attempt to cross it, nor let anyone he cared about attempt to do the
same.
This view is persuasive for several reasons. First, it appears to be consistent with our general conviction
that beliefs are intimately connected with our behaviour and that people can be described as having
certain beliefs even though they may not be entertaining any thoughts on the subject. In other words,
dispositional talk allows us to avoid some of the complications that we encounter when we resort to
describing belief as an occurent mental phenomena.
One example of this kind of complication was pointed out by Ryle when he suggested that if an action
needed to be explained in terms of an occurent belief, then this raised the issue of whether that occurent
belief (if we see it as a kind of action, albeit a mental action) requires a separate act of occurent belief,
and so on. In other words, if I need to suppose the presence of a mental event like an occurent belief
before I can act on that belief (crossing the lake), then it would seem that I also need to experience a
mental event like having a belief regarding my belief about my prospects of crossing the lake (and so on
...), which brings us to the problem of infinite regress.
Second, dispositional talk tends to appeal to thinkers whose intuitions are not congenial to metaphysical
explanations or dualistic explanations when it comes to accounting for mental phenomena. Philosophers
with a penchant for naturalism, nominalism, materialism, or some form of positivism are likely to see the
merit in accounting for mental phenomena (like belief) in terms that assume a naturalistic explanation.
Third, another advantage that some individuals will find with adopting a dispositional account of belief is
that a dispositional account of belief seems to allow for the possibility that we can expand the circle of
believing agents to include non-linguistic creatures (such as lower animals) to be included within the
community of agents whose behaviour would seem to indicate that they possess certain beliefs. This
allows me to suggest (and not just in an honorific sense) that when my wife opens a can of tuna and our
cat Maggie comes running and “meowing”, that her behaviour can be explained as the result of her
belief (or some kind or “proto-belief”) that this behaviour will result in her receiving her share of the “tuna
liquid” in the can.
Whether these considerations speak decisively in favour of a dispositional account is hard to say since
many of these considerations, and this account itself, tends to appeal to a specific mode of philosophical
thinking. Before we ourselves proceed to address the question of whether a dispositional account of
belief fits well into a robust theory of knowledge, it might be best to table that decision until we have had
a chance to review both sides of this account.
Some disadvantages of viewing belief as a type of

disposition
Although the dispositional view of belief does seem to go a long way toward settling certain issues
regarding the nature of belief and although it seems to lend itself to solving some of the awkward
metaphysical issues raised in the course of outlining a dispositional view of belief, the adequacy of this
particular account is not likely to be obvious to everyone.
First, although the dispositional view can be invoked to explain or account for a particular action (he
performed x because he had a certain disposition to do x) it can be seen as coming up a bit short when
it comes to providing a sufficiently nuanced account for someone’s behaviour. The expression "S did y
because..." seems to require that we be able to point to something behind a particular performance to
explain the performance itself, but under the dispositional view we cannot go any further than to state
that "S has such and such a complex disposition to behave in a certain manner" and this does not
always seem to provide us with the kind of explanation we are looking for in terms of exactly "why" S did
some particular x and not another (y perhaps).
This kind of nuanced explanation seems to be particularly in order whenever an individual is in a position
where they need to provide an explanation or a justification for their behaviour either in terms of its
rationality or morality. It makes perfectly good sense to ask someone “what they had in mind” or exactly
what beliefs they held that led them to engage in a specific form of behaviour. Another difficulty with this
perspective is that it seems to leave little room for those marginal, yet significant, cases where an
individual acts against their usual beliefs or inclinations or where an individual behaves “out of character”
for reasons or “beliefs” that may not be reflected through an interpretation of their behaviour. Insincere or
feigned behaviour is also a bit of a mystery under this view. For example, if a spy is required to assume
a pattern of behaviour for a long period of time (they are a mole or a part of a sleeper cell), what do their
dispositions to engage in certain forms of behaviour tell us about their beliefs?
Second, not all explanations or accounts of behaviour are easily traced back to observed behaviour. For
example the belief that I am perceiving something or that I am in pain cannot be explained entirely with
reference to my ostensive behaviour, otherwise it would have to be said that the way I discover these
things is by observing my own behaviour and it seems somewhat misguided to say that I gain my
awareness of my perceptual and pain states by observing my own behaviour the same way that other
individuals acquire this kind of information about me (by observing my behaviour). This would seem to
indicate that, at some level, something significant may be missing in the dispositional account of belief.
Dispositional behaviour may provide one avenue of information about our belief states, but it is not
immediately evident that it represents the only avenue through which this kind of awareness can be
acquired.
Dispositional Belief and the JTB Theory of Knowledge

As we noted earlier, the idea of knowledge seems to be essentially predicated on our ability to exercise
belief. In terms of developing a cogent view on belief, several alternatives seem to present themselves
as good candidates. The representational view of belief seems to fit well within the bounds of JTB theory
in the sense that the JTB theory is usually best understood from a perspective that allows for an
intentional exercise of belief that is directed at something like a sentence that expresses a claim or a
proposition, even if a closer look at this perspective reveals that this outlook on belief is not as
straightforward as we might have hoped it to be.
Along the way we did manage to catch glimpses of lines of thought that seem to address some of our
earlier concerns as to why true belief theory (even reliable true belief theory) did not present itself as a
good candidate for a theory of knowledge. We also stumbled across a possible reason why Gettier’s
argument continues to represent the kind of intractable puzzle that continues to vex epistemologists to
this day. Although the dispositional theory of belief seems to recommend itself as a viable alternative to
the representational account of belief due to its ability to deconstruct (or creatively sidestep) some of the
metaphysical issues that resulted from a close examination of beliefs from a representational
perspective, and although this account could be modified to fit into something like a JTB account of
knowledge (by re-formulating the second condition to incorporate “dispositional talk”), its less than
nuanced explanatory power seems to fall short of the kind of rich perspective on belief that we seem to
need from a view of belief that represents a condition for knowing something to be the case.
This isn’t to say that a dispositional theory doesn’t represent a serious candidate in this regard, but the
JTB Theory seems to be predicated on an approach that is capable accounting for our intuition that we
are capable of “knowing that” something is or is not the case, and although a representational view of
belief can be seen as a very complicated addition to our approach to knowledge theory, it does seem to
represent the kind of explanation that is most amenable to this particular theory of knowledge even if we
are inclined to regard it as choice made in a somewhat faute de mieux fashion, so to speak .
Conclusion
And so it would seem that while we have managed to develop something like a rough sketch of what it
means to believe that something is the case and in the course of doing so develop an appreciation for
some of the various complications that accompany any attempt to elucidate on this particular activity
(believing that), we have managed to reach a point where we can recognize why believing that
something is the case cannot provide us with a sufficient basis for knowing that something is the case,
while at the same time recognizing its role as a necessary condition.
Tips for Reading

Tips for Reading
A few close-reading tips are as follows:

1. Some students unfamiliar with metaphysics might want to do some quick online research into
nominalism and universalism since part of Grayling’s discussion assumes a passing familiarity
with this issue in philosophy.
2. Some students have found it helpful to discover that one of Audi's main purposes in writing his
article was to demonstrate that "dispositional talk" could solve certain problems that seem to
arise from talking about beliefs as if they represented occurrent experiences or discrete ideas
that we somehow "carry around" in our minds.
Discussion Board
Discussion
This week's questions will be posted on the Module 7 Discussion Board.
Please consult the Course Outline for next week’s study and coursework.
Assignments
Become familiar with the requirements and assignment due for Week 7.

CPHL550, Module 7 - The Role of Believing in Ordinary Life, As A Part of Knowing, and in Philosophy in General

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6/17/2021 CPHL550, Module 7 - The role of believing in ordinary life, as a part of knowing, and in philosophy in general

The role of believing in ordinary life, as a part of

Believing as a Doxastic Attitude

Belief as a Matter of Degree

Belief as a Matter of Value

Believing as an Intentional Act

The Role of Believing in Knowing

The Role of Believing in Philosophy

Representation as an Object of Belief

Sentences (or Claims Expressed in Language) as the

Propositions as the Objects of Belief

Believing De Dicto and Believing De Re or Does Lois Lane

Superman is stronger than Clark Kent.

Clark Kent is an alien from another planet.

Belief as a Specific Disposition

Some advantages of viewing belief as a type of

Some disadvantages of viewing belief as a type of

Dispositional Belief and the JTB Theory of Knowledge

Tips for Reading

A few close-reading tips are as follows:

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