American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No.

uncertain, much of their analyses is still very useful for nationalism is to be celebrated and rewarded because it is not
understanding the current developments and future of EMU. exclusivist (by definition). Liberal nationalism in a liberal de-
mocracy aims to protect a culture of a nation but will, according
to Nielsen, not harm the cultures of others. Since ethnic
National Self-Determination and Secession. Edited by Mar- nationalism tends to spawn more secessionist movements (it is
garet Moore. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. not clear whether liberal nationalism exists in reality), it is not
285p. $65.00. clear whether Nielsen's argument can be applied.
Daniel Philpott largely ignores nationalism in his argument
Stephen M. Saideman, Texas Tech University for an equally general right to secession. He views self-
Yugoslavia's violent disintegration revealed that self-deter- determination as a form of democracy. We ought to take
mination is difficult to apply in practice. Because the right of seriously (by analyzing) his argument that allowing secession
self-determination applied only to colonial territories (nar- to take place may result in less violence than in denying
rowly defined) from the end of World War II to the end of groups secession. He ultimately maintains that his views
the Cold War, the complexity of self-determination was would not condone many more secessionist efforts than
overlooked until recently. This book presents a debate about Buchanan's, which raises more questions than it answers.
whether and which groups should be allowed to secede. The other contributions to the volume raise important
Margaret Moore introduces the book by delineating three questions about many of the assumptions in the previous
lines of thought: just cause theories, choice theories, and chapters. Moore emphasizes the territorial nature of seces-
theories of national self-determination. The first half of the sion but believes that boundaries by themselves do not or
book presents these ideas, and the last three chapters are ought not to have moral force. Beiner challenges the liberal
more empirical. One striking omission (although the last three basis of the previous chapters by arguing that a focus on
contributions come close) is a defense of the old conventional rights increases conflict, since rights are about the creation
wisdom that the right of states to their territorial integrity is and enforcement of boundaries between individuals (p. 162).
superior to a group's right to self-determination. John McGarry focuses on postsecession politics for both
Ironically, Allen Buchanan's book, Secession: The Morality minorities and majorities in the new state, arguing that
of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, secession is likely to solve very little.
1991, which has set the terms of the debate, was a challenge Donald Horowitz's contribution challenges the more per-
to the conventional wisdom of the time, as it seemed to grant missive views of self-determination. It raises a crucial prob-
more support for secession than previously allowed. Yet, in lem that most of the authors overlook or downplay (e.g.,
subsequent debates and in this volume, he presents the most Nielsen, p. 123), namely, that in any society, multiple identi-
restrictive view of the right to self-determination. Buchanan ties coexist, and the salience of each depends on the political
argues that the right to secede is a remedial right, like the context. Consequently, to say that one nation is deserving of
right to revolution. A group should be allowed to secede only self-determination privileges one identity at the expense others,
if it faces persistent violations of human rights or had been which may reemerge in the new state and/or in the rump state.
previously free. Of course, how one determines whether either This not only is likely to lead to conflict after the secession but
condition exists is quite difficult. Furthermore, Buchanan is also raises a critical issue that this book was supposed to
quite clear in arguing that no groups deserve support if they are address: Who is the self that is determining its future?
seceding from a legitimate democracy (p. 17). Thus, the Quebec Finally, Rogers Brubaker, in a piece written for another
separatists do not have a legitimate case, according to book, argues that nationalism has been misconceived. There
Buchanan. Canadians outside Quebec would agree with his key are two problems with this chapter. First, only part of it fits
point that easy terms of secession would make it possible for a with the rest of the volume—when he argues that there is no
minority to blackmail the majority. one-size-fits-all solution to ethnic conflict. Second, it does not
Wayne Norman supports Buchanan's restrictive view by serve well as a conclusion to the volume. Although the book
arguing that a less restrictive right to self-determination should not end with a definitive stance on the issues (that is
would encourage more secession, which would provoke more not its purpose), the final chapter should have suggested
violence. This assumption, present in many of the other where the debate ought to go in the future.
chapters, stands on perhaps the weakest empirical grounds. This book provides an excellent summary of a very lively
Events in East Timor may have encouraged the Acehnese to debate. It would be useful in upper division undergraduate
intensify their efforts to become independent because they courses and graduate courses in political theory, both for its
were both responding to the same pivotal actor, the govern- debate about rights and for its application of liberal and
ment of Indonesia, but East Timor matters less for groups in communitarian theory to live, on-going, policy-relevant is-
other states (David Lake and Donald Rothchild, The Inter- sues. For that reason alone, this book also would be of value
national Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 1998). Norman seems to to courses in ethnic conflict.
be on better ground when arguing that a restrictive right to
self-determination would improve the plight of groups by
providing states incentives to be less oppressive (p. 44). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Kai Nielsen argues (as does David Miller in a separate Messina to Maastricht. By Andrew Moravcsik. Ithaca,
chapter) that nations are entitled to self-determination and NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 514p. $59.95 cloth,
that it would be best for each nation to have its own state, $22.50 paper.
converting Ernest Gellner's (Nations and Nationalism, 1983)
definition of nationalism (a nation is a group that seeks to Jeffrey J. Anderson, Brown University
have its own state) into a right. Nielsen maintains that this Andrew Moravcsik addresses a central puzzle in the study of
right to secession is based on the individual right to autonomy European integration: Why have sovereign governments
that liberalism values. Interestingly, Nielsen applies his anal- "chosen repeatedly to coordinate their core economic poli-
ysis only to advanced liberal democracies as a direct chal- cies and surrender sovereign prerogatives within an interna-
lenge to Buchanan. Nielsen qualifies his argument by sug- tional institution" (p. 1)? The resulting uniqueness of the
gesting that ethnic nationalism is to be condemned but liberal European Community (EC) demands a convincing explana-

515
Book Reviews: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
tion. The conventional wisdom, Moravcsik argues, has ac-
corded far too much weight to geopolitics, such as the goal of
binding Germany to the West or the pursuit of a federal
vision of Europe, in shaping the development of the Euro-
pean project since the 1950s. Supranational actors also have
received undue credit for driving the integration process and
directing its institutionalization. The reality is quite different.
The EC emerged as the result of rational decisions made by
member governments in pursuit of core economic interests.
Over the course of forty years, choices for Europe crystallized
not because of supranational influence but from the relative
bargaining power of the three largest member states: France,
Germany, and Britain. European institutional arrangements
were designed to enhance the credibility of commitments
among governments, not to achieve a federal Europe or to
realize procedural efficiency.
To support these revisionist claims, Moravcsik presents a
"rationalist framework" (p. 19), an eclectic construction
assembled from diverse schools in comparative politics, in-
ternational political economy, and international relations. He
examines five grand bargains, starting with the Treaty of
Rome and concluding with the Maastricht Treaty, and he
parses each into three temporal-analytical stages: preference
formation, interstate bargaining, and implementation. At-
tached to each stage is a set of competing hypotheses: for
stage one, the relative importance of economic versus geo-
political interests; for stage two, the relative importance of
national versus supranational actors; for stage three, the
relative importance of credible commitments versus an as-
sortment of considerations, including Europeanism and tech-
nocratic efficiency.
Moravcsik maintains that his aim "is not to close the
debate over the fundamental causes of European integration
but to renew it" (p. 85). The ensuing analysis, in which
methodological rigor is a running theme (more on that
below) and conventional wisdoms are swept away time and
again, leaves little doubt that he is trying to accomplish both
simultaneously. His innovative framework is surely worth
exploring further. Although Moravcsik succeeds in shifting
the theoretical debate away from the stale reference points of
the EC studies literature toward general social science con-
cerns, his approach raises many questions. Is it analytically
sound, for example, to separate preference formation from
bargaining, or bargaining from implementation, given the
potential for interactive effects? The structured narratives in
this book hint at such recursiveness, but clearly a more
extensive discussion is warranted. The author also provides
new grist for a mill constructed in the early 1990s—the
debate over the relative importance of the European Com-
mission and the member states in advancing integration.
Moravcsik was a protagonist in this scholarly exchange, and
his critics will have their hands full trying to rebut the new
evidence suggesting that governments rule the European
roost.
The author's most revisionist claim—national economic
interests are the main motor of integration—is also the least
convincing. Few contemporary observers of the European
Union will be surprised to learn that difficult negotiations
over the Common Market, economic and monetary union
(EMU), and other economic initiatives were the occasion for
intense lobbying by domestic producer groups advancing not
geopolitical but economic interests, and that the resulting
interstate bargains represented carefully crafted compro-
mises over matters of economic substance. In short, coordi-
nating "core economic policies" (p. 1) tends to call forth
economic interests, economic disagreements, and economic
compromises.
516
June 2000
Moravcsik admits as much in the opening chapter, and
were that the sum total of his argument, it would be unlikely
to generate much controversy. What gives the thesis bite is
that he consistently relegates geopolitical interests to the
causal sidelines: They influence bargaining outcomes on the
margins and only within parameters set by the primacy of
economic interests. What is extraordinary—and here one
must tip one's hat to Moravcsik for faithfully presenting the
data—is that these marginal effects invariably impart true
distinctiveness to the European project, that is, why it
emerged not as a simple free trade area but something more,
and why its supranational components have been augmented
and strengthened over the years. Indeed, Moravcsik acknowl-
edges the special nature of geopolitical effects but downplays
their significance. This is odd, given the book's central puzzle.
Minimizing the import of geopolitics often takes on need-
lessly provocative dimensions. Many readers will be puzzled
by Moravcsik's portrayal of national leaders, including
Charles De Gaulle, who behaves more like the French
Minister of Agriculture than president of the Republic. His
conclusion that German unification had no effect on the
Maastricht Treaty negotiations is frankly incredible. True,
EMU was on the agenda at least two years before the Berlin
Wall came crashing down, and the German chancellery and
Foreign Ministry supported the initiative. At no time during
this period, however, did the Germans commit to a firm
deadline for the introduction of a single currency, despite the
entreaties of EC partners and commission officials. Unifica-
tion rendered Germany's qualified—perhaps even empty—
commitment to EMU unsustainable. For geopolitical rea-
sons, Helmut Kohl brushed aside the concerns of the
Bundesbank and Finance Ministry, much as he did in 1990
over the terms of German economic and monetary union,
and committed his country to a firm timetable. Moravcsik's
narrative disregards this crucial shift in the German stance on
EMU.
In the realm of method, Moravcsik makes a very strong
claim about the data that underpin his analysis. In contrast to
previous studies of integration, which relied on secondary
literature and "soft" primary sources (memoirs, official press
releases, interviews, and the like), which are inherently prone
to bias or distortion, this book is based overwhelmingly on
"hard" primary sources. Moravcsik concedes that in many
instances, because internal government documents are still
under lock and key, he is forced onto softer ground; never-
theless, he assures the reader that only facts gleaned directly
from "hard" primary sources are extracted from the second-
ary literature, not interpretations or conclusions of the
author in question. All well and good. Yet, on closer exam-
ination, there is little to distinguish this book from other
monographs that attempt to test theory by means of qualita-
tive empirical analysis. In five case study chapters spanning
386 pages, there are 917 footnotes altogether; about 2%
contain references to internal government documents, the
hardest of "hard" primary sources. Secondary sources, not to
mention political memoirs and other soft primary sources,
make up the remaining 98%. Moravcsik also relies frequently
on open-ended interviews he conducted during the 1990s.
The reader is left to wonder why his subjects, who include
acting and former prime ministers, a European Commission
president, and other high-ranking officials, would be less
inclined than those quizzed by other scholars to put a
favorable spin on events in response to questions posed by
someone whose work was sure to be widely read.
This aspect of the book's methods would be a minor matter
were it not given such emphasis by the author and were it not
used to dismiss entire bodies of scholarship, such as historical
American Political Science Review
institutionalism (p. 491), for relying too much on secondary
sources. It also leads Moravcsik to questionable conclusions;
for example, he quotes an internal German government
document that appears in Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's
Name (1993), to support his contention that economic inter-
ests drove Helmut Schmidt's approach to monetary cooper-
ation in the 1970s (p. 254). Nowhere mentioned is Garton
Ash's subsequent observation that the verb employed in the
German text (abdecken) is also strongly suggestive of parallel
and reinforcing geopolitical motivations. This simply under-
scores that there is no such thing as an unvarnished fact,
particularly where the written word is concerned, and that
scholars have an admittedly difficult obligation to grapple
with both facts and interpretations drawn from all manner of
sources if they hope to arrive at a complete picture.
In the summary chapter, Moravcsik describes the Euro-
pean Union as "an institution sofirmlygrounded in the core
interests of national governments that it occupies a perma-
nent position at the heart of the European political land-
scape. Therein lies the political achievement and the ongoing
social-scientific puzzle" (p. 501). He is surely right. One can
only hope that EC scholars, in responding to his invitation to
join a renewed debate, will choose to focus on real issues of
substance, of which there are many in this volume, and not be
distracted by contentious overstatements, of which there are,
alas, many here as well.
Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and
War. By Paul A. Papayoanou. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1999. 193p. $50.00.
Mark R. Brawley, McGill University
In recent years, scholars have aimed to gain better insight
into international relations by incorporating material from
various subfields. This can be seen in the melding of subjects
within security studies and international political economy; it
can also be observed in the closer attention paid to causal
arguments drawn from several different levels of analysis.
Taking up these challenges simultaneously has been difficult,
and often the resulting works fail on one or more counts.
Often, important themes clash within the text. In Power Ties,
Paul Papayoanou has taken up these tasks and masterfully
handles the various elements. The book stands as an excellent
example of the sort of work of which we should expect to see
more in the future.
Papayoanou takes on a classic theory in international
relations: balance of power. As he notes, this well-known and
well-worn phrase covers a number of very different argu-
ments; he selects as principal targets for criticism the versions
presented by Realists such as Kenneth Waltz (and the later
reformulation by Steven Walt into a theory of states balanc-
ing against threats). The criticisms raised, however, are more
in the nature of a call for better specification of expected
results and for recognizing contextual and situational vari-
ants. It is on these same grounds that Papayoanou then tries
to redress the weaknesses of existing theories.
As the author's criticisms suggest, remedies can be found
in elaborating the different factors that affect how status quo
powers react to the threats posed by revisionist states and in
clarifying the factors that encourage revisionist states to
pursue an alteration of the international status quo. Such
factors can be found in both the systemic and domestic
political and economic spheres. What is innovative about
Papayoanou's approach is the way in which the logic of
signaling games is employed to organize and integrate the
material from different traditions and theoretical approaches.
Vol. 94, No. 2
Yet, those who try to incorporate theories based on different
assumptions face a barrier: How does one integrate the
theories without undermining each element's coherence or
meaning?
Papayoanou overcomes this barrier by using the logic of
signaling (from game theory) to pull together material from
different levels and traditions. He argues that leaders of
status quo powers choose their strategy for dealing with
revisionist challenges by calculating the effect of extensive
economic ties with other status quo states or with revisionist
states. The degree of ties between the status quo state and
other defenders of the status quo shapes not only the leaders'
perceptions of domestic support for an alliance but also the
credibility of that alliance in the views of the potential ally
and the revisionist power. This notion allows Papayoanou to
bring together some existing arguments about economic
interdependence deterring war and domestic politics as a
constraint against playing power politics (as well as on
decision making more generally), although in a fashion that
respects the fundamental insights of Realism on great power
alignments.
This integration does not come without a price, however.
Because of the emphasis on perceptions of economic ties
between states, the key evidence Papayoanou needs to
present is difficult to grasp. It is not evidence of actual links
per se, or even of public opinion on the links between
economies, but rather the views of key decision makers
concerning the public's views of ties between economies.
Moreover, Papayoanou must show that such factors have
played a key role in the behavior of particular states. A small
amount of evidence carries much of the argument.
Nevertheless, the organization of the evidence shows off
the strength of Papayoanou's views. The author first lays out
the questions concerning a particular historical period, then
presents the standard historiography for that period. That is
followed by the typical interpretations found in the political
science literature. This highlights the disjunctures between
the two disciplines, a disjuncture that is understandable but
uncomfortable for political scientists. The difference in inter-
pretation is understandable given our different endeavors:
Historians emphasize the uniqueness of events, whereas
political scientists stress generalizable aspects of cases. None-
theless, historians' detailed descriptions should prove useful
for political scientists. Too often, however, details are lost,
and historians routinely scold political scientists for running
rough-shod over evidence. Papayoanou illustrates how a
sophisticated argument can reconcile the differences between
the historians' narratives and those generated by political
science theories. The argument is sophisticated but not overly
complex, so that it retains its applicability across a wide range
of cases.
There are only a few areas in which the book could have
been improved, and perhaps organization of the cases is the
most significant. These are grouped historically (which is very
helpful for appreciating the variance in views between histo-
rians and political scientists), but it might have been more
useful to group cases together on a different basis. For
instance, the model is supposed to give us insight into the
actions of the revisionist powers, but the patterns there are
not easily discerned because these cases are not presented
together. It is easier to see the similarities in the strategies of
the status quo democracies because these form the focal
point of each chapter.
All in all, Power Ties is an excellent example of the sort of
work we all should be aiming to complete: It addresses
shortcomings in existing theories by complementing those
arguments with insights from other theoretical traditions.
517