Jomar Paulo M.

Ortega MA Philosophy
Philosophy 291 University of the Philippines Diliman

Book I of De Anima

This paper will discuss Book one of Aristotle’s De Anima, I would like to answer
the question what does the soul do? The book discusses two distinct characteristics of
the soul. First, soul as the origin of motion of living being. And soul as a seat of
perception and cognition. While the later part of the book is drawn on the function and
nature of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material, but it is a substance
and not an attribute. Soul is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity.
The soul is the origin of perception and motion, including psychological processes like
emotions and desires. A suitable explanation of how the soul causes perception,
motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul. Something that is in motion
were called animated objects which is a living thing. A soul that makes an object
animate is an animal. Take for instance, a tree moved by the wind. We cannot say that
it was an animate because it does not move voluntarily. It moves because of the wind.
On the other hand, if you think of an animate object it was related to life, it chooses to
move on its own.
What kind of thing is the soul? Soul is immaterial thing. Soul is separate with the
body. It continues to operate without a body. But Aristotle doesn’t believe in it, for him
soul belongs to the body and exist because of the body. Aristotle doesn’t believe in
reincarnation of the soul unlike of Plato. There is no transmigration of the soul.
Soul is not a substance but actualizes matter into a composite. And this
composite is actualized matter, actualized body. How does the soul actualize the body?
The soul for Aristotle is the first actuality of the body and it is inseparable. Take for
instance, Michael doesn’t have the idea of Cartesian Dualism. While the next person
Adrian knows what Cartesian Dualism is but he is not thinking about it right now
because he is sleeping so he won’t able to comprehend it. The third person Simon
knows the Cartesian Dualism and right now explaining it to his students. Now, let us
evaluate the three. Michael’s knowledge that he has is potential. Adrian has the
knowledge but he is doing other thing because he is sleeping, now he partially actual
and partially potential. Simon’s knowledge fully actualized it. He knows it and he
comprehend it. Soul, for Aristotle, is not an activity but instead an ability to engage to
certain kinds of activity. It is not an undeveloped potential like Michael’s knowledge.
Rather it is actualized potential to engage in some sorts of activities.
We accept an initial knowledge of act and potency through the analysis of motion
or change. A being cannot come from being which already is, nor can it come from non-
being, since it is nothing, meaning that being ‘is’ and on these paths there are many
proofs that being is without beginning and without end, not ever existing alone
immovable and without end will it be, since now is, all together, one and continuous.
The capacity to have perfection is called potency. It is not the mere privation of
something, which will be acquired, but a real capacity in the subject to acquire certain
perfections. The reality of potency, which breaks Parmenides’ homogenous view of
being, was an important contribution, which Aristotle introduced in his effort to
understand the reality of change.
Act, the perfection which a subject possesses, is contrasted to potency. Some
example of act: are the sculptured shapes of the wood, the temperature of water, and
acquired knowledge. Motion or change then, is the successive actualization of the
potency: it is the transition from being something in potency to being in act.
In general, act is the perfection of a subject—the notion of the act is a primary
and evident one. Therefore it cannot be defined; it can only be described by means of
examples and by differentiating it from potency. Act is related to potency as one who
builds to someone who is capable of building, as one who is awake to someone who is
asleep, as one who sees someone whose eyes are closed but who has the power too of
sight, as that which proceeds from matter itself, and as that which has been processed
to that which is still unprocessed. The former is called the act; and the latter called
potency.
Potency is also directly known through experience as correlative to act. It must
be noted that, in case of potency, the reference to act is unavoidable, since it is
constitutive of potency to be directed towards some type of act. Sight for instance, is the
potency of seeing, and movability is the capacity to be in movement.
 “The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth
in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in some sense
the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature,
and secondly its properties; of these some are thought to be affections proper to the
soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal owing to the presence of
soul.”1 Man who doesn’t bother his soul with power displays and civil disputes. But
instead focuses on his building its own virtue. However, that same young man may find
in another person’s and in his house a resentment which has its indifference to status.
Thus, by observing to his father and listening to his reasoning. He’s tempted to
the flourishing of his own intellect or virtues. But influenced by others in his house or
city, he may become power craving. He has a sense to the portion of his soul that is
intermediate between reason and desire. The one that is aggressive and courageous
that composed of military character. Young Timocrats may indulge to money and
money-making activity but he becomes increasingly focused on saving his goods as he
ages. Since the virtue of his soul has not been purified by salutary effects of reasoning
activities and aesthetic experiences.
The Philosopher-rulers, on the other hand, are guided by the virtue of Wisdom.
With them the rational component of the soul should reign, they must neither be enticed
by the appeal to the populace nor the fruits of accumulation of wealth. Either of these
would result in the hijack of the most important virtue as rulers—wisdom. Instead of the
rational part of the soul prevails, the spirited part takes over. For Tyranny, the tyrannical
ruler’s decision is absolute and final, while the governed has no voice to be heard and
must only comply with the decision. And lastly for Oligarchy, self-interest is the only
prime concern of the people that is why monopoly of goods is apparent in this type of
governance, where material accumulation is treated as the main, if not, only impetus for
one’s action or inaction. Here, value is placed on the desire for wealth, hence referring
to the corruption by the appetite component over reason.
We have seen that the ultimate question we can ask of anything is about its very
being. The term being is at first vague, general being of common sense. We have

1
Aristotle, De Anima, Translated by J.A. Smith, 402a9 p. 641
investigated the various kinds of being: real, ideal, and logical. We have also seen that
we must recognize the term being in an analogical sense, one of proportionality.
The principles of being are of utmost importance. We have seen that they are
basic to any understanding of reality. These principles are: the principle of identity, the
principle of contradiction, the principle of excluded middle, and the principle of sufficient
reason.
Oneness or unity, truth or trueness, beautiful and goodness are the
transcendental properties of all being. Besides the most general aspects of being which
are found in common in all beings, there are special aspects of being which reveal
certain lines of division running through creation.
We have considered being from the standpoint of its intelligibility and saw that
there is a twofold aspect in being: existence and essence. We have also considered
being from the standpoint of its action and saw that the concepts of act and potency
give us another way of dividing the term being. Lastly, we have considered being from
the standpoint of its existence as outside our intellects and divided being into
substance, that being which can exist in itself, and accidental being, that being which
must existence in another.
We have used the concepts of act and potency to explain the concept of change
and we have identified and explained the category of substance and the nine categories
of accidental being.
The study of the causes of being is perhaps one of the most important studies we
discover in metaphysics. We have seen how the four causes, material, formal, efficient,
and final explain reality, becoming, and change in all their fullness and richness.