Ethical Theory 1

The Nature of Ethics

*
DA de Vera

This essay is not a hallmark in the study of Ethics. It simply aims to present the nature of
ethics and its relevant application in various human affairs. As such, it does not offer a definite
position on certain ethical concerns. Rather, what is given a purchase in this attempt is the process of
ethical thinking, vis a vis, conclusions drawn from judgments made concerning human actions. The
essay has twelve parts for this purpose. Each part is essential in understanding the other parts. As a
whole, the parts form complicated indexes of principles derived largely from various human actions
and judgments, hence this essay.

Introducing Ethics

One way of introducing Ethics is to try to begin from our common sensical notions of the
distinction between 'good' and 'bad', or better still, of our knowledge of what is right and what is
wrong. Generally, we use these distinctions to identify the kind of judgments we give when we look
at certain human actions. We use them to distinguish the range of actions that are ethically
acceptable to us without prejudice to existing ethical rules and maxims. We hold onto them when
certain human actions are in need of evaluations. Thus, we say that some actions are good since they
are ethically acceptable while others are bad since they are ethically not acceptable. The ethical
acceptability or unacceptability of actions is somehow dependent upon our knowledge of the nature
of what is ethical and otherwise, principles, which are formed within the complexity of language and
human affairs. We generally base our ethical evaluations upon this complexity.

The complexity of the ethical evaluations is likewise amplified by the peculiarity of the
judgments made of actions, of which the reasons alluded to in support of such judgments is accessible
only to the persons providing the judgments. How we come to understand these judgments is
defined by the language we are accustomed to use. There are of course imperceptible assumptions
on this point. Initially, we generally assume that language is public and so its meanings. Secondly,
we likewise assume that language is carried through by a shared background, which is essentially
demarcated by tradition, culture, religious beliefs and other institutional values. The way we look at
ethics and how we understand the ethical point of view are matters that maybe attributed to this social
context. Thus, the social context sets the possible direction of understanding the nature of the ethical
question.

The ethical question, if understood fully, does not simply refer to what actions are ethically
acceptable or otherwise and what actions are ethically praiseworthy or not. What is of paramount
concern is the general idea that the ethical question can possibly define the extent of one's ethical
knowledge on ethical matters, without necessarily jeopardizing one's personal values and
commitments. While it is true that the understanding of the nature of ethics is limited by one's
knowledge of ethical principles, one cannot ignore the importance of ethical reasoning. Far from
simply knowing the distinction between what is ethically acceptable or otherwise, ethical reasoning
allows one to look after reasons through which ethical knowledge is founded. It gives access to one's
deepest values and commitments. When an ethical judgment is forwarded or articulated, one does
not only recognize the validity of established rules of conduct or ethical principles, one also
recognizes the importance of personal values, the existence of which provides reasons necessary to
make judgments and by means of which, the extent of one's ethical knowledge is identified. It is thus
significant to also consider ethical reasoning aside from simply knowing the ethical question, if one is
committed really to understand the nature of ethics.

*
Faculty, Department of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, Central Luzon State University, Science
City of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, July 4, 2005.
 Ethical Theory 2

The consideration of ethical reasoning is nonetheless, far from the usual process of knowing
what the ethical question is or what the nature of ethics is. Ethical reasoning allows one to extend the
horizon of one's ethical knowledge, which eventually leads to the understanding of the scope of one's
knowledge on the nature of ethics. Initially, ethical reasoning allows one to identify the ethical
question. The identification of the ethical question is only possible through the possession of some
ethical knowledge, which is believed to be the basis for acting rightly. It assumes that through ethical
reasoning, one communicates the range of one's knowledge on ethical matters by trying to provide
demarcation lines on questions, which have ethical significance. One is able to say that an action is
ethically acceptable or that it is ethically allowed but not necessarily acceptable. One cannot do this
in the absence of reasoning. Secondly, ethical reasoning provides constitution for one's personal
values and commitments when one deals with ethical issues. The reasons one alludes to when
confronted by an ethical issue circumscribe the personal values that one lives by or conforms to. One
grounds one's reasons upon this set of personal values, in the absence of which, one may fail to
recognize that such issue is of ethical significance. Thirdly, ethical reasoning permits one to go
beyond the generally acceptable principles of right conduct by directing one to carefully assess the
ethical significance or difference of an ethical issue. One assumes that by providing reasons
necessary to determine the ethical significance or difference of an issue, one is able to identify the
limitations of one's ethical knowledge, by means of which, one also enlarges one's ethical thinking.
Lastly, ethical reasoning allows one to look into the significance of other ethical reasoning made by
other persons, through which one grounds one's respect towards other ethical point of views. One
learns to consider other reasons that may determine the ethical significance or difference of an issue
to avoid whimsical ethical confrontations and eventually find a common ethical language that may
serve as a unifying language of the differing interests and competing values of several persons.

This is not to say however that the reasons forwarded are conclusive. Rather, what is given a
purchase is the significance of trying to arrive at the best possible ethical reasoning that one can
make when confronted by an ethical issue. It is a necessity primarily because our understanding of
ethics is deeply grounded from the conventional standpoint perpetuated by the practices lived by the
society. While it is true that society lays down before us some principles that embody the ideals of
conduct, it is not necessarily the case that non-conformity to such principles may mean non-
recognition of the ideals of conduct. It maybe the case that such non-conformity may possibly re-
direct one's personal values and commitments to the more universal and unifying principles of right
conduct. This is significant primarily because it runs contrary to the general belief about the nature of
ethics.

Generally, one understands ethics as referring to a system of rules upon which certain
principles are believed to be reflective of right conduct, to achieve the best possible quality of life
that one wills to create. One further understands that ethics embodies the principles necessary to
develop, if not perfect, one's character, in order to create a certain modus vivendi or mode of living.
Any deviation, thus, from this set of rules is deemed contrary, if not wholly contradictory, to one's
desire of creating a mode of living that may, in principle, create one's character. It assumes,
nevertheless, that one is aware of the kind of character one wills to create. One regards ethics thus,
as closely tied up, not only with the development of one's character, but also, with the cultivation of
one's personal values, which one believes to be the constitution for achieving the quality of life one
wills to have, the possibility of which is defined by one's chosen actions anchored upon some
principles or ideals of right conduct.

In the larger ethical framework, one understands ethics as similar to laws on one hand and
statutes on the other. Unlike laws and statutes, however, ethics is not dependent on some enactments
made by some authoritative bodies or similar groups having the same function. Ethics exists before
the individual as self-imposed rules of reason, which one eventually accepts as part of the social
enterprise to regulate the relation between individuals. Of course, the acceptance of this set of rules
is carried out through the social institutions that maintain the society. The church is most likely one of
the most significant institutions that directs an individual to eventually accept this set of rules and later
on internalize them. It is in this sense that ethics becomes, to some extent, social in its origin, sanction
 Ethical Theory 3

and function, the presence and effects of which may not be bargained away by any legislation,
ordinance or law coming from any social institution that wishes to challenge its existing principles.1
For instance, Frankena argues that unlike laws and statutes, the sanctions provided by ethics, as
internalized rules of reason, are largely associated with feelings of guilt and shame, signs of favor and
disfavor as well as praises and condemnations, signs that are generally regarded as salient elements
in the creation of character and quality life.

Ethics, Person and Character

The creation of character and the desire to achieve quality life does not simply begin with an
understanding of what Ethics is. It does not end either with the possession of some ethical knowledge
that one uses when confronted by an ethical issue. The desire to create a character, for example,
requires a personal determination to cultivate moral values or ethical traits. The cultivation of moral
values or ethical traits requires a personal determination to will it, through human actions that one
chooses to act. One's ability to personally determine the moral values or ethical traits that one
chooses marks one's moral rectitude or one's willingness to deliberately cultivate one's character.
This is however, possible only if one understands the nature of one's self as a concrete individual
immersed in the very complexity of human interactions.

In the larger philosophical discourse thus, understanding moral rectitude necessitates an

understanding of the person. The understanding that it seeks however is more than simply knowing
one's background or one's moral knowledge. It is not simply possessing relevant knowledge on what
values or attitudes or ethical traits, one has or what character one has built. What is sought, rather, is
the person in [its] totality, that is, the person in all [its] truth. Francisco quotes Wojtyla:

What is in question here is man in all [his] truth, in [his] full

magnitude. We are not dealing with the abstract man, but the real,
"concrete" historical [man]. We are dealing with each [man]… in all the
unrepeatable reality of what [he] is and what [he] does of [his]
2
intellect and will, of [his] conscience and heart.

Accordingly, to fully understand a person's moral rectitude, it is imperative that an understanding of

the person be given first to situate the context through which it may be understood.

The concept of the person, if understood fully, is much more meaningful than the concept of
the individual. While the concept of the individual reveals the primal nature of man as a rational
being, the concept of the person exemplifies the dynamic nature of the rational being toward self-
creation and fulfillment. The drive toward self-creation and fulfillment is not something that maybe
solely attributed from the rationality of the individual but rather from the latter's personal subjectivity.
Personal subjectivity here is understood to mean that the individual has an innate potential to become
the source of meaning for one's being and acting as well as for one's essence and existence, really
distinct from the objects of one's being and acting. This personal subjectivity thus, may only be
understood within the context of being and acting, that is, within the human experience itself.
Francisco remarks:

[Man] as the subject of [his] own existence and action, must be

perceived through [his] whole experience as [man] which constitutes
[his] totality as [he] exists and acts … experience cannot be detached

1
For a more detailed explanation of this point, please see W. Frankena. Ethics: An Introduction. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Incorporated, 1963. Herein after the text is cited as EA.
2
Rolyn B. Francisco, Karol Wojtyla's Theory of Participation. Makati City: St. Pauls Philippines, 1995. p. 16.
Herein after the text is referred to as TOP. Enclosures […] on pronouns and the italics are added to indicate that
they are not exclusive only to the male human species. The same is applied to other pronouns or nouns
throughout the texts.
 Ethical Theory 4

from the human subject … it is through human experience that [man]'s

subjectivity is understood…3

Underlying this basic truth is the concrete reality that [man] must always be understood as
both existing and acting. Essentially, to speak of [man] or better yet, person, is to speak about the
human experience as the most profound manifestation of one's rationality. The human experience, as
such, gradually unfolds the becoming of the person, which constitutes the very subjectivity that one
manifests through one's chosen actions and conscious experiences. These chosen actions and
conscious experiences become the wherewithal of the primal unity of [man] and [his] actions,
through which one's character is fundamentally built.

The primal unity of [man] and [his] actions, apparently, is deeply rooted from the classical
axiom operari sequitur esse (action follows being). This suggests that the "whole gamut of human
4
dynamics is largely determined by what [man] does and brings to pass". [Man]'s essential nature,
hence, as ens intellegens (rational being), must be first understood as dependent on one's esse, that is,
being. The esse on the other hand, may only be fully realized through operari, that is, action. This
realization, through which the dynamics of the ens intellegens is manifested, passes through existence
eventually leading to the becoming in [man], in the already existing [man] as Francisco notes. It
reveals that, "to begin to exist is, in fact, to become".5

Furthermore, the maxim operari sequitur esse does not only reveal the primordial unity of
being and acting, but also unfolds the purposive generation of a peculiar modus vivendi (mode of
6
living), out of which a certain character maybe developed or better still created. Here, the
development of character, as a moral goodness, is marked by one's willingness to persist in doing what
one thinks is right to the best of one's ability.7 Essentially, what allows for the development of such
character is constituted through one's being. This is crucial primarily because the being is the first act
of each [one] being the origin and subject of the dynamism necessary for the actualization of the modus
vivendi.8 However, central to this modus vivendi is the person's ability to discern (phronesis) what
action to take to allow for the generation of one's character or better yet one's person. This is critical
primarily because the kind of actions one does or the range of decisions one makes provides
essential constitutions to one's modus vivendi. This is to say that understanding a person is in effect,
an understanding of what one does and what one brings forth into the larger community of persons.
The very constitution that magnifies one's modus vivendi is therefore an eventuality of one's becoming
through conscious and deliberate actions, that is, actions willed and chosen to achieve some end or
purpose. Wojtyla notes:

Action reveals the person, and we look at the person through [his]
action. Action is thereby conceived as a specific moment of revealing
the person. In experiencing [himself] as a person through actions,
[man] becomes manifest to [himself] as such and this manifestation
happens by an understanding, which consists in the intellectual
apprehension grounded from the fact that [man] acts in its innumerable
9
recurrences.

3
TOP, p. 17
4
See Karol Wojtyla, Towards a Theory of Participation. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1981, p.
13. Herein after the text is referred to as TPP.
5
Op. Cit. TOP, p. 19. The Latin text reads "Ut esse incepere, enim, decere est".
6
See Peter Anthony Bertocci, Introduction to Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
Incorporated, 1951. p. 224. Herein after, the text is cited as IPR
7
cf. IPR, p. 392.
8
op. Cit. p. 21
9
See Karol Wojtyla. The Acting Person. Dordrecht, Holland: D Reidel Publishing Company, 1979. pp. 10-11.
Henceforth in the text, AP.
 Ethical Theory 5

Consequently, the becoming of the person is determined to a large extent by the kind of actions and
choices one makes. Here, the concept of becoming, notwithstanding the innumerable recurrences of
one's esse, is that becoming that allows one to be fully human. It makes sense thus, to speak of
becoming only through those actions and choices that make [man] or better still, the person rectify
one's moral dignity. This of course, is closely connected to the magnitude of values or traits that one
practices and to the kind of character one tries to create. There is a unity therefore, of what one
knows, moral knowledge on one hand and of what one chooses to do, freewill on the other. In this
sense, the person may arrive at the primal distinction between one's moral knowledge and one's
10
moral practices or better yet, one's moral principles and one's moral traits. However, the
distinction, once known, must not be construed as contrary to one another, instead it must be posited
as a particular moment of crafting a character towards the rectification of one's moral dignity. This is
to say simply that moral knowledge without moral practice is as good as dead or better still, entirely
useless. It makes sense all the more to parody Immanuel Kant's famous dictum that principles without
character are impotent and character without principles is blind.

Character and Human Actions

The concept of becoming involves at least in principle, certain actions and decisions that
allow a person to be fully human. This of course assumes that one is able to recognize the kind of
actions and decisions that may allow a person to become one. It further assumes that there are
indeed actions, which are proper to [man], actions, which, by their very nature may allow a person to
become fully human. What these actions and decisions are, is the subject of the succeeding
discussion.

Central to this position is the fact that [man] is always conscious of what [he] does. [He] is not
only conscious, but also, deliberately serious. This attitude perhaps, has something to do with what
the action or decision may contribute to [his] character. It may be that the action or the decision [he]
makes has some bearing to what [he] sees as significant in the creation of [his] character. Be that as it
may, it seems that what [he] constantly does or chooses to do has some connections to [his] very
person and self. It appears, within this defined limit, that [his] actions and decisions are constitutive
of [his] person.

It is not therefore unusual to maintain that the act through which the person is revealed is the
11
kind of acting that can be assigned to no other agent than a person. Following this line, it appears
really that the constitution of a person's character is highly a concatenation of [his] deliberate actions.
This assumes that [man], whenever [he] acts or decides, always tries to effect some change or better
still, bring forth some development, whether in [his] person or in the person of another. Here, the
terms effect and bring are constitutive of the very nature of the act itself. It may perhaps be true that
the act, in so far as it is deliberate, is always an act with a view to some end or purpose. Hence, when
a person acts, [he] acts to realize this end or purpose and [he] acts deliberately, unless persuaded by
some other factors like fear and coercion. This is why every act or every decision, in so far as it is
willed to achieve some end or purpose, is a creative act of the very author of the act itself, that is, the
person. Indeed, there is some truth to the thesis that action is a specific moment of revealing the
12
person. St. Thomas Aquinas may perhaps help us understand this point:

Of actions done by [man], those alone are properly called human

which are proper to [man] as [man]. Now, [man] differs from
irrational animals in this; that [he] is master of [his] actions. Wherefore,
those actions alone are properly called human of which [he] is master.

10
Op. Cit. EA, pp. 52 - 53.
11
op. cit. TOP. p. 22
12
Ibid.
 Ethical Theory 6

Now, [man] is master of [his] actions through [his] reason and will:
whence too, the freewill is defined as the faculty and will of reason.
Therefore, those actions are properly called which proceed from a
deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in [man], they can
be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they
13
are not proper to [man] as [man].

This is not simply the reason why an action is regarded as a specific moment of revealing the person.
It does not only involve the person's freewill and rationality. It also involves the entirety of the
person, including [his] deepest interests and desires. Essentially, when a person acts, [he] brings
with the act the very purpose of [his] reason and will - to know the right or good and realize it, thereby
creating a certain mode of character, defined by [his] deliberate choice to act. Whether this
character is of admirable nature is another matter. What is crucial and peculiar at this point, is the
condition that when a person acts, [he] has the innate capacity to shape the act, from what is admirable
to otherwise as [he] intends or decides to do so. [He] has the freewill to choose what sort of action is
constitutive of or destructive of [his] character. As a result, every act, in so far as it is deliberate, is
always a controlled act of the person. It is as Prof. Peter Bertocci observes, [his] unique mode of
14
adjustment to [his] own nature and environment. Eventually, the very mode of adjustment of the
person is an instantiation of [his] becoming through the modus vivendi [he] has created by freely
willing every act necessary for the exercise of reason.

In addition, freewill and reason are not the only significant elements in understanding the
human act. Consciousness also plays a critical role. It is regarded as essential and constitutive of the
action. When a person acts, [he] is not only conscious of [his] action, but [he] is also conscious of the
15
fact that [he] is the author of the action itself. [He] is, hence, a conscious subject. Francisco quotes
Wojtyla:

Consciousness functions cognitively in a general way to reflect or

mirror what happens in [man] and what [man] does. In a more
specific way, it reflects or mirrors what [man] does, how [he] does it,
what to [him] and everything that [he] comes in contact with by means
16
[his] doing.

As a conscious subject, [man] through the function of consciousness, experiences [himself] by means
of [his] own action. [He] realizes that [he] is not simply conscious of what [he] does but [he] is also
conscious of why [he] does it. [His] actions, in so far as they are conscious actions, are reflective of
what [he] wants to be or better still of what [he] intends to become. They are constitutive elements, if
not part and parcel, of the experiences of the person [himself], which serve as bases for generously
creating a certain kind of character, of which the very purpose is the recognition that one is capable
of achieving moral rectitude.

This is why Ethics primarily deals with human actions. It is believed that human actions carry
the fundamental autonomy of a person. In choosing to do an action, whether there are rules of action
that must be obeyed, one always does an action on the basis of one's intention. The intention to act
proceeds from one's deliberate willing to achieve some end, as elsewhere mentioned in this paper. It
reveals two significant things. Initially, it unfolds that [man] is a rational being, that is, [he] possesses
moral knowledge through which reasons for actions are grounded. And lastly, it shows [man]'s
freewill, that is, [man] can always, through [his] intention, shape the form of [his] actions, which is of

13
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II. Translated by the Dominican Fathers of the English Province,
New York: Benzinger Brothers, Inc. 1947. I-II. Q. 1. a. 1. Henceforth in the text ST. Italics added.
14
op. cit. IPR. p. 222
15
op. cit. TOP. p. 27
16
Ibid. p. 28
 Ethical Theory 7

course magnified by the means through which [man] chooses to carry out [his] intention, then achieve
the desired end or result that the action may bring into the community of actors. There are however,
other factors that may affect this dynamism. One, emotions like fear and pity may indirectly
influence, if not wholly affect, the reason why a person intends to do an action. Fear and pity diminish
the moral knowledge of the person to the point that the very reason for acting is no longer grounded
upon the objective rules of reason but upon certain inclinations derived from some source other than
reason itself, in this case, from feelings of fear and pity. While it does not negate reason, the very
intention to act is directed by some rules external to the person, that is, one acts not because one
thinks that one's action is the right thing to do but one acts because one fears that not doing the action
may mean something else. It is therefore imperative to look into the very reason why an action is
done and for what purpose it is anchored. Whatever reason there is and whatever purpose is
present, it definitely reveals the character of the author of the act. As thus stated, action is a specific
moment of revealing the person provided that [his] actions are grounded upon the objective rules
that reason gives to itself. Action then is the only means to uncover the character of the person as
well as one's ethical principles toward the realization of one's modus vivendi or one's moral rectitude.

Character, Moral Judgments and Moral Standards

Viewed within the totality of human experiences, it is indeed true that action is the only means
to uncover the character of the person. The uncovering of the character on one hand likewise
suggests that there is really a primordial unity between being and acting, through which the process
of becoming fully human is generated. The becoming though naturally implies acting from being,
does not simply end with having acted on the basis of freewill and reason or by having created a
modus vivendi for some definite ends or purposes. The becoming, if understood fully consists in the
deliberate willing of the person to consistently sustain what one has established as one's modus
vivendi, provided that one's modus vivendi is such that it leads to the rectification of one's moral
dignity. Otherwise, the entirety of the person leads to disintegration and depersonalization through
one's actions.17

Corollary to the aforementioned is the idea that disintegration as well as depersonalization

negate the very personal subjectivity of the person as revealed by one's actions. One's nature, as ens
intelligens, is demeaned by choosing to act contrary to the dictates of reason. One deprives oneself
of the innate ability to govern oneself within the limits of the objective laws of reason, to the point that
18
it prevents one from subordinating oneself and thus from remaining in possession of oneself. This is the
reason why it is very significant that the person must determine oneself within the limitations of what
one intends to become. This determination of oneself, in so far as it is willed and discerned by reason
represents the deeper and more fundamental dimension of human authorship.19 Prof. Peter Bertocci
remarks:

Thus … the strength of the will refers not to the possibility of free will
(will-agency) to begin with, but to the ability of the will-agency to
overcome opposition or actually to bring the approved to
20
actualization.

17
One's character for instance may disintegrate when one chooses to act contrary to the self-imposed rules of
reason about what is morally obligatory. Cheating for example, during examinations, may cause the
disintegration of one's character since it runs contrary to honesty and thus negates rationality itself. The choice to
cheat does not proceed from a rational thinking but rather arises because of some perceived consequences that
are prima facie beneficial to the doer, disregarding the salient feature of what is by nature morally right and
obligatory. As an ens intelligens, one is always expected to possess moral sensitivity in order to distinguish a
morally right choice of action from morally wrong choice of action.
18
Op. cit. AP, p. 194
19
op. cit. TPP, p. 13
20
op. cit. IPR, pp. 228-229 \ the original text reads: "…to bring the approved to fruition"
 Ethical Theory 8

The becoming thus, to be fully human always consists in the ability of the freewill to actualize
consistently the dictates of reason whenever it is bound to act, provided of course that the dictates of
reason are constitutive features of the purposive generation of one's character. The generation of
one's character, though dependent upon a person's free will, is essentially associated with one's
values, aims and goals. What one intends to become or what kind of character one wants to create is
therefore an act of a determined will. In this process, the generation of character reveals three (3)
important things. Initially, it discloses the idea that one cannot act without first determining one's self
21
and one's values. Secondly, that one is the agent of one's self-realization. Finally, it directs one to
be self-regulated and self-governed. The last one suggests that there exists a turning towards one's
realization, thus revealing the very intentionality of one's willing. This is peculiar because it involves
a turning toward the self. It discloses the reality that when a person chooses to do what is by nature
both right and good, one in turn, becomes good and one's moral dignity is rectified.

On the contrary, while it is acknowledged that the generation of character and the
rectification of moral dignity are indeed necessary to become fully human, one cannot deny that
actions are open to judgments made by other persons since the actions are performed within a
community of persons. Generally, judgments are made when the actions deserve either praise or
blame or when the actions run in contrast to existing principles of desirable values and traits.
Judgments define the extent of one's moral knowledge and may sometimes reveal one's moral
sensitivity or awareness. The judgments, in so far as they are made to evaluate actions likewise
reveal the nature of the actions, as they are perceived within the limits of one's moral knowledge.

In Ethical theory for example, ethical judgments and moral judgments are used quite
synonymously. Both express values or prescribe certain acceptable behaviors that are normally
associated with praise or blame and with social reprobation or approbation. Judgments thus, define
the extent of one's sense of moral responsibility and are closely connected to both moral and ethical
evaluations. Two possible reasons may be given to support this claim. On one hand, judgment
provides distinctive marks between actions that are morally acceptable and actions that are
abhorred. We generally assume that actions are morally acceptable since they are consummated
within the limits of existing moral principles, that is, they are done in the realization of some rules of
duty or obligation as dictated by accepted moral principles. We say otherwise when the actions are
in conflict with the existing moral principles and rules, that is, they are performed without the moral
approbation necessary to judge them as morally praiseworthy. On the other hand, judgment
constitutes the range of one's moral sensitivity. It allows a person to recognize the sort of actions
where moral judgments are necessary and when moral judgments do not apply as Herman aptly puts
it. In this sense, moral sensitivity means that a person knows what constitutes an action to be judged
as morally permissible or otherwise, that is, one is capable of picking out the morally significant
features of the actions required of judgments. This may include for instance descriptions about the
actions, for what purpose the actions are sought, the perceived consequences of the actions, for
whom the actions are made and why the actions are chosen. The identification of the morally salient
features of the actions may somehow assist the person to make bold the necessity of judgments about
certain actions in certain circumstances and thus know when actions must not be judged as morally
justified actions.

There are however unstated contingencies in this process. Initially, the identification of the
morally salient features of actions necessary for moral evaluations requires moral perception. Moral
perception refers to one's way of looking at moral phenomena, at how one perceives moral problems
and how one arrives at resolutions to resolve these problems. This is sometimes referred to as one's
moral point of view, through which one's moral sensitivity is developed. Secondly, one's moral
sensitivity does not prescribe what actions are morally right or otherwise, it only presents the morally
salient features of actions chosen to achieve some ends. In short, moral sensitivity does not generate
duties and obligations. It only identifies the reasons why they are called duties and obligations.

21
op. cit. p. 32
 Ethical Theory 9

Thirdly, moral sensitivity depends on one's moral perception or one's moral point of view. Thus,
judgment made through one's way of looking at things, is only possible when one recognizes the
morally salient features of the actions, that is, when one identifies the conditions under which the
action is perceived as the sort of action, which is morally permissible to do. Fourthly, moral
perception is, to a large extent, influenced by the social context. Its structure thus, is defined by the
existing conventions on norms, laws and moral principles. As such, it may for example, give differing
judgments about the moral permissibility of an action depending on the nature of the convention that
one lives by or conforms to. The virtue of honesty for instance, may be regarded as a cardinal virtue
by some persons and thus has a greater moral weight in this sense but if perceived differently,
honesty may not appear as the sort of virtue that one is expected to cultivate. This is possible since
persons are reared differently and have acquired different values and have cultivated different traits
in the process. When this happens, there arises a clear and defined morally salient features of what
sort of virtues are morally justified virtues that one ought to cultivate. This does not however negate
the presence of moral duties and obligations. When the morally salient features of the actions are
identified, say for example, between honesty and loyalty, the person has all the more reasons to
recognize where moral judgments are necessary and when moral judgments must be applied. In
effect, one clearly identifies the conditions under which judgments are justified judgments. This of
course depends upon the convention that one lives by or conforms to as internalized rules of
behavior.

Finally, moral sensitivity, as a constitutive element of moral perception allows the possibility of
competing moral judgments and hence recognizes the presence of significant moral standards used
for moral evaluations. The practice of moral sensitivity gives the person access to the nature of a
given moral judgment concerning an action viewed as the kind of action, which is morally
permissible to do. In addition, it also assists the person to recognize what sort of moral standard one
uses and thus enables the person to discern the origin of the judgment. Moral sensitivity hence,
structures the constitution of moral judgments made of actions notwithstanding the varieties of moral
standards that persons may appeal to when required to do so.

The validity of this set of contingencies nevertheless, is dependent on one's understanding of

the nature of moral judgments and moral evaluations. Problems of the same kind may become bold
eventually if one fails to understand the nature of judgments and evaluations. Two issues may be
raised as a matter of moral clarity to situate this concern. First, what is the nature of moral judgments?
How are they generated? And second, how is moral evaluation possible? Under what conditions an
evaluation is morally necessary? The answers to these issues may be viewed in two ways. First, the
reasons alluded to in moral judgments are accessible only to the individual doing the evaluation,
which later on magnifies the range of one's personal values and principles. The first view thus may
be considered subjective since the standards for evaluation proceed from one's pool of moral
knowledge. Second, the evaluations made of actions are articulated in language that has a shared
meaning and background. The standards for evaluation proceed from a common criteria of moral
evaluation shared by the community of moral agents, making the evaluations, thus, objective since
the evaluations make use of the existence of morally acceptable principles of conduct. On the other
hand, while the answers may be viewed as both subjective and objective, one cannot deny that most
of the times, one appeals to the subjective evaluation of conduct creating eventually a conflict
between one's values and the values lived by the community of moral agents. Obviously this calls for
a set of common criteria for judgment and evaluation to avoid any possible conflict between one's
moral perception and the moral point of view upheld by the community of moral agents. One
plausible solution to this maybe-conflict is an understanding of the nature of moral standards and the
extent of moral evaluation. An understanding of the nature of moral standards may somehow
enlighten a person as to when and where moral judgments are necessary.

Contemporary discourse on Ethical Theory, for example, entertains the presence of two
competing moral standards in moral evaluations. Each of the standards is generally believed to have
encapsulated the salient characteristics of moral judgments. They however differ in their conception
of obligation and look at it quite differently. Consequently, differing conceptions on the nature of
 Ethical Theory 10

obligation result in the differences of moral judgments. More often than not, one thinks that the
difference these standards produce is, to a large measure, tantamount to conflicting ethical principles
that are reflective of ethical biases. One believes that this difference is what produces confrontation
and misunderstanding between persons of different ethical backgrounds. This however must not be
the case. One's moral judgment in so far as it proceeds from a critical inquiry, following the dictates
of one's moral perception and structured by one's moral sensitivity, is as valid as any other moral
judgment, thus, there is no fact of the matter wherein one moral judgment is more reasonable than the
other. However, a possible solution to this seemingly natural variation is to look into the central
features of the different moral standards that contemporary discourse on ethical theory admits, then
perhaps decide which of these standards offer a more critical approach to any action open to moral
judgment and evaluation, only then that we can understand why there exists differences in
judgments.

22
Utilitarians, for example, equate obligation with what is good. The concept good thus, is
what defines obligation. Here, the concept good is closely associated with what is beneficial to
oneself, to others and to the community of persons. Following this principle, it is obvious that the
standard for evaluation rests mainly upon a consequentialist doctrine of happiness. As such, actions
are evaluated on the basis of the amount of good that the actions produce. If the actions produce
greater amount of good than bad, then, the actions are morally right actions. Three things must be
23
considered under this doctrine. Initially, given an action, one must be able to determine the
amount of happiness that will be produced through it. Secondly, one must likewise be able to
determine the amount of unhappiness that the action will produce. Finally, one must be able to
determine which has greater weight between happiness and unhappiness to identify the net result of
the act. If the action has more unhappiness than happiness, then, the action is regarded as a morally
wrong action and right if the action has more beneficial consequences rather than aversive
consequences. Essentially, the measure of a morally right action is defined by the results that the
action brings into the community of moral agents. John Stuart Mill fittingly remarks:

… the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the

Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure,
and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
24
pleasure…

On the other hand, deontologists do not look at the consequences of the acts as the measure
of what is morally right, instead they look into the nature of the act itself as well as the motive for
performing the act. Here, the concept of obligation is defined by what is right rather than good. The
moral ought, rightness or wrongness is understood to be closely tied up with moral obligation rather
than moral value. This standard thus regards individual liberty as well as moral rights as primordial in
the determination of what is a morally right or wrong action. Kant's Moral Theory is regarded as the
leading literature in the consideration of individual liberty. An action for example is morally right or
the sort of action, which is morally permissible to do, if a law may be willed that everyone, under
relevantly similar conditions can perform the same act. This is known in Kantian Ethical Theory as the

22
Utilitarians are followers of Utilitarianism, an ethical theory or doctrine developed by David Hume and refined
by Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and J. J. Smart among others. Utilitarianism, as an ethical
doctrine believes that the only criterion of what is a morally right action, is the amount of good it produces over
pain. An action is right if it brings greater amount of good over evil. This is also referred to in Ethics as the
Principle of Comparative Nonmoral Value. Thus, an act is right if and only if it will probably produce at least, the
greater balance between good and bad under relevantly similar conditions.
23
For a better understanding of the steps, please refer to Michael Bayles and Kenneth Henley, editors. Right
Conduct: Theories and Applications.. New York: Random House, Incorporated, 1983, p. 100. Here in after the
text is cited as RC.
24
See John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism in RC, p. 108
 Ethical Theory 11

Principle of Universalizability. Corollary to this principle is the regard for individual liberty of
persons. An action is morally good if it respects the liberty of persons, treats them as ends in
themselves and never merely as means to achieve some good. Kant calls this the Principle of Respect
for Persons. The measure of what is morally right rests on the idea that there may well be other facts
that will make an action right other than the consequences, notwithstanding the fact that persons have
moral rights, which are closely connected to their individual liberty. The principle of respect for
persons thus establishes what Kant calls ‘dignity of persons’ and lays down the initial condition for
what is morally right action. In this sense, what is morally right may be generated on the basis of
these principles. Following the principle of universalizability and the principle of respect for
persons, there appears, in Kant’s ethical theory an objective and only one imperative of morality.
Kant says:

…there is only one imperative which directly commands a certain

conduct without making its condition some purpose to be reached by
it. This imperative is categorical. It concerns not the material of the
action and its intended result but the form and principle from which it
results. What is essentially good in it consists in the intention, the
result being what it may. This imperative may be called the
25
imperative of morality.

This imperative of morality however is possible only through an a priori knowledge of what is
right. One arrives at this a priori knowledge when one can will that one’s maxim or volition is
universalizable, that is, under relevantly similar conditions, all men can possibly arrive at the same
maxim or volition.

Following Kant, an action is morally right if and only if a) one’s maxim is universal, b) it can be
a universal law of nature, c) it treats humanity as an end in itself, d) the maxim is made by a will
giving-universal-laws and e) it is a maxim for a possible kingdom of ends.

On one hand, Kant’s idea of maxim, as it is generated by human beings, is not a maxim of
action. Instead they are maxims that allow us to generate possible rules or policies. Its function
therefore is to lay down the general principles through which human beings must anchor their
actions. It is not in this sense, a maxim of action. Actions as such properly belong to the domain and
26
responsibility of human judgments.

25
see Immanuel Kant, ‘Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals’ in Steven Cahn, Classics of Western Philosophy.
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1977. p. 1028. Herein after, the text is cited as GMM.
26
See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. 1996. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor. New York:
Cambridge University Press. p. ix, Introduction. Henceforth, MM.