Green Agrevolution Pvt Ltd: delivering

360° “seed-to-market” solution

Aditya Sinha, Suresh Jha and Amritesh

hashank, the CEO and co-founder of an agriculture-based Indian start-up Green Aditya Sinha is based at

S Agrevolution Pvt Ltd (GAPL), is planning to reach out to more than one million
farmers by 2021-2022, which is more than 20 times of the present volume. His team
Department of Agricultural
Extension, Bidhan Chandra
Krishi Viswa Vidyalaya,
is presently serving around 42,000 farmers with a home-grown technological platform
Mohanpur, West Bengal,
DeHaat which provides end-to-end services right from seed to the market. Micro- India. Suresh Jha and
entrepreneurs are selected and groomed to act as local touchpoints for farmers in the Amritesh are both based at
respective catchment areas ranging from 3 to 5 km. Shashank has been a recipient of Department of Humanities
multiple accolades and recognition and is now firmly seated to drive his start-up to the next and Social Sciences,
level of growth and pan-India market penetration. The venture also requires an Management area, Indian
understanding of segment-specific needs, cropping pattern, using local resources and Institute of Technology
Ropar, Rupnagar, India.
channelizing the advisory services to occupy a central role in the value chain. There are
other impending issues such as low smartphone adoption, low internet access and lack of
entrepreneurial mindset among the rural youth. Similar issues were relatively backward
states of India with little or no provision of app-based services. Will he be successful to
expand on such a high pace in other States with the existing resources and capabilities?

Fragmented nature of agriculture supply chain

The agriculture sector in India contributes around 18 per cent to national GDP employing
more than half of the total workforce (Indian Economic Survey, 2018) and feeds more than a
billion people. There are more than 90.2 million[1] agriculture households in India who use
to depend on different sources to get agriculture advisory services (Exhibit 1). The
agriculture landscape of India is diverse, and farmer’s agricultural practices, and priorities
highly vary across various regions due to changing climatic conditions, soil quality and
uneven landscapes. The agriculture supply chain in India is yet to build a systematic
structure to serve the farmers. There are many government institutions such as banks and
agriculture extension centers which are offering financial and knowledge-based services,
respectively, to the farmers. Their accessibility to farmers often seen limited. Lack of proper
transportation and storage results into a huge post-harvest loss (up to 40 per cent). Farmers
of rural India usually rely on local suppliers and middle men to get agriculture inputs. The
output market is neither organized nor adequately accessible by the farmers. Farmers do
not have much knowledge to decide why should they chose a particular type of fertilizer, Disclaimer. This case is written
solely for educational purposes
who to approach when anything went wrong and how can they increase their margin. and is not intended to represent
Farmers had to rely on multiple channels and travel long distances to fulfill their successful or unsuccessful
managerial decision-making.
requirements such as seeds, fertilizers, machinery, crop advisory and information and The authors may have
market linkage. One the other hand, the output market lacks a proper platform to connect disguised names; financial and
other recognisable information
with the farmers and exchange information, which is highly desired for supply forecasting. to protect confidentiality.

DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-06-2018-0148 VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019, pp. 1-23, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 1
 Information and communication technology and Indian agriculture
There is a growing body of evidence that underscores the role of information and
communication technology (ICT) in agriculture in support services. One of the most notable
market-led interventions in Indian agriculture was ITC’s e-Choupal initiative (E-Choupal,
2018) which introduced a kiosk-based service platform to access market information.
Availability of low-cost online information reduces information asymmetry between
farmers and traders, facilitates input purchase and enhances the farmer’s capacity to
align their production with the consumer’s demand across various marketing channels.
Mobile phone operators have also entered this sector and developed a range of services
for the farming community. Initially, mobile-based services included information about
weather, crop/animal husbandry advisory, fertilizer advisory, market prices, electricity
timings, government schemes and news[2]. Many of such informational services were
delivered either in the form of SMS or voice messages along with an option given to the
farmers to call back and raise queries, and a quick response was provided back to them.
The government has been proactively formulating policies and chalking out plans to
improve the farmer’s life and set the target to double the average farmer’s income by
2022 (Policy paper, 2017). Encouraged by a favorable political environment, many
agriculture startups providing Web and mobile app-based services have marked their
presence at scattered locations in India in the past few years (Exhibit 2).
The mobile phone penetration in India is expected to grow to 85-90 per cent by 2020 from
65-70 per cent at present, and half of the smartphone users are expected to subscribe to
network data services (Omidyar, 2008). The data on all India mobile internet users report
(Exhibit 4) have indicated a decent but a non-uniform growth rate across urban and rural
India in over the past few years. Despite the visible occurrence of demographic
heterogeneity, one cannot deny the percolating effect of ICT in rural India across the
farming community. However, on the other hand, there are other challenges such as lack of
mechanizations, poor access to credit, reduced and fragmented landholding (Deshpandey,
2017), inefficient channels of advisory services, lack of organized market access services,
inadequate storage and transportation facilities, etc., which cannot be overlooked.

The GAPL venture

In 2009, Shashank and along with his friend Manish (Co-founder) started visiting farmers in
the rural areas and observed many challenging issues and gaps in the agriculture value
chain.

Farms and farmers

In October 2010, they launched their initiative in Vaishali district of Bihar[3] where more than
90 per cent of the landholding size is of less than 2 hectares. They initially started a non-
government organization “Farms and Farmers (FnF)”[4], a nonprofit arm of the agribusiness
firm GAPL in 2010. It has promised to provide all kinds of services required for the entire
crop lifecycle and increase the farmer’s profit margin by reducing the long chain of
intermediaries. They went to the field and tried conversing with a small group of farmers and
persuaded them to try cultivating cash crops instead of conventional ones. It was not an
easy job for them as in one of the press interviews Manish quoted[5]:
We suggested to farmers to cultivate rajma (red kidney beans) instead of the conventional crop
of wheat. But they ignored our suggestions outright,” said Manish. “We were at our wits’ end [. . .]
but we somehow persuaded 18 farmers to experiment on six acres of land. Luckily, it was a huge
success [. . .]. The farmers earned Rs 1000 per kattha[6] with an investment of Rs 400. For wheat,
they used to invest Rs 350 and reap 50 kg produce per kattha, earning Rs 400 to 500.

PAGE 2 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Soon after their initial success, they have expanded their operations to the neighboring
districts Muzaffarpur, Sitamarhi, Banka and Purnia. They have observed the local practices
of cultivation and suggested local solutions to increase the farm output. For example, to the
farmers of Purnia district who used to grow corn and potato and leave their land unused
between June and September, and they have advised growing baby corn during these
months because it had a short reaping cycle of around 50-60 days. It was a big
success. To the farmers of Buxur district who were facing water shortage and limited
irrigation options, they have suggested growing medicinal herbs because it can be
produced in regions having drought gardens and poor soil. Their close interaction with
small and marginal farmers provided insights about various agricultural requirements of
small and medium-sized farmers. Observing the vast gaps in value chain services,
Shashank then commented:
There is no structured way how direct communication with farmers can be established for
customized crop production or feedback of seed or other input.

Earlier FnF worked with government projects in the area of livelihood generation of rural
women below the poverty line, forming self-help-groups and connecting them with formal
financial institutions such as NABARD[7].

Green Agrevolution Pvt Ltd

Shashank and his team formed GAPL, the commercial arm of FnF in February’ 2012, to
undertake the operation of marketing and processing of farm produce along with other
commercial activities. They aimed at minimizing the cost of production and maximizing
profit per unit area for the farmer and came up with an innovative concept with the name
“DeHaat (A Hindi synonym for a remote and undeveloped area in a village).” Thus, they
began operating with two separate identities: the one is Farms and Farmers (NGO), which is
registered as a society, and the second one is Green Agrevolution Pvt. Ltd. (GAPL) – a
commercial entity which has employed franchising model under which they ran DeHaat
centers to deliver their services. It has three different streams of revenue: first one from input
sales, second from crop advisory and the third one is from output sales. Presently, about 70
per cent of the revenue comes from sales of Agri-output to the institutional buyers. There are
more than 75 institutional buyers including ITC, Godrej, Reliance Fresh, NCDEX, NCML,
etc., who procure the agriculture produce directly from the DeHaat centers. The crop
advisory services are freely accessible to the farmers. Free advisory services help the
microentrepreneurs stay close to the local farmers and collect farm related critical
information, which may help the input suppliers and institutional buyers to design, innovate
and customize the products.

DeHaat: one stop solution to farmers

Shashank and his friend Manish Kumar[8], MSc from IIT Kharagpur instituted DeHaat. He
was soon joined by many likeminded people most of them were young engineering and
management graduates during the phase of inception and initial launch (Their details are
mentioned in Exhibit 5).
Adopting a multipronged approach, DeHaat model was systematically designed to provide
customized solutions to farmers under one roof, almost everything and that too in 3-5 km
range of their fields. Farmers could get the quality agricultural inputs directly from input
manufacture, they may get the specific advisory services based on the input and type of
crop they grow, and they can also sell their produce directly to the institutional buyers at the
end of their cropping season. Shashank recalled:

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 3

 We have connected the queries to right stakeholders. Input related demands go to input
companies; crop monitoring queries go to the advisory team; procurement and market linkages
related queries go to output companies directly.

Shashank and his team established their first two DeHaat centers not far from one
another in the two neighboring districts of Vaishali and Muzaffarpur in 2012-2013. They
ran the centers themselves for roughly a year and 3-4 months to understand first-hand
the problems and other hindrances at the village level. Reflecting on the formative
years, Shashank elaborated:
In those initial years, creating awareness about DeHaat model and convincing farmers was
difficult. We started with cash crops. We realized that this is going to be a long process. It is not
about growing crops, but it is whether farmers have trust in you or not [. . .] we used to interact
with farmers [. . .] they were trying to understand why we left the job and came to Bihar. You want
to grow new crops, why not existing crops? Even there are inefficacies with the existing crop they
are growing [. . .] it will be much easier for us to build a relationship to encourage them, to ensure
them, to switch them from old crop to the newer crop [. . .]. That was one of the approaches we
used. Initially, trust was the main issue.

Providing last mile access

After getting the first-hand experience from the first two DeHaat centers, they wanted to
scale up their operations in other districts as well, which was not practically possible with
their small team. They planned to use their DeHaat model to work as franchised outlets
against COCO (company owned-company operated) model to extend their services. The
franchise owners are supposed to play multiple roles other than just of a distributor.
Shashank realized that participation people preferably from the farming community would
be needed to run these DeHaat outlets. The next job was to identify an appropriate persona
to do this job. A local youth with clean image in the age bracket of 25-40, generally
educated up to senior secondary school or more, comfortable with using Android
smartphones, and preferably having a motorcycle was found suitable for the purpose. Such
youths were identified and nurtured as microentrepreneurs to run the DeHaat outlets. Each
DeHaat micro-entrepreneurs is supposed to bring an initial capital contribution of 3-4 lakh
rupees, which is required for the development of their own inventory. Depending on their
contribution, FnF develops a physical space to render its DeHaat center. Recently, FPOs
(farmers producer organization) have also shown their interest in running the DeHaat
centers. Presently, there are 8 FPO operators in Odisha running the DeHaat center. FPOs
being more rooted in the community could provide a more inclusive and reliable platform for
the farmers. On the initial expansion strategy Shashank said:
[. . .], there is a defined process [. . .] again this is not just word of mouth [. . .] if we wish to set up
DeHaat center in any area properly [. . .] so it is well advertised in that area [. . .] we meet the
government officials there [. . .] we get in touch with the existing organizations present there. we
access their strength. we collaborate with them. we work in close collaboration with NABARD[9]
[. . .] and this is how we work.

The DeHaat operators were provided with a tablet with preinstalled DeHaatTM app. Further,
they were trained on how to use the app on smartphones; how to talk to the farmer; what all
exactly they have to do on a day-to-day basis, and so on. Using this the initial contribution
as their revolving fund, they worked closely with roughly 600-800 farmers in a catchment
area of 3-5 km approximately and made an earning of Rs 12000-18000 roughly. Many
DeHaat centers are also operated from franchisee owned premises to reduce the operating
cost. Prices of inputs are generally determined by the parent company to keep a check on
DeHaat entrepreneurs.

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Creating a comprehensive service package
Initially, DeHaatTM had an advisory model of selective crops. They did not have options for
all the inputs required. They used to purchase selected crops from the farmers. The
uncertain climatic conditions and the mono-cropping pattern has given limited opportunity
to diversify their services. They kept doing on field research to understand the peripheral
needs of the farmers which can be served in during the lean time. They have also started
recommending and encouraging farmers to go for crop mixing for which in-depth advisory
services were required.
Shashank further mentioned:
Earlier, we did not have the complete basket of the offering. Because of that, there was
seasonality in the cash flow of the micro-entrepreneurs. To fill the void of seasonality, they added
more products, more services, more features on the app. “Even after we added more input and
more crops, still we found that there are few months which are lean. And we mean to utilize the
lean time; we added some features related to crop monitoring and field visit on the app. They
capture crop-based queries, form farm level data at our backend. The data is much sought after
by input companies and R&D organizations which create 2-3% of the revenue of DeHaatTM.

The services delivered by these microentrepreneurs through DeHaat outlets include

information and access provisions to a wide range of genuine products for crop protection,
crop nutrition, seeds and fertilizers. Also, it provides support to the input players for right
product placement, direct access to farmers, feedback from farmers and assurance of no
black marketing or adulteration. It provides price transparency to the buyers with the
elimination of intermediaries, and information on the estimated volumes of produce way
before harvesting which results in better price realization both for the farmers and output
firms. Under crop advisory, it provides a cost-effective module to farmers on crop planning,
crop reminder calls in the local language, crop monitoring and relevant information related
to weather and market to ensure maximum yield. Under research and development (R&D)
services, it provides innovative solutions related to farm mechanization and land use
modeling for sustainable economic and environmental impact (Exhibit 6). Overall, the
DeHaat centers rechanneled the existing resources around the value chain and got
appreciations by all the involved stakeholders. It also promotes organic farming by
organizing periodic workshops and training for farmers at DeHaat centers. It also helped
them to get the essential bio inputs at subsidized rates (wherever available).

Enhancing quality though DeHaatTM app

The DeHaat mobile application was launched in 2016 which provided an online channel
and a platform to connect small farmers to their various needs. Over 400 agricultural inputs
are listed on the platform. Among its multiple services (Exhibit 7), DeHaat app provided
frequent crop reminder voice calls in local languages to the farmers specific to their crop
requirements. Thus, farmers were informed about the right dosage of input as well as the
best available crop consultation. It also provided the farmers the flexibility to contact
respective micro-entrepreneurs to gain information personally. Farmers can register their
queries on the toll-free number of DeHaat which used to get directed to the respective
service nodes. The microentrepreneurs made repeated visits to individual farmers,
collected information about their individual requirements and created an aggregate
demand of the listed inputs in use. With such an efficient and cost-effective service, the
farmers did not have to go anywhere else for placing the demand or making any negotiation
with the middlemen. They were relieved because they were getting the best price at their
doorstep in the least possible time. Farmers started getting customized advisory service
through automated voice calls based on the information collected during demand
aggregation. They need not bother about reading SMS or memorizing the suggestions for
the whole crop cycle. The team has also designed a different version of the app for the

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 5

 farmers to provide them a direct communication option. Although many farmers have a
feature phone, these are not compatible with smartphone features or internet. Therefore, the
role of a micro-entrepreneur becomes essential. DeHaat cannot offer solutions until and
unless they get farm level or field data. The micro-entrepreneurs fill this gap in today’s
scenario and fetch data from the fields of farmers.

Achieving the next-day delivery target

In the beginning, it used to take a minimum of 2 to 3 days to deliver to the farmers from
DeHaat centers. The immediate challenge for Shashank was how to shorten the delivery
time. As the number of centers and micro-entrepreneurs grew, more and more farmers
registered to the network. Thus, information about farmers’ land holdings[10] and the
cropping pattern, and other issues started sizing up considerably. They collected rich
information and insights on all the crop cycles and calculated an optimum inventory needed
at each DeHaat level. They also estimated that how much total produce they are going to
have at the end of the season. Before harvesting season, the buyers were pretty much
identified and shortlisted. It helped them to reduce the lead time from 2-3 days to 0 days; at
the same time, it has emerged as a kind of institutional support for their DeHaat micro-
entrepreneurs. The efficiency of the entire model improved significantly. Shashank recalled:
[. . .] we generate so many insights which really helps us to improve our efficiency [. . .] when 50
or up to 60-65% season is gone, even by that time we get close to 75% estimate of the crop in
terms of how much quantity it is likely to be harvested, what will be the harvesting time, what kind
of quality we are expecting., and the same information is shared with all our listed buyers. It
helps us to improve our efficiency to get to better markets, better buyers. And it brings
transparency in the entire value chain [. . .]. Using the revolving fund of 3-4 lakh rupees, now a
micro-entrepreneur does a total business of 35-40 lakhs in a year. Their capital cycle is pretty
efficient now. The inventory cycle is pretty efficient now. This is primarily because the overall
approach is highly data-driven. Not only to maintain the inventory but also to think about the
output.

Influencing the value chain

Earlier, it was tough to get connected to the existing chain. First, DeHaat model was the first
of its kind. There were very few or probably no Agri- or Agri-tech startups at that time. So,
convincing the institutional buyers to go beyond the conventional value chain was very
difficult. The had their issues.

Exploiting the pain points

There are more than 20 major brands in the list of input suppliers including IIL, Du Pont,
Bayer and Tata. They had very limited control over the role played by other supply chain
actors down the line. They often struggle to get information about farmer’s requirements and
maintaining the supply and quality as per the expectations. Shashank and team started
identifying such pain points of these input companies and started building their propositions
around it. Shashank elaborated:
[. . .] for input company, the pain point is when they sell their product to their distributor/
wholesaler, ironically, after that, they do not have any control, neither on pricing nor on the way in
which the stock or inventory got handled. Very often, their products, e.g. seeds or pesticides,
etc. are sold in the bank. “Well-known brands, e.g. Syngenta or DuPont, and essentially, their
brand goes for a loss.” Secondly, they had no access to farmers at that time. They did not have
visibility at farmers’ level. Any input company, for example, a seed or a pesticide company wants
feedback from farmers on how much percentage germination from their seed or how crop
protection performed. At that time, there was no way to get to know that from the existing value
chain. So, that was one of their pain points.

PAGE 6 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Snatching the bargaining power
On the input side, initially, DeHaat had to buy from the same set of local distributors or
retailers simply to keep the ball rolling. And because of that, at that time, their margins were
pretty low. They focused more on the fulfilling the requirement of farmers and kept
increasing their farmer’s network to increase the aggregate demand. Once they built the
volume, they started successfully bargaining with the major suppliers in the market. On the
output side, initially, DeHaat had to take care of all transit risks, logistics and other related
activities. The stand of the companies was that “if you want to sell then deliver it to our
factory.” They did not want to bring any changes in their practices just for one player. For
delivering to the output companies such as ITC and Godrej, they had to rely on a long chain
of intermediaries, and because of this, the overall lean chain between farm-to-factory was
fairly high which was affecting the freshness of the product as well as the net cost of the
produce. This is one of the reasons of substantially high post-harvest loss in India.
In addition to that, if any buyer has any specific requirement, say, dominos want any
specific variety of tomato, or if any company wants a specific variety of corn, and there was
no way they can get it produced. At the same time, corporate firms needed numbers. And
hence, Shashank and team focused initially, more on building farmers’ network side so that
an optimum volume could be produced first. Shashank explained:
[. . .] we are doing this much of volume of the product, but still we are buying from your local
dealer, can’t we have an institutional system or a centralized distribution system? With time, our
consistent efforts and growing volume, the perception changed. In fact, today we have direct tie-
ups with all input companies, and not just that, they are delivering their product to our node level
now. It means that there is no logistic cost we have to incur. They also believe in the model. They
also saw the value addition; they also saw how overall numbers are growing and at the same
time, solving the pain points.

He further elaborated:
Initially, we were the one who had to take care of everything, i.e. farm, farm level integration,
grading, sorting, entire logistics, and we also had to take care of entire transit risk. If they had to
supply corn to a particular company they had to supply it all the way from their nodes in Bihar to
Kharagpur or to Bhubaneswar. But again, with time, the companies realized that we are
consistent, and the volumes are growing. Then all output companies, in fact, we have more than
80 institutional buyers now, started buying from our warehouse because we could convince
them that is their strength, not ours. Just being consistent and being more and more efficient
concerning time changed the perception.

Dealing with competition

Shashank’s took on his company’s direct or indirect competitors slightly differently. There
are many indirect competitors in the market. There were a large number of input distributor
at district/state level, the so-called middlemen who are playing around arbitrage and cutting
across a significant share of farmer’s income. But that was taken care of by the farmers
themselves. Having the DeHaat center around, farmers believed that from day one, they got
to experience the difference, and there were no other service providers similar to or better
than DeHaat in their region. Looking at this business shift and to Shashank’s surprise, the
local traders offered to associate with DeHaat. Shashank said:
[. . .] in our inception years, we used to think that our DeHaat centers are competing with the local
input dealers, competing with the local aggregators, who are small individual based entities.
which purchase produce from the farmers. but concerning time [. . .] we observed that things
changed. and they came to us requesting for the creation of DeHaat center [. . .] so it was quite
difficult for us to understand that they used to be our competitors. why are they thinking for the
creation of DeHaat centers? [. . .] We thought about them and realized that they were just
individual entities without no institutional support [. . .][. . .] so we thought that why not imbibe

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 7

 them. so why not consider these people in the category of micro-entrepreneurs who are already
engaged in some agribusiness activity but on an individual level [. . .] so they should be included
in the value-chain.

In the past few years, a lot of agriculture-startups (some of them are listed in Exhibit 2) have
mushroomed up in the Indian market with their services available online and on mobile apps
as well. These startups have been delivering specific kinds of services in small regions.
Considering such kind of emerging business environment, Shashank commented:
[. . .] we don’t consider them as a type of competitor. In a way, we are helping each other. Since
the Indian market is huge (more than $400 billion markets). We need more such startups, more
organization. There are companies e.g. CropIn, AgroStar, Ninjacart etc but these companies are
focusing on specific value chain services like AgroStar which is working in Maharastra, is
working only on input and advisory; CropIn, a Bengaluru-based startup is working only on
advisory, Ninjacart is working only on the output part, and even within that output part, it is for
fruits and vegetables. So, they are either service specific or crop specific.

Explaining the unique value proposition of DeHaat in the market, he further explained:
Somehow, we at DeHaat are farmer specific. So, we have the unique proposition of end-to-end
or one-stop solution. That is our USP. Even if they enter a new area, say, Maharashtra or
Karnataka, we may not have first mover advantage, but we are equipped with a wide set of
offerings that individual farmers need. So, to deliver everything from day one is our plus point. At
the same time, we have to be efficient; we don’t have to ignore the competition for sure. Since we
have complete solution for the farmers so we believe that even in case of competition, we will
definitely be a preferred channel for farmer being a one-stop solution. So, we believe that
wherever be the competition or location, it will be the most prominent factor for the farmers to go
ahead.

The way ahead

Currently, there are more than 80 DeHaat outlets functional in three different States in India
serving more than 42,000 farmers. Shashank has targeted to cover with 11,20,000 farmers
in next five years which is more than 20 times of the present volume (Exhibit 9). Such an
exponential growth will be realized by increasing the number of DeHaat outlets, grooming
up a large number of microentrepreneurs, and extending the services to three other States,
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh in the next phase. The number of DeHaat
outlets is supposed to reach 2170 by 2021-2022 (Exhibits 9 and 10) maintaining an average
ratio of about 500 farmers per DeHaat center. Applying integrating artificial intelligence into
the DeHaat app is also an option to deliver smart advisory services with the least amount of
input. One of the key challenges is that of applying technology in typical rural environments
where there is a general lack of entrepreneurial mindset on one side and lack of
technological competence on the another. Shashank said:
In Bihar, the penetration level of smartphones is less than 12%. Even in relatively prosperous
western India, it is around 40%. Hypothetically, if every farmer had a smartphone, then our work
would have been much easier. Any farmer could have ordered from his own field; if he needed to
know the cure of a crop disease, he could have got the required information merely by sending
the photographs from his field. Their crops and agricultural practices could have been synced
with weather data. We have solutions but are not able to deliver it. Connectivity in rural areas has
improved a lot in last one and a half year, but the numbers are still very less [. . .].

India has a diverse socio-cultural background and a huge landscape. Farmer’s agricultural
practices and priorities highly vary across various regions due to changing climatic
conditions, soil quality and uneven landscapes. Therefore, customization of an interface
according to the local needs and developing technology-intensive services may also be
seen as an option for hassle frees extension. Commenting on possible adaptation of
DeHaatTM mobile App, Shashank said:

PAGE 8 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

 One is the language, and even the code has been written accordingly. The overall approach is
very much pictorial, based on machine leaning and artificial intelligence. Customization as per
location might not be required. Going forward, the feature that we are trying to develop in future
is that suppose one takes a picture of a tomato, the solutions will pop-up [. . .]. That the machine
learning will itself will lead to the suggestion rather than u needs to type anything. Thus,
basically, the approach is more inclined on the technology side to build a robust platform.

In the face of such challenges and looking at the future targets (Exhibit 9), the pace of
expansion does not seem to be an easy task. New technology and a wide range of app-based
services could certainly give a competitive lead over other players in the market at the early
Keywords:
stage. Local resources, language diversity, regional diversity in cropping pattern, lower level
Strategy,
of ICT access, trust, etc., are among the other issues which is equally challenging for all the Marketing,
players of the market and the first mover might have an edge over others. Entrepreneurship

Notes
1. Accessed on June 14, 2018, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=113796
2. India: The Impact of Mobile Phones: Accessed on June 14, 2018 www.icrier.org/pdf/
public_policy19jan09.pdf
3. Bihar stands at the lowest position among Indian according to the per capita net state domestic
product: report by research bank of India, Accessed on June 15, 2018, https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/
rdocs/Publications/PDFs/13SDP_240617EE2A8970184542E895DCE89D75A02259.PDF
4. Web Article, Accessed on June 14, 2018, https://yourstory.com/2016/08/green-agrevolution-
dehaat/
5. News Article, Accessed on June 15, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/2-IITians-turn-
down-lucrative-job-offers-tread-new-path-in-farming/articleshow/8990911.cms
6. A unit of land measurement: 1 Kattha is generally equal to 1,361 ft2 in Bihar (This area varies in
different States of India)
7. NABARD: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development; www.nabard.org/
8. Manish left the team in 2015 to pursue an idea of multi sectorial approach and started a not for profit
called back to village (B2V) in Odisha.
9. NABARD: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (www.nabard.org/)
10. Presently DeHaatTM has a recorded database of approximately 1,29,000 acres of land.
11. Singh (2018) earlier reported that operated land size of DeHaat farmers were significantly larger
than (3.71 acres vs 2.78 acres) than the non-DeHaat counterparts (2.78 acres) in Bihar.

References
Cole, S. and Sharma, G. (2017), “A report on ‘The promise and challenges of implementing ICT in Indian
agriculture’”, India Policy Forum, available at: www.ncaer.org/Events/IPF-2017/IPF-2017-Cole-Sharma-
Conf-vesion.pdf (accessed 14 June 2018).
Deshpandey, T. (2017), “86% of land holdings are less than 2 hectares, state of agriculture in India”, PRS
Report, available at: www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1517552563State%20of%
20Agriculture%20in%20India.pdf (accessed 15 June 2018).
E-Choupal (2018), available at: www.itcportal.com/businesses/agri-business/e-choupal.aspx (accessed
14 June 2018).
Indian Economic Survey (2018), Financial Express, available at: www.financialexpress.com/budget/
india-economic-survey-2018-for-farmers-agriculture-gdp-msp/1034266/ (accessed 14 June 2018).
Omidyar (2008), “Innovation for the next half billion”, available at: https://omidyar.com/sites/default/files/
file_archive/Next%20Half%20Billion/Innovating%20for%20Next%20Half%20Billion.pdf (accessed 14
June 2008).
Policy paper (2017), “Government of India”, http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/
DOUBLING%20FARMERS%20INCOME.pdf (accessed 14 June 2018).

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 9

 Exhibit 1. Access to agriculture advisory services

Table EI
Any Krishi Agricultural Private Radio, TV, Veterinary
Mobile advice Extension Vigyan University commercial Progressive newspaper, department NGO
Region (%) (%) (%) Kendra (%) (%) agents (%) farmer (%) internet (%) (%) (%)

All-India 98 41 6 3 1 8 21 21 8 1
Men – 41 7 3 1 8 20 21 8 1
Women – 40 6 3 1 8 21 20 8 2
Landholding <1 ha – 41 6 3 1 8 20 20 8 1
Landholding <2 ha – 57 15 5 2 10 31 31 16 2
Landholding >2 ha – 60 10 5 3 16 32 35 12 1
High agricultural
income – 39 6 3 1 8 20 21 7 1
Low agricultural
income – 43 7 3 2 9 22 21 10 2
Jammu & Kashmir 80 58 0 14 9 1 21 48 31 4
Himachal Pradesh 127 39 3 3 1 0 4 28 19 0
Punjab 110 51 3 6 11 19 15 24 27 0
Haryana 83 45 6 6 4 9 20 30 18 1
Rajasthan 82 27 3 2 0 4 15 10 3 0
Uttar Pradesh 72 27 1 3 1 8 11 12 3 1
Bihar 68 33 4 1 0 2 19 13 2 0
Assam 59 58 11 1 2 6 17 45 15 1
West Bengal 54 51 3 2 0 22 30 22 6 2
Orissa 69 36 10 2 0 5 22 13 6 1
Madhya Pradesh 81 38 3 1 0 2 20 17 4 1
Gujarat 100 49 7 5 3 4 39 22 9 2
Maharashtra 70 43 9 4 1 9 20 24 8 1
Andhra Pradesh 85 64 28 1 0 37 36 36 12 0
Karnataka 95 66 10 6 3 9 36 44 28 3
Kerala 99 65 14 22 1 2 16 52 21 1
Tamil Nadu 104 40 16 1 6 12 10 33 16 7
Source: Cole and Sharma (2017)

PAGE 10 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Exhibit 2. Agriculture start ups in India

Table EII
Name of Year of
No. start-up launch Nature of business/operations Key services Headquarters

1. Crofarm 2016 F2B (Farm to Business) venture Digitised agri-supply chain for fruits and Bengaluru
vegetables
2. Agrostar 2008 Utilization of technology and data to build Agricultural advisory and input supply for Pune
scalable systems and process farming
3. Aibono 2014 Farm Management-as-a-Service (Farm- Improves farm’s productivity and increases Bengaluru
related technology, expertise and gadgets earnings by helping sell the produce better
to farmers)
4. CropIn 2010 Provides farm management software and Improves financial, operational, and Bengaluru
mobile app enabling connected and data- agronomy aspects
driven farming
5. Ninjacart 2015 B2B Agri-marketing platform Cost-efficient, reliable and scalable supply Bengaluru
chain
6. Waycool 2015 Omnichannel fresh produce distribution Distributes fruits and vegetables to multiple Chennai
company end-use segments spanning small local
shops, modern retail outlets
7. EM3 Agri 2014 Farm mechanization services company, Offers entire range of interventions, from soil Noida
Services Farming-as-a-Service (FaaS) model preparation to harvesting
8. Intello 2016 Uses Artificial Intelligence and deep Proper grading of agricultural commodities, Bengaluru
Labs learning for crop quality parameters eliminating wastages, reducing crop losses
9. FarmLink 2014 End-to-end supply chain of fruits and Supplier of value-added fresh produce Mumbai
vegetables
10. Gramco 2010 Creating and leasing full service agri- Creates better market links for farmers Indore
Infratech infrastructure to the farmers
Pvt Ltd
11. Tessol 2013 Cold chain technology Eliminates the use of fossil fuel for cold chain Mumbai
transport systems, cost-saving
12. BigHaat 2015 Empowering farmers through an Purchase seeds, crop nutrients and Bengaluru
e-commerce platform solutions, and agro instruments online
13. Ravgo 2016 Agri-equipment rental marketplace Access to agri-equipment to all the farmers Gurgaon
Sources: 1. https://startup.siliconindiamagazine.com/ranking/10-best-startups-in-agriculture-solutions-rid-181.html; 2. https://yourstory.
com/2017/12/agri-tech-startups-trends/; 3. https://inc42.com/features/watchlist-agritech-startups-2018/; 4. www.thebetterindia.com/
125044/5-agri-startups-farmers/

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 11

 Exhibit 3. Growth of agriculture sector in India

Table EIII
Employment in agriculture Agriculture, value Adjusted net national Land under
as a percentage added as a income per capita Agricultural land cereal production
Year of total employment percentage of GDP (current US$) (% of land area) (million hectares)

2000 59.645 23.876 382.531 60.869 102.40

2001 60.262 23.773 389.606 60.705 100.271
2002 59.156 21.463 406.388 60.729 94.470
2003 58.608 21.512 471.693 60.625 98.608
2004 56.961 19.734 546.332 60.667 97.805
2005 55.998 19.508 619.225 60.583 99.519
2006 54.691 18.967 690.608 60.509 99.236
2007 53.678 18.933 888.382 60.413 100.833
2008 53.159 18.444 851.061 60.459 101.155
2009 52.378 18.395 955.865 60.564 97.171
2010 51.515 18.881 1,159.451 60.397 100.075
2011 48.808 18.527 1,259.543 60.430 100.625
2012 47.004 18.202 1,248.452 60.421 98.969
2013 46.660 18.589 1,254.242 60.439 99.299
2014 45.524 18.019 1,366.026 60.447 99.988
2015 44.362 17.462 1,380.033 60.447 99.533
2016 43.444 17.353 1,461.624 NA 98.474
2017 42.737 NA NA NA NA
Sources: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

Exhibit 4: Mobile internet penetration in India (millions)

Figure E1

PAGE 12 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Figure E2

Figure E3

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 13

 Exhibit 5. GAPL Team during formative years

Table EIV
Name Educational background Year of joining Key roles

Amrendra Singh
Adarsh Srivastav
Shyam Sundar Singh
Abhishek Dokania
Source: Provided by GAPL
B.Tech (Computer Engineering), NIT 2012 Agri-Input devision, expansion of DeHaat micro-
Jamshedpur ( 2011) entrepreneurs network
B.Tech , IIT -ISM Dhanbad (2012) 2013 Agri-output, post-harvest management
B.Tech, IIT Kharagpur & MBA , IIM 2013 Using technology and data to improve the efficiency
Ahmadabad of agri-supply chain
MBA, IIPM 2013 Agri-output, post-harvest management

Exhibit 6. Role of DeHaat services in different stages of agriculture production

Figure E4

PAGE 14 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Exhibit 7. The DeHaatTM App

Figure E5

List of services available on mobile applications:

䊏 crop manual;
䊏 crop monitoring;
䊏 agri input demand aggregation;
䊏 input dosage recommendation;
䊏 agri output procurement;
䊏 farmers’ enrolment; and
䊏 farmers’ social media.
Source: Provided by GAPL

Exhibit 8. Location of DeHaat centers- state and district wise

Table EV
State Node Number of DeHaat outlets

Bihar[11] Vaishali 32
Samastipur 16
Purnea 12
West Champaran 8
Bihar Sharif New Node, recently set up
UP Ghazipur 4
Varanasi New Node, recently set up
Odisha Mayurbhanj 2
Ganjam 2
Nuapada 8 FPOs
Source: Provided by GAPL

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 15

 Exhibit 9. Yearly membership and sales data

Table EVI
Year 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022

Number of 6300 16000 39000 147000 335000 567000 11,20,000

farmers
Revenue 7.5 11 21.6 60 193 392 740
(INR-CR)
Revenue Agri output, Agri output, Agri output, Agri output, Agri output, Input Agri output, Input Agri output, Input
stream Advisory Input & Input & Input & & Advisory, Credit & Advisory, Credit & Advisory, Credit
Advisory Advisory Advisory & other Agri value & other Agri value & other Agri value
added services added services added services
Source: Provided by GAPL

Exhibit 10. Annual growth in number of micro-entrepreneurs

Table EVII
Year 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022

Number of DeHaat 15 38 78 345 610 1270 2140

(Micro
entrepreneurs/
FPOs)
States Bihar Bihar, Bihar, Odisha, Bihar, Bihar, Bihar, Odisha, UP, Bihar, Odisha, UP,
Odisha Uttar Pradesh Odisha, UP Odisha, UP, Maharashtra, Maharashtra,
(UP) Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Rajasthan,
Rajasthan Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
Source: Provided by GAPL

About the authors

Aditya Sinha is a doctoral student in the Department of Extension Education at Bidhan
Chandra Krishi Viswa Vidyalaya, Nadia. He received his MSc in Extension Education from
BHU, Varanasi. Previously, he has also worked as an Assistant Professor-cum-Scientist in
the Department of Extension Education at Bihar Agricultural College, Sabour. His research
interests include digital technology, leadership development and teaching innovations.

Suresh Jha is a doctoral student working in management area in the Department of HSS at
IIT Ropar. Prior to this, he has completed his masters in mechanical engineering from IIT
Kanpur. Also, he has a rich industrial experience of working for more than six years in Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), the top energy company in India.

Dr Amritesh is an Assistant Professor (management area) in the Department of HSS at IIT

Ropar. He has significant academic exposure to interdisciplinary research including
projects funded by reputed agencies such as European commission and DRDO. His
research articles have appeared in International journals/conferences published by Taylor
& Francis, CUP, Springer, Emerald, IGI Global, IEEE & ACM’s conference proceedings.
Amritesh is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: amritesh@iitrpr.ac.in

PAGE 16 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Teaching notes
Aditya Sinha, Suresh Jha and Amritesh
The teaching plan is designed to be used with the case “Green Agrevolution Pvt Ltd” to help
the instructor encourage classroom discussion to enhance student comprehension on
strategic business issues concerned with the expansion of an app-based agri-business.

Case synopsis
In mid-2017-2018, a young entrepreneur Shashank, the CEO of Green Agrevolution Private
Limited (GAPL), was planning to expand his farmer’s network to 11,20,000 in next five years
from the present number of 42,000 in 2017-2018 fiscal year. GAPL along with its non-profit-
arm “Farms and Farmers (FnF)” started operating through its franchised physical nodes
“DeHaat” situated at remote locations in the remote villages of North India. Each of these
DeHaat centers depends on a local microentrepreneur who runs the center and extend the
services at the farm level. These microentrepreneurs are provided with a smartphone with a
preinstalled DeHaatTM app. This app is the technological backbone of this service model
and differentiates it from other app-based agri-services in India. Shashank and his team
have kept collecting farm level data and generated rich insights to make their practices
more efficient, structured, and scalable. The case explored the role of these DeHaat
centers and its technological backbone DeHaatTM app, described as how it has disrupted
the conventional value chain and became able to provide a profitable market linkage to the
farmers. DeHaat has emerged as an influential actor in the Agri-value chain, and Shashank
is now thinking of replicating the same model at thousands of other locations in India in the
next five years to realize his goal. Presently, the majority of their service nodes are located in
Bihar, which is one of the economically most backward states of India. Other states may
have local environmental barriers such as scarce local resources, a different coring pattern,
lack of entrepreneurial mindset and lower level of ICT access. Shashank has been
successful with its strategy centered around DeHaat model, and one cannot deny the
enormous potential in technology. Will he be able to replicate the same model in other
states at an exponentially high rate?

Target audience
This case is about ICT-enabled value chain innovation, which is suited for senior
undergraduate and postgraduate students, entrepreneurs and executives. The data are
collected by conducting interviews with Shashank, the CEO of GAPL, who happens to be
the main protagonist of this case. The case faithfully represents the early challenges faced
by the protagonist, appreciates his successful efforts in the mid-term expansion, captures
the details of the current situation and projects future milestones to explore the available
strategic options.
The case integrates with multiple topic areas for mainstream courses in business strategy,
marketing, social entrepreneurship, e-Commerce. Instructors may use a variety of concepts
such as industry analysis frameworks, business model design, marketing strategy and
value chain innovation in this case. Students should be familiar with the fundamentals of
business strategy and marketing. They may apply the value chain analysis framework,
Porter’s industry analysis framework, VRINE framework, and segmentation and targeting
concepts.

Learning objectives
The prime objective of this case is to introduce learners to a successful agri-start-up where
they can explore the existing challenges and critical strategic decisions for the firm’s
growth. More specifically, the case is designed to fulfill the following learning requirements:
䊏 to understand and analyze the opportunities and challenges associated with an ICT-
based agri-business start-up in a rural set-up by applying well-known frameworks;
䊏 to select an appropriate method of analysis of internal and external business
environment; and
䊏 to identify the unique opportunities and design innovative propositions around it to
address segment specific needs.

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 17

 Assignment questions

Q1. What is the scenario of agriculture sector in India? What opportunities does it provide
for a technology-based startup? What are the challenges? (Instructor may suggest
the usage of PESTLE and SWOT analysis frameworks at this stage)
Q2. What are the various characteristics of DeHaat service platform? How did it create
value for the farmers?
Q3. What is the level of competition in the existing and target market for GAPL? Apply
Porter’s five forces and analysis to explain how did GAPL deal with the competition
from old value chain actors?
Q4. Will Shashank be able to reach out the other states of India as planned pace with the
existing resources and capabilities?

Teaching plan
A 60 min teaching plan may be designed to teach the case in the following stages.

Stage 1: Macro analysis of agri-business environment in India (15 min)

The discussion can be initiated with the analysis of agriculture scenario in India, the
macroeconomic aspects, trends in GDP, use of ICT and new agri start-ups. The instructor
may use the Agriculture Statistics presented in PRS Report (URL is mentioned in case
footnote no. 7), along with the data shown in Exhibits 1 and 10. Agriculture Statistics report
from the Ministry of Agriculture, available at the government of India website (https://eands.
dacnet.nic.in/PDF/Glance-2016.pdf) may also be used as a reference source. The
instructor may use PEST analysis in this session to describe the external environment of
agri-business and lead it towards analysis of opportunities and challenges.

Stage 2: Value chain analysis of DeHaat (Exhibit 11) (10 min)

Instructure may use Porter’s value chain analysis framework to explain DeHaat center’s
competence and propositions. Instructor me explain the network of actors and nature of
interactions among them before and after the intervention of DeHaat model.

Stage 3: Industry analysis using Porter’s five forces framework (Exhibit 12) (15 min)
The instructor may explain the competitive forces in the agri-business market in the context
of DeHaat and transformation of relationships among value chain actors. The details of
specific points are mentioned in Exhibit 12.

Stage 4: Analysis of internal resources and capabilities, discussion and wrap up (Exhibit 13)
(20 min)
The instructor may adopt the perspective of resource-based view of a firm along with VRINE
framework to analyze vital resources and capabilities such as DeHaat app, DeHaat
franchisee, Knowledge, Market linkage, etc., to evaluate the competitive status of the
company. The discussion can be referred back to Porter’s value chain analysis. A question
can be put up the in class that exploiting which of the existing resources or capabilities
should be on the top priority to attain sustained competitive advantage? The instructor
should lead the discussion towards factors, which could raise the difficulty of imitating the
resources and capabilities. Four key resources are of prime concern: DeHaat app, DeHaat
franchisee, Knowledge, Network of corporate brands, (Exhibit 13) advocating their
relevance for competition.
Creating DeHaat franchisee as a local resource center has provided a way for GAPL to
deliver doorstep services through trained micro-entrepreneurs. Identifying and preparing
micro-entrepreneurs for the assigned role is a difficult job for GAPL. Shashank has also
attempted to ensure regular cash flow for the micro-entrepreneurs by addressing the
seasonal variations in demand. The initial capital required by the micro-entrepreneurs
further create an exit barrier for them. This will undoubtedly act as a source of competitive
advantage in the Northern Indian States assuming that other modes of direct service
channels are not being explored. FPOs could be one possible option to use as a channel of

PAGE 18 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

service delivery, which may be targeted by other agri-business firms. Thus, having DeHaat
franchisee as the only channel may not ensure long-term competitive advantage in the
proposed expansion plan in the other states of India. The instructor may discuss an
alternative situation that if other agri-business competitors targets the network of big
corporate brands (of output market) then how will GAPL save its stake.
Shashank may always bargain to have a significant share in the network of corporate
brands by offering rich farm level knowledge. This is a unique knowledge resource of its
type, which is hard to be replaced by any other firm in the future. The range of services
available on the DeHaat app makes it easier to outperform any other existing agri-business
firm (see Case Exhibits 2 and 6) in any new market where farmers are the prime beneficiary.
One can argue that Shashank has two key resources: Rich farm level data and a 360˚
service platform, which provides a sustainable competitive advantage in the present
market, and it may also help in expanding in the new markets as well.

Relevant readings

䊏 Carpenter, M.A. and Sanders, W.G. (2006), “Strategic management: a dynamic

perspective, concepts, and cases”.
䊏 Dierickx, I. and Cool, K. (1989), “Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of
competitive advantage”, Management Science, Vol. 35 No. 12, pp. 1504-1511.
䊏 Porter, M.E. (2008), “The five competitive forces that shape strategy”, Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 86 No. 1, pp. 25-40.
䊏 Porter, M.E. (2011), Competitive Advantage of Nations: Creating and Sustaining
Superior Performance, Simon and Schuster, Vol. 2.
䊏 Porter, M.E. and Millar, V.E. (1985), “How information gives you competitive
advantage”.
䊏 Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2001), A Handbook for Value Chain Research, IDRC,
Ottawa, Vol. 113.
䊏 Ardichvili, A., Cardozo, R. and Ray, S. (2003), “A theory of entrepreneurial
opportunity identification and development”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18
No. 1, pp. 105-123.
䊏 Osterwalder, A., Pigneur, Y., Bernarda, G. and Smith, A. (2014), Value Proposition
Design: How to Create Products and Services Customers Want, John Wiley & Sons.
䊏 Pokorná, J., Pilar, L., Balcarová, T. and Sergeeva, I. (2015), “Value proposition canvas:
identification of pains, gains and customer jobs at farmers’ markets”, AGRIS on-line
Papers in Economics and Informatics, Vol. 7 No. 4, p. 123.
䊏 Singh, S. (2018), “Agro-franchising for farm input and market linkage delivery: a case
study from Bihar”, Institutional Innovations in the Delivery of Farm Services in India,
Springer, New Delhi, pp. 161-228.
䊏 Chand, R. (2017), “Doubling farmer’s income: rationale, strategy, prospects and action
plan”, NITI Policy paper, Government of India, 2017, available at: http://niti.gov.in/
writereaddata/files/document_publication/DOUBLING%20FARMERS%20INCOME.pdf

VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 19

 Exhibit 11. The DeHaat value chain

Figure E6

PAGE 20 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

 Table EVIII
Forces
Rivalry
Competitors
Industry growth
Differentiation
Degree of transparency
Sustainable competitive advantage
through innovation
Level of advertising expense
Threat of new entrants
Farmer’s switching cost
Economies of scale
Industry profitability
Brand Identity
Access to distribution channels
Threat of substitutes
Availability of close substitutes
Farmer’s propensity to substitutes
Perceived service differentiation
VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019
Relative Price performance of the
substitutes
Bargaining power of customers
Number of customers
Availability of substitutes
Customer’s profitability
Customer information availability
Bargaining power of suppliers
Supplier’s switching cost
Distribution Channel strength
Number of suppliers
Availability of substitutes (of supplies)
The degree of differentiation of inputs
Industry’s importance to supplier
j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 21
Score
(1-5 scale) Remark
Nature of competition that firms strive for advantage over their rivals
A scattered market with little or not much competition, Growth of App-based Agri-services is likely to increase
the competition in future.
Great prospect for industry growth in line with the emergence of new players. Over 20 agriculture start-ups have
come up in recent years.
Differentiation regarding services offered through mobile applications, e.g., DeHaat application.
Terms of trade are highly formalized and easy to monitor through the DeHaat App.
Exhibit 12. Porter’s five forces
Offering 3600 services to the farmers from seed to market. Use of mobile application for placing orders,
agriculture-knowhow, customized crop advisory services, market information, etc.
Low; mostly through word-of-mouth of member farmers and collaborative partners, local workshops and training
of micro-entrepreneurs.
New entrants lead to a decrease in profitability for other firms in the industry
Switching costs are low for the consumer (farmers can shift to another supplier at ease without incurring much
loss). Switching cost for the micro-entrepreneur is also low since the amount invested for the purchase of inputs
is easily recoverable from the sale. There is no lock-in amount either for the farmer or the micro-entrepreneur.
Scale-economies are leading to better bargaining power for input demand and output supply.
High. As the entire sector is supposed to grow in terms of GDP.
Low, yet to invest in brand building.
Conventional distribution channels were inefficient. DeHaat has introduced itself as a new channel of Agri-trade.
Greater threat of substitutes poses lesser attractiveness for the incumbent
Low.
Low. Substitutes are mainly input dealers and middlemen which provide expensive and incomplete services
forcing the farmers to depend on multiple sources.
Highly differentiated services regarding quality and completeness.
Low, as they deliver more expensive services than DeHaat.
High bargaining power of customers results in low attractiveness for incumbent
Large. Farming is the main source of income in the villages.
Low. Substitutes do not offer complete end-to-end solutions
High because of the very objective of DeHaat model.
Information is easily accessible through DeHaat App.
Greater bargaining power of suppliers means less attractiveness for the incumbent.
High, farm-level information is something that they can’t ignore.
High because of the spread of DeHaat’s network.
Low. Suppliers are mainly restricted to input dealerships
Low for most of the combinations.
Low. There are very few prominent brands.
Important for suppliers’ business
 Figure E7

Industri
Rivalry
(Low)

Bargaining
Threat of
power of
sunstitutes
customers
(Low)
(Low)
DeHaat

Bargaining
Threat of
power of
new entrants
Suppliers
(Moderate)
(Low)

Exhibit 13. VRINE framework

Table EIX
Competitive
Resource Value Rarity Inimitable Non-substitutable Exploitable outcome?

DeHaat app- High value: App-based Not much difficult to Not easily Very effective in Sustainable
based Efficient and services are not imitate (until left substitutable once collecting farm level competitive
services effective services rare, but an unpatented) if supply you get the first data along with other advantage
integrated 360˚ chain actors are ready mover advantage services
solution is unique to collaborate
DeHaat An important rural Such franchise Yes, this a common There are other Very much so for Temporary
Franchisee/ touch point to models are not franchisee model for available alternatives multiple purposes advantage
Microentre deliver services very rare service extension such as FPOs, PACS,
preneurs and other agriculture
co-operative
organizations
Knowledge Knowledge Yes, such Difficult to imitate Farm-level local Yes, particularly for Sustainable
(Rich volume derived from farm knowledge is not knowledge is the key designing crop Competitive
of farm data) level insights is easy to get in resource for GAPL diagnostic & advisory Advantage
the prime aggregated form which is hard to services, Creates
resources substitute R&D opportunities for
input companies,
Demand forecasting,
etc
A network of Key actors to It is a B2B Depends on the Not substitutable at Yes, to scale up the Competitive
big corporate provide market condition where bargaining power, least in the domestic supplies & sales parity
brands linkage not many players which is currently in market. GAPL may
are there, and a GAPL’s favor due to its further look at the
first mover may access & control over international markets
always get an farm level data (a as well to form new
advantage critical input for brands) networks

PAGE 22 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 9 NO. 1 2019

Abstract
Title – Green Agrevolution Pvt Ltd: delivering 360˚ ‘‘seed-to-market’’ solution.
Learning outcomes – The purpose of this paper is to introduce learners to a successful Agri-start-up
where they can explore the existing challenges and critical strategic decisions for the firm’s growth.
Case overview/synopsis – Shashank, the CEO and co-founder of an agriculture-based Indian start-up
Green Agrevolution Pvt Ltd (GAPL), is planning to reach out to more than one million farmers by 2021-
2022, which is more than 20 times of the present volume. His team is presently serving around 42,000
farmers with a home-grown technological platform DeHaat which provides end–to-end services right
from seed to the market. Micro-entrepreneurs are selected and groomed to act as local touchpoints for
farmers in the respective catchment areas ranging from 3 to 5 km. Shashank has been a recipient of
multiple accolades and recognition and is now firmly seated to drive his start-up to the next level of growth
and pan-India market penetration. The venture also requires an understanding of segment-specific
needs, cropping pattern, using local resources and channelizing the advisory services to occupy a
central role in the value chain. There are other impending issues such as low smartphone adoption, low
internet access and lack of entrepreneurial mindset among the rural youth. Similar issues were relatively
backward states of India with little or no provision of app-based services. Will he be successful to expand
on such a high pace in other States with the existing resources and capabilities?
Complexity academic level – Senior undergraduate and Master’s level business students
Supplementary materials – Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Please contact your
library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.
Subject code – CSS 11: Strategy

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