EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN (MAJORITY VIEW, DECEMBER

7, 1889)
CONSOLACION MIJARES, plaintiff and appellant, VS. DELFINA NERY ET
AL., defendants and appellees.
G.R. No. 1380, January 18, 1904
Ponente: Torres, J.

DOCTRINE:
In the determination of natural children, the principal basis is the Civil Code
of Spain which became effective in the Philippines on December 7, 1889. In
the case at a bar, A natural child may be acknowledged by the father and
mother jointly or by only one of them." Article 131 prescribes the form in
which the acknowledgment of the natural child should be made. This
acknowledgment is to a certain extent one of the rights of the natural child
with respect to his parents, who are obliged to make such acknowledgment in
the cases respectively set forth in articles 135 and 136 of the code, which
became operative in these Islands on December 7, 1889, twenty days after
its publication, which took place on the 17th of November of the same year.

FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by means of a bill of exceptions by the plaintiff,
Consolacion Mijares y Borromeo, daughter of Don Mariano Mijares, against the
decision of April 11, 1903, rendered in favor of the defendants Delfina Nery,
Carmen Mijares y Nery, and others, with the costs. Don Mariano Mijares died
in the Province of Albay leaving property of the estimated value of 80,000
pesos. The deceased at the time of his death had no legitimate heirs,
descendant or ascendant, but left a daughter, Consolacion Mijares, born in
1862 out of wedlock, although legally recognized as a natural child. He
likewise left five other daughters born in like manner of Delfina Nery, who was
a niece of the deceased, which said five daughters, who were born
successively from the year 1862 until 1889, were acknowledged expressly and
tacitly by Don Mariano Mijares during his lifetime as his own daughters.

Acting on the supposition that Don Mariano Mijares died intestate, the plaintiff,
Consolacion Mijares y Borromeo, alleging that she is the sole natural daughter
of the deceased recognized by him, and that he left no legitimate descendants
or ascendants, contends that she is the sole heir to her father's estate by
reason of the fact that the five defendants, daughters of Delfina Nery, a niece
of her said father, are illegitimate daughters, without the status of natural
children under law 11 of Toro, in force on the date of the birth of said
defendants, she therefore brought suit to be declared the sole universal heir
ab intestate to her father's estate, and asks judgment in her favor as to the
ownership and possession of the hereditary property held by the defendants,
praying that they be ordered to make delivery thereof to her.

The defendants opposed this claim, alleging that although it is true that the
daughters of the deceased by his niece Delfina Nery, being illegitimate, could
not enjoy the status of natural children under law 11 of Toro in force at the
time of their birth, nevertheless under the Civil Code, which became operative
in the Philippine Islands in 1880, they acquired the status of natural children,
entitled to inherit, because they were acknowledged by their late father, and
because, according to a will and codicil executed by the deceased during his
lifetime, they were entitled to the several parts of the estate therein
bequeathed to them, since the deceased had instituted all his daughters as
his heirs in equal parts.

ISSUE:
W/N the defendants have obtained the status of natural children, according to
article 119 of the code and are entitled to inherit?

RULING:
YES. The old law governing the natural children has been modified by the Civil
Code, which has confined to the time of conception the period at which the
parents must be free to marry, with or without dispensation.

Article 119 of the Civil Code says: "Only natural children may be legitimized.
Natural children are those born out of wedlock of parents who at the time of
the conception of the children could have married with or without
dispensation."

According to Article 119, in order to determine whether a child born out of

wedlock is or is not a natural child, it is necessary to consider only the time of
its conception that is to say, to determine whether during any one of the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred preceding the birth of the
child the parents were qualified to marry with or without dispensation,
applying article 108, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code in the determination of the
time of conception.

Article 129 of the Civil Code provides: "A natural child may be acknowledged
by the father and mother jointly or by only one of them." Article 131 prescribes
the form in which the acknowledgment of the natural child should be made.
This acknowledgment is to a certain extent one of the rights of the natural
child with respect to his parents, who are obliged to make such
acknowledgment in the cases respectively set forth in articles 135 and 136 of
the code, which became operative in these Islands on December 7, 1889,
twenty days after its publication, which took place on the 17th of November
of the same year. The plaintiff and the five sisters, defendants, were born out
of wedlock, and were acknowledged by Don Mariano Mijares, their father, as
his daughters.

It is indisputable that the legal relations and the rights originated from the
birth of the defendants and from their acknowledgment by their father, facts
which took place under the former law, are to be determined by the Civil Code
by virtue of paragraph 2 of rule 1 of the transitory provisions above cited.

The five daughters of Mijares with his niece, Nery, acquired the status of
natural children by virtue of article 119 of the Civil Code, because at the time
of their conception the disability of their illegitimate parents to marry might
have been removed by means of a dispensation, which in fact they
subsequently obtained. This right to the status of natural children of their
father who acknowledged them expressly and tacitly, was unknown to the
former law, inasmuch as said law 11 of Toro required as a condition that the
parents of a natural child should be qualified to marry at the time of the
conception or the birth thereof, without dispensation, and it therefore results
that it is a new right for the first time declared by the Civil Code in article 119
cited.

Hence, the defendants have obtained the status of natural children according
to the article 119 of the Civil Code.
EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN (MAJORITY VIEW, DECEMBER
7, 1889)
MARIA COSIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, V. ANTONINO AND
JESUSPILI, defendants-appellees.
G.R. NO. L-3720. FEBRUARY 3, 1908
Ponente: TORRES, J.

DOCTRINE:
NATURAL CHILDREN; SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF PARENTS. — Children born
of the union of a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, both
being single and free and qualified to marry each other, either before or after
the birth of the children, are undoubtedly natural children, and by the
marriage of their parents must be considered as children legitimized by
subsequent marriage.

FACTS:
The lawyer for Maria Cosio filed a petition requesting that letters of
administration for the property of the late Tomas Cosio becaused the deceased
has no ascendants or desendants but only collateral heirs an did not executed
any will. At the time of the death of the deceased, he owned three parcels of
land and two carabaos.

By a writing dated August 23, 1905, Elena Cosio, sister to the deceased, stated
that she neither could nor did she claim to be heir to her late brother, Tomas
Cosio, because the latter left children had with his wife, Leocadia Pili, also
deceased, said children being named Antonino and Jesus Cosio;

Antonino and Jesus Cosio, both of age, also filed a petition stating that they
were the natural sons duly acknowledged and legitimized by subsequent
marriage, of Tomas Cosio and Leocadia Pili, both deceased, and that for said
reason the statement of Maria Cosio to the effect that their late father left no
direct descendants but only collateral relatives was false, because the
petitioners were the only ones entitled to the intestate inheritance of their
father, and, citing the first paragraph of section 782 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, asked that they be granted a hearing for the taking of the evidence
that they proposed to produce in support of their respective rights, and that
they be declared the only heirs of Tomas Cosio, deceased, and that after all
the formalities of the law should have been complied with, the administrator,
Pamilacan, or his successor, deliver to them all the property of the deceased
which might be in his possession.

ISSUE:
W/N the above-mentioned Antonino and Jesus were really natural children?

RULING:
Yes. It is to be noticed that the birth of the said Antonino and Jesus took place
many years before the Civil Code, which went into force on December 7, 1889,
was promulgated in these Islands, and, therefore, the rights acquired by them
under the shelter of the former legislation are regulated by and just be judged
in accordance therewith; the provisions of the said Civil Code cannot be
applied retroactively in so far as they are prejudicial to them. (Rule 1 of the
transitory instructions.)

Although the question herein refers solely to the intestate estate of Tomas
Cosio, it should be taken into account that it is of record, and the judge has
so considered it in his decision, that Leocadia Pili was unmarried when she
gave birth, on the 14th of May, 1879, to her natural son Antonino, and on the
17th of June, 1882, to her other son Jesus; that for a number of years prior
to the birth of her said children she was living with Tomas Cosio, as his wife,
in the barrio of San Juan, Santa Cruz, the capital of La Laguna, and that after
living together during long years they were married on the 27th of May, 1889.
It is inferred from these facts that the two sons born while they lived together
as husband wife had the condition of natural children afterwards legitimized
by subsequent marriage. (Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV, and articles 119 et seq.
of the Civil Code.)

The certainty and reality of the natural filiation as the fundamental basis for
the rights of a child born out of wedlock requires the recognition by his
parents, which, according to Law XI of Toro, now Law I, Title V, Book X of the
Novisima Recopilacion, is its conditional complement.

EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN (MAJORITY VIEW, DECEMBER

7, 1889)
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALDECOA
AND COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
G. R. No. 6098, August 12, 1911
Ponente: Torres, J.

DOCTRINE:

PUBLIC LANDS; SEASHORE LANDS; LAW OF WATERS. — All lands thrown up

by the sea and formed upon the shore by the action of the water, together
with the adjacent shore, belong to the national domain and are for public uses,
in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 the
sole law which governs in these Islands, after laws 3 and 4, title 28, partida
3, in relation with the provisions of the Civil Code, Art. 339 and Art. 341.

FACTS:
On April 20, 1907, the Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Surigao against the firm of Aldecoa & Co., alleging that it
continues to operate as such mercantile co-partnership company under the
name of Aldecoa & Co.; The said defendant, knowing that it had no title or
right whatever to two adjoining parcels of land, which belong to the domain
of the Government of the United States and were placed under the
administration and control of the Government of these Islands, has been
occupying them illegally for the past seventeen years— all for its exclusive use
and benefit;

These lands, situated in Bilang-bilang, in the pueblo of Surigao and the

province of the same name, belonged to the late Spanish Government in the
Philippines and are now the property of the Government of the United States
and were placed under the control of the Insular Government. The defendant,
has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in representation of
the Insular Government, to recognize the latter’s right of dominion over the
same and to deliver to it the said property, and that, by reason of such
demands, Aldecoa & Co., on February 25, 1903, recognizing the Insular
Government’s ownership, agreed to return the land, but that later, after
several delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally to continue
occupying the said land and refused to return it to the Insular Government;
Counsel for the defendant, Aldecoa & Co alleged that it held and possessed,
as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over. The demand of the
representative of the Government is for the recovery of possession of two
united parcels of land, belonging to the public use and domain, which are at
present occupied by the defendant Aldecoa & Co. The latter claims to have the
full and absolute ownership of the said land and to have held it as owner since
1889, by virtue of a verbal permit from the politico-military governor of
Surigao.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such parcels of land are considered public dominion and
defendant has no right in the said parcels of land?

RULING:
Yes. The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7,
1889, the twentieth day of its publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the 17th
of November of the same year, confirms the provisions of the said Law of
Waters, since, in its article 339, it prescribes that:

"Property of public ownership is —

"1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads,
and that of a similar character."

Article 341 of the same code provides:

"Property of public ownership, when no longer devoted to general uses or to

the requirements of the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
State property."

The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be
devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion
of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for
public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the
State, such lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent
thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to
the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance
with the provision of article 1936 of the Civil Code.
It is, then, incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain
and belongs to the State, inasmuch as at the present time it is partly shore
land and in part, was such formerly, and now is land formed by the action of
the sea.

Excluding the space occupied by Bates Avenue, that lies between the
defendant’s buildings and the shore and the lands added to the latter by the
action of the sea in the sitio called Bilang-bilang, all this said land, together
with the adjacent shore, belongs to the public domain and is intended for
public uses. So that the defendant, in constructing on the two aforementioned
parcels of land a retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for
the storage of coal, for its exclusive use and benefit, did all this without due
and competent authority and has been illegally occupying the land since 1889.
EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN (MAJORITY VIEW, DECEMBER
7, 1889)
BARETTO, ET. AL. V. TUASON, ET. AL.
G.R. Nos. L-36811, 36827, 36840, 36872 March 31, 1934
Ponente: Imperial, J.

DOCTRINE:
CONTRACTS OF SALE; ACTION OF ANNULMENT; PRESCRIPTION. — The action
of annulment instituted and relied upon by the impugners of the sales of their
participations has already prescribed, both under the Laws of the Partidas and
the Novisima Recopilacion and under the provisions of the Civil Code

FACTS:
For the third time, there is presented for the consideration of the mayorazgo
founded by the deceased Don Antonio Tuason. It is brought about by four
appeals taken by the defendants and some intervenors from certain portions
of the decision and order rendered by the court during the new trial held
pursuant to our resolution of which we shall hereafter have occasion to speak.
The properties of the mayorazgo consist of the Haciendas de Santa Mesa y
Diliman, Hacienda de Mariquina, and two urban properties situated on Rosario
Street, Manila.

The appellants in G.R. L-36811 are the brother and sisters Benito, Consuelo,
and Rita, surnamed Legarda y de la Paz. These intervenors claim participations
in one-fifth of the properties in two capacities: First, as descendants of the
younger son Pablo Tuason, and, second, for having inherited from their
parents the participations in one- fifth of the properties which were sold to the
latter by certain relatives of the founder. Records shows enumeration of the
deeds with names of the vendors of their participations in favor of the parents
of the appellants. Of the said sales, only those executed by the following were
impugned: (1) Isabel Arenas; (2) Tomasa Tuason de Tobias; (3) Luis Tuason
and Pedro Tuason; (4) Alejandro, Anacleto, Teodorico, Maria, and Dionisia,
surnamed Camacho y Tuason, and Tomas, Encarnacion, Maria, and Mercedes,
surnamed Macaranas y Tuason; (5) Felipe G. Alcalde, and (6) Teodora
Eizmendi. The impugners of the sales are relatives of the vendors who would
be entitled to succeed them in their respective participations.
In support of their contention, the appellants advance the following reason,
one of which is that the present action of the impugners to invalidate the sales
as to one-half thereof has already prescribed

ISSUE:
W/N the action to impugne the sales of participation has already prescribed?

RULING:
Yes. It will be recalled that the deed of sale of the participation of Tomasa
Tuason de Tobias was executed on October 3, 1888, and the sale of those of
the brothers Luis and Pedro Tuason on April 7, 1886; the complaints of
intervention which assailed the validity of the sales of said participations for
the first time were filed in 1927, hence, approximately forty-one years have
elapsed from the first sale to the date its validity was questioned for the first
time, and about thirty years from the execution of the second sale to the said
date.

The right now exercised by the impugners of the sales is a personal action
whose prescription should be governed by the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the deeds of sale, as provided in Article 1939 of present Civil
Code.

"ART. 1939. Prescription which began to run before the publication of this
Code shall be governed by the prior law; but if, after this Code took effect, all
the time required by the same for prescription has elapsed, it shall be
sufficient even if according to such prior law a longer period of time would
have been required."

And article 1301 of the same Code provides:

"ART. 1301. The action of annulment shall last four years.
XXX
According to these provisions, the action of annulment, admitting that it had
not yet prescribed when the Civil Code took effect in these Islands on
December 7, 1889 (Mijares v. Nery, 3 Phil., 195), should have been
commenced by the impugners of the sales within the four (4) years following
the taking effect of the Civil Code, which was not done.
EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN (MINORITY VIEW, DECEMBER
8, 1889)
BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA
G.R. NO. L-1056 December 8, 1903
Ponente: Willard, J.

DOCTRINE: GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE. — The law now in force in the

Philippine Islands as to grounds for divorce is to be found in the partidas, and
the only cause authorizing divorce is adultery.

FACTS:
This is an action for divorce alleging abandonment and adultery as grounds.
The court below assumed that the provisions of the Civil Code relating to
divorce, contained in title 4 of book 1, are still in force.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891. Both were happily living
together until August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous
warning, took his wife to the house of her parents and left her there. It was
found out that in plaintiff’s complaint for separation, she charges defendant of
committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower courts believed such
adulterous acts committed by the defendant. On the part of the defendant
however, he stated that the reason why he left his wife was because he
received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a Spanish civil
guard named Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff
regarding the said letter, she admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon
her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day he took her to the
home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. The mother
testified that about a year after her daughter was returned to her she heard
that the defendant believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the
plaintiff on account of a certain letter.

ISSUE:
W/N the Courts of First Instance now have jurisdiction of divorce cases, and if
they have, on what law it is based?
RULING:
Yes. Courts of First Instance is now vested jurisdiction over matrimonial
causes which was vested previously in the ecclesiastical court during Spanish
regime.
Titles 4 and 12 of book 1 of the Civil Code, which deal respectively with
matrimony and the register of civil status, are not in force, they having been
suspended by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands shortly
after the extension of the Civil Code to this Archipelago. The Court of First
instance was in error to apply it thinking it was still in force. The law now in
force in the Philippine Islands as to grounds for divorce is to be found in the
partidas, and the only cause authorizing divorce is adultery.

It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: “For the sin of

each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.” The
Court’s conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce.
Section 497 authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such findings upon
the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require." The
judgment below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts:
The allegations of the complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to
the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are true as therein stated
except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo. The
plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental
Negros, committed adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard. As
conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled
to judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the
plaintiff take nothing by her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and
that neither party recover of the other any costs either in this court or the
Court of First Instance.
EFFECTIVITY OF CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN (MINORITY VIEW, DECEMBER
8, 1889)
MARIANO VELOSO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ANICETA
FONTANOSA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-4874, March 2, 1909
Ponente: Arellano, CJ.

DOCTRINE:
COMPUTATION OF PRESCRIPTION. – It therefore follows that in computing
the time for prescription from said date it would be necessary to take into
consideration the fact that the Civil Code was not yet in force, as it did not
become effective until December 8, 1889, and that, at that time, the period
for the prescription of personal actions, such as the one at issue, by law 5,
title 8, book 11, of the Novisima Recopilacion, was twenty years

FACTS:
This case was brought by means of a bill of exceptions to this court for a
revision of the facts and evidence. A complaint was filed with Court of Instance
of Cebu. ) Mariano Veloso, et. al are the sole lawful heirs of Gavino Veloso and
Buenaventura Veloso, their father and brother respectively. The defendants
are Aniceta Fontanosa, as widow of Roberto Ancajas, and Florentina, Leona,
Maria, Juan, Romualda, Vicenta, and Felix, all of the surname of Ancajas, the
lawful children of the deceased Roberto, and Estefania Fontanosa, mother and
legal guardian of the minor Jose Ancajas. At the death of Gavino Veloso,
Roberto Ancajas owed him the sum of 5,065 pesos which he had borrowed
prior to the year 1881. The debt before the death of Buenaventura Veloso, the
debt was amounted to 11,722.43 pesos. And that on the death of Veloso, the
defendants, as his sole and lawful heirs, inherited, and that same year divided
between them all his property with the exception of the above-mentioned
credit, which is at present held pro indiviso between them, and they, as the
lawful heirs of Buenaventura Veloso, the creditor, have repeatedly called upon
the defendants to pay the said credit, but the latter have constantly refused
to do so, thus having rise to the filing of the complaint.

Answering the complaint, the defendant alleged that this supposed right of
action had prescribed before the action was instituted.
The trial judge said that the defendants are liable for the payment of the sum
of P11,722.43 to the plaintiffs, in their capacity of heirs, to Buenaventura
Veloso, for the debt contracted in his favor by their late principal Roberto
Ancajas, and which debt was acknowledged and admitted by them.

ISSUE:
W/N the action instituted by plaintiff-appellees already prescribed?

RULING:
No. It has been proven that on the 11th of October, 1883, Roberto Ancajas
acknowledged that a balance of 10,449.18 pesos was standing against him;
that since that time he has received and paid amounts in connection with said
obligation, the last payment being made "shortly before his death in 1888,"
that is, on May 5, 1888. It therefore follows that in computing the time for
prescription from said date it would be necessary to take into consideration
the fact that the Civil Code was not yet in force, as it did not become effective
until December 8, 1889, and that, at that time, the period for the prescription
of personal actions, such as the one at issue, by law 5, title 8, book 11, of the
Novisima Recopilacion, was twenty years, which period should expire in 1908,
so that when the complaint herein was presented in 1906, the term had not
expired; therefore, we have not to consider the legal interruption of a term
which has not yet expired, as in the present case the question is one of a
period of prescription that commenced before the enforcement of the Civil
Code, which period, by the terms of the article 1939 of the said code, must
be governed by the laws then in force.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY OF NEW CIVIL CODE – AUGUST 30, 1950

LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954
Ponente: Montemayor, J.

DOCTRINE:
As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce,
article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed
said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce
governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new
Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official
Gazette.

FACTS:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs
or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of “Waval Taxi.” He
employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the
latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September
4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance
notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation
company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs
above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to
continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del
Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight
hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada)
provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of
their former employer to give them one month notices. Subsequently, the
three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers
remained as plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime
compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid?

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of
the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386)
appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of
the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August
30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the
plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on
September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they
invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it
were still in force speaks of “salary corresponding to said month.” commonly
known as “mesada.” If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the
day, week, or month, then computation of the month’s salary payable would
be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary.
EFFECTIVITY OF NEW CIVIL CODE - TRANSITORY PROVISION
PATROCINIO RAYMUNDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOROTEO PEÑAS,
defendant and, Appellee.
G.R. No. L-6705. December 23, 1954
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L.

DOCTRINE:
PROCEEDINGS ALREADY TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF BY THE COURTS ARE NOT
AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE FROM ABSOLUTE DIVORCE TO LEGAL
SEPARATION. — Divorce proceedings instituted under Act No. 2710 and which
were pending at the liberation of the national territory are not affected by the
change from absolute divorce to legal separation, since the transitional
provisions of the new Civil Code expressly prescribe the subsistence of rights
derived from acts that took place under the prior legislation.

FACTS:
Raymundo and Penas were validly married to each other in Manila on Mar. 29,
1941. The spouse lived together until 1949, but had no children, nor did they
acquire conjugal property. Sometime in July, 1949, the husband lived
maritally with another woman, Carmen Paredes. At the instance of the
deserted wife, an information for concubinage was filed on Oct. 30, 1949. The
husband Penas was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the CFI (now
RTC) on May 25, 1950. Pending his appeal on July 14, 1950, the wife instituted
the present proceedings praying for a decree of absolute divorce. The
conviction of Penas was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on Oct. 31, 1951.

The trial court found that the acts of concubinage that gave rise to the action
as well as the judgment of conviction by the CFI took place before the repeal
of Act 2710 (the Divorce Law) by the new Civil Code (which became effective
on August 30, 1950, as held by this court in Lara v. Del Rosario, 50 0.G.
1957). Nevertheless, said trial court did not grant the divorce on the ground
that the wife had acquired no right to a divorce which can be recognized after
the effective date of the new Civil Code in view of Art. 2254 ("no vested or
acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or
which infringe upon the rights of others"). Thus, it concluded that the criminal
act of the husband did not give the wife any vested right, and since divorce is
abolished under the THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES of the new Civil
Code, the divorce decree should not be granted, even if the divorce
proceedings were instituted prior to the effective date of the new Civil Code.

ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in not granting the divorce?

RULING:
Yes. The trial court is not correct. Despite the change of legislation (i .e., no
more divorce under the new Civil Code), the wife is protected by Art. 2253
which provides that "The Civil Code of 1819 and other previous laws shall
govern rights originating under said laws, from acts or events which took place
under their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in different
manner, or may not recognize them. True, the new Code does not recognize
absolute divorce, but only legal separation, thereby impliedly repealing Act
2710, but other provisions clearly safeguard rights and actions arising under
the preceding law.

The present case is readily distinguished from the case of divorce proceedings
instituted under Executive Order No. 141 of the Japanese occupation,
Executive Commission, and which were pending at liberation. We ruled in Peha
de Luz v. CFI, 43 0.G., p. 4102, that such pending divorce proceedings must
be dismissed because the occupation divorce ceased to be in force and effect
upon liberation of the national territory and because the proclamation of
General Douglas McArthur in Leyte on Oct. 23, 1944 had abrogated all
occupation legislation absolutely and without qualification. The repeal of Act
2710 by the new Civil Code is in a different position since the transitional
provisions of a latter law expressly prescribe, as we have seen the subsistence
of rights derived from acts that took place under the prior legislation.

NOTE: The importance of this case lies in the fact that as long as the divorce
proceeding had already been brought before Aug. 30, 1950, same will be
allowed to continue. Moreover, even if the final judgment of conviction is made
after Aug. 30, 1950 —divorce can still be granted.

EFFECTIVITY OF NEW CIVIL CODE

CAMPOREDONDO VS. AZNAR
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84
Ponente: Felix, J.

Doctrine:
INFORMAL CIVIL PARTNERSHIP; REQUISITE BEFORE A PARTY MAY BE
ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE
COHABITATION — Before Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines)
went into operation on August 30, 1950, this court had already that where a
man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment to contract marriage,
live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists, and
each of them has an equal interest in the properties acquired during said union
and is entitled to participate therein if said properties were the product of their
JOINT effort

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao
and on the following year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located
in the municipality of Padada of the same province. Arriving together with the
group of laborers was Bernarda Camporendondo, who became an assistant to
the cook. Thereafter, the girl and Edward E. Christensen, who was also
unmarried starting living together as husband and wife, the lower court found
the same to have been continuous for over 30 years until the death of
Christensen occurred on April 30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy
and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.

Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Bernarda Camporendondo claimed in her complaint 1/2 of the properties of
the deceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased.
She alleged as basis for action that she and the deceased Edward E.
Christensen had lived and cohabitated as husband and wife, continuously and
openly for a period for more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff
and the deceased acquired real and personal properties through their common
effort and industry; and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner
of said properties.

The executor denied the averments of the complaint, contending that the
decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were
acquired through his own efforts; that plaintiff had never been a co-owner of
any property acquired or possessed by the late Edward Christensen.
ISSUE:
W/N Bernarda Camporedondo, by reason of such relationship, may be
considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired by the deceased during
said period and thus entitled to one-half thereof after the latter's death

RULING:
No. The court reversed the ruling of the lower court and denied her claim.
Camporedondo is not entitled to ½ of the properties. The lawmakers
incorporated Article 144 in Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines)
to govern their property relations. Said article read as follows:

ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership.

It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
the woman thus living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage and that the properties realized during their cohabitation be
acquired through the work, industry, employment or occupation of both or
either of them. And the same thing may be said of whose marriages are by
provision of law declared void ab initio. While it is true that these requisites
are fully met and satisfied in the case at bar, it must be remembered that the
deceased and herein appellee were already estranged as of March, 1950.
There being no provision of law governing the cessation of such informal civil
partnership, if ever existed, same may be considered terminated upon their
separation or desistance to continue said relations. The Spanish Civil Code
which was then enforce contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the
records in the instant case failed to show that a subsequent reconciliation ever
took place and considering that Republic Act No. 386 which recognized such
form of co-ownership went into operation only on August 30, 1950, evidently,
this later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee's claim.

Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their
joint industry apparently in her desire to tread on the doctrine laid down in
the aforementioned cases, that her help was solicited or she took a hand in
the management of and/or acquisition of the same. But such assertion
appears incredible if because as observed by the trial Court, she is an illiterate
woman who cannot even remember simple things as the date when she
arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when she commenced relationship with the
deceased, not even her approximate age or that of her children.
PUBLICATION OF LAWS MUST BE IN FULL
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO v. REPUBLIC
GR No. 180705, 2012-11-27
Ponente: Velasco, Jr, J.

DOCTRINE:
The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law
since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the
law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or
whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the
publication requirement.

FACTS:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails and
seeks to annul a portion of the Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11,
2003, as affirmed in a Resolution of December 28, 2004, both rendered by
the Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case ("CC") No. 0033-A (the judgment shall
hereinafter be referred to as "PSJ-A")

In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut
Investment Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut Investment Fund
("CIF"), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55
levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of... copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which
the copra seller was or ought to be issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was
placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut
producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration ("PHILCOA" now
"PCA") as... having the largest membership.
the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had
its share of the... coco levy.

The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by P.D. No.
1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code), read:
Section 5. Exemption. The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements
as herein authorized, shall not be construed … as special and/or fiduciary
funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the...
contemplation of PD 711; … the intention being that said Fund and the
disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut
farmers shall be owned by them in their private capacities
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly
to finance various projects and/or was converted into various assets or
investments. Relevant to the present petition is the acquisition of the First
United Bank.

ISSUES:
W/N the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded the status
of a law without publication.

RULING:
No. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred
to above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex
to the same law. It is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In
fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law.
Tañada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 1986) said as much: Publication of the
law is indispensable in every case x x x. Laws must come out in the open in
the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the
people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn. The publication must be of the full text
of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the
contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree,
its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy
the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the
contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree
when published. The SC cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the
status of a law. Consequently, the Court joined the Sandiganbayan in its
holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary
transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the
Civil Code.
INDISPENSABILITY OF PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS
LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Ponente: Escolin, J.

DOCTRINE:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis nonexcusat.” It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a
right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1
as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties".
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given
due course.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE:
W/N the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official
Gazette.

RULING:
Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of
publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must
be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2 does not prevent
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential
issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares
that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.
PROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
SEVERO AGUILLON, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
opponents-appellant
G.R. No. L-5448 December 16, 1910
Ponente: Johnson J.

DOCTRINE:
Laws, as a general rule, have no retroactive effect.

FACTS:
Severo Aguillon, the petitioner, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of certain parcels of land described in the said
petition. The Attorney-General, representing the Insular Government,
opposed the registration of the parcels of land in question, upon the theory
that the said land belonged to the Government. At the time of the trial of the
cause the Director of Lands amended his opposition to the registration of the
parcels of land in question, alleging that the plans presented by the petitioner
had not been prepared in conformity with the provisions of sections 4 and 5
of Act No. 1875 of the Philippine Agriculture. The appellee contends that,
inasmuch as his plans had been prepared long before the enactment of the
said Act No. 1875, the same was not applicable, for the reason that to make
the law applicable to the present case would be giving to said law a retroactive
effect.

ISSUE:
W/N the Republic Act in question applies to the case of the petitioner?

RULING:
No. The court said that the law does not have a retroactive effect. It only
applied to cases which were begun in the Court of Land Registration after its
enactment. It is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court
may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does
not affect or change vested rights. The judgment of the lower court should be
reversed and stand reversed until with the provisions of Act No. 1875, and the
case is hereby ordered to be returned to the lower court with direction that
the petitioner present his plans in accordance with said Act.
EXCEPTION TO THE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAW; LAWS
CREATING NEW RIGHTS
MONICA BONA, Petitioner And Appellant, VS. HOSPICIO BRIONES ET AL.,
Objectors And Appellees.
G.R. No. 10806 July 06, 1918
Ponente: Torres, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is well known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive
effect only governs the rights arising from acts done under the rule of the
former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a subsequent law
it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject
to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right
of the same origin.

FACTS:
Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased
Francisco Briones who died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the
will which the said deceased husband on September 16, 1911. The petition
was granted on January 20, 1915.

The counsel of the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator,
opposed the probate of the will alleging that the said will was executed before
two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence
exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed through fraud and
deceit; and prayed that for that reason the said will be declared null and of no
value.

On March 27, 1915, the judge rendered judgment, denied probate to the will
dated March 27, 1915, denying probate to the will. Counsel for Monica Bona
appealed On March 31, 1915, the judge admitted the appeal, ordered the
original records to be brought up, and reiterated his order of December 28,
1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.

ISSUE:
W/N in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by
section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
RULING:
Yes. It is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by
Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, the order denying probate was
rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act No. 2645
amending said section 618 and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took
effect only from July first of the last named year: so that, in order to explain
whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in accordance with the
law then in force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will in question
should be examined in accordance with, and under the rules of, the law in
force at the time of its execution.

The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing
and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. But the absence
of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that
the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will shows in a clear
manner that the said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow
of doubt the will of the testator; and that in its execution the solemnities
prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190 have been
observed.

The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated
section 618 cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as
this document was executed in September, 1911, five years before said
amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died
on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of
the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the present case is the
provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the
provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been
presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into
effect. It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have
retroactive effect only governs the rights arising from acts done under the rule
of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a subsequent
law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts
subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another
acquired right of the same origin.
LAWS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT - IN GENERAL
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents
G.R. No. 104528. January 18, 1996
Ponente: Panganiban, J.

DOCTRINE:
GENERALLY, LAWS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT — Pursuant to Article 4 of
the Civil Code," laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.

FACTS:
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from
Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo).
On December 18, 1975, said subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor
of petitioner, Philippine National Bank, notwithstanding the land purchase
agreements over said lots. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents
duly complied with their obligations and constructed their houses on the lots
in question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the
mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner
of the lots.
In a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB without prejudice
to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. may collect from private
respondents only the "remaining amortization, in accordance with the land
purchase agreements they had previously entered into with "Marikina Village.
Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots
they had already bought from said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989,
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On July
12, 1976, P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective
Decree" was enacted, concurring with HLURB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957
retroactively?
RULINGS:
No, the Office of the President did not err in applying P.D. 957 retroactively
on subject mortgage executed on December 18, 1975. Generally, pursuant to
Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for its
retroactivity, it may be inferred that the intent of the law was to cover even
those real estate mortgages, executed prior to its enactment, to protect
innocent lot buyers from "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers”.
Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution
may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law.
If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the
contract. Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and,
always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with
a matter affecting the public welfare.
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, Petitioner, v. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
Ponente: Vitug, J.

DOCTRINE:
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal
maxim — "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" — that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children.
Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. The
Petitioner as well as her children suffered physical violence. Petitioner and
their children left the home. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight
physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court, stating that petitioner had failed to establish that
the respondent showed signs of mental incapacity, that incapacity is grave,
preceded the marriage and is incurable, that such incapacity is psychological,
that the root cause has been identified medically/clinically and has been
proven by an expert and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable in
nature. Petitioner argued that the doctrine enunciated in Santos v. CA as well
as the guidelines set out in Republic v. CA and Molina should have no
retroactive application. Petitioner further argues, the application of the Santos
and Molina case should at least only warrant a remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

ISSUE:
W/N guidelines for psychological incapacity in the Molina and Santos cases
should be taken in consideration in deciding this case?
HELD:
Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case
would fall under the category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage
null and void. This decision has the force and effect of a law. These guidelines
are mandatory in nature.

The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” ordained in Article 8 of the
Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal
maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute
was enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of the Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of the parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith (“lex prospicit,
non respicit”). Petitioner utterly failed, both in her allegations and in her
evidence to prove psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent.
RULES IN CUSTOMS
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
Ponente: Moreland, J.

DOCTRINE:
For rig-drivers or cocheros, however, to temporarily leave their horses while
assisting in unloading the calesa is not an inherently injurious custom.

FACTS:
On 11th day of September 1908, plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the
left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging
to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder and to which
was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction.
Thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff’s carromata, observing that the
delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at a great speed, crowded close
to the sidewalk and stopped, in order to give defendant’s delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by. But that instead of passing by the defendant’s wagon
and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and
overturned it, severely wounding plaintiff and also injuring the carromata itself
and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. The defendant contends
that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the
accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at
Calle Herran and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving
lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver
and made noises that frightened the hoses causing them to run. The employee
failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground. The trial court
found the defendant guilty of negligence and ordered to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P442.50 with interest.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of
horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such
driver?

RULING:
No. The SC reversed the decision of the lower court. The SC ruled that the
cochero was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by
the evidence in this case. It appears that the horses which caused damage
were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable;
that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six
months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them
in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident and they
had never run away up to that time and there had been no accident due to
such practice.

The SC also ruled that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the
merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that
which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in
question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.

The act of defendant’s driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was
not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts, the performance of which has not
proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in
by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be
held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Therefore, the SC ruled
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
MISTAKE OF FACT vs MISTAKE OF LAW
JOSE ZULUETA v. FRANCISCA ZULUETA
G.R. No. 428. April 30, 1902
LADD, J.

DOCTRINE:
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith" (Civil Code,
Article 2)

FACTS:
Don Jose Zulueta and his sister, Doña Francisca Zulueta, are sole heirs under
the will of their father Don Jose who died in Iloilo in 1900. In the course of the
voluntary testamentary proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo by Don Jose, three auditors were appointed to make a division of the
estate under article 1053 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, of whom Don Jose
and Doña Francisca each nominated one, the third or auditor umpire being
chosen by common accord of the parties. The auditor umpire, whose report
was filed March 29, 1901, agreed with and accepted in its entirety nominated
by Don Jose. The procedure marked out in articles 1062 and 1067 of the Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Civil was then followed, and upon the application of Doña
Francisca the record was on April 13 delivered to her for examination. April
25, she filed her opposition to the report of the auditor umpire. The court, by
a providencia of May 4, directed that the procedure prescribed for declarative
actions be followed, and that the record be again delivered to Doña Francisca
in order that she might formulate her demand in accordance with Article 1071
of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.

On petition of Don Jose the court by a providencia of May 7 fixed the term of
fifteen days as that within which Doña Francisca should formulate her demand,
which term was subsequently enlarged seven days on petition of Doña
Francisca. This petition the court denied in an auto rendered June 15,
declaring, furthermore, that the term fixed for the filing of the demand having
expired, Doña Francisca had lost her right to institute the action.
June 22 Doña Francisca petitioned for the reform of this auto. On the same
day this petition was denied in an auto rendered by Don Cirilo Mapa, a justice
of the peace of the city of Iloilo. The denial of this petition was put on the
ground that the auto of June 15 was not one against which the remedy of
reform was available, but that the remedy was by way of appeal under article
365 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.

While the appeal was pending in this court Doña Francisca presented a petition
under Act No. 75 of the Civil Commission, alleging that the auto of June 22
was rendered through a mistake of the acting judge of first instance, who
erroneously believed that he had jurisdiction to render the same; that Doña
Francisca was prevented from entering an appeal from that auto by her
mistake as to the term prescribed by the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil for
entering appeals in such cases.

On June 29 Doña Francisca interposed an appeal against the auto of June 22,
which the court, now presided over by the regular judge of first instance of
the district, declined to admit, on the ground that it was not presented within
three days, as prescribed in article 363 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Doña Francisca is entitled to relief against the consequences
of her failure to interpose her appeal against the auto of June 22 within the
period fixed by law

RULING:
The mistake in this instance was her own, but it was a mistake of law, and
while we should be unwilling to say that special cases might not occur in which
relief would be afforded in such a proceeding as this against a mistake of law
made by a party, we are of opinion that the present is not such a case. Nothing
is shown here except the bare fact that the party acted under ignorance or
misconception of the provisions of the law in regard to the time within which
the appeal could be taken, and there is no reason why the general principle,
a principle "founded not only on expediency and policy but on necessity," that
"ignorance of the law does not excuse from compliance therewith" (Civil Code,
art. 2), should be relaxed. The framers of Act No. 75 could not have intended
to totally abrogate this principle with reference to the class of CASEs covered
by the act. If such were the effect of this legislation the court "would be
involved and perplexed with questions incapable of any just solution and
embarrassed by inquiries almost interminable." library
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE FROM COMPLIANCE
THEREWITH.
THE UNITED STATES v. BARTOLOME GRAY
G.R. No. L-3482. September 7, 1907
TORRES, J.

DOCTRINE:
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
(Article 3, Civil Code of the Philippines)

FACTS:
By means of written complaint dated the 24th of April, 1906, Bartolome Gray,
a councilor and resident of the municipality of Candon, was accused by the
provincial fiscal of Ilocos Sur of violation of Act No. 663, being then and there
councilor, was unlawfully and feloniously interested in the direct manner in a
cockpit established in said town, having secured a license therefor in the year
1905, which was renewed on the 5th of January, 1906.

The case having proceeded to trial upon the said complaint, and after the
accused had pleaded not guilty, the provincial fiscal, in order to shorten the
proceedings, moved that the following facts stated in the complaint be
considered proven, as they were indisputable
(1) That since the year 1904 to April 24, 1906, the accused, Gray had acted
as a duly elected councilor of the municipality of Candon, and had during the
said time exercised the rights and duties inherent to such office.
(2) That since 1905 until the first months of 1906 he was directly interested
in the cockpit business in the municipality of Candon.
(3) That for the purpose above stated he secured the corresponding license
from the municipal treasurer of Candon for the year 1905, the same having
been renewed on the 5th of January, 1906.

The defense counsel alleged that the accused have never intended to commit
an offense, which intent is the basis of the penalty, and that he was ignorant
that, being a councilor, he could not take part in any contract in which the
municipality was interested, nor in cockpits, so much so that as soon as hi
attention was called thereto by intelligent person he at once asked that his
license be canceled, and that it was then that it was discovered that he was a
contractor for the cockpit.

ISSUE:
 Is Bartolome Gray, as a councilor, guilty of engaging in cockpits even though
he insists that he is ignorant of the law that prohibits the act?

RULING:

Yes. Gray is guilty of violating the Act. No. 82, as amended by Act No. 663.

It is an express legal precept that ignorance of the law does not excuse from
anyone from compliance therewith (art. 2, Civil Code), and the exculpatory
allegation offered by the accused, to the effect that he was ignorant of the
prohibitive provisions of said municipal law, as amended, is therefore not all
admissible. It was the duty of the accused, as councilor for the town of
Candon, to be acquainted with all the laws in force, especially the municipal
laws in connection with his duties and obligations, because he was obliged not
only to comply with them but also to see that they were complied with by all
of his townsmen and upon this theory he could not be ignorant thereof; on
the contrary, the presumption exists that he was well aware of their
provisions, particularly such laws as Act No. 82. which was in force since
January 31, 1901, and its amendment by Act No. 663, enacted on the 5th of
March, 1903, both of which dates are long prior to the time when he began
the performance of his duties as councilor of the municipality.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW DOES NOT EXCUSE A PERSON FROM
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH
THE UNITED STATES v. RUFINO DELOSO
G.R. No. 4411. August 31, 1908
TORRES, J.

DOCTRINE:
PUBLIC DOCUMENT; FALSIFICATION BY A PRIVATE PERSON. — The fact that
a private individual perverted the truth in the narration of the facts set forth
in a document issued by a municipal secretary, in order to use the same as
he did, in the exercise of the right of suffrage, constitutes the crime of
falsification of a certificate and of the use thereof by a private person, which
is defined and punished by article 311 in connection with article 310 of the
Penal Code.

FACTS:
Rufino Deloso, in order to take part in the municipal elections that were to be
held about the 1st of December 1904, in the town of Jimenez, province of
Misamis, called at the municipal building and stated under oath, to the
municipal secretary, that he was a resident of the said town, and that at the
date of the next municipal election he would have resided therein for a period
of six months; and that he was in every way entitled to vote.

At the municipal elections held in the town of Oroquieta, same province, on

the 5th of December, 1905, Rufino Deloso was elected by a majority vote to
the office of municipal president. The election was protested by several
residents of the town on the ground that the successful candidate had no legal
residence therein. In his defense Deloso stated under oath on the 4th of
January, 1906, before Vicente Fortich, notary public of Oroquieta, that he had
been, and was at the time, a resident of the said town, and that he had resided
therein from the month of April, 1902, until the above-mentioned date.

From documents marked "A" and "B," offered in evidence by the provincial
fiscal, it appears from the first that Rufino Deloso, who signed both of them,
had resided in Oroquieta since April, 1902, and continued to live there until
the date of the document, January 4, 1906; that he was a candidate for the
municipal presidency of Oroquieta at the elections of December, 1903. The
first document was signed under oath in the presence of Notary Vicente
Fortich, and the second, marked "B," is a municipal form No. 10, wherein the
accused stated under oath that he was a resident of Jimenez.

A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Rufino Deloso with the
crime of falsification of official documents, and the court, in view of the
evidence adduced at the trial, found him guilty of the crime defined and
punished by article 311, in connection with article 310, of the Penal Code, and
sentenced him to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to suffer the
accessory penalties and to pay costs.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that he signed the document
marked Exhibit B, without having read it, and that he was not acquainted with
the provisions of the Municipal Code as to the residence required of an elector.
These allegations cannot be sustained nor do they constitute an exemption of
the accused, in as much as, according to article 2 of the Civil Code, ignorance
of the law does not excuse a person from compliance therewith.

ISSUE:
W/N Rufino Deloso guilty of the crime of falsification of public documents?

RULING:
Yes. Rufino Deloso is guilty of falsifying public documents which is a crime
defined and punished under Article 310 and 311 of the Penal Code.
Article 310 of the Penal Code provides that — "A public official who shall issue
a false certificate of merit or service, of good conduct, of property or of other
similar circumstances, shall be punished with the penalties of suspension in
its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."
Article 311 of the said code prescribes that — "An individual who shall falsify
a certificate of the kinds mentioned in the preceding articles shall be punished
with the penalty of arresto mayor.
"This provision is applicable to the person who shall knowingly make use of
such false certificate.” The document offered in evidence as Exhibit B, issued
by the municipal secretary of Jimenez, is not, strictly speaking, a public
document, but it belongs to the class of documents the falsification of which
is specially punished by articles 306 to 311 of the Penal Code; therefore, the
provisions of articles 301 and 302, in connection with article 300 of said code,
are not applicable to the present case.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM IGNORANCE OF THE
FACT
LUCIANO DELGADO vs. EDUARDO ALONSO DUQUE VALGONA
G.R. No. L-19826 March 31, 1923
STREET, J.

DOCTRINE:
Ignorance of the provisions of the Usury Law does not relieve a party from
legal consequences of the making of a usurious contract into which he has
voluntarily entered.

FACTS:
The parties to this action are residents of the municipality of Goa, Camarines
Sur, the plaintiff, Luciano Delgado, being a planter of local prominence, while
the defendant, Eduardo Alonso Duque Valgona, is a businessman in Goa. In
November 1917 Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the municipality
of Goa from one Stickney, who was then about to leave the Philippine Islands,
paying the sum of P15,000 therefor. At the time of acquiring the property he
probably expects, from certain conversations that he had had with Delgado,
to be able to sell the property on advantageous terms to the latter. Alonso
indeed claims that the property was purchased by him at the instance and
request of Delgado. In order to secure the payment of the purchase money
Delgado contemporaneously executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant
upon the same land.

The conveyance by way of mortgage executed by Delgado to secure the

payment of the purchase price is before us; and it is this instrument which
supplies the principal basis of controversy. The stipulations of this mortgage,
so far as material to be here noted, are contained in clauses A to E, inclusive,
of paragraph 2; and in substance they are as follows: (A) The debtor-
mortgagor (Delgado) promises to pay to the creditor-mortgagee (Alonso) the
sum of P15,000 in a single payment. (B) To secure this sum the debtor creates
a mortgage in favor of the creditor on the fourteen parcels of land described
in paragraph 1 of the same instrument. (C) So long as the indebtedness
subsists the debtor obligates himself for interest in the amount of P2,250, to
be paid in two semi-annual installments of P1,175 each, which, it will be
observed, make an amount larger by P100 than the other quantity. (D) The
creditor concedes to the debtor the period of twelve years from the date of
the instrument within which the latter may make payment of the P15,000
aforesaid. Finally, in clause (E), it is stipulated that, if the debtor should not
make payment within twelve years, the creditor may, at the end of that period,
enter into possession of the mortgaged property.

During the year 1919 and thereafter, Delgado seems to have been unable to
make further payment of interest, and when Alonso began to press him about
the matter, recourse to legal advice was had by the former; and on February
3, 1920, this action was instituted by Delgado in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur.

By the amended complaint, bearing date of October 21, 1920, the plaintiff
seeks to enforce the right of action given in section 6 of Act No. 2655 and
thereby to recover from the defendant Alonso the sum of P2,625 paid upon
February 1, 1919, by way of interest, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee, alleged to be in the amount of P2,500. In the same complaint the plaintiff
seeks to obtain a declaration of nullity as to the stipulations contained in
clauses A, C, and E of the mortgage.

ISSUE:
W/N the plaintiff entitled to collect a reasonable fee or recover interest paid
upon a usurious contract?

RULING:
Yes. As to this statute in effect says that any person who has paid upon any
usurious contract a higher rate than is allowed by law may recover the whole
interest paid "with costs and attorney's fees in such sum as may be allowed
by the court." This language undoubtedly recognizes a discretion in the court
in respect to fixing the amount of the fees, but it is not so clear that the court
has a discretion to deny the allowance altogether. On the contrary, we incline
to the view that when the right of action to recover interest paid upon a
usurious contract is established, a reasonable attorney's fee should be allowed
as a matter of course, the same as costs are awarded.
The defendant alleged that the contract in question had been entered into by
him innocently and in total ignorance on his part of the existence of the Usury
Law and, further, that he had been maliciously inveigled into said contract by
the plaintiff, with full knowledge on the part of the latter of the illegality of the
stipulation for usurious interest, and with the design of taking advantages of
the Usury Law to the prejudice of the defendant.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW DISTINGUISHED FROM IGNORANCE OF THE
FACT
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.

DOCTRINE:
Waiver requires knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right
waived, with an awareness of its consequences (Floresca case)

FACTS:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from
the RenaissanceTower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when
the platform he was then on board while working, fell. The falling of the
platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely
inserted to the connecting points of the chain block without a safety lock. Jose
Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among others
that the widow cannot recover for from the company
anymore civil damages on the account that it has recovered damages under
the Labor Code.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded
actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in
toto.

ISSUE:
W/N the private respondent barred from filing complaint for damages against
the petitioner despite the availment of benefits from State Insurance Fund?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of
damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to a recovery under
an ordinary civil action. It ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either
remedies. However, the Supreme Court allowed some exceptions. In the case
at bar, the CA ruled that the widow had a right to file for civil actions.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between

inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or
proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by
the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to
both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people
responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by
election.

However, waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence. A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make
an intelligent decision.

In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and
thus her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not constitute a
waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner-company.

Petitioner’s argument that Art 3 of the New Civil Code, stating that “Ignorance
of the law excuses no one” cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that the
application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may
be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a
person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The
rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held
against her.

Therefore, the aggrieved party is not barred from filing complaint for damages
against her deceased husband’s employer.
LAWS IN GENERAL IS PROSPECTIVE, UNLESS PROVIDED
MARCELINO BUYCO vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO
BRANCH
G.R. No. L-14406 June 30, 1961
PAREDES, J.

DOCTRINE: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is

provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code)

FACTS:
Mandamus case filed by petitioner Marcelino Buyco praying that the
respondent Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept his Backpay
Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, as payment of his obligation with said
respondent.

On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in

the amount of P5,102.90 plus interest thereon, which represented petitioner's
deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with respondent bank. Petitioner is a holder
of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955, under
Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years.

On April 24, 1956, petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his
crop loan for the abovementioned crop year 1952-53 with his said backpay
acknowledgment certificate, but on July 18, 1956, respondent answered
petitioner that since respondent's motion for reconsideration in the case of
Marcelino B. Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, L-8782, (52 O.G. 2522)
was still under consideration by this Court (S.C.) respondent "cannot yet
grant" petitioner's request.

On February 15, 1957, and after this Court had denied respondent's motion
for reconsideration in said case No. L-8782, petitioner, again wrote
respondent, reiterating his request to pay the obligation with said certificate.
On February 19, 1957, respondent answered petitioner that in view of the
amendment of its charter on June 16, 1956 by R.A. No. 1576, it could not
accept petitioner's certificate.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent compelled to accept the Backpay Acknowledgement
Certificate No. 4801 from the petitioner as payment of his obligation despite
the amendment to its charter by R.A. No. 1576?

RULING:
Yes. The amendment to R.A. 1576 on June 17, 1956 does not apply or has no
effect to the case at bar which was offered by the petitioner on April 24, 1956.

Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its
retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply states its
effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive
effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the
offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended,
the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had
accrued prior to such amendment.

Moreover, the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Florentino

case filed by respondent-appellant, did not affect the petitioner's vested right
already created and acquired at the time he offered to pay his obligation with
his certificate on April 24, 1956, and before the passage of Rep. Act No. 1576

Therefore, the respondent is compelled to accept the Backpay

Acknowledgement Certificate No. 4801 from the petitioner.
REPEAL OF LAW
ANDRES E. LAZARO vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-22512 & G.R. No. L-22514 December 22, 1967
CONCEPCION, C.J.

DOCTRINE:
CIRCULAR 133 DID NOT REPEAL CIRCULAR NOS. 44 AND 45. — Despite the
issuance of Central Bank Circular No. 133, importations made without the
corresponding Central Bank release certificate violated said Circular Nos. 44
and 45, in relation to section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Central Bank Circular 133 did not repeal Circulars 44 and 45 with respect to
the necessity of a release certificate. Paragraph 6 of Circular 133 required
imports to be released only upon presentation of a release certificate issued
by the Central Bank.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
On August 31, 1954, the SS "Templar" arrived at the port of Manila with a
shipment of candies, dried shrimps, and celluloid combs, consigned to
petitioner, Andres E. Lazaro. For lack of the Central Bank release certificate
required in Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, in relation to Section 1363
(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, the goods were subjected to seizure
proceedings; but, on September 4, 1954, they were released to the petitioner
upon a surety bond of the Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation in the
sum of P4,822.00.

After appropriate proceedings, the Collector of Customs rendered a decision

decreeing the forfeiture of the goods, and, as the same had already been
released to the petitioner, ordering him to pay in cash the sum of P4,820.00
as the value thereof. This decision was, on appeal taken by petitioner, affirmed
by the Commissioner of Customs, who directed the confiscation of said bond
and ordered petitioner and his surety to pay in cash sum of P4,822.00, within
thirty (30) days from notice. Motion for reconsideration was denied. On
appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Commission of Customs.
Said Court having subsequently refused to reconsider its decision, two
petitions for review thereof by the Supreme Court have been filed for
petitioner herein, with substantially the same issues.
Petitioner maintains that Section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code,
which was applied by the Court of Tax Appeals, to sustain the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs, is inapplicable to this case because said section
refers to articles of "prohibited importation," to which category the goods in
question do not, he claims, belong; that Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 do not
authorize the forfeiture of goods imported in violation thereof; that said
circulars have been repealed by Circular No. 133, issued by the Central Bank
on January 21, 1962.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of Central Bank Circular No. 133 repeal Circular Nos. 44 and
45 with respect to release certificate?

RULING:
No. Central Bank Circular 133 did not repeal Circular 44 and 45 with respect
to the necessity of a release certificate. As matter of fact, paragraph 6 of
Circular 133 required imports to be released only upon presentation of a
release certificate issued by the Central Bank. Not only that, section 14 which
states:

"14. No item of import shall be released by the Bureau of Customs

without the presentation of a release certificate issued by the
Central Bank or any authorized Agent Bank in a form prescribed
by the Monetary Board."

These questions have already been decided by this Court adversely to

petitioner's pretense. In Lazaro vs. Commissioner of Customs, Supreme Court
held that: “1. Despite the issuance of Central Bank Circular. No. 133,
importations made without the corresponding Central Bank release certificate
violated said Circular Nos. 44 and 45, in relation to Section 1363(f) of the
Revised administrative Code.” Not only that, section 14 which states:"14. No
item of import shall be released by the Bureau of Customs without the
presentation of a release certificate issued by the Central Bank or any
authorized Agent Bank in a form prescribed by the Monetary Board."

Therefore, the said circulars did not repeal Central Bank Circular No. 133 which
still requires release certificate from imports.
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAW UNLESS PROVIDED
UNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS, INC. v. RICE AND CORN BOARD
G.R. No. L-21013. August 17, 1967
FERNANDO, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as
having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used.

FACTS:
Appeal from a judgment of Judge Guillermo Torres of Pasig, Rizal dated August
6, 1962, dismissing an amended petition for declaratory relief seeking a
judicial declaration of illegality of the construction placed by respondent Rice
and Corn Board of its Resolution No. 10 in connection with Section 2-A of
Commonwealth Act No. 108.

The amended petition of February 8, 1961 after the averments as to the

petitioners and respondents alleged that pursuant to the power vested in
respondent Rice and Corn Board by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3018,
Resolution No. 10 was promulgated dated November 21, 1960, a particular
regulation of which specifically provides: "No person who is not a citizen of
the Philippines shall be employed in any capacity in any Filipino-owned
establishment engaged in any of the lines of activity in the rice and/or corn
industry except technical personnel whose employment may be authorized by
the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Rice and Corn
Board."

Then came a paragraph that petitioner Universal Corn Products, Inc. "is a
corporation the capital stock of which is wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines and is engaged in certain lines of activity covered by Republic Act
No. 3018 and Resolution No. 10 of the Rice and Corn Board." It was then
stated that all its employees numbering over 200 are Filipinos, with the
exception of co-petitioners, then holding the positions of executive vice-
president, comptroller, sales manager, chief warehouseman, assistant plant
superintendent, cashier, and sales supervisors, 3 and that such alien
employees" have been with the Universal Corn Products, Inc. long before the
enactment into law of Republic Act No. 3018 and the promulgation of
Resolution No. 10 of the Rice and Corn Board.

What was sought, without success, was a ruling that petitioner Universal Corn
Products, Inc. could retain its co- petitioners, all aliens, in its employ,
contending that a dismissal from employment on the strength of the aforesaid
construction by respondents would be to give it a retroactive, and under the
circumstances, an unconstitutional effect.

ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of alien workers a retroactive effect of the Resolution No.
10 and Republic Act No. 3018?

RULING:
No. The contention that the interpretation by respondents of Resolution No.
10 and Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 suffers from the vice of
retroactivity or afflicted with the taint of unconstitutionality is far from
persuasive.

As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced: "It
is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as
having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt
must be resolved against the retrospective effect. The cases supporting this
rule are almost without number."

“We find no merit in this contention because the acts constituting the crime
for which appellant has been convicted in the case at bar were all executed
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 1180, and by no means can we
consider appellant’s conviction as the result of the application to him of an ex
post facto law.” Petitioners are vocal in their fears that to construe Resolution
No. 10 in connection with Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 as to
require the dismissal of alien personnel would be to run the risk of an
unconstitutional interpretation. Such doubts and misgiving are unjustified.

A recent decision of this Court, King v. Hernaez, 17 of far-reaching

significance, ought to have stilled such misplaced apprehension. Thus: "It is
hard to see how the nationalization of employment in the Philippines can run
counter to any provision of our Constitution considering that its aim is not
exactly to deprive a citizen of a right that he may exercise under it but rather
to promote, enhance and protect those that are expressly accorded to a citizen
such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. True, this
fundamental policy was expressed in a decision the subject of which concerns
the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Act, but since the Anti-Dummy Law is
but a mere complement of the former in the sense that it is designed to make
effective its aims and purposes and both tend to accomplish the same
objective either by excluding aliens from owning any retail trade or by banning
their employment if the trade is owned by Filipinos, and the target of both is
‘the removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and
domination’ thru the nationalization of the retail trade both in ownership and
employment, the pronouncement made in one regarding its constitutionality
applies equally if not with greater reason to the other both being
complementary one to the other. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail
trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is merely
limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities.”

Therefore, the enactment of Republic Act No. 3018 and the promulgation of
Resolution No. 10 of the Rice and Corn Board is not retroactive and thus
constitutional.
TAX LAWS OPERATE PROSPECTIVELY UNLESS RETROSPECTIVE
EFFECT IS EXPRESSLY DECLARED OR CLEARLY IMPLIED
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT
COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-29059 December 15, 1987
CRUZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
Sec. 291. Injunction not available to restrain collection of tax. — No court shall
have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national
internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code.

FACTS:
By virtue of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendered on June 21, 1961,
as modified on appeal by the Supreme Court on February 27, 1965, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was ordered to refund to the Cebu Portland
Cement Company the amount of P 359,408.98, representing overpayments of
ad valorem taxes on cement produced and sold by it after October 1957.
On March 28, 1968, following denial of motions for reconsideration filed by
both the petitioner and the private respondent, the latter moved for a writ of
execution to enforce the said judgment.
The motion was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the private
respondent had an outstanding sales tax liability to which the judgment debt
had already been credited. In fact, it was stressed, there was still a balance
owing on the sales taxes in the amount of P 4,789,279.85 plus 28% surcharge.
On April 22, 1968, the Court of Tax Appeals granted the motion, holding that
the alleged sales tax liability of the private respondent was still being
questioned and therefore could not be set-off against the refund.
Private respondent disclaims liability for the sales taxes, on the ground that
cement is not a manufactured product but a mineral product. As such, it was
exempted from sales taxes under Section 188 of the Tax Code after the
effectivity of Rep. Act No. 1299 on June 16, 1955, in accordance with Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, decided in 1968. Here
Justice Eugenio Angeles declared that "before the effectivity of Rep. Act No.
1299, amending Section 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code, cement
was taxable as a manufactured product under Section 186, in connection with
Section 194(4) of the said Code," thereby implying that it was not considered
a manufactured product afterwards. Also, the alleged sales tax deficiency
could not as yet be enforced against it because the tax assessment was not
yet final, the same being still under protest and still to be definitely resolved
on the merits. Besides, the assessment had already prescribed, not having
been made within the reglementary five-year period from the filing of the tax
returns.
The petitioner denies that the sales tax assessments have already prescribed
because the prescriptive period should be counted from the filing of the sales
tax returns, which had not yet been done by the private respondent.

ISSUE:
Could payment of taxes be postponed by simply questioning their validity?

RULING:
No. Sec. 291. Injunction not available to restrain collection of tax. — No court
shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any
national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code.
The argument that the assessment cannot as yet be enforced because it is
still being contested loses sight of the urgency of the need to collect taxes as
"the lifeblood of the government." If the payment of taxes could be postponed
by simply questioning their validity, the machinery of the state would grind to
a halt and all government functions would be paralyzed.
It goes without saying that this injunction is available not only when the
assessment is already being questioned in a court of justice but more so if, as
in the instant case, the challenge to the assessment is still-and only-on the
administrative level. There is all the more reason to apply the rule here
because it appears that even after crediting of the refund against the tax
deficiency, a balance of more than P 4 million is still due from the private
respondent.
To require the petitioner to actually refund to the private respondent the
amount of the judgment debt, which he will later have the right to distrain for
payment of its sales tax liability is in our view an Idle ritual.
Therefore, payment of taxes cannot be postponed by questioning its validity.
Expressium facit cessare tacitum
PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU vs. RICARDO
CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
ESGUERRA, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided . Expressium facit cessare tacitum.

FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of
two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated
August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to
dismiss "on the authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated
October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order.

The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969,
by plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against
private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay
rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against said respondent,
he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 338-M. In the said Court private respondent sought
to amend his answer filed in the Municipal Court. But, the motion to file
amended answer was denied by the Court. The parties eventually submitted
a stipulation of facts, few of which are; 1. The following are the rates of
rentals: (a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year, (b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year, (c)
1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year, (d) 1962 P16.00 a year, (e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70
a year,(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year; 2. Effective January 1969 the lease
was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was increased to P30.00
a month by the plaintiffs; 3. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid
rental at the present monthly rate.

On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz issued an order giving private respondent
herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on
July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking
the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126 or the Rental Law. Petitioners
opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on
August 4, 1970, to sustain the motion for dismissal filed by the defendant on
July 13, 1970.

A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent

Judge. Hence this petition. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent
provisions of law in question:
Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's
dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March
31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the
lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said
rental does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved June 17, 1970.

ISSUE:
Is Republic Act 6126 applicable to the case at bar?

RULING:
Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to the case at bar. As the language of the
law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.
Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot
involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect
on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase
in rentals had been effected. The claim of private respondent that the act is
remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is untenable. The
statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective
construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that
laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that
where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts
as found. Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective
on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law
did not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did
not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation.
Therefore, Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to the case at bar.
EXCEPTION TO PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINALONAN, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
NUEVA SEGOVIA
G.R. No. L-8243 December 24, 1915
TRENT, J.

DOCTRINE:
“The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed
to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made
harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a
previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.”

FACTS:
This is a registration proceeding instituted by the Director of Lands under the
provisions of section 61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of
all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binangonan,
Province of Pangasinan. This appeal is brought by one of the private claimants
to two parcels of land within that area.

It is said that Act No. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands, or,
at most, lands claimed by the Government, in other words, it is said that the
Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles.
Reference is made to the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), which specifically
authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration
proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area
which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed
in the Act, and the inference is drawn that section 61 of Act No. 926 does not
permit of similar proceedings, else the Legislature would not have fund it
necessary to enact Act No. 2259.

Attention is also directed to the title of the Public Land Act, which contains no
mention of compulsory registration proceedings. No reference is made in Act
No. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of section 61 of Act No. 926, and the
inference to be drawn from this is that, in the view of the Legislature, the
latter did not concern the subject-matter of the new Act.

Section 61 reads:
 It shall be lawful for the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, whenever
the opinion of the Chief Executive the public interests shall require it, to
cause to be filed in the Court of Land Registration, through the Attorney-
General, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant
of any land in the Philippine Islands who shall not have voluntarily come
in under the provisions of this chapter or the Land Registration Act…”

ISSUE:
Whether section 61 of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory
registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined
exclusively to public lands

RULING:
Compulsory registration is unconstitutional.
As an argument against the validity a judgment under section 61, it is said
that the Land Court has no power to enforce its judgment as to the costs of
the proceedings, saying that nowhere in the land Registration Act (No. 496)
is there authority granted for that purpose. This objection is now best
answered, so far as this case is concerned, by section 18 of the Cadastral Act,
made applicable to this case by Act No. 2334, which provides that the costs
taxes against each parcel shall be considered as a special tax assessment and
shall constitute a first lien upon the land.

A legislature "has no power to make a decree or judgment rendered without

jurisdiction a valid and binding decree or judgment." (2 Lewis' Southerland
Stat. Const., sec. 676, citing Willis vs. Hodson, 79 Md., 327; 29 Atl., 604.)
But the legislature has power to pass healing acts which do not impair the
obligation of contracts nor interfere with vested rights. They are remedial by
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The
rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be
done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made
harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a
previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one. If the irregularity consists
in doing some act, or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have
made immaterial by a prior law, it may do so by a subsequent one. These
rules are supported by numerous cases. (2 Lewis' Southerland Stat. Const.,
sec. 675.) We conclude that section 61 of Act No. 926 conferred jurisdiction
upon the land court to entertain compulsory registration proceedings against
private property owners.

The fact that both lots are bounded on all sides by public streets; that no
portion of either is included within the wall surrounding the church property;
that one of the lots has always served as a public plaza, there being no other
in the poblacion; that the other has been the site of the public school since
1877, at least; that there is no indication of the church ever having
administered the property, while there is testimony showing that it has been
administered by the municipality; all these facts are well established by the
testimony of record. The fact that portions of these lots were used at times
for the forming of religious processions is not sufficient to justify an award of
the land to the appellant in view of the evidence in favor of the municipality.
Therefore, section 61 of Act No. 96 is confined exclusively to public lands.
WHEN THE LAW IS RETROACTIVE
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTEBAN ZETA
G.R. No. L-7140. December 22, 1955
LABRADOR, J.

DOCTRINE:
…The presumption, however, is that all laws operate prospectively only and
only when the legislative has clearly indicated its intention that the law operate
retroactively will the courts so apply it. Retroactive operation will more readily
be ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to legislation which
may disadvantageously, though legally, effect past relations and
transactions." (2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 243.)

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Samar,
finding Esteban Zeta guilty of a violation of Republic Act No. 145 (which took
effect on June 14, 1947), for having solicited, charged demanded and
collected a fee or compensation of P300 for assisting one Eugenio Albiza in
the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under
the laws of the United States.

Eugenio Albiza, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army and later of the United
States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), suffered disability in the course
of rendering services for the army in Aparri, Cagayan in the year 1942. On
November 6, 1946, he promised to pay Mr. Esteban Zeta 5 per cent of any
mount he may receive as a result of his claim for backpay, insurance or any
other privileges granted by law (Exhibit 1). Zeta prepared the necessary
papers for disability compensation and as a result Albiza received the sum
P5,919 from the United States Veterans Administration. In pursuance of the
contract, Albiza paid Zeta the sums of P200 on June 7, 1951 and P100 on June
11, 1951.

The law in force at the time of the execution of that agreement (Exhibit 1)
was Commonwealth Act No. 675, section 11 of which provides as: "No
attorney, agent, or other person in charge of the preparation, filing, or
pursuing of any claim for arrears in pay allowances under this Act shall
demand or charge for his services fees more than five per centum of the total
money value of such arrears in pay and allowances, and said fees shall become
due and demandable only after the payment of the said arrears in pay and
allowances is received by the widow or orphan entitled thereto. The retention
or deduction of any amount from any such arrears in pay and allowances for
the payment of fees for such services is prohibited. A violation of any provision
of this section shall be punished by imprisonment of from 6 months to 1 year,
or by a fine of from six hundred to one thousand pesos, or by both such
imprisonment and fine.”

But on June 14, 1947, Republic Act No. 145 was passed. It provides that "any
person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation and prosecution
of his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States administered by
the United States Veterans Administration who shall, directly or indirectly,
solicit, contract for, charge, or receive, or who shall attempt to solicit, contract
for, charge, or receive any fee or compensation exceeding twenty pesos in
any one claim, or who shall collect his fee before the claim is actually paid to
a beneficiary or claimant, shall be deemed guilty of an offense and upon
conviction thereof shall for every offense be fined not exceeding one thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both, in the discretion of
the court."

The trial court held that upon the passage of Republic Act No. 145, the
agreement for the payment of a 5 per cent fee on the amount collected was
voided and compliance therewith became illegal; so it sentenced the
defendant-appellant to pay a fine of P200, to indemnify Eugenio Albiza in the
sum of P280, or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

ISSUE:
Is defendant Zeta’s collection of a fee of P300 as compensation for assisting
Albiza illegal?

RULING:
No. The collection of fees as compensation from the rendered service is not
illegal.

The application of Republic Act No. 145 to the defendant-appellant for having
charged and collected the fee of 5 per cent is an infringement of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. he case of U. S. v. Diaz
Conde, Et Al., 42 Phil., 766, is cited for the principle that law impairing the
obligations of a contract is null and void; that a law must be construed
prospectively, not retroactively, so that if it is legal at its inception it cannot
be declared illegal by subsequent legislation, otherwise the sanctity of
contracts will be impaired in violation of the organic law.

In the case at bar the collection of the fee was affected after Republic Act No.
145 had been passed. The claim that said Act is an ex post facto law is not
fully justified because although the services were rendered before the Act took
effect, collection for said services did not take place until after the law became
effective.

The subsequent law enacted after the rendition of the services should not as
a matter of simple justice affect the agreement, which was entered into
voluntarily by the parties as expressly directed in the previous law. To apply
the new law to the case of the defendant-appellant such as to deprive him of
the agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructive of the
inviolability of contracts, and therefore invalid as lacking in due process; to
penalize him for collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of justice. Such
could not have been the legislative intent in the enactment of Republic Act
145.

Therefore, defendant is not guilty and the ruling must be reversed.

CURATIVE STATUTES AS RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION - ALLOWED
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and SPOUSES HONESTO G. NICANDRO and ELISA F.
NICANDRO
G.R. No. L-28774 February 28, 1980
ANTONIO, J.

DOCTRINE:
General rule - curative statutes are forms of "retrospective legislation” which
reach back on past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid
and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended.

FACTS:
On March 18, 1955, the Board of Governors of petitioner-appellant DBP,
petitioner, under its Resolution No. 2004, appropriated the sum of
P1,204,000.00 to purchase land for a housing project for its employees. It
was contemplated that the Bank itself will build houses on the land to be
acquired and these will then be sold to employees who do not yet own homes
and who shall pay for them in monthly installments over a period of twenty
(20) years.

Pursuant thereto, on October 20, 1955, DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters
of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed Diliman Estate Subdivision of
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). However, the sale of
the lots to DBP, Lots 2 and 4, which form part of said 159 lots, were still sold
by PHHC to the spouses Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to
them by PHHC.

Atty. Roman Cariaga, Chief of the Sales Division of the PHHC, testified that on
or before September 29, 1958, he was summoned by Benjamin Gray,
Secretary to the Board of Directors of the PHHC, and, while in the latter’s room
was introduced to respondent-appellee, Honesto G. Nicandro. Gray then
requested Cariaga to prepare the order of payment for Lots 2 and 4 in favor
of Honesto G. Nicandro. Cariaga informed them (Gray and Nicandro) forthwith
that both lots were part of those already sold to the DBP.
In September 29, 1958, Mr. Sergio Ortiz Luis, a PHHC Director, and, at the
time, Acting Manager of the PHHC, wrote to the Chairman of the DBP that Lots
2 and 4, Block WT-21, had been inadvertently included among the lots sold to
the DBP and for said reason requested that the two lots be excluded from the
sale (Exhibit 1-DBP).

In his reply letter dated October 16, 1958, Chairman Gregorio S. Licaros of
the DBP refused to exclude Lots 2 and 4 as requested, insisting that they form
part of the 159 lots sold to the DBP as shown in the Sales Agreement dated
October 20, 1955 and for which DBP has made a partial payment of
P400,000.00 (Exhibit 2-DBP). On October 14, 1958, Acting Manager Sergio
Ortiz Luis, without waiting for the reply of DBP Chairman Licaros, approved
the order of payment for Lots 2 and 4, Block WT-21, in favor of appellees
Honesto G. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro who paid the sum of P700.56 and
P660.00 as down payment, representing 10% of the price of the lots.

On June 17, 1961, Republic Act No. 3147 was enacted, amending certain
provisions of the DBP Charter (Republic Act No. 85), among which was Section
13 which, as Section 23 in the amended law, now reads as follows:
“No officer or employee of the bank nor any government official who may
exercise executive or supervisory authority over the said bank either directly,
or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of others shall, except
when the same shall be in the form of advances appropriated or set aside by
the Bank itself in order to provide for housing for the benefit of its officials and
employees, borrow money from the Bank, nor shall become a guarantor,
indorser or surety for loans from the said bank to the others, or in any manner
be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the said Bank. Any such officer or
employee who violates the provisions of this section shall be immediately
removed by competent authority and said officer or employee shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor exceeding five years
and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand
pesos.”

Upon learning of PHHC’s previous transaction with DBP, the spouses filed a
complaint against DBP and the PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by
PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI held that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is
null and void, for being in violation of Section 13 of the DBP Charter.
ISSUE:
Whether Court of Appeals erred in not granting retroactive effect to Republic
Act No. 3147 amending Republic Act No. 85 which authorizes the DBP to
provide for housing for the benefit of its officials and employees

RULING:
Yes.
There cannot be any doubt that one of the purposes of Congress when it
enacted Republic Act No. 3147, by amending Section 13 of Republic Act No.
85, was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the
DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended
to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. This
is obvious from the fact that Republic Act No. 3147 was enacted on July 17,
1961, at a time when the legality of the acquisition of the lots by the DBP for
its housing project was under question. It is, therefore, a curative statute to
render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC.
It may be stated, as a general rule, that curative statutes are forms of
"retrospective legislation which reach back on past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended." They are intended
to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed and
intended, but which has failed of expected legal consequences by reason of
some statutory disability or irregularity in their action. They thus make valid
that which, before enactment of the statute, was invalid.
Therefore, DBP has the legal right over the lots in question.
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
J. AMADO ARANETA vs. ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA
RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-34882 August 24, 1976

ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT,

INC. vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL,
JUDGE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO ARANETA
G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976
BARREDO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system

FACTS:
Two separate but related petitions, that in G.R. No. L-34882 being for
certiorari and prohibition against the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of said court in refusing to dismiss the appeal of private
respondents from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a civil
action between the private parties and that in G.R. No. L-35643 being also
one for certiorari and prohibition against the same Court of First Instance of
Rizal for having issued a writ of execution of the decision, the finality of which
is in issue in G.R. No. L-34882.

In connection with the second petition (G.R. No. L-35643), on November 23,
1974, counsel for therein private respondent J. Amado Araneta filed a motion
for dismissal of the petition upon the ground basically that said private
respondent "would prefer to wait for the finality of the decision before availing
of the execution thereof." The Doronilas opposed such dismissal, unless it is
coupled with a final injunction of this Court against the questioned execution
orders of the trial court.

As regards the first petition (G.R. No. L-34882), it appears that in Civil Case
No. 9856 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, an action filed by J. Amado
Araneta for specific performance of an exclusive option to buy granted by him
to Alfonso Doronila, for himself and for A. Doronila Resources Development
Corporation, over two big parcels of land situated in the Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, at a total price of P13,071,215.00, and for damages,
the said court, after due trial, rendered on April 28, 1971 a decision against
Doronilas.

From this judgment, the Doronilas took steps to appeal to the Court of
Appeals, but in the said appellate court, J. Amado Araneta moved to dismiss
said appeal.
Plaintiff Appellee, J. Amado Araneta, filed a motion to dismiss appeal of
defendants-appellants on the ground that the record on appeal does not show
on its face that the appeal was perfected on time.

On February 10, 1972, defendants-appellants filed their answer alleging

among others that they filed their appeal on time. In support thereof, they
submit a copy of notice of the trial court (Annex A, Answer) giving them an
additional ten-day period within which to file their amended record on appeal.

ISSUE:
Does respondent’s appeal be taken into account despite the question of filing
within reglementary period?

RULING:
Yes. "Literal adherence to the 'material data rule'", to borrow Justice Munoz
Palma's expression in Krueger.

Under the rules (Sec. 7 of Rule 41), unless the court fixes a period for the
filing of the amended record on appeal, the same may be filed within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order for amendment. Assuming that the Doronilas
filed their original record on appeal as early as May 31, 1971, which is already
rather extraordinary, since generally, the record on appeal is filed some days
later, they still had a total of 24 days from May 31 to make a timely appeal by
filing their amended record on appeal. In other words, their reglementary
period would have expired on June 24, 1971. And since the Doronila amended
record on appeal was filed on June 22, 1971, it is almost beyond question that
their appeal was perfected on time.
Surely, matters of judicial notice constitute part of whatever data is required
under Section 1 of Rule 50 and Section 6 of Rule 41. And taking the
circumstances of judicial notice already referred to together with the absence
of any further objection in the Part of Araneta to the amended record on
appeal in question as well as the failure of Araneta to alleged categorically
that the original record on appeal of the Doronila was filed out of time or to
deny that it was filed within the reglementary period. We are persuaded that
the amended record on appeal here in dispute sufficiently complies with the
requirements of the rules.

Therefore, appeal is valid and filed within the period set by court. Thus, the
case can proceed with its regular course.
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL LICERA
G.R. No. L-39990, [July 22, 1975], 160 PHIL 270-274
Castro, J:

DOCTRINE:
Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule,
especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof.

FACTS:
In the municipal court, defendant was charged with the offenses of illegal
possession of firearm and assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
Found guilty of the first charge, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
the province. The second case against him was forwarded to the same court
where the parties agreed to a joint trial of the two cases but was only convicted
of illegal possession of firearm. Plaintiff brought the case to the Court of
Appeals invoking as his legal jurisdiction for his possession of firearm his
appointment as a secret agent by the Governor of Batangas. He claimed that
as secret agent he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang (L-12081, Dec. 23, 1959), he was exempt from the
requirements relating to issuance of license to possess. He alleged that the
lower court erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa (L-22301,
Aug. 30, 1967), which held that Section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by
provincial governors for the requirements relating to firearms licenses. The
case was certified to this Court on the ground that a question of law was
involved.
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not
only at the time of defendant's appointment as secret agent, which
appointment included a grant of authority to possess the firearm, but as well
as at the time of his apprehension, defendants incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal
requirements relating to firearm licenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of Mapa rule
retrospectively?

RULING:
Yes, at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the
time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without
the requisite license or permit thereof in 1965, the Macarandang rule formed
part of the jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa
revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves are not
laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates and old rule, the new doctrine
should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored
by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith
thereof.
DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
ABDON HOSANA vs. BALBINO DIOMANO and FRANCISCO DIOMANO
G.R. No. 27116, [October 3, 1927]
Villa-Real, J:

DOCTRINE:
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; DEPOSIT; ACT NO. 2588. — During the
course of the hearing of an appeal from a judgment rendered by a justice
court in an action for forcible entry and detainer, the appellee moved to
dismiss on the ground that the appellants had not made the deposit required
by section 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Abdon Hosana, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas dismissing the case without any special
pronouncement as to costs, on the ground that the said plaintiff had not
reproduced his complaint in the Court of First Instance within the period of
two months, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2111, amending
section 78 of Act No. 190.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged
errors as committed by the court a quo in its order, to wit: "1. The trial court
erred in holding that Act No. 3171 is not applicable in the instant case; 2. The
trial court erred in holding that the provisions of Act No. 3171 have no
retrospective effect; 3. The trial court erred in dismissing the case."
The essential and pertinent facts for the resolution of this appeal may
be summarized as follows:
On May 8, 1924, the plaintiff-appellant, Abdon Hosana, brought an
action for forcible entry and detainer against Balbino Diomano and Francisco
Diomano, in the justice of the peace court of Pitogo, Tayabas. Judgment
having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants appealed the
case to the Court of First Instance of the said province. While the case was
pending in the Court of First Instance, the clerk, on September 22, 1924,
notified the plaintiff to file a new complaint or reproduce the original complaint
within the period of two months from the date of the receipt of said notice,
that is, on or before November 22, 1924, pursuant to the provisions of Act No.
2111.
 On October 30, 1924, Act No. 3171 of the Philippine Legislature,
amending section 78 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2111, went into
effect.
Relying on the provisions of the new law, the plaintiff did not reproduce
in the Court of First Instance the original complaint filed by him in the justice
of the peace court, nor did he present a new one.
On March 31, 1926, upon motion of the attorney for the defendants, the
lower court dismissed the case on the grounds stated above.

ISSUE:
Whether Act No. 3171 has retroactive effect and whether its provisions are
applicable to appeals pending at the time of its enactment.

RULING:
ACT No. 3171. — to shorten the period and simplify the proceedings in cases
appealed from the justice of the peace courts, by eliminating the sixty-day
period within which the plaintiffs are required to reproduce their complaints,
which are considered reproduced from the moment the appeal is docketed in
the Court of First Instance, making it the duty of the clerk of court to notify
the defendant by registered mail, so that he may interpose a demurrer or file
his answer within the reglementary period.
IF LAW IS REMEDIAL IN NATURE
JOSE H. GUEVARA vs. ANANLAS LAICO
G.R. No. 44057, [February 27, 1937], 64 PHIL 144-151
VILLA-REAL, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but sanity is
presumed, and." . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense
of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him . . .
." (U. S. v. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. v. Hontiveros
Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62; People v. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and
reiterate this doctrine.

FACTS:
In civil case No. 794 of the justice of the peace court of the municipality
of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein the herein respondents Carlos
Young, Newland Baldwin, and Adele C. Baldwin, as sublessors, doing
business under the firm name of The Tunasan Estates, were plaintiffs, and
the herein petitioner Jose H. Guevara, as sublessee, was defendant,
judgment was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant, condemning the defendant
to vacate lot No. 298-A of The Tunasan Estates; to pay the sum of
P61.38 as rents due to the premises with legal interest from the date
of the filing of this complaint; the sum of P30.69 equivalents to 50
per cent of the rent due and unpaid as penalty for non-payment and
costs of this action."
As the above-named defendant had not appealed from said judgment,
it became final and executory. On January 17, 1935, upon petition of said
plaintiffs, a writ of execution (Exhibit A), addressed to the herein respondent
provincial sheriff of Laguna, was issued, ordering him to cause the defendant
immediately to vacate said property and to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiffs. Likewise, commanded to collect from him the rents, damages and
costs, and upon failure of the defendant to pay, attach the personal property
of said defendant, except such as is exempt from execution, and sell the
same in the manner provided by law in such cases, until the amount equal
to that of the judgment is obtained, plus the costs of the suit, and the
corresponding interest thereon from the date of the judgment, aside from
lawful fees on this execution, turning over the amount so collected from the
plaintiffs in this case, excluding the lawful fees on the execution."
On January 18, 1935, provincial sheriff of Laguna required the therein
defendant and herein petitioner Jose H. Guevara to remove his house from
the residential lot No. 298-A of The Tunasan Estates, giving him until January
24, 1935, to do so, and warning him that if he fail to comply, said sheriff
would be compelled to do so himself.
On January 22, 1935, the attorney for the petitioner wrote to the
respondent sheriff asking him what steps he proposed to take in compliance
with said writ of execution.
The next day, said sheriff answered the attorney for the petitioner
saying that he would follow the practice usually observed in the service of
writs of execution of the same nature and that he would eject the defendant
and execution debtor Jose H. Guevara from the residential lot No. 298-A
remove the latter's house therefrom and collect the various amounts and
fees mentioned in said writ of execution.
On January 26, 1935, the attorney for the petitioner again wrote to
the respondent sheriff telling him that in view of the vagueness of the terms
of the writ of execution as to the manner of compliance therewith, he should
consult the competent court in regard thereto.
On January 31, 1935, the respondent sheriff answered said attorney
telling him, among other things, the following: "Inasmuch as the size and
construction of the defendant's house are such that it is impossible to remove
it from the lot without tearing it down, the house not being portable except
certain parts thereof, consequently, said house will necessarily have to be
demolished."
Petitioner Guevara filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, now under consideration, against
Ananias Laico, provincial sheriff of Laguna, Carlos Young, Newland Baldwin
and Adele C. Baldwin, doing business under the firm name of The Tunasan
Estates. Said petition was docketed as civil case No. 6613 of said court. It
prayed for the issuance of a writ or preliminary injunction to become final
and permanent after the corresponding proceedings and hearing, ordering
the respondent sheriff to leave the petitioner in the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of his rights of ownership of said house belonging to him, with
the costs to the respondents, alleging that the demolition of the house was
neither ordered in the writ of execution nor authorized by law.
On February 1935, the Court of First Instance of Laguna granted the
petition and ordered the issuance of the corresponding writ of preliminary
injunction, after filing a bond of P100.
In answer to the petition, respondent Ananias Laico denied each and
every one of the facts stated therein and, as a special defense, alleged,
among other things, stating that "The petitioner's application consists in his
earnest desire to show that, in attempting to comply with said writ of
execution the delivery of possession of the land described therein as lot No.
298-A of The Tunasan Estates, he has acted under the sincere and honest
conviction on his part that said writ of execution included the removal from
the land not only of the person of the defendant but also of his house of
mixed materials constructed thereon, requested the respondent sheriff to
turn over to them the possession of said land, first removing therefrom not
only the person of the defendant but also his house of mixed materials
constructed, as an indispensable prerequisite to restitution of possession of
the land to the plaintiffs."
Respondents Carlos Young, Newland Baldwin and Adele C. Baldwin,
denied each and every one of the facts alleged therein, and set up a special
defense with a counterclaim praying that the petitioner be ordered to pay
them the sum of P1,000 as damages plus the sum of P61.38 as annual rent
from January 1, 1935, in accordance with the judgment rendered in civil case
No. 794 of the justice of the peace court of San Pedro, Laguna, with the
costs.
The petitioner Guevara denied each and every one of the facts alleged
therein. After due trial and hearing of the evidence presented by the
respective parties, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered judgment
on June 19, 1935.
The petitioner interposed the present appeal from said judgment,
assigning the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo, to
wit:
"1. In not holding that by virtue of the writ of ejectment under the
terms prescribed in section 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
sheriff, process server or any other person, has neither right nor
 authority to demolish or destroy the house of the appellant, as
execution debtor in the writ of ejectment.
"2. In not declaring the writ of preliminary injunction, previously
issued, permanent and final, in dismissing the complaint with costs,
and in ordering the petitioner to pay P5.12 monthly, as
compensation for the occupation of the premises.
"3. In denying the new trial applied for and in not providing for the
opinion of experts for the assessment and compensation of the value
of the house in question."

ISSUE:
Whether or not said court erred "in not holding that by virtue of the writ of
ejectment under the terms prescribed in section 85 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

RULING:
The legal provision contained in section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 89
prohibits the sheriff, executing a decision in an ejectment case, from
destroying, demolishing or removing the improvements constructed by the
defendant and execution debtor or his agents, unless, upon petition of the
plaintiff or his attorney and after due hearing, it is so authorized by the court
upon the failure of the defendant and execution debtor to do so within a
reasonable time, after having been so ordered by said court.
In view of this new law, which is procedural in nature and, therefore,
with a retroactive effect (Enrile vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 36 Phil.,
574; Hosana vs. Diomano and Diomano, 56 Phil., 741), the respondent sheriff
cannot carry out the demolition of the petitioner's house constructed by him
on the lot in question
Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes no distinction between
a simple complaint and a complaint praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, in authorizing the defendant to set forth by answer all
the facts constituting his defense and the counterclaims he may have,
whatever their nature, provided they are in favor of all the substantial
defendants and against all the substantial plaintiffs in the action, as required
by section 96 of said Code. The counterclaim under consideration herein is in
favor of the substantial defendants and execution creditors Carlos Young,
Newland Baldwin and Adele C. Baldwin, the other defendant Ananias Laico, as
provincial sheriff of Laguna, being a mere process server, and against the
substantial plaintiff, the herein petitioner, Jose H. Guevara.
A preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy and it may be issued by
a court only in an action pending before it or before an inferior tribunal (section
163, Act No. 190). Therefore, the judgment rendered in favor of said
respondents, upon their counterclaim, is in accordance with law and the result
of the evidence. Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed in so far as it
orders the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued, which is
made permanent, and it is affirmed in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
IF LAWS ARE REMEDIAL IN NATURE
ANASTACIO LAUREL vs. ERIBERTO MISA
G.R. No. L-200, [March 28, 1946], 76 PHIL 372-411
BENGZON, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Per Legem Terrae- The historical antecedents of the phrase "due process of
law" may be clearly traced back to the expression per legem terrae as it occurs
in the Charter wrung by the Barons from King John.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen who was arrested in Camarines Sur by
the United States Army under a commitment order "for his active
collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but he was
turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been
under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons.
Petitioner Anastacio Laurel demands his release from Bilibid Prison,
mainly asserting that Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating People's Court,
specially section 19, under which he is detained as a political prisoner, is
unconstitutional and void. The Solicitor General, meeting the issue, sustains
the validity of the whole law.
Petitioner Anastacio Laurel also contends that the aforesaid section
violates our Constitution, because it is (a)discriminatory in nature; (b)
unlawful delegation of legislative powers; and (c) retroactive in operation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 682 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Petition is denied.
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, suspending the provision so
of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in so far as political detainees were
concerned, for six months from their formal delivery by the Commander in
Chief of United States Army in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government, is not discriminatory in nature, unlawful delegation of legislative
powers, retroactive in operation
IF LAWS ARE REMEDIAL IN NATURE, EXCEPTION TO PROSPECTIVE
EFFECT OF LAWS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO SUMILANG
G.R. No. 49187, December 18, 1946
FERIA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
New rules of courts can apply to pending actions.

FACTS:
The petitioner in this case was convicted by the Court of First Instance
of Laguna of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty
of from 5 years 4 months and 21 days of presidio correccional to 10 years and
1 day of prision mayor.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower
court. The petitioner filed on June 14, 1944, a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the
petition was denied on July 5, 1944. A motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner on July 17, 1944,
and also denied.
From the records it appears that a copy of the resolution of this Court
denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner's attorney
at big address 307 Palma, Quiapo, Manila. But the attorney for the petitioner
alleges now that he did not receive the notice because then "he was already
hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla officer of the Markings
guerrilla," and "prays this Court that the reading of the sentence of the
accused be suspended and that said accused be permitted or allowed to file
whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary
for the protection of the rights of the accused.", which suspends, until further
notice, section 8 of Rule 53, and provides that judgment shall be enteredupon
the expiration of fifteen days from notice of such judgment to the parties in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural laws are retrospective in effect.
RULING:
Yes, procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is
applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it cannot
be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had
become final before said resolution became effective. In this case, the
motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17,
1944, and a second motion for rehearing or consideration could not be filed
after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from promulgation of the
order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been
pending in this Court (section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired
before the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the
Court cannot permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in
the present case.
MANDATORY LAW SHALL PREVAIL OVER DIRECTORY LAWS.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA. GILBERT R.
BREHM and ESTER MIRA BREHM vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18566, [September 30, 1963], 118 PHIL 1005-1009
PAREDES, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 5 of the Civil Code: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
Mandatory Law Shall Prevail Over Directory Laws.
Provisions that contain words of positive prohibition and is couched in the
negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise
than designated are MANDATORY.

FACTS:
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with
temporary assignment at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester
Mira, a Filipina citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by another man, also
of the American navy, who left the country in 1952.After the marriage, the
couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila, and the minor Elizabeth
had always been under their care and support of Brehm.
On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor
Elizabeth.
An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert R. Brehm was
registered by the Republic of the Philippines, it appearing that Brehm’s
residence in the Philippines was merely temporary same being effective only
for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him from
making an adoption because under Art. 335[4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule
100, Rules of Court, that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no
jurisdiction over him.
A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They claim that
Art. 335 does not apply in the case, reasoning out that it covers only
adoptions for the purpose of establishing a relationship of paternity and
filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not
total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child
and Brehm, created by affinity and that Art. 338 of the New Civil Code,
expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, in which
category petitioner Brehm falls. Petitioners contend that the records show
their residence in Manila, for while Brehm works at Subic, he always goes
home to Manila, during weekends and manifested that he intends to reside
in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the U.S. Naval
Forces.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court rendered the pertinent
portions of which read —
WHEREFORE, finding that the principal allegations of the
petitioners are true, it is hereby adjudged that henceforth
the minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and is,
to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners
Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, said minor's
surname being changed from 'Mira to 'Mira Brehm."
The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment, claiming that
it was error for the Court in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the adopted
child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. The appeal, however, did not assail the
right of petitioner Ester Mira Brehm, the natural mother of the minor, to
adopt her.
There is no question that petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm is a non- resident alien.
By his own testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his status here,
and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason, he is
not qualified to adopt. On this very point, we have recently declared —
"The only issue in this appeal is whether or not being permanent
residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby
Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that —
'The following cannot adopt:(4) Non-resident aliens;'

ISSUE:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are
qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
RULING:
No, because Brehm is an American citizen serving the U.S. Navy with
temporary assignment at Subic Bay, is a non-resident alien and cannot adopt
anybody in the Philippines. The stepfather of the minor is disqualified to adopt
said step-child when said step- father is a non-resident alien.
Article 335 No. 4, of the Civil Code is mandatory because it contains
words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative terms importing that
the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated. On the other
hand, Article 338, No. 3, of the same Code is merely directory, and can only
be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions
of said article 335.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and Brehm’s Petition to adopt
the child Elizabeth Mira, denied.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
TEODORO M. CASTRO vs. AMADO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-17915, [January 31, 1967], 125 PHIL 611-620
MAKALINTAL, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the 8
other assistant revenue regional directors does not amount to a waiver on
their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence
must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent or waive is
unmistakable.

FACTS:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that
of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II, Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was
appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is being questioned by
petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The court a quo annulled
Toledo’s appointment, but did not grant Castro’s prayer that respondent
officials be ordered to appoint him.
Castro wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue protesting
said appointment and that he should have been considered for the position.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, informed Castro that the contested
position, is for Regional District No. 3, Manila, and the appointment thereto
had to be issued to the person actually performing the functions of the
position,” namely, respondent Toledo.
Castro appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who indorsed the
matter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with a request for a
statement of the comparative qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After
setting forth the qualifications as requested, the Commissioner explained
that since the protested position was for Regional District No. 3, Manila,
where Toledo was next in rank, and since he was actually performing the
functions of the controverted office, there was no need to make a comparison
between his qualifications and those of Castro.
The Commissioner of Civil Service rendered his decision dismissing Castro’s
protest on the ground that the contested position belonged properly to
Regional District No. 3, where Toledo was the next ranking employee, while
Castro was in Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City.
Hence, Castro filed the present petition asking that Toledo’s appointment be
annulled and that he be declared entitled to the position. As already stated,
the trial court rejected Castro’s claim, but at the same time annulled Toledo’s
appointment — this last on the ground that his previous appointment as
Chief Revenue Examiner was illegal.
Both sides appealed from the decision

ISSUE:
Whether the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their
rights to the position by their failure to complain against Toledo’s
appointment.

RULING:
No, the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors did not waive their
rights to the position by their failure to complain against Toledo’s
appointment.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the 8
other assistant revenue regional directors does not amount to a waiver on
their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence
must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent or waive is
unmistakable.
Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight
others were not interested in the position. Not having shown either seniority
in rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the
Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro
has failed to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle him touts
respondent Toledo.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
AZ P. ARRIETA and VITALIADO ARRIETA vs. NATIONAL RICE AND
CORN CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-15645, [January 31, 1964], 119 PHIL 339-350
REGALA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly
shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other reasonable
explanation

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the defendant-appellant NARIC from the decision
of the trial court dated February 20, 1958, awarding to the plaintiffs-
appellees the amount of $286,000.00 as damages for breach of contract and
dismissing the counterclaim and third party complaint of the defendant-
appellant NARIC.
Arrieta and the appellant corporation entered into a Contract of Sale of Rice.
The former obligated herself to deliver to the latter 20,000 metric tons of
Burmess Rice at $203.00 per metric ton. In turn, defendant corporation
committed itself to pay for the imported rice “by means of an irrevocable,
confirmed and assignable letter of credit in U.S. currency in favor of the
plaintiff-appellee and/or supplier in Burma, Thiri Setkya immediately.
Appellee made a tender to her supplier in, Burma, and arranged the sale of
20,000 metric tons of Burmess Rice. Appellee made a 5% deposit amounting
to P200,000 as advance payment to Setkya. Arrieta promised Setkya that he
will be paid by NARIC on August 4, 1952
NARIC applied to open a letter of credit on the amount of $3,614,000.00 with
the Philippine National Bank, but requires that NARIC deposits 50% of the said
amount. NARIC failed to do this and the letter of credit was delayed when the
obligation to pay Setkya became due. Because of this, Arrieta lost the
opportunity to profit from the sale as the agreement was eventually forfeiteder
5% depoit was likewise forfeited pursuant to Burma laws.
Appellee offered to substitute Thailand rice instead to the defendant NARIC to
offer as a solution which should be beneficial to the NARIC and her, however,
was rejected by the appellant.
On the foregoing, the appellee sent a letter to the appellant, demanding
compensation for the damages caused her in the sum of $286,000.00, U.S.
currency, representing unrealized profit. The demand having been rejected
she instituted this case now on appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offer to substitute Thailand rice for the originally
contracted Burmese rice amounted to a waiver by the appellee of whatever
rights she might have derived from the breach of the contract.

RULING:
No. The court said Waivers are not presumed, but must be clearly and
convincingly shown, either by express stipulation or acts admitting no other
reasonable explanation. In the case at bar, no such intent to waive has been
established.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the sole modification that
the award should be converted into the Philippine peso at the rate of exchange
prevailing at the time the obligation was incurred or on July 1, 1952 when the
contract was executed. The appellee insurance company, in the light of this
judgment, is relieved of any liability under this suit.
WAIVER OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHT, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
MATIAS GONGON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-24421, [April 30, 1970], 143 PHIL 357-364
FERNANDO, J.:.

DOCTRINE:
Petitioner’s waiver of his preferential right over the lot being contrary to the
avowed policy laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 539, such waiver is null
and void.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila of Matias
Gongon's complaint to set aside the decision of the Land Tenure
Administration — as affirmed by the Office of the President — awarding Lot
18-B, Block 23 of the Tambobong Estate, to herein private respondent Amada
Aquino, wife of her co-respondent Rufino Rivera. The decision appealed from
likewise ordered Gongon to turn over the possession of the litigated lot to
Amada Aquino, to pay the rentals due at the rate of P6.00 a month from 1949
until such possession is restored to her and to pay attorney's fees in the
amount of P1,000.00.
Lot 18-B, Block 23, with an area of 274 square meters, is a portion of
the Tambobong Estate in Malabon, Rizal, which used to belong in its entirety
to the Roman Catholic Church. The lot was originally leased to Amada Aquino.
who in turn sublet it in 1934 to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a
nominal monthly rental of P6.00. The sublessee constructed his residential
house on the property and since then has been living there, together with his
family.
Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the Government
from the Roman Catholic Church on December 31, 1947 under the provisions
of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, which authorized the President of
the Philippines ". In due time Matias Gongon filed an application with the
defunct Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of Lot 18-B, Block 23,
claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant. The application was opposed
by Amada Aquino, who also filed her own application, alleging that as bona
fide tenant or lessee she had the preferential right to purchase the lot. After
investigation, the Director of Lands rendered a decision on May 31, 1965
approving Gongon's application, he being the actual occupant. On appeal to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this official set aside the
order of the Director of Lands and gave due course to Amada Aquino's
application.
Matias Gongon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied
by the Land Tenure Administration. Matias Gongon then appealed to the Office
of the President, which thereafter affirmed the decision of the Land Tenure
Administration.
The Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 18-B in
favor of Amada Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, on March 10, 19761,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her name.
On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to annul the decisions of the Land Tenure
Administration and of not in question to him; to cancel its registration in the
name of Amada Aquino and to have it registered in his name instead. The
complaint likewise contained a prayer for attorney's fees and costs.
It is noteworthy that the Land Tenure Administration, in a manifestation
it filed in the lower court on May 27, 1961, made common cause with herein
appellant Matias Gongon, stating (in part) as follows:
"That at the time it issued the said Order, the LTA Board of
Administrators was newly constituted and therefore it has not
had sufficient time to study thoroughly the legality or wisdom of
the Bureau of Lands policy giving preference right to tenants to
purchase the lots leased by them over and above the actual
occupants or sub lessees thereof; hence, it just affirmed the said
decision of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
as a matter of sound administrative policy.
That after a serious study of the issues of facts and of law in
cases identical to the case at bar, the LTA Board of
Administrators found out that it would be more in keeping with
the spirit and intention of the laws (Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20
and 539 and Republic Act No 1400) governing acquisition and
disposition of the landed estates (including the Tambobong
Estate) if it followed the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court
in the case of Marukot, et al. v. Jacinto, et al., (GR. Nos. L-8036-
38) promulgated on December 20, 1955, giving the actual
occupants or sublessees the preference to purchase the lots
occupied by them as against tenants or lessees who do not
occupy the same; hence answering defendant subsequently
 reversed the policy followed by the Bureau of Lands and adopted
by the doctrines laid down in the Marukot case."
As stated, the lower court dismissed the complaint. In due time the
plaintiff elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In affirming the decision
appealed from the appellate court pointed out (1) that the finding of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as affirmed by the Office of
the President, to the effect that appellant Matias Gongon had waived whatever
right he might have had over the lot in question was factual in nature and
could not be reviewed by the courts; and (2) that appellant could be not
considered as a bona fide occupant of the lot because his possession as
sublessee was in effect possession by the lessee, citing Article 524 of the Civil
Code.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals, Matias Gongon filed the present petition for review, contending that
the appellate court erred in failing to recognize his right as sub lessee-tenant
to the lot in question and in not cancelling the sale thereof to respondent
Amada Aquino as well as its registration in her name; in holding that he had
waived his right to the lot in question in favor of respondents-spouses Amada
Aquino and Rufino Rivera; and in ordering him to pay rentals at the rate of
P6.00 a month from 1949, plus attorney's fees and costs.

ISSUE:
If the petitioner has, whether or not the alleged waiver of whatever right he
might have had over said lot is valid.

RULING:
No, his preferential right could not be validly waived, such waiver being
against public policy.
Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code “rights may be waived, unless the waiver
is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
In the case at bar, petitioner's waiver of his preferential right over the lot
being contrary to the avowed policy laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 539,
such waiver is null and void.
the decision appealed from is reversed. The award of the lot in question to
respondent Amada Aquino is set aside; transfer certificate of title No. 84738
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal is ordered cancelled; and petitioner is
declared to have the preferential right to purchase the said lot. Costs against
respondents.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAURICIO
ALILLANA and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-25245, [December 11, 1967], 129 PHIL 497-503
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

DOCTRINE:
Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise, like the
Labor Ministry (Department), are accorded respect and finality and that the
remedy of certiorari does not lie in the absence of any showing of abuse or
misuse of power properly vested in the Ministry (Department) of Labor and
Employment.

FACTS:
Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domestic corporation engaged in
producing copra, on July 19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment.
On April 21, 1958, Alillana suffered from pains at the ribs; he was found
with bronchitis and went on leave. On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowed
by the company to resume his work.
Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time complained of cough, with
chest and back pains, for which he was treated. Referred for physical and X-
ray examinations, on July 6, 1958, his condition was found to be as follows:
"Far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis at the left lung, associated with
bronchitis." The next day, on July 7, 1958, he retired from the company.
Franklin Baker Co. paid him P188.16 under its non-occupational sickness and
disability benefit plan for the period from July 7, 1958 to October 29, 1958;
and P669.12 as retirement benefits.
Alillana subsequently filed a claim for disability compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. On February 28, 1963, the Regional Office
hearing officer awarded disability benefits. Franklin Baker Co. elevated the
case to the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, on October 11, 1963,
affirmed the award, slightly reducing the amount to P3,015.06. Section 14
was applied, on temporary total disability, i.e., 60% of his average weekly
wage of P27.01, times the maximum of 208 weeks less a brief period when
he had "odd-lot" or sporadic employment.
On July 25, 1964, Franklin Baker Co. paid said award of P3,015.06.
Satisfaction thereof was acknowledged by Alillana in writing.
 Thereafter, alleging continuing disability from his ailment, Alillana filed
a motion in the same case for additional compensation. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission, ordered a physical examination of Alillana. After
said physical examination by one of the Commission's doctors, finding Alillana
still suffering from temporary total disability due to his ailment, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission issued an order for additional compensation of
P984.94, thus raising the total award to the then statutory maximum of
P4,000.
Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission en banc denied the motion, stating that the period
of disability can be extended beyond 208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.
In Avecilla Building Corporation vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-10668, September 26, 1957, this Court already ruled that the
maximum period of 208 weeks can be extended under Section 18, as amended
by Republic Act 772.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Commission has the power
under Section 18 to extend the period of disability under Section 14 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.

RULING:
Yes. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission has power under Sec.
18 to extend the period of disability under Sec. 14 of the Act.
This Court has already ruled that the maximum period of 208 weeks as
fixed in Section 14 can be extended under Section 18, as amended by Rep.
Act 772. The right of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen
a case already decided by him is an innovation introduced by Rep. Act 772
particularly, Sec. 13 thereof, amending Sec. 18 (last par.) of the original
Workmen's Compensation Law, Act 3428 and is solely for the benefit of the
employee as may be gathered from the proviso that the Commissioner may
from time to time cause examination of the condition of the disabled laborer,
with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of compensation (Avecilla
Building Corporation vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-10668,
Sept. 26, 1957).
In the case at bar the disabled employee has signed a satisfaction
receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any
agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to
recover under the Act (Sec. 29).
The appealed orders of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are
hereby affirmed.
PROHIBITION AGAINST WAIVER
THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (Formerly San Miguel Brewery Inc.)
vs. MACARIO CRUZ and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-27828, [February 27, 1970], 142 PHIL 708-714
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

DOCTRINE:
It has been held that the acceptance of benefits such as separation pay and
terminal leave benefits would not amount to estoppel or waiver of right of
employee to contest his illegal dismissal.

FACTS:
Petition filed by the San Miguel Corporation (formerly San Miguel
Brewery, Inc.) for review of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
(in Case No. 2870-ULP), finding it guilty of unfair labor practices and ordering
the reinstatement with back wages of complainant Macario Cruz.
The records of the case show that sometime in October, 1957 the
"Pagkakaisa Samahang Mangagawa sa S.M.B. (Paflu)", a labor organization
in the San Miguel Corporation, staged a strike against the latter. After said
strike ended and the strikers resumed their work, Macario Cruz, a driver-
employee and member of the Union, was called by one Mr. Camahort, a
company official, and was shown a newspaper clipping carrying a picture
depicting him (Cruz) as one of the strikers. According to Cruz, he was told
by Camahort that he would be dismissed if he would not desist from union
activities. A few months thereafter Cruz was advised of the company's
decision to retire him from the service for physical disability, effective 31
March 1958. Cruz must have already received information thereof before it
could be sent by the company because under date of 15 March 1958 said
employee wrote the company requesting that the benefits due him on
account of his retirement be given in only one installment. Accordingly, Cruz
received from the company HSBC Checks Nos. K905357 and K905358 in the
total sum of P3,019.46 as "full and complete payment of all my (his)
retirement benefits."
On 12 June 1958, Cruz also filed with the Social Security System an
application for disability benefit, wherein he affirmed having retired from
employment on 31 March 1958. This claim, however, was denied for the
reason that the case properly falls under sickness benefits, to which claimant
was not yet entitled, he having been a member of the System for less than
one year.
Three years after he was retired, on 27 May 1961, Macario Cruz
charged the San Miguel Company before the Court of Industrial Relations
with unfair labor practices for his dismissal in 1958, allegedly for union
activities. The formal complaint against the company was filed by the Acting
Prosecutor of the Court on 12 October 1961 (Case No. 2870-ULP). After
hearing, the trial Judge rendered a decision sustaining the charges and
ordering the respondent Company to reinstate the complainant with back
wages, but deducting therefrom the amounts already received by him as
retirement benefits. The company sought reconsideration thereof before the
court en banc, and when the same was denied on 5 June 1967 (with two
judges dissenting) the present petition for review was filed.
In disposing of the company's defense of estoppel and ruling that the
acceptance by complainant of retirement benefits did not preclude the latter
from assailing the validity of the termination of his employment, the
respondent Court cited the case of Cariño vs. Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a former employee who has accepted retirement benefits may
still contest the regularity and validity of his retirement 3 years thereafter.

RULING:
No. A Former employee who has accepted retirement benefits may no
longer contest the regularity and validity of his retirement 3 years thereafter.
The acceptance of separation and terminal leave benefits by the
employee do not amount to estoppel as to preclude him from assailing the
validity of the termination of his employment, cannot be controlling in the case
at bar. First petitioners were improperly dismissed and never relented in their
efforts to assert the illegality of their separation from employment and to
demand reinstatement. By contrast, herein complainant not only specified,
and obtained payment of retirement gratuities due him in a lump sum; he
even applied for disability benefits with the Social Security System. He never
protested his alleged illegal dismissal nor demanded reinstatement. It took
him more than 3 years to question the validity of his said retirement. The
original posture taken by the complainant, indeed, can be nothing but an
agreement, or at least acquiescence, to the decision of the company to have
him retired for physical disability. Thus, even assuming that where was ground
to declare his separation from the service invalid, complainant's receipt of all
the benefits arising therefrom, with full knowledge of all the facts surrounding
the same, amounts to waiver of the right to contest the validity of the
company's act.
The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations under review is
reversed, and the complaint for unfair labor practices against the petitioner,
dismissed.
REPEALS OF LAWS
JOAQUIN QUIMSING vs. CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-in-Charge
of the PC Controlled-Police Dept., Iloilo City; LT. NARCISO ALIÑO, JR.,
Actg. Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO, PC
Provincial Commander of the Province of Iloilo
G.R. No. L-14683, [May 30, 1961], 112 PHIL 110-120
CONCEPCION, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Repeals and even amendments by implication are not favored, whereas
an affirmative answer would entail a vital amendment, amounting, for all
practical purposes.

FACTS:
Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly
licensed cockpit, located in the District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February
13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city police force and the
Constabulary, under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso
Aliño Jr., upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day,
not a legal holiday. Quimsing claimed that the cockpit was authorized to
operate by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on October
31, 1956. This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica allegedly threatened to raid
the cockpit should cockfighting be held therein, thereafter, on Thursday.
Moreover, Quimsing and nine other persons were arrested and then charged
in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 and 2286 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Quimsing, in turn, commenced the present action, in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, against Major Cesar Lucero, as the then provincial
commander of the Constabulary, and Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso
Aliño Jr., as incumbent PC officer in charge and acting chief of police,
respectively, of the Iloilo City Police.
In his petition, Quimsing set up two causes of action; one for the
recovery from respondents, in their private capacity, of compensatory
damages, as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly sustained in
consequence of the raid and arrest effected on February 13, 1958, upon the
ground that the same were made illegally and in bad faith, because
cockfighting on Thursdays was authorized by Ordinances Nos. 5 and 58 of
the City of Iloilo, in relation to Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing
was at odds with the city mayor of Iloilo; and another for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and after trial, a permanent injunction, restraining respondents,
in their official capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of
said cockpit on Thursdays and making any arrest in connection therewith.
In their answer, respondents alleged that the raid and arrest
aforementioned were made in good faith, without malice and in the faithful
discharge of their official duties as law enforcing agents, and that, pursuant
to the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, petitioner cannot legally hold cockfighting on
Thursdays, despite said ordinances of the City of Iloilo. Respondents,
likewise, set up a P150,000 counterclaim for moral and exemplary
damages.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered
judgment dismissing the petition, as well as respondents' counterclaim.
Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that:
"1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from
representing the respondents-appellees in the first cause of action
of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;
"2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from
asking the invalidity of an ordinance of the City of Iloilo;
"3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 5, series of
1954, as amended by Ordinance No. 58, series of 1956, of the City
of Iloilo as illegal;
"4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the
petitioner."
The first three assignments of error are related to petitioner's second cause
of action, whereas the fourth assignment of error refers to the first cause of
action. Hence, we will begin by considering the last assignment of error.

ISSUE:
Whether or not peace officers who arrested persons attending a cockfight may
not be sentenced to pay moral and exemplary damages.
RULING:
No, officers are not sentenced to pay moral and exemplary damages.
Where officers of the law, in good faith and under the firm conviction
that they were faithfully discharging their duty as law enforcing agents, raided
a cockpit and arrested its owner and several other persons, although the
holding of the cockfight on that day was authorized under two city ordinances,
said officers are not sentenced to pay moral and exemplary damages, the
assessment of which "is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case"
Although this section imposes upon the city fiscal the duty to appear in the
cases specified, it does not prohibit him from representing city officers sued
as private individuals on account of acts performed by them in their official
capacity, especially when, as in the case at bar, they claim to have acted in
good faith and in accordance with a legal provision, which they earnestly
believed, as the lower court believed, should be construed in the manner set
forth in their answer. Again, under petitioner's second cause of action,
respondents are sued in their official capacity. This fact and the circumstances
under which respondents performed the acts involved in the first cause of
action sufficiently justified the appearance of the City Fiscal of Iloilo on their
behalf.
REPEAL OF LAWS (EXPRESS VS IMPLIED)
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. vs.
HON. JOSE Y. FELICIANO, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-24022, [March 3, 1965], 121 PHIL 358-379
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws and parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed.
Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition
that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being
the case the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore.

FACTS:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General
Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the
Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice,
thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to
the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its
Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his
cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved
the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the
Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to
undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano
announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for
February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452
which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law
appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as
taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose
Y. Feliciano, from conducting the bid scheduled and from doing any other act
that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this
Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due course, this Court granted
upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having
been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer, do not dispute the essential allegations
of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the importation
sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the
provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being
undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the National
Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is
prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the
importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon payment of
the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration,
or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of
rice and corn exclusively to private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so
the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from
this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the
government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And
this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on
the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among
other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent
shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the
President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any
government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the
National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present
which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting
in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after
consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to
stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason
why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.
ISSUE:
Whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452.

RULING:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
The provision of Republic Act 2207 on government importation of rice
still stands. Section 2 of said Act, among other things, provides that there
should be an existing or imminent shortage of the local supply of rice of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the
National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such
importation thru any government agency that he may designate.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that "all laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly" is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather,
it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the
case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to
different methods applicable to different circumstances. Thus, the total
banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in Republic
Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the
Administration. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban
of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted
to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the
same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a
total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being
applicable only to the government during normal period.
REPEAL OF LAWS
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, as
Collector of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 14205, [September 30, 1919], 40 PHIL 224-231
JOHNSON, J.:

DOCTRINE:
In such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is discarded and
repealed (In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53)

FACTS:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila on the 20th day of December, 1916. Its purpose was to recover of
the defendant the sum of P83,159.63 which the plaintiff had paid to the
defendant as internal-revenue tax, under protest.
The plaintiff alleged that the said sum had been illegally assessed and
collected by the defendant as internal-revenue tax during the years 1915
and 1916; that by virtue of its charter, subsection 12 of section 1, in relation
with subsection 10 of Act NO. 1510, it was relieved from all taxes of every
name and nature — municipal, provincial or central — upon its capital stock,
franchise, right of way, earnings, or other property owned or operated by it,
except those mentioned in said charter (Act No. 1510); that the amount
which the defendant collected and for which the present action was brought
was not included as a part of the taxes which the plaintiff was required to
pay under its charter. The defendant admitted that the amount collected was
collected as internal-revenue tax upon certain oil and coal which the plaintiff
had imported into the Philippine Islands, for its use.
All of the facts alleged by the plaintiff were admitted to be true. The
defendant alleged as a special defense, in justification of his collection of said
sum, that "during the period covered by the complaint the plaintiff imported
into the Philippine Islands at various times, various quantities of coal and oil
by virtue of the provisions of subdivision C of section 4 of the Act of Congress
of October 3, 1913, upon importation into the Philippine Islands, to the
payment of the internal-revenue tax imposed by the Philippine Government
upon like articles manufactured and consumed in the Philippine Islands."
Upon the issue thus presented the Honorable James A Ostrand, judge,
held that; notwithstanding the provisions of said Act of Congress invoked by
the defendant, subsection 12 of section 1 of Act No. 1510 of the Philippine
Legislature is in full force and effect, and, upon that theory, rendered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P83,159.63, without any finding as to costs. From that judgment the
defendant appealed.
The appellant alleges that the lower court committed an error in
holding that subsection 12 of section 1 of Act No. 1510 of the Philippine
Legislature is still in full force and effect and in not holding that section 4,
subdivision C, of the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, did apply to coal
and oil imported into the Philippine Islands by the plaintiff for the use in the
operation of its lines.
On the 7th day of July, 1906, by an Act of the Philippine Legislature, a
special charter was granted to the Manila Railroad Company. Subsection 12
of section 1 of said Act (No. 1510) provides that:
"In consideration of the premises and of the granting of
this concession or franchise, there shall be paid by the grantee
to the Philippine Government, annually, for the period of thirty
(30) years from the date hereof, an amount equal to one-half
(2) of one per cent of the gross earnings of the grantee in respect
of the lines covered hereby for the preceding year; after said
period of thirty (30) years, and for the fifty (50) years thereafter,
the amount so to be paid annually shall be an amount equal to
one and one-half (1½) per cent of such gross earnings for the
preceding year; and after such period of eighty (80) years the
percentage and amount so to be paid annually by the grantee
shall be fixed by the Philippine Government.
"Such annual payments, when promptly and fully made by
the grantee, shall be in lieu of all taxes of every name and nature
— municipal, provincial, or central — upon its capital stock,
franchises, right of way, earnings, and all other property owned
or operated by the grantee under this concession or franchise."
Subsection 16 of section 1 of said charter (Act No. 1510)
provided that: "This franchise or concession is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United
States. . . ."
 On the 5th day of August, 1909, the Congress of the United States
passed an Act entitled "An Act to raise revenue for the Philippine Islands,
and for other purposes." Section 24 of said Act of Congress provides:
"That in addition to the taxes imposed by this Act there
shall be levied and collected on goods, wares, or merchandise
when imported into the Philippine Islands from countries other
than the United States the internal revenue tax imposed by the
Philippine Government on like articles manufactured and
consumed in the Philippine Islands or shipped thereto, for
consumption therein, from the United States." (Vol. 7, Pub. Laws
of the P. I., p. 416.)
On the 3d day of October, 1913, the Congress of the United States
passed an Act entitled "An Act to reduce tariff duties and to provide revenues
for the Government, and for other purposes." In subsection C of section IV
of said Act there is found the following provision:
"That in addition to the customs taxes imposed in the
Philippine Islands, there shall be levied, collected, and paid
therein upon articles, goods, wares, or merchandise imported
into the Philippine Islands from countries other than the United
States, the internal-revenue tax imposed by the Philippine
(Government on like articles manufactured and consumed in the
Philippine Islands or shipped thereto for consumption therein,
from the United States." (Vol. 38, Pub. Laws of the U. S., p.
193.)
In pursuance of the above-quoted provisions of the said Acts of
Congress, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2432 and subsequent
Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto, which placed an
internal-revenue tax upon coal and oil imported into the Philippine Islands,
and by virtue of said laws the defendant collected from the plaintiff, as
internal-revenue tax upon coal and oil which was paid under protest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said Acts of Congress can be regarded as an amendment,
alteration, or repeal of subsection 12, section 1, of Act No. 1510
RULING:
No. Special laws or charters may not be amended, altered, or repealed
by a general law, by mere implication.
Repeal of laws by implication is not favored. The mere repugnancy
between two statutes should be very clear in order to warrant the court in
holding that the later in time repeals the former, when it does not in terms
purport to do so.
It is well settled that a special and local statute is not repealed by a
subsequent statute unless the intent to repeal or alter it is manifest, although
the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases in the
special law.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general-
the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in
the special- the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to
the general- one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case.
Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in
the nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of the machinery
of the general government. They are usually adopted after careful
consideration of the private rights in relation with resultant benefits to the
State. They stand upon a different footing from general laws.
The reason why a general law will not repeal a special law or charter is
because in passing a special charter the attention of the Legislature is directed
to the facts and circumstances which the act or charter is intended to meet.
The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a
particular case. The Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and
circumstances in a particular case in granting a special charter, it will not be
considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law without any
mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend,
repeal, or modify the special act or charter.
From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later became RA
No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the PSC over the
public utilities operated by government - owned or controlled corporations is
to be confined to the fixing of rates of such public services, "in order to avoid
cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to
public interests."
REPEAL OF SPECIAL STATUTES THE CITY OF MANILA vs. THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 29955, [December 22, 1928], 52 PHIL 515-530
MALCOLM, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Doctrine of Estoppel precludes a person from denying or to negate
anything to the contrary of that which has been constituted as truth, either by
his own actions, by his deeds or by his representations or by the acts of judicial
or legislative officers.

FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company first applied to the Public Service
Commission for authority to abandon the trolley bus service then operating in
Intramuros, Manila, and the street car service then operating on Taft Avenue,
Manila, and to substitute therefor temporarily an auto bus service to operate
on a specified route. The Commission granted a permit for an experimental
period of thirty days and later extended the permit for another period of thirty
days. Before the time thus delimited had expired, the Manila Electric Company
applied for permanent authority for the operation of an auto bus service
"under the terms of petitioner’s franchise." In support of this application,
petitioner alleged "that the proposed service has been demonstrated to be a
public convenience and necessity." The City of Manila opposed the petition on
the ground that the bus service, although involving a change for the better, is
in violation of the franchise of the Manila Electric Company, and under the
franchise, requires the city’s consent to the substitution and abandonment of
the electric car service. After taking the testimony of the Vice-President of the
Manila Electric Company, a decision was handed down by the Commissioner
which dismissed the opposition of the city, and ratified the authority formerly
given the petitioner by making it permanent.
The franchise of the Manila Electric Company was granted that company
by Act No. 484 of the Philippine Commission, as carried into effect by
Ordinance No. 44 of the City of Manila in 1903, and as later amended by Act
No. 1112 of the Philippine Commission, as carried into effect by Ordinance No.
70 of the City of Manila in 1904. The franchise was to run for a period of 50
years and authorized the construction and maintenance of an electric street
railway in the streets of the City of Manila "in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in the two parts" of the franchise "and the laws and
ordinances, not inconsistent herewith, now or hereafter in force." It was
provided that "The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company shall be
authorized to make excavations and constructions for the purposes prescribed
in Part One of said Ordinance No. 44, upon such further streets,
thoroughfares, bridges, and public places within the City of Manila as may,
from time to time, be approved by the Municipal Board."
From time to time, changes in the lines of the Manila Electric Company
have been requested and permitted. One such concession as to single tracks
and removal was provided for by the Philippine Commission in Act No. 1447
enacted in 1906. Other changes were approved by ordinances enacted by the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila beginning with 1904 and continuing until
1924.
The Public Service Commission has been delegated "general supervision
and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public services, and also
over their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises so far
as may be necessary for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this
Act.
The material parts of the franchise of the Manila Electric Company lie
before us. So likewise do the important portions of the Public Service Law. The
franchise granted by the City of Manila to the Manila Electric Company is in
the nature of a contract which the parties to it must respect. That is true. But
it is not a contract such as is protected from impairment by the Constitution.
The franchise was originally authorized by the Legislature. It was made
effective by a municipal corporation acting pursuant to delegated power. What
the principal has given into the hands of the agent may subsequently be
recalled by the principal. So uncomplicated by constitutional limitations, the
question recurs if the Philippine Legislature by placing on the statute books
Act No. 2307 and its successors intended thereby to withdraw from the City
of Manila certain power previously conferred by the Philippine Commission, or
whether the contrary was the legislative purpose.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has been constrained to vacate orders
provided by the Public Service Commission, and to require adherence to the
provisions of the franchise of the Manila Electric Company.
RULING:
The franchise of the Manila Electric Company was granted that company
by Act No. 484 of the Philippine Commission, as carried into effect by
Ordinance No. 44 of the City of Manila in 1903, and as later amended by Act
No. 1112 of the Philippine Commission, as carried into effect by Ordinance No.
70 of the City of Manila in 1904. An analysis of the franchise of the Manila
Electric Company discloses, among other provisions, the following: "All
reasonable or proper or necessary changes on the lines or routes of the
grantee, or the abandonment of any part of its franchise, or of any street or
streets which it may not be desirable or advisable to use, may be made by the
grantee, with the approval of the municipal authorities." The Public Service
Law is Act No. 3108, as amended by Act No. 3316. By it, there has been
delegated to the Public Service Commission "general supervision and
regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public services, and also over
their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises so far as
may be necessary for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act."
Contrasting the provisions of the franchise of the Manila Electric Company with
the provisions of the Public Service Law, the first being a special law and the
latter a general law, a lack of intention is shown by the Legislature to repeal
the special law by the later general law. The franchise granted by the City of
Manila to the Manila Electric Company is in the nature of a contract which the
parties to it must respect. But it is not a contract that is protected from
impairment by the Constitution. The city, as a subdivision of the general
government, holds power at the pleasure of the Legislature which may recall
it at any time.
The substitution of a bus line for a street railway service may be made
under a franchise requiring street railway operation, but which contemplates
improvements and changes in the system such as the progress of science and
the development of motive power may make reasonable and proper. That is
the better and more liberal view.
It was not the legislative intent as disclosed by the Public Service Law
to grant power to the Public Service Commission to abrogate the franchise
provisions of the Manila Electric Company concerning abandonment and
substitution of service. The agency of the Government of the Philippine Islands
to which is confided the power to authorize the Manila Electric Company to
abandon a trolley bus service and a street car service and to substitute
therefor exclusively an auto bus service is the City of Manila and not the Public
Service Commission.
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF LOSS OF LIFE OF AN EMPLOYEE IN
PERFORMANCE OF ITS WORK
Floresca v. Phillex Mining Corp
G.R. No. L-30642, April 30, 1985
MAKASIAR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation, who, while working at its copper mines underground operations,
died as a result of the cave-in that buried them. Thus, this case is a petition
for review of order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing
the complaint filed by the petitioners against Phillex on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction as the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive
original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected
deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not
the employer was negligent. Incorporated in the complaint is an alleged
violation of law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee. On August 3,
1978 petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with
respondent Philex. The Court dismissed the petition only insofar as the
aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other
petitioners in this case.

ISSUE:
Does the court of First Instance of Manila have the jurisdiction to try the case?
Does the other petitioners who benefitted on the Workmen’s Compensation
Act can be precluded from bringing an action before the regular court?
RULING:
Yes, the court of First Instance of Manila has the jurisdiction to try the case.
Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of
contract or tort.
In this case, petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no
allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident
arising out of and in the course of their employments. Further, the petitioner
alleges for reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to
protect the lives of its workers.
Hence, the Court of First Instance has the jurisdiction to try the case as this
constitutes to a breach of contract.

No, petitioners who benefitted on the Workmen’s Compensation Act cannot be

precluded from bringing an action before the regular court.

The Court held in the case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA
442, that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages
but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.

At the case at bar, the petitioners who resorted to the remedy of Workmen’s
Compensation Act committed a mistake of fact. Had petitioners been aware
of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.

Hence, first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which

nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice
AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT TO INVESTIGATE AND SUSPEND
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER
Noblejas V. Teehankee
G.R. No. L-28790. April 29, 1968
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J:

DOCTRINE:
Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of Judicial
functions.

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case, Antonio H. Noblejas, is a commissioner of Land
Registration Authority. Respondent, Secretary of Justice, coursed to the
petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing on March 7, 1968 why no
disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-
subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles."
Noblejas Argued that he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and
compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of
First Instance. In connection to this, the Executive Secretary issued the
suspension order of the petitioner pending investigation of the charges.
Thus, requesting the Court to issue writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction restraining against the investigation of the Secretary of Justice and
suspension order of the Executive Secretary.

ISSUE:
Is the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated and
suspended by the Supreme Court?

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court cannot investigate and suspend the Commissioner of
Land Registration since it is unconstitutional. Incidentally the investigation and
suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34
of the Civil Service Law (R.A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts
in excess of jurisdiction.

It has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to
arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil, 600).

In this case, if the court exercise the authority to investigate and suspend the
Commissioner of Land Registration, such action does not fall to the judicial
function and will be unconstitutional as this violates the fundamental doctrine
of separation of powers and reduce pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials

Therefore, the Supreme Court has no authority to investigate and suspend the
Commissioner of Land Registration Authority in respect to the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
CONCEPCION, C.J:

DOCTRINE:
The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a statute depends upon factors
other than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by
the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take
place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law

FACTS:
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen,
a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class
suit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
He alleges that Resolution of Both House (RBH). the following Resolutions of
the House are unconstitutional:
1 R.B.H. - Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to
180 members.
2 R.B.H - Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.
3 R.B.H - Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the
Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their seats
Subsequently Republic Act No. 4913 was passed and took effect on June 17,
1967 and is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for approval the
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress
of the Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses Numbered 1 and 3, adopted
on March 16, 1967. This particular statute is being assailed by the petitioner
on its constitutionality

ISSUE:
Is Republic Act. No. 4913 is unconstitutional?

RULE:
No, Republic Act No. 4913 is constitutional. Votes in favor thereof are
insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional.
It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law.
In this case, it is notable that by November 14, 1967, the citizenry shall have
had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in
question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides security
measures to ensure that the public will be informed of the amendments. This
renders the court not not be prepared to say that the foregoing measures are
palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that
proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification,"
and that said measures are manifestly insufficient from a constitutional
viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendments sought to be made.

Therefore, Republic Act. No. 4913 is violative to the spirit of constitution but
not unconstitutional.
PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
Lidasan v. Commission on Election
G.R. No. L-28089. October 25, 1967
SANCHEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected,
as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other,
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that
if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which
are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them.

FACTS:
Petitioners in this case, Bara Lidasan, is a resident and a qualified voter of
Parang, Cotabato. The Republic Act 4790, entitled "Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" was approved and
enacted. This law provides that certain barios located in the Province of
Cotabato will be constituted into a distinct and independent municipality to be
known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. Appraised
by the development, the Office of the President recommended to COMELEC
for the suspension of the operation of statute. COMELEC stood to its
interpretation, and maintained that the statute must be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Hence, filing of Lidasan of
petition for certiorari and prohibition against RA 4790.

ISSUE:
Is RA 4790, which created Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao Del Sur,
but which includes barrios located in the province of Cotabato,
unconstitutional?

RULING:
Yes, RA 4790 is unconstitutional as the title of the statute failed to be couched
in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
In the case of Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. The Court
appreciates the ruling that “No law shall embrace more than one object, which
shall be expressed in its title” and furthered that similar statutes aimed at
changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not
expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, the title of Republic Act 4790 “Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” failed to express that certain
barios within the boundaries of the Province of Cotabato was included as
stated in its provisions. More so, provisions of Republic Act 4790 is indivisible.
Hence, Republic Act 4790, an “Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur” is unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject which is not expressed in the title of the statute.
PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
Barrameda v. Moir
G.R. No. 7927. August 8, 1913
Trent, J:

DOCTRINE:
The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or
efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to
legislate

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case is defendant in a suit brought before a justice of the
peace to try title to parcel of land. The decision of the justice of the peace is
not favorable causing the appeal to the Court of First Instance. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the appeal and demurred with basis on Acts No. 2041
and 2131 which provides that “Justice of the peace shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate questions for title to real estate or any interest
therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two
hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less
than six hundred pesos the justice of the peace shall have jurisdiction
concurrent with the Court of First Instance." Act No. 2131, section 1,
substituted “exclusive original jurisdiction” for “exclusive jurisdiction”.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of Act. No. 2041 and Section 1 of Act No. 2131, as basis of
demurring of the Court of First Instance, unconstitutional?

RULING:
Yes, Section 3 of Act. No. 2041 and Section 1 of Act No. 2131 is
unconstitutional as it deprives the Court of First Instance of their original
jurisdiction to try cases where the title to realty valued at not more than P200
was involved.

In the case of Weigall v. Shuster (11 Phil. Rep., 340) it was held that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Court of First Instance, as fixed by
section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added to but not diminished by the
Philippine Legislature. More so,
In this case, the Court of First Instance demurred on exercising its jurisdiction
to decide the case involving the parcel of land and in effect, it fails to perform
its duties vested to it by section 9 of the Philippine Bill. Section 3 of Act. No.
2041 and Section 1 of Act No. 2131 is repugnant to the Philippine Bill and
diminishes the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by providing exclusive
authority to justice of the peace to hear the case.

Hence, Section 3 of Act. No. 2041 and Section 1 of Act No. 2131 providing
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate questions for title to real estate or any
interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed
two hundred pesos is void.
PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer
G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927
MALCOLM, J.:

DOCTRINE: The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must
express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has
no power to legislate

FACTS:
The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue
of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine Legislature as amended by Act No. 2822, and
of the Corporation law. Petitioner in this case, the Government of the
Philippines, initiated a petition for quo warranto against three directors of the
National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative
members of the committee. The petition further challenges the validity of
section 4 of Act No. 2705 as amended by Section 2 of Act 2822 which provides
that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned
by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a
committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives."

ISSUE:
W/N the other petitioners who benefitted on the Workmen’s Compensation Act
can be precluded from bringing an action before the regular court?

RULING:
Yes, the court of First Instance of Manila has the jurisdiction to try the case.
Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of
contract or tort.
In this case, petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no
allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident
arising out of and in the course of their employments. Further, the petitioner
alleges for reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to
protect the lives of its workers.
Hence, the Court of First Instance has the jurisdiction to try the case as this
constitutes to a breach of contract.

No, petitioners who benefitted on the Workmen’s Compensation Act cannot be

precluded from bringing an action before the regular court.

The Court held in the case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA
442, that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages
but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.

At the case at bar, the petitioners who resorted to the remedy of Workmen’s
Compensation Act committed a mistake of fact. Had petitioners been aware
of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.

Hence, first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which

nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice
RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE THE PRODUCT OF A DELEGATED
POWER
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. V. SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION
G.R. No. L-167704 March 17. 1962
Barrera, J.:

DOCTRINE:
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it
renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law,
p. 194)

FACTS:
Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 providing that on
November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System,
will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or
earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up
to a maximum of P500 for any one month. Petitioner in this case wrote a letter
to the Respondent alleging that Circular No. 22 is contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957. Responded further questions the
validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for
lack of publication in the Official Gazette. The respondent overruled and
claimed that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective,
but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of
general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.

I
Is Social Security Commission Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social
Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of
the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act."?
RULING:

No. Supreme Court held that the Social Security Commission Circular No. 22
merely purports to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the
light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the
monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security
contributions should be based.
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted
by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy
stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit. pp. 195-197).
In this case, the provision of SSC Circular No. 22 was construed by the Court
that Social Security SSC Circular No. 22, the it is construed that the provision
of the said circular apprise those concerned of the interpretation or
understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its
duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the
law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the
Commission as to how the law should be construed.

Hence, SSC Circular No. 22 is valid and in effect. It does not constitute to a
constitutionality expert.
REGULATIONS FORMULATED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators
G.R. No. L-25619. June 30, 1970
FERNANDO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the
legislature.

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case is a veteran who suffered from permanent disability in
line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which
participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy. He filed
his claim for disability pension pursuant to the Veterans' Bill of Rights, R.A.
No. 65. Respondent in this case approved the claim but granted only P25.00
monthly, thereafter increased to P 50.00 a month contrary to the provision of
R.A. No. 65. His initial claim is for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate
of P50 00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month,
plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years
of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00
a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children
below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. This result to the filing of suit for
mandamus to the Court of First Instance. The suit was dismissed by the lower
court citing that the respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to
process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that
it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in
error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be
maintained. Hence, this appeal, which, as noted at the outset, calls for an
affirmative response.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner’s right as conferred by law takes precedence to what the
administrative rules and regulations of promulgated by the respondent?
RULING:

Yes. The court held that it is indisputable that the petitioner’s right as
conferred by law takes precedence to what the administrative rules and
regulations of promulgated by the respondent.

In People V. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative

order vested in an administrative official and reaffirmed such a doctrine in a
1951 decision, where the Court again made clear that where an administrative
order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the
mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed."

In this case the amount granted to the petitioner is less than to the amount
granted to him by R.A. No. 65. The basis of the respondent for giving such
amount is contrary or repugnant to the provision of the act.

Hence, the petitioner is legally entitled to pension effective as of May 10, 1955
at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00
a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children below
18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference
of P50.00 a month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor
children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963 until the statutory rate has
been satisfied. Thereafter petitioner is entitled to the amount of P100.00 a
month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children
below.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
ELEMENT OF CONSIDERATION FOR LOTTERY
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE:
The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d. 99, 137 Cal.
App. (Supp). 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for
the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive
something of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective
properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that
of the sponsor.

FACTS:
In 1960 petitioner in this case, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., formulated a
promotional scheme denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest". No
payment or product to be purchased is required to participate so long that you
are motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. The contest is having 3
levels, one of which is the National Contest. Considering extensive use of the
mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for
the transmission of communications relative thereto, a formal communication
was made by Caltex detailing the mechanics the promotional scheme with the
postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing.
The then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law and declined to grant the
requested clearance. Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration on the part of any
contestant. The respondent maintained its position, hence filing the present
petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar,
praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law.

ISSUE:
Is the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violative of the Postal Law?
RULING:

No, the element of consideration which is essential element to the anti-lottery

provisions of the Postal Law is lacking.

The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second,

prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. United States [1892], 147 U.S. 449)

In the case at bar, the court identified the existence of Prize and Chance in
the questioned contest, but there exists no requirement of fee or at least a
requirement to purchase a product of Caltex (Philippines) Inc. which in effect
completes the essential element of lottery to participate in the promotional
scheme.

Hence, given the absence of Consideration which is an element lottery in this

case, the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not violative of the Postal Law.
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW DOCTRINES
People of the Philippines v. Jose Jabinal Y Carmen
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
ANTONIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system

FACTS:
On September 5, 1964 a complaint was filed against the accused alleging that
he is a person not authorized by law, and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. 22. The
accused admitted that he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or
permit. He, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had
no license or permit, he in-fact, had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the trial court a quo that in view of his above-
mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with
authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was
entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
(1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958). On December 27, 1968 the Trial Court,
however, held that the accused is criminally liable for illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court
in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in
People vs. Mapa, supra (1967).

ISSUE:
Is the jurisprudence in the case of People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero should prevail in this case?
Yes, the jurisprudence in the case of People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero should prevail since it is the jurisprudence since the Jurisprudence of
People vs. Mapa came only on 1967.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
… .”

In this case, since the judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws shall
form part of the legal system, the court held that the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Being the
jurisprudence of People vs. Mapa came only on 1967, it must not apply
retroactively to the case at bar since it is committed and tried on 1964 and is
not favorable to the accused. The jurisprudence applicable in that time is
People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero. Applying this, considering that
appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent
and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and
permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.

Hence, there is no criminal liability on the part of appellant and the

jurisprudence to be observed is People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero.
JUDICIAL DECREE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE INVALIDITY OF
VOID MARRIAGES
Maria Apiag, Teresita Catero Securom and Glicerio Cantero vs. Judge
Esmeraldo G. Cantero
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070 February 12, 1997
Panganiban J.:

DOCTRINE:
A marriage though void still needs . . . a judicial declaration of such fact"
before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage
will also be void." This was expressly provided under Article 40 of the Family
Code

FACTS:
Plaintiffs in this case, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A.
Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge
Esmeraldo G. Cantero with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed
bigamy and falsification of public documents. Later on, they also learned that
defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay. Responded in this
case, claimed that the marriage is true, but denied the validity of it due to
execution, for the truth of the matter that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized by their parents and shot their wishes and proposes without the
consent given. He narrated that "As a matter of fact, I was only called by my
parents to go home to our town at Hinundayan,Southern Leyte to attend party
celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing
I was made to appear in a certain drama marriage and we were forced to
acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract.
That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second-
year high school days”
Upon hearing the actuations of the complainant and respondent, the
Investigating Judge and Court Administrator recommended that respondent is
guilty of crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public
Documents) however, considering his length of service in the government, it
is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year without pay. On
September 27, 1996 responded Judge died while this case was still being
deliberated upon by this Court
ISSUE:
Is the respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct for allegedly having
committed bigamy and falsification of public documents?

Is the marriage between Maria Apiag and the respondent judge void?

RULING:
No, the court ruled that gross misconduct is not applicable since acts imputed
against respondent Judge Cantero.

Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By

uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of
his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private
individual.

In this case the acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain
to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither
do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official
responsibilities.

Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross

misconduct in office.

Yes, the jurisprudence on the case of Odayat vs. Amante will be applicable
since the marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
as well as the jurisprudence in the case of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy.

Article 80 of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to

establish the invalidity of void marriages.

In this case Article 80 of the New Civil Code provides that the marriage of
Maria Apiag and the respondent Judge is void ab initio and judicial decree is
not needed to establish the invalidity of void merriages.

Hence, the prior marriage of the respondent to Maria Apiag is void and has no
legal effect.
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF LOSS OF AN EMPLOYEE IN
PERFORMANCE OF ITS WORK
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
PARAS, J.:

DOCTRINE:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code)

FACTS:
Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed
that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the
status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court
for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and
the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already
married to someone else.

ISSUE:
Is there a need for presentation of evidence of prove that her first marriage
was vitiated by force?
RULING:
No, to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but
merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Art. 80, Civil Code provides that her marriage to the respondent is void since
she has an subsisting marriage with her first husband.
In this case, it was proved that the prior marriage was not annulled and
therefore, existing.
Thus, the second marriage is void ab initio.
FRAUD
Lourdes Corpus vs MUNICIPAL JUDGE CIPRIANO P. CABALUNA, JR.,
ALIMODIAN, ILOILO,
A.M. No. 53-MJ January 31, 1974
Muñoz Palma, J.

DOCTRINE:
Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations or
circumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be supported by
clear and convincing proof.

FACTS:
Lourdes Corpus filed a case before the Court of First Instance presided by
Judge Cipriano Cabaluna concerning the ownership of two parcels of land.
Judge Cabaluna ruled in favor of Corpus as the true owners of the parcels of
land.

In a separate case, Judge Cabaluna - in capacity as Cadastal Judge, heard the

case of Alimodian Cadastre. Cadastre claims to be of the owner of land - the
same land described owned by Corpus. In the course of hearing the case a
deed of sale was executed on the land owned by Corpus.

Corpus filed a case to set the decision made by Judge Cabaluna that the land
litigated by Judge Cabaluna was the same land awarded to her as the true
owner.

Corpus charged Judge Cabaluna before the Secretary of Justice for having
committed gross fraud. She stated that Judge Cabaluna ratified the deed of
sale knowing that Corpus was the true and lawful of the land litigated. Judge
Cabaluna in her defense claimed that the charge against her should be
dismissed for lack of evidence. The Secretary of Justice ruled to dismiss the
charge, citing the lack of evidence of gross fraud?

ISSUE:
Was there gross fraud on the part of Judge Cabaluna on ratifying the Deed
of Sale?
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that there was no gross fraud on the part of Judge
Cabaluna.

Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations or

circumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be supported by
clear and convincing proof.

The act of Judge Cabaluna in ratifying the deed of sale - to which it was
declared Corpus was the lawful owner, is not itself a fraudelent act, absent of
any showing that Judge Cabaluna connived in the ratifying of the deed of sale.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THE RECISION OF OBLIGATION
TITLE:
In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA.
CONCEPCION PATERNO VDA. DE PADILLA v. ISABEL BIBBY VDA. DE
PADILLA
G.R. No. L-48137 October 4, 1943
BOCOBO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of
the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest;
consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can
return whatever he may be obliged to restore.

FACTS:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the late
Narciso A. Padilla. In order that his property may be divided according to his
last will and testament, it is necessary first to liquidate the conjugal
partnership. It was in connection with such liquidation that the widow,
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced the instant proceedings by
filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property
be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with
the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given one-
half of the conjugal partnership property; and that her usufructuary right over
one-half of the portion pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be
recognized. The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring
certain pieces of real estate and jewelry as well as certain sums of money to
be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be delivered to the widow (appellee
herein). The trial court's judgment, as amended, reads:
En vista de los hechos y consideraciones que preceden, el Juzgado dicta
sentencia y declara:
(a) Que todos los bienes que constan en el inventario, y sobre los cuales no
se ha suscitado controversia por las partes, son bienes gananciales;
(b) Que se nombran tres (3) Comisionados, uno a recomendacion de la
heredera instituida en el testamento, otro a recomendacion de Da. Concepcion
Paterno Vda. de Padilla, y el tercero por el Juzgado, para que se hagan cargo
de avaluar las fincas o partes de fincas que se deben justipreciar de
conformidad con las conclusiones sentadas en esta decision hagan las
computaciones correspondientes a fin de determinar el remanente liquido de
la sociedad de gananciales, tomando por base los precios calculados y
avaluados sobre dichos bienes, y dividan por mitad el remanente liquido entre
Da. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, y la heredera testamentaria Da.
Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, especificando los bienes que a cada una debe
corresponder;
(c) Que pagadas todas las deudas de la sociedad de gananciales, dichos
comisionados procederan a dividir en tres partes los bienes que deben
corresponder al difunto, a fin de que las dos terceras partes sean adjudicadas
a la heredera testamentaria en pleno dominio, y la otra tercera parte en nuda
propiedad a la misma heredera testamentaria y en usufructo a la viuda
Concepcion Paterno mientras ella viva.lawphil.net
(d) Que los gastos en que incurra esta Testamentaria por los servicios de los
Comisionados se paguen por ambas partes, por mitad.

ISSUE:
Is the interest should be paid by the widow on the amount of P9,229.48
withdrawn by her from the Monte de Piedad savings account No. 3317 of the
conjugal partnership?

RULING:
YES, it is true that article 1385 ordains that the fruits of the paraphernal
property form part of the conjugal partnership and are subject to the payment
of the charges against the marriage. But as Manresa says, article 1386
contains a limitation on the first part (just cited) of article 1385.
It is likewise true that under article 1408, par. 1, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband during the marriage are chargeable against the
conjugal partnership, but article 1386 is an exception to the rule, and exempts
the fruits of the paraphernal property from the payment of the personal
obligations of the husband, unless there is proof that they redounded to the
benefit of the family. It is self-evident that the amounts in question did not
benefit the family. Hence, they cannot be charged against the fruits of the
paraphernal property. They should be paid from the husband's funds. There
are just and sound reasons for article 1386. The wife contributes the fruits,
interests, and rents of her paraphernal property to help bear the expenses of
the family. When the husband contracts any debt in his own name, it is
chargeable against the conjugal partnership as a general rule (article 1408,
par. 1) because it is presumed that the debt is beneficial to the family. But
when such a debt is enforced against the fruits of the paraphernal property,
such a presumption no longer applies, considering article 1386. On the
contrary, it must be proved that the purpose for which the wife contributes
the fruits of her paraphernal property has been accomplished through such
personal debt of the husband.
Wherefore, with the modification that the appellee pay such interest, if any,
on P9,229.48 as the Monte de Piedad would have paid if the amount had not
been withdrawn, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
EXEMPTION FROM THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. MERALCO
G.R. No. L-23623, June 30, 1977
Fernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:
According to RA 1394 Sec 6, that insulator are exempt from all taxes whatever
kind of nature.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the reversal by the respondent Court of a
determination by petitioner Norberto Romualdez Jr., that private respondent
was not exempt from the payment of special import tax under RA 1394 for
shipment to it of insulating oil.
In respondent Court’s decision, private respondent is not exempt from the
special import tax not only by virtue of Sec. 6 of RA 1394, which exempts
from said tax equipment and spare parts for use in industries, but also under
Par. 9, Part Two, of its franchise, which expressly exempts is insulators from
all taxes of whatever kind and nature.
The question to such decision of the respondent Court is: “Does the insulating
oil in question come within the meaning of the term ‘insulator ‘?”. Yes the
insulating oil imported by petitioner used for cooling as well as for insulating
comes within the term insulator.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is liable for the payment of the special import
tax under RA 1394.

RULING:
No, respondent is not liable for the payment of the special import tax under
RA 1394. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. A
cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application.In the case at bar that is
what the respondent did, it is clear according to Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and Par.
9, Part Two, of its franchise, that insulators are exempt from all taxes
whatever kind of nature and that insulating oil comes within the term insulator
therefore respondent is not liable for the payment of the special import tax
under RA 1394. The petition for review is dismissed and no cost.
GOODS PRODUCED WITHIN THE COUNTRY
Republic Flour Mills Inc vs The Commissioner of Customs
GR No. L-28463, May 31,1971
Fernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:
As long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms
of Section 2802.

FACTS:
Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged
in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard (darak) and bran
(ipa) in the process of milling. During the period from December, 1963
to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was
loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while
anchored near the breakwater. The respondent assessed the petitioner by way
of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which
assessment was paid by petitioner under protest.

According to the petitioner, “products of the Philippines” found in Section 2802

of the Tariff and Custom Code, excludes bran (ipa) and pollard (darak)
because they are merely waste from the production of flour.

The main contention before respondent Court of petitioner was

"that in as much as no government or private wharves or government
facilities were utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of
wharfage dues is contrary to law.

Respondent Commissioner of Customs said that petitioner was liable for

wharfage dues uponreceipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel
engaged in foreign trade regardless of thenon-use of government-owned or
private wharves

ISSUE:
Whether or not the collection of wharfage is accordance with the law.
RULING:
The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be
levied, collected and
paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products
of the Philippines except
coal, lumber, creosoted and other pressure treated materials as well as
other minor forest products,
cement, guano natural rock asphalt, the minerals and ores of base metals
(e.g., copper, lead, zinc, iron,
chromite manganese, magnesite and steel), and sugar molasses exported
from the Philippines, a charge
of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage xxx"
One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the
Philippines that are
exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that
as long as the goods are
produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section.
The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be
levied, collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the
Philippines, and on products of the Philippines except coal, lumber, creosoted
and other pressure treated materials as well as other minor forest products,
cement, guano natural rock asphalt, the minerals and ores of base metals
(e.g., copper, lead, zinc, iron, chromite manganese, magnesite and steel),
and sugar molasses exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage xxx" One category refers to what is
imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported.
Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as
the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above
section.
WHEN AN APPEAL ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT UP TO A COURT
Bello vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974
TEEHANKEE, J.:

DOCTRINE:
It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in
exercise of its power to "control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice" to grant petitioners-accused's timely plea to
endorse their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and within
the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3.

FACTS:
Petitioners spouses were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for
allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a value of P1,000.00
received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission
basis.

Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss
appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the
city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly
to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the

analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals
in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall
certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the
grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the
appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."

They filed with the city court their "motion to elevate appeal to Court of
Appeals" of December 7, 1971 stating that "through inadvertence and/or
excusable neglect" they had erroneously filed a notice of appeal to the court
of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and
prayed that the city court, following precedents of this Court remanding
appeals before it to the proper court instead of dismissing appeals, "elevate
the records ... to the Court of Appeals for proper review."

Respondent city court denied petitioners' motion "for having been erroneously
addressed to this court" instead of to the court of first instance ignoring
petitioners' predicament that the court of first instance had already turned
them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them
and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction
against them.

Petitioners spouses then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus
against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the
judgment and to compel respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973
dismissed the petition, after finding that the city court's judgment was directly
appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI instead of dismissing
appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be
endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since petitioners did not implead
the court of first instance as "principal party respondent" it could not "grant
any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve
some equities," as follows:

ISSUE:
Is the Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion by
erroneously brought up appeal.

RULING:
Yes, under Rules 50, section 3, In a mis-directed appeal to the Court of
Appeals of a case that pertains to the court of first instance's jurisdiction, the
said Rule expressly provides that the Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the
appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court" viz, the court of first
instance in the given example. There is no logical reason why in all fairness
and justice the court of first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not
be likewise bound by the same rule and therefore enjoined not to dismiss the
appeal but to certify the case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court.
It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in
exercise of its power to "control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice" to grant petitioners-accused's timely plea to
endorse their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and within
the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3.
Hence, the Court of First Instance shall be held liable for acting with grave
abuse of discretion.
PARTNERSHIP NAME
Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the firm name "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
G.R. No. X92-1 July 30, 1979
Melencio-Herrera, J.

DOCTRINE:
Names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners
and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third
person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner.

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a case before the Supreme Court to allow their firm to
use the names of 'Sycip' and 'Ozaeta' who died on May 5, 1975 and February
14, 1976 respectively. They argue that a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name which includes the name of a
deceased partner provided under Article 1840 of the Civil Code.

In addition, they held that the United States Supreme Court and the American
Professional Code of Conduct allows the use of the deceased partner's name
in the firm

ISSUE:
Will the firm be allowed to use the deceased partner's name?

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that they cannot use the names of Sycip and
Ozaeta in the firm.

Article 1815 of the Civil Code provides that the names of the partnership must
living partners, or in case of non-partners, they are living but subject to
liability.
As to the legal basis from American jurisprudence and Code of Conduct, there
are no local customs in the Philippines which allows the use of a deceased
partner's name.
AGE ELIGIBILITY TO ASSUME POSITION IN SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN (SK)
Garvida vs. Sales
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
PUNO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on
public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be
declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum
age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her
proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be

held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration
as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her
application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and
ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan
ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered

Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-
Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision, the said court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional
Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close
association with petitioner.

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent
Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor
Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her
age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A.
Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.

On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to
petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of
Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend
the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private

respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as
the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

ISSUE:
Is the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Garvida on the ground that
she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK
valid?

RULING:
Yes, Garvida is ineligible to assume any position in Sangguniang Kabataan as
she exceeds the age need to be eligible. The requirement that a candidate
possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the
age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein,
if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he
is ineligible.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996,
the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner
was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed
office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have
qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner
was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local
Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.
She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang
Kabataan elections.
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be
declared elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has failed to prove that the
electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they
maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and
throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner vs. MIGUEL D.
TECSON, ET AL.MIGUEL D. TECSON THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-29131, August 27, 1969
CONCEPCION, C.J.

DOCTRINE:
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall
be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months,
of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

FACTS:
Before a judgement was already served in the Civil Case No. 20520 Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance
Co. Inc. On December 21, 1965, Miguel D. Tecson appealed to move to dismiss
the previously judged Civil Case No. 20520 because it was upon lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The
National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and chooses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff
in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against Mr. Tecson, for
the revival of the judgment rendered the previous Case No. 20520. Acting
upon the motion and plaintiff’s opposition thereto, said Court issued, on
February 14, 1966, an order reading:

“Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the
amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a
revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must
be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court
became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December
21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365
days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so
that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgement is barred by
the statute of limitation

RULING:
The ordered appealed from as it is hereby AFFIRMED, without costs. Although
some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not
realistic, for failure to conform to ordinary experience or practice, the theory
of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying,
Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative
Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act
of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in
the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative
process, not by judicial decree.
FACTS SHOW THE RIGHT OF A PERSON AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORMANDO DEL
ROSARIO Y LOPEZ, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994
MELO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Under article 3, section 2 The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

FACTS:

The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and

sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony
of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the
tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was
then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where
he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-
out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the
suspects.

After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his
statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was only subscribed on
May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in
the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was
handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the
authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

RULING:
Yes. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the course
of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be
apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the
authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the
Court included “invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial
investigations.

It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to
the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore,
the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved
crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the
crime.

However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is
voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such
a waiver.

No, there are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful
warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b)
when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and
when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused
in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not
conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was
done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense
because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely
relied on the account of one eyewitness.

Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not
affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused still
submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he
waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest."
Legal separation on the basis of adultery
Pastor B. Tenchavez vs. Vicenta F. Escaño, et al.
15 SCRA 355
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965
Ponente: J. J.B.L. Reyes

FACTS:

Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain.
Upon discovery of their daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and Mena
sought priestly advice where it was suggested that the marriage be
recelebrated. However, the recelebration did not take place and the
newlyweds eventually became estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta
left for the United States. There, she filed a complaint for divorce on the
ground of extreme mental cruelty, and an absolute divorce was granted by
the Court of Nevada. She later sought for the annulment of her marriage from
the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta eventually married an American in Nevada
and acquired American citizenship.

Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against

Vicenta and her parents whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged their daughter from joining him and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church for having decreed the annulment of the
marriage. He asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.

Vicenta claims a valid divorce from Tenchavez and an equally valid marriage
to her American husband; while her parents filed a counterclaim for moral
damages, denying that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts.

The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to her exclusion. It granted the
counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees against Tenchavez, to the extent of P45,000.00. Thus, he filed
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and
binding in the Philippines;

2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral

damages.

RULING:

1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between
Tenchavez and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada.
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the
time expressly provided that “Laws relating to family rights and duties or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” Here, at the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then still subject to Philippine law, which does not admit
absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.

2.) Yes. The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and
considerations that Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation on
the basis of adultery as provided under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since our jurisdiction does not recognize Vicenta’s divorce and second
marriage as valid, her marriage and cohabitation with the American is
technically “intercourse with a person not her husband” from the standpoint
of Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband also constitute in law a wrong
for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Thus, the
latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law.

As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a million pesos
as unreasonable, taking into account some considerations. First, the marriage
was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or
undue humiliation on his part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third,
there is evidence that Tenchavez had originally agreed to the annulment of
the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public
policy. Fourth, the fact that Tenchavez is unable to remarry under our law is
a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he entered into
voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by
way of moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Philippine law over Foreigner’s Law
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator,
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22595
November 1, 1927

DOCTRINE:
According to Philippine law and not his national law is NOT LEGAL because
it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article
16 of the civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions.

FACTS:
A will of a Turkish testator (Joseph Brimo) provided that his Philippine estate
is disposed of in accordance with the Philippine Law. The testator further
provided that whoever fails to comply with this request (that his estate be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law) would forfeit his inheritance.

The Appellant (Andre Brimo), one of the brothers of the deceased Joseph
Brimo, opposed the Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s partition scheme of the estate
which denies his participation in the inheritance.

ISSUE:
Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis on the distribution of
Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo forfeit his inheritance?

RULING:
The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will that his properties shall
be distributed according to Philippine law and not his national law is NOT
LEGAL because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 16 of the civil Code, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Testator’s estate shall be distributed according to his national (Turkish) law.
He cannot provide otherwise. The appellant's inheritance will not be forfeited
because the provision is not legal.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE THAT THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF FOREIGN CITIZEN SHALL GOVERN BY THEIR NATIONAL LAW
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

DOCTRINE:
National law of the deceased in the intestate or testamentary successions is
applicable in four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed

FACTS:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He
had five legitimate children with Mary E. Mallen: Edward, George, Henry,
Alexander and Anna Bellis. He had also illegitimate children namely: Amos,
Maria and Mariam Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he

directed that after all taxes and obligations are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided in the following order and manner: (a) to his wife;
(b) to his three illegitimate children; (c) and the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives. Subsequently, Bellis
died, his will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
oppositions to the partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children.

After they filed their pertinent pleadings, the lower court, issued an order
relying on the provision of Article 16 of the Civil Code, applying the national
law of the decedent. Their motion for reconsideration denied.

ISSUE:
Is the nationality of the deceased applied for the division of the legitimes?

RULING:
Yes, the validity of provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under the Texas Law, Philippine law on legitime cannot
be applied. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to

the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with

respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law.
REQUISITES AN INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD CONSIDER IN
PERFECTING A CONTRACT
Rafael Enriquez vs Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada
G.R. No. L-15895, November 29, 1920
Malcolm, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there
was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant;
(2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the
company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the
company to the applicant.

FACTS:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff ad administrator of the estate of the
late Joaquin Ma. Herrer to recover from the defendant life insurance company
the sum of pesos 6,000 paid by the deceased for a life annuity. The trial court
gave judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
On September 24, 1917, Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity.
Two (2) days later, he paid the sum of 6T to the company’s manager in its
and was given a receipt.

On Nov. 26, 1917, the head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to
Manila. On the same date, the Manila office prepared a letter notifying Herrer
that his application has been accepted and this was placed in the ordinary
channels of transmission, but as far as known was never actually mailed and
never received by Herrer.

Herrer died on Dec. 20, 1917. The plaintiff as administrator of Herrer’s estate
brought this action to recover the 6T paid by the deceased.

ISSUE:
Is the contract perfected?
RULING:
No. the contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because
it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application
ever came to the knowledge of the applicant.

The Civil Code rule, that an acceptance made by letter shall bind the person
making the offer only from the date it came to his knowledge, may not be the
best expression of modern commercial usage.

The law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph of article
1262 of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not
bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his
knowledge. The pertinent fact is, that according to the provisional receipt,
three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there
was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant;
(2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the
company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the
company to the applicant.
PRESCRIPTION FOR SUITS PREDICATED ON ALLEGED MISDELIVERY
DOMINGO ANG V. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES, INC.
G.R. No. L-25047 March 18, 1967
Bengzon, J. P., J.:

DOCTRINE:

Suits predicated not upon loss or damage but on alleged mis delivery (or
conversion) of the goods, the applicable rule on prescription is that found in
the Civil Code, namely, either ten years for breach of a written contract or
four years for quasi-delict (Arts. 1144[1], 1146, Civil Code)

FACTS:
Yau Yue Commercial Bank, Ltd. of Hongkong, also referred to hereafter as Yau
Yue, agreed to sell one boat (50 feet, 30 tons) containing used U.S. Military
Surplus to one Davao Merchandising Corp. for the sum of $8,820.27 (US), and
42 cases (62 sets and 494 pieces) of Hiranos Automatic Cop Change for Cotton
Loom for Calieo to one Herminio Teves for the sum of $18,246.,65 (US),
respectively with the following terms and arrangements: (a) the purchase
price should be covered by a bank draft for the corresponding amount which
should be paid by the purchaser in exchange for the delivery of the
corresponding bill of lading to be deposited with a local bank, the Hongkong
& Shanghai Bank of Manila; (b) upon arrival of the articles in Manila the
purchaser would be notified and would have to pay the amount called for in
the corresponding demand draft, after which the bill of lading would be
delivered to said purchaser; and (c) the purchaser would present said bill of
lading to the carrier's agent; American Steamship Agencies, Inc., which would
then issue the corresponding "Permit To Deliver Imported Articles" to be
presented to the Bureau of Custom to obtain the release of the articles.

On May 9, 1961 the article arrived in Manila, and under the bill lading of the
arrival of the goods and requested payments of the demand draft representing
the purchased price of the article. Mr. Teves did not pay the demand draft to
Hongkong and Shanghai bank contrary to the agreement. The bank protested
and likewise returned the bill of lading and demand draft to Yau Yae which
later endorse the bill of lading to Domingo Ang.
Despite of non-payment of the purchase price of the article, Teves was able
to obtain a bank guaranty in favor of American Steamship as carriers’ agent
to the effect that he would surrender the negotiable bill of lading duly endorsed
by Yau Yaeon on the strength of this guaranty. Teves succeeded in securing
permit to deliver goods from the carrier’s agent, which he presented to Bureau
of Customs which in turn release to him the articles covered by the bill of
lading. Domingo Ang claimed for the article from the American Steamship
agencies Inc and presented the endorsed bill of lading, but he was informed
bu the latter that the article he is claiming was already delivered to Mr. Teves.
Domingo Ang filed separate complaints in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the American Steamship Agencies, Inc., for having allegedly
wrongfully delivered and/or converted the goods covered by the bills of lading
belonging to plaintiff Ang, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. The suit
as to the Teves shipment was filed on October 30, 1963; that referring to the
Davao Merchandising Corp.'s shipment was filed on November 14, 1963.
The lower court dismissed the complaint of Ang on tha grounds of on the
ground of prescription. Hence filling the complaint in the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Did plaintiff-appellant's causes of action prescribe under Section 3(6),
paragraph 4 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act?

RULING:
No, the lower court’s order was reversed.
The court ruled that the applicable prescription period on prescription is that
found in the Civil Code, namely, either ten years for breach of a written
contract or four years for quasi-delict (Arts. 1144[1], 1146, Civil Code). At the
case at bar, there is misdelivery not nondelivery. Finally, the recipients of said
goods did not file any complaint with defendant regarding any damage to the
same. No loss nor damage is therefore involved in these cases.
Thus, the prescriptive period under Section 3(6), paragraph 4 of the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act does not apply.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON PRESCRIPTION
Yek Ton Fire and Marine Insurance Co., LTD. vs. American President
Lines, Inc.
G.R. No. L-11081 April 30, 1958
Labrador, J.:

DOCTRINE:
In a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act that the general
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made
to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corp., 93 Phil., 207; 50 Off. Gaz.,
[1], 159.)

FACTS:
This case is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of manila
dismissing the complaint filed in this action on the ground of prescription.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that defendant-appellee is not allowed to traverse
the allegations contained in the complaint but must proceed upon the
hypothetical assumption that all the allegations therein are true. The present
motion to dismiss traverses no allegation of the complaint; it sets up as new
matter that the goods in question arrived in Manila on July 17, 1952, on which
point the complaint has avoided making a statement to avoid a fatal objection.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that no evidence was submitted to support this
allegation; but the same does not appear to have been denied by plaintiff-
appellant
Besides, courts can take judicial notice of the fact that a vessel leaving Japan
on June 18, 1952, arrived Manila by July 17, 1952. Plaintiff-appellant argues
also that the court erred in not considering its action suspended by the
extrajudicial demand which took place, according to defendant's own motion
to dismiss, on August 22, 1952.

ISSUE:
In a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, is the general
provision of the Code of Civil Procedure on Prescription should apply?
No, if the Code of Civil Procedure on Prescription were made to apply it would
extend the prescription period.
The Court has already held in a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act that the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on
prescription should not be made to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship
Corp., 93 Phil., 207; 50 Off. Gaz., [1], 159.) In such a case the general
provisions of the new Civil Code (Article 1155) cannot be made to apply, as
such application would have the effect of extending the one-year.
Therefore, it is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by sea
be decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the provisions of
Article 1155 of the new Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and
permit delays in the settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary
to the clear intent and purpose of the law.
REPEAL OF LAWS
Benito Chua Kuy vs. Everrett Steamship
G.R. No. L-5554 May 27, 1953
Bautista – Angelo, J.

DOCTRINE:
A general law only applies to cases not covered by special acts. To hold
otherwise would be render nugatory the prescriptive provision contained in
that special act.

FACTS:
Benito Chua Kuy placed an order of 500 cases of evaporated milk for 90
babies. The merchandise was brought from the Columbia Pacific Distributing
Company of Portland, Oregon. When the merchandise was brought to the
Philippines on February 26 1947, the evaporated milk was only good for 48
babies and not the original order for 90 babies.

A case was filed to to resolve on the issue of the merchandise. Chua Kuy said
that his civil action should not prescribe because the Code of Civil Procedure
is the applicable law. He argued that the Code of Civil Procedure repealed the
Code of Commerce and even assuming the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
applies, the action to recover loss or damage can only be brought by the
shipper and not any other person interested in the transaction.

ISSUE:
Did the Code of Civil Procedure repealed the Code of Commerce with respect
to the rule on prescription?

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that the Code of Civil Procedure did not repealed
the Code of Commerce.

A general law only applies to cases not covered by special acts. The
transaction under consideration was covered by the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act which is a special law. To hold otherwise would be render nugatory the
prescriptive provision contained in that special act.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Development Bank of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137916 December 8, 2004
Callejo Sr., J.

DOCTRINE:
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.

Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision. Malice connotes ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm.

FACTS:
The Gotangco spouses secured a loan from the Developmant Bank of the
Philppines for their poultry project and executed a real estate mortgage over
the spouses' parcel of lands located in Palayan City.

The spouses executed in favor of Elpidio Cudio a contract to sell over the
parcels of land mortgaged to Development Bank of the Philippines for P50,000
in two installments. The Gotangco remitted to the Development Bank in partial
payment of his loan account.

Around 1988, the poultry farm and its improvements were gutted by fire. The
Development Bank wrote to the Gotangco spouses demanding payment for
the loan. Cucio, the buyer of the lands, filed a complaint against the
Development Bank and Gotangco spouses for damages. Cucio alleged that
despite of the payments of the full purchase price of the parcel of lands, the
bank refused to turn over the duplicate copy of the title and the spouses did
not execute a deed of absolute sale in his favor. The spouses in their defense
claimed that they cannot be faulted because Cucio did not inform to them that
he made complete payment to Development Bank. Because the bank had
implied consent on the sale, it was the bank's obligation to turn over the titles.
Pending the case, the bank judicially foreclosed the parcels of land. The Trial
Court ruled that the Development Bank is legally bound to turn over the titles
to Cucio and awarded damages to the spouses because the extrajudicial
foreclosure made by the bank was to harass the spouses. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Trial Court's decision.

ISSUE:
Will the spouses be entitled of the award of damages?

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held there was no sufficient basis to grant damages to
the spouses. The principle of abuse of rights is under Article 19 of the Civil
Code.

The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of said
provision.

Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.

The bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage, notwithstanding those differences, cannot
thereby give rise to the conclusion that the petitioner did so with malice, to
harass the Spouses Gotangco.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs Jesse Yap
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
Bidin, J.

DOCTRINE:
A civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the Civil
Code. In order to prosper, the following elements must be present: 1) the fact
of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant himself was the
prosecutor and that action was finally terminated with an acquittal; 2) in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause and; 3) the
prosecutor was impelled by legal malice

FACTS:
Albenson Enterprises delivered steel plates to Guaranteed Industries and a
check was received as payment drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
The check was dishonored by reason of account closed and the check was
traced to Eugenio Baltao. Albenson extrajudicially demanded for the payment
of steel plates but Baltao stated that he did not issue the check nor the
signature belonged to him.

Albenson filed with the fiscal for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. It
appeared that Baltao had a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III managing
E.L. Woodworks. The fiscal exonerated Baltao and moved to dismiss the
information. Because of the alleged unjust filing of the criminal information,
Baltao filed a case for malicious prosecution. The Trial Court ruled in favor of
Baltao the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Albenson argued that the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding Baltao's cause of action for abuse of rights
despite the basis for civil action in malicious prosecution is Article 21 or 2176
of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Was the Court of Appeals correct in holding that Albenson abused their right
in filing a case against Baltao?

RULING:
No, the Supreme Court held that Albenson did not abused their right in filing
a case against Baltao. Article 19 sets standards, not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of their duty. When one does not
conform in the norms under Article 19 and results in damage to another, he
must be held responsible.

Albenson did not violated the principle of abuse of rights. What prompted them
to file a case was their failure to collect the amount due on the bounced check.
Likewise, there was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Eduardo Manuel vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 19 - commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties.

If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper.

FACTS:
Accused Manuel was charged for the crime of bigamy. Manuel was a married
man and met complainant Tina Gandalera. Manuel courted Gandalera and
introduced himself to her parents and assured to them that he was single.
They were married to each other after. During their marriage, Tina become
jobless and Manuel left her. She later on found that Manuel was previously
married. The Regional Trial Court ruled that Manuel was guilty for bigamy
beyond reasonable doubt. Manuel in his defense claimed that he was under
good faith and without malicious intent on the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted.

ISSUE:
Will complainant Tina Gandalera be entitled to the award of damages?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Manuel is liable to the private complainant
for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code.

Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or

negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same."
On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages."
In this case, accused Manuel - a married man, misled Gandalera in believing
that he is indeed a single man. During the course of their marriage, Gandalera
was jobless, did not provide her support and later on left her. When Gandalera
later on knew Manuel was a married man, she felt humiliated. His acts were
against public policy and undermine the family as a social institution.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100727 March 18, 1992
Madialdea, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The provision covers a situation where a person has a legal right which was
violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.

FACTS:
A certificate of public convenience was issued in favor of respondent Lungsod
Silangan Transport Services to ply the Cogeo-Cubao route.

Lungsod Silangan Services issued Board Resolution No. 9 which states that a
member of the cooperative may was permitted to queue for passengers in
exchange for a ticket for 20 pesos that will be utilized for the Christmas
programs. This prompted the members of association to strike against
Lungsod Silangan Services. They formed a human barricade and forcibly took
over the motor units and personnel of the Lungsod Silangan Transport group.

The association denied the allegation that they plan to take over, but they
admitted that they do not have the authority to transport passengers.

The Trial Court ruled that the association is liable to Lungsod Silangan Services
for damages.

ISSUE:
Was the Association liable for damages?
RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that Association was liable for damages. Article
21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The takeover by the association paralyzed the usual activities of Lungsod

Silangan and violated the right of respondent to conduct its operations through
its authorized officers.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Alfred Velayo vs Shell
G.R. No. L-7817 October 31, 1956
Felix, J.

DOCTRINE:
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitutue a violation of law
should be compensated by damages. Article 23 of the Civil Code provides that
even if an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to
the fault or negligence of the defendant, he shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited.

FACTS:
Commercial Airlines Inc. (CALI) was engaged in the air transport business and
it fuel supplies were provided by Shell. CALI had an outstanding balance owing
to Shell and informed that CALI was in state of insolvency. CALI had a C-54
plane and was offered to Shell as partial payment but Shell refused. In a
meeting with CALI's creditors, it was agreed that CALI will sell its assets to
settle the payment including the plane. Prior to the meeting, CALI had a plan
to sell its plane equipment and the C-54 plane to Philippine Air Lines Inc.

Unaware to CALI, Shell made an assignment of credit to a sister corporation

in the United States and was able to secure an attachment of credit and sale
of C-54 plane to satisfy the debt. Velayo, as the assignee, filed an injunction
to prevent the assignment and sale of the plane. Shell in their defense argued
that there is no law prohibiting a creditor assigning his credit to another.

ISSUE:
Was Shell liable for damages for taking advantage of the sale of the plane
against CALI's creditors?
RULING:
Yes, Shell was liable for damages to the creditors of CALI. The assignment of
credit to another was legal, but such transfer was swift and unsuspected, it
deprived CALI the opportunity to recover the plane.

Article 19 is not a mere declaration. Such declaration was implemented by

Article 21 which states: "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages."
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Sevilla vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-41182-83 April 16, 1988
Sarmiento, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

FACTS:
Tourist World Service Inc. leased a property owned by Segunda Noguera for
the purpose of setting up a branch office. Lina Sevilla worked for Tourist World
and she received 4% for any airline fare bought. It was come to the knowledge
of Tourist World that Sevilla worked for a rival company and Tourist World was
incurring losses. The Board of Directors of Tourist World issued resolutions
namely: 1.) to abolish the office of the branch manager - which Sevilla was
currently holding and; 2.) to receive the properties of the company at the
branch office.

The contract for the use of the branch company was terminated and
effective on January 1962. To comply with the mandate, the corporate
secretary padlocked the premises because Sevilla cannot be contacted and to
protect the interest of the company. A complaint was filed before the Trial
Court and ruled in favor of Tourist World. The court held that Tourist World as
the true lessee had the prerogative to terminate the lease and padlock the
premises and Sevilla was under the employment of Tourist World.

ISSUE:
Was the Trial Court correct in holding that Tourist World had the authority to
padlock the premises?
RULING:
No, the Trial Court was not correct. Tourist World do not have any authority
to padlock the premises without notice to its actual occupants. The acts made
my Tourist was to put Sevilla in a bad light that she worked for a rival
company. This led to remove Sevilla by abolishing the branch manager office
to let the corporate secretary takeover the branch office properties. Such
unwarranted revocation of contract of agency made Tourist World liable for
damages.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Valenzuela vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 83122 October 19, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:
Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith; and every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

FACTS:
Valenzuela is a general agent of Philippine American General Insurance
Company (PHILMAGEN) and he was authorized to sell non-life insurance in
behalf of PHILMAGEN with a commission of 32.5%. Valenzuela solicited Delta
Motors Inc. in the amount of P4.4. Million pesos with 32.5% commission. He
was not able to get the full commission as Delta only paid P1.6 million pesos.
In turn, Delta proposed a 50-50 share on the commission but Valenzuela
refused. As a result Delta threatened the cancellation of his policies and leaked
news that Valenzuela had a substantial amount with PHILMAGEN. Later on,
Delta terminated the General Agency Agreement of Valenzuela. Valenzuela
filed before the Trial Court an action for damages against Delta and the court
ruled in favor of Valenzuela. Delta Motors appealed to the Supreme Court
holding that the Trial Court erred in awarding damages in favor of Valenzuela.

ISSUE:
Was Delta Motors Inc. liable for damages?
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that Delta Mortors Inc. are liable for damages.
The termination by Delta Motors of the General Agency Agreement was tainted
in bad faith.

If a principal acts in bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the
agency, then he is liable in damages. This is in accordance with the precepts
in Human Relations enshrined in our Civil Code that "every person must in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith; and every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
David Llorente vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 85464 October 3, 1994
Sarmiento J.

DOCTRINE:
It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code together with Article 27 that
the performance of duty be done with justice and good faith.

FACTS:
Atty. Llorente was employed in the PCA as Deputy Administrator. A massive
reorganization happened and hundreds of employees resigned. A clearance
must be signed by the CPA officers only when there is no pending
accountability. The clearance of Mr. Curio was still pending because he still
had existing liability. However, there are other employees whose clearances
were signed despite having existing liability. Mr. Curio filed a case against
Atty. Llorente before the Tanodbayan but he was advised to wait for the
resolution.

The clearance was still pending and as a result, he failed to get gainful
employment and his family literally went hungry. A case was filed before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but
Atty. Llorente was acquitted for lack of evidence showing bad faith. However,
he was tasked to pay compensatory damages for abuse of right.

ISSUE:
Did Atty. Llorente acted in bad faith when he did not release the clearance of
Mr. Curio?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Llorente acted in bad faith. He was
able to sign clearances of employees with existing liabilities except for Mr.
Curio. It is no defense that Atty. Llorente was motivated by no ill-will or he
was merely complying with legal procedures for he was not as strict to the
other employees. There can be no other conclusion that he was acting in bad
faith.
It is the essence of Article 19 of the Civil Code under which the petitioner was
made to pay damages with Article 27 that the performance of duty be done
with justice and good faith.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Philippine National Bank vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978
Antonio, J.

DOCTRINE:
Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited
provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
in the statutes.

FACTS:
Rita Tapnio and PNB entered into a contract of loan and PNB secured a lien on
her sugar crop as security for the mortgage. Tapnio was indebted to PNB in
the amount of P2000.00 pesos. Her debt became due but Tapnio was not able
to pay her debt. Tapnio admitted that she still owes the bank, but she stated
that she cannot be indebted to the bank because she had a lease agreement
with Jacobo-Nazon on her unused sugar export quota to which the bank was
also aware of. The bank manager recommended the approval of P2.80 per
picul of sugar in the lease agreement. However, the Board of Directors did not
took action on the agreement at the time it was P3.00 per picul. Her unused
1000 piculs of sugar at the price of P2.80 per picul - which the total amount
is at P2800, was already in excess of her obligation to the bank. This caused
Jacobo-Nazon to rescind the contract and Tapnio filed a complaint against PNB
for the recovery of money plus damages. The Trial Court ruled faulted the
Board of Directors for not taking action on the approval of the price of the
sugar. The PNB appealed stating that they should not be held liable?

ISSUE:
Was the PNB liable for damages against Tapnio?
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that PNB was liable to Tapnio. There is no
question that Tapnio's failure to utilize her sugar quota for the crop year 1956-
1957 was due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of
petitioner.

While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the

proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly
cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest
of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of
said sugar quota. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to
expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be
unable to utilize the sugar quota in question.

Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
MORAL DAMAGES
Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-26882 April 5, 1978
Makasiar, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 27 of the Civil Codes provides that any person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.

FACTS:
Petre Galero obtained from the Bureau of Lands a Homstead Patent on a parcel
of land located at Camarines Norte. On 1940, Galero sold the land to Mario
Escuta and Escuta later on sold the same land to Florencio Caramoan on 1942.
Petitioner de Laig and Galero filed an action before the court to recover the
parcel of land on the ground that its alienation violated Section 118 of the
Public Land Act. The said law states that there no alienation, transfer, or
reconveyance shall take effect with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce.

In 1948 a deed of sale between Atty. de Laig and Galero was executed in favor
of Vda. de Laig. However, Atty. de Laig failed to solicit the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

The wife Vda de Laig went to the Register of Deeds that the disputed parcel
of land has been sold in favor of his late husband and requesting to claim
ownership of the land. It was later on forwarded to the Secretary and
approved the sale stating that it did not violate the Public Land Act. Galero on
the other hand, sought for a second duplicate owner's copy of the land and it
was issued by Atty. Lapak - the son of the Register of Deeds, in his favor.
Galero executed a Deed of Sale on the disputed land in favor Carmen Verzo.
Vda de Laig filed a case against the Secretary for damages and to annul the
second deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Was Petre Galero liable for damages?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that Galero was liable for damages and the
second deed of sale was void. Galero was able to procure the second copy
thru the son of the Register of Deeds.

Both the father and his son Atty. Jose Lapak are likewise civilly liable for failure
to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public
officer and as a member of the Bar or for willfully or negligently causing
damage to another, or for willfully causing loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy.
MORAL DAMAGES
Magbanua vs Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985
Abad Santos, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts
mentioned in Article 21 of the same code which provides: "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages."

FACTS:
Magbanua and plaintiffs were tenants of a land owned by defendants Perezes.
The Perezes diverted the free flow of water to the farm lots of the plaintiffs
which caused portion of their landholding to dry up with great damage and
prejudice. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Magbanua, stating that there had
been complete closure of water supplying plaintiffs' landholdings which
hampered their palay crop.

The Trial Court ruled that the Perezes are prohibited from disrupting the free
flow of water and awarded them moral damages. The decision was appealed
to the appellate court and modified the decision by removing the award of
moral damages. Magbanua appealed to the Supreme Court praying for the
reinstatement of moral damages.

ISSUE:
Was Magbanua entitled to the award of moral damages?

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that Magbanua and plaintiffs are entitled to the
award of moral damages.

They were entitled of damages because they were denied of irrigation water
to force them to vacate their landholding. Their rights were violated and
prejudiced from the unjustified diversion of water.

Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts
mentioned in Article 21 of the same code which provides: "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages."
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
People's Bank Trust & Co. vs. Dahican Lumber
G.R. No. L-17500 May 16, 1967
Dizon, J.

DOCTRINE:
The law provides that creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to
defraud them; and that any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Similar
liability is demandable under Arts. 20 and 21 - which may be given retroactive
effect.

FACTS:
The Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila sold its rights to Dahican Lumber
(DALCO). To develop the concession, DALCO obtained various loans from
People's Bank Trust & Co. DAMCO also obtained loan from Export-Import Bank
of Washinton D.C through the People's Bank and executed between the
Export-Import Bank and Dahican American Lumber Association (DAMCO) - a
foreign corporation.

DALCO used the parcels of land in Camarines Norte as security of the

mortgage and the deeds contained the following provision extending the
mortgage lien to properties to be subsequently acquired - referred to hereafter
as "after acquired properties".

When DALCO and DAMCO failed to pay the 5th promissory note upon its
maturity, they contacted Connel Bros. Company (CONNEL) and to sell their
equipment to them. The bank requested DAMCO to rescind the sale of the
properties but DAMCO refused to comply. A complaint was filed before the
court to restrain the sale of the properties.

ISSUE:
Were DALCO and DAMCO liable for damages?
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that DALCO and DAMCO were liable for damages.

The law provides that creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to
defraud them; and that any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Similar
liability is demandable under Arts. 20 and 21 - which may be given retroactive
effect.

DALCO and DAMCO, after failing to pay the fifth promissory note upon its
maturity, conspired jointly with CONNELL to violate the provisions of the
fourth paragraph of the mortgages under foreclosure by attempting to defeat
plaintiffs' mortgage lien on the "after acquired properties". As a result, the
plaintiffs had to go to court to protect their rights thus jeopardized.
Defendants' liability for damages is therefore clear.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97336 February 16, 1993
Davide, Jr. J.

DOCTRINE:
When the proximate cause of a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of giving herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme to accept him and to obtain her
sexual consent, could justify the award of damages under Article 21 of the
Civil Code.

FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales met Gashem Baksh, an Iranian exchange student, accepted
Baksh's promise to marry and they will get married at the end of the school
semester. Baksh went to the family of Gonzales to secure their approval to
the marriage and Marilou was a virgin before she was forced to live with him
in an apartment.

A week before Marilou filed a complaint, she was maltreated and sustained
injuries. A day before filing the complaint, Baksh repudiated the marriage
agreement and asked not to live with her anymore. The Trial Court founded
Baksh liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code. It was anchored that Baksh
deceived Marilou to marry her, only to deflower her and he abused the
Philippine hospitality and sense of morality.

Baksh argued that Article 21 is not applicable because he has not committed
any moral or injury and as a Muslim, his failure to promise to marry is tolerable
under his culture.

ISSUE:
Was Baksh liable under Article 21?
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that Baksh was liable for damages under Article
21. As a rule, a mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable.

But when the proximate cause of a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of giving herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had no intention
of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme to accept him
and to obtain her sexual consent, could justify the award of damages under
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO COMPENSATE MORAL DAMAGES
TITLE: Carmen Quimiguuing, suing through her parents, Antonio
Quimiguing and Jacoba Cablin v. Felix Icao
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

DOCTRINE:
For a married man to force a woman, not his wife to yield to his lust constituted
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitled her to claim
compensation for the damage caused as provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

FACTS:
An appeal was filed in this Court after Civil Case No. 1590, was dismissed its
complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment
of the same pleading in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
(Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding).
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors
in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per
month, damages and attorney's fees.
Defendant Icao, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action
since the complaint did not alleged that the child had been born; and after
hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result
of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff
appealed directly to this Court.

ISSUE:
Is the decision of the lower Court reversible?
RULING:
YES, the orders under appeal were reversed and set aside. The appealed
orders of the court below was untenable, since the lower court's theory that
Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn".
First reason, the order was reversed, the petitioner in her complaint alleged
that as a result of the intercourse, she later gave birth to a baby girl, and it
was denied by the respondent despite efforts and giving the plaintiff drugs.
The lower Court’s theory violated Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article
40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with
the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive at
the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the
parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
Second reason was, appealed from is that for a married man to force a
woman, not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint
in this case) constituted a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitled
her to claim compensation for the damage caused. It is provided in Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO ANALOGOUS CASES OF MORAL
DAMAGES
TITLE:

FACTS SHOW THE CIVIL LIABILITY CHARGES TO PETITIONER FOR

VIOLATING RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, petitioner vs. NELSON

D. LAVINA, respondent.

G.R. No. 183026, November 14, 2012

Reyes, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Under rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 4 Verification - Except

when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need to be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

FACTS:

Lavina and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as

Ambassador and Consul General. In the course of their stay in Kenya, the
residence of Lavina was raided twice. On November 17, 1997, Lavina filed
before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his wife. Lavina
complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront against his
privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the
two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials; (b) infringement of his
constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures; (c) bad faith, malice
and deceit exhibited by the defendants. Lavina sought payment of actual,
moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suits.

In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids
conducted on Lavina’s residence. As counterclaims, he alleged that the suit
filed by Lavina’s caused him embarrassment and sleepless nights. On October
3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision, ordering Nestor to pay Lavina PHP
500,000.00 as moral damages, PHP 50,000.00 as nominal damages, PHP PHP
75,000.00 as exemplary damages, PHP 150,000.00 as attorney’s fee and
litigation expenses, and cost of suit.
 The petitioner asked to reverse the decision of RTC and waive the charges
occurred during the decision.

ISSUE:

Is the civil damages imposed by RTC to the petitioner is legal?

RULING:

Yes, the civil damages imposed to the petitioner is legal because the act done
was contrary to Sec. 4 – Verification under rule 45 of the rules of Civil
Procedure.

Under rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 4 Verification - Except

when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need to be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

In the case, a pleading must be verified by the affiant has read the pleadings
and the allegations of the rule, in relation to affront against his privacy and
the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the two raids
conducted by the Kenyan officials. Further, verification based on “information
and belief” or upon “knowledge, information belief” or lacks a proper
verification of the rule, in relation to infringement of his constitutional rights
against illegal searches and seizures.

Hence, the Civil damages charges imposed by RTC to the petitioner is valid.
Francisco Hermosisima v. The Hon. Court Of Appeals, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
CONCEPCION, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8)
Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions
referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

FACTS:
Soledad Cagigas, referred to as complaint, together with her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child, filed moral damages for alleged breach of
promise against the petitioner in the case at bar. Petitioner admitted the
paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied
having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, the court
ordered petitioner to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month,
which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course,
later on, CFI of Cebu rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
Declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of
defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay
to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable
on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for
actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE:
Is moral damage recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?
RULING:
YES, the Court of Appeals ruled that the fact that the general tenor of Article
2219 (3), provides that moral damages may be recovered in the case of
“seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts”. Indicated that the word
“seduction”, contemplates a crime punishable under Articles 337 and 338 of
the Revised Penal Code which in the case at bar is not evident but rather
petitioner is “morally guilty” of seduction not only because;
First, he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot.
Secondly, but also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for
him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy."
Therefore, the court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the moral
damages inflicted on the complainant; (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for
the support of the child: (2) P4, 500, representing the income that
complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly
after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5, 000,
as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation,
and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child — and
increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was hereby affirmed, with the elimination
of this award for damages, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. Therefore, it was ordered.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO IDENTIFY DUTY OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND ITS APPELATE JURISDCTION
TITLE:
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter
represented herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian v.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
BIDIN, J.:

DOCTRINE:
REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF APPEALS; DUTY THEREOF IN THE EXERCISE OF
ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — It must be stressed at the outset that
factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and not a conclusive
effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it
is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial
court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned
and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It
is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that
as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court.

FACTS:
The petitioner Amelita Constantino, filed an action for acknowledgment,
support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. In her
complaint, Amelita Constantino alleged, among others, that sometime in the
month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony’s Restaurant located at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their
first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he
was billeted. Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita, afterwards he
brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter and that after the
sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they
repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November,
1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila. Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for
help and support were ignored by the respondent.
The fact that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly
income of P5,000 to P8,000.00, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees plus costs.
August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony’s Cocktail Lounge
but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her and prayed for
the dismissal of the case. Both parties rendered motion but the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and
plaintiff-minor Michael Constantin and ordering the respondent to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and
the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical
bills incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to
recognize as his own illegitimate child and shall be entitled to all the rights,
privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such status; to give a
permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the
amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s
fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual
findings of the trial court and in not affirming the decision of the trial court.
They also pointed out that the appellate court committed a misapprehension
of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita
during the first or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time
of the conception of the child.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside
the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint?

RULING:
NO, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit as this Court found out that
in order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere
or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation it should established by clear and convincing
evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative
allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint
was dismissed.
As regards Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 (3) & 21
(4)of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage,
she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals
that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita
was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan.
Therefore, repeated their sexual intercourse only indicated that passion and
not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her
submit herself to Ivan.
Hence, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors
of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court
to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by
the parties unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported
by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE ACT OF REPLEVIN
TITLE:

ANIANO OBAÑA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO SANDOVAL

G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
Petitioner sought a review of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court
ordering him in an action for Replevin to return to private respondent, 170
cavans of rice or to pay its value in the amount of P37.25 per cavan, with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
Private respondent, Sandoval was approached by a certain Chan Lin who
offered to purchase from him 170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) at
the price of P37.26 per cavan, and to be delivered at petitioner's store in San
Fernando, La Union, with payment to be made thereat by Chan Lin to
Sandoval's representative. Sandoval accepted the offer as he knew petitioner
and had previous transactions with him.
As agreed, the 170 cavans of rice were transported the following day on a
truck belonging to SANDOVAL to petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union.
Chan Lin accompanied the shipment. Upon arrival thereat, the goods were
unloaded but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price
from Chan Lin, the latter was nowhere to be found. The driver tried to collect
from petitioner, but the latter refused stating that he had purchase the goods
from Chan Lin at P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already
been paid to Chan Lin.
Further demands have been met with refusal, Sandoval, as plaintiff, filed suit
for replevin against petitioner, then the defendant, before the Municipal Court
of San Fernando, La Union, which ordered petitioner-defendant to pay to
Sandoval one-half (½) of the cost of the rice or P2,805.00.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner’s claimed rights over the products wherein he was repaid by
the respondent, and the sale has been rescinded, just?
RULING:
NO, as he has been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin, the sale between
them had been voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby
divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the
rice to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, wants to return the rice to Sandoval,
petitioner-defendant cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another by holding on to property no longer belonging to him. In
law and in equity, therefore, Sandoval is entitled to recover the rice, or the
value thereof since he was not paid of the price therefore.
WHEREFORE, albeit on a different premise, the judgment under review was
hereby AFFIRMED and costs against petitioner was rendered.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THE TACIT AND MUTUAL CONSENT OF
SERVICE RENDERED
TITLE:
VICENTE PEREZ v. EUGENIO POMAR, Agent of the Compañia General
de Tabacos
G.R. No. L-1299, November 16, 1903
TORRES, J.:

DOCTRINE:
There is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, the
defendant is still obliged to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if
there is no written contract entered between the two parties on the basis of
quasi-contract. Every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him. (Art. 22 of the Civil Code)

FACTS:
On August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna a complaint, which was amended on the 17th of January of this year,
asking that the court determine the amount due the plaintiff, at the customary
rate of compensation for interpreting in these Islands, for services rendered
in the Tabacalera Company, and that, in view of the circumstances of the case,
judgment be rendered in his favor for such sum.
In this complaint it was alleged that Don Eugenio Pomar, as general agent of
the Compañia General de Tabacos in the said province, verbally requested the
plaintiff on the 8th of December, 1901, to act as interpreter between himself
and the military authorities; that after the date mentioned the plaintiff
continued to render such services up to and including May 31, 1902; that he
had accompanied the defendant, Pomar, during that time at conferences and
in many occasion.
The respondent, Pomar, assured the plaintiff that the Tabacalera Company
always will generously repaid services rendered for it, and these statements
were made in the absence of witnesses and that therefore the only proof as
to the same was Mr. Pomar's word as a gentleman; that the employees of the
company did not understand English.
In the amended complaint it was added that the defendant, on behalf of the
company, offered to renumerate the plaintiff for the services rendered in the
most advantageous manner in which such services are compensated, in view
of the circumstances under which they were requested; and that the plaintiff,
by rendering the company such services, was obliged to abandon his own
business, the manufacture of soap, and thereby suffered damages in the sum
of $3,200, United States currency.
The defendant, on the other hand, filed an answer asking for the dismissal of
the complaint, with costs to the plaintiff. In his answer the defendant denied
the allegation in the first paragraph of the complaint, stating that it was wholly
untrue that the company, and the defendant as its agent. He stated that he
especially denied paragraph 2 of the complaint, as it was absolutely untrue
that the plaintiff had been at the disposal of the defendant for the purpose of
rendering such services; that he therefore had not been obliged to abandon
his occupation or his soap factory, and that the statement that an offer of
employment with the company had been made to him was false. The
defendant also denied that through the mediation of the plaintiff the company
and he had obtained large profits.
The succeeding statements in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint were
also denied. The defendant stated that, on account of the friendly relations
which sprang up between the plaintiff and himself, the former borrowed from
him from time to time money amounting to $175 for the purposes of his
business, and that he had also delivered to the plaintiff 36 arrobas of oil worth
$106, and three packages of resin for use in coloring his soap. The plaintiff
accompanied the defendant to Pagsanjan, Pilar, and other towns when the
latter made business trips for the purpose of extending his business and
mercantile relations. The plaintiff in the said conferences acted as interpreter
of his own free will, without being requested to by the defendant and without
any offer of payment or compensation. The defendant concluded by saying
that he answered in his individual capacity.

ISSUE:
Is the respondent oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the
petitioner?
RULING:
YES. The Court’s judgement was rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the
payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos.
The tacit agreement and consent of both parties with respect to the service
rendered by the plaintiff, and the reciprocal benefits accruing to each, are the
best evidence of the fact that there was an implied contract sufficient to create
a legal bond, from which arose enforceable rights and obligations of a bilateral
character.
In contracts, the will of the contracting parties is law, this being a legal
doctrine based upon the provisions of articles 1254, 1258, 1262, 1278, 1281,
1282, and 1289 of the Civil Code.
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists the moment that
one or more persons consent to be bound, with respect to another or others,
to deliver some thing or to render some service. Article 1255 provides that
the contracting parties may establish such covenants, terms, and conditions
as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or
public policy. Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact remains
that Perez rendered to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear
that he did this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, having
accepted the benefit of the service, to pay a just compensation.
Therefore, by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des implicitly
established.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THE JURIDICAL RELATION OF QUASI-
CONTRACT
TITLE:
PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION v. CONSOLACION
INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC.
CONSOLACION INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC. v. GREGORIO V.
PAJARILLO, third party
G.R. No. L-30204 October 29, 1976
ANTONIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Principle of unjust enrichment which is basic in every legal system, was
already expressly recognized in this jurisdiction. Certain lawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end
that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

FACTS:
That on the 19th day of October, 1962, a Writ of Execution was received at
the Court of First Instance of Manila under Civil Case No. 49691, entitled
Pacific Merchandising Corporation vs. Leo Enterprises, Inc., a copy of the said
Writ of Execution is attached as ANNEX A to the complaint.
Atty. Greg V. Pajarillo was appointed on March 2, 1963 as Receiver of all the
assets, properties and equipment of Paris Theatre, tolerated by Leo
Enterprises, Inc. under Civil Case No. 50201 entitled Gregorio V. Pajarillo vs.
Leo Enterprises, Inc..
On or about the third of March, 1963, third-party defendant Pajarillo
approached the third-party plaintiff and applied for a surety bond in the
amount of P5, 000.00 to be rated in favor of the abovenamed plaintiff in order
to guarantee the said plaintiff the payment of obligations in its favor by the
Leo Enterprises, Inc..
To protect third party plaintiff against damage and injury, third party
defendant Pajarillo executed in favor of the former an INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT, copy of which is attached as ANNEX 'B' to third party complaint;
the terms of which are incorporated by reference;
Plaintiff's counsel demanded from the said principal, Greg V. Paiarillo, the
payment of the installments corresponding to the months of May, June, July,
August and September, 1963, which remain unpaid in spite of said demand,
(attached as ANNEX 'E' to the complaint). The defendant was duly notified of
the demand made on Greg V. Pajarillo and in spite of said notice the defendant
has failed and refused to pay the unpaid obligation.
The third-party plaintiff reminded Pajarillo regarding his obligations in favor of
the plaintiff, the third-party defendant, Greg V. Pajarillo replied that he no
longer was bound to pay because he had ceased to be the receiver of Paris
Theatre operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. by virtue of the decision of the Court
in Civil Case No. 50201 cited above, and for this reason, and refused to pay
the demand of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Is the third party defendant-appellant Gregorio V. Pajarillo, under the facts
and circumstances obtaining, liable to plaintiff for the unpaid amount claimed?

RULING:
YES, in the case at bar, appellant Pajarillo does not dispute the fact that he
never secured the court's approval of either the agreement of March 11, 1963,
with Pacific Merchandising Corporation or of his Indemnity Agreement with the
Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. on March 14, 1963, in consideration
of the performance bond submitted by the latter to Pacific Merchandising
Corporation to guarantee the payment of the obligation.
As the person to whom the possession of the theater and its equipment was
awarded by the court in Civil Case No. 50201, it was certainly to his personal
profit and advantage that the sale at public auction of the equipment of the
theater was prevented by his execution of the aforesaid agreement and
submission of the afore-mentioned bond. In order to bind the property or fund
in his hands as receiver, he should have applied for and obtained from the
court authority to enter into the aforesaid contract. Unauthorized contracts of
a receiver do not bind the court in charge of receivership. They are the
receiver's own contracts and are not recognized by the courts as contracts of
the receivership. Consequently, the aforesaid agreement and undertaking
entered into by appellant Pajarillo not having been approved or authorized by
the receivership court should, therefore, be considered as his personal
undertaking or obligation. Certainly, if such agreements were known by the
receivership court, it would not have terminated the receivership without due
notice to the judgment creditor as required by Section 8 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court. This must be assumed because of the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed. Indeed, if it were true that he
entered into the agreement and undertaking as a receiver, he should have, as
such receiver, submitted to the court an account of the status of the properties
in his hands including the outstanding obligations of the receivership. Had he
done so, it is reasonable to assume that the judgment creditor would have
opposed the termination of the receivership, unless its claim was paid.
Having failed to perform his duty, to the prejudice of the creditor, appellant
should not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The judgment
creditor having been induced to enter into the aforesaid agreement by
appellant Pajarillo it was the duty of the latter to comply with is end of the
bargain. He not only failed to perform his undertaking, but now attempts to
evade completely his liability. Under such circumstances, appellant is not
entitled to equitable relief. No ground for equitable relief can be found in a
case where a party has not only failed to perform the conditions upon which
he alone obtained the execution of the contract, but where it is clear that he
never, at any time, intended to perform them.
Moreover, Pajarillo paid for the said claim, otherwise he would be enriching
himself without paying plaintiff for the cost of certain materials that went into
its construction. ... It is angled however, that he did so only as a receiver of
Leo Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No. 50201 all of the
properties of Leo Enterprises, Inc. passed on to Pajarillo by virtue of the
judgment in Civil Case No. %201 ...” This Roman Law principle of "Nemo Cum
alterious detrimento locupletari protest" is embodied in Article 22 (Human
Relations), and Articles 2142 to 2175 (QuasiContracts) of the New Civil Code.
Long before the enactment of this Code, however, the principle of unjust
enrichment which is basic in every legal system, was already expressly
recognized in this jurisdiction.
This Court ruled that where one has rendered services to another, and these
services are accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that the service ",
as rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a reasonable
remuneration therefore because "it is a well-known principle of law, that no
one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another."
The foregoing equitable principle which springs from the fountain of good
conscience are applicable to the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the judgment unilateral was
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN GOOD FAITH AS DEFENSE
TITLE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Romeo T. Acosta
(formerly Jose D. Malvas), Director of Forest Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. HON.
NORMELITO J. BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, Branch 41, Regional
Trial Court, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and DANILO REYES
G.R. No. 163794 November 28, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal
thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them unless the person who
recovers the possession exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the
preceding article.

FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, private respondent Reyes bought the subject 182,941-
square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro from one
Regina Castillo (or Castillo) in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606.
Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements and planted the land
with fruit trees, including about a thousand mango[es], more than a hundred
Mandarin citrus, and more than a hundred guyabanos. He also had the title
transferred in his name and was issued TCT No. 45232.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it
turned out that about 162,500 square meters of this land is part of the
timberland of Oriental Mindoro and, therefore, cannot be subject to any
disposition or acquisition under any existing law, and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for "Cancellation of
Title and/or Reversion" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (or OSG) in
behalf of the Republic [petitioner], as represented by the Bureau of Forest
Development (or BFD), it was explained that the source[,] Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. P-2388 of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent No.
V-79606, is spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of:
a) ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (162,500) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, of the land covered by OCT No. P-2388 was, at the
time it was applied for patent and or titling, a part of the timberland of Oriental
Mindoro, per BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715. Copy of said
maps are attached hereto as Annexes "B" and "C";
b) The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-2388 are entirely inside
the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of
Atty. Augusto D. Marte4 [Atty. Marte], copy of the Map of AFFLA No. 175 and
AFFLA No. 175 are attached hereto as Annexes "D" and "E";
c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property because the rightful occupant is Atty. Augusto D.
Marte by virtue of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA] No. 175,
issued to him by the Ministry of Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on
December 21, 2011;
d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 45232, in the name of
defendant Danilo Reyes, is a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per
BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 & 1715, the same cannot be the
subject of any disposition or acquisition under any existing law (Li Hong Giap
vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Veno vs. Gov't of P.I. 41 Phil. 161; Director
of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). (pp. 18 to 19, rollo)

ISSUE:
Did the RTC ascribe grave abuse of discretion and acting without jurisdiction
in granting Reyes' motion to remove improvements?

RULING:
YES, in the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity, we rule
in favor of Reyes pro hac vice. We reiterate that this Court is not precluded
from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of
justice for technicality. Indubitably, to order the reversion of the subject land
without payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the rights of
Reyes over the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced therein,
would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as well.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4, 2004
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:
1) The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, is
hereby DIRECTED to determine the actual improvements introduced on the
subject land, their current value and the amount of the expenses actually
spent by private respondent Danilo Reyes for the said improvements thereon
from 1970 until May 13, 1987 with utmost dispatch.
2) The Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, is DIRECTED to pay private
respondent Danilo Reyes the value of such actual improvements he introduced
on the subject land as determined by the Regional Trial Court, with the right
of subrogation against Atty. Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement No. 175.
This Court rendered no costs. SO ORDERED.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN NEMO EX ALTERIUS INCOMMODE
DEBET LECUPLETARI
TITLE:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE
NATIONAL TREASURER v. CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the
name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION
SUPPLY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Civil Code embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari
(no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) stating: Every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

FACTS:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation to
Bid" dated January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business under the name
and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction),
was pre-qualified together with two other contractors. Since respondent
submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting of
Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. On November 4, 1992, a Contract Agreement was
executed by respondent and petitioner. On September 25, 1992, District
Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the concreting of
Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, made
advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs.
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.
The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.
However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of
funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired
at the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer sought the
opinion of the DPWH Legal Department on whether the contracts of Carwin
Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation projects were valid and
effective although its contractor’s license had already expired when the
projects were contracted.
In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the
DPWH Legal Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No.
4566), otherwise known as the Contractor’s License Law, does not provide
that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is
no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract
is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate
administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government officials or employees concerned.
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the
Legal Department, recommended that payment should be made to Carwin
Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion. Despite such
recommendation for payment, no payment was made to respondent.
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the
decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.

ISSUE:
Is the petition meritorious to pronounce the decision of the Court of Appeals
favoring the respondent in the case at bar? The Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that respondent has no cause of action against petitioner, considering
that:
(a) Respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and
(b) It is the commission on audit which has the primary jurisdiction to resolve
respondent’s money claim against the government

RULING:
NO, the general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same
after due deliberation.
The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. Since respondent had
rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then
the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the
finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for
the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not
allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345
is AFFIRMED. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
The decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in
that the interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum computed from June
21, 1995.
Therefore, no pronouncement as to costs on the present petition.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN INFLICTED DAMAGES AWARDED TO
BREACH OF CONTRACT
TITLE:
ELADlA DE LIMA, POTENCIANO REQUIJO, NEMESIO FLORES,
REYNALDO REQUIJO, DOMINADOR REQUIJO and MARIO REQUIJO v.
LAGUNA TAYABAS CO., CLARO SAMONTE, SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC.,
(SEVEN-UP BOTTLING CO., OF THE PHILIPPINES) and PORVENIR
ABAJAR BARRETO
G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Discretion based on equitable grounds which is duly sanctioned by Art. 2210
of the Civil Code which provides: In the discretion of the court, interest was
allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.

FACTS:
A collision between a passenger bus of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) and
a delivery truck of the Seven-up Bottling Co. of the Philippines which took
place on June 3, 1958 resulting in the death of Petra de la Cruz and serious
physical injuries of Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores, all passengers of the
LTB bus. Three civil suits were filed against herein respondents which were
consolidated for trial before the Court of First Instance of Laguna (San Pablo
City).
The Court then, rendered its decision that the judgment was against the
defendants LTB Co. Inc. and Claro Samonte, who were hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally, the resolve plaintiffs with respective amounts.
Plaintiffs, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision seeking an award
of legal interest on the amounts adjudged in their favor from the date of the
said decision but their motion was not acted upon by the court a quo. Since
their motion was not aced, therein petitioners voluntarily desisted from
appealing the decision by reason of financial necessity and in the hope that
the defendants LTB Co. and its driver Claro Samonte will be persuaded to
make immediate payment to them as adjudged by the court a quo. Only the
said defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals and the disputed
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this decision sought for its
modification so that the legal interest awarded by the Appellate Court will start
to run from the date of the decision of the trial court on December 27, 1963
instead of January 31, 1972, the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Potenciano Requijo as heir of the deceased Petra de la Cruz further
sought an increase in the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 to P 12,000.00.
The Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration holding that since
the plaintiffs did not appeal from the failure of the court a quo to award
interest on the damages and that the court on its own discretion awarded such
interest in view of Art. 2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity of the interest
should not be rolled back to the time the decision of the court a quo was
rendered.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeal; erred in granting legal interest on damages to start
only from the date of its decision instead of from the date of the trial court's
decision?

RULING:
NO, It is true that the rule is well-settled, that a party cannot impugn the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he may make
counter assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on
other grounds but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, for in such case
he must appeal. A party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain
any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained
from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.
However, in the case at bar, respondents failed to note that the legal interest
was awarded by the Appellate Court in its discretion based on equitable
grounds which is duly sanctioned by Art. 2210 of the Civil Code which
provides:
In the discretion of the court, interest was allowed upon damages awarded for
breach of contract.
Thus, the Appellate Court pointed out —
upon damages for breach of contract was allowed." There is no doubt that
the damages awarded in these civil cases arise from the breach of a
contractual obligation on the part of the defendants- appellants. But to grant
the imposition of interest on the amounts awarded to and as prayed for by
one of the plaintiffs and deny the same to the others considering that the
cases arose from one single incident would be, unfair and inequitous.
In the light, therefore, not only of the provision of the Civil Code above
referred to, but also the facts and circumstances obtaining in these cases. This
Court believed that on equitable grounds legal interest, the amounts adjudged
in favor of the plaintiffs from the date of this decision up to the time of actual
payment thereof, be allowed. At any rate, this Court was inclined to adopt a
liberal stance in this case as done in previous decisions where it held that
litigations should, as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on
technicality.
WHEREFORE, the petition was GRANTED, the subject decision was modified in
the legal interest on the damages awarded to petitioners commenced from
the date of the decision of the court a quo until actual payment while the civil
indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz was increased to P 30,000.00. This
judgment was immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to
file motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Court ordered.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN RECIPROCSL OBLIGATIONS AND
CONTRACTS
TITLE:
SPOUSES DOMINGO and LOURDES PAGUYO v.
Pierre Astorga and St. Andrew Realty, Inc.
G.R. No. 130982 September 16, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The right to rescind a contract involving reciprocal obligations is provided for
in Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Article 1191 states:
“The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one
of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.”

FACTS:
Herein petitioners, Spouses Domingo Paguyo and Lourdes Paguyo, were the
owners of a small five-storey building known as the Paguyo Building located
at Makati Avenue, corner Valdez Street, Makati City. With one (1) unit per
floor, the building has an average area of 100 square meters per floor and is
constructed on a land belonging to the Armas family.
This lot on which the Paguyo Building stands was the subject of Civil Case No.
5715 entitled, Armas, et al., v. Paguyo, et al., wherein the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 57, rendered a decision on 20 January 1988 approving a Compromise
Agreement made between the Armases and the petitioners. The compromise
agreement provided that in consideration of the total sum of One Million Seven
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1,700,000.00), the Armases committed to
execute in favor of petitioners a deed of sale and/or conveyance assigning and
transferring unto said petitioners all their rights and interests over the parcel
of land containing an area of 299 square meters
In order for the petitioners to complete their title and ownership over the lot
in question, there was an urgent need to make complete payment to the
Armases, which at that time stood at ₱917,470.00 considering that petitioners
had previously made partial payments to the Armases.
On 29 November 1988, in order to raise the much needed amount, petitioner
Lourdes Paguyo entered into an agreement captioned as Receipt of Earnest
Money with respondent Pierre Astorga, for the sale of the former’s property
consisting of the lot which was to be purchased from the Armases, together
with the improvements thereon, particularly, the existing building known as
the Paguyo Building, under the following terms and conditions as stated in the
document, to wit:
RECEIVED from MR. PIERRE M. ASTORGA the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
(₱50,000.00) PESOS (U.C.P.B. Manager’s Check No. 013085 dated November
29, 1988) as earnest money for the sale of our property consisting of a parcel
of land designated as Lot 12 located at Makati Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila,
covered by and described in T.C.T. No. 154806 together with the
improvements thereon particularly the existing building known as the Paguyo
Bldg. under the following terms and conditions:
1. The earnest money (Exh. "D") shall be good for fifteen (15) days from date
of this document during which period the owner is bound to sell the property
to the buyer;
2. Should the buyer decide not to buy the subject property within the
earnest/option period, the seller has the right to forfeit Fifteen Thousand
(₱15,000.00) pesos, and return the difference to the buyer;
3. The agreed total purchase price is seven million (₱7,000,000.00) pesos
Philippine Currency;
4. Within fifteen (15) days from execution of this document, the buyer shall
pay Fifty (50%) percent of the total purchase price less the aforesaid earnest
money, upon payment of which the following documents shall be executed or
caused to be executed as the case may be, namely:
a. Deed of Absolute Sale of the Paguyo Bldg., in favor of the buyer.
b. Deed of Absolute Sale to be executed by the Armases who still appear as
the registered owners of the lot in favor of the buyer.
c. Deed of Real Estate Mortgage of the same subject lot and Bldg. to secure
the 50% balance of the total purchase price to be executed by the buyer in
favor of the herein seller.
5. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage shall contain the following provisions,
namely:
a. payment of the 50% balance of the purchase price shall be payable within
fifteen (15) days from actual vacating of the Armases from the subject lot.
b. During the period commencing from the execution of the documents
mentioned under paragraph 4 (which should be done simultaneously) the
buyer is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the rental due and actually received from
the tenants of the Paguyo Bldg. plus the use of the penthouse while the seller
shall retain possession and use of the basement free of rent until the balance
of the purchase price is fully paid in accordance with the herein terms and
conditions. The one-half (1/2) of the tenants’ deposits shall be credited in
favor of the buyer.
However, contrary to their express representation with respect to the subject
lot, petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to acquire the lot from
the Armas family despite the full financial support of respondents.
Nevertheless, the parties maintained their business relationship under the
terms and conditions of the above-mentioned Receipt of Earnest Money.
On 12 December 1988, petitioners asked for and were given by respondents
an additional ₱50,000.00 to meet the former’s urgent need for money in
connection with their construction business. Due also to the urgent necessity
of obtaining money to finance their construction business, petitioner Lourdes
Paguyo, who was also the attorney-in-fact of her husband, proposed to the
respondents the separate sale of the building in question while she continued
to work on the acquisition of the lot from the Armas family, assuring the
respondents that she would succeed in doing so.
Aware of the risk of buying an improvement on the lot of a third party who
appeared ambivalent on whether to dispose their property in favor of the
respondents, respondents took a big business gamble and, relying on the
assurance of petitioners that they would eventually acquire the lot and
transfer the same to respondents in accordance with their undertaking in the
Receipt of Earnest Money, respondents agreed to petitioner Lourdes Paguyo’s
proposal to buy the building first. Thus, on 5 January 1989, the parties
executed the four documents in question namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale
of the Paguyo Building, the Mutual Undertaking, the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, and the Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interest. Simultaneously
with the signing of the four documents, respondents paid petitioners the
additional amount of ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, the respondents renamed the
Paguyo Building into GINZA Bldg. and registered the same in the name of
respondent St. Andrew Realty, Inc. at the Makati Assessor’s Office after paying
accrued real estate taxes in the total amount of ₱169,174.95. Since 1990,
respondents paid the real estate taxes on subject building as registered
owners thereof. Further, respondents obtained fire insurance and applied for
the conversion of Paguyo Building into a condominium. All of these acts of
ownership exercised by respondents over the building were with the express
knowledge and consent of the petitioners.
Pursuant to their agreement contained in the aforecited documents,
particularly in the Mutual Undertaking, respondent company filed an
ejectment case and obtained a favorable decision against petitioners in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati in Civil Case No. 40050. The case
reached this Court which affirmed the decision of the MeTC in favor of
respondent company. This decision had already been executed and the
respondent company is now in possession of the building. Accordingly,
respondents continued to exercise acts of full ownership, possession and use
over the building.
On 06 October 1989, petitioners filed a Complaint for the rescission of the
Receipt of Earnest Money with the undertaking to return the sum of
₱763,890.50. They also sought the rescission of the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, the Mutual Undertaking, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Building, and
the Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interest.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondents Astorga and St.
Andrew Realty, Inc., led them to believe that they would advance the
₱917,470.00, which was needed by petitioners to complete payment with the
Armases, with the understanding that said amount would simply be deducted
from the ₱7 Million total consideration due them for the sale of the lot and the
building as agreed upon in their Receipt of Earnest Money. The same,
however, did not materialize because instead of making available the check
for the said amount, respondents did not produce the amount and even
ordered the "stop payment" of the same before it could be deposited in court.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner’s ground to seek the rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale
of the Building and the other documents in question as plaintiff averred that
they are entitled to cancel the Deed of Sale altogether in view of fraud, gross
inadequacy of price, mistake, and undue influence?

RULING
In the instant case, the trial court found that the documents, which petitioners
seek to rescind, were entered into as a result of an arms-length transaction.
These are factual findings that are now conclusive upon us.
Petitioners’ contentions lack merit. The right to rescind a contract involving
reciprocal obligations is provided for in Article 1191 of the Civil Code. Article
1191 states:
“The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one
of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.”
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of
the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible. The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who
have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the
Mortgage Law. The law speaks of the right of the "injured party" to choose
between rescission and fulfillment of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case.
Here, petitioners claimed to be the injured party and consequently sought the
rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the Building and the other
documents in question. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to cancel the
Deed of Sale altogether in view of fraud, gross inadequacy of price, mistake,
and undue influence.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and the Resolution dated 30 April 1997 and 12
September 1997, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
47034, were hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the amount of
damages and attorney’s fees recoverable, as follows: (1) moral damages is
reduced to ₱30,000.00, (2) exemplary damages is reduced to ₱20,000.00,
and (3) attorney’s fees is reduced to ₱20,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN PRECEDENTS OF OBLIGATIONS
TITLE:
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI)
v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO
INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.

FACTS:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the
Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter
Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately heed to the Sorsogon Branch of
the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she
engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida)
who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon City, reading: "Send
check money Mommy hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.50 for
which she was issued a receipt.
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no
response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru
JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her
husband Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her
arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.
Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha left for Quezon
City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from January 30, 1991 to
March 21, 1991.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February
15, 1991. On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger
of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was
another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the same but the
address could not be located, hence, the telegram was resent on February 2,
1991, and the second messenger finally found the address on February 15,
1991.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), demanded an explanation from
the manager of the Service Quality Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs.
Lorna D. Fabian.
Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective
spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter
alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of
the late Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they prayed for the
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, RTC decision disposed favoring the plaintiffs against the
defendant, to wit: the Court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the
following amount:
1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages;
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees;
and
3. To pay the costs.

ISSUE:
Is the appeal of the herein petitioner meritorious, challenging the decision
made by the CA in its then filed motion against the respondents?

RULING:
NO, the respondent’s pleading to dismiss the CA decision was not meritorious.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. On the other hand, in determining the
presence of moral damages, its requisites must be present:
Firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission
factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant; and
fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
This Court had DENIED the petition, and the challenged decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN RECOERY OF MORAL DAMAGES TO
WRONGFUL OMISSION
TITLE:
JOSE B. LEDESMA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO
DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private respondents)
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:
Article 27 of the New Civil Code, provides; there is no argument that moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act
or omission."

FACTS:
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students
of the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the
treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club
to some of the students of the school. “The petitioner claims that the said act
of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the
petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her
that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she
would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school. Delmo
asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo,
thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decision on April 13, 1966
which provided:
After a careful study of the records, the Office sustained the action took by
the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers
and members thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However,
the Office was convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her
capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of
the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer
to discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance and other
humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse
Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser
of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from
misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had
unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws
of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the
Club president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the part
of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties as
such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the
questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any
award or citation from this school or any organization in this school." Violeta
Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she
alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would,
therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of
graduating with honors in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, the Office believed and so hold and hereby
directed that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club
members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award,
citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto.
The petitioner received mail of the decision of the Director and all the records
of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the
following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner
allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back.
On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the
Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order
him to furnished Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn,
sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the
decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof.
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another
telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors
due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the
program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a
plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director
for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo
should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the
petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school
to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages
against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo
passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed
by her parents as her sole and only heirs.

ISSUE:
Did respondent, Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding
that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code?

RULING:
NO, the rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good.
This Court had no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts be
reversed. The trial court awarded P20, 000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo
and P10, 000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5, 000.00 for nominal
damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10, 000.00 and P2,
000.00 attorney's fees.
It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which
was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus,
moral damages are but proper.
Provided by Article 27 of the New Civil Code; there is no argument that moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act
or omission."
WHEREFORE, the petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in
the preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS WHICH MJST BE SHOWN AMBIGUITY OF COMPLAINT CANNOT
BE DISMISSED

TITLE:

CORNELIO AMARO and JOSE AMARO v. AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT

G.R. No. L-14986 July 31, 1962

MAKALINTAL, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground
that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1),
because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16)
or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the
different methods of discovery provided by the Rules.

FACTS:
The pertinent allegations in the complaint are that on October 5, 1958
appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot, near the city government
building of Silay. The following day he, together with his father (Cornelio
Amaro) and his witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of
obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized;"
that in view thereof they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in
the prosecution of the crime . . . .;"
Upon advice of the City Mayor, the appellee was investigated (of said crime)
and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to filed or had already filed
an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant.
As "having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the
defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work,
ordering them thru his police power to appear in his office when he is absent,
and he order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared
affidavits, stating that that the plaintiffs are exempting the police from any
dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime.

ISSUE:
Is the order of the dismissal of the complaint correct and in due process?
RULING:
In the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and
terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their
claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and
terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was
his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid
provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the
context of the allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated
in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged that "he is
about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of
exculpation in favor of the policemen.
An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or
uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8,
but rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or
uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8,
but rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16. Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. I, p. 111. In two cases decided by this Court,
it was observed:
Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground
that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rule 8, section 1),
because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16)
or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the
different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, 20, 21, 22
and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said "The real test of good pleading under
the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party
to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of
pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party
wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter
that is stated too generally (Vol. XIII, Cincinnati Law Review, January 1939.)
The fact, cited by the court below in the order subject to review, that
appellants have another recourse (in connection with the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm supposedly committed against one of them) as by filing
their complaint directly with the city Attorney of Silay or by lodging an
administrative charge against appellee herein, does not preclude this action
for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code and hence does not justify its
dismissal.
THE ORDER where APPEALED from, is set aside and the case is remanded to
the Court of origin for further proceedings. This court therefore, give costs
against appellee.
FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE:
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, ET AL. v. SUSANO TAYO
G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
BARRERA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Under Section 2221 of the Revised Administrative Code, the majority of the
members of the council constitutes a quorum to do business, the council "shall
be presided by the Mayor and no one else", and inasmuch as it is one of the
duties imposed upon him under Section 2194 (d) of the Revised Administrative
Code.

FACTS:
"That the petitioners are duly elected and qualified as members of the
Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines; and that the respondent, at the time the acts herein below
complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor
of the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo.

"On February 8, 1960, the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista,

Iloilo, unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960, dated February
8, 1960, a copy of which is hereto attached to form an integral part hereon as
Annex ‘A’ which set the regular sessions of the Municipal Council of Buenavista
on every first and third Wednesday of every month, and which resolution was
duly approved by the respondent, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality
of Buenavista.

"That on June 1, 1960, at the time and place set for the regular session of the
Municipal Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, No. 1 and No. 2 Councilors and the
Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case,
were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary
presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having
thus elected a temporary presiding officer and secretary of the Council, they
proceeded to do business.
At the time and place designated in Resolution No. 5, series of 1960, dated
February 8, 1960 above referred to, the petitioners acting as duly elected and
qualified councilors were present and again, in view of the absence of the
Mayor, Vice-Mayor, said two councilors and the Secretary, proceeded to elect
a temporary presiding officer and temporary secretary from among them, and
did business as a Municipal Council of Buenavista. That again on July 6, and
July 20, 1960, on August 3, and August 17, September 7, and on September
21, 1960, the petitioners met at the place and time designated in Resolution
No. 5, series of 1960, and proceeded to elect a temporary Secretary among
themselves, and did business as the Municipal Council of Buenavista, in view
again of the absence of the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 councilors, and the
Secretary.

"That when the minutes of the proceedings of June 1, June 15, July 6, July 20,
August 17, September 7, and September 21, 1960 of the Municipal Council
were presented to the respondent for action, the respondent Mayor refused to
act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution
as approved by the Municipal Council, the Mayor declaring the session above
referred to as null and void and not in accordance with law. The petitioners
made repeated demands for payment of their per diems for the sessions of
June 1, June 15, July 6, July 20, August 3, August 17, September 7 and
September 21, 1960, by presenting the payrolls; Provincial Forms No. 38 (A)
to the respondent Mayor for the latter’s signature, but that the respondent
refused to affix his signature to the payrolls thus presented, covering the per
diems of the petitioners, alleging that the proceedings were illegal due to his
absence. The petitioners, acting through Atty. Bartolome T. Tiña, addressed a
letter dated August 8, 1960 to the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of the Province
of Iloilo, asking of the latter’s opinion on the validity of the acts of the herein
petitioners, acting as the Municipal Council in the absence of the Mayor, Vice-
Mayor, said two councilors and the secretary, a copy of which letter is herewith
attached as Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part of this petition.
"That on August 9, 1960, the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of the Province of
Iloilo, in his indorsement, rendered an opinion upholding the validity of the
controverted sessions of the Municipal Council, a copy of which communication
is, likewise, attached herein as Annex ‘C’ and made an integral part of this
petition. The respondent Mayor refused and still refuses to act upon the
resolutions presented to him and to sign the payrolls covering the per diems
of the herein petitioners, despite the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal. The Mayor
even brought the matter to the attention of the Provincial Board of the
Province of Iloilo, by means of a letter questioning the legality of the minutes
of the regular session of the Municipal Council without his presence, and that
the Provincial Board resolved on September 23, 1960 to return the minutes
of the regular session of the Municipal Council of Buenavista, Iloilo, informing
the Mayor that per the opinion of the Legal Assistant, said minutes is legal.
The Mayor refused and still refuses to recognize the validity of the acts of the
Municipal Council and the legality of its regular session held in his absence."

Issue:
When rule providing for succession during the mayor’s temporary incapacity
should be disregarded?

RULING:
NO, under Section 2221 of the Revised Administrative Code, the majority of
the members of the council constitutes a quorum to do business, the council
"shall be presided by the Mayor and no one else", and inasmuch as it is one
of the duties imposed upon him under Section 2194 (d) of the Revised
Administrative Code. The argument would be correct if the mayor (herein
appellant) were present at the sessions in question and was prevented from
presiding therein, but not where, as in the instant case, be absented himself
therefrom.
"The respondent here as Municipal Mayor should have given good example,
by calling and attending regular sessions on the dates fixed by the Council. In
the discharge of his official duty, he should consider the Session Hall of the
Municipal Council as the sanctuary and depository of public interest and public
welfare. Any member of the Council should enter the Session Hall, not as a
representative of any political party or group, but as a representative of the
people of the municipality, whose interest and welfare should be safeguarded
by the Council. In entering this Hall, he must lay aside his political affiliation,
interest, and consideration, because it is the sworn duty of every councilor to
perform his duty with justice and impartiality. Not to attend a meeting,
constitutes an abandonment of the people’s welfare. "Petitioners here claim
moral damages pursuant to the provisions of Article 2219, in connection with
Article 21 and Article 27 of the new Civil Code. Said Article 27 provides as
follows:

‘Any person suffering material or moral loss because, a public servant or

employee neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.’
MOTION TO QUASH THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
Correa v. Court of First Instance Bulacan
G.R. No. L-46096, July 30, 1979
Antonio, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A Public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or
beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally
liable therefor lie any private individual. This principle of personal liability has
been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or
discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason
of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from
office, the officials were acting outside their official authority.

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and declaratory relief assailing the Order
dated April 22, 1977 of respondent Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
II, denying petitioner's Motion to Quash Writ of Execution issued in Civil Case
No.

3621-M

On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil Case

No. 3621-M in favor of therein plaintiffs

Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento,

municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan respectively,
should be ordered personally to pay the salaries... which the plaintiffs failed
to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually
reinstated.

(private respondents herein) and adversely against therein defendants

Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein) and Virgilio Sarmiento.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution acted with grave abuse of discretion or with lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

RULING:

A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or
beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally
liable therefor like any private individual. This principle of personal liability has
been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or
discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason
of non-compliance with the requirements of law in... respect to removal from
office, the officials were acting outside their official authority.

Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in

denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution. The writ was strictly
in accordance with the terms of the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.
AN ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE INSTITUTION
Palma v. Graciano
G.R. No. L-7240. May 16, 1956
Concepcion, J.:

DOCTRINE:
With respect to the province of Cebu and the City of Cebu, it is clear that the
order appealed from is well-taken and must be upheld. Indeed, if as Plaintiff
avers in his complaint, the acts therein set forth were performed by
Defendants Manuel Cuenco and Honorato Graciano, “contrary to law,” it
follows that they bore neither the approval nor the authority of said political
subdivisions, which, accordingly, cannot be held liable therefor. This
exemption from responsibility of the province of Cebu and the City of Cebu
becomes more evident when we consider that said acts (prosecution of
crimes) are, not corporate, but governmental or political in character, and
that, in the discharge of functions of this nature, municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the
extent that, that have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with
the requirements thereof (Cooley, Municipal Corporations, 376; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary38 Am. Jur. 299-300). In fact, section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 58 (as amended), which is the Charter of the City of
Cebu.
“The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the mayor, the municipal board, or any
other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this charter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said mayor, municipal board, or other officer
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.”

FACTS:
This is an action to recover damages for the institution, against Plaintiff-
Appellant, Ladislao Palma, of Criminal case No. V-2135 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, for “frauds against the public treasury,” which was
dismissed, and of criminal case No. V-2763, of the same court, for
malversation of public funds, in which he was acquitted. It is alleged in the
complaint that the information in said criminal cases were, on or about August
31 and September 26, 1950, respectively, caused to be filed — through
“malicious machination” and in “bad faith”, as well as “without any probable
cause” and “with the intention of harassing and embarrassing the Plaintiff”
and “to besmirch” his “honor and reputation” — by Defendant Manuel Cuenco,
then provincial governor of Cebu who, it is said, acted, “with evident
premeditation” and “due to personal hatred and vengeance against Plaintiff,”
in connivance with Defendant Honorato Graciano, as assistant fiscal of the City
of Cebu, and contrary to law. Said City of Cebu and the province of Cebu were,
likewise, included in the complaint as Defendants.
In due course, each one of the aforementioned four Defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss, all based upon one and the same ground, namely, “that
the complaint states no cause of action”. By an order of August 12, 1953, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu granted said motions and dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this appeal by Plaintiff Ladislao Palma.

ISSUE:
whether or not Plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action against any of the
four Defendants herein.

RULING:
The situation varies, fundamentally, as regards Defendants Manuel Cuenco
and Honorato Graciano. The order of dismissal complained of is predicated
upon the theory that the filing of the informations above referred to, is
“presumed” to have been made “in good faith” and that, in fact, the proper
court had found the existence of probable cause against Plaintiff herein,
contrary to the allegations in the complaint, which specifically charges “bad
faith”, lack of “any probable cause”, desire to give vent to “personal hatred
and vengeance,” and intent to harass and embarrass the Plaintiff and to
besmirch his honor and reputation. The only question for determination by the
court, at the time of the issuance of said order, was whether or not the
complaint states a cause of action. This implied that said issue was to be
passed upon on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, assuming them
to be true. Instead, his honor, the trial judge inquired into the truth of said
allegations and, in effect, found them to be false. And this it did without giving
the Plaintiff an opportunity to prove his aforesaid allegations. Thus, the lower
court had, not only exceeded its jurisdiction, by going beyond the purview of
the issue posed by Defendants’ motions to dismiss, but, also, denied due
process of law to Plaintiff herein, by, in effect deciding the case on the merits,
before it had been submitted for decision and before Plaintiff had a chance to
introduce evidence in support of the allegations of his complaint.
Upon the other hand, it is impliedly conceded that a cause of action would
exist against Defendants Manuel Cuenco and Honorato Graciano, if said
allegations were taken on their face value. In this connection, it is well settled
that when a public officer goes outside the scope of his duty, particularly when
acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but
is liable for his acts like any private individual (46 C.J. 1046; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary22 R. C. L. 478-479).
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed as regards, only, the province
of Cebu and the City of Cebu, and it is reversed as to Defendants Manuel
Cuenco and Honorato Graciano, and let the record be remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings, insofar as the last two Defendants are
concerned, without special pronouncement as to costs.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MOTION TO DISMISS, NATURE AND
EFFECTS OF; MOTION TO DISMISS ASSAILING VERACITY OF
COMPLAINT HOW RESOLVED
Carreon v. Province of Pampanga
G.R. No. L-8136, August 30, 1956
Concepcion, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurer, and, as
such, it hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint. If said motion assails directly or indirectly, the veracity of the said
allegations, it is improper to grant the motion upon the assumption that the
averments therein are true and that those of the complaint are not. The court
should either deny the motion, without prejudice to defendants’ right to plead,
as a special defense, in his answer, the very issue upon which said motion is
predicated, or proceed to the reception of evidence on the issue of fact thus
raised, before settling the same.

FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by plaintiff Rafael Carreon from an order of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, granting a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants herein.

Plaintiff instituted this case on October 21, 1953, against the Province of
Pampanga, and Rafael Lazatin, Emilio Cortez and Librado D. Santos. In his
complaint, plaintiff alleges, as first cause of action, that he owes a parcel of
land situated in Duck Island, barrio Sto. Niño, municipality of Guagua,
province of Pampanga, which was then and is being subdivided into small lots;
that, in order to facilitate the sale thereof to the public, at a good price in
January, 1948, he applied, from the Municipal Council of Guagua, Pampanga,
for authority to construct, at his expense, a bridge across the Guagua River,
between said Duck Island and the market site of Guagua; that said council
referred his application to the Provincial Fiscal, for opinion on the feasibility of
granting the authority prayed for; that on June 17, 1949, said council passed
Resolution No. 70, requesting the proper authorities to patronize the
construction of the bridge aforementioned; that on April 12, 1950, the
Provincial Board of Pampanga passed Resolution No. 303 appropriating
P15,000 for said bridge and providing that the additional sum of P9,480, more
or less, needed to complete its construction, be borne by the municipality of
Guagua; that on April 18, 1950, the municipal mayor of Guagua wrote to
plaintiff a letter suggesting that he donate P10,000 for completion of said
bridge; that on August 14, 1950, plaintiff wrote to Jose B. Lingad, the them
Provincial Governor of Pampanga, offering to make said donation; that this
officer signified the intention of the Province of Pampanga to accept the
donation; that on April 25, 1951, plaintiff delivered to the provincial treasurer
of Pampanga the sum of P5,000 on account of said donation, which the
Provincial Board of Pampanga accepted by Resolution No. 930, dated June 30,
1951; that on August 3, 1951, the Office of the District Engineer of Pampanga
advised Carreon in writing that ht construction of the bridge had begun already
and requested him to pay the balance of said donation; that on August 16,
1951, Carreon caused to be delivered to the provincial treasurer of Pampanga
the sum of P3,000, with the understanding that the balance of P2,000 would
be paid later, "to cover expenses for the finishing touches of the bridge in
question"; that , while said bridge was being constructed, on June 30, 1952,
the new Provincial Board of Pampanga, composed of defendants Rafael
Lazatin, as Provincial Governor, and Emilio Cortez and Librado D. Santos, as
members, passed Resolution No. 1687, whereby "without any valid reason",
they "illegally and maliciously stopped the work" of construction of said bridge,
and "illegally and maliciously" diverted the application of the balance of the
funds appropriated therefor by the Province "to the construction of another
bridge along the road between Angeles and Magalang"; and that, despite
repeated demands, defendants had failed and refused, and still fail and refuse,
to authorize the continuation of the construction of the bridge in question.

By way of second cause of action, it is alleged in the complaint that, by reason

of said "illegal and malicious" acts of defendant herein, "particularly, Librado
D. Santos", who is said to "have a grudge against the plaintiff because the
latter had work in the last elections for the candidacy of their opponents,"
plaintiff had sustained damages in the aggregate sum of P150,000.00 in view
of which he prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor for said sum of
P150,000, apart from "ordering the defendants to immediately cause the
resumption of the construction of the bridge in question until the same is fully
completed."

On December 19, 1953, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, purporting to act

on behalf of the defendants, filed an answer admitting some allegations of the
complaint and denying other allegations thereof, as well as setting up several
special defenses and a P50,000 counterclaim for actual and moral damages
allegedly sustained by them. The court having later considered this answer as
that of the Province of Pampanga only, defendant Cortes submitted his
separate answer, whereas Atty. Eligio G. Lagman, filed on behalf of "the
defendants", another states no cause of action." After due hearing the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga issued an order dated March 29, 1954, granting
said motion to dismiss and, accordingly, dismissing plaintiff's complaint,
without pronouncement as to costs. This order was predicted upon the
following reasons:

The Provincial Board of Pampanga, in passing Resolution No. 303 dated

April 12, 1953, no doubt had in its mind the welfare of the people of the
Municipality of Guagua especially those people who were already living
or would transfer their residences to the Duck Island of the said
Municipality, and likewise had in mind that during the time when they
passed the aforementioned resolution, they had only at their disposal
the limited amount of P15, 000.00 so they made a proviso in the
aforesaid resolution that for the completion of the construction of the
aforementioned bridge, the Municipality of Guagua should have to
defray the difference in the costs of construction. When the Provincial
Board accepted the donation of the plaintiff herein, the members thereof
might have or might not have known that the prime interest of the
plaintiff in offering the donation to defray part of the expenses for the
construction of the bridge was for a business purpose, that of realizing
big profits from the lots that have been subdivided in the Duck Island.
In the offer of the plaintiff to defray the expenses of P10,000, he did not
make or given any condition to the Provincial Board that would bind the
Provincial Board, happen what may, to complete the construction of the
bridge now in question. Considering Mr. Carreon's purpose in giving the
amount of P10,000, and in himself, he might have considered it a
business transaction and was expecting big profit, therefore, he should
have made clear his offer in such a way that the offer for P10,000 and
the acceptance by the Provincial Board thereof would constitute a sort
of a contract. Scanning very well Exhibits 'A' and '1' and '2', we could
not see anything therein where a contract existed either express or
implied. We can see only that the Provincial Board wanted to have a
bridge across the Guagua River connecting the barrio of Sto. Niño,
Guagua to the Duck Island, and Mr. Carreon, with a big heart wanted to
have the said bridge constructed. We only can see from the letter of Mr.
Carreon that he was being philantrophic without in the least suspecting
that between the lines what he means was profit and gain. The Provincial
Board in its Resolution No. 1687 dated July 30, 1952, in reverting the
funds originally appropriated for the construction of the bridge to
connect Duck Island to the poblacion of Guagua to the construction of a
concrete bridge along the road between Angeles and Magalang, was in
the exercises of its power and authority. It is not within the province of
any officer but that of the members of the Provincial Board to judge the
needs of the people of the province and the feasibility and
reasonableness of its improvements. The Provincial Board, in passing
the aforementioned last resolution may have in fact prejudiced the
private interest of the plaintiff herein but we do not see therefrom that
the real and true intention of the members of the board in passing the
said resolution was for the sole purpose of prejudicing or damaging the
interest of the plaintiff as he had alleged in his complaint. The Court, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, does not have to interfere with the
soundness of the actions of the Provincial Board because it is only the
said board that can decide whether what they have done is good or not
for the province, as the members of the Provincial Board has done in
Resolution No. 1687. The Provincial Board of Pampanga, in passing its
Resolution No. 303 dated April 12, 1950 might have believed that the
construction of the bridge over the barrio of Sto. Niño and the Duck
Island was for the best interest of the people concerned, and the
Provincial Board, in passing Resolution No. 1687, might have also in
mind the best interest of the province and it is not for the Court of
question as we have aforestated, the reasonableness and soundness of
their actuations. As we have aforestated, the Court cannot see that
there was contract either express or implied, between the Provincial
Board of Pampanga, and the members composing it on the one hand
and the plaintiff herein on the other hand for the completion of the
construction of the aforementioned bridge. We only could see that the
plaintiff wanted to have big gains in the guise of a philanthropic gesture
which unluckily backfired. This being the case, we are of the opinion and
so hold that the plaintiff cannot compel the Province of Pampanga and
the members of its board to resume the construction of the bridge to
connect the barrio of Sto. Niño, Guagua to the Duck Island if in the
decision of the Provincial Board, they are not yet in a position to
 construct the same and if they believe that the resumption of the
construction of the same is not yet timely.

ISSUE:
We likewise believe that the members of the Provincial Board of Pampanga,
namely: Defendants, Hon. Rafael Lazatin, Hon. Emilio P. Cortez and Dr.
Librado D. Santos, should not be held liable for any damage that the plaintiff
herein may have sustained in the former's passing Resolution No. 1687, dated
July 30, 1952, because in passing the same they have acted in their official
capacities and within the scope of the authority and power vested in them as
members of the aforementioned provincial board.

RULING:
It is not necessary for us, and we do not mean, to determine, at this stage of
the proceedings, whether the function involved in the approval of Resolution
No. 1687 of the Provincial Board of Pampanga, dated July 30, 1952, is
governmental or corporate in character. The resolution of such question may
be deferred until such time as the case may be ready for decision on the
merits. We do hold, however, that the allegations of the complaint state prima
facie a cause of action against the defendants and that, consequently, plaintiff
is entitled to an opportunity to prove the allegations of his complaint, before
the validity of his claim could be passed upon.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and let the records of
this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, in conformity
with this decision, with the costs of this instance against the defendants.
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 96740, March 25, 1999
Purisima, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted or overcome by other
evidence:

That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husbands and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

FACTS:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated October 26, 1989 and the
Resolution[2] dated January 4, 1991, of the Court of Appeals[3] in CA - G.R. CV
NO. 11750, reversing the Decision[4], dated May 30, 1986, of Branch XV,
Regional Trial Court, in Trece Martires City[5] in Civil Case No. NC -75.

The antecedent facts that matter are as follows:

Virginia P. Sarmiento and Apolonia P. Catibayan, the petitioners herein, filed

a complaint for partition of a piece of land, more particularly described as Lot
No. 926 of the Naic Estate, G.L.R.O., Record No. 8340, in Naic, Cavite, with
an area of 1, 779 square meters, covered by TCT No. 21877 issued on
September 1, 1941 to co-owners, Francisco Arguelles and Petrona Reyes.

Petitioners are sisters, their parents being Tiburcio Pangilinan and Leogarda
Arguelles, who died in 1946. Leogarda was the daughter of Francisco Arguelles
who died on February 18, 1949 and Emilia Pineli, who died on May 2, 1950.
Private respondent Simon Arguelles is a half brother of Leogarda, with
Francisco Arguelles as their common father.

Petitioners claim that as granddaughters of Francisco Arguelles, they and

private respondent Simon Arguelles are co-owners of the 1/2 portion of Lot
No. 926, as the only heirs of the late Francisco Arguelles. But according to
private respondent, petitioners are not the legal heirs of Francisco Arguelles
because their (petitioners') mother, Leogarda Arguelles, was allegedly an
illegitimate child of his father, Francisco Arguelles, and Emilia Pineli who were
not married. Under the old Civil Code, which should be applied since Francisco
Arguelles died in 1949, before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, an
illegitimate child did not have successional rights.

After trial, the lower court came out with a decision ordering the parties herein
to partition among themselves subject portion of Lot No. 926; and disposing
thus:

"In view of all the foregoing, plaintiffs Virginia P. Sarmiento and Apolonia P.
Catibayan and defendant Simon Arguelles are hereby ordered to partition
among themselves the one-half portion of lot No. 926 of the Naic Estate,
located in Naic, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21877,
pertaining to the deceased Francisco Arguelles.

The counterclaim, for lack of merit, is hereby dismissed.

No pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied therewith, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals
on a Petition for Review; theorizing that:

"I. The Lower Court erred in holding that Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli
were legally married and that Leogardo (sic) Arguelles was their legitimate
daughter.

II. The Lower Court erred in not holding that the cause of action of the
plaintiffs-appellees if any, had already prescribed.

III. The Lower Court erred in ordering the partition of the property involved in
this case among the plaintiffs-appellees and the defendant-appellant."[7]
On October 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals handed down its judgment,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of origin and disposing as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered REVERSING the decision appealed
from and DISMISSING the complaint for judicial partition. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE:
With the denial of their Motion For Reconsideration on January 4, 1991,
petitioners found their way to this court via the present Petition; posing as
issues:

"I. WHETHER OR NOT A MAN AND A WOMAN WHO LIVED TOGETHER AS

HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRESUMED MARRIED; and

II. WHETHER THE BORN OUT OF SUCH MARRIAGE IS LEGITIMATE OR NOT."

RULING:
Evidently, petitioners relied mainly on the legal presumption that Francisco
Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were married, without introducing any evidence to
prove the mrriage theorized upon.

In a belated attempt to establish the legitimacy of Leogarda Arguelles,

petitioner have theorized for the first time, in the present Petition, that the
birth certificate[22] of Leogardo Arguelles which they allegedly presented
during the trial below, shows the legitimate status of Leogarda Arguelles.[23]
Concededly, such birth certificate may be used to show the alleged marriage.
But be that as it may, the totality of evidence for the private respondents
preponderates over petitioners.' Preponderant evidence means that, as a
whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse
party.[24] Compared with the evidence introduced by the private respondent,
petitioners rely heavily on the legal presumption of marriage which, as earlier
pointed out, has been effectively rebutted. We are concluded by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals.

Premises studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and so

hold, that the Court of Appeals erred not in reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision, dated
October 26, 1989, and Resolution dated January 4, 1991, of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
NATURE OF TORT FOR VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Liwayway Vinzons Chato v. Fortune Tobacco
G.R. NO. 141309, June 19, 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is
grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a public
officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should
be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear
showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the
Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for
violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public
officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law
on the superior public officers' liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the
instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same
is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the
certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe
the rules and to dismiss the complaint.

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the

public officers' "acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while
Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers' violation of
constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether
the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce
de Leon,[14] respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff
and it is not required that said public officer should have acted with malice or
in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed
to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary
to hold petitioner liable.

FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall
be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall
not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway
issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured
by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject
to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette
brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent
has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who
dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise
even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of
his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38,
Book I, Administrative Code

RULING:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads
is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment
for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law
not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad
faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may
arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a
superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness
or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with
malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional
right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being
a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act
by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has
been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by
the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason
sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.

IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Aberca v. Ver
G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988
Yap, J.:

DOCTRINE:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public
use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government
for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity
or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's
act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a
right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages,
and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any
criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his
act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

FACTS:
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen.
Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist
(CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants.
During these raids, certain members of the raiding TFM confiscated a number
of purely personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were
arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period
after their arrest, they were arrested without denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel,
through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver.
Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas
corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners’ detention; (2)
respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of
their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action
against respondents.
On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the
case. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On May
11, 1984, the trial court, without acting on the motion to set aside the Order
of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against petitioners. After
their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioners then filed
the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985, seeking to annul and set
aside the respondent court’s resolutions and order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents can be held liable for damages

RULING:
Yes. The purpose of article 32 of the Civil Code is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. No man
may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.
Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to
reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of
the predominant power in the community.
The decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The
law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly’ or “indirectly”
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible
has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
DAMAGES CAUSED BY SEIZURE WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT
Lim v. Ponce de Leon
G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975
Martin, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is
not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make
such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused
their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end
to official abuse by the plea of good faith.

FACTS:
On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to acertain Alberto Timbangcaya
of Brooke’sPoint, Palawan a motor launch named M/L“San Rafael”. A year
later, Timbangcayafiled a complaint alleging that Taha forciblytook away the
motor launch from him. Without a search warrant and in the absenceof
consent, fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leonordered the impound of the motor
launchfrom Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon explainedin his request that the
subsequent sale of themotor launch to a third party cannot preventthe court
from taking custody of the same.In his defense, fiscal de Leon claimed that“he
was in good faith, without malice andwithout the slightest intention of
inducinginjury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha”when he ordered the
seizure of the motorlaunch.

ISSUE:
Is the defense of good faith enoughto clear the liability of fiscal de Leon
inviolating a right provided under Article 32of the Civil Code?

RULING:
No. The Court citing Dr. Jorge Bocobo,Chairman of the Code
Commission statedthat the very nature of Article 32 is that thewrong may be
civil or criminal. It is notnecessary therefore that that there should bemalice
or bad faith. To make such arequisite would defect the main purpose
ofArticle 32 which is the effective protectionof individual rights. Public officials
in thepast have abused their powers on the pretextof justifiable motives or
good faith in theperformance of their duties. Precisely, theobject of the
Article is to put an end toofficial abuse by the plea of good faith.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS, MORTGAGE, CHATTEL MORTGAGE, PACTUM
COMMISORIUM, FORECLOSURE
Esguerra v. Gonzales-Asdala
G.R. No. 168906, December 04, 2008
Chico-Nazario, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Esguerra's Petition before the Court of Appeals is one for certiorari,
prohibition, as well as mandamus, all special remedies under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, relevant provisions of which read:

SEC. 1. Petition for Certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

SEC. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board,

officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.

FACTS:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision1 dated 31 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79075 which denied the Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari/Mandamus with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
of petitioner Perla S. Esguerra (Esguerra); and the Resolution2 dated 12 July
2005 of the appellate court in the same case denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian presently employed as the Chief

Dietitian of the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), located at East Avenue, Diliman,
Quezon City. Respondents J. Walter Thompson Company3 (JWT) and AGL
Market Research, Inc. (AGL) are corporations duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws. On 15 May 2000, AB Food and Beverages4 Philippines
(AB Food) entered into a contract with JWT whereby the latter would handle
the advertising, marketing, promotional and general publicity requirements of
the former.

Esguerra filed an Amended Complaint5 for Damages with Prayer for

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against JWT and AGL,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and raffled to Branch 87 of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), presided by respondent Judge
Fatima Gonzales-Asdala (Judge Asdala).

In her Amended Complaint, Esguerra alleged that on 14 May 2003, AGL, thru
its Director/General Manager Nicanor G. Aguirre (Aguirre), wrote a letter to
the PHC, inviting nutritionists from the said hospital to participate in a study
it was conducting. Aguirre gave the assurance that "all information that would
be generated from this study would be kept completely confidential," and the
AGL representative bearing the letter made it understood that, among other
things, a talent fee of P20,000.00 would be paid to the nutritionist who would
be chosen to appear in a commercial that would subsequently be shot.

Esguerra narrated that she showed up at the Cravings Restaurant in San Juan
at the appointed time on 16 May 2003 to participate in the AGL "study." The
first stage thereof consisted in being "interviewed" by a lady about two
unnamed products with disclosed ingredients and nutrients; the second
product had evidently higher nutrients. Esguerra was requested to compare
the two products and asked whether she would endorse use of the higher-
nutrient product. In the second stage of the supposed study, Esguerra was
taken inside a room where she was asked additional questions by another
lady, while a man, apparently representing JWT, focused a video-camera on
her. She was then asked to uncover and find out for herself the product she
preferred to endorse. Her candid reaction to the "discovery" was that it was
Ovaltine. The incident was taped on the video-camera. As Esguerra emerged
from the room, a third lady approached her asking her to sign a piece of paper
and telling her that it had to do with the taping that just took place. Since she
was in a hurry to keep another appointment in Quezon City, Esguerra signed
the document, which appeared to be a contract of agreement, but expressly
writing at the side thereof that in case she would be chosen to appear in the
commercial, which she thought would still be shot at some future time,
clearance from the Director of the PHC must first be obtained before such
commercial may be shown to the public. Esguerra also verbally informed the
third lady of this condition.

On 16 June 2003, at about noontime, an Ovaltine commercial was aired on

television with Esguerra appearing therein. The said commercial showed a
portion of Esguerra’s interview videotaped on 16 May 2003. According to
Esguerra, there was absolutely no advice from either JWT or AGL prior to the
airing of the commercial that she had been chosen to so appear therein.
Neither did JWT and AGL secure the required clearance from the PHC Director
nor did they pay Esguerra any talent fee for the commercial.

That same afternoon of 16 June 2003, after being informed of the unexpected
airing of the Ovaltine commercial, and fearful of any adverse consequences,
disciplinary sanction, or misunderstanding which may result therefrom,
Esguerra allegedly took the following actions: (a) she immediately called up
JWT Account Director Joef Peña to protest against the showing of the
commercial; (b) she wrote a letter dated 17 June 2003 to JWT, copy furnished
AGL, to formally protest the airing of the commercial and to demand the
immediate pull-out of the same; and (c) she furnished the PHC Director and
her Association with copies of her 17 June 2003 letter to inform and explain
to them that what happened anent the Ovaltine commercial was not of her
volition.

Esguerra averred that JWT responded by transmitting to her, on 24 June 2003,

a communication officially informing her for the first time of her selection as
one of those who would appear in the Ovaltine commercial, for which she
would receive remuneration in the amount of P5,000.00. Not satisfied
therewith, Esguerra, through her counsel, wrote JWT on 4 July 2003 a second
missive seeking, among other demands, the immediate cessation of the airing
of the Ovaltine commercial and payment of the agreed upon talent fee of
P20,000.00. Despite her letter-protest, received by JWT and AGL, the Ovaltine
commercial showing Esguerra continued to be broadcasted on a daily basis up
to the time she instituted Civil Case No. Q-03-50205.

Esguerra thus prayed of the RTC-Branch 87 the following:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner Esguerra] most

respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that:

1) Pending hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, a Temporary

Restraining Order be immediately issued enjoining [herein respondents JWT
and AGL] from airing the subject Ovaltine commercial featuring the
appearance therein of [Esguerra]; and after such hearing, for a preliminary
prohibitory injunction to issue against such airing;

2) Following trial on the merits, judgment be rendered in favor of [Esguerra]

and against [JWT and AGL], making said injunction already permanent, and
further ordering [JWT and AGL] as follows:

a) To pay the amount of P20,000.00 as [Esguerra’s] talent fee plus interest at

the legal rate thereon until fully paid;

b) To pay the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;

c) To pay the sum of P300,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages;

d) To pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the amount due, as and by way of

attorney’s fees;

e) To pay the costs of suit.6

Esguerra claimed to have made several inquiries on the status of her

application for preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court. She was assured that her
application would be set for hearing. After almost three weeks of waiting
without her application for injunctive relief being set for hearing, Esguerra filed
on 26 August 2003 an Urgent Motion for Inhibition of RTC Judge Asdala,
asserting therein that "by failing to act swiftly on her application for TRO as
mandated under the law, [RTC Judge Asdala] has already displayed partiality
and bias against her and in favor of the [herein respondents JWT and AGL],
whether or not for `valuable’ consideration."

RTC-Branch 87, however, subsequently issued an Order dated 28 August 2003

in which it ruled on Esguerra’s application for preliminary injunction and/or
TRO, thus:

From the given facts (par. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) in the complaint, this Court
finds that not only did [herein petitioner Esguerra] clearly fail to point the
specific acts committed by each of the [herein respondents JWT and AGL] in
alleged violation of her right or which has caused her or will cause her
injustice, [Esguerra] likewise failed to show in her application the material and
substantial right she claims to have been invaded by [JWT and AGL] to warrant
the issuance of preliminary injunction.

Since facts have not been sufficiently shown by [Esguerra] in her application
to bring her case within the conditions required by Sec. 3, Rule 58,7 this Court
has to refuse injunction, more considering the fact that the action for damages
which [Esguerra] has already instituted against [JWT and AGL] would
adequately compensate the injuries caused her.
From an overall judicious examination of [Eguerra’s] allegation in support of
her application for injunction, this Court finds that issuance of an injunctive
relief based on the facts obtaining is not warranted.

WHEREFORE, [Esguerra’s] application for injunction is DENIED for lack of

merit.8

This led Esguerra to file another Urgent Motion9 which sought, among other
reliefs, reconsideration of the Order dated 28 August 2003 of RTC-Branch 87
and resolution of her Motion for Inhibition. She averred in her Urgent Motion
that the denial of her application for injunctive relief was highly irregular,
having been issued without a summary hearing, in violation of the provisions
of Section 4(d), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, without waiting for the resolution of her Urgent Motion by RTC-
Branch 87, Esguerra filed a Petition10 before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, in which she sought the issuance of: (a) an Order
to expedite the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205; (b) a Writ of
Prohibition permanently enjoining Judge Asdala of RTC-Branch 87 from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and an Order to
re-raffle the said case to another judge; and (c) a Writ of Certiorari to annul
and set aside the denial of Esguerra’s application for injunction/TRO. In the
alternative, Esguerra prayed for the issuance of: (a) a Writ of Mandamus
ordering Judge Asdala to conduct summary hearing on Esguerra’s application
for injunction/TRO; (b) an Order directing Judge Asdala to pay damages
sustained by Esguerra; and (c) an Order enjoining Judge Asdala from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205.

ISSUE:
Esguerra is presently before us via the Petition at bar, raising the following
issues:

1) Whether or not the case had become totally moot and academic.

2) Whether or not the public respondent may be held liable for damages.

3) What is the amount of damages that should be awarded.[22]

Esguerra wants us not only to reverse and set aside the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, but also to hold Judge Asdala answerable
for damages in the amount of P2.2 million, plus costs of suit and attorney's
fees.

RULING:
It is clear from the foregoing that in petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, the public respondent, such as Judge Asdala herein, should not
actively participate in the proceedings as a general rule, unless directed
otherwise by the court. The inclusion of the public respondent in such
petitions is more of a formality, since it is still the private respondent/s who
must contest the said petitions. It is likewise explicitly stated in the afore-
quoted provision that the public respondent in petitions under Rule 65 shall
not be liable for the costs which may be awarded to the petitioner/s. It can
be rationally deduced therefrom that in such petitions, the public respondent
is not meant to incur or shoulder personal liability for his official actions, even
if the writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus are so issued against him.

Esguerra's subsequent reinstatement of her application for injunction/TRO

before RTC-Branch 215 did not revive the grounds for her Petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79075. She sought recourse with the Court of Appeals because RTC-
Branch 87 denied her previous application for injunctive relief. In contrast,
RTC-Branch 215, upon reinstatement by Esguerra of her application, actually
granted her a TRO and also a preliminary injunction. Esguerra, however,
cannot use her reinstated application for injunctive relief which was favorably
acted upon by RTC-Branch 215, as the basis for her then pending Petition
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. This, certainly, will be
repugnant to the fundamental due process which Judge Asdala must not be
deprived of.

Finally, Esguerra is still litigating her civil case against JWT and AGL before
RTC-Branch 215, Quezon City, in which she also prays for compensation for
the damages she had suffered from the airing of the Ovaltine commercial. To
insist on recovering damages from Judge Asdala for the same act, i.e., the
showing of the Ovaltine commercial, suspiciously appears to be an attempt to
recover double compensation.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is denied for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 March 2005 and its
Resolution dated 12 July 2005 CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 are Affirmed. Costs
against petitioner.
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI FROM THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Marcia v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-34529, January 27, 1983
Relova, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The petitioner appealed to the CA invoking Article 33 of the New Civil Code
and Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Sec. 3.
The CA held that private respondent cannot be held civilly liable after it had
ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision
was pure accident.

FACTS:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao Pampanga, a bus
operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep
driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter’s death and in physical
injuries to petitioner Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information
for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against Paje in RTC Pampanga.

On January 23, 1957 an action for damages was filed in the RTC of Rizal by
the petitioner against Victory and Paje, alleging that the mishap due to the
reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving.

While the civil case was in progress in Rizal, RTC Pampanga rendered its
decision and convicted the respondent. However, in their appeal to the Ca
they were acquitted.

As conducted by the CA, criminal negligence is wanting in the case, and that
Paje was not even guilty of Civil Negligence because it was a case of mere
accident.

Respondent Paje in the Civil Case in Rizal moved for dismissal of the complaint
invoking the decision of the CA for his acquittal. However, the Rizal RTC
dismissed the motion and thereafter continued the trial. The RTC Rizal
dismissed the complaint against Victory and Paje based on the decision of the
CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the civil case filed separately be dismissed.

RULING:
It was held by the court that Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. The injuries suffered by the petitioners were alleged to be
the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence,
no independent civil action for damages maybe instituted in connection
therewith. Furthermore, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states
that “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from which the civil might arise did not exist.”
Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared
to be non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability
will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
FALSIFICATION OF DEEDS OF REAL STATE MORTGAGE
Benitez v. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-14646, May 30, 1961
Paredes, J.:

DOCTRINE:
No dispute arises from the fact that both civil case No. 33251 and criminal
case I.S. No. 15190 arose from the same transactions and/or facts. The
general rule is where both a civil and a criminal case arising from the same
facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence [Rule 107, sec. 1
(b)]. An exception to this general rule would be if there exist prejudicial
questions which should be resolved first before action could be taken in the
criminal case and when the law provides that both the civil and criminal case
can be instituted simultaneously (Art. 33, new Civil Code). A prejudicial
question has been defined as

"* * * One based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused." (Civil Code Annotated by Padilla, Vol. I, 1956 Ed., p. 83; see also
De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 202, as to the definition of the term).

"Under the foregoing doctrine, for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to

a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending its (civil
case) final determination, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the aforesaid civil action the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined." (D.S. Mendiola, et al., vs. Hon. H. Macadaeg, et
al., 111 Phil., 169).

FACTS:
This is a petition to prohibit the respondent Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., in
his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, from proceeding with the investigation of
a criminal charge (I. S. [Investigation Slip] No. 15190) for falsification of
deeds of real estate mortgage.
On May 4, 1946, petitioner Yu Bon Chiong, as Debtor, petitioner Rufino
Ibañez, as Mortgagor, and Ong Ho, as another mortgagor, and Ching Siok Eng
(wife of Petitioner Yu Bon Chiong) also as a mortgagor, executed in favor of
the Philippine National Bank a real estate mortgage to secure the payment of
Yu Bon Chiong's indebtedness in the amount of P50,000.00. The mortgage
was amended on March 26, 1947, to secure the payment of the increased
indebtedness of petitioner Yu Bon Chiong which had risen to P170,000.00. Yu
Bon Chiong failed to pay the indebtedness, so that on December 17, 1949,
the Philippine National Bank filed with the CFI of Rizal, Civil Case No. 994,
against both petitioners herein, Ching Siok Eng (wife of Chiong) and
respondent Ong Ho, for the foreclosure of the mortgages. Against a decision
in favor of the bank, the defendants in said case appealed to the Court of
Appeals which certified it to this Court, being G. R. No. L-14244.

On July 24, 1957, respondent Ong Ho filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila
(Civil Case No. 33251), against the Philippine National Bank, petitioners Yu
Bon Chiong, alias Mariano Benitez, Rufino Ibañez and Heirs of Ching Siok Eng,
for the annulment of the two deeds of mortgage, claiming that the signatures
purporting to be his in said documents were forgeries.

The defendants in said case No. 33251 adopted the special defense of the
pendency of another case between the same parties involving the same
subject matter. During the hearing of the special defense, Ong Ho raised the
issue that he was not the same Ong Ho involved in Civil Case No. 994.

On June 16, 1958, respondent Ong Ho filed a criminal complaint before the
respondent City Fiscal of Manila (I. S. No. 15190), charging the herein
petitioners of falsification of the deeds of mortgage involved in Civil Case No.
994. On July 2, 1958, petitioners filed a motion before the respondent City
Fiscal, for the dismissal of the criminal complaint, on the ground that civil
prejudicial questions are involved which should first be resolved. On
September 24, 1958,the respondent City Fiscal, denied the motion to dismiss
or suspend the proceedings in the criminal ca.se and set the same for hearing.
The motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss was
also denied.

Claiming that respondent City Fiscal, in denying the motion to dismiss or

suspend the proceedings in I.S. No, 15190, and the motion for reconsideration
filed thereto, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, petitioners filed the present action for prohibition,
with preliminary injunction. Respondent City Fiscal interposed Special and/or
Affirmative Defenses, which were adopted in substance by respondent Ong
Ho.

ISSUE:
Is the question in the civil case prejudicial so as to warrant the suspension of
the hearings and/or investigation of the criminal case at the City Fiscal's
office? This seems to be the dominant issue for our consideration.

RULING:
In Civil Case No. 33251, for annulment of the deed of mortgage, the issue is
that the signatures of Ong Ho appearing therein are forged. In the criminal
case, O.S. No. 15190, the issue is likewise the falsification of the deeds in
question. It appearing that the principal issues in both cases are the same,
and/or arise from the same facts, it stands to reason that it is not necessary
that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. This
being the case, the proposition is simply reduced to a matter of preferences.
In the case of Pisalbon, et al. v. Tesoro, et al., G.R. No. L-5065, April 20,
1953, one Estefania Pisalbon found in the records of the cadastral case an
affidavit purporting that she renounced her rights over the land, subject of the
cadastral case, to Eugenia Pisalbon, subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Felix Villaflores. Estefania filed a complaint with the Justice of the Peace
of Asingan, Pangasinan, against the Notary Public for Falsification of
Document. The Justice of the Peace without conducting a hearing or
investigation, dismissed the complaint on the ground that he could not
proceed with the criminal case until the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
had decided the Cadastral case in which the alleged falsified affidavit had been
presented. The CFI of Pangasinan denied the petition for certiorari and
mandamus against the Justice of the Peace, on the ground that since the
alleged falsified affidavit had been presented in the cadastral case, the
criminal case should be suspended until after the cadastral case had been
terminated. On appeal to this Court, we ruled - The Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan erred in holding that the criminal case should be suspended. In
the present proceedings, the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial
to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the
evidence has been presented in the civil case, may not affect the alleged crime
committed by the notary public, which is the subject of the criminal case. But,
even supposing that both the civil and the criminal case involve the same
questions and one must precede the other, it should be the civil which should
be suspended rather than the criminal, to await the result of the latter (Section
1, Rule 107; Almeda, et al., v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178; See also par. 2, Art. 35,
N.C.C.)
WHEN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE DEEMED A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE
Zapanta v. Montesa
G.R. No. L-14534, February 28, 1962
Dizon, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. (People v.
Aragon, supra.) Hence, where the defendant in a bigamy case in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan claims that the second marriage is void on the ground
that he entered into it under duress, force and intimidation, and, as a matter
of fact a case is pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the
annulment of said marriage, the civil action for annulment must first be
decided before the action for bigamy can proceed.

FACTS:
On May 20, 1958 Olimpia Y. Co filed a bigamy case against Merardo L. Zapanta
alleging that the latter having previously married to Estrella Guarin, and
without having the said marriage dissolved contracted a second marriage with
the complainant. On June 16, 1958, Zapanta filed a case against Co for the
annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress force and intimidation.
Co filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no
cause of action but was denied after a few days. On Sept. 2, 1958, Zapanta
filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as well as
petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered his arraignment. After
entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner field the present action.

ISSUE:
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court.
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the
ground that Zapanta’s consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation?
RULING:
Zapanta’s act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for
bigamy. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second
marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. The civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action
for bigamy can proceed. Wherefore, the writ prayed for in the petition was
hereby granted. Without any costs.
ANNULMENT OF AN EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION OF PROPERTIES
Fortich v. Celdran
G.R. No. L-22677, February 28, 1967
Bengzon, J.P., J.:

DOCTRINE:
Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil action is the motion to
withdraw; its authenticity is assailed in the same civil action. The resolution
of this point in the civil case will in a sense be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending in another tribunal. As
such, it is a prejudicial question which should first be decided before the
prosecution can proceed in the criminal case.
Regarding the procedural question on Ignacio Cel-dran's right as private
offended party to file thru coun-sel a motion to suspend the criminal case, the
same exists where, as herein, the Fiscal, who had direction and con-trol of the
prosecution, did not object to the filing of said motion. And its filing in this
case complied with Sec. 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of pre-judicial question. - A petition for the
sus-pension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial
question in a civil case, may only be presented by any party before or during
the trial of the cri-minal action."

FACTS:
A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition of properties and for
accounting was filed on February 3, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Civil Case No. 3397-R).
Appearing therein as plaintiffs were: Jose, Francis-co, Pedro, Jr., Ignacio, all
surnamed Abuton-Celdran (children of the deceased Pedro Celdran by the first
nup-tial) and, as the administratrix of Francisco Celdran (another brother),
Modesta Rodriguez. Defendants were: Pablo Celdran (child of the deceased
by the first marriage who refused to join as plaintiff), Josefa Vda. de Celdran
(spouse of the deceased by the second marriage), Manuel, Antonio, Pedro III,
Jesus, Vicente and Miguel, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran (children of the
deceased by the second nuptial).
After the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, a motion to withdraw as co-
plaintiff was filed on May 24, 1957. It was signed "Ignacio Celdran". This
motion has been marked as Exh. B-Josefa.
Subsequently, with leave of court, the plaintiffs (excluding Ignacio) filed an
amended complaint implead-ing Ignacio Celdran as defendant. Ignacio
Celdran filed an answer and, later, on February 16, 1959, an amended answer
with counterclaim and cross-claim.
After trial but before judgment, Ignacio Celdran had the document Exh. B-
Josefa (the motion to withdraw) examined by the Police Department of Cebu
City. The po-lice were of the view that the same (signature therein) was
falsified. Alleging newly discovered evidence, Igna-cio Celdran asked for new
trial, which the court denied.
All the parties, except Ignacio Celdran, thereafter entered on May 6, 1959 into
an amicable settlement, re-cognizing as valid the aforementioned extrajudicial
par-tition.
Regarding Ignacio Celdran, the court rendered judg-ment on July 19, 1961,
declaring the same extrajudicial partition as valid for having been ratified by
him (Ignacio). Specifically, the court found among other things that Ignacio
signed the motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa) after he received P10,000 of
the agreed P20,000 and two residential lots to be given to him in return for
his aforesaid ratification of the partition.
Said decision was later amended to require Pedro III, Antonio, Jesus, Miguel
and Vicente, all surnamed Fortich--Celdran, to pay Ignacio the balance of the
P20,000 aforestated and to deliver to him the promised two parcels of land.
Ignacio Celdran appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. And said appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, shown in the record before Us as still
pending.
Now on March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio Celdran, an information for
falsification of a public document - that is, Exh. B-Josefa or the
abovementioned motion to withdraw in the civil case - was filed by the City
Fiscal of Ozamis in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Accused
therein were: Pedro III, An-tonio, Manuel, Vicente, Miguel, and Jesus, all
surnamed Celdran (defendants in the civil case); Santiago Catane, as
subscribing officer; Abelardo Cecilio, as the person who filed the motion.
As private complainant, however, Ignacio Celdran, on December 12, 1962,
moved before trial to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the
ground of pre-judicial question. The reason given in support thereof was that
the alleged falsification of the same document is at issue in the civil case
pending in the Court of Appeals.
Declaring that there was no pre-judicial question, the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Occidental denied on January 28, 1963 the motion to suspend the
prosecution. It ruled that the alleged forgery was not an is-sue in the civil
case.
Assailing the above ruling, Ignacio Celdran filed in the Court of Appeals on
February 21, 1963, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-
G.R. No. 31909-R) to enjoin the CFI of Misamis Occidental and the City Fiscal
of Ozamis from proceeding with the prosecu-tion of the criminal case.
On February 18, 1964 the Court of Appeals decided said petition for certiorari,
ordering the suspension of the criminal case due to pre-judicial question.
Pedro III, Jesus, Manuel, Miguel and Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran;
Santiago Catane and Abelardo Cecilio - accused in the criminal suit and
respondents in the petition for certiorari - appealed to us from the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated February 18, 1964.
Appellants would contend that there is no pre-judi-cial question involved. The
record shows that, as aforestated, the Court of First Instance ruled that
Ignacio Celdran ratified the partition agreement; among the rea-sons cited by
the trial court for said ruling is that Ignacio Celdran received P10,000 and
signed the motion to withdraw as plaintiff in the suit. Disputing this, Celdran
assigned as error in his appeal the finding that he signed the aforementioned
motion (Exh. B-Josefa) and maintains that the same is a forgery. Since
ratifica-tion is principal issue in the civil action pending ap-peal in the Court
of Appeals, and the falsification or genuineness of the motion to withdraw -
presented and marked as evidence in said civil case - is among the ques-tions
involved in said issue, it follows that the civil action poses a pre-judicial
question to the criminal pro-secution for alleged falsification of the same
document, the motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of grave abuse of discretion for the court’s
refusal to suspend criminal proceedings despite prejudicial question arises.

RULING:
Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution was therefore attended with
grave abuse of discretion; and the issue having been squarely and definitely
presented before the trial court, a motion for reconsideration, which would but
raise the same points, was not necessary. Neither was appeal the remedy
available, since the order denying suspension is interlocutory and thus not yet
ap-pealable.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals un-der review - ordering
suspension of Criminal Case No. 5719, People v. Pedro Fortich-Celdran, et al.
pending before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, until after
Civil Case No. CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, Pedro A. Celdran, et al. vs. Pedro Fortich-
Celdran III, et al., shall have been decided - is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant.
VALIDITY OF RECEIPT IN CIVIL CASE NOT PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
IN CRIMINAL CASE OF ESTAFA
Jimenez v. Averia
G.R. No. L-22759, March 29, 1968
Dizon, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the
resolution of which (question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in
said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
(Encyclopedia Juridical Española, p. 228). In People v. Aragon, G.R. No. L-
5930, February 17, 1954, We held in connection with this subject that the
question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case
before the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must
be lodged in another tribunal.

FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. TM-235 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
respondents Ofelia V. Tang and Estefania de la Cruz OLANDAY were charged
with estafa, the information filed alleging that, having received from Manuel
Jimenez the sum of P20,000.00 with which to purchase for him a fishing boat
known as "Basnig," with the obligation on their part to return the money on
January 30, 1963 in case they should fail to buy the fishing boat, they
misappropriated the amount aforesaid, to the damage and prejudice of
Jimenez.

Before arraignment, the accused filed Civil Case No. 6636 against Jimenez in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon contesting the validity of a certain receipt
signed by them on October 25, 1962 (Annex "A" of the present petition)
wherein they acknowledged having received from him the sum of P20,000.00
with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and its accessories, and the
further sum of P40.00 as agent’s commission, with the obligation, on their
part, to return the aforesaid amounts on January 30, 1963 in case they were
unable to buy the fishing boat. Their complaint alleged that they had never
received any amount from Jimenez and that their signatures on the questioned
receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit and intimidation employed by
him. Several days later, they filed a motion in the aforementioned criminal
action to suspend proceedings therein on the ground that the determination
of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon was a prejudicial question, The respondent judge granted the motion
in an order dated October 18, 1963.

ISSUE:
The issue to be decided is whether the determination of the issue raised in the
civil case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it
must be first resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa
may proceed.

RULING:
Applying the above considerations to the instant case, it will be readily seen
that the alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption
that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil
case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be
established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that
they had actually received from the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 with
which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they
misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him
upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be
tenable had they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved
in the civil action.

Were We to sanction the theory advanced by the respondents Tang and De la

Cruz Olanday and adopted by the respondent judge, there would hardly be a
case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing
for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an
independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that
he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be
interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceeding.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Court of

First Instance of Cavite to proceed without undue delay with the trial of
Criminal Case No. TM-235, with the result that the order complained of
suspending the proceedings therein until after Civil Case No. 6636 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon has been resolved is hereby set aside. With costs
against the respondents except the respondent judge.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE INSTANCE OF THE SECOND WIFE
Landicho v. Relova
G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968
Fernando, J.:

DOCTRINE:
"We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage
can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the
criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of
the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because
determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the
civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the
conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of
bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared
valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a
decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."

FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the
annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner,
with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for
the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a
pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in
the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27,
1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It
was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to
Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of
First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe
Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void
ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On
June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first
spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her
before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the
hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the
validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent
Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came
a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise
denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was
required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being
issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the
bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an
amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the
inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court
admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year
where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the
qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first
spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative
defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial
questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even
on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is valid
RULING:
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March
15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later,
on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil
action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his
marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of
respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having
such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in
the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought
almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have
been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based
on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the
opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less
gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.
WHEN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE DEEMED A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE
Zapanta v. Montesa
G.R. No. L-14534, February 28, 1962
Dizon, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. (People v.
Aragon, supra.) Hence, where the defendant in a bigamy case in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan claims that the second marriage is void on the ground
that he entered into it under duress, force and intimidation, and, as a matter
of fact a case is pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the
annulment of said marriage, the civil action for annulment must first be
decided before the action for bigamy can proceed.

FACTS:
On May 20, 1958 Olimpia Y. Co filed a bigamy case against Merardo L. Zapanta
alleging that the latter having previously married to Estrella Guarin, and
without having the said marriage dissolved contracted a second marriage with
the complainant. On June 16, 1958, Zapanta filed a case against Co for the
annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress force and intimidation.
Co filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no
cause of action but was denied after a few days. On Sept. 2, 1958, Zapanta
filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as well as
petitioners motion for reconsideration and ordered his arraignment. After
entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner field the present action.

ISSUE:
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. Should the
question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the ground that
Zapanta’s consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation?
RULING:
Zapanta’s act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for
bigamy. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second
marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. The civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action
for bigamy can proceed. Wherefore, the writ prayed for in the petition was
hereby granted. Without any costs.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION ON THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Meynardo L. Beltran v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
Buena, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The pendency of a case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial

question. Moreover, the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for the
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

FACTS:

Meynardo L. Beltran filed for petition for review, which seeks to review and
set aside the Order ssued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case
against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial
question.

The facts show that the petitioner and Charmaine E. Felix were married in
1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine, however, alleged that it was Meynardo who left the conjugal
home, and is now living with Milagros, his paramour.

Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court,

saying that the pendency of the petition for nullity of his marriage with
Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration
filed by Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to
stop the lower court from trying his case. The RTC denied his petition and the
motion for reconsideration. Undaunted, the filed to the Supreme Court instant
petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.

RULING:

NO. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not
pose a prejudicial question to a prosecution for concubinage. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements:

· the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the

issue raised in the criminal action; and
· the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is

not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.

In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN AN ANNULMENT CASE
Arthur Te v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
Kapunan, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.

FACTS:

Arthur Te file a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division and the Resolution dated
October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in Civil
rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage
although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl, petitioner stopped visiting her. While his
marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a
second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella.

When the private respondent learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella,

she filed a complaint affidavit at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
charging the petitioner with bigamy. She also also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against the petitioner
and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality.

The petitioner, on the other hand filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for
the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he
was forced to marry her.
When the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit
the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards
petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case. The RTC denied the
petitioner’s demurrer and motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge.

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board)
a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal
case for bigamy. The Board denied the said motion.

The petitioner again filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) another petition for
certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in failing to
hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of
the administrative case pending before it.

The Court of Appeals (CTA), Tenth Division upheld all the decisions made by
RTC. It also held that the Board did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
on its denial on the petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the
administrative case.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of

the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. Thus, the petitioner filed an
instant petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CTA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is a prejudicial question and had
to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be rendered
judgment?

RULING:

NO. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, it a marriage
annulment cannot be used as a prejudicial question to the prior criminal case
and administrative case against the petitioner. Moreover, the second marriage
was clearly a void ab initio. Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code is the
prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
RECOVERY FROM THE DEATH OF UNBORN CHILD
Antonio Geluz v. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo
G.R. No. L-16439, June 20,1961
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

DOCTRINE:

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having
rights and obligations. Moreover, the damages which the parents of an unborn
child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations,
as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them
(Art. 2230, New Civil Code).

FACTS:

Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, file a litigation case against
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial
court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz,
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award. Thus, leading the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari
on the decision made.

The facts show that Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar Lazo, respondent, came
to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula
Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were
legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents,
she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again
on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant
and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter
Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was
in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial
board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her

abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for
the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death

pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could deliberately accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical
personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently alive

However, it is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion

of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that,
under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

Therefore, the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,

could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
TRANSMISSION OF THE RIGHTS OF SUCCESSION
Angela M. Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc
G.R. No. L-15499, February 28,1962
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

DOCTRINE:

By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to

his heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes
all property rights and obligations that survive the decedent.

FACTS:

Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located
at Sta. Cruz, Manila. Other owners are Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, 1/6;
José V. Ramirez, 1/6; José E. Ramirez, 1/6; Belen T. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita De
Ramirez, 1/6; and José Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.

On October 20, 1951. José V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding

No. 15026 was instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6)
undivided share in the aforementioned property. His last will and testament
has been admitted to probate, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his
children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs.
Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant. The Bank of the
Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.

Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, one of

the co-owners of the late José V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her
undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., defendant-appellee herein, for
the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution an affidavit to the effect that
formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the
deed of sale was duly registered and the old TCT was cancelled in lieu of which
a new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.

On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter
to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of
the late José V. Ramirez informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter,
together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, sent a letter and a Philippine
National Bank cashier’s check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc. offering to redeem share sold by Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de
Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned
the amount in court and filed the corresponding action for legal redemption.
Without prejudice to the determination by the court of the reasonable and fair
market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive,
plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal
redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

RULING:

YES. Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is

clear. As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs
acquired an interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her
predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the
death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the
succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the
moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights.
COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY
Ramon Joaquin v Antonio C. Navarro
G.R. No. L-54262, November 29, 2000
Tuason, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more
persons who would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the
prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of
rights from one to the other shall take place.

FACTS:
Three proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in
the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro. The main
question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the
deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were
killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila. The trial court
found the deaths of these persons to have occurred the following order: 1st.
The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin
Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to
Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared
to have survived his mother. It is this modification of the lower court's finding
which is now being contested by the petitioner.

On February 6, 1945, while the battle against the Japanese in Manila was
raging, the family of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, sought refuge
in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. However, after
some time they all have died. At the time of the massacre, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. about 30.

Many years later, three proceedings were instituted for the summary
settlement of the estates of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., deceased. All of them having been heard
jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that of the Court
of First Instance. Court of Appeals assumes that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30,
must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was
admittedly above 60 years of age based on Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
But this decision was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died

before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically
affects the right of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who
was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the
deceased spouses, and of Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Angela Joaquin died before her son Joaquin Navarro Jr.

RULING:

NO. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to
die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the
person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the
absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time
and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

In light of the conditions painted by Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be

arrived at that Joaquin Navaro Jr died before his mother. The presumption
that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on speculations, not
evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil
cases are decided, this inference should prevail.

Evidence of survivorship may be:

1. Direct,
2. Indirect,
3. Circumstantial, or
4. Inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to
succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there
shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court,
in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship
SUIBALITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Felipe M. Roldan v. Philippine Veteran Boards
G.R. No. L-11973, June 30, 1959
Paras, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Only body corporate and politic in deed and in law are capable of to sue and
being sued. Thus, a mere agency mere office or agency of the government,
unincorporated and possessing no juridical personality under the law are
incapable of suing or being sued.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Roldan is appealing the decision of the Court of first Instance of
Manila, dismissing his complaint on the ground the action brought against the
members of the Philippine Veterans Board, which was a mere agency of the
government, was in effect a suit against the state and that it was done without
its consent.

Roldan was a first grade Civil Service eligible. On March 26, 1953, he was
appointed clerk in the Philippine Veterans Board with compensation at the rate
of P2,160 a year, and he entered upon the performance of his duties.
Defendant Antonio F. Garcia, acting Administrative Officer of the Philippine
Veterans Board of which he was a member and signing for the Chairman
terminated Roldan from his duty.

Thus, Roldan was separated from the service on March 25, 1954 and in his
place, Juan Domingo was appointed. Roldan initiated Quo Warranto
proceedings against Domingo in Civil Case No. 25603 of the CFI of Manila. The
trial court in said case decided in favor of Roldan, declaring his ouster to have
been illegal.

Roldan filed the present action against the Philippine Veterans Board and its
five members to recover his back wages during said period plus moral
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 including P600.00 for attorney fees. The
trial court, through Judge Luis B. Reyes, dismissed the complaint on the
ground that:
 · Republic Act No. 65 creating the Philippine Veterans Board made
said Board a mere agency of the Government to carry out the
purposes of said Act. No. 65;
· The salaries of the employees of said Board, like that of the plaintiff,
were appropriated every year by law and that the salary
corresponding to the position of Roldan for the period from March
26, 1954 when separated from the service, until September 24,
1955, when he was reinstated, had already been paid to Juan N.
Domingo, the defendant over whom he won in the Quo Warranto
Proceeding; and
· Neither the Philippine Veterans Board nor its members can provide
for the payment of Roldan’s back wages, having no power to do so
under the law, Congress being the only body that can make the
appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine Veterans Board is a juridical entity and is within the
meaning of Article 44 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

NO. Counsel for the appellant merely quotes Article 44 without giving reasons
why the Philippine Veterans Board is included in its provisions.

A juridical person is a "being of legal existence, susceptible of rights and

obligations, or of being subject of juridical relations".

It is clear that the Philippine Veterans Board which was created under Section
7 of Republic Act No. 65 under the Department of National Defense to carry
into effect the purpose of said act and to take charge of effectuating the duties
assigned to it by law, which Board is composed of a chairman and four other
members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the commission
on Appointment from among veterans of the Philippine Army and of
recognized or deserving guerrilla organizations, which members are entitled
to per diems of P15 each for every meeting actually attended, may not be
considered a juridical person within the meaning of the law, capable of being
sued, especially for the recovery of back salaries, which salaries are
appropriated only by Congress.
Thus, a suit like the present one against the Board is in reality an action
against the government itself. Any suit against the government without its
consent does not prosper.
LIABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE ACTS OF ITS AGENTS
E. Merrit v Government of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
Trent, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The state is liable only when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed.

FACTS:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped
by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries
rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457
authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due
to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the
amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine Government is liable for the negligent act of the driver?

RULING:

NO. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply
to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in
and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a
special agent; thus, the Government is not liable.
NON-SUABILITY OF OFFICERS OF THE STATE
United States v. Hon. Eliodoro Guinto
SCRA 64, February 26,1990
Cruz, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A State may not be sued without its consent is also applicable to the officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties.

FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon.
The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that
Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid,
and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US
Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been
ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup
stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The
club manager suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board
of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal.

3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-
bust operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and
special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against
Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the
charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for
damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latter’s
acts that he lost his job.

4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

 A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against
petitioners (US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the
former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were
arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases
Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the
generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as
part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be
bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society
of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended
to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on
the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the
Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also
insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents
of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.

There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
(governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.

In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions

granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by
private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the
defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the
evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below
for further proceedings.

In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US
government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can
claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with
Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself
of its sovereign immunity from suit. But the court still dismissed the complaint
against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the
proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly
in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the

exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation
and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a

closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate
if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually
exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must
first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties.
GARNISHMENT OF THE FUNDS OF GOCCS
Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. vs Board of Liquidators
GR No. 84992, December 15,1989
Grino-Aquino, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the
funds of such government-owned and controlled corporation and non-
corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt
from garnishment.

FACTS:

In its decision dated March 21, 1987 in CA-G.R. SP No. 12017, the Court of
appeals set aside the decision and order of execution pending appeal which
the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued in favor of the Philippine Rock
Industries (Philrock), authorizing the immediate execution of its decision
against the funds deposited in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of the
respondent Board of Liquidators as liquidator of the defunct Reparations
Commission (REPACOM for brevity).

The facts show that PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against
the Board of Liquidators, as liquidator of the defunct REPACOM, for: (1) the
replacement of the defective rock pulverizing machinery purchased from
REPACOM, or, as alternative, to refund the purchase at 31% of its contract
price; (2) reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of
maintaining the plant at Php5,000 a month and Php4,000 per day as
unrealized profits and exemplary damages; and (3) Php50,000 attorney fees
plus expenses and costs of the suit.

The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the
State, filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the payment for damages
are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and execution.
Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of Execution. Subsequently the
Board of Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court
of Appeals where the Court of Appeals set aside the -Writ of Execution by the
RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators in
the Philippine National Bank may be garnished to satisfy a money judgment
against the BOARD.

RULING:

NO. The sale of the rock pulverizing plant to PHILROCK by the Board of
liquidators, although proprietary in nature was merely incidental to the
performance of the Board's primary and governmental function of settling and
closing the affairs of the REPACOM. Hence, its funds in the Philippine National
Bank are public funds which are exempt from garnishment. Even when the
government has been adjudged liable in a suit to which it has consented, it
does not necessarily follow that the judgment can be enforced by execution
against its hands for every disbursement of public funds must be covered by
a corresponding appropriation passed by the Legislature. Executive Order 635
A. s. 1980, is not an appropriation law for it does not emanate from the
legislature.

Thus, funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators in the

Philippine National Bank cannot be garnished to satisfy a money judgment
against the BOARD.
GARNISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS
Republic of the Philippines vs Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor
GR No. L-03671, November 28,1973
Grino-Aquino, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding

appropriation as required by law.

FACTS:
A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic of the
Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of P1,712,396.40 in favor
of respondent corporation. After the decision became final and executory,
respondent judge issued an order directing the sheriff to execute the said
decision, and the corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued.

Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks especially
the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank received
such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller, these funds of the AFP with
the said banks are public funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its
military and civilian personnel.

The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges the

validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and
executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution directed against
the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.

ISSUE:
May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against public
funds?

RULING:
NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by private parties,
there is corollary that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been previously granted and
the state‘s liability has been adjudged.

Thus, in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San Diego, such a well
settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee. The
universal rule that where the state gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant‘s action only up
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that
the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific object is
appropriated by law.
NON-SUABILITY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES AND ITS OFFICERS
Municipality of San Fernando La Union vs Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme
GR No. L-52179, April 8, 1991
Medialdea, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Municipalities cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation
existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his
official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents Juana
Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña,
Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña
Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court.

A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of

San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in
turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck
driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of
non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Baniña

ISSUE:
Whether municipal corporations are suable and are liable for the torts
committed by their employee who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions?

RULING:
NO. It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can
be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that
the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by
law.

Thus, municipal corporations are not suable nor liable for the torts committed
by their employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions.
MUNICIPALITIES PERFORMING PROPREITARY FUNCTIONS
Laudencio Torio v. Rosalina Fontanilla, et al
GR No. L-29993, October 23, 1978
Munoz Palma, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Municipal corporations are for damages for acts done in the performance of
proprietary functions. Moreover, under the doctrine of respondent superior,
they can also be held liable for the acts of its agent relative to the exercise
thereof of acts proprietary in character.

FACTS:
On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed
Resolution No. 156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town
fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was
also passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction
of two stages, one for the zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On
January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning
Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition
for recovery of damages. Defendant councilors contend that they are merely
acting as agents of the municipality.

ISSUE:
Whether the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a
governmental or a corporate function of the municipality?

RULING:
The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of
a private or proprietary function of the municipality. The provision on Section
2282 of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty
to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the
municipality is held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Since it is
established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows
that it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation where
officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely
because of their official relation to it.
Thus, the municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla for the reason of
performing proprietary function.
LOST AND CHANGE OF DOMICILE
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs Commission on Elections
GR No. L-29993, October 23, 1978
Munoz Palma, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Article 50 of the Civil Code states that for the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence.

However, an individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and
maintained residences in different places.

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that
her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she
did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked
the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed

seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s

proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed
itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was
the overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to
satisfy the one (1) year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.

RULING:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the
purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court
that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner
was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed
to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
Angel T. Limjoco vs Intestate Estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
GR No. L-770, April 27, 1948
Hilado, J.:

DOCTRINE:

It is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights
and obligations which survive after his demise.

FACTS:
Pedro O. Fragante, A Filipino citizen, applied for certificate of public
convenience to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive
capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and
to sell the ice produced from said plant. However, he died prior to the approval
of his application. Since his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service, the commission, ordered certificate of
public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant
with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the
said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal,
and in Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a “citizen
of the Philippines” within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act,
as amended.

RULING:
YES. Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in
view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission
the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one
change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its
economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his
heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is
the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from
inheriting it.
TRANSFER TO MUNICIPALITIES BY GOVERMENT
Rev. Jorge Barlin v Vicente Ramirez
GR No. L-2832, November 24, 1906
Willard, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The Government of the Philippine Island has never undertaken to transfer to

the municipalities the ownership or right of possession of the churches therein.

FACTS:
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of
Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of
January, 1869, the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt
between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by the order
of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was
performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de
barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was required
to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days every year.
The material necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest
from the funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of
the pueblo. After the completion of the church it was always administered,
until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion and all
the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to that church.

The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest,
took possession of the churchHe administered it as such under the orders of
his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been
then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery
to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments,
books, jewels, money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a
written document of that date, refused to make such delivery.

ISSUE:
Whether the Roman Catholic Church has a legal personality in the Philippine
Islands.
RULING:
No. It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no
legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with
reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any
other personality in Europe, and which existed "when Grecian eloquence still
flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of
Mecca," does not require serious consideration.
CHURCH AND OTHER ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES RIGHTS TO ACQUIRE
PROPERTY
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, ET AL v. The Municipality Placer
GR. No. 3490. September 23, 1908
TRACEY, J.:

DOCTRINE:
All the public funds employed in church buildings and other property were
appropriated for that purpose without any reservation or restriction whatever,
being approved according to law by the representatives of the nation in Cortes,
or by those of the towns in the common councils. therefore the application of
funds thus appropriated and voted by the legitimate mandataries of the nation
or of the municipalities constituted, from the standpoint of law and justice, a
perfect, irrevocable gift.

FACTS:
The plaintiff is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church filed a complaint against
the hereto defendant The Municipality Placer. The Roman Catholic Church
curate of Placer and Taganaan brought an action in the Court of Justice to
recover possession of the church, convent, and cemetery which are object of
the present suit. The action filed was denied by the Court of Justice. He
appealed to the Court of First instance but again denied upon appeal of the
defendant.

ISSUE:
Is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church curate has the right to recover the
possession such properties?

RULING:
Yes, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church curate has the right to recover the
possession of the church, convent, and cemetery. All the public funds
employed in church buildings and other property were appropriated for that
purpose without any reservation or restriction whatever, being approved
according to law by the representatives of the nation in Cortes, or by those of
the towns in the common councils. therefore the application of funds thus
appropriated and voted by the legitimate mandataries of the nation or of the
municipalities constituted, from the standpoint of law and justice, a perfect,
irrevocable gift.

The legislative assembly of Porto Rico had the power to confer jurisdiction on
the supreme court of the islands of this special class of controversies. Such
legislation was not contrary to the constitution and was inconformity with the
power conferred by Congress upon the legislative assembly to regulate the
jurisdiction of the courts. The juristic personality and the church's ownership
of property had been recognized in the most formal way by the concordats
between Spain and the papacy and by the Spanish laws from the beginning of
settlements in the Indies. Such recognition has also been accorded the church
by all systems of European law from the fourth century of the Christian era.
The fact that the municipality may have furnished some of the funds for
building or repairing the churches can not affect the title of the Roman Catholic
Church, to whom such funds were thus irrevocably donated and by whom
these temples were erected and dedicated to religious uses.
Therefore, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church has the right in possession of
the church , the convent, and the cemetery.
ELEMENTS OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
Sabandal v. Tongco
G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001
PARDO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

FACTS:
Sabandal entered into a memorandum of agreement on dealership with
Philippines Today Inc., for the distribution of the newspaper in Bacolod City
and in designated towns in Negros Occidental. Petitioner shall pay for the one
month equivalent amount for advance deliveries. Respondent delivered the
newspapers based on the agreement. Later on, petitioner issued checks in
exchange to the advance deliveries.

Petitioner’s issued checks were of no value or worthless for being insufficient

in funds, respondent made several attempt on petitioner to address the issue.
However, there is no reponse in the petitioner. Respondent filed a complaint
to the petioner in violation of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. After three years
the petitioner countered and filed a complaint to the respondent in the grounds
specific performance, recovery of overpayment and damages. Petitioner also
filed a motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration on his criminal case
based on a prejudicial question. However, the Regional Trial Court denied both
motion. Hence, the petition was raised the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Is a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the
criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner
until after the resolution of the civil action for specific performance, recovery
of overpayment, and damages.

RULING:
No, the prejudicial question in this case is not possible. The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue
in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages is
whether complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today,
Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid
respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing
checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense.18
The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a civil
action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages did not pose a
prejudicial question in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the
filing of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases.
Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal
charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.
REQUISITES OF PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
Apa vs. Fernandez
G. R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution
is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension
of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but
also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be
decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari to set aside the orders of
respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court that denied the petitioners
motion for the suspension of the arraignment of criminal case as well as their
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners Isabel Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionision Jacalan allegedly conspired
and mutually helping each other to commit felonious acts in occupying and
possessing the property owned by the hereto respondent Rosita Tigol without
her consent. The petitioners constructed and reside on the respondents
property against the latter’s will, the petitioners ignored the repeated
demands by the respondent.

Petitioner filed a motion to suspend their current criminal case to the ground
of prejudicial question. The civil action filed against the respondent Rosita
Tigoy, as it will be a prejudicial question to the current criminal case.The
petitioners filed a motion to set aside the arraignment but denied and later on
filed a motion for reconsideration and again not granted.

ISSUE:
Is the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending, in Civil
Case No. 2247-L, a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners?
RULING:
Yes, the petitioners argument of question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, is
a prejudicial question to the criminal case. A prejudicial question is a question
which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of

land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the latter's
will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the knowledge
and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took
possession of a portion of "her property" by building their houses thereon and
"deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.

In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case
rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her
husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by the
spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno and
Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in that case is
not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is that
whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership, such
resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the
criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot in question, they
cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as much entitled to the
use and occupation of the land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol
and her family.3

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a piece
of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to
the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar,
no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private
respondent claims the right to possession based on her claim of ownership.
Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil
case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be
suspended.

Hence, the question of ownership of the lot is a prejudicial question to the

proceedings of the criminal case.
REQUIREMENTS OF MARRIAGE TO BE CONSIDERED NULL AND VOID
People of the Philippines v. Aragon
G. R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957
LABRADOR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated
in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void
marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express
provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted
to.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding
appellant guilty of bigamy.
The accused under the name of Proceso Rosima contracted his first marriage
with Maria Gorrea, while his first marriage is still subsisting he contracted
another marriage under the name of Proceso Aragon with Maria Faicol. The
second marriage was sponsored by Eulogio Giroy and Emilio Tomesa.
Proceso’s wife in his first marriage Maria Gorrea later on died, seeing that the
coast is clear in Cebu, Proceso and Maria Faicol decided to move in Cebu. In
the duration of the marriage of Proceso and Maria Faicol it appears that Maria
was being maltreated by the forme. Proceso, in his knowledge on his actions
took care of Maria’s medical attentions, while treatment occurs Proceso
contracted his third marriage under the name of Jesusa Maglasangin Sibonga.

The accused made an attempt to deny his second marriage but the Court
believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was
fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by
the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the
wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol.

ISSUE:
Is Proceso Aragon guilty on the crime of bigamy for having contracted his third
marriage when there is subsisting second marriage?
RULING:
Yes, Proceso Aragon is guilty on the crime of bigamy for having been marriage
although there is still subsisting marriage. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent
enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said
rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second
wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of
the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this
marriage can not prosper.

Hence, Proceso Aragon is guilty on the crime of bigamy.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE
Merced v. Diez
G.R. No. L-15315, August 26, 1960
LABRADOR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto
of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the
element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. But the question of
invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but
in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage,
subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case
and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the
second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action
to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage
must first be secured.

FACTS:
This is a petition for writ of certiorari prohibiting the judge of the Court of First
Instance to proceed with the criminal case against the petitioner until after
final termination of the civil action for the annulment of the petitioner Abundio
Merced with Elizabeth Ceazar.
The petitioner filed a civil action for the annulment of his marriage with Ceazar
for allegedly threatening, forcing him to marry Ceazar as he was living with
Ceazar for more than five years, which is not true according to the petitioner.
They entered into a marriage contract as marriage license in their case was
not necessarily needed, but after the marriage Merced did not live with Ceazar
together. Merced pray for annulment of their marriage and necessary moral
damages, but Ceazar filed also a counter complaint praying the court for moral
damages as the time of their marriage Merced was married with the name of
Eufrocina Tan. Right after the counterclaim for damages, Ceazar file a criminal
action of bigamy to Merced for being married to another while there is a
subsisting marriage.

ISSUE:
Is an action to annul the second marriage a prejudicial question in a
prosecution for bigamy?
RULING:
Yes, the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto
of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the
element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. But the question of
invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in
a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject
of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second
marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the
effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must
first be secured.
In the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must
be determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can
proceed. We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second
marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before
the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity
of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because
determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the
civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy.
In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal
jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there
is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to
be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the
civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and
different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.
In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth
Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in
the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for
bigamy can proceed.
Therefore, the second marriage is a prejudicial question in the prosecution of
the crime bigamy.
LAWFUL HEIRS OF A DECEASED PERSON
Quita vs. Dandan
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Fe De Quita and Arturo Padlan were married in the Philippines but they were
not blessed with children, later on they were divorced in the USA. Quita was
then married to her second marriage named under Felix Tupaz but somehow
end up in divorced. She was then married for the third time to a certain
Wernimont.
When Arturo died he left with no will, Lino Javier Inchiong filed a petition to
the Regional Trial Court concerning with the administration of the estate that
Arturo left in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo has also six
child with the latter opposed the petition and showing the intention of
acquiring the estate of Arturo. Blandina submitted necessary documents that
will prove the petitioner and Arturo private writing and final judgement of their
divorce. Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be the brother of Arturo also intervened.
Petitioner moved for immediate declaration of the heir and the distribution of
the estate of the decedent.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner Quita has the right to the heir of the decedent Arturo Padlan?

RULING:
No, the petitioner’s prayer to acquire to heir and estate of the decendant has
no merit. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. We
note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit
from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A.
and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural
rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12
Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. We
emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court
should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83
of the Civil Code.
Hence, the Quita’s petition is not merited.
THE MATTER OF THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD SHOULD BE THE
SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS
Unson vs. Araneta
G.R. No. L-52242 November 17, 1980
BARREDO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody
of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never
has this Court diverted from that criterion.

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari to have the order of the respondent judge to return the
custody of the child Maria Teresa Unson the daughter of the Miguel Unson and
Edita Araneta the petitioner and respondent respectively to her mother.
Obliging the petitioner to sustain the needs of their child.
Unson and Araneta were married and produced a child named Teresa.
However, both had an agreement of separation of their properties and their
relationship. There is no provision in the agreement on what will be the set up
on their child. They only scheduled the custody of the child, the petitioner will
take care of the child every weekdays and the mother will take care every
weekends.
However, Unson later found out that Araneta were having an affair with her
brother in law and in fact they also produced a child. Since that was immoral
if the child will be in the custody of the mother in her formative years.
Hence, this court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, after the decision on separation of properties had become
final, the matter of the custody of the child should be the subject of a separate
proceedings.

RULING:
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody
of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never
has this Court diverted from that criterion.
The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her
mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right
and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual
and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the
husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she
has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly
concerned with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be
expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in this case. Under the
circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds no alternative than
to grant private respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child in
question.
Hence, the matter of the custody of children of separated spouses may be
brought before the Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any
other proceeding, the respondent court had jurisdiction to decide the question
of custody here.
INAPPLICABILITY OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE IN PHILIPPINE LAW
Republic of the Philippines vs. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
PERALTA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to
it. In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against
in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

FACTS:

Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation

of Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtue
of a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the

Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing. During
the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary for purposes
of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was
filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based
on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

Petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national

named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract.

A case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court.

Petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and
in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese
former husband.
This petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was
already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree.

Petitioners prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
surname, MANALO.

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for
Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and
admitted were.

ISSUE:

Is the respondent’s prayers that the entry of their marriage in the civil
registrar with the Japanese national be declared invalid attainable under
Philippine law?

RULING:

Yes, the respondents prayer’s will merit. Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good
to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree
is rendered admissible a written act of the foreign court. As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit an opportunity to do so.

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden
of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. The power
of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to
remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations
are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.

Hence, the respondents divorce with the Japanese national is possible under
Philippine law.
IN THE MATTER OF DETERMINING THE HEREDITARY RIGHTS
The Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher
G.R. No. L-11668 January 28, 1961.
BARRERA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
In the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the
properties acquired during their marriage.

FACTS:
The case is about the determination of the hereditary estate of the decedent.
Couple in the name of Walter Stephenson and Beatrice Mauricia Stephenson
where married in the Philippines. Later on, Walter Stephenson died, Beatrice
was instituted to be the sole heiress of the property of Walter in the
Philippines.
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent. Murray Strat was appointed as ancillary administrator
in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the
inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States.
Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the
valuation of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the
appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair
market value in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After
allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral
expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration
expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the
amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a
total of P16,023.23.

The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax.

In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as
originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00
to P42,000.00.
The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax
return. This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the
amended return, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption
and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross
estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal
Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was
allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code; and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and
inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount
of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a
consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of
P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The
Collector denied the claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-
half (½) of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile
surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in
relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code.

RULING:
In the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the
properties acquired during their marriage.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in
the Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old
Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective
only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality
theory of determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is
a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the administration
disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a case, the
national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in determining the
property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the
two articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that
it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the
Philippines or abroad while Article 13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to
marriages contracted in a foreign land.
Petitioner cannot make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old
Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code,
which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass or
contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses.
Said article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this term,
in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property
that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for
distribution. It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of spouses,
as distinguished from their successional rights, is governed differently by the
specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code.
Therefore, the lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property
in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
LEGAL AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSIONS SHALL BE REGULATED BY
THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE DECEDENT
Phil Trust Co vs. Bohanan
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
LABRADOR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the
country in which it is found.

FACTS:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon
San Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan,
Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by
the executor and approving the said project.

The Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted
to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, In the said order, the
court made the following findings:

The testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state.
His stay in the Philippines was merely temporary, and he continued and
remained to be a citizen of the United States until his remaining days.

The testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and
testament. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the
executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor.

The executor filed a project of partition, making, in accordance with the

provisions of the will, the following adjudications:

(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants

National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the
benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists
of several mining companies;
 (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L.
Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike.
This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock
similar to those given to testator's grandson;

(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert

Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three
yearly installments;

(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine

Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings,
P2,000;

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of
the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above
indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the
laws of the form concede to them.

ISSUE:

Is the appellant Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children has the rights
on the will of the deceased?

RULING:

No, the project of partition must be made in accordance with the testamentary
provisions. Legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property
and the country in which it is found.

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was
decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had
selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. It is not disputed
that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will.
It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the
above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's
duly to do.

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the
above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above
circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada,
can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been
offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of

testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the
testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national
law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above,
which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will.

Hence, the appellant Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children has no
rights on the will of the deceased.
A WILL IS A TESTATOR SPEAKING AFTER DEATH
Ancheta vs. Dalaygon
G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially
the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before
the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear
in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted
them to do so. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having
meant just what he said.

FACTS:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill. When Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her
entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The court also
named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta as ancillary administrator.

Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon with whom he has two children,

namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed
an inventory and appraisal of the following properties:

(1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements. (Makati

property);

(2) a current account in Audrey’s name.

When Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator.

Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9

Petitioner also filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being
apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and
Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.

ISSUE:

Is the will of the testator bequeathed his entire estate to the respondent valid?

RULING:

Yes, the will of the testator bequeathed his entire estate to the respondent is
valid. A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have
substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator
stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as
they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation
of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument,
permitted them to do so. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's
having meant just what he said.

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate. All these properties
passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard
subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to
respondent.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been
brought to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed
project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any
other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or
validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed
according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to
respondent.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to
acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of
the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and
entities owned or controlled by them. The prohibition against acquisition of
private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article
XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen,
as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections
7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain,
except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a
former natural-born citizen.

Therefore, the acquisition of the estate of the deceased according to his will
shall be acquired by the respondent.
DOMICILIARY RULES IN DECIDING LEGAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
WILL
Aznar vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
LABRADOR, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus, one may be domiciled in a place where
he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, on
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by
her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be
payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions
of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen.

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his

final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen

Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by
the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute
dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is the appellant acknowledged in the last will of Christensen by identifying the

domicile of the latter?

RULING:

Yes, since the domicile of the deceased was proven to be in the Philippines,
jurisdiction of the validity of the provisions stated in the will shall be governed
by Philippine law. The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken
to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus, one may be domiciled
in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he
has no domicile.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article
16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention cannot
be sustained.

Therefore, the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is

the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California.
WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED WHICH DISREGARDS NORMS
RESULTING DAMAGE TO ANOTHER
Rellosa vs. Pellosis
G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001
VITUG, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith.7 When a right is exercised in a manner which discards
these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.

FACTS:

The case seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals in not countenancing an

attempt to abridge and render inutile a legal right to contest an adverse ruling
of an agency of government.

Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes,

located at San Pascual Street, Malate, Manila. Respondents had built their
houses on the land which, over the years, underwent continuous
improvements.

After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor Reyes.
Sometime in 1986, Victor informed respondents that, for being lessees of the
land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of first refusal
to buy the land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge
of respondents, the land occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia
Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name.

Cynthia Ortega, filed a petition for condemnation of the structures on the land.

Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the
"Declaration of Nullity of the Sale”, made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega
predicated upon their right of first refusal which was claimed to have been
impinged upon the sale of the land to petitioner Ortega without their
knowledge.
After due hearing in the condemnation case, the Office of the Building Official
issued a resolution, the demolition of the houses of respondents. Cynthia
Ortega, together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired
workers to commence the demolition of respondents' houses. Respondents
filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building Official.
Petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of
respondents' houses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard
of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy 5 and
to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof,6 but the
exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule
established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. 7
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting
in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be
held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much about the
existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of
whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard
of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an
order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order
unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different
matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.
REQUISITES TO BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE ABUSE OF
RIGHTS PRINCIPLE
Nala vs. Cabansag
G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution2
dated October 28, 2003, dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming with
modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated August 10, 1994
rendered in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed a Civil Case for damages. According to

respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio
Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez. Said property is part of a 400-square
meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. He received a demand
letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima
Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he
leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal
and civil actions will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on
May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent suffered damages and
was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.

Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that
he was merely acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's
claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square
meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was
subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square meter property was
conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement
that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Nala also
claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he occupies.

ISSUE:

Is Atty. Nala’s action on her demand to the petitioner acted in bad faith?

RULING:

No, Nala acted in good faith when instructing Del Prado his demand about his
property. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle,
the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.

In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and
her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the
demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's
actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband
Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had
no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by
Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was
only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned
of such sale.

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to
send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to
enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent.
One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 16 Thus, whatever
damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.

Therefore, Nala’s action was done in good faith and not by abusing her rights.
IN THE MATTER OF MORAL DAMAGES FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
Aznar vs. Citibank
G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

DOCTRINE:
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable
only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in
bad faith, oppressive or abusive.

FACTS:

Emmanuel B. Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred

Master Credit Card issued by Citibank. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to
take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour.

With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur
for his group. Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said
destination.

Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments

in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when
he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia to
purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his
card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets
in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card
was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use
blacklisted cards.

Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, a civil action and raffled
to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross
negligence blacklisted his Mastercard. He further claimed that he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation
and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To prove
that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-
out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of one
Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was "DECL
OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.

Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. It also

contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and
use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of
its cards by any merchant affiliate.

To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card
Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins
which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s
trip.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioners claim for damages arising from being allegedly blacklisted
from Citibank meritous?

RULING:

No, the petitioners claim lacks of merit. In culpa contractual or breach of

contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting
to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach
must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.

While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment
he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially
when the agency’s personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to
use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed
to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation
that would make it answerable for said suffering.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the

illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury to those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which
does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
Therefore, the petitioners claim for damages lacks of merit.
FACTS TO PROVE A BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
ERLINDA ESTOPA v. LORETO PIANSAY, JR.
G.R. No. L-14733. September 30, 1960
Bengzon, J.:

DOCTRINE:
While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. (Art. 2234, New Civil Code.)

FACTS:
The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, filed an appeal from the decision of the Negros
Occidental court of first instance awarding to plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00
by way of moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P1,000.00
as attorney's fees

The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago,

Negros Occidental, with her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated that
she fell in love and submitted herself completely to the defendant Loreto
Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a courtship that lasted for a
couple of months during which period the defendant consistently promised
and succeeded to make her believe in him that he was going to marry her;
that sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff was informed reliably that
defendant was backing out from his promise of marriage so she demanded
defendant’s compliance to his promise in order to vindicate her honor, and
plaintiff went to the extent of asking the help of defendant’s parents, but all
her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her efforts were futile but
knowing that her cause was not completely lost, she decided to file her
complaint, not to compel the defendant to marry her, but to demand from him
compensation for the damages that she sustained."

There is no claim for any other kind of damages. In fact, Erlinda Estopa filed
no brief here. And her complaint merely alleged "social humiliation, mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and moral shock."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable damages for mere breach of a promise
to marry?

RULING:
No. The court ruled that the mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. According to article 2234 of the New Civil Code, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In this case, as plaintiff is not entitled to any
damages at all, the defendant may not be condemned to pay for moral
damages.
FACTS TO PROVE A BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
BEATRIZ GALANG v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMO QUINIT and
RODRIGO QUINIT
G.R. No. L-17248, January 29, 1962
Concepcion, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral damages
to plaintiff, who insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry
are collectible under our laws, but this question has already been settled
adversely to plaintiff's pretense in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628
(September 30, 1960).

FACTS:
Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo’s
parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. They lived as husband and
wife in the house of one Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo left and never returned.
The evidence on other pertinent facts is however conflicting. Plaintiff tried to
prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the opposition of the latter’s
mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and defray the
expenses of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of Dagawan
for them to stay as husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not able to
secure a marriage license for lack of a residence certificate, he went back to
his hometown to get such a certificate but never returned.

On the other hand, the defendants sought to establish that he and the plaintiff
were engaged but his parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was
agreeable to marry the plaintiff after his graduation but the latter was
impatient and wanted the marriage to take place sooner. Because of continued
relationships with the plaintiff, Rodrigo’s parents told him to leave the parental
home. He later told this to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to go to
Dagawan’s house where she followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his
continued refusal to marry the plaintiff, the latter’s relatives, accompanied by
policemen and constabulary soldiers intimidated him. He was allowed to go
home and was then placed under the custody of a town mayor by his parents.
He refused to acknowledge the marriage application, which was provided by
Dagawan for him to sign, when he did not appear before a notary public.
Plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo and his father Maximo Quinit to recover
damages for breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo to marry her. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, which on appeal, was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the
alleged breach of promise to marry?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
reason that mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. In
the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to
sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages
made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.
FACTS TO PROVE A BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
APOLONIO TANJANCO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS
G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966
Reyes, J.B.L., J.

DOCTRINE:
In This case, Plaintiff duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of
action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its
support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing that: any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

FACTS:
From December, 1957, petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted the respondent,
Arceli Santos, both being of legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such
feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his
pleas for carnal knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco
had carnal access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting pregnant.
As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary
in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her state of unemployment Santos became unable
to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill his
promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the
court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was
bearing, and pay her for support and damages.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state
cause of action. Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the
latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a cause of action was
present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed
such a decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Apolonio Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos
for breach of his promise to marry Arceli Santos?

RULING:
No. Petition is meritorious. CFI ruling is affirmed. The CA wrongly held Art. 21
of the New Civil Code, overlooking the SCs memorandum to support the
original draft of the Civil Code. Art. 21 refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage. It connotes
essentially the idea of deceit on the part of the seducer to which the woman
has yielded.

To constitute seduction, there must be in all cases some sufficient promise or

inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction. A mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a
recovery.

The parties were two people in love. Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. There only existed
voluntariness and mutual passion.

Hence, no case is made under Art. 21 of the New Civil Code. No error was
committed by the Court of First Instance.
FACTS TO PROVE ABUSE OF RIGHTS
SPS. MOISES and CLEMENCIA ANDRADA v. PILHINO SALES
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JOJO S. SAET
G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011
Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:
Based on Article 21 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil
Code, is part of the cause of action known in this jurisdiction as "abuse of
rights." The elements of abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty;
(b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.

FACTS:
The respondent Pilhino Sales Corporation sued Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife,
Maxima to recover a sum of money. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, which came to be implemented against two trucks owned by Jose
Andrada, Jr.

However, the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhino’s name due to its
having been already registered in the name of petitioner Moises Andrada.
Pilhino thus instituted an action in the RTC to annul the deed of sale between
Jose and Moises.

The RTC dismissed the case for all the respondents in that case, except for
the Spouses Moises and Clemencia. This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pilhino should be held liable for the damages the petitioners
sustained from Pilhino’s levy on execution upon the Hino truck?

RULING:
No. The petition lacks merit. The CA found that Pilhino had acted in good faith
in bringing Civil Case No. 21,898-93 to annul the deed of sale involving the
Hino truck executed by Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of Moises Andrada,
considering that Pilhino had “believed that the sale in favor of defendants-
appellants had been resorted to so that Jose Andrada might evade his
obligations.
Petitioner’s insistence that abuse of rights was not established requires the
consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed,
for an appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine factual
issues. In the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial. Perforce, the findings of
fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.
FACTS TO PROVE ABUSE OF RIGHTS
EUSEBIO GONZALES vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL BANK &
INTERNATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011.
Velasco, Jr., J

DOCTRINE:
Art. 19 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that "every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This is the basis
of the principle of abuse of right which, in turn, is based upon the maxim suum
jus summa injuria (the abuse of right is the greatest possible wrong).

In order for Art. 19 to be actionable, the following elements must be present:

"(1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith,
and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another." We find that
such elements are present in the instant case. The effectivity clause of the
COHLA is crystal clear that termination of the COH should be done only upon
prior notice served on the CLIENT.

FACTS:
Petitioner Eusebio Gonzales was a client of Philippine Commercial and
International Bank (PCIB) for 15 years. PCIB, through a Credit-On-Hand Loan
Agreement (COHLA), granted the credit line of Gonzales. Gonzales drew from
said credit line through the issuance of check. At the institution of the instant
case, Gonzales had a Foreign Currency Deposit (FCD) of USD8,715.72 with
PCIB. Gonzales and his wife obtained a loan for PhP 500,000.00.
Consequently, Spouses Panlilio and Spouses Gonzales obtained a loan with
PCIB in the amount of PhP 1,000,000.00 and PhP 300,000.00, respectively.
The three loans were covered by three promissory notes, and as a security,
the spouses Panlilio and spouses Gonzales executed a Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of PCIB. The promissory notes specified the solidary liability of both
parties. However, it was spouse Panlilio who received the loan of PhP
1,800,000.00. The monthly interests were paid by the spouses Panlilio, but
after some time, the spouses Panililio already failed to pay their loan.

In the meantime, Gonzales issued a check in favor of Rene Unson for PhP
250,000.00 drawn against the COHLA, but the check was dishonored due to
the termination of the COHLA, and the PCIB also froze the account of
Gonzales. Gonzales, through counsel, wrote PCIB insisting that the check he
issued had been fully funded, and demanded the return of the proceeds of his
FCD as well as damages for the unjust dishonor of the check. PCIB stood its
ground in freezing the account of Gonzales. Gonzales reminded PCIB that it
was the spouses Panlilio who benefited from the loans, but PCIB ignored
Gonzales’ contention. The refusal of PCIB prompted Gonzales to file a case
against PCIB with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC ruled in favor of
PCIB and held that the spouses Panlilio and spouses Gonzales were solidarily
liable on the three promissory notes. Hence, the termination of the COHLA
was just because of the outstanding loan. Also, the dishonor of check is also
proper given that the COHLA was already terminated. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto. CA held that the spouses Panlilio and spouses Gonzales were
indeed solidary debtors, and PCIB correctly dishonored the checks because it
was only exercising its rights under the contractual stipulations in the COHLA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PCIB acted in bad faith by dishonoring the check of petitioner?

RULING:
Yes. In the instant case, Gonzales suffered from the negligence and bad faith
of PCIB. From the testimonies of Gonzales’ witnesses, particularly those of
Dominador Santos and Freddy Gomez, the embarrassment and humiliation
Gonzales has to endure not only before his former close friend Unson but more
from the members and families of his friends and associates in the PCA, which
he continues to experience considering the confrontation he had with Unson
and the consequent loss of standing and credibility among them from the fact
of the apparent bouncing check he issued. Credit is very important to
businessmen and its loss or impairment needs to be recognized and
compensated.

Even in the absence of malice or bad faith, a depositor still has the right to
recover reasonable moral damages, if the depositor suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation. Although incapable of
pecuniary estimation, moral damages are certainly recoverable if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. The factual
antecedents bolstered by undisputed testimonies likewise show the mental
anguish and anxiety Gonzales had to endure with the threat of Unson to file a
suit. Gonzales had to pay Unson PhP 250,000, while his FCD account in PCIB
was frozen, prompting Gonzales to demand from PCIB and to file the instant
suit.
FACTS TO PROVE LIABILITY TO MORAL DAMAGES
CECILIO PE, ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
Bautista Angelo, J.

DOCTRINE:
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.

FACTS:
Defendant, Alfonso Pe was a married man and an agent of the La Perla Cigar
and Cigarette Factory, carried an illicit affair with Lolita Pe, who was
unmarried. The defendant was adopted by PeBeco, a collateral relative of
Lolita’s father. Given that the defendant had the same last name with Lolita
made them close and frequented her house to teach her how to pray the
rosary. Eventually both of them fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts
which eventually reached the ears of Lolita's parents. Defendant, a Chinese
national was filed with deportation by plaintiffs (Lolita’s parents and siblings)
but the affair continued nonetheless. Lolita disappeared but found a note with
the defendant’s handwriting.

Plaintiffs filed damages for causing injury in a manner contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy. The trial court considered their complaint not
actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that the defendant
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection, thus was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral,
good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair?

RULING:
Yes, the defendant is liable. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in
Article 21 of the Civil Code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of
Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita.
The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is
a married man.

Art. 21. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.”

In the case at bar, Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary
to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with
intent to injure. Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act
which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages. The decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby
sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against
appellee.
FACTS TO PROVE THE RULES IN EVIDENCE
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996
Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making them privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.

FACTS:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband
Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his
house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check,
greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her
Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her
husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s
Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress
and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence?

RULING:
No. Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or her.

The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by

making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.

The review for petition is denied for lack of merit.

FACTS TO PROVE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
MHP GARMENTS, INC., AND LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL
LUGATIMAN, AND GERTRUDES GONZALES
G.R. No. 86720 September 02, 1994
Puno, J.

DOCTRINE:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is
not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make
such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Precisely, the object of the Article is
to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States
this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

FACTS:
In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official
Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be
undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and
other scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received
information that private respondents were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de Guzman (“Larry”), an employee
of MHP, was then tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make
a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel,
and 2 other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the
stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. WITHOUT any warrant,
they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items and the items were
then turned over to MHP for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private
respondents but during its pendency, Larry exacted from respondent
Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be dropped from the complaint. However,
after the preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
complaint against all the private respondents and ordered the return of the
seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite
demands. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of
business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the seized items were
returned and the other items returned were of inferior quality.

Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and damages against
MHP and Larry. The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents which was
later on affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not imputing liability for damages to the petitioner who did not
effect the seizure of the subject merchandise is proper?

RULING:
No. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been
included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents'
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. Despite
the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods
of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages
in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at the bench, the search
and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry
de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts
items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the
same extent as the officers themselves.

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages
for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from a public officer or private
individual. The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or
criminal. It is NOT necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad
faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32
which is the effective protection of individual rights.
In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of
the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article
32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or
injury caused to the aggrieved party… it should nonetheless be made clear in
no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
FACTS TO PROVE VIOLATION OF CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., PERPETUA BESAS DE BERNALDES and
JOVITO BERNALDES, aided by NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., as Guardian-
ad-litem v. BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION, INC.
G.R. No. L-18193, February 27, 1963
Dizon, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil action
is based upon an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

This provision evidently refers to a civil action based, mostly on the act or
omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an
obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract. Upon the other
hand it is clear that a civil action based on the contractual liability of a common
carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted against the carrier or its
employee based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first is governed by
the provisions of the Civil Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code,
and it being entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, the same
may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the
result of the latter. (Visayan Land Transportation Co. vs. Mejia, et al., 99 Phil.,
50 ; 52 Off. Gaz. p. 4241).

FACTS:
In a complaint for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol by
appellants, the spouses Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. and Perpetua Besas and their
minor son, Jovito, against appellee, the Bohol Land Transportation Co., a
domestic corporation engaged in business as a common carrier in said
province, they alleged, in substance, that, in the afternoon of November 27,
1958, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's
passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of
Guindulman, Bohol, bound for Tagbilaran of the same province; that on the
way the bus fell off a deep precipice in bario Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-
Hernandez, of the said province, resulting in the death of Nicasio and in
serious physical injuries to Jovito.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds, namely
that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment and
that it did not state a cause of action for damages. Leonardo Balabag, driver
of the bus involved was acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been
established beyond reasonable doubt and that appellees, through Attys.
Amora and Tirol, intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve
the right to file a separate action for damages.

ISSUE:
Whether a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based
on breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action
instituted against the driver has been disposed of and the aggrieved party did
not reserve his right to enforce civil liability in a separation action?

RULING:
Yes. Article 31 of the Civil Code evidently refers to a civil action based, not on
the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one based
on an obligation arising from other sources such as law or contract.

The civil action instituted against the appellee in this case is based on alleged
culpa contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio
Bernaldes and his brother Jovito to their place of destination, whereas the
criminal action instituted against the appellee’s driver involved exclusively the
criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his criminal negligence
FACTS TO PROVE VIOLATION OF CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
ANITA TAN v. STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO., JULITO STO DOMINGO,
IGMIDIO RICO, and RURAL TRANSIT CO.
G.R. No. L-4160, July 29, 1952
Bautista Angelo, J.

DOCTRINE:
The case of the Rural Transit Co. is even more different as it is predicated on
a special provision of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, article 101, Rule 2, of
said Code provides:

"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and
in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules;

"Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion
to the benefit which they may have received."

FACTS:
On May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery of
1, 925 gallons of gasoline to the Rural Transit Company. The truck containing
the ordered gasoline was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped
Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground
tank, it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the
Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street he
abandoned the truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first
street causing the buildings on that side to be burned and destroyed. The
house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she spent
P12,000.

Anita Tan then brought the action against the Standard Vacuum Oil Company
and the Rural Transit Company; including the two employees, seeking to
recover the damages she has suffered for the destruction of her house.
Respondents filed separate motions to dismiss alleging in substance that (a)
plaintiff's action is barred by prior judgment (since Rico and Sto. Domingo had
been acquitted in a previous criminal charge of arson through reckless
imprudence before CFI Manila) and (b) plaintiff's complaint states no cause of
action; and this motion having been sustained, plaintiff elevated the case to
this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Anita Tan may recover damages from respondents?

RULING:
Yes, she can recover damages against the two companies but not to the two
accused .

The rule is that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not
necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Here it is true that Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were acquitted, the
court holding that they were not responsible for the fire that destroyed the
house of the plaintiff,—which as a rule will not necessarily extinguish their civil
liability,—but the court went further by stating that the evidence throws no
light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the
accused cannot be held responsible. In our opinion, this declaration fits well
into the exception of the rule which exempts the two accused from civil
liability. When the court acquitted the accused because the fire was due to an
unfortunate accident it actually said that the fire was due to a fortuitous event
for which the accused are not to blame. It actually exonerated them from civil
liability.

But the case takes a different aspect with respect to the other defendants. For
one thing, the principle of res judicata cannot apply to them for the simple
reason that they were not included as co-accused in the criminal case.

FACTS TO PROVE VIOLATION OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE v. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ
GR No. 129282, Nov 29, 2001
Pardo, J.

DOCTRINE:
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."

FACTS:
A case for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to
account to priv respondent Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Villegas
entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-
ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, Villegas filed a
complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of
money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same
transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the
following grounds:(1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37,
arising from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a
certification against forum shopping.

The trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case but after an MR
by Villegas, the case was reinstated.

ISSUE:
Whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for
estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action?

RULING:
Yes. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This is the
law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an
offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and
indemnification of consequential damages.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission, the rule has been changed.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to in the Rules of Court refer
only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a
reservation. (See Rule 111, Section 3)

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to

independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no
vested rights in the rules of procedure.

Thus, the Civil Case, an independent civil action for damages on account of
the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its
filing.

FACTS TO PROVE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC. vs.
MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA
G.R. No. 130362, September 10, 2001
Quisumbing, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance
of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), we held that Article
33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability.
It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary
civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful
act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its
subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

FACTS:
Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and
commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner
International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. (IFFI). The general managers
reported directly to Hernan Costa, the appointed managing director. Costa
and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general
managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their
services. They signed a “Release Waiver and Quitclaim”. That same time,
Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which described respondents as
“persona non grata” and urged the employees not to have further dealings
with them. Two Information were filed against Costa for the criminal charge
of libel. In addition, respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa
and Petitioner Corporation (IFFI), in its subsidiary capacity as employer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based
on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner’s
employee?
RULING:
No. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of
defamation, the injured party may bring a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action. Such civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance
of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court held that
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil
liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its
subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of
the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based
on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.
FACTS TO PROVE VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA,
G.R. No. 102207., September 2, 1994
Romero, J.

DOCTRINE:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in
part: How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the

pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is

plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

FACTS:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually
convicted on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction the accused died. The findings of the National
Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.

The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment
on Bayotas’ civil liability arising from the crime. In the Solicitor General’s
comment, the civil liability hasn’t yet expired. The solicitor general based its
judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-
appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment
the criminal and civil liability shall be extinguished.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil
liability?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the
Supreme Court, the controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code. The provision states that death extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the
case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action against
the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as
instituted in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the
criminal case then it follows that the death dissolves both civil and criminal
liability.

The Solicitor General’s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced.

What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising
from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say
that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil liability arising from
delict only.
FACTS TO PROVE VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN
FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENT
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO,
JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, JUAN SAMSON
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
Aquino, J

DOCTRINE:
The rule, if a person had in his possession a falsified document and made use
of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption
is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if
the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time
with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity
of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and
therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People
vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs.
Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

FACTS:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's
theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of
Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a
lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the
provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers
in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund for P57,048.23.

The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts: upper part, to be
signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's
representative; middle part; Paragraph 1, by the creditor; Paragraph 2, by
the provincial engineer; Paragraph 3, by the provincial treasurer; Paragraph
4, by the auditor; Paragraph 5, by the provincial treasurer. In the instant cases
paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the
purchase of materials for public works projects. And following paragraph 5, is
the receipt of the signed by the creditor. According to the prosecution, Samson
also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words:
"Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
The lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and
Samson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official
documents. Thus, Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court. However,
Sendaydiego died; hence, his appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed.
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered
by the CFI, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate
action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the

deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article
30 of the Civil Code and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform
this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly
appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted
for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned
(Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

ISSUE:
Whether or not several falsification and malversation are separate offenses
and thus constitute six separate or distinct offenses?

RULING:
Yes. The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate
crimes of falsification and malversation were committed. These are not cases
where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies
or where the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It
is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the
malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses

In the instant cases, the province, as the custodian of the money forming part
of the road and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without
falsifying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent
detection of the malversation. The falsifications cannot be regarded as
constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse. The
falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct offenses.

And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a

separate crime of malversation. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of
the said twelve offenses. As already stated, he is presumed to be the author
of the falsification because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and
he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.

The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.
FACTS TO PROVE CIVIL LIABILITY (LIBEL)
JOSELITO VILLEGAS and DOMINGA VILLEGAS v. COURT OF APPEALS
and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
G.R. No. 129977. February 1, 2001.
Quisumbing, J.

DOCTRINE:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore

FACTS:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V.
Raquiza against then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly
imputed to him acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Senate Committee on Public Works (the Committee) observed
that all the allegations in the complaint were based mainly on the
uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility
turned out to be highly questionable. Villegas also failed to submit the original
copies of his documentary evidence. Thus, after thorough investigation,
Raquiza was cleared of all charges by the Committee. All these acts of political
grandstanding received extensive media coverage.

On July 25, 1969, an information for libel was filed against Villegas who denied
the charge. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the United States
where he stayed until his death on November 16, 1984. Nevertheless, trial
proceeded on absentia by the time of his death in 1984, the prosecution had
already rested its case Two months after notice of his death, the court issued
an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to
resolve its civil aspect.

Judge Obien rendered judgment he dismissal of the criminal case against

Antonio J. Vlllegas, on account of his death on November 16, 1984. is hereby
reiterated. He ordered the estate of Antonio J. Villegas, represented herein by
his legal heirs, namely: Lydia A Villegas, Ma. Teresita Villegas, Antonio
Villegas, Jr., Ma. Antoniette Villegas, and Ma. Lydia Villegas (sic), to pay
plaintiff Antonio V. Raquiza Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00); CA
rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment modified only with
respect to the award of damages which was reduced to P2 million.

In their petition (G.R. No. 82562), the Heirs once again raise the very same
issues brought before the Court of Appeals, albeit reworded. On the other
hand, petitioner Requiza (G.R. No. 82592) questions the extensions of time to
file appellant's brief granted by the appellate court to the Heirs, as well as the
drastic reduction in the award of damages.

It is immediately apparent that the focal issue in these petitions is the effect
of the death of Villegas before the case was decided by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Did the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish his liability?

RULING:
No. Referring to rule in People vs Bayotas The source of Villegas' civil liability
in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly committed. Yet,
this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 9
in relation to Article 1157 of the Civil Code. If the Court ruled in Bayotas that
the death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not
only his criminal but also his civil liability unless the latter can be predicated
on a source of obligation other than the act or omission complained of, with
more reason should it apply to the case at bar where the accused died shortly
after the prosecution had rested its case and before he was able to submit his
memorandum and all this before any decision could even be reached by the
trial court.

The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accused's

civil liability dependent on two factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a
separate civil action and that it be made subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended. Obviously, in the case at the
bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no
waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same,
nor was it instituted prior to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of
the private offended party in a criminal case such as this which must be
dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine, where the civil action was
impliedly instituted with it?

The answer is likewise provided in Bayatas, thus: Assuming that for lack of
express reservation, Belamala's civil for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were
terminated without finals adjudication the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately

Hence, logically, the court a quo should have dismissed both actions against
Vilegas which dismissal will not, however, bar Raquiza as the private offended
party from pursuing his claim for damages against the executor or
administrator of the former's estate, notwithstanding the fact that he did not
reserve the right to institute a civil separate civil action based on Article 33 of
the Civil Code.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY UPON DEATH OF THE
ACCUSED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
Romero, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon (civil liability
ex delicto). As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensor strictiore. In this case, the civil liability
of Bayotas was also extinguished because it is based solely on the criminal
act he committed (civil liability ex delicto).

Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually
convicted on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction the accused died. The findings of the
National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992. The
Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its
comment on Bayotas’ civil liability arising from the crime. In the Solicitor
General’s comment the civil liability hasn’t yet expired. The solicitor general
based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of
the accused-appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after
final judgment the criminal and civil liability shall be extinguished.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil
liability.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme
Court, the controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The
provision states that death extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at
bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action against the
accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted
in the criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal
case then it follows that the death dissolves both civil and criminal liability.

The Solicitor General’s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced.

What was contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising
from other sources of obligation other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say
that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil liability arising from
delict only.
RULES WITH RESPECT TO RECOVERY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING
FROM CRIME AND OTHER SOURCES
Mansion Biscuit Corp vs CA
G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995
Kapunan, J.:

DOCTRINE:

As a sidelight, we would like to reiterate our ruling in People v. Bayotas,

where we summarized the rules with respect to recovery of civil liability
arising from crime and other sources, to wit: 1. Death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b)
Contracts; c) Quasicontracts; e) Quasi-delicts. 3. Where the civil liability
survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefore
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1984 Rules on Criminal Procedures as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid an apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.

In the case at bench, the Mansion Biscuit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and
civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of
the checks in question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may be
awarded.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers

Corporation, ordered numerous canons of nutria-wafer biscuits from Mansion
Biscuit Corporation, before the delivery of the goods on November 12, 1981,
Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion Biscuit Corp.,
four postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutria-wafer
biscuits. Four other postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each
were issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the
same year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp. delivered the goods. When
the first four checks were deposited, they were all dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Ang Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor
and requested him to replace the checks with good cash or good checks. Ty
Teck Suan failed to heed said request. Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered
a total of 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits plus cash
advance by Suan and the amount paid was applied as payment for the first
post dated check. Hong sent Suan a formal demand letter requesting the
latter to make good the value of the remaining dishonored checks within five
days from the receipt thereof. Thereafter, the second batch of checks were
issued by Suan and Gui but were all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit
Corporation filed a case against Suan and Gui for violation of Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks were
issued merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with the
complaint.

RULING:

The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject

to these two criminal cases, and their subsequent dishonor, cannot be
considered in violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one
important element of the offense is missing: that the check is made or
drawn and issued to apply on account or for value and because these were
issued to guarantee the fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by
complaint when accused Suan would place orders. Accused are hereby
declared not guilty of the offense charged.
CIVIL LIABILITY OF A PARENT
Elcano and Elcano v. Hill and Hill
G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA
Barredo, J.:

DOCTRINE:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

FACTS:

Reginal Hill was married and a minor who was then still living in care of his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill. Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing
Agapito Elcano. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not
criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes. The father
of Agapito Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his father
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued
that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and
that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact
that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious liability being the father of a
minor child who committed a tort?

RULING:

The law clearly stated that parental authority is terminated upon

emancipation of the child according to Title X of Family Code; Emancipation
and Age of Majority, emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor.
However, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although
married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART
2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill –
the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of
age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
FACTS WHICH MUST SHOWN TO PROVE RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
Padua vs Robles
66 SCRA 485, August 29, 1975
Castro, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Civil liability in negligence cases; Option of offended party to file action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal or action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana; Prohibition against recovery of damages
twice for the same negligent act or omission. —Civil liability coexists with
criminal responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs)
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on
culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil
Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal
section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted
with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate
application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however,
precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.

Facts:

The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless
imprudence filed to driver Romeo Punzalan and defendants - appellees as
subsidiary liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely (1) the
civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising
from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana.

Issue:

Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate
and independent liabilities.
RULING:

It is by now settled beyond all cavill as to dispense with the citation of

jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives
rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil
liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from
civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault
are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in
exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be
prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article
2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying
amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been
ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount
adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess
over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger
amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case.
Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced
to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent
criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.
CIVIL ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES BASED ON QUASIDELICT
NEMESIO AZUCENA vs. SEVERINO POTENCIANO & LAGUNA
TRANSPORTATION CO.
GR L-14028 June 30, 1962
J. Makalintal.:

DOCTRINE:

A civil action to recover damages on the theory of quasidelict may proceed

although the defendant therein was acquitted in the criminal case, because,
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code, the civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case. To subordinate the civil action
contemplated in said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31 that such action "may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

FACTS:

An action for damages which was allegedly sustained, as a result of a

collision between Azucena's scooter and a bus of appellee Laguna Trans. Co,
then driven by its co-appellee Severino Potenciano. Negligence is imputed to
the driver, and to the company itself with respect to the choice and
supervision of its employees. The allegations send to make out a case of
quasi-delict, or culpa aquiliana, under Arts2176 & 2180, CC. Complaint was
filed. Defendants answered, with a counterclaim also for damages. They filed
a supplemental pleading with a prayer for dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that in the criminal action against Severino Potenciano for serious
physical injuries with damage to property through reckless imprudence,
involving the same accident which gave rise to the civil action, the accused
was acquitted in CFI Laguna. Since the acquittal of the accused was based
on a finding that he did not act recklessly or negligently the judgment in the
criminal case is a bar to the civil action. Reliance is placed squarely on Rule
107, which provides,
inter alia, that when a criminal action is instituted the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it, and that the extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact front which the civil might arise
did not exist.

ISSUE:

Which law should govern: Rule 107, a general rule, or specific provisions of
Articles 31, 33 and2177, CC:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

RULING:

Order appealed from set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of
origin. Costs against defendants Appellees contend that the civil action
referred to in Article 33 of the Civil Code is that which arises ex delicto, or
from the commission of the offense involving defamation, fraud or physical
injuries, and consequently, pursuant to Rule 107, section 1 (a), the right to
file it must be expressly reserved in the criminal action if it is to prosper at
all. The contention is erroneous.
Bacharach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Gamboa. It presupposes that there must first
be a conviction for the crime, for without conviction there can be no offense
to speak of from which civil liability could arise. Article 33 contemplates a
civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the
purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason why only a
preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is
deemed sufficient.
LIABILITY OF OFFENDER FOR DAMAGES
Roa vs. De la Cruz
107 Phil 8, February 13, 1960
Gutierrez David, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Art. 33. In case of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 1225 of the court below, Segunda de la Cruz, one of
the defendants, was charged with serious oral defamation. The offended
party, herein plaintiff Maria C. Roa, did not waive the civil action or reserve
her right to institute it, but intervened through counsel in the prosecution of
the offense. After trial, the court on April 30, 1957 rendered a decision
finding the defendant Segunda de la Cruz guilty of slight slander and
sentencing her to pay a fine of P50.00. It, likewise, ordered her to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs, but made no
award as to damages.

About a month later, or on May 28, 1957, the offended party Maria C. Roa
filed the present action in the same court below against Segunda de la Cruz
and her husband Juan Aguas to recover moral and exemplary damages. The
cause of action was based on the defamatory remarks which were the
subject matter of the criminal action against Segunda de la Cruz. The
aggregate amount sought to be recovered, including attorney's fees, was
P28,000.00

Instead of filing an answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the

complaint on the grounds that it was barred by prior judgment and that it
did not state a cause of action. Sustaining the motion on the first ground,
the court below dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff in due time filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can file a separate action for damages

RULING:

In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby

affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

There is no question that in defamation cases (such as the present) as in

cases of fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured
party, and such action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence (Art. 33,
New Civil Code). In such cases, the injured party need not make a
reservation in the criminal case for the filing of the civil action for damages,
for the Civil Code already grants or reserves to him that right, so that his
failure to reserve such right in the criminal case does not bar him from filing
a separate civil action for damages (Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113;
Garcia v. Flerido, 52 SCRA 420). This is true even if Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of
the former Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Revised Rules of Court (the
rule applicable herein) required a reservation in the criminal case, because
the Civil Code does not require such reservation, and the Rules of Court,
being merely procedural, cannot amend the Civil Code which is substantive
in nature (Mendoza v. Arrieta and Garcia v. Flerido, supra).
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND FOREIGN LAW
Menandro B. Laureano vs. Court of Appeals and Singapore Airlines
Limited
324 SCRA 414, February 2, 2000
Quisumbing, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has the burden of
proof, and where said party has failed to discharge the burden, Philippine
law applies. —At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on
the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
“Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant’s failure to show
which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the
applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be
applied.”

FACTS:

In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of Flight Operations

and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with the defendant
company through its Area Manager in Manila. Plaintiff’s appointment was
confirmed effective July 21, 1979. On the said date, the defendant also
offered the plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years
effective January 21, 1979 to January 20,1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter
accepted.

Sometime in 1982, defendants initiated cost-cutting measures due to

recession. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found
in excess of the defendant’s requirements. Defendant informed its expatriate
pilots including the plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take
advance leaves. It did not however immediately terminate A-300 pilots. It
reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet.
Among the 17 Airbus pilots reviewed, 12 were found qualified.
Unfortunately, the plaintiff was not one of the 12. On October 5, 1982,
defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982
and that he will be paid three (3) months’ salary in lieu of three months’
notice but defendant gave only two (2) months’ notice and one (1) month
salary.

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds since the plaintiff was employed in
Singapore and all other aspects of his employment contract were executed
in Singapore, therefore, Singapore laws should apply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not art.3 of the civil code is applicable in the case bar.

RULING:

Yes, the parties are charged with full knowledge of the existing laws at the
time they entered into a contract and at the time it is to be operative –and,
a person is presumed to be more knowledgeable about his own state law
than his alien or foreign contemporary.

All these considered, the supreme court found sufficient factual and legal
basis to conclude that petitioner’s unlawful termination was for an authorized
cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard by
respondent company.
PHILIPPINE COURT JURISDICTION

Manila Hotel vs NLRC

343 SCRA 1, October 13, 2000
Pardo, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction

over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.

FACTS:

In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June

1988, he was recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay
and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotel’s job offer and so he started
working there in November 1988. The employment contract between him
and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel
notified Santos that he would be laid off due to business reverses. In
September 1989, he was officially terminated.

In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against

Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL).
The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC
is a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a
foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace
Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of Santos. The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:

1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that
Santos is a Filipino;

2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations –

MHC cannot be held liable because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has
no direct business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of
corporate fiction can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC
is directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate
entities.

3. Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the
Philippines;

4. Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention of the

POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction
because it will be the POEA which will hear the case);

5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the
Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents of the Philippines;

Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the
relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not competent to determine
the facts because the acts complained of happened outside our
jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a
judgment is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel
(in the first place, it was not served any summons).

The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non
conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over
the case if it chooses to do so provided:
 (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;

(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent

decision as to the law and the facts; and

(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to

enforce its decision.

None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at the bar.
OPERATIVE ACT
Millarosa vs Carmel Dev Inc.
GR 194538, Nov 27, 2013
Sereno, CJ.:

DOCTRINE:

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds

possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee
or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Here, possession by
a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by the other party on
account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the
possession became illegal when the other party demanded that the
possessor vacate the subject property because of the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the possessor
refused to heed the demand.

FACTS:

Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a

Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo,
Caloocan City.

As a consequence of Tuason, the respondent made several oral demands on

the petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail. A written demand
letter which was sent sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.

On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer

before the MeTC. After due hearing on 9 November 2007, the trial court
rendered a Decision

Petitioner alleges that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because respondent had filed the Complaint beyond the one-year
prescriptive period for ejectment cases

In this case, the petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened
by reliance on an invalid law.
Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit
allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing
petitioner to occupy the... same. However, this Affidavit was executed only
sometime in 1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was
promulgated. At the time petitioner built the structures on the premises, he
ought to have been... aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and
the subsequent unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These circumstances
necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact doctrine.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case;

Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite petitioner not being a
party to the case; and

Whether or not the petitioner is a builder in good faith.

RULING:

The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being one of unlawful
detainer. Petitioner argues that respondent has no cause of action against
him, because under the doctrine of operative fact and the doctrine of res
inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt, petitioner should not
be prejudiced by Tuason; the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D.
293 should not affect the rights of other persons not party to the case.

While petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is
binding on him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of
the nature of an in rem proceeding.
DECISIONS THAT CONSTITUTES JURISPRUDENCE

Miranda vs Imperial,
77 Phil 1066, Febrero 28, 1947
Briones, M.:

DOCTRINE:

Decisions of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for inferior courts
on points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision, and a ruling of
the Court of Appeals may become a doctrine.

FACTS:

Defendants Feliciano and Juana Imperial borrowed from plaintiff Miranda the
amount of P1,000; that in consideration of this debt and to guarantee
payment they executed verbal antichrists in favor of the latter. In an action
filed by Miranda against Imperial, the lower court in deciding based its
finding in the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeals in the case of
Santa Rosa vs. Noble. Obtaining a negative judgment, appellant has brought
the present appeal claiming that the court erred in applying the case of
Santa Rosa vs. Noble alleging that cases decided by the court of appeals
does not constitute precedent and hence may not be applied in deciding
cases.

ISSUE:

Whether the decisions of the Court of Appeals constitute precedents.

RULING:

Only the decisions of the Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines

in the jurisdiction. However, this does not prevent that a conclusion or
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals which covers a point of law still
undecided in our jurisprudence may serve as juridical guide to the inferior
courts, and that such conclusion or pronouncement be raised as a doctrine
if, after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis and revision,
this Supreme Court should find that it has merits and qualities sufficient for
its consecration as a rule of jurisprudence.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGEMENTS
BPI vs Guevara
GR #167052, March 11, 2015
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

DOCTRINE:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a

judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

FACTS:

Respondent, as a president of a stock brokerage firm PHILSEC (owned by

Ayala International Finance), was tasked to resolve the outstanding loans of
Ventura Ducat. The debtor proposed to settle his debts by an exchange of
his assets. It was agreed that his property in Harris County, Texas, which
was believed to be around $2.9 mil, will be the object of the exchange.
William Craig, a former owner of the property was the one who conducted
the appraisal of its fair market value which he estimated to be $3.365 mil.
The agreement was executed in Makati, Philippines; however, the ATHONA
holdings had difficulty selling the property because the actual price is lower
than expected. Due to that, ATHONA did not pay the balance of the purchase
price for the property and PHILSEC and AIFL refused to release Ducat’s stock
portfolio, claiming that they were defrauded into believing the appraised
value. 1488, Inc. before the U.S. District Court sued PHILSEC, AIFL, and
ATHONA while the latter group filed counterclaims against 1488, Inc., Daic,
Craig, Ducat, and respondent seeking to recover damages and excess
payment, or the rescission of sale. The U.S. District Court dropped
respondent as a counter-defendant for lack of evidence. Respondent then
moved to sanction petitioner (PHILSEC, now BPI Securities Corp. – the
petitioner) based on Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
the said case, the Court concluded that the counterclaims against
respondent are frivolous and brought against him simply to humiliate and
embarrass him, thus directing PHILSEC and AILF to pay $49,450. Upon
appeal, The U.S. Court of Appeals found no basis of fraud, thus dismissing
the claim, but vacated the award of Rule 11 sanctions in favor of respondent
for being rendered without due process, and remanded such issue to the
U.S. District Court. However, the U.S. District Court reinstated its previous
judgment on the ground that the basis of the original suit was unfounded.
Still, petitioner continued to refuse compliance with the order of the U.S.
District Court and this prompted respondent to file an action for enforcement
in the RTC of Makati. The same allegations were presented by petitioner,
that the U.S District court rendered a decision upon a clear mistake of law or
fact and in violation of its right to due process. The RTC favored the
respondent which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the U.S. District Court is unenforceable in

Philippine Jurisdiction on the ground that it committed a clear mistake of law
and fact.

RULING:

Foreign decisions are enforceable in Philippine Jurisdiction by virtue of

general accepted principles of international law and the incorporations clause
of the Constitution even though there is no procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, the Supreme Court provides for its rules in Section 48,
Rule 39 Rules of Court stating that in case of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render it: upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title; while, if against a person, it is a
presumptive evidence of a right between the parties. In either case, the
judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. The rules are silent to
what initiatory procedure must be undertaken but there is no question that a
civil action is an appropriate measure since it is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, and clearly an action to
enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right rescinding
either from a “conclusive judgment upon title” or the “presumptive evidence
of a right.”

However, due to the policy of preclusion, Philippine courts cannot substitute

their own judgment to what was rendered under the jurisdiction of another
state. Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
and can only be repelled by them on grounds external to its merits. Since
the fact of the foreign final order in this case is not disputed, the
presumptive validity of the order by the U.S. District Court stands
enforceable. Any purported mistake petitioner attributes to the U.S. District
Court in the latter’s issuance of the Order would merely constitute an error
of judgment in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction, which could have
been corrected by a timely appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages
Fujiki vs Marinay,
GR #196049, June 26, 2013
Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A Petition for Recognition of a Foreign Judgment is not an action to nullify a

marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectiveness
of a foreign judgment on a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact
that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Thus, upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as
the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with the petitioner's parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).

Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to

recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULINGS:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-
10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment
in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of
a party or a particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file a petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. There is no
doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural

safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize
the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to

substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.
RESCISSION OF AGREEMENT
G.G. Sportswear vs World Class Properties
614 SCRA 75, March 20, 2013
Sereno, CJ.:

DOCTRINE:

The absence of the certificate of registration and license to sell no longer

existed at the time of the filing of the complaint and could no longer be used
as basis to demand rescission.

FACTS:

World Class is the owner/developer of Global Business, an office

condominium project located on Julia Vargas Avenue and Jade Drive, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City slated for completion on December 15, 1998.GG
Sportswear, a domestic corporation, offered to purchase the 38th floor
penthouse unit and 16 parking slots for 32 cars in World Class's
condominium project for the discounted, pre-selling price of P89,624,272.82.
After GG Sportswear paid the P500,000.00 reservation fee, the parties, on
May 15, 1996, signed a Reservation Agreement (Agreement) that provides
for the schedule of payments, including the stipulated monthly installments
on the down payment and the balance on the purchase price. Based on the
Agreement, the contract to sell pertaining to the entire 38th floor Penthouse
unit and the parking slots would be executed upon the payment of thirty
percent (30%) of the total purchase price. It also stipulated that all its
provisions would be deemed incorporated in the contract to sell and other
documents to be executed by the parties thereafter. The Agreement also
specified that the failure of the buyer to pay any of the installments on the
stipulated date would give the developer the right either to: (1) charge 3%
interest per month on all unpaid receivables, or (2) rescind and cancel the
Agreement without the need of any court action and, upon cancellation,
automatically forfeit the reservation fee and other payments made by the
buyer. From May to December 1996, GG Sportswear timely paid the
installments due; the eight monthly installment payments amounted to a
total of P19,717,339.50, or 21% of the total contract price. In a letter dated
January 30, 1997, GG Sportswear requested the return of the outstanding
postdated checks it previously delivered to World Class because it (GG
Sportswear) intended to

replace these old checks with new ones from the corporation’s new bank.
World Class acceded, but suggested the execution of a new Reservation
Agreement to reflect the arrangement involving the replacement checks,
with the retention of the other terms and conditions of the old Agreement.
GGSportswear did not object to the execution of a new Reservation
Agreement, but requested that World Class defer the deposit of the
replacement checks for 90 days. World Class denied this request, contending
that a deferment would delay the subsequent monthly installment payments.
It likewise demanded that GG Sportswear immediately pay its overdue
January 1997 installment to avoid the penalties provided in the Agreement.
On March 5, 1997, GG Sportswear delivered the replacement checks and
paid the January1997 installment payment which had been delayed by two
months. World Class in turn issued second

Reservation Agreement, which it transmitted to GG Sportswear for the

latter’s conformity.

World Class also sent GG Sportswear a provisional Contract to Sell, which

stated that the condominium project would be ready for turnover to the
buyer not later than December 15, 1998.GG Sportswear did not sign the
second Reservation Agreement. Instead, it sent a letter to World-class,
requesting that its check dated April 24, 1997 be deposited on May 15, 1997
because it was experiencing financial difficulties. When World Class rejected
GG Sportswear’s request, GG Sportswear sent another letter informing
World Class that the second Reservation Agreement was incomplete because
it did not expressly provide the time of completion of the condominium unit.
World Class countered that the provisional Contract to Sell it previously
submitted to GGSportswear expressly provided for the completion date
(December 15, 1998) and insisted that GGSportswear pay its overdue
account.
On June 10, 1997, GG Sportswear filed a Complaint with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) claiming a refund of the installment
payments made to World Class because it was dissatisfied with the
completion date found in the Contract to Sell. In its Answer, World Class
countered that: (1) it is not guilty of breach of contract since it is the
petitioner that committed a breach; (2) the complaint is an afterthought
since GG Sportswear is suffering from financial difficulties; (3) the
petitioner’s dissatisfaction with the expected date of completion of the unit
as indicated in the proposed Contract to Sell is not a valid and sufficient
ground for refund; (4) a refund is justified only in cases where the
owner/developer fails to develop the project within the specified period of
time under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, which period has not yet
arrived; and (5) the petitioner was already in default when it filed the
complaint and therefore came to court with unclean hands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Agreement can be rescinded.

RULING:

No. The Board’s pronouncement in its January 31, 2006 decision –

that the Agreement could no longer be rescinded because the CR/LS had
already been issued at the time the complaint was filed - cannot be
considered a mere obiter dictum because it touched upon a matter squarely
raised by World Class in its petition for review, specifically, the issue of
whether GG Sportswear was entitled to a refund on the ground that it did
not have a CR/LS at the time the parties entered into the Agreement.

With this ruling, the Board reversed the Arbiter’s ruling on this particular
issue, expressly stating that "the absence of the certificate of registration
and license to sell no longer existed at the time of the filing of the complaint
and could no longer be used as basis to demand rescission." This ruling
become final when GG Sportswear chose not to file an appeal with the OP.
Thus, even if the Board ultimately awarded a refund to GG Sportswear based
entirely on another ground, the Board’s ruling on the non-resistible character
of the Agreement is binding on the parties. Consequently, the OP had no
jurisdiction to revert to the Arbiter’s earlier declaration that the Agreement
was void due to World Class’s lack of a CR/LS, a finding that clearly
contradicted the Board’s final and executory ruling.

There was no breach on the part of World Class to justify the rescission and
refund. GG Sportswear has no legal basis to demand either the rescission of
the Agreement or the refund of payments it made to World Class under the
Agreement. Unless the parties stipulated it, rescission is allowed only when
the breach of the contract is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of
the obligation. Whether the breach is slight or substantial is largely
determined by the attendant circumstances. In the first place, GG
Sportswear cannot claim that it did not know the time-frame for the
project’s completion when it entered into the Agreement with World Class.
As World Class points out, it is absurd and unbelievable that Mr. Gidwani,
the president of GG Sportswear and an experienced businessman, did not
have an idea of the expected completion date of the condominium project
before he bought the condominium units for P89,624,272.82. Even assuming
that GG Sportswear was not aware of the exact completion date, we note
that GG Sportswear signed the Agreement despite the Agreement’s omission
to expressly state a specific completion date. This directly implies that a
specific completion date was not a material consideration for GG Sportswear
when it executed the Agreement. Thus, even if we believe GG Sportswear’s
contention that it was dissatisfied with the completion date subsequently
indicated in the provisional Contract to Sell, we cannot consider this
dissatisfaction a breach so substantial as to render the Agreement resistible.
The grant, too, to World Class of a first License to Sell up to August 1998
and a second License to Sell.

Significantly, World Class completed the project in August 1999, or within

the time period granted by the HLURB for the completion of the
condominium project under the second License to Sell. This completion,
undertaken while the case was pending before the Arbiter, rendered the
issue of World Class’s failure to develop the condominium project moot and
academic. As a side note, we observe that GG Sportswear, not World Class,
substantially breached its obligations under the Agreement when it was
remiss in the timely payment of its obligations, such that its January 1997
installment was paid only in March 1997, or two months after due date.
Sportswear did not pay the succeeding installment dated April 1997
(presumably for February1997) until it had filed its complaint in June 1997.
A substantial breach of a reciprocal obligation, like failure to pay the price in
the manner prescribed by the contract, entitles the injured party to rescind
the obligation. Under this contractual term, it was World Class, not GG
Sportswear, which had the ground to demand the rescission of the
Agreement, as well as the prerogative to secure the forfeiture of all the
payments already made by GG Sportswear. However, whether the
Agreement between World Class and Sportswear should now be rescinded is
a question we do not decide, as this is not a matter before us.
STATE’S OWNERSHIP OVER PUBLIC AND ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
347 SCRA 138, Dec. 6, 2000
Cruz, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Regalian Doctrine (Art. XII, Sec. 2 relate with Art. XII, Sec. 5 and Art. II,
Sec. 22) Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources

by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on
real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources. The Congress may provide for
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Article XII)

Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and

national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being. (Article XII)

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development. (Article II)

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

RULING:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining

the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization
of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO ASK FOR COMPENSATION
PNB vs Palma
466 SCRA 307, AUGUST 9, 2005
Panganiban, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Stare Decisis

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6758 (R.A. 6758), otherwise known as 'An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government
and for Other Purposes,' took effect on 1 July 1989. Section 12 thereof
provides for the consolidation of allowances... and additional compensation
into standardized salary rates, but certain additional compensation was
exempted from consolidation.

The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate

Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to implement R.A. 6758.
Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 enumerated the other allowances/fringe
benefits which are not likewise integrated into the basic salary rates...
prescribed under R.A. 6758, but were allowed to be continued only for
incumbents as of 30 June 1989.

The appellate court ruled that respondents were entitled to the questioned
benefits. Petitioner invokes the doctrine of stare decisis, arguing that the
proper interpretation of Section 12 of RA 6758 was already settled with
finality in Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, Manila International Airport
Authority v. COA, Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, and
Social Security System v. COA. It further argues that the CA improvidently
applied Cruz v. COA to the present case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are legally entitled to the questioned fringe
benefits.

RULING:

The doctrine "Stare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled)" is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence.
Once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier
controversy.

This Court has consistently held in those cases that allowances or fringe
benefits, whether or not integrated into the standardized salaries prescribed
by RA 6758, should continue to be enjoyed by employees who (1) were
incumbents and (2) were receiving those... benefits as of July 1, 1989.

In the present case, the payment of benefits to employees hired after July
1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated that those
benefits... should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying
them before its enactment.

Under Section 12 of RA 6758, additional compensation already being

received by the employees of petitioner, but not integrated into the
standardized salary rates enumerated in Section 5.5 of DBM-CC No. 10, like
"rice subsidy, sugar subsidy, death benefits other than those granted by the
GSIS," and so on shall continue to be given.

However, the continuation of the grant shall be available only to those

"incumbents" already receiving it on July 1, 1989. Thus, in PPA v. COA, this
Court held that PPA employees already receiving the RATA granted by LOI
No. 97 should continue to receive them, provided they were already
"incumbents" on or before July 1, 1989.
Principle of Abuse of Right
TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA,
Respondent
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
Ponente: Abad, J.

DOCTRINE:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person
must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be
liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.

FACTS:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right
committed by a superior public officer in preventing a subordinate from doing
her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the

Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, tendered
her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001. But five months
later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed
security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her
superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera to

respondent Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed
a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus
B. Villanueva then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and
Valera with the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a TRO, enjoining Villanueva and
the Finance Secretary from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August
28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the

injunction order before the Court of Appeals. The CA issued its own TRO,
enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed
after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.

While the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force,
petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001,
authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy
Commissioner.

Respondent filed an action for damages against the petitioner Villanueva

alleging that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy
Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave
applications. The RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating
that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and incurred no omission that
entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally
replaced her as Deputy Commissioner.

The CA reversed the RTCs decision, citing the abuse of rights principle, it held
that Villanueva acted maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from
performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her
official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages

to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the
RTC issued in the quo warranto case?

RULING:

No. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He
would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.
Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 f the Civil Code which
grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of
right or duty.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to
spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.
His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an
honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and
prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said in
Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez, a party’s refusal to abide by a court order
enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and
an unlawful exercise of right.
The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such
damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the
immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish in the cases specified in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.
THREE ELEMENT MUST BE PRESENT TO PROVE ABUSE OF RIGHTS
PETROPHIL CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. AMANDA
TERNIDA-CRUZ, JESSIE DE VERA, MARCIAL MULIG, ANTONIO
CUENCA, and RUFINO CUENCA
G.R. No. 122796 December 10, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:
There is abuse of a right under Article 19 if the following elements are
present: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith;
3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another BPI Express Card
Corporation vs. CA, 296 SCRA 260, 272 (1998)

FACTS:
Petitioner’s appeal is to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 26, 1995 which affirmed the ruling of Regional Trial
Court of Manila dated May 29, 1991 with the following cases: 1. In Civil Case
No. 87-40830 for preliminary injunction and In Civil Case NO. 88-43949 for
damages.

On December 27, 1970, petitioner Petrophil Corporation (Petrophil) entered

into contract with private respondent Dr. Amanda Ternida-Cruz, allowing the
latter to haul and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of
Petrophil. The contract provided that Petrophil could terminate the contract
for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance
or abandonment. Paragraph 11 of the contract also stipulated that the contact
shall be for an indefinite period, provided that Petrophil may terminate said
contract at any time with 30 days prior written notice.
In a letter dated May 21, 1987, Petrophil, through its Operations Manager,
advised Dr. Cruz that it was terminating her hauling contract in accordance
with paragraph 11 thereof. Dr. Cruz appealed to Petrophil for reconsideration
but said appeal was denied on June 5, 1987.

On June 23, 1987, Dr. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40930, against Petrophil seeking the
nullity of the termination of the contract and declaring its suspension as
unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions. She claimed that the
termination of her hauling contract was a retaliation against her for allegedly
sympathizing with the then striking Petrophil employees and for informing the
PNOC president of anomalies perpetrated by some of its officers and
employees.

On March 11, 1988 tank truck drivers od Dr. Cruz, Jessie de Vera, Marcial
Mulig, Antonio and Rufino Cuenca, also filed a complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 88-43946 for damages against Petrophil. They corroborated with the
allegations of Dr. Cruz that the termination of the contract was to silence her.
Petitioner denied that Petrophil officials were out to starve Dr. Cruz's drivers
for their support of her. They professed that the hauling trips were reduced
not because Dr. Cruz was being punished, but because the company was
assigning hauling trips on the basis of compartmentation. Additionally,
witnesses for Petrophil testified that on April 25, 1987, there was a strike at
the Pandacan terminal and Dr. Cruz and her husband were at the picket line.
They refused to load petroleum products, resulting in the disruption of delivery
to service stations in Metro Manila and in the provinces, which in turn resulted
in loss of sales and revenues. Because of Dr. Cruz's refusal to load, the
management terminated the hauling contract.

ISSUE:
Did the petitioner exercise abuse of right under Article 19 in terminating the
agreed contract between Dr. Cruz which entitles the latter to damages?

RULING:
Yes. Petrophil Corp abused his right when he terminated the contract with Dr.
Cruz for hauling products of Petrophil. It has been enumerated in the case of
BPI Express Card Corporation vs. CA, 296 SCRA 260, 272 (1998) that there
are three elements needed to prove when abuse of right is committed which
are: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for
the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.

In the case at bar, Petrophil Corporation has the legal right to terminate the
contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate
performance or abandonment anytime with 30 days prior written notice. But
the termination of contract was exercised with bad faith because it was done
after the respondents were seen at the picket line of the striking employees
of Petrophil during which they instructed their truck drivers not to load
petroleum products. Petrophil terminated the contract as a punishment to Dr.
Cruz for sympathizing with the employees. Petrophil did not even hear the
side of Dr. Cruz which is an act of bad faith. While Petrophil had the right to
terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private
respondents. The termination causes the loss of income of Dr. Cruz and the
truck drivers under her employ.

Therefore, given the consequences, Petrophil is guilty with abuse of right

under Article 19 of the Civil Code when it terminated the contract with Dr.
Cruz and the injured party, as well as the truck drivers, are entitled to collect
damages according to Article 20 of the Civil Code.
THREE ELEMENTS MUST BE PRESENT TO PROVE ABUSE OF RIGHT
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ vs. SHIRLEY
G. QUIÑONES
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:
To prove that abuse of right is committed, three elements must be present:
(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

FACTS:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing
Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA,
Robinson’s Department Store in Cebu City. She then decided to purchase the
black jeans worth ₱2,098.00. Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier
evidenced by a receipt issued by the store.

While she was walking through the skywalk a Guess employee approached
and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She then suggested
that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of
the mall. When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees
allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific.
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director
of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident. With the above experience,
respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and social humiliation.

She thus filed the Complaint for Damages before the RTC against petitioners
California Clothing, Inc., Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez. She demanded
the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses. RTC Ruled in favor of California Clothing.

On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed and set aside RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Did the Guess employees exercise an abuse of right which is punishable under
Article 19 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
Yes. Guess employees were in good faith when they confronted respondent
inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA,
however, found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad
faith in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer. Contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s
director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for assistance
for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule,
humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay. There
was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer
who was not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since
the purported letter contained not only a narrative of the incident but
accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would
be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. In
this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights. And all the elements
needed to prove abuse of rights were present: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.

In our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission,

whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles
20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read: Article 20. Every person who, contrary
to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same; Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Therefore, Guess employees abused their right and acted in bad faith against
the respondent.
FACTS TO PROVE THE RIGHTS TO LITIGATE

MS. VIOLETA YASOÑA vs. RODENCIO and JOVENCIO, both surnamed

DE RAMOS

G.R. No. 156339, [October 6, 2004], 483 PHIL 162-170

CORONA, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant
to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

FACTS:

Aurea Yasoña and her son, Saturnino, went to the house of Jovencio de
Ramos to ask for financial assistance in paying their loans to Philippine
National Bank (PNB), otherwise their residential house and lot would be
foreclosed. Inasmuch as Aurea was his aunt, Jovencio acceded to the request.
They agreed that, upon payment by Jovencio of the loan to PNB, half of
Yasoñas’ subject property would be sold to him. Jovencio paid Aurea’s bank
loan. As agreed upon, Aurea executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Jovencio over half of the lot consisting of 123 square meters. Thereafter, the
lot was surveyed and separate titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna in the names of Aurea and Jovencio

In August 1993, Aurea filed an estafa complaint against brothers

Jovencio and Rodencio de Ramos on the ground that she was deceived by
them when she asked for their assistance in 1971 concerning her mortgaged
property. In her complaint, Aurea alleged that Rodencio asked her to sign a
blank paper on the pretext that it would be used in the redemption of the
mortgaged property
 On February 21, 1994, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo B.
Zayenis dismissed the criminal complaint for estafa for lack of evidence. On
account of this dismissal, Jovencio and Rodencio filed a complaint for damages
on the ground of malicious prosecution. They alleged that the filing of the
estafa complaint against them was done with malice and it caused irreparable
injury to their reputation, as Aurea knew full well that she had already sold
half of the property to Jovencio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the criminal complaint for estafa by petitioners
against respondents constituted malicious prosecution?

RULING:

To constitute “malicious prosecution,” there must be proof that the

prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a person,
and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution.

In the case at bar, the records show that the sale of the property was
evidenced by a deed of sale duly notarized and registered with the local
Register of Deeds. After the execution of the deed of sale, the property was
surveyed and divided into two portions. Separate titles were then issued in
the names of Yasoña and Jovencio. Since 1973, Jovencio had been paying the
realty taxes of the portion registered in his name. In 1974, Aurea requested
Jovencio to use his portion as bond for the temporary release of her son who
was charged with malicious mischief. Also, when Aurea borrowed money from
the Rural Bank of Lumban in 1973 and the PNB in 1979, only her portion was
mortgaged.
 Allpieces of evidence indicate that Aurea had long acknowledged
Jovencio’s ownership of half of the property. Furthermore, it was only in 1993
when petitioners decided to file the estafa complaint against respondents. If
petitioners had honestly believed that they still owned the entire property, it
would not have taken them 22 years to question Jovencio’s ownership of half
of the property.

Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the

elements of (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. These two elements
are present in the present controversy. The complaint for estafa was dismissed
outright as the prosecutor did not find any probable cause against
respondents. A suit for malicious prosecution will prosper where legal
prosecution is carried out without probable cause.
FACTS TO COUNTERCLAIM
PRO LINE SPORTS CENTER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118192 October 23, 1997
Bellosillo, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Civil liability arising from the crime is deemed instituted and determined in the
criminal proceedings where the offended party did not waive nor reserve his
right to institute it separately.

FACTS:
On 11 February 1981, or sixteen years ago, Edwin Dy Buncio, General
Manager of PRO LINE, sent a letter-complaint to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) regarding the alleged manufacture of fake "Spalding" balls
by UNIVERSAL. On 23 February 1981 the NBI applied for a search warrant
with the then Court of First Instance, Br. 23, Pasig, Rizal, then presided over
by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera. On that same day Judge Vera issued Search
Warrant No. 2-81 authorizing the search of the premises of UNIVERSAL in
Pasig. In the course of the search, some 1,200 basketballs and volleyballs
marked "Spalding" were seized and confiscated by the NBI. Three (3) days
later, on motion of the NBI, Judge Vera issued another order, this time to seal
and padlock the molds, rubber mixer, boiler and other instruments at
UNIVERSAL's factory. All these were used to manufacture the fake "Spalding"
products, but were simply too heavy to be removed from the premises and
brought under the actual physical custody of the court. However, on 28 April
1981, on motion of UNIVERSAL, Judge Vera ordered the lifting of the seal and
padlock on the machineries, prompting the People of the Philippines, the NBI,
together with PRO LINE and QUESTOR, to file with the Court of Appeals a joint
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA G.R. No.
12413) seeking the annulment of the order of 28 April 1981. On 18 May 1981,
the appellate court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Vera
from implementing her latest order. Meanwhile, on 26 February 1981, PRO
LINE and QUESTOR filed a criminal complaint for unfair competition against
respondent Monico Sehwani together with Robert, Kisnu, Arjan and Sawtri, all
surnamed Sehwani, and Arcadio del los Reyes before the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal (I. S. No. 81-2040). The complaint was dropped on 24 June 1981 for the
reason that it was doubtful whether QUESTOR had indeed acquired the
registration rights over the mark "Spalding" from A. G. Spalding Bros., Inc.,
and complainants failed to adduce an actual receipt for the sale of "Spalding"
balls by UNIVERSAL. On 9 July 1981 a petition for review seeking reversal of
the dismissal of the complaint was filed with the Ministry of Justice. While this
was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment on 4 August 1981 in
CA G.R. No. 12413 affirming the order of Judge Vera which lifted the seal and
padlock on the machineries of UNIVERSAL. The People, NBI, PRO LINE and
QUESTOR challenged the decision of the appellate court before this Court in
G.R. No. 57814. On 31 August 1981 we issued a temporary restraining order
against the Court of Appeals vis-a-vis the aforesaid decision.

ISSUE/S:
Whether private respondents Sehwani and UNIVERSAL are entitled to recover
damages for the alleged wrongful recourse to court proceedings by petitioners
PRO LINE and QUESTOR; and whether petitioners' counterclaim should be
sustained.

RULING:
We nonetheless affirm the dismissal of petitioners' counterclaim for damages.
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action
against the plaintiffs. It is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action,
so that when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to
the matter stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions
pending between the same parties, where each is at the same time both a
plaintiff and defendant. A counterclaim stands on the same footing and is to
be tested by the same rules, as if it were an independent action. Petitioners'
counterclaim for damages based on the illegal and unauthorized manufacture
of "Spalding" balls certainly constitutes an independent cause of action which
can be the subject of a separate complaint for damages against UNIVERSAL.
However, this separate civil action cannot anymore be pursued as it is already
barred by res judicata, the judgment in the criminal case (against Sehwani)
involving both the criminal and civil aspects of the case for unfair competition.
To recall, petitioners PRO LINE and QUESTOR, upon whose initiative the
criminal action for unfair competition against respondent UNIVERSAL was
filed, did not institute a separate civil action for damages nor reserve their
right to do so. Thus the civil aspect for damages was deemed instituted in the
criminal case. No better manifestation of the intent of petitioners to recover
damages in the criminal case can be expressed than their active participation
in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case through the
intervention of their private prosecutor. Obviously, such intervention could
only be for the purpose of recovering damages or indemnity because the
offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of a public offense. Section 16, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court
requires that the intervention of the offended party in the criminal action can
be made only if he has not waived the civil action nor expressly reserved his
right to institute it separately. In an acquittal on the ground that an essential
element of the crime was not proved, it is fundamental that the accuse cannot
be held criminally nor civilly liable for the offense. Although Art. 28 of the New
Civil Code authorizes the filing of a civil action separate and distinct from the
criminal proceedings, the right of petitioners to institute the same is not
unfettered. Civil liability arising from the crime is deemed instituted and
determined in the criminal proceedings where the offended party did not waive
nor reserve his right to institute it separately. This is why we now hold that
the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present
counterclaim for damages based upon the same cause.
FACTS TO PROVE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
LIMANCH-O HOTEL VS. CITY OF OLONGAPO
G.R. No. 185121 : January 18, 2010
Abad, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Resort to judicial processes, by itself, is not an evidence of ill will which would
automatically make the complainant liable for malicious prosecution.

FACTS:
Sometime in 1993, the respondent City of Olongapo assessed, through its
Public Utilities Department (PUD), petitioner Conrado Tiu (the owner,
president, and general manager of petitioner Limanch-O Hotel and Leasing
Corporation) his unregistered electricity consumption from November 1988 to
February 1993 in the amount of P9,364,276.50. The City threatened to cut off
his electric supply if he did not immediately settle the amount. Petitioner Tiu
filed an action against the City before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo for injunction with damages, which he won. The RTC enjoined the
City from collecting the deficiency amount and from cutting off Tiu's power
supply.

ISSUE:
Is there a malicious prosecution done by the City

RULING:
No. Because there was no evidence shown that there had been bad blood
between respondent City and petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel prior to the
filing of the criminal charge, which circumstance if present could justify a
malicious motive in filing the charge. Resort to judicial processes, by itself, is
not an evidence of ill will which would automatically make the complainant
liable for malicious prosecution. Otherwise, peaceful recourse to the courts
will be greatly discouraged and the exercise of one's right to litigate would
become meaningless and empty. Even if the Court were to concede that the
City branded petitioners Tiu and Limanch-O Hotel as thieves, asked the people
not to patronize their business, and had been overly zealous in pursuing the
criminal complaint that it filed, these are not the legal malice contemplated in
suits for malicious prosecution as the determining factor is evil motive in
bringing the action, not the acts exhibited by the complainant after the case
had been filed.
FACTS TO INDEPENDENT CLAIM
VILLANUEVA-ONG v. ENRILE
G.R. No. 212904, November 22, 2017
Tijam, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.

FACTS:
On December 4, 2012, Juan Ponce Enrile (respondent) filed a civil Complaint
for damages against Yolanda Villanueva-Ong (petitioner) for libel before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 118, in Civil Case No. R-PSY-
12-12031-CV. The pertinent portions of the complaint are as follows:
On 16 October 2012, a libelous article entitled "Like father like Son?" was
published in page 16, Opinion Section of the Philippine Star. The article was
authored by VILLANUEVA-ONG. The article characterizes [respondent] as a
liar, fraud, and manipulator. It accuses [respondent] of attempting to "revise
history" with a devious purpose of enticing the electorate to support his only
son, Juan Castañer Ponce Enrile, Jr., (popularly known as Jack Enrile), an
incumbent Congressman in the province of Cagayan and a candidate in the
upcoming senatorial elections. [Petitioner], instead of giving fair comments on
[respondent] as public official, deliberately focuses on attacking his character
with false and defamatory accusations and intrigues affecting his family and
personal life.

ISSUE:
Are petitioner's counterclaims compulsory or permissive in nature?

RULING:
No. Because a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in anot
FACTS ON EQUITY OF JURISDICTION
REYES v. LIM.
G. R. No. 134241 - August 11, 2003
Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE:
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the
loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

FACTS:
On 23 March 1995, petitioner David Reyes ("Reyes") filed before the trial court
a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against respondents Jose
Lim ("Lim"), Chuy Cheng Keng ("Keng") and Harrison Lumber, Inc. ("Harrison
Lumber"). The complaint alleged that on 7 November 1994, Reyes as seller
and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell ("Contract to Sell") a parcel
of land ("Property") located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Harrison
Lumber occupied the Property as lessee with a monthly rental of P35,000. The
Contract to Sell provided for the following terms and conditions:
1. The total consideration for the purchase of the afore described parcel of
land together with the perimeter walls found therein is TWENTY EIGHT
MILLION (P28,000,000.00) PESOS payable as follows:
(a) TEN MILLION (P10,000,000.00) PESOS upon signing of this Contract to
Sell;
(b) The balance of EIGHTEEN MILLION (P18,000,000.00) PESOS shall be paid
on or before March 8, 1995 at 9:30 A.M. at a bank to be designated by the
Buyer but upon the complete vacation of all the tenants or occupants of the
property and execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, if the tenants
or occupants have vacated the premises earlier than March 8, 1995, the
VENDOR shall give the VENDEE at least one week advance notice for the
payment of the balance and execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
2. That in the event, the tenants or occupants of the premises subject of this
sale shall not vacate the premises on March 8, 1995 as stated above, the
VENDEE shall withhold the payment of the balance of P18,000,000.00 and the
VENDOR agrees to pay a penalty of Four percent (4%) per month to the herein
VENDEE based on the amount of the downpayment of TEN MILLION
(P10,000,000.00) PESOS until the complete vacation of the premises by the
tenants therein. The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison
Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also
informed Keng5 and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March
1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as
provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint further alleged that Lim
connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000
monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase
price of P18,000,000. On 3 May 1995, Keng and Harrison Lumber filed their
Answer denying they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes. Keng and Harrison
Lumber alleged that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to
vacate the Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their
business. Harrison Lumber claimed that as of March 1995, it had already
started transferring some of its merchandise to its new business location in
Malabon. On 31 May 1995, Lim filed his Answer8 stating that he was ready
and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price on or before 8 March
1995. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latters daughter on
the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the balance but
Reyes kept postponing their meeting. On 9 March 1995, Reyes offered to
return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having
problems in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes offer
and proceeded to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim learned
that Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation ("Line
One") on 1 March 1995 for P16,782,840. After the registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the Register of Deeds issued to Line One TCT No. 134767
covering the Property. Lim denied conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber
to defraud Reyes. On 2 November 1995, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim
of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific
performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another
trial court. The trial court granted the motion in an Order dated 23 November
1995. In his Amended Answer dated 18 January 1996, Lim prayed for the
cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment in an Order dated 7 October 1996. On 6 March 1997,
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million
down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The
trial court granted this motion. On 25 March 1997, Reyes filed a Motion to Set
Aside the Order dated 6 March 1997 on the ground the Order practically
granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court
denied Reyes' motion in an Order12 dated 3 July 1997. Citing Article 1385 of
the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that an action for rescission could prosper
only if the party demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged
to restore should the court grant the rescission. The trial court denied Reyes
Motion for Reconsideration in its Order13 dated 3 October 1997. In the same
order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment
with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October 1997. On 8 December 1997,
Reyes14 filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Reyes prayed
that the Orders of the trial court dated 6 March 1997, 3 July 1997 and 3
October 1997 be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 12 May 1998, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?

RULING:
Yes. Because the purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is
to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that substantial
justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of
ordinary law are inadequate. The Supreme Court also states that rescission is
possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he
may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless
there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante. In
this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the
deposit of the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of
Appeals.was affirmed.
REQUISITES OF ACCION IN REM VERSO
SHINRYO Philippines vs RRN Incorporated
G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010
Peralta, J.:

DOCTRINE:
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must
be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff
has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just
or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, be reversed
and set aside.

The petitioner, SHINRYO Philippines, and respondent, RRN Incorporated, are

domestic corporations organized under Philippine laws. The petitioner and the
respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-Contract
respectively. Under this agreement, the respondent signifies its willingness to
perform any projects, in whole or in part as described in the Conditions of
Sub-Contract and other Sub-Contract Agreements.

In June 2002, a project was instituted for Philip Morris Greenfield where the
petitioner agreed to supply manpower chargeable to the respondent and the
respondent to perform variation orders. Respondent RRN was not able to
finish the entire works with the petitioner due to financial crisis.

Accordingly, the respondent sent a letter to the petitioner demanding the

latter of its unpaid balances. The petitioner denied any unpaid balances and
instead claimed materials back charges. To settle their dispute, the
respondent advised the petitioner to submit the matter for arbitration to
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

In its judgement, the CIAC favored RRN Incorporated and ordered SHINRYO
to pay its unpaid balances plus interest. The petitioner partially agreed on the
decision of the CIAC but pointed out that it gravely erred when it denied the
petitioner’s claim for manlift equipment rental despite the evidence presented
that such equipment was used by RRN and from which, the respondent was
benefited from such usage.

Upon the petitioner’s reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment, the matter
was elevated to Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed the decision of
CIAC. Thus, this case was filed.

ISSUE:
Can SHINRYO Philippines invoke unjust enrichment?

RULING:
NO. According to Article 22 of the New Civil Code:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other

means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must
be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff
has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just
or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

It was ruled out by the Supreme Court that in the case at bar, the invocation
of accion in rem verso lacks two elements:
(3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground. In
the case at bar, SHINRYO was not able to prove that the respondent’s free
use of manlift was without legal basis.
(4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract,
crime or quasi-delict. In this contested case, SHINRYO’s claim is based on
contract.

Hence, SHINRYO, the petitioner, cannot invoke unjust enrichment

ACTS VIOLATIVE OF RIGHTS TO PRIVACY
Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing vs Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

DOCTRINE:
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other
relief:
(1)Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2)Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3)Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4)Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

FACTS:
This case was a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Bill and Victoria Hing
against the respondents Alexander Choachuy and Allan Choachuy.

The petitioners in this case claimed that they are owners of a parcel of land
situated in Mandaue Cebu. Adjacent to their property are two (2) lots owned
by the respondents under its business name Aldo Development and Resources
Inc (Aldo) in which the auto-repair building was situated in one of the lots.

Aldo filed a case for injunction and damages against the petitioners for
constructing a fence without valid permit and the construction of which would
damage the wall of his building. The respondent’s petition in the trial court
was denied for lack of evidence. To support respondents’ claim they illegally
installed video surveillance cameras facing the property of the petitioners.
Moreover, the respondents took pictures on the on-going construction the
petitioner’s property. Thus, the petitioner prayed for the removal of the
installed surveillance cameras invoking its right to privacy.
The respondents’ countered that they did not install the surveillance cameras;
that they did not order their employees to take pictures of the petitioner’s on-
going construction; and that they are not owners of Aldo but mere
stockholders.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The respondents filed
for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court but was denied. Thus, the
respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which consequently
annulled the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

Hence, for this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the respondents, Choachuy, violate the right of the petitioners to privacy?

RULING:
YES. Article 26 of the Civil Code expressly provides that: Every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention, and other relief:

(1)Prying into the privacy of another’s residence.

As one of the acts that produces action for damages, prevention, and other
relief, the Court pointed out that it is not only the private residence that is
entitled to privacy. The law specifically mentioned “other similar” acts which
may entitle other entities such as business establishment.

Accordingly, the right to privacy should not be confined to one’s residence as

this may be extended to places where he has the right to exclude or deny the
public of access.

Hence, the respondents, Choachuy, violated the rights of the petitioners to

privacy.
FACTS THAT MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE THE VIOLATION ON PRIVACY
RIGHTS
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in

society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually
engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for
privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others,
in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives

FACTS:

Nenita Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, both minors are graduating students
at St. Theresa’s College, Cebu City. In January 2012, while on a beach party,
took digital photos of themselves only in their undergarments and then
uploaded it on Angela Tan’s Facebook profile.

When Mylene Escudero, a STC Highschool teacher, learned about this she
reported the matter to the STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
It found out that the student to have deported in the manner prescribed by
the Student Handbook, for possession of alcoholic drinks, engaging immoral
acts, smoking and drinking in public places, and exposure of underwear. As
part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement
exercises.

A week before graduation, one of the students mother, filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC and prayed that the defendant be
enjoined implementing the sanction to student from joining the
RIGHT OF ACTION BY THE PERSON
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS VS. SPS BERNARDO
G.R. No. 190667, November 07, 2016
SERENO, C.J.:

DOCTRINE:
Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action
by the person who thereby settlers damage.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the large-scale manufacture,
sale, and distribution of beverages around the country, while respondents,
doing business under the name "Jolly Beverage Enterprises," are wholesalers
of soft drinks.

On 22 March 1994, the parties formally entered into an exclusive dealership

contract for three years. Under the Agreement, petitioner would extend
developmental assistance to respondents in the form of cash assistance and
trade discount incentives.

On 1 March 1997, the parties executed a similar agreement for another two
years. This time, petitioner gave respondents complimentary cases of its
products instead of cash assistance, and increased the latter's sales quota to
8,000 cases per month.

Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired, petitioner
required respondents to submit a list of their customers. The respondents
assume that their contract would be renewed for a longer period if they would
submit the list. However, the promise did not materialize.

Respondents discovered that petitioner started to reach out to the persons

whose names were on the list. Furthermore, respondents found out that
petitioner had employed a different pricing scheme, such that the price given
to distributors was significantly higher than that given to supermarkets.
Respondents claimed that because of these schemes, they lost not only their
major customers.
Respondents filed a Complaint for damages, alleging that the acts of petitioner
constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair
competition in commercial enterprise.

ISSUE:
Is the Petitioner liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair competition?

RULING:
Yes. The Petitioner is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair
competition. The RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed
oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage
and diminish the investment returns of respondents.

Under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provides that the legal bedrock
for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever another
person commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which,
though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates
certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods

resulting in unfair competition also gives a right of action to the injured party.
Under Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that Unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use
of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby settlers damage.
Hence, the Petitioner is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair
competition.

\\
REQUISITES OF MORAL DAMAGES
MERALCO V. SPS. EDITO AND FELICIDAD CHUA, AND JOSEFINA
PAQUEO
G.R. No. 160422: July 05, 2010
PONENTE: BRION, J

DOCTRINE: Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages are
proper when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation
of property without due process of law, are violated. Jurisprudence has
established the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there
is an injury - whether physical, mental, or psychological - clearly sustained by
the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3)
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
The monthly electric bills of spouses Edito and Felicidad Chua (the Chuas)
from 11 June to 11 September 1996 ranged from P747.84 to P887.27 for 231
to 269 kilowatt hours of electricity consumed per month. They were surprised
when their electric bill for 11 September to 11 October 1996 (September 1996
bill) amounted to P4,906.87 for 1,297 kilowatt hours of consumed electricity,
which was approximately 553% higher than their previous monthly bill. Their
daughter went to MERALCO to question the bill and paid the same under
protest to avoid disconnection. MERALCO replaced the old meter with a new
one because the old meter’s terminal was missing, its cover seal was broken
and it had a broken sealing wire. Based on the new meter, the Chuas’ electric
bills from 11 October 1996 to 24 January 1997 ranged from P700.00 to
P800.00 for an average usage of 227 to 254 kilowatt hours of electricity.
MERALCO then sent a demand letter to the Chuas requiring them to pay its
differential billing of P183,983.66. When the Chuas refused to pay, MERALCO
disconnected their electric supply. Later, MERALCO sent the Chuas another
letter demanding payment of the reduced differential billing of P71,737.49.
The Chuas filed a case for mandamus and damages with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction to compel MERALCO to restore their electrical
connection. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued the injunctive writ and
subsequently ruled in favor of the Chuas and awarded them P300,000.00 as
moral damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision but
reduced the moral damages to P100,000.00. MERALCO, thus, brought the
case to the Supreme Court for review.
MERALCO contended that even assuming it had no right to disconnect the
electric service, the Chuas could not claim moral damages because they did
not sustain any, having sourced their electric supply from another electric
meter within the premises.

ISSUE:
Are Defendants entitled to moral damages?

HELD:
Yes. The Spouses Chua were entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00. Under Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages
are proper when the rights of individuals, including the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated. Jurisprudence
has established the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1)
there is an injury - whether physical, mental, or psychological - clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages
is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In
this case, considering the manner MERALCO disconnected the Spouses Chua’s
electric service, the award of moral damages was proper. Apart from the havoc
wreaked on the Spouses Chua’s daily lives when MERALCO abruptly and
without legal basis cut off their electricity, the removal of the electric meter
also caused the Spouses Chua extreme social humiliation and embarrassment
as they were subjected to speculations in their neighborhood of being “power
thieves.” As Mrs. Felicidad Chua testified, she suffered sleepless nights and
felt serious anxiety after the removal of their electric meter came to the
attention of the barangay. She even had to consult a doctor for this anxiety.
Thus, even if the Spouses Chua’s subsequently obtained their electricity from
another source, the damage to the Spouses Chua’s reputation and social
standing had already been done.
Therefore, Defendant Spouses Chua were entitled to moral damages.
PRESCRIPTION PERIOD OF QUASI DELICT
Victoria G. Capuno and Josephine G. Capuno
v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi
G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965
MAKALINTAL, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Art. 1146 of the Civil Code provides that: the following actions must be
instituted within four years:(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;(2)
Upon a quasi-delict.
Article 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
Article 33 of the Civil Code, In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

FACTS:
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953
in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon
Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the
latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina
Paras.

On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The information was
subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three
victims.

On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate
of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company
of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. Included in the complaint was a claim for
indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of
Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise
and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for
damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00
previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation
Act." The Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only
on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges
against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein
appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which,
upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of
February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken.

ISSUE:
Is the Lower Court correct in dismissing the Independent Civil Action because
the action had already prescribed?

HELD:
Yes. Prescription Applies since the action done on Sept. 26, 1958 is an
Independent civil action in accordance to Article. 31 of the Civil Code which
provides that: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter; and Article 33 of the Civil code Which provides that: In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the following actions must be instituted
within four years:(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;(2) Upon a
quasi-delict.

In this case, the question of prescription is decisive. There can be no doubt

that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict,
which action must be instituted within four 4 years.
The Criminal Case against Defendant Elordi commence on January 5, 1953
and the Independent Civil Action was filed on September 26, 1958.
Therefore, the lower Court is correct in dismissing the Civil Action because the
Independent Civil Action had already Prescribed.
THE FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY WITH
PHYSICAL INJURIES
Manliclic vs. Calaunan
G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The following are requisites for testimonies that must be satisfied: (a) the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved
the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of
action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same
issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

FACTS:
12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on
his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep and the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac,
and the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on
the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first
brought for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan
City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later
transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December
1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City.The criminal case was tried ahead
of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent
Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.

ISSUE:
Is Petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI guilty on Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries?

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI is guilty on Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

Under Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between
the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court.
In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted
by both petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the
TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If
petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat
it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the
adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same
time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be
admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be
unfair.

Hence, petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI is guilty on Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
RESIDENCE OF A CORPORATION
Hyatt Elevators vs Goldstar Elevators
G.R. No. 161026 October 24, 2005
Panganiban, J.

DOCTRINE:
Well established in our jurisprudence is the rule that the residence of a
corporation is the place where its principal office is located, as stated in its
Articles of Incorporation?

It now becomes apparent that the residence or domicile of a juridical person

is fixed by "the law creating or recognizing" it provided under Article 51 of the
Civil Law.

FACTS:
Goldstar is a domestic corporation engaged in making elevators with the
address at EDSA, Guadalupe Makati City while Hyatt Company also makes
elevators and its address is located at Legazpi Village, Makati City. Hyatt filed
a case for unfair trade practices and damages under Article 19-21 of the Civil
Code but Goldstar argued that the venue was improperly laid, as neither Hyatt
nor the defendants reside in Mandaluyong City, where the original case was
filed.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed denied the Motion to Dismiss of Goldstar.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court and ruled that
Makati City was the principal place of business of both Hyatt and Goldstated
as stated in their Articles of Incorporation.

ISSUE:
Is the residence of a corporation is the same as stated in the Articles of
Incorporation.

RULING:
Yes, it is established in jurisprudence is the rule that the residence of a
corporation is the place where its principal office is located, as stated in its
Articles of Incorporation.

The Court has ruled that residence is synonymous with domicile.

FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
SANCTIFY?
TITLE:
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., v. HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G.
MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY
OF CAUAYAN
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009
TINGA, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.― No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided.

FACTS:
Bombo Radyo Philippines ("Bombo Radyo") operates several radio stations
under the AM and FM band throughout the Philippines. These stations are
operated by corporations organized and incorporated by Bombo Radyo,
particularly petitioners Newsounds Broasting Network, Inc. ("Newsounds")
and Consolidated Broasting System, Inc. ("CBS"). Among the stations run by
Newsounds is Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broast
station operating out of Cauayan City, Isabela. CBS, in turn, runs Star FM
DWIT Cauayan ("Star FM"), also operating out of Cauayan City, airing on the
FM band. The service areas of DZNC and Star FM extend from the province of
Isabela to throughout Region II and the Cordillera region.
In 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broasting stations,
management office and transmitters on property located in Minante 2,
Cauayan City, Isabela. The property is owned by CBS Development
Corporation (CDC), an affiliate corporation under the Bombo Radyo network
which holds title over the properties used by Bombo Radyo stations
throughout the country. On 28 June 1996, CDC was issued by the then
municipal government of Cauayan a building permit authorizing the
construction of a commercial establishment on the property. On 5 July 1996,
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a Zoning Decision
certifying the property as commercial. That same day, the Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Cauayan
affirmed that the commercial structure to be constructed by CDC conformed
to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location "is classified as a
Commercial area." Similar certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997
to 2001.
All that changed beginning in 2002. On 15 January of that year, petitioners
applied for the renewal of the mayor's permit. The following day, the City
Assessor's Office in Cauayan City noted on CDC's Declaration of Real Property
filed for 2002 confirmed that based on the existing file, CDC's property was
classified as "commercial."On 28 January, representatives of petitioners
formally requested then City Zoning Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo
(Maximo) to issue a zoning clearance for the property. Maximo, however,
required petitioners to submit "either an approved land conversion papers
from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was
converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to
commercial land." Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers
before, and from 1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified that the
property had been classified as commercial.
Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were
unable to secure a mayor's permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City to compel the issuance of
the 2002 mayor's permit. The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Cauayan
City RTC. When the RTC of Cauayan denied petitioners' accompanying
application for injunctive relief, they filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, but this would be dismissed by the appellate court
due to the availability of other speedy remedies with the trial court. In
February of 2003, the RTC dismissed the mandamus action for being moot
and academic.1
In the meantime, petitioners sought to obtain from the DAR Region II Office
a formal recognition of the conversion of the CDC property from agricultural
to commercial. The matter was docketed as Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-
002. Then DAR Region II Director Abrino L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan)
granted the application and issued an Order that stated that "there remains
no doubt on the part of this Office of the non-agricultural classification of
subject land before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988." Consequently, the DAR
Region II Office ordered the formal exclusion of the property from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and the waiver of any requirement
for formal clearance of the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to
non-agricultural use."
Petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayor's permit for the year
2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved.
However, on 4 March 2003, respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City
Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR
Order was spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy
Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not
have any record of the DAR Order. A series of correspondences followed
wherein petitioners defended the authenticity of the DAR Order and the
commercial character of the property, while respondent Meer demanded
independent proof showing the authenticity of the Aydinan Order. It does not
appear though that any action was taken against petitioners by respondents
in 2003, and petitioners that year paid realty taxes on the property based on
the classification that said property is commercial.
The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that year, petitioners filed
their respective applications for their 2004 mayor's permit, again with the DAR
Order attached to the same. A zonal clearance was issued in favor of
petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13 January 2004, respondent Meer claimed
that no record existed of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office
of the Regional Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI. As a result,
petitioners were informed that there was no basis for the issuance in their
favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor's
permit.
Another series of correspondences ensued between Meer and the station
manager of DZNC, Charmy Sabigan (Sabigan). Sabigan reiterated the
authenticity of the DAR Order and the commercial character of the property,
while Meer twice extended the period for application of the mayor's permit,
while reminding them of the need to submit the certifications from the DAR or
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that the property had been duly converted for
commercial use.
On 14 September 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for
mandamus. The RTC upheld all the arguments of the respondents, including
their right to deny the sought after mayor's permit unless they were duly
satisfied that the subject property has been classified as commercial in nature.
The Decision made no reference to the application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, citing the
trial court's failure to hear and act on the motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction as a violation of the right to due process, and disputing the RTC's
conclusions with respect to their right to secure the mayor's permit. This
motion was denied in an Order dated 1 December 2004.
Petitioners initiated two separate actions with the Court of Appeals following
the rulings of the RTC. On 13 December 2004, they filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA G.R. No. 87815, raffled to the
Fourteenth Division. This petition imputed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC for denying their application for preliminary mandatory
injunction. On the same day, petitioners also filed a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC, this time in connection with the denial of their petition for mandamus.
This appeal was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 88283 and raffled to the Eleventh
Division.
Petitioners lost both of their cases with the Court of Appeals. On 27 October
2005, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 87815 dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari, ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in impliedly denying the application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On
30 May 2007, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88283 denied the appeal
by certiorari, affirming the right of the respondents to deny petitioners their
mayor's permits. On both occasions, petitioners filed with this Court respective
petitions for review under Rule 45 - the instant petitions, now docketed as
G.R. NOS. 170270 and 179411.
The Court in G.R. No. 170270 issued a writ of preliminary injunction,
"enjoining respondents from implementing the closure order dated March 24,
2005, or otherwise interfering with the operations of Bombo Radyo DZNC
Cauayan (NBN) and STAR FM DWIT Cauayan (CBS) in Cauayan City until final
orders from this Court." On 21 January 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate
G.R. No. 170270 with G.R. No. 179411, which had been initially dismissed
outright but was reinstated on even date.
ISSUE:
It emerges then that there exists tension between petitioners' right to free
expression, and respondents' authority by law to regulate local enterprises.
What are the rules of adjudication that govern the judicial resolution of this
controversy?
Is implicit denial of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction by
the RTC was in fact attended with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No.
170270?

RULING:
YES, To recall, the RTC on 20 April 2004 issued an order denying the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, claiming that "[t]here is
insufficiency of allegation…[t]here was no certainty that after the election
period, the respondents will interfere with the operation of the radio stations,
which were operating by virtue of the order of the COMELEC." Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on 13 May 2004. The
refusal of the RTC to grant provisional relief gave way to the closure of
petitioners’ radio stations on 10 June 2004, leading for them to file a motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on 25 June 2004.
This motion had not yet been acted upon when on 14 September 2004, the
RTC promulgated its decision denying the petition for mandamus.
Among the arguments raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration
before the RTC was against the implied denial of their motion for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, claiming in particular that such
implicit denial violated petitioners’ right to due process of law since no hearing
was conducted thereupon. However, when the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in its 1 December 2004 Order, it noted that its implied denial
of the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was not a ground
for reconsideration of its decision.
Petitioners maintain that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when
it impliedly denied their motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction without any hearing. The Court of Appeals pointed out
that under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the
granting of a writ of preliminary injunction that mandatorily requires a
hearing. The interpretation of the appellate court is supported by the language
of the rule itself:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.― No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to
which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte
a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided.
Section 5 of Rule 58 prescribes a mandatory hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined if preliminary injunction should be
granted. It imposes no similar requirement if such provisional relief were to
be denied. We in fact agree with the Court of Appeals that "if on the face of
the pleadings, the applicant for preliminary injunction is not entitled thereto,
courts may outrightly deny the motion without conducting a hearing for the
purpose." The Court is disinclined to impose a mandatory hearing requirement
on applications for injunction even if on its face, injunctive relief is palpably
without merit or impossible to grant. Otherwise, our trial courts will be forced
to hear out the sort of litigation-happy attention-deprived miscreants who
abuse the judicial processes by filing complaints against real or imaginary
persons based on trivial or inexistent slights. The application of Article 32 not
only serves as a measure of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the injury to
constitutional rights, it likewise serves notice to public officers and employees
that any violation on their part of any person's guarantees under the Bill of
Rights will meet with final reckoning.
The present prayer for temperate damages is premised on the existence of
pecuniary injury to petitioner due to the actions of respondents, the amount
of which nevertheless being difficult to prove. Temperate damages avail when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The existence
of pecuniary injury at bar cannot be denied. Petitioners had no way of knowing
it when they filed their petition, but the actions of respondents led to the
closure of their radio stations from June 2004 until this Court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction in January 2006. The lost potential income during that
one and a half year of closure can only be presumed as substantial enough.
Still, despite that fact, possibly unanticipated when the original amount for
claimed temperate damages was calculated, petitioners have maintained
before this Court the same amount, P8 Million, for temperate damages. We
deem the amount of P4 Million "reasonable under the circumstances."
Exemplary damages can be awarded herein, since temperate damages are
available. Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to uphold
embody "a poison of wickedness that may not run through the body politic."
Respondents, by purposely denying the commercial character of the property
in order to deny petitioners' the exercise of their constitutional rights and their
business, manifested bad faith in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive and
malevolent manner. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved
where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages, and the
sought for amount of P1 Million is more than appropriate. We likewise deem
the amount of P500 Thousand in attorney's fees as suitable under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petitions were GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, were
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus was
hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue
petitioners' zoning clearances and mayor's permits for 2004 to
petitionersRespondents Caesar G. Dy, Felicisimo G. Meer, Bagnos Maximo,
and Racma Fernandez-Garcia are hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY the following amounts in damages:
(1) FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00) as TEMPERATE DAMAGES;
(2) ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
(3) FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 500,000.00) as ATTORNEY'S FEES.
ERASURE, ALTERATION, OR AMENDMENT OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Baguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Del Castillo, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman
not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice
Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse
and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted
however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate
‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
“spouse” embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from
criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed
or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament
or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view
cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
FACTS:
Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat), married since 1965, owned several
properties, among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano. The deed of sale
was signed by Adriano as vendee, while Rosario (Baguis) signed as one of the
witnesses. When the title to the lot was issued (TCT No. T-145321(M),
however, it was registered in the name of “ADRIANO TAMBUYAT married to
ROSARIO E. BAGUIS”. When Adriano died intestate in 1998, Wenifreda filed
a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, alleging that she was the surviving
spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered; that Rosario is
married to one Eduardo Nolasco; and the registration was a result of the
insidious machination of Rosario with the assistance of the broker. She prayed
that TCT T-145321 be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the
spouse married to Adriano. Opposing, Rosario denied that the property was
acquired by the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage; that it
was she who bought it using her personal funds; she and Adriano were
married on September 2, 1988 and lived together as husband and wife,
producing a son named Adrian; that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
proceeding as it is merely a summary proceeding and a thorough
determination will have to be made if the property is conjugal or personal.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda. It ordered the
cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one indicating Wenifreda
as married to Adriano, as well as the payment of damages in her favour. It
ruled that Section 108⁠ 1 of PD 1529 required court authorisation for any
alteration or amendment if any mistake, error or omission was made in
entering a certificate of title. It was proved that Wenifreda is the surviving
spouse of Adriano; that Rosario had a prior subsisting marriage to Nolasco,
and TCT No. T-145321 was issued with her erroneously indicated as Adriano’s
spouse. Adrian’s filiation may not be proved in a land registration case.
On appeal to the CA, the later ruled that a separate and different proceeding
is not necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in the case as she in
effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the court to prove her
allegations; the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration
court and as a general court had been eliminated by PD 1529; Adriano and
Rosario were not co-owners of the property as both of them had prior
subsisting marriages at the time of their adulterous relations; Adriano alone
was the vendee in the deed of sale and no evidence was proved that Rosario
contributed to the purchase of the property.
Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court. She argues that the case is
essentially a partition of Adriano’s estate which deprives her and her son of
their share; Section 108 cannot apply to the case as there were contentious
issues which need to be resolved by a court of general jurisdiction; based on
the evidence, she acquired the property using her own funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT T-143521
to indicate Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano.

RULING:
The Court denies the Petition. The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was
not precluded from resolving the objections raised by Banguis in her
opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need not be filed
in a different court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be
considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court
for complete determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and
adduced and submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. “The active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with
his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where
the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and
a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from
later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”⁠ 2 Under Section 108 of
PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or
been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on
the certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been
married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a
corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there
is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.⁠ 3 The present
case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan
committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis” when, in truth and in fact,
respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in nature, contemplating
corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial issues.”⁠ 4 Banguis’s opposition to the petition for cancellation
ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the
hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by Adriano.
However, apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is
irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the evidence apparently indicates that
Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of
the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete
determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court thus led to the conclusion
that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in
TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse. As correctly ruled by the appellate court,
the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the
legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence – among others, the
parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage
certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a marital union⁠ 5 –
indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married
to Nolasco – and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition
of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it
cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other;
it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all.
Consequently, Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as
Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone. x x x
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that
such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court interprets
Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted however that with
respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-
law spouses).” There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, the term “spouse” embraces common law relation for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it
is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife
de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.⁠ The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-
99 is – who should be included in the title to the subject property as Adriano’s
spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there an error in placing Banguis’s name
in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is Adriano’s spouse, then there
would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the other hand, if
Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be
erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is required
in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse;
it was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the
property. Title to the property is different from the certificate of title to it. x x
x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction
between title and the certificate of title:The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses the certificate with the title.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean
that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from
a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of
any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat,
registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.
Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
x x x.Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title.
Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has.⁠ 7 Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to
demonstrate that she is the true owner of the subject property in order to
convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321, then
she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect.
Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other
evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate
of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is
not convinced of her claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be
adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the subject
property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the
purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering the subject
property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier
of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which
are thus considered conclusive and binding.⁠ 8 Moreover, the Court notes that
while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds
and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that
Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its
acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim;
basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be
logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of
sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred
in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis
would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just
the same. Her failure to explain why – despite her claims that she is the
purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the
sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. “Where a party has the
means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against
him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong
inference against him.”⁠ 9 One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules
of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common
sense.”⁠ 10Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s
petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano’s
estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus
divests Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein. LRC
Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful entry in
TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title –
that Adriano is married to Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been
a summary proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her
claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier
stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.Finally, with the foregoing
disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the
petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial court’s March 30, 2004 Order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the
April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution issued, as they have become moot and
academic.WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012
Decision and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.
ANNULMENT OF SALE NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE ISSUE
Vicente S. Umali v Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-63198 June 21,1990
Padilla, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

FACTS:
The Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation,
hereinafter referred to simply as OROSEA. Sometime on September 4,1979,
the petitioners, as officers of OROSEA, purchased from the spouses Honorio
and Solina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay,
Mulanay, Province of Quezon, covered by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name
of spouses Edano, for the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four installments.

When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners asked, for two
times, deferment of its presentation for payment, the first to June 30, 1980,
and the second to July 31, 1980. In the first deferment petitioners issued a
check that matured on June 30, 1980 to replace the check that matured on
March 31, 1980. On the second deferment petitioners issued another check
dated July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30, 1980. This second
renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack
of funds. So were the checks post dated September 30, 1980 and March 31,
1981. They were also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of funds. As
a consequence of the dishonor of these checks, the Edano spouses filed a
complaint for estafa against petitioners. Arraignment was set on September
4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but
this was postponed upon motion of petitioners.

On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon against the Edano spouses for the annulment/rescission of the
Contract of Sale executed on September 4, 1979 by and between OROSEA
and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of
Mulanay, and for which the petitioners issued the checks.
The criminal case again was set for arraignment on November 5, 1980. This
was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to
quash Criminal Case No. 1423-I, on grounds of improper venue, but this
motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. The
arraignment was again set for January 4, 1982 which was again postponed;
then to February 5, 1982, again postponed; then to March 23, 1982. However,
before March 23, 1982, petitioners filed, in Criminal Case No. 1423-I, a 'Motion
to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion
To Suspend Proceedings'. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon.
Resolving the motion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now
under question, denying the motion

ISSUE:
Whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No.
1423-I so as to require a suspension of proceedings in the latter case, until
the civil case is disposed of.

RULING:
NO. It cannot be denied, however, that at the time the acts complained of in
CR No. 1423-I were committed, the deed of sale sought to be later annulled
in CV No. 8769 was binding upon the parties thereto, including the petitioners.
The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

More specifically, what private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is

that the checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of
funds upon due presentment to the drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of
said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to
the deed of sale, continued to subsist. And because petitioners' checks were
dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners are answerable under the law for the
consequences of their said acts.
DISTINGUISHMENT OF LIQUIDATION AND REHABILITATION
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Vega
G.R. No. 105364* June 28, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors
and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed
to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash,
discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a

reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation
to its former position of successful operation and solvency.

FACTS:
The Central Bank of the Philippines filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank. Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans Bank Employees Union-
N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez,
filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said
court.

Petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above
case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.

The Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation
of the Philippine Veterans Bank.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.

Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority

allowing the PVB to reopen.

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB,

respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank.
Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to order the payment
and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while
petitioners’ claims have been frozen to their prejudice.

ISSUE:

May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine

Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and
reopening?

RULING:

No, liquidation court operations must cease to operate when there is an

enactment of rehabilitation on the same institution, here in this case Philippine
Veterans Bank. Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or
settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so
that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process
of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a

reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation
to its former position of successful operation and solvency.

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides: Sec. 10. Effectivity.
- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective
immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed
into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said
law became effective on said date.

Hence, the rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank will prevail over its
liquidation.