TITLE X – CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

PEOPLE V. GUIAPAR, G.R. NO. L-35465, MAY 31, 1984

FACTS:
On or about June 3, 1969, in the Municipality of Nuling, Province of Cotabato, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in company with Karim Abo
who is still at large conspiring, confederating together and helping one another and with intent of
gain, by means of force and violence against person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away one (1) revolver, caliber .38, with Serial No. LA-695, valued at
P400.00 and pocket money containing P70.00 cask Philippine currency, belonging to Demetrio
Fernandez without the consent and against the will of the latter to the damage and prejudice of
said Demetrio Fernandez in the aforesaid sum and by reason or on the occasion of such robbery,
the said accused, armed with a hard wood and hunting knife with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
felonious assault, hit, attack and stab said Demetrio Fernandez with said hard wood and hunting
knife, and as a result thereof, said Demetrio Fernandez sustained several stab wounds which
directly caused his death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused Karunsiang Guiapar after having
rendered the decision convicting his co-accused on the strength of the latter's testimony that he
committed the offense alone
RULING:
The court determined the intention of the offenders by their acts, prior to, contemporaneous with
and subsequent to the commission of the crime. There is no doubt that escape was intended by
the offenders. But if escape were the sole objective, then the same could have been attained after
the first assault (hitting the guard on the head with a piece of wood). The kicking and the
stabbing of the guard were unnecessary to effect the escape. Equally unnecessary was the taking
of the guard's gun and knife. These subsequent acts would merely delay the escape. Clearly,
robbery was equally intended and, in fact, consummated. The death of the guard resulting from
the injury he sustained during the robbery qualifies the offense to robbery with homicide. As
long as homicide resulted during, or because of, the robbery, even if the killing is by mere
accident, robbery with homicide is committed (People vs. Mangulabnan, et al.. L-8919, 52 O.G.
6532 [Sept. 28, 1956]); it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. (People vs. Saliling, L-27974, 69 SCRA 427 [Feb. 27, 1976]; People
vs. Arpa, et al., L-26789, 27 SCRA 1037 [April 25, 1969]). Further, whenever a homicide has
been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the crime are also guilty as principals in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it

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clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide (People vs. Bautista, L-25095, 49
Phil. 389 [Sept. 18, 1926]; U. S. vs. Macalalad, L-2558, 9 Phil. 1, [Oct. 8, 1907]). There is no
showing that Karunsiang Guiapar endeavored to prevent the injury to the deceased. It is of no
consequence whether or not said Karunsiang Guiapar hit the deceased on the base of the latter's
head; nor does it matter whether or not he took the guard's gun at the time of the commission of
the crime. Robbery with homicide was committed; and Karunsiang Guiapar is guilty thereof
together with his co-accused. Finally, they consider the circumstances appreciated by the lower
court in the imposition of the proper penalty. The lower court found Karunsiang Guiapar guilty
of the crime of robbery with homicide "with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and with
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and craft by
befriending the victim policeman, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same".

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 PEOPLE V. REGALA G.R. NO. 130508, APRIL 5, 2000
FACTS:
On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old
victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the former’s house. Appellant and his
companions entered the house through the kitchen and went to the room of the victims and poked
at the 8-inch gun on them, one after the other, and hogtied both of them. Armando raped Nerissa
in bed while her grandmother was hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmother’s
aparador being opened where two rings, two wrist watches, and money were taken from the
aparador. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from
the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and was raped again by the
accused. He was convicted in the lower court but the accused-appellant appealed his criminal
case at the Regional Trial Court in Masbate. He questioned the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. And based on
medico-legal, Dr. Conchita Ulanday, a health officer of Aroroy, testified herself that the
complaining witness “either” voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.
ISSUE:
Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered as an aggravating
circumstance?
RULING:
On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo, separately testified that they
saw the face of Regala, despite of no electricity at the commission of the crime, because he used
a flashlight and took off the mask he was wearing, and thus, they remembered him wearing an
earring of his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the
police station. The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot detract
from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified the accused- appellant. As
correctly pointed out by the appellee, the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the
ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-
appellant, who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulanday’s testimony does not support the contention
of the accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily submitted to sexual advances of Regala. The
crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: (1)
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. In this case, the additional rape
committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. The judgment convicting Armando

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Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, where the
victim is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
PEOPLE V. AVILA G.R. NO. L-19786, MARCH 31, 1923
FACTS:
Mrs. Pilares inadvertently left in a vehicle her purse containing money, gold coins, and jewels,
the value of which is P4,300. The driver of the vehicle found the purse, and knowing the owner
thereof, turned it over to the accused in order that the latter might return it to Pilares. The
accused, instead of doing so appropriated the purse with all its contents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused, upon the facts stated, committed the crime of theft?
RULING:
The accused is convicted of theft under the second paragraph of Article 517 of the Penal Code
which says: “The following are guilty of theft: Any person who, having found anything which
has been lost, shall with knowledge of its ownership appropriate the same with intent of gain.”
The accused in this case committed the offense of theft when he appropriated the purse
belonging to Lucio Pilares, and the circumstances that he received the purse by the delivery from
Tiburcio de los Santos, who was the actual finder, isimmaterial.

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 PEOPLE V. VALENZUELA G.R. NO. 160188, JUNE 21, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was
then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was
wearing an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a
pushcart with cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases
in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the
supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxesto the same area in the open parking space. When Lago asked petitioner for
a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a
warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. Before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
ISSUE:
Is the crime committed frustrated or consummated theft?
RULING:
The crime is consummated. The following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There was no need of an intent
to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. So long as the
descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and
apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of
another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. Insofar as
we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material in this respect. Unlawful
taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the
felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of
execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we can
only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

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 PEOPLE V. CONSTANTINO 60 O.G. 3603, SEPTEMBER 6, 1963
FACTS:
One Sabas Constantino was stabbed in Barrio Santor, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, on June 24, 1963.
Sabas is closely related to the appellants, being the brother of Fausto and Gregorio, the nephew
of Marcelo, and the cousin of Hilarion. The suspected assailant was Inocencio Romaguera who
happened to be the brother-in-law of the decedent, Carlino Perdido. Inocencio Romaguera fled
after the stabbing and he still remains at large. At about 10 o'clock in the evening of June 27,
1963, appellant Marcelo went with a group to the house of the deceased, looking for Inocencio.
Encarnacion Perdido, sister of the decedent who was in her house just 12 meters away, heard
Marcelo threaten the decedent by saying first, "if you are not going to bring out your brother-in-
law, I will pierce you" and then, "if you are going to involve yourself in this case, you will be a
victim." When these statements were made, Marcelo was at the foot of the stairs of Encarnacion's
house, and was about 2-1/2 meters away from her. Thereafter, she talked with the decedent and
confirmed that it was Marcelo who uttered those remarks. Early the following morning, June 28,
1963, before taking breakfast, the decedent left the house to see his plants and to gather
vegetables in the field, despite the admonitions of his wife, Florentina Romaguera, not to go out
in view of the incident the night before. When he did not return, Florentina went out to look for
the decedent and failing to find him, she reported his absence to Barrio Lieutenant Ignacio de la
Cruz. The latter, in turn, sought the aid of Sanchez Mira Police Chief Damaso Dumlao who sent
policemen Dominador Valdez and Tito Mangligot to Barrio Santor to investigate. The two
policemen arrived in Barrio Santor late that evening and early the next day, June 29, 1963, they
started looking for the decedent, together with the Barrio Lieutenant, Quirino Callo and other
barriomates. At around 10 o'clock that morning, they came upon the dead body of the decedent
near the creek, south of Barrio Santor.
ISSUE:
WON trial court erred for having relied upon the prosecution witnesses and in not upholding
their allegedly credible defenses.
RULING:
No. The flaws and defects in the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses raised by
appellants are too insubstantial to merit serious consideration. The relationship of Balicat, Callo
and Encarnacion Perdido to the decedent does not necessarily vitiate their otherwise credible
testimonies. Also, we can draw no suspicious inference from the fact that Quirino Callo did not
immediately denounce appellants before the authorities on June 28, 1968 since he did not
actually see them kill the victim but only saw them 300 meters away from the scene of the crime.

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 U.S. V. DE VERA G.R. NO. L-16961, SEPTEMBER 19, 1921
FACTS:
On the 20th of February, 1920, three Igorots named Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the
Escolta, of this city, trying to dispose of a bar of gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to his
house, stating that there was a woman there who would buy the precious metal. They
accompanied the Ilocano to the house indicated by him where they met a woman, the accused
herein, who, apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and requested them to hand it
examined, stating that she would return within a short time to report the result. The Igorot Pepe,
who was the owner of the bar of gold, thereupon handed it to her to have changed into silver
coins. The woman the left the house at about 12 o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait
there. But the woman did not return. They agreed that one of them should remain on watch while
the other two went to the Meisic police station to report the matter. The policeman Jose
Gonzalez, assigned to take charge of the case, soon identified the woman who had taken away
the bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had given him, an at a few minutes after 11
o'clock he already was in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining the accused as to the
whereabouts of the bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots. The two other policemen, Mr.
Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, they took the woman to house at No. 541 Calle Regidor, followed
by Gonzalez and the three Igorots. There the bar of gold divided into three pieces was found
wrapped in a handkerchief and placed inside the water tank of a water- closet. The accused
requested one Mamerta de la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in turn handed to the
policemen. According to Exhibit B, which is a certificate issued by the Bureau of Science, the
bar of gold delivered to the accused weighed 559.7 grammes and was worth P587.68 at the rate
of P1.05 per gramme; whereas, the three bars found by the police weighed only 416 grammes,
and were, therefor, 143.7 grammes short. Of the P200 bank notes delivered to the accused, she
returned only P150.
ISSUE:
WON the thing was delivered freely to the accused to effect actual delivery which would not fall
under the crime of theft.
RULING:
When the delivery of a chattel or cattle has not the effect of transferring the juridical possession
thereof, or title thereto, it is presumed that the possession of, and title to, the thing so delivered
remains in the owner; and the act of disposing thereof with intent of gain and without the consent
of the owner constitutes the crime oftheft.

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 SANTOS V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 77429, JANUARY 29, 1990
FACTS:
In November 1980, the complaining witness, En-carnacion Peñalosa, entrusted her car to
petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week later,
Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within a period of two
months. After the period, Peñalosa went to the petitioner’s repair shop at Malabon, to retrieve her
car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she did
not have the money then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she could
not find Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the shop several times
thereafter but to no avail. Unable to recover her car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against
Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed
when the petitioner convinced the military authorities that the complainant had sold the vehicle
to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor. On
October 26, 1982, an information for estafa on Peñalosa’s complaint was filed against Santos in
the RTC of Quezon City. The accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced to “an
indeterminate penalty”. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but Santos was held guilty of
qualified theft and not estafa. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner is really guilty of theft and not estafa
RULING:
Yes. Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft.
It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as
alleged in the information. And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all
the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use
of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things. Theft should not be confused
with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal
Code, “The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in
estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there
may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the
material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.”

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 DIMAT V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 181184, JANUARY 25, 2012
FACTS:
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law before
the Manila RTC. Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo
Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife,
Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a Nissan Safari for P850,000.00. On March 7, 2001 PO
Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the said car on E.
Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and
inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its
chassis number CRGY60- YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of
stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had
been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Mantequilla affirmed that he owned the
said car which he mortgaged to RCBC. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at
Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG. Apparently, Dimat
claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the car in good faith and for value from a
certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and
its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also
claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers
took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle. On July
20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to
an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. The court also ordered him to pay P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for
gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
RULING:
Yes. The elements of “fencing” are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, “buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken” during
that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from
that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. In this
case, Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped
on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the
correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis. Second, Dimat claims lack of criminal intent

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as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.

PAMINTUAN V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 111426, JULY 11, 1994

FACTS:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH, arrived at his residence located at Parañaque at
around 9:45 p.m. of 12 February 1988 coming from the airport and immediately proceeded
inside the house, leaving behind his driver and 2 housemaids outside to pick-up his personal
belongings from his case. 5 unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion
of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them
inside his house. The men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor.
Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away pieces of jewelry and other personal
properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to
the police. He was then interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an operation
group would be assigned to the case. He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police
District on 15 February 1988. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house
and he was asked to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including
a sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown
area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made
with their participation, on 14 February 1988. As such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00
a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he was with his
wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall
being tended by Norma Dizon-Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with
diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud, 1 set of earring diamond worth
P15,000, and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000. Dizon-Pamintuan was charged with
violation of the Anti- Fencing Law. On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the offended parties), Cp. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel
Sanchez, both of the Western Police District, the RTC Manila promulgated on 16 November
1990 its decision, finding Dizon-Pamintuan guilty for violation of Presidential Decree 1612
beyond reasonable doubt, and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from 14 years of prison mayor to 18 years of reclusion temporal. No civil liability was imposed
in view of the recovery of the items. Dizon-Pamintuan then appealed her conviction to the CA
where she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that
the prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00. On 29
March 1993, the Court of Appeals held that the guilt of Dizon-Pamintuan was established
beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was
not enough evidence to prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to
the imposition of the proper penalty under Section 3 of PD 1612. It opined that the trial court
erred in concluding that the value of the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare
testimony of Teodoro Encarnacion and the self-serving list he submitted; and thus remanded the
records to the court of origin. Dizon-Pamintuan filed the petition for review.

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ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the prosecution proved the existence of the third element in the crime of fencing,
i.e. the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from here were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft.

RULING:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." Herein, there is no doubt that the first, second, and
fourth elements were duly established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the
house of Encarnacion who afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the Western
Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the
jewelry taken from them. Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded
with diamonds worth P75,000.00; (b) one set of earrings worth P15,000.00; and (c) a chain with
crucifix worth P3,000.00, were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by Dizon-Pamintuan in Sta.
Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on
the part of Dizon Pamintuan. As to the third element, one is deemed to know a particular fact if
he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, is aware of the existence of
something, or hasthe acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with
certitude and clarity. Since Section 5 of PD 1612 expressly provides that "mere possession of
any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that Dizon Pamintuan is presumed
to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of
robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise
from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This
presumption does not offend the presumption271 of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
Dizon-Pamintuan was unable to rebut the presumption under PD 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the
contrary, even disclosed that Dizon-Pamintuan was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry
and that she used to buy from a certain Fredo.

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 DIZON-PAMINTUAN VS. PEOPLE GR 111426, JULY 11, 1994
FACTS:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH testified that when he arrived at his residence, he
immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside
to pickup his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five unidentified masked
armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns
to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house. They were made to lie face
down on the floor and thereafter, the robbers ransacked thehouse and took away jewellery and
other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter
immediately to the police. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area
as tipped by the informer the police and an entrapment was made with their participation. He and
his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the
stall being tended by Dizon-Pamintuan. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to
prove by evidence that the recovered items were part of the loot and such recovered items belong
to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That the recovered items were
found in the possession of the accused and she was not able to rebut the presumption though the
evidence for the defense alleged that the stall is owned by one “Fredo”
ISSUE:
Whether the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft?
RULING:
Fencing, as defined in the Anti Fencing Law, is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,or
shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such
under the RPC or the Anti Fencing Law. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere
accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. The state may thus choose to
prosecute him either under the RPC or the Anti Fencing Law, although the preference for the
latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and the Anti
Fencing Law creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of the property. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements
were duly established. Robbery was committed in the house of the private complainants who
afterwards reported the incident to the authorities and submitted a list of the lost items and
sketches of the jewelry that were later displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in
Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain
on the part of the petitioner. Since Section 5of the Anti Fencing Law expressly provides that
mere possession of any good, article, item, object ,or anything of value which has been the

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subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing, it follows that the
petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were
the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical
inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in
the fundamental law.

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 PEOPLE V. CHUA G.R. NO. 187052, SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
FACTS:
Within the period of 29 July 2002 up to 20 August 2002, accused personally met the
complainants individually and on separate dates where she represented herself to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport the complainants as Filipino Overseas Workers,
particularly Taiwan. She personally received various amounts as placement fees in consideration
for their overseas employment and personally issued receipts to the complainants. Accused
represented herself that she is an employee of Gate International (Golden Gate) Office located in
Paragon Tower, Ermita, Manila. She also assured them that the earlier complainants would be
able to pay their placement fees then the earlier that they could leave. After the complainants
completed payment of their placement fees, they were made to sign a contract containing
stipulations as to salary and conditions of work. On several occasions thereafter, they returned to
the appellant's office to follow-up on their application. After several visits, however, they noticed
that all the properties of Golden Gate in its Paragon Tower Office were already gone. Thus, the
complainants filed a complaint for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against the accused. During
trial, the accused denied that she was the one who recruited the complainants and that she is
merely a cashier of Golden Gate.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa?
RULING:
YES. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both
illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefore is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. However, the Supreme Court held that the
prosecution failed to establish the presence of the third and fourth elements of estafa as to the
case of private complainant Ursulum. While Ursulum claims that he delivered to the accused
some amounts, he failed to produce receipts to substantiate the same. Instead, Ursulum relies
only on ten text messages allegedly sent by the accused as evidence of their transaction. Said text
messages alone does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was able to
obtain an amount from Ursulum as a result of her false pretenses. Unlike in illegal recruitment
where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear showing that the offended
party parted with his money or property upon the offender’s false pretenses, and suffered damage
thereby. In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the

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elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused. It is imperative,
therefore, that damage as an element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) be proved as
conclusively as the offense itself. The failure of the prosecution to discharge this burden
concerning the estafa allegedly committed against Ursulum warrants the acquittal of appellant on
the said charge.

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 PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO G.R. NO. 208686, JULY 1, 2015
FACTS:
ALELIE TOLENTINO a.k.a. "Alelie Tolentino y Hernandez was charged at RTC Muntinlupa
with illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Accused represented to the 5 complainants that she could secure work at
Korea and she is capable of processing the travel visa and other documents for their travel and
employment at Korea and demanded from the said complainant to pay the amount of ₱80,000.00
as placement fee, except for LEDERLE PANESA, which is 75, 000.00. Complainants gave and
delivered a partial payment to the appellant, however upon learning of the accused’s arrest for
illegal recruitment, they demanded their money be returned but failed to recover such amounts,
private complainants were able to secure a certification from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) that appellant was not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment. Appellant admitted that she had no authority or valid license to engage in
recruitment and placement of workers. The testimonies and the documentary evidence submitted
by the prosecution showed that appellant led complainants to believe that she had the power or
ability to send private complainants to Korea to work as factory workers and that the latter were
convinced to give their payment to appellant in order to be employed. Appellant even issued
petty cash vouchers acknowledging receipt of private complainants’ payment and she made them
sign Trainee Agreements, which were purportedly their contract with their Korean employer.
Appellant’s claim that it was Narcisa Santos who recruited the private complainants and who
profited from the illegal transaction was disregarded by the Court of Appeals for lack of
evidence. The Court of Appeals noted that it was appellant who dealt directly with private
complainants. The Court of Appeals ruled that a person may be charged and convicted separately
of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) in relation to the Labor Code, and
estafa underArticle 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic
Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
YES. First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Part of the evidence submitted
by the prosecution is a POEA Certification dated 10 March 2003, stating that appellant is not
licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Appellant admitted that she
has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers. Second, despite the absence of a license or authority to undertake recruitment
activities, the appellant gave the impression that she has the power or ability to secure work for
private complainants in Korea. Private complainants Orlando Layoso, Donna Magboo, and
Jimmy Lejos all testified that appellant promised them work as factory workers in Korea and

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induced them to pay placement fees, which included the expenses for medical examination and
the processing of their documents for work in Korea. Appellant even showed pictures of
previous applicants, whom she allegedly helped find work abroad. Appellant also explained to
them the procedure for overseas employment and promised them that she would secure their
visas and employment contracts within three months. The testimonies of Orlando Layoso, Donna
Magboo, and Jimmy Lejos were corroborated by private respondents Marcelino Lejos and
Lederle Panesa, whose Affidavits of Complaint were adopted as their direct testimonies. This
Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he could send
workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal
recruitment. Third, there are at least three victims in this case which makes appellant liable for
large-scale illegal recruitment. ppellant denies that she gave private complainants the distinct
impression that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work. She insists that she
herself had been applying then as a factory worker in Korea through Narcisa Santos, who had
previously deployed her as domestic helper in Hongkong. Although appellant admits having
received payments from private complainants and issuing receipts, she submits that she did so
only upon the instructions of Narcisa Santos, to whom she turned over the money collected from
private complainants.275 The Court is not swayed by appellant’s contentions. Asfound by the
trial court and the appellate court, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the
private complainants: she explained to them the procedure for276 overseas employment; she
charged them placement fees to cover their medical examination and the processing of their
travel documents;she issued petty cash vouchers with her signature, acknowledging receipts of
their payments; she promised the eventual release of their visas and employment contracts; and
she made them sign Trainee Agreements, purportedly their contract with their Korean employer.
Clearly, appellant, despite being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority, engaged in
recruitment activities, making her liable for illegalrecruitment. Well-settled is the rule that the
trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial,
can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Appellant’s mere denial
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants. The trial court’s
findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some
substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the case. Furthermore, factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are deemed binding and
conclusive.

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INTESTATE ESTATE OF CARUNGCONG V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 181409, FEB. 11, 2010
FACTS:
William was married to Zenaida. They have two daughters, Karen and Wendy. Zenaida died
ahead of her mother Manolita, William's mother-in-law. In 1992, William made Manolita sign
special powers of attorney appointing Wendy, then only 20 years old, as Manolita’s attorney-in-
fact to sell and dispose of four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William told Manolita
(who was already completely blind) that the documents she wassigning were merely for paying
taxes. Believing William's misrepresentation, Manolita signed the documents. The parcels of
land were sold and William misappropriated the proceeds thereof amounting to P22,034,000.
After the death of Manolita, Mediatrix, one of the surviving daughters, filed a petition for the
settlement of Manolita’s intestate estate before the RTC praying that she be appointed
administratrix thereof. After her appointment as such, Mediatrix learned from her niece Wendy
about the fraudulent sale of the parcels of land and the misappropriation committed by William.
Thus, as the duly appointed administrator of the estate of her deceased mother, she filed a case
for estafa against her brother-in-law, William. William moved to quash the Information claiming
that under Article 332 (1) of the RPC, his relationship to Manolita, his mother-in-law exempts
him from criminal liability. The RTC sustained William’s motion and dismissed the information.
The court said that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity of her
husband William and her mother Manolita, and therefore Article 332(1) exempting him from
criminal liability was still applicable. The CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Should William be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to Manolita?
RULING:
No. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
The Information against William charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the
offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the
offense. What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission
of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in
the Information. A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that William is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. He resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special
power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa. Since the
crime with which the respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, he cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause
provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor. The purpose of Article 332 is

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to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. Thus, the action provided under the said
provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to
the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through
falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension
and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves.
Effectively, when the offender resortsto an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of
public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed
from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

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PEOPLE V. NITAFAN G.R. NOS. 81559-60, APR. 6, 1992
FACTS:
The accused, being then the proprietress of Eckart Enterprises, a business entity allegedly
defraud the Allied Banking Corporation, a banking institution, represented by its Account
Officer, Raymund S. Li, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused received in trust from
the aforesaid bank Gordon Plastics, plastic sheeting and Hook Chromed, in the total amount of
P398,000.00, specified in a trust receipt and covered by Domestic Letter of Credit No.
DLC?002-801254, under the express obligation on the part of said accused to sell the same and
account for the proceeds of the sale thereof, if sold, or to return said merchandise, if not sold, on
or before October 16, 1980, or upon demand, but the said accused, once in possession of the said
articles, far from complying with the aforesaid obligation, notwithstanding repeated demands
made upon her to that effect, paid only the amount of P283,115.78, thereby leaving unaccounted
for the amount of P114,884.22 which, once in her possession, with intent to defraud, she
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Allied Banking Corporation in the aforesaid sum of P114,884.22,
Philippine Currency. The accused filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused can be punished under P.D. 115.
RULING:
"SEC. 13 of P.D. No. 115 provides: "xxx Penalty clause. - The failure of an entrustee to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to
the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said
goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of
Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight
Hundred and Fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation
or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the
penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or
other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil
liabilities arising from the criminal offense." The factual circumstances in the present case show
that the alleged violation was committed sometime in 1980 or during the effectivity of P.D. 115.
The failure, therefore, to account for the P114,884.22 balance is what makes the accused-
respondent criminally liable for estafa. The trust receipt arrangement has a security feature that is
covered by the trust receipt itself. Like Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, punishes the act "not as an
offense against property, but as an offense against public order. x x x The misuse of trust receipts
therefore should be deterred to prevent any possible havoc in trade circles and the banking
community. The offense is punished as a malum prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent

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or malice. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a
criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest.
Therefore, the RTC decision granting the motion to quash was set aside and remanded

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