OCN-L-002164-21 09/12/2021 9:33:42 PM Pg 1 of 3 Trans ID: LCV20212109774

September 12, 2021

VIA E-COURTS
Honorable Craig L. Wellerson, P.J.S.C.
Superior Court of New Jersey
Law Division, Ocean County
100 Hooper Avenue
Tom’s River, New Jersey 08753
Re: Township of Brick vs. Congregation Kehilos Yisroel, Inc.
Docket No.: OCN-L-002164-21

Dear Judge Wellerson:

Our firm represents Defendants in the above-captioned matter. Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a
more formal brief in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to our motion to remove.

Essentially, Plaintiff’s argument is that the Law Division has the authority to adjudicate matters of
equitable relief, and therefore, this matter should not be removed to the Chancery Division. Plaintiff cites a slew
of cases to support this notion. However, as shall be set forth further below, although the Law Division may be
a proper venue for equitable relief in certain circumstances, the current matter does not fall within those
circumstances. Therefore, this case should properly be removed to the Chancery Division.

Plaintiff first cites Paul v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. Super. 286, 289 (App. Div. 1984). However, the
facts of Paul are clearly distinguishable from the current matter. In Paul, the Plaintiff brought an action in Law
Division for a personal injury matter. The Plaintiff also filed a supplemental complaint, seeking a judgment
declaring that Defendant Ohio Casualty was bound to cover certain medical expenses. In those circumstances,
where the ultimate issue to be decided by the Court was a monetary one, the Court held that the entire
matter may be properly heard in the law division, although the remedy sought was declaratory judgment.

In contrast, in the present matter, the ultimate issue to be decided by the Court is an equitable one;
namely, whether or not to grant an injunction. In this circumstance, the ultimate remedy is equitable, and
should be properly heard in the Chancery Division.
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In fact, the next case cited by Plaintiff specifically states regarding declaratory judgment that: “[s]uch
relief is neither equitable or legal in nature, but takes on the color of either, depending upon the issue involved.”
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Butler, 128 N.J. Super. 492, 495 (Ch. Div. 1974). Clearly, seeking a
declaratory judgment in and of itself does not mean that a case should be placed in the Law Division. Rather,
the question of proper forum depends upon “the issue involved”. Since the current matter involves an issue that
is completely equitable in nature, the proper venue is the Chancery Division.

Plaintiff further cites to Theodore v. Dover Board of Education, 183 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1982).
While it is not entirely clear from Plaintiff’s brief what he intends to glean from this case, Theodore is an
entirely different set of facts from the current matter. In Theodore, a case for wrongful termination was
improperly filed and adjudicated, through trial, in the Chancery Division. The Appellate Court therefore noted
that such an improper placement of the action was not grounds to reverse the judgment. This does not mean that
an action at its very inception should be kept in the wrong court. Indeed, the Appellate Court specifically noted
that “the Chancery Division designation was improper. In view of the essentially tort nature of the cause of
action, it belonged in the Law Division. While that error represented a misallocation of the business of the
trial court divisions, it is nevertheless clear that it was not a jurisdictional error. See R. 4:3-1.” Id., at 411.
(emphasis added).

In the present matter, the case is merely at the onset. Defendant has not yet even filed an answer.
Therefore, at this point in the case, as a purely equitable matter, this case should be removed to the proper
forum, namely, the Chancery Division.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s citation of Boardwalk Properties v. BPHC, 253 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 1991),
is misplaced. In that case, the complaint raised both issues of equity and law, and there were actions pending in
both the Law and Chancery divisions. As the case was pending trial, the Court discussed whether the issues
could be brought to a jury in the Law Division, or if the case should be kept in the Chancery Division. In that
specific circumstance, the Court noted that the Chancery and Law Divisions each have coextensive jurisdiction
to hear a case.

In contrast, in the current matter, the relief sought is entirely equitable in nature, and therefore, should be
properly heard in the Chancery Division.

Plaintiff further cites Washington Commons v. City of Jersey City, 416 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div.
2010), and opines that the case “is particularly instructive in the instant matter.” However, Plaintiff fails to set
forth what relation that case has to the present matter.

A review of the case shows that the issue in Washington was whether a defendant’s motion for
equitable relief was proper in an action originally brought as a prerogative of writ by the Plaintiff, or whether
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Defendant was required to file a new and separate complaint. This question has no bearing whatsoever on the
current matter.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s citation to Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Green Brook v. Datchko, 142 N.J. Super. 501
(App. Div. 1976) is puzzling, as that case has no relation to the current matter. In Green Brook, the Court
discussed whether an action to enforce a municipal ordinance could be filed as a complaint in lieu of a
prerogative of writ. The Court held that it could. There is no discussion as to the removal of an action to the
Chancery Division from the Law Division.

Thus, the holding in Green Brook, is completely unrelated to the current motion for removal to the
Chancery Division, and Plaintiff’s brief does nothing to explain how this case is relevant to the current matter.

Indeed, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, New Jersey cases are full of instances where the Courts have
heard motions to transfer, and have transferred actions between the Law Division and the Chancery Division, as
appropriate. See e.g.; Fazio v. Temp. Excellence, Inc., No. A-5441-08T3 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 2012) (slip op. at 6
n.1) (“By order dated November 17, 2006, the Chancery court transferred the matter to the Law Division.”); In
re North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 175 N.J. Super. 167, 181 (App. Div. 1980) (“Defendants thereafter
moved for an order transferring the action pending in the Chancery Division to this court.”); Long v. Landy, 35
N.J. 44, 52 (1961) (“[I]f by inadvertence one were instituted in the Law Division… [t]he matter would simply
be transferred to the Chancery Division.”). As further stated in my initial motion papers, the Court Rules
themselves allow for a motion to remove. See Rule 4:3-1, et seq.

Therefore, as set forth in Court Rule 4:3-1, et seq., as well as the case law cited above, this matter should
be transferred to the Chancery Division.

Respectfully submitted,

LEVIN, SHEA, PFEFFER & GOLDMAN P.A.

Attorneys for Defendant

By:__/s/ Adam Pfeffer______

Adam Pfeffer Esq.