Journal of Philosophy, Inc

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Is Marxism a Philosophy?
Author(s): Derek P. H. Allen
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 17, Seventy-First Annual Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 10, 1974), pp. 601-612
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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IS MARXISM A PHILOSOPHY? 6oI
W
IS MARXISM A PHILOSOPHY?
T T HAT countsas orthodoxMarxismis controversial.

It is
widelybelieved that thereare significantdoctrinaldiffer-
ences between Marx on the one hand and Engels and
Lenin on the other.This view is mistaken,I believe,but I will not
argue the point. To determinewhetherMarxism is a philosophy,
we mightask whetherand, if so how, Marxism thoughtof itselfas
a philosophy.According to Lenin, Marxism is not a philosophy,
but part of Marxism is. "The philosophyof Marxism is material-
ism."1 But Engels writes that "modern materialismis essentially
dialectic,and no longer needs any philosophystanding above the
othersciences. . . . That which still survives,independently,of all
earlier philosophy is the science of thoughtand its laws-formal
logic and dialectics.Everythingelse is subsumedin the positivesci-
ence of nature and history."2 Then again Marx in 1843 assignedto
philosophy the task of unmasking human self-alienation.The
proletariatcould be emancipatedonly on conditionthatphilosophy
be actualized, which would be for philosophyas such to be abol-
ished.3 (Whether these sets of remarksare mutually consistentI
will not consider.) But we might ask instead, or as well, whether
Marxism is at least in part a philosophyby virtue of taking sys-
tematicallyrelated positions on issues of traditionalphilosophical
interest.I believe that Marxism can be understoodor reconstructed
to commit itself to a number of philosophical positions, among
which is the normativeethical theoryof utilitarianism.To make
the case forthisthesisinvolvesreconstructing the classical textsand
usinga mode of argumentationtheirauthorsdid not use in response
to questions theydid not ask, but on which neverthelessthe posi-
tionstheywould have takenhad it seemed importantto themto do
so may be surmised.That thissortof approach is unavoidable indi-
catesat least one way in which Marxismfails to be a philosophy.
I have argued elsewherefor a utilitarianinterpretationof Marx
and Engels.4But thiswas a mistakeif Marx's critiqueof capitalism
neitheris nor includes a moral theoryas such or any special moral
* To be presentedin an APA symposiumof the same title,December 28, 1974;
Marlene Gerber Fried will comment; see this JouRNAL, this issue, pp. 612/3.
1 V. I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism," Lenin
Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968), p. 21.
2 F. Engels, Anti-Duhring (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969), p. 36.
3 J. O'Malley, ed., Karl Marx's Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' (New
York: Cambridge, 1970), pp. 131-142.
4 "The Utilitarianismof Marx and Engels," American Philosophical Quarterly,
X, 3 (July1973): 189-199.
602 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
principle,as Allen Wood has claimed in a recentarticle."The core

of Wood's case is as follows.Marx did not criticizecapitalismin the
name of justice, not for the tactical reason that to have done so
might have turned the workers'revolutionarymovementin a re-
formistdirection,but because "the rhetoricof justice . . . presup-
posed a theoryof societywhich he believed he had shown to be
false" (274). In his critiqueof Hegel, Marx rejected the "juridical"
conception of society,which takes the legal-political "aspect" of
social life to be fundamentaland justice to be the highestmeasure
of thingshuman. In its place Marx put a theoryfor which all "as-
pects" of society interact as dependent moments of a mode of
production.6A transactionis just, on thistheory,if it "corresponds"
to the prevailingmode of production,which it does if it "plays a
concreterole in thismode" and "functionsas an actual momentin
the production process."7There are no general rules of "natural
justice"; rather,each mode of production has the principles of
justice appropriateto it. Direct slaveryin itselfis neitherjust nor
unjust. It is just in antiquitybut not in capitalism.Each mode of
production is just in its own way, none is "more just" than any
other; thus it would be a mistaketo criticizecapitalismfor failing
to conformto post-capitaliststandards of justice. Rational assess-
mentsof thejustice of specificacts and institutionsare in order,but
only if based on "the concretefunction"of those acts and institu-
tions withina specificmode of production.In Marx's view capital-
ism is not unjust. The basis of capitalism is the appropriationof
surplusvalue by capital throughthe exploitationof unpaid labor.
This practiceis not unjust preciselybecause it is the basis of capital-
ism. Marx did morally condemn certain features of capitalism,
but not because he subscribed to some philosophically derived
moral principle,like the principle of utility;rather,some features
of capitalism-e.g., "disguisedexploitation"and "unnecessaryservi-
tude"-were unproblematicallygood reasons for condemning it
(Wood, 281/2).
In the balance of this paper, I shall discusstwo ways in which I
findWood's case unsatisfactory.8 He fails to notice that Marx be-
6 "The Marxian Critiqueof Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs,i, 3 (Spring
1972):244-282.
6Wood says that,forMarx, a mode of productionis "an organicwhole of
social lifein a givenhistoricalepoch"(ibid.,p. 251).
7Ibid., p. 256. Cf. K. Marx,Capital (London: Lawrence& Wishart,1970-72),
III, pp. 339-340.
8 There are more.For example,I believeWood goeswrongin his accountof
Marx'stheoryofsocialstructure. He seemsto thinkthatif theeconomic,or any,
"aspect"of societywere "fundamental" it would causallydeterminebut could
IS MARXISM A PHILOSOPHY? 603
lieves capitalism to be unjust by its own standardsand that Marx

judges the capitalistprinciple of distributivejustice to be defective
in comparisonto the communist.To make the firstpoint I shall
considerMarx's account of the exchange relation between laborer
and capitalist.This relation is not what it appears to be. Its essen-
tial nature must be discovered by what Marx calls (empirical)
"science,"6 not philosophy. The second point raises a difficulty
whichdeservesto be called philosophical but which Marx does not-
discuss.I believe he could have solved it by appealing to the prin-
ciple of utility.
Wood argues that for Marx the appropriationof surplus value by

capital is not an injustice. The laborer is paid "what is socially
necessaryfor the reproductionof his life-activity
as a worker"(262),
which is to say that he receivesthe value of his labor power. His
exchangewith the capitalistis, "accordingto the Ricardian formula
and the strictestrules of commodityexchange,a just transaction,an
exchangeof equivalent forequivalent. Surplus value, to be sure, is
appropriatedby the capitalistwithout an equivalent. But there is
nothing in the exchange requiring him to pay an equivalent for
it." 10 The value createdby labor power duringa day is more than
what the buyerof labor powerpays forits use. "This circumstance,"
says Marx, "is, withoutdoubt, a piece of good luck for the buyer,
but by no means an injustice (Unrecht) to the seller."1"
As far as he goes, Wood is correct.But there is more to Marx's
point, as the firstchapteron "Wages" in Capital makes clear. The
transactionbetweencapitalistand laborer appears to be just and is
just. But the transactionthat appears to occur does not, and the
transactionthat really occurs does not appear. According to the
principle that is used in capitalist society to appraise what ap-
parentlyoccurs,what reallyoccursis unjust; but it does not appear
to be, because it does not appear. However, accordingto the prin-
ciple that governswhat really occurs,what really occurs is just. It
appears that labor is exchanged for its "value," but what really is
exchangedforits value is labor power. (It mustbe emphasizedthat
not be causallydetermined by any other(249-252).But forMarx the economic

"base" of societyis fundamental, althoughin a sense compatiblewith the
possibilitythatit be causallydetermined in certainlimitedrespectsby super-
structuralelementsor events.
S Capital, I, p. 542.
10 Ibid.; cf. Capital, x,p. 583.
11Ibid., p. 194. I followWood in translating
'Unrecht'as 'injustice'not 'in-
jury'.Cf. Marx Engels Werke(Berlin:Dietz Verlag,1972),xxiii, p. 208.
Marx thoughtthat the expression'value of labor' was "irrational,"

but also that in capitalistsocietyit is apparentlysignificant(cf. be-
low). Speaking more strictlythan does Marx himselfin the first
"Wages" chapter, it appears that labor is exchanged for a wage
equivalent to the value that the laborer adds to the value he trans-
fers to the product from those componentsof the labor process
which representmaterializedlabor power. This is what it means to
say that labor appears to be exchanged for its "value." Since I can
think of no noncircumlocutious,accurate paraphrase,I shall con-
tinue to say (with Marx but in invertedcommas) that the laborer
appears to be paid the "value" of his labor.)
Justiceappears to require that the laborerbe paid the "value" of
his labor, and so it appears he is. But justice reallyrequires that he
be paid the value of his labor power, and so he really is. What he
is paid appears to be what justice apparentlyrequires; but he is
really paid less than what justice apparentlyrequires because the
value of his labor power is less than the "value" of his labor. The
practiceof payingthe laborerless than the "value" of his labor con-
flictswith the principle which requires that he be paid a wage
equivalent to the "value" of his labor. Relative to thatprinciple,the
practice is unjust. Since it is that principle which the agents and
apologistsof capitalismuse to appraise capitalistpractice,capitalism
is unjust by one of its own standards.But it would be absurd to
demand that capitalistpractice conformto capitalistprinciple,for
the principle by which capitalism appraises its practice is incom-
patible with the basis of capitalistproduction: if the laborer were
to be paid the "value" of his labor, he would create no surplus
value; and without the creation of surplus value, capitalism is in.
conceivable. Thus the principle in question is inappropriate for
appraisingcapitalistpractice.This needs to be clarified.A principle
is inappropriateforappraisinga practicein case conformity of the
practiceto the principlewould be incompatiblewith the prevailing
mode of production.What it means to say that a practiceis incom-
patible with a mode of production is best indicated by example.
Thus directslaveryis incompatiblewith capitalismbecause capital-
ism requires "free" wage-laborers;for this reason direct slavery
under capitalismis unjust. A principleis appropriateforappraising
a practicein case conformity of the practiceto the principlewould
be compatible with the prevailingmode of production.A practice
that is required by a mode of production is obviously compatible
with it. The appropriationof surplus value by capital is required
by capitalismand is therefore just.
"On the surfaceof bourgeoissocietythe wage of the labourer ap-

pears as the priceof labour" (Capital i, p. 535). But "wages,"or "the
value and priceof labour," are "categoriesforthephenomenalforms
of essentialrelations"(537). And "in respectto the phenomenalform
. . . as contrastedwith the essentialrelationmanifestedtherein,viz.,
the value and price of labour power,the same difference holds that
holds in respectto all phenomenaand theirhidden substratum.The
formerappear directly and spontaneously as current modes of
thought;the lattermust firstbe discoveredby science" (542). This
discoveryclassical political economy failed to make because "it
accepted uncriticallythe categories'value of labour', 'natural price
of labour', etc.,as finaland adequate expressionsfor the value-rela-
tion under consideration"(538).
"Value of labour" is an "imaginary"and "irrational expression
forthe value of labour-power"(539). But it arisesfromthe relations
of production themselves(537). The agents of these relations,
capitalist and laborer, like the classical economists,are unaware
that the form in which their exchange relation appears is irra-
tional. "Since theyare accustomedto move about in such relations,
theyfindnothingstrangetherein.A complete contradictionoffers
not the slightestmysteryto them (Capital, III, p. 779). Marx cites
Hegel: "that which seems irrational to ordinary common sense
is rational, and that which seems rational to it is itselfirrational"
(ibid.). To commonsense it must seem irrationalthat an exchange
of one day's labor for the "value" of less than a day's labor be an
exchange of equivalents; but, if a day's labor exchanges for the
value of a day's labor power, then it is rational that a day's labor
exchange for an equivalent that is less than the "value" of a day's
labor, because the value of a day's labor power is produced in less
than a day. On the other hand, what seems rational to common
sense-that a day's wage equal the "value" of a day's labor-is irra-
tional because incompatible with the creation of surplus value,
which requires a day's labor to be exchanged for less than its
"value"; to suppose thisexchangeneverthelessto be an exchangeof
labor for wages equal to its "value" is plainly contradictory.
'Value of labor' is an "irrational"expression,but neverthelessit
is used in capitalistsocietyas if it were significant."Thus people
speak of thevalue of labour and call itsexpressionin moneyitsneces-
saryor naturalprice."12 If a workingday of 12 hoursembodiesitself
12 Capital,x,p. 535. For an important
discussionof the "irrational"categories
deployedby politicaleconomy,see the "TrinityFormula"chapter,Ca$ital, II,
pp. 814-831.
6o6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in a moneyvalue of 6s., then the "value" of a day's labor is 6s. If

"equivalents are exchanged,. . . then the labourer receives6s. for
12 hours' labour; the price of his labour would be equal to the
price of his product. In this case he produces no surplus-valuefor
the buyer of his labour, . . . the basis of capitalist production
vanishes. But it is on this verybasis that he sells his labour and
that his labour is wage-labour."18 The laborer sells his labor on a
basis that makes possible the productionof surplus value. If he is
to produce surplus value he must be paid less than the "value" of
his labor; accordingly,he is paid foronly a part of the workingday.
But the value he receives-his wage-"appears as the value or price
of the whole workingday. . . . The wage-formthus extinguishes
everytrace of the division of the working-dayinto . . . paid and
unpaid labour. All labour appears as paid labour" (539). Bourgeois
jurisprudence and apologetics rest on this appearance. "This
phenomenal form [wages or the "value" and "price" of labour it-
selfl, which makes the actual relation [the value and price of
labour-power]invisible,and, indeed, shows the direct opposite of
thatrelation,formsthe basis of all the juridical notions(Rechtsvor-
stellungen)of both labourer and capitalist,of all the mysitifications
of the capitalistmode of production,of all its illusionsas to liberty,
of all the apologetic shiftsof the vulgar economists"(540). In the
Grundrisse,14 Marx develops the point that the wage formis the
basis of capitalist apologetics. The capitalist appears to exchange
wages equivalent to the "value" of the labor he receives. The
economists"take refuge"in this appearance "in order to construct
a legitimation,an apology for capital by explaining it with the
very process which makes its existence impossible. In order to
demonstrateit theydemonstrateit away." Their apology is to this
effect:"You pay me formy labour, you exchange it forits product
and deduct frommy pay the value of the raw material and instru-
ment which you have furnished.That means we are partnerswho
bringdifferent elementsinto theprocessof productionand exchange
according to their values. Thus the product is transformedinto
money,and themoneyis divided in such a way thatyou, the capital-
ist, obtain the price of your raw material and your instrument,
while I, the worker,obtain the price which my labour added to
them"(322).
13 Capital,x,p. 536. Marx expresseshimselfmisleadinglyhere.The value of
theday'slaborin thisexampleis not6s.,becausethe6s. also "embody"thevalue
the laborertransfersto his productfromthe meansof production.Marx puts
the pointmorecarefully in the passagefromthe Grundrisse quoted below.
14London:PenguinBooks,1973.
IS MARXISMA PHILOSOPHY? 607
For the laborer to receiveless than the "value" of his labor is a

violation of his contract with the capitalist-as the contract is
understoodin bourgeoislaw-and therefore, accordingto bourgeois
principle,unjust. Marx makes somethinglike this point explicit in
the Critique of the Gotha Programme(1875).15In the firstphase
of postcapitalistsocietythe individual producer"receivesback from
society-after the deductions have been made-exactly what he
givesto it." He receivesin theformof means of consumptionexactly
what he gives in the formof labor; "so much labour is one form
is exchangedforan equal amount of labour in anotherform."Marx
continues,"equal right here is still in principle-bourgeois right
althoughprincipleand practiceare no longer in conflict"(8/9). In
capitalistsocietythepracticeof payingthelaborera wage equivalent
to part of the "value" of his labor conflictswith the principle that
he receive the equivalent of its full "value"; but postcapitalist
practice will conformto capitalist principle. On Wood's interpre-
tation, Marx believes that practice and principle conformwithin
capitalistsociety.But Marx argues,in effect,that capitalistpractice
conformsto the principle which is appropriate for appraising it
-that the laborer be paid the value of his labor power-but not to
the principle by which the agents and apologistsof capitalist pro-
duction actually appraise it. His point is not that bourgeois
practiceought to conformto bourgeoisprinciple,but thatbourgeois
principleis inappropriateforappraisingbourgeoispracticebecause
the practicethat theprincipleprescribesis incompatiblewithcapital-
ism. Practice can and will conformto bourgeoisprinciple,but not
in bourgeoissociety.,"
II
Accordingto Wood, it is illegitimateon Marx's account of juridical
principlesto appraise one mode of productionby the juridical prin-
ciples of another; a mode of production is neither more nor less
15New York: International Publishers,1970.
16Marx also believesthatcapitalismis unjustby at leastone of its standards
whichis apt forappraisingit. Thus the laborerwho worksa day of "abnormal"
lengthis denied the value of his commodity, labor power.Accordingly he can
base his appeal fora legallylimitedworkingday on bourgeoisjustice: he is
simplydemandingthevalue of his commodity. But so is the capitalistwhenhe
triesto makethe day as long as possible:he simplydemandsmaximumbenefit
fromthecommodity, labor power,whichhe has bought.Thus thereis a conflict
betweenpurchaserand seller,whose rightsare equally based on the law of
exchanges.It seems,then,that,pace Wood,capitalismcannotbe just by itsown
standards.But the interestof capital itselfis in a normalworkingday. Thus,
if the capitalist'srightsas purchasercan be securedonly by securingthe
worker'srightsas seller,and if the workergetshis rights,more or less, then
bourgeoisjusticeis done.Cf.Capital,I, ch.x.
6o8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
just than any other,but merelyjust in its own way. Accordingly,it

would be inconsistentwith thisaccount to believe that postcapital-
ist societywill be "more just" than capitalism. However, in one
well-known text Marx does seem to suggest that postcapitalist
societywill be "more just" than capitalism.17
The text in question is the Critique of the Gotha Programme,
where,as we have just noticed,Marx saysthat,in the first, socialist18
phase of postcapitalistsociety,practice will conformto bourgeois
principlebecause theworkerwill receive,"afterthedeductionshave
been made," an equivalent of all the labor he supplies. Since it will
be just in the way capitalismpurportsbut fails to be just, socialism
will be "morejust" than capitalism,not just in its own way. But this
is misleading,because to say socialism is "more just" than capital-
ism accordingto the same principleof justice is to suggestthat the
principle in question is apt for appraising both, when in truth
it is apt for appraising the production relations of socialism but
not those of capitalism. Socialism will be just in a way in which
capitalismcannot be just. However,Marx goes on to say thatin the
second and "higher" phase of postcapitalistsociety "the narrow
horizon of bourgeois right (will) be left fully behind" (Critique,
p. 10). In the lower phase, "the rightof the producersis propor-
tional to the labour they supply"; in the higher, each gives ac-
cording to his ability and receives according to his needs. Marx
findsthe distributiveprincipleof the lower phase defectivebecause
it requiresmeans of consumptionto be distributedaccordingto the
output, not the needs of each worker.Here, "equal right is still
stigmatizedby a bourgeois limitation"; it is "an unequal rightfor
unequal labour." But "these defects are inevitable" in the first
phase of postcapitalistsociety(9/10).
It seems, then, that Marx believed that eventuallypostcapitalist
relationsnot only would be just in theirown way but would con-
formto a principleof distribution"morejust" than the correspond-
ing "bourgeois" principle. It seems that he believed theywould be
''more just" in principleand practicethan were capitalistrelations
in principle and socialist relations in practice. The "bourgeois"
principle of distributivejustice is defective.To distributeto each
accordingto his needs will be "more just," Marx seems to suggest,
than to distributeto each according to his labor. But there are
17 Wood refersto thistext(Op. cit.,pp. 270/1),but does not discussit.
18 "What is usuallycalled socialismwas termedby Marx the "first," or lower
phase of communistsociety"(Lenin, "The State and Revolution,"op. cit., p.
334). Communism, strictlyso-called,is the second,or higherphase of post-
capitalistsociety.
two objections to reading Marx in this way. (a) The concepts of

"right" and "justice" will have no place in the higher phase of
postcapitalistsociety because legal and political institutionswill
have disappeared (cf.Wood, p. 271). Thus it is incorrectto describe
the distributiveprinciple of the higher phase as a principle of
justice, and, a fortiori,to say that the practice governed by it is
"morejust" than any other.This objection is sound but irrelevant.
As an eventual regulative principle of postcapitalistsociety,dis-
tributionby need is a principle of justice in substance if not in
name. (b) Marx does not actually say that distributionby need
will be "more just" than distributionby labor. He saysratherthat
distributionby labor will be a defectivepractice,and that, when
distributionis by need, "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right"
will have been left behind. This objection is sound and relevant.
For, on Wood's view, Marx could not have judged distributionby
need to be "more just" than distributionby labor consistently with
his position that a principle of justice is apt for appraising a prac-
tice only if conformityof the practice to the principle would be
compatible with the prevailing mode of production. I agree that
this is Marx's position; and, accordingly,that he could not con-
sistentlyhave judged distributionby need to be "more just" than
distributionby labor unless either method of distributionwould
be compatiblewith the same phase of postcapitalistsociety.But this
conditionis not satisfied.Distributiontied to productionincentives
differentiallyrewardinglabor would be incompatible,perhaps by
definition,withthe higherphase of postcapitalistsociety.19 Distribu-
tion by need would be incompatible with the degree of develop-
ment attained by the means and forcesof productionin the lower
phase: therewouldn't be enough to go around. Thus Marx could
not have consistentlyjudged that distributionby need would be
"more just" than distributionby labor. Significantly, he does not
do so; but he clearlybelieves that distributionby need will be a
less defectivepractice than distributionby labor. How might he
have argued for this belief?
In what followsI referto the phases of postcapitalistsocietyas
phase one and phase two; and to theirrespectivedistributiveprin-
ciples as P1 and P2; and I shall say that Marx believed P2 to be a
"higher"principle than P1. On Wood's view Marx would not have
preferredP2 on the ground that it met the requirementsof some
specificmoral theorymore adequately than P1, for he subscribed
19 This was pointedout to me by D. Goldstick,to whomI am gratefulfor
helpfulcomments on an earlierdraftof thispaper.
6io THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to no such theory.I believe,however,that Marx mighthave argued

in somethinglike the following way. A just transaction"corre-
sponds" to the prevailingmode of production.P2 will correspondto
phase twobecause it will servethe point of productionin thatphase
of postcapitalistsociety.Marx indicates the point of postcapitalist
productionwhen he writesthat "the timeof productiondevoted to
differentarticleswill be determinedby the degree of their social
utility."20 In the same contexthe answersin the negativethe ques-
tion whetherin bourgeoissocietywhat determineswhich objects are
produced in greatestnumber is "the absolute utilityof these ob-
jects, their intrinsicutility,their utility insomuch as they corre-
spond, in the most useful manner,to the needs of the workeras a
man, and not to the man as a worker."By contrast,apparently,the
point of production in postcapitalistsociety will be to produce
objectswhose utilityis of just thissort.It will be to maximizesocial
utilityby allocatingthe mostproductiontime to thosearticlesmost
useful for satisfyinghuman needs. A principle of distributionwill
correspondto a mode of production with this aim to the extent
that it promotesthe satisfactionof human needs. To serve human
well-beingby maximizingthe satisfactionof human needs is what
the principleof utilityrequires.Then, on thisinterpretation, Marx
mighthave arguedthat,in phase two,distributionby need will meet
the requirementsof the principle of utility.
The secondpoint to noticeis thatMarx believesP1 to be defective
not only in comparisonto P2, but within phase one. He faults it
forfrustrating need satisfaction.But this defect,and its others,are
compensatedfor by those consequences of applying P1 which are
part of what makes phase one an "advance" over capitalism. Dis-
tribution by labor will have some disutile consequences, Marx
mighthave said, but over-all,in phase one, it will be in the interests
of utility.But Marx believes that the point of productionin phase
two will be to maximize utility.Thus, if he evaluates P1 in terms
of utility,he appraises two phases of one mode of production by
the same principle,ratherthan each phase by a principle specific
to it. But this should not embarrasshis account of juridical prin-
ciples,for the principleof utilityis not a juridical principle.How-
ever,if the principle of utilityis apt forevaluating both phases of
postcapitalistsociety,it mustbe "external"to both in the sense that
it is specifc to neither.If Marx also evaluatesthe utilityof capitalist
practices,as he does (cf. Allen, op. cit.), then the principle of
20 The Povertyof Philosophy(New York: International
Publishers,1969),
p. 63.
IS MARXISM A PHILOSOPHY? 6II
utilityis external,in the indicated sense, to capitalist societytoo.

But Marx denies that there are eternal moral precepts standing
"above history."21 He mighthave argued, however,that the prin-
ciple of utilityis no such precept. In the firstplace, its modern
formulation-as the principle that human well-beingalways ought,
morally,to be promoted-occurs in capitalist society,of which for
this reason it may be said to be a "product." Furthermore,the
principle of utility,in the formulationI have specified,or some-
thinglike it, is not a moral precept; it is not, for the most part, a
proximateguide to conduct,but, primarily,a criterionfor assessing
proximateguides to conduct and proximate regulativeprinciples
of social practice in differenthistoricalcircumstances.Then prin-
ciples of justice,as proximateregulativeprinciplesof social practice,
may be assessed for their utility. Accordingly,on this view, it
would be in order for Marx to evaluate the principlesof justice of
any mode of productionby the principle of utility.Similarly,the
practicesof any mode of productioncan be appraised in termsof
theirutility,not only fortheirown, but, if theyare pre-communist,
for subsequent modes of production.Regardlessof the utilityof a
practicein its own mode of production,it may have consequences
forothermodes whichcontributeto makingit utile over-all.In this
spirit Engels writes: "without the slaveryof antiquity no modern
socialism" (Anti-Duihring, p. 216). Furthermore,the utilityof prac-
tices in differentmodes can be compared. It would be absurd to
ask whetherutilitywould be servedif directslaverywere systemati-
callyto replace wage labor withincapitalism,but not to ask whether
slaverywas more or less utile in antiquity than is wage labor in
capitalism.Nor to say that P1 is a "higher" principle than P2 if
distributionby need in phase two is more productive of human
well-beingthan is distributionby labor in phase one.
I have, of course,simplyadumbrateda case for a utilitarianinter-
pretationof Marx. He does not appear to see the difficultyto which
it responds,nor is thereany evidence that if he had he would have
been disturbed.Whatever accounts for this explains one way in
whichMarxismfails to be a philosophy.But, for thosewith a philo-
sophical interestin Marxism, it is worth noticing that he could
have soughta utilitariansolution.22
op. cit.,part I,
op. cit.,passim;and Engels,Anti-Diihring,
21 Cf. his Poverty,
ch. ix. From the examplesEngels discussesin this chapterit is clear that,in
denyingeternalmoral principles,he is denyingthat thereare eternalmoral
guidesto conduct.
22But whetherat the expenseof being inconsistent in ways not here con-
sideredwouldhaveto be determined.
In the capitalist mode of productionprinciple and practice ap-

pear to conform,but to some extenttheydo not and cannot. Social
appearance and social realityare in systematicconflict.23 For this
reason Marx believed that capitalism was "irrational."To demon-
strate its irrationalitywas a task for what in Capital he calls
(empirical) "science" but once called "true philosophical criticism"
(O'Malley, op. cit.,p. 92). Hegel had claimed that the rational was
actual, the actual rational.24This claim was contradicted,Marx be-
lieved, by an "irrationalactuality,which everywhereis the contrary
of what it assertsand assertsthe contraryof what it is" (O'Malley,
64). It is doubtful whether he understood 'actuality' in Hegel's
sense,but evident that,like Hegel, he believed it was the point of
philosophy "to comprehend what is." 25 Hegel's philosophy por-
trayedthe existingsocial order as somethinginherentlyrational; a
"true" philosophywould portrayit as inherentlyirrational.Later,
empirical"science" replaces "philosophy"forMarx, but to perform
the same function.It is a reasonable if not veryclear hypothesisthat
the persistentHegelian dimensionof orthodox Marxism conceives
of itselfas both "philosophy"and empirical "science."
DEREK P. H. ALLEN
Universityof Toronto
I
MARXISM AND JUSTICE *
Allen'spaper I will set out an

on Professor
N mycomments
account of what I take to be Marx's analysisof the origin of
principlesof justice and theirapplication withina productive
mode. This account will show the vital role that ideologyplays in
sustainingthe statedprinciplesof justice by whichbourgeoissociety
ostensiblyevaluates itselfand the basis of Marx's conceptof justice.
My account accords with Allen's centralassumptions,but displays,
in a way that he does not, the complexityof the relation between
bourgeoisprincipleand practice.
28 Cf. G. Cohen, "Karl Marx and the Withering Away of Social Science,"
Philosophy & Public Affairs,I, 2 (Winter 1972): 182-204.
24T. M. Knox, tr., Hegel's Philosophy of Right (New York: Oxford, 1967),
p. 10. Cf. W. Wallace, tr., The Logic of Hegel (New York: Oxford, 1972), p. 10.
25 Knox, op. cit., p. 11. Hegel also assertshere that to portraythe social order
as it ought to be is alien to this enterprise.There is much evidence that Marx
would agree. This is one of the major reasons why it is problematic to ascribe
an ethic to Marx.
* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium,Is Marxism a
Philosophy?, December 28, 1974, commentingon a paper of the same title by
Derek P. H. Allen, this JOURNAL, this issue, pp. 601-612.

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T T HAT countsas orthodoxMarxismis controversial.

principle,as Allen Wood has claimed in a recentarticle."The core

lieves capitalism to be unjust by its own standardsand that Marx

Wood argues that for Marx the appropriationof surplus value by

not be causallydetermined by any other(249-252).But forMarx the economic

Marx thoughtthat the expression'value of labor' was "irrational,"

"On the surfaceof bourgeoissocietythe wage of the labourer ap-

in a moneyvalue of 6s., then the "value" of a day's labor is 6s. If

For the laborer to receiveless than the "value" of his labor is a

just than any other,but merelyjust in its own way. Accordingly,it

two objections to reading Marx in this way. (a) The concepts of

to no such theory.I believe,however,that Marx mighthave argued

utilityis external,in the indicated sense, to capitalist societytoo.

In the capitalist mode of productionprinciple and practice ap-

Allen'spaper I will set out an

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