Iso - 23932-1 Fire Safety Engg General Principle

INTERNATIONAL ISO
STANDARD 23932-1
First edition
2018-09
Fire safety engineering — General

principles —
Part 1:
General
Ingénierie de la sécurité incendie — Principes généraux —
Partie 1 : Généralités
Reference number
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
I n tern ati o n al Org an i z ati o n fo r S tan d ard i z ati o n

© ISO 2018
P ro vi d e d by I H S M arki t u n d er l i cen s e wi th vari o u s N ati o n al S tan d ard s B o d i e s
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
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© ISO 2018 – All rights reserved
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... v
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ vi
1 Scope ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative references ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
3 Terms and definitions ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
4 Overview of the FSE process ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3
5 Set FSE project scope ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
6 Identify FSOs ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
6.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
6.2 Li fe safety..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
6.3 Property protection ............................................................................................................................................................................ 8
6.4 Continuity o f operations ................................................................................................................................................................. 8
6.5 Protection of the environment .................................................................................................................................................. 8
6.6 Protection of heritage ....................................................................................................................................................................... 8
7 Identify FRs ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
8 Select risk analysis approach .................................................................................................................................................................. 9
8.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
8.2 Comparative versus absolute approach ......................................................................................................................... 11
8.3 Qualitative analysis .......................................................................................................................................................................... 11
8.4 Deterministic analysis ................................................................................................................................................................... 12
8.5 Probabilistic analysis ...................................................................................................................................................................... 12
8.5.1 General................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
8.5.2 Semi-quantitative risk analysis ........................................................................................................................ 12
8.5.3 Quantitative risk analysis ...................................................................................................................................... 12
9 Identify PCs ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 13
10 Create fire safety design plan ............................................................................................................................................................... 13
11 Determine design scenarios .................................................................................................................................................................. 14
11.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
11.2 Hazard identification ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14
11.3 Design fire scenarios ....................................................................................................................................................................... 14
11.4 Design occupant behavioural scenarios ......................................................................................................................... 15
12 Select engineering methods .................................................................................................................................................................. 16
12.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 16
12.2 Fire models .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 16
12.3 Evacuation models ............................................................................................................................................................................ 16
12.4 Validation and verification ......................................................................................................................................................... 17
12.5 Data from test methods and surveys ................................................................................................................................ 17
12.6 Analysis o f results from re ference fire scenario test ........................................................................................... 17
12.7 Engineering judgement ................................................................................................................................................................ 17
13 Evaluate design ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
13.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18
13.2 Quantification o f design scenarios ...................................................................................................................................... 18
13.2.1 Input data ............................................................................................................................................................................ 18
13.2.2 Estimation o f consequence .................................................................................................................................. 18
13.2.3 Estimation o f frequency o f occurrence ..................................................................................................... 19
13.3 Uncertainty.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 19
13.4 Comparison with PCs ..................................................................................................................................................................... 20
13.5 Identi fy other affected FSOs ..................................................................................................................................................... 20


iii
ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
.......................................................................................................................................................................... 2 0
14.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 20
1 4 D o c u m e n t i n fi n a l re p o r t
14.2 FSE assessment.................................................................................................................................................................................... 20

14.3 Conditions of use of the built environment................................................................................................................. 21
14.4 Inspection and maintenance procedures ...................................................................................................................... 22
14.5 Forms of documentation ............................................................................................................................................................. 22
14.6 Global project review ..................................................................................................................................................................... 22
14.7 Agreement o f relevant regulatory authorities .......................................................................................................... 22
f .................................................................................................................................................. 2 2
15.1 Identification and treatment o f changes ........................................................................................................................ 22
1 5 I m p l e m e n t fi re s a e ty d e s i g n p l a n
15.2 Check o f built environment conformity ......................................................................................................................... 22

15.3 Update of project documentation ........................................................................................................................................ 23
f ....................................................................................................................................................... 2 3
16.1 General ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 23
1 6 E xe c u te fi r e s a e ty m a n a g e m e n t
16.2 Fire safety management............................................................................................................................................................... 23

16.2.1 Requirement for fire safety management ............................................................................................... 23
16.2.2 Fire safety manual ....................................................................................................................................................... 23
16.2.3 Liaison with fire service ......................................................................................................................................... 23
16.3 Inspection ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
16.4 Li fe-cycle analysis .............................................................................................................................................................................. 24
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 5
iv

ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work o f preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters o f
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the di fferent approval criteria needed for the
di fferent types o f ISO documents should be noted. This document was dra fted in accordance with the
editorial rules o f the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso .org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some o f the elements o f this document may be the subject o f
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identi fying any or all such patent rights. Details o f
any patent rights identified during the development o f the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso .org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is in formation given for the convenience o f users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the voluntary nature o f standards, the meaning o f ISO specific terms and
expressions related to con formity assessment, as well as in formation about ISO's adherence to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following
URL: www.iso .org/iso/foreword .html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 92, Fire safety, Subcommittee SC 4, Fire
safety engineering .
This first edition o f ISO 23932-1 cancels and replaces ISO 23932:2009, which has been technically
revised.
The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:
— a clarification o f the FSE process ( Figure 1) has been added and the document has been restructured
subsequently in accordance with the per formed changes;
— an expanded discussion o f the types o f risk analysis approaches commonly used for FSE has
been added;
— re ferences to relevant FSE standards have been added;
— examples to illustrate the FSE process have been added.
A list of all parts in the ISO 23932 series can be found on the ISO website.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso .org/members .html.


v
ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
Introduction
Fire sa fety designs o ften rely on prescriptive specifications set in national, regional or local regulations.
It is possible that various engineering approaches also be allowed by these regulations. In addition to
prescriptive design, regulations can also allow the use o f per formance-based design, i.e. the reliance on
engineering methods to determine whether a given design meets stated performance objectives. Fire
sa fety can be evaluated through engineering approaches based on the quantification o f the behaviour
o f fire and people, and based on the knowledge o f the consequences o f such behaviour on li fe, property,
operations, environment and heritage.
Fire sa fety engineering (FSE) is used in support o f per formance-based fire sa fety design. The FSE
process not only involves fire sa fety design, but also extends to the implementation o f fire sa fety design
plans and fire sa fety management.
The di fference between prescriptive and per formance-based fire sa fety design is highlighted in this
document by requiring fire sa fety objectives (FSO), functional requirements (FR) and per formance
criteria (PC) to be explicitly stated in per formance-based fire sa fety design.
This document sets forth the general principles and requirements for a per formance-based fire sa fety
design and the implementation o f fire sa fety design plans and fire sa fety management. Hence, it is
important that this document be viewed as an outline o f the FSE process, and not as a detailed design
methodology. This document provides the process (necessary steps) and essential elements that are
needed to design, implement and maintain a robust per formance-based fire sa fety programme.
A set o f ISO documents on FSE is available, which provides methods and data supporting the steps in a
FSE design, as defined in the ISO 23932 series. This coherent set o f ISO documents ensures an e ffective
and correct application o f FSE, which includes per formance-based fire sa fety design, implementation o f
fire sa fety design plans and fire sa fety management.
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
Fire safety engineering — General principles —

Part 1:
General
1 Scope
T h i s do c u ment provide s genera l pri nciple s and re qu i rements for F S E , and i s i ntende d to b e u s e d b y
professionals involved in
1) p er formance -b a s e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign (o f b o th new and e xi s ti ng bu i lt envi ronments) ,
2) i mplementation for fi re s a fe ty de s ign pla n s , a nd
3) fi re s a fe ty management.
T h i s do c ument i s no t i ntende d a s a de tai le d te ch n ic a l de s ign gu ide, but do e s provide the key elements
ne ce s s ar y for add re s s i ng the d i fferent s tep s a nd thei r l i n kage s i n the fi re s a fe ty de s ign pro ce s s . T h i s
do c u ment a l s o provide s key elements l i n ke d to the i mplementation o f fi re s a fe ty de s ign p lan s a nd fi re
s a fe ty ma nagement. T h i s do c ument i s i ntende d no t on ly to b e u s e d on its own, but a l s o i n conj u nc tion
with a con s i s tent s e t o f FS E do c u ments coveri ng me tho d s i n p er forma nce -b as e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign,
implementation and management.

FS O s covere d b y th i s do c u ment i nclude:
— s a fe ty o f l i fe;
— prop er ty pro te c tion;
— conti nu ity o f op eration s;
— pro te c tion o f the envi ron ment;
— preservation of heritage.
T he genera l pri nciple s and re qu i rements o f FS E c an be appl ie d to all con figu ration s o f the bui lt
envi ron ment, i . e . bu i ld i ngs or o ther s truc ture s (e . g. o ff- s hore plat form s; c ivi l engi ne eri ng works , s uch
as tu n nel s , bridge s and m i ne s; and me an s o f tra n s p or tation, s uch a s mo tor veh icle s and ma ri ne ve s s el s) ,
but may no t b e appl ic able for con s tr uc tion s ite s .
B e c au s e pre s crip tive regu lation s coveri ng fi re s a fe ty de s ign com mon ly co - exi s t with p er forma nce -
based de s ign, th i s do c u ment acknowle dge s that fi re s a fe ty de s ign s con form i ng to pre s c rip tive
regulations can become the basis for comparison of engineered designs of built environments.
2 Normative references
T he fol lowi ng do c u ments are re ferre d to i n the tex t i n s uch a way th at s ome or a l l o f thei r content
con s titute s re qu i rements o f th i s do c u ment. For date d re ference s , on ly the e d ition cite d appl ie s . For
u ndate d re ference s , the late s t e d ition o f the re ference d do c ument (i nclud i ng a ny amend ments) appl ie s .
I S O 1 3 9 43 , Fire safety — Vocabulary
3 Terms and definitions

For the pu rp o s e s o f th i s do c u ment, the term s a nd defi n ition s given i n I S O 1 3 9 43 and the fol lowi ng apply.

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ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https: //www.iso .org/obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at http: //www.electropedia .org/
3.1
affected party
p ar ty th at is i mp ac te d by a fi re s a fe ty de s ign, i nclud i ng prop er ty owners a nd o ther prop er ty
s ta keholders , or authority havi ng j u ri s d ic tion or i n cha rge o f publ ic s a fe ty, he a lth and wel fare
3.2
deterministic analysis
risk analysis approach (3.10 ) i n wh ich the fi re s a fe ty de s ign i s eva luate d u s i ng a s e t o f wors t cre d ible
case scenarios
3.3
engineering judgement
pro ce s s e xerci s e d b y a pro fe s s iona l or a te am o f pro fe s s iona l s who i s qua l i fie d b y way o f e duc ation,
exp erience and re co gn i z e d s ki l l s to complement, s upplement, accep t or rej e c t elements o f an engi ne eri ng
ana lys i s
3.4
fi r e s a f
e t y e n g i n e e r i n g
FSE
appl ic ation o f engi ne eri ng me tho d s b as e d on s c ienti fic pri nciple s to the development or as s e s s ment
o f de s ign s i n the bu i lt envi ron ment th rough the ana lys i s o f s p e c i fic fi re s cena rio s or th rough the
qua nti fic ation o f ri s k for a group o f fi re s cenario s
3.5
fi r e s a f
e t y s t r a t e g y
s p eci fication o f des ign func tions used in achieving fire-s a fety obj ec tives that forms the b as is for the des ign
3.6
functional requirement
FR
s tatement o f the me an s to ach ieve s p e c i fie d FS O, ta ki ng i nto accou nt the fe atu re s o f a bu i lt envi ron ment
N o te 1 to entr y: M a nd ato r y fu nc tio n a l re qu i rements a re re qu i re d , e xp l ic itl y or i mpl ic itl y, b y n ation a l re gu l ation s
or bu i ld i ng co de s; vo lu nta r y fu nc tion a l re qu i rements a re e x pre s s e d b y o ther a ffe c te d p a r tie s .
3.7
mandatory objective
FS O, s uch as l i fe s a fe ty a nd pro te c tion o f the envi ron ment, wh ich i s re qu i re d b y nationa l re gu lation s or
building codes
3.8
performance criterium
PC
threshold o f per formance that forms an agreed b as is for as ses s ing the s a fety o f a built environment des ign
3.9
probabilistic analysis
risk analysis approach (3.10 ) in wh ich the fi re s a fe ty de s ign is eva luate d u s i ng the fu l l ra nge of
representative scenarios
3.10
risk analysis approach
me tho d for comp ari ng e s ti mate d ri s k a nd tolerable ri s k u s i ng s ome form o f ri sk me a s ure, wh ich
includes qualitative analysis (3.18 ), deterministic analysis (3.2) and probabilistic analysis (3.9)
2
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
3.11
safety factor
multiplicative adjustment applied to calculated values to compensate for uncertainty (3.14 ) i n me tho d s ,
c a lc u lation s , i nput d ata a nd as s u mp tion s
3.12
safety margin
additive adjustment applied to calculated values to compensate for uncertainty (3.14 ) i n me tho d s ,
ca lc u l ation s , i nput data and a s s u mp tion s
3.13
f
(3.4
t r i a l fi r e s a e t y d e s i g n
de s ign cho s en for the pur p o s e o f ma ki ng a fire sa fety engineering ) ana lys i s a nd eva luation
3.14
uncertainty
qua nti fic ation o f the s ys tematic and random error i n data, vari able s , p ara me ters or mathematic a l
relation s h ip s , or o f a fai lu re to i nclude a releva nt element
3.15
validation
process of determining the degree to which a calculation method is an accurate representation of the
re a l world from the p ers p e c tive o f the i ntende d u s e s o f the c a lc u lation me tho d , s uch a s con fi rm i ng the
corre c t a s s u mp tion s and governi ng e quation s i mplemente d i n a mo del when appl ie d to the enti re cla s s
o f problem s add re s s e d b y the mo del
3.16
ve r i fi c a t i o n
pro ce s s o f de term i n i ng that a c a lc u lation me tho d i mplementation acc u rately repre s ents the develop er's
conceptual description of the calculation method and the solution to the calculation method
N o te 1 to entr y: T he fu nd a menta l s trate g y o f ver i fic atio n o f computatio n a l mo del s i s the identi fic ation a nd
qu a nti fic atio n o f er ror i n the comp utation a l mo del a nd its s o lutio n .
3.17
voluntary objective
FS O that i s re qu i re d b y affected parties (3.1 ) b eyond mandatory objectives (3.7)
3.18
qualitative analysis
risk analysis approach (3.10 ) i n wh ich are as o f i ncre as e d ri s k are identi fie d
4 Overview of the FSE process

T he F S E pro ce s s s ha l l b e i n iti ate d at the e arl ie s t s tage o f a proj e c t (that c an i nclude, for e xample,
arch ite c tu ra l concep t de s ign, s truc tura l, venti lation, plu mbi ng , ele c tric a l de s ign s) for a new bui lt
envi ron ment, to mo d i fy or re fu rbi s h an exi s ti ng bu i lt envi ron ment or to eva luate compl i ance with
up date d regu lation s . Fi re s a fe ty de s ign sh a l l b e i nte grate d fu l ly with a l l o ther engi ne eri ng de s ign
s p e ci a l itie s th roughout s uch a proj e c t. T h i s i s ne ce s s ar y when con s ideri ng , for exa mple, how the re s u lt
o f acou s tic or therma l engi ne eri ng (i ntro duc tion o f fl am mable s ou nd/ he at ab s orbi ng materi a l s) or
en hancement o f s e c u rity ( l i m itation o f me tho d s o f e gre s s) c a n i ntro duce u n i ntende d fi re s a fe ty de s ign
problems.
Figure 1 shows an outl i ne o f the F S E pro ce s s o f a bu i lt envi ron ment, with re ference s to C lau s e s o f th i s
do c u ment a nd re ference s to add itiona l I S O do c u ments wh ich explai n the pro ce s s i n more de ta i l . T he
pro ce s s i nvolve s p er forma nce -b as e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign, i mplementation o f fi re s a fe ty de s ign pla n a nd
fi re s a fe ty ma nagement. I n Figure 1 , the p er formance - b a s e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign b egi n s with s e tti ng the
ana lys i s s cop e and end s with do c u mentation i n fi na l rep or t.

3
ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
As shown in Figure 1 , the FSE process is iterative. When following the process, the fire sa fety designer
shall explore the answers to key questions posed in decision nodes. The answers to these questions
can require that steps o f the process be repeated. This procedure is illustrated by the decision nodes
(rhombi) and the associated iterative loops (Yes/No arrows) in Figure 1.
The boundaries o f the analysis shall be clearly defined in the first part o f the FSE process. First, the
overall project scope shall be documented. This can include factors such as new building, renovation,
expansion, and so forth. Secondly, the scope o f the FSE project, within the context o f the overall
project, shall be identified, agreed and documented. The FSE project scope statement shall contain
a description o f project relevant in formation, e.g. characteristics o f the built environment, a ffected
parties and external environmental factors, but also a clear definition o f what shall be analysed with
the per formance-based fire sa fety design.
In subsequent steps, the FSOs and FRs shall be identified. This shall be followed by the selection o f the
type o f risk analysis approach and the subsequent identification o f PCs, which are dependent on the
chosen risk analysis approach.
The identification o f FSOs, FRs and PCs is an essential part o f the FSE process. Objectives describe the
desired outcome o f fires, i.e. they identi fy what is essential to protect. The FSO for a project should be
clearly defined. It should also be documented as to which objectives are to be met by the fire sa fety
analysis and which may be deemed to be met by compliance with prescribed (deemed to satis fy)
regulatory measures. FRs translate objectives into required functionality o f the fire sa fety design.
Finally, FRs are quantified in terms o f PCs, which are used for determining whether or not the FSOs are
achieved given the selected risk analysis approach. The risk analysis approach is selected based on the
required treatment o f uncertainty in the design (see Clause 8 ). An FSO can be represented by one or
more FRs. Similarly, an FR can be quantified by one or more PCs.
The following questions illustrate the relationship between FSOs, FRs and PCs:
— FSOs (see Clause 6): What are the required/desired outcomes of all foreseeable fires?
— FRs (see Clause 7 ): How will these outcomes be achieved by design functionality?
— PCs (see Clause 9): How will the adequacy of the design be measured in engineering terms?
When the boundaries o f the analysis are set, a trial fire sa fety design plan shall be created. This design
plan shall then be evaluated using design scenarios and engineering methods. The evaluation shall be
per formed in relation to the identified PCs. I f the criteria are met, the trial design can be considered to
have met the objectives. I f not, revision o f the trial fire sa fety design is required. It is possible to have
more than one trial design that fulfils the objectives.
4
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
a S ee als o I S O /TR 1 6 5 7 6 (E xamp les ) .
b S ee als o I S O 1 6 7 3 2 - 1 , I S O 1 6 7 3 3 - 1 , I S O /TS 2 9 7 6 1 .
c S ee als o I S O 1 6 7 3 2 - 1 , I S O 1 6 7 3 3 - 1 , I S O /TS 2 9 7 6 1 .
d S ee als o I S O /TS 1 3 447 , I S O 1 67 3 0 - 1 , I S O /TR 1 6 7 3 0 - 2 to 5 (E xamp les ) , I S O 1 6 7 3 4, I S O 1 6 7 3 5 , I S O 1 6 7 3 6,
I S O 1 6 7 3 7 , I S O /TR 1 6 7 3 8 , I S O 2 46 7 8 - 6.
e S ee als o I S O /TR 1 6 7 3 8 , I S O 1 6 7 3 3 - 1 .
NO TE D o c u ments l i n ke d to l a rge p a r ts o f the F S E p ro ce s s : I S O 167 3 2 -1 , I S O 167 3 3 -1 , I S O/ T S 2 4 679, I S O/
T S 2 9 761 , I S O/ T R 167 3 2 -2 to 3 ( E xa mp le s) , I S O/ T R 2 4 67 9 -2 to 4 a nd 6 ( E xa mp le s) .
Figure 1 — FSE process — Design, implementation and management

5
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
Once a trial fire sa fety design plan has been evaluated and shown to meet the FSOs o f concern to the
analysis, the fire sa fety designer shall assess whether the trial fire sa fety design plan has negatively
a ffected any prescribed FSOs. Once a set o f appropriately justified fire sa fety trial designs are obtained,
the fire sa fety designer may provide the set o f options to the client, or apply cost-benefit analysis or
other measures to identi fy a final fire sa fety design solution.
Documentation o f the fire sa fety design solution shall be provided in the form o f a report in the final step
o f the per formance-based fire sa fety design. The fire sa fety design is then, when relevant, accepted by
the appropriate authority and implemented, e.g. construction o f the built environment and subsequent
inspections. Once the build environment is in use, management activities shall be conducted to monitor
i f the fire sa fety design plan is respected. Changes to the use or design o f the built environment shall
require revision o f the fire design plan according to the per formance-based fire sa fety design process.
Figure 1 is strictly applicable to deterministic analysis (see 8.4) and probabilistic analysis (see 8.5).
For qualitative analysis (see 8.3 ), the procedure can be used in a reduced manner appropriate to the
analysis.
NOTE Significant parts o f the FSE process are described in ISO 16732-1, ISO 16733-1, ISO/TS 24679 and ISO/
TS 29761. In addition, examples o f application o f the FSE process are provided in ISO/TR 16732-2 to 3 and ISO/
TR 24679-2 to 4 and 6.
5 Set FSE project scope

A clear FSE project scope shall be set in the initial phase o f the FSE process. In order to achieve this,
the contractual and organizational context o f the design work shall be clearly defined, including the
functions and duties of each member of the design team.
The FSE project scope statement shall contain project-related information that is relevant for the
per formance-based fire sa fety design. This can include, but is not limited to:
— characteristics o f the project;
— characteristics o f the site;
— characteristics o f the built environment;
— a ffected parties;
— external factors;
— extent o f FSE application and non-FSE regulatory compliance.
An essential part o f the project characteristics is whether the planned project involves re furbishment,
expansion or change in the use o f an existing built environment, or is solely the construction o f a new
built environment.
The characteristics o f the site, i.e. the location where the building or other structure is to be built,
include such aspects as fire service access, extinguishment water supply and characteristics o f the
surrounding built environment.
The characteristics o f the built environment, i.e. building or other structure, include such aspects as the
type o f built environment, type o f construction technique and planned use.
A ffected parties can include authorities having jurisdiction, owners, developers, employees and
other prospective occupants, emergency responders, insurers and neighbours. All parties directly or
indirectly influenced by the planned project should be identified.
External factors can include environmental and manmade conditions external to the built environment
that can influence fire sa fety. For example, the potential for natural disasters, e.g. earthquakes,
forest fires, flooding, etc., shall be considered. Potential manmade conditions, e.g. the fire sa fety o f
neighbouring built environments, transportation o f dangerous goods, etc., shall also be taken into
6
ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
account. External factors can also include requirements or restrictions imposed by national, regional or
local government, which can dictate which types o f buildings/projects that are allowed.
In the FSE project scope, it shall be clear to what extent an FSE approach will be applied, e.g. for the
entire built environment or only part o f it, or for all or selected fire sa fety areas (see Clause 6 ), and
which regulations apply. For example, there may be parts o f the built environment that are designed
in ways that do not con form to prescriptive requirements. These parts can then be designed using
per formance-based fire sa fety design, provided that all the FSOs for the built environment are fulfilled.
EXAMPLE 1 A hotel building contains floors with hotel rooms, an open lobby area and a restaurant, which
are all separated with appropriate fire barriers and have separate means o f escape. The hotel floors and the
restaurant follow the prescriptive requirements in the codes and regulations. However, due to its design (e.g.
size, number o f floors, etc) the open lobby area does not con form to prescriptive requirements. Per formance-
based fire sa fety design can there fore be per formed for the lobby area o f the hotel building. However, it needs to
be ensured that deviations from prescriptive requirements in the lobby area does not lead to increased risks in
the parts o f the building, in which case per formance-based fire design would need to be applied to all parts o f the
building.
EXAMPLE 2 In a planned building, all prescriptive requirements related to the li fe sa fety o f rescue service
personnel are followed. However, some prescriptive requirements related to the li fe sa fety o f occupants are not
followed, namely the prescribed maximum distance to emergency exits is exceeded. Per formance-based fire
sa fety design can be per formed for the li fe sa fety o f occupants to address the deviation from the prescriptive
requirements, namely to show that the extended distance to emergency exits is addressed by other sa fety
improving measures. However, it needs to be ensured that deviations from the prescriptive requirements related
to the li fe sa fety o f occupants do not influence the li fe sa fety o f rescue service personnel. There can also be other
FSOs that are influenced by the proposed deviations. In this specific case, an extended maximum distance to
emergency exits influences (among other things) the ease o f access to the fire for the rescue service personnel.
6 Identify FSOs
6.1 General
FSOs are either voluntary or mandatory. Voluntary objectives can be added by the building owner, who
can consult a ffected parties. Mandatory objectives are stated in codes or regulations. These mandatory
objectives shall always be met.
When dealing with predominantly prescriptive regulations, it is possible that the FSOs are not clearly
identified in the regulations. In such cases, the fire sa fety designer can provide an interpretation o f the
FSOs in a form that is understood by a ffected parties, and an agreement on the objectives should be
obtained and documented, as these are the basis for demonstrating compliance with the prescriptive
regulations. This can sometimes be accomplished by stating the interpretation o f the intent o f the
regulatory provisions, or how equivalent sa fety is intended to be achieved. A regulatory interpretation
o f FSOs is, in some cases, provided by authorities having jurisdiction.
In addition to required regulatory objectives, i.e. mandatory objectives, there can be some other
objectives that are voluntary, e.g. minimizing o f business interruption. In this case, engineering analysis
can lead to the addition of objectives.
Objective statements typically address one or more o f the fire sa fety areas in 6.2 to 6.6.
NOTE Examples o f FSOs are provided in ISO/TR 16576.
6.2 Life safety

Li fe sa fety objectives typically seek to reduce or avoid harm to occupants and other a ffected people
within and outside the built environment. To avoid injuries that can occur before an occupant can
reasonably react to fire and begin evacuation, the objective is typically stated in terms o f requirements
on equipment or other products to reduce the likelihood o f fire occurrence.
EXAMPLE 1 An example o f a li fe sa fety objective for building occupants is: the fire sa fety design shall be such
that fire related injuries to occupants (away from the immediate areas o f fire origin) are minimized (FSO1).

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EXAMPLE 2 An example o f a li fe sa fety objective for rescue service personnel is: the fire sa fety design shall be
such that the rescue service personnel are given opportunities for safe operations for a reasonable period of time
in case o f fire (FSO2).
6.3 Property protection

The property protection FSOs can relate both to one’s own property and the property o f others.
Objectives typically seek to reduce or avoid both damage to the built environment and to its contents,
such as equipment.
EXAMPLE 1 An example o f a property protection objective for the protection o f a building is: the fire sa fety
design shall be such that property losses caused by fire are limited (FSO3).
EXAMPLE 2 An example o f a property protection objective for the protection o f neighbouring buildings is: the
fire sa fety design shall be such that neighbouring property losses are limited (FSO4).
6.4 Continuity of operations

The business or operations continuity objectives typically seek to reduce the length o f time that
operations are interrupted, but can also be stated in terms o f the economic cost o f such interruptions
(including market share and lost employment opportunities) or the functional continuity required for
the sa fety o f a specific process.
EXAMPLE 1 An example o f a business and operations continuity objective for a production facility is: the fire
sa fety design shall be such that business operations are not interrupted for a significant time as a result o f a
fire (FSO5).
EXAMPLE 2 An example o f an operations continuity objective for a community is: the fire sa fety design shall be
such that transportation, power, in formation, health care and other in frastructure necessary for the functioning
o f the community/region/country are not interrupted for a significant time as a result o f a fire (FSO6).
6.5 Protection of the environment

The environmental protection objectives typically seek to reduce or avoid the immediate and long-term
e ffects o f a fire on the quality o f the natural environment, which can include animals, soil, ground water,
etc. I f there are national, regional or local requirements for environmental quality, it is possible to state
the minimum environment protection objectives in terms o f compliance with those requirements.
EXAMPLE An example o f an environmental protection objective for a ground water is: the fire sa fety
design shall be such that the ground water quality is unlikely to be compromised outside o f the immediate area
o f a fire (FSO7).
6.6 Protection of heritage

The heritage protection objectives typically seek to avoid the loss or alteration o f objects for which the
value at stake is not primarily economic. These irreplaceable objects are generally both old and unique,
having cultural or other symbolic significance.
EXAMPLE 1 An example o f a heritage protection objective for museum arte facts is: the fire sa fety design shall
be such that damage to arte facts as a result o f a fire is limited (FSO8).
EXAMPLE 2 An example o f a heritage protection objective for a culturally important building is: the fire sa fety
design shall be such that damage to the structure and external façade as a result o f a fire is limited” (FSO9).
7 Identify FRs
Each FSO shall be associated with one or more FRs that are necessary to satis fy by the fire sa fety
design. An FR is a statement o f a condition necessary to achieve the FSO. That is, the means to achieve
an objective are specified as the requirements for the functions, which are elements subject to control
through fire sa fety design, such as the structure, compartments or other defined spaces, materials and
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products used in the construction o f the built environment or fire protection systems. While objectives
are stated in terms o f non-quantifiable outcomes o f fires, FRs are stated in terms o f the function o f the
fire sa fety design that is deemed necessary to achieve the stated objectives. FRs are still qualitative,
but they apply at the level o f the design elements and are more meaning ful and directly useable for
engineering.
EXAMPLE 1 Examples o f FRs linked to the achievement o f FSO1 stated above are: FSO1 is achieved i f (1)
occupants are not exposed to untenable conditions due to elevated temperatures, radiation, toxic species, irritant
species or reduced visibility while moving along the paths o f egress (FR1.1), and (2) occupants are not exposed
to falling debris or failing building parts while moving along the paths of egress (FR1.2).
EXAMPLE 2 An example o f an FR linked to the achievement o f FSO2 stated above is: FSO2 is achieved i f fire
does not result in permanent structural damage during the time required for rescue operations (FR2.1)
does not spread beyond the compartment o f fire origin (FR3.1).
does not spread to neighbouring properties (FR4.1).
EXAMPLE 5 An example o f an FR linked to the achievement o f FSO5 stated above is: FSO5 is achieved i f
machines that are essential for production, but not directly involved in the fire, are not damaged by elevated
temperatures or radiation (FR5.1).
EXAMPLE 6 Examples o f FRs linked to the achievement o f FSO6 stated above are: FSO6 is achieved i f (1) major
road transportation routes are not blocked by smoke or fire (FR6.1), and (2) essential trans former stations are
not a ffected by fire (FR6.2).
EXAMPLE 7 An example o f an FR linked to the achievement o f FSO7 stated above is: FSO7 is achieved i f waste
extinguishment water does not spread significant amounts o f contaminants to the ground water (FR7.1).
EXAMPLE 8 An example o f an FR linked to the achievement o f FSO8 stated above is: FSO8 is achieved i f any
damage to arte facts as a result o f the fire is reparable (FR8.1).
EXAMPLE 9 Examples o f an FR linked to the achievement o f FSO9 stated above are: FSO9 is achieved i f (1) no
major structural collapse o f the building occurs for the entire duration o f the fire (FR9.1), and (2) the façade can
be repaired using time typical building techniques (FR9.2).
NOTE Examples o f FRs are provided in ISO/TR 16576.
8 Select risk analysis approach
8.1 General
Once the FSO and connected FRs have been decided, a risk analysis approach shall be selected. A
common feature o f risk analyses is that a comparison between estimated risk and tolerable risk is
made using some form o f risk measure, i.e. PCs. The tolerable risk can be either explicitly stated, i.e.
absolute, or implicitly derived, i.e. comparative (see 8.2 ). The tolerable risk in prescriptive regulations
is implicitly defined by the regulatory provisions. The tolerable risk in per formance-based designs
should be explicitly stated. Risk needs not be expressed numerically.
Risk analysis approaches can be categorized in terms o f the level o f treatment o f uncertainty in the
risk analysis (see Figure 2 ). The lowest level o f treatment o f uncertainty is achieved by the qualitative
analysis, in which deviations from the tolerable risk are identified. The intent o f the qualitative
analysis is to identi fy areas o f increased risk, which means that uncertainty is partially handled by
identi fying and subsequently addressing all negative impacts. Addressing negative impacts can include
introduction of compensating measures to reduce the impact of a deviation or simple estimates to show
that a deviation has a negligible impact.
An intermediate level o f treatment o f uncertainty is achieved by the deterministic analysis, in which a
set o f worst credible case scenarios are evaluated. The intent o f the deterministic analysis is to expose
the design to a severe challenge, which means that uncertainty is partially addressed by assuming

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wors e tha n average exp o s u re . T he s e are s ome ti me s charac teri z e d as con s e quence ana lys e s , comp are d
agai n s t s ome tolerable ri s k c riterion .
T he h ighe s t level o f tre atment o f u ncer tai nty i s ach ieve d by the prob abi l i s tic ana lys i s , i n wh ich the fu l l
range o f repre s entati ve s cena rio s are identi fie d and eva luate d . T he i ntent o f the prob abi l i s tic ana lys i s
i s to s u fficiently quanti fy the enti re s cenario s p ace, wh ich me an s that uncer ta i nty i s d i re c tly add re s s e d
i n the ana lys i s . B o th the fre quenc y and con s e quence for e ach s cenario ne e d to b e qua nti fie d i n the
prob abi l i s tic ana lys i s . Qua nti fic ation o f fre quenc y and con s e quence c a n b e e xpre s s e d as s p e ci fic va lue s
or distributions.
T he choice o f ri sk a na lys i s appro ach dep end s on the level o f tre atment o f u ncer ta i nty re qu i re d i n the
ana lys i s . For relatively wel l-known devi ation s , for wh ich the de s igner c a n re a s onably pre d ic t the i mp ac t
o f the devi ation s , on ly b a s ic tre atment o f u ncer tai nty i s typic a l ly ne e de d and a qua l itative ana lys i s c an
s u ffice . H owever, when the u ncer tai ntie s a re gre ater, i . e . when the de s igner c a n no t pre d ic t the i mp ac t
o f the de s ign, a more i n- dep th tre atment o f u ncer tai nty i s re qui re d and a de term i n i s tic or prob abi l i s tic
ana lys i s i s ne e de d .
Figure 2 — Different types of analyses in the FSE process
I n a comp arative ana lys i s , tolerable ri s k i s i mpl ic itly derive d from a b ench ma rk de s ign for a defi ne d s e t
o f tolerable cond ition s . T he ri s k ana lys i s appro ach c an b e qua l itative, de term i ni s tic, or prob abi l i s tic
Figure 2
ana lys i s (s e e f ) . O n ly the ac tors a s s o ci ate d with the deviation ne e d to b e a na lys e d and the
outcome i s a comp ari s on with the b ench ma rk, i . e . “h igher ” or “lower ”. T he cho s en ri s k a na lys i s me tho d
determines the measures used for the comparison.
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In an absolute analysis, risk is estimated, and tolerability o f the risk is judged, based on a defined level
o f tolerable risk (however quantified). The risk analysis approach can be deterministic or probabilistic
analysis (see Figure 2).
NOTE The di fferent risk analysis approaches are described in ISO 16732-1, ISO 16733-1 and ISO/TS 29761.
8.2 Comparative versus absolute approach
A per formance-based fire sa fety design can employ a comparative or absolute approach. In the
comparative approach, the risk level o f the design built environment, i.e. building or other structure,
is compared with the risk level o f a benchmark built environment. The benchmark shall be designed
exclusively according to the prescriptive regulations, which implicitly defines a risk level for
comparison. I f the risk level o f the design built environment is equal to or lower than the risk o f
the benchmark, the fire sa fety design shall be considered to provide a su fficient level o f sa fety. The
comparative approach requires that minor and relatively well-established changes are made from the
prescriptive requirements to ensure a valid comparison between the level o f risk o f the design built
environment and the benchmark built environment.
In some cases, a comparative approach is not possible or desirable, in which case an absolute approach
shall be employed. For example, it can be impossible to design a benchmark built environment according
to prescriptive regulations, i.e. i f the regulations require a per formance-based approach. Authorities
having jurisdiction can also require an absolute approach for per formance-based fire sa fety design.
The risk level shall be explicitly stated i f an absolute approach is employed. A risk level can be stated in
the regulation, or may need to be derived using statistics or other estimates.
For both the comparative and absolute approach, the risk level can o ften be expressed in terms o f PCs.
EXAMPLE 1 The regulations in an example country speci fy that a specific building type, namely a two-storey
school building, can be designed prescriptively, but perhaps for only a specific material type, such as concrete.
However, deviations from the prescriptive requirements are envisioned, such as the use o f lightweight timber
construction, and a per formance-based fire sa fety design will there fore be employed. As a benchmark building
exists, i.e. an equivalent prescriptively designed building, a comparative approach can be applied.
EXAMPLE 2 The regulations in an example country only allow prescriptive design o f buildings up to 16 floors
in height. The design building has a height o f 32 floors and there fore needs to be designed using a per formance-
based approach. As there is no benchmark building, i.e. a prescriptively designed 32-floor building is not allowed,
an absolute approach is applied.
8.3 Qualitative analysis
Qualitative analysis can be per formed in cases where minor deviations from the prescriptive
requirements are made. Because qualitative analysis belongs to the comparative approach, comparisons
can be made to a benchmark. The qualitative analysis aims to identi fy deviations from the benchmark
design that lead to increased risk compared to the benchmark, which means that uncertainty is
partially addressed by identi fying all negative impacts. I f possible, comparison can be made based on
sections or individual paragraphs in the prescriptive regulations.
The qualitative analysis leads to a separate procedure compared to the deterministic and probabilistic
analyses (see Figure 2 ). Once the deviations leading to increased risk have been identified, they are
directly addressed for every identified deviation in order to get a lower risk level than the benchmark
design. However, it shall be ensured that any risk-reducing measures taken in response to a specific
deviation also covers all possible areas o f increased risk.

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The qualitative analysis is o ften based on logical reasoning, but can also involve simple calculations
as input.
EXAMPLE Regulations in an example country state that the maximum walking distance to the closest
emergency exit shall not exceed 30 m for a specific type o f building. However, the maximum walking distance in
the design building is set to 35 m, which exceeds the requirement in the prescriptive regulations. The designer
identifies the deviation, concludes that it contributes to an increased risk for the sa fety o f evacuees, and attempts
to address the increased risk by introducing a more sensitive smoke detector than the prescriptive regulations
require. These detectors provide a quicker detection and subsequent alarm, which allow evacuees more time
to escape. However, the designer fails to recognize that an increased maximum walking distance to the closest
emergency exit also means that the rescue services need to travel longer distances inside the building to reach a
fire. The designer has hence failed to identi fy all possible areas o f increased risk connected to the deviation.
8.4 Deterministic analysis
Deterministic analysis involves the evaluation o f a set o f worst credible case scenarios, i.e. scenarios
that represent a severe but not unlikely challenge for the design. It is based on the estimation o f the
seriousness o f the consequences o f each design scenario, which is compared with threshold values
expressed as PCs. Deterministic analysis includes quantitative analyses o f the consequences o f a fire, but
the frequency o f occurrence o f the scenarios is not explicitly considered. However, other probabilistic
considerations, such as reliability, may be evaluated separately.
NOTE Deterministic analysis is described in ISO 16733-1 and ISO/TS 29761.
8.5 Probabilistic analysis
8.5 .1 General
Probabilistic analysis explicitly considers both the frequency o f occurrence and consequence o f the
scenarios evaluated. Depending on the desired level o f detail and the form o f risk expression, two levels
o f risk-based analysis are available; semi-quantitative risk analysis and quantitative risk analysis.
NOTE Probabilistic analysis is described in ISO 16732-1. In addition, examples o f application o f probabilistic
analysis are provided in ISO/TR 16732-2 to 3.
8.5 .2 Semi-quantitative risk analysis
Semi-quantitative risk analysis involves quantification o f scenarios partially or fully in the form o f
point scales or categories with predefined broader ranges. O ften, either frequency o f occurrence
or consequence is quantified using statistical data, and other components o f risk are described
qualitatively. Sub-components, be it frequency o f occurrence or consequence, can be assigned weights,
depending on their importance or contribution to the overall risk. Semi-quantitative analysis can be
su fficient to prove the acceptability o f risk when an absolute approach is employed.
8.5 .3 Quantitative risk analysis
Quantitative risk analysis consists o f an analysis o f the risks as a quantified combination, for all
scenarios, o f the frequency o f occurrence and consequence that are predicted. Engineering calculations
are commonly used in quantitative risk analysis, but require good quality and case-specific input data.
Quantitative risk analysis allows for determination o f expected loss o f li fe, property damage, cost o f
interruptions, environmental impact and heritage losses associated with the design. There are various
methods available, ranging from predictions based on statistical data analysis to advanced computer
modelling with random input sampling. Quantitative risk analysis is appropriate for both comparative
and absolute approaches.
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9 Identify PCs
PCs shall be formulated. They are engineering metrics that are expressed in deterministic or
probabilistic form and determine whether each FR has been satisfied by the fire sa fety design. For each
FR, there shall be one or more PCs.
The exact formulation o f PCs depends on the selected risk analysis approach. For the comparative
approach, where tolerable risk is implicitly derived from a benchmark design, PCs shall be chosen
to enable valid comparison to the benchmark. PCs can there fore be expressed both as conservative
estimates, i.e. values corresponding to less than critical exposure given average susceptibility, or as
representative estimates, i.e. values corresponding to critical exposure given average susceptibility.
For the absolute approach, where comparison is made with a defined level o f tolerable risk, PCs are
dependent on whether the analysis is deterministic or probabilistic. In the case o f deterministic
analysis, where the design is exposed to a severe challenge (worst credible case scenarios), PCs
shall be expressed as conservative estimates to account for the low level o f treatment o f uncertainty
in the analysis. In the case o f probabilistic analysis, PCs can be expressed both as conservative and
representative estimates. However, conservative and representative estimates are not associated with
the same frequency o f occurrence as the severity o f the exposure is di fferent.
EXAMPLE 1 In an example project, an absolute approach is applied and the chosen risk analysis method is the
deterministic analysis. PCs corresponding to conservative estimates are chosen for FR1.1, i.e. levels o f exposure
to elevated temperatures (< 353 K), radiation (< 2,5 kW/m 2 ), toxic species (CO < 2 000 ppm, CO 2 < 5 %, O 2 > 15 %),
irritant species (Fractional E ffective Concentration < 0,3, as defined in ISO 13571:2012) and reduced visibility
(< 10 m). These PCs would allow the majority o f the population to escape sa fely in case o f a real fire, but are
chosen deliberately in the analysis to account for the fact that uncertainty is not treated to a high level o f detail.
EXAMPLE 2 In an example project, an absolute approach is applied and the chosen risk analysis method is
the probabilistic analysis, namely a quantitative risk analysis. Example regulations state that the frequency o f
occurrence o f a building occupant being exposed to toxic species (CO < 2 000 ppm, CO 2 < 5 %, O 2 > 15 %) cannot
exceed 10 −6 per year. The toxicity levels would allow the majority o f the population to escape sa fely in case o f a
real fire, i.e. it is a conservative estimate o f dangerous exposure. The design team wants to instead use a realistic
estimate o f dangerous exposure (Fractional E ffective Dose < 1, as defined in ISO 13571:2012 and meaning
incapacitation for hal f o f the population) together with the frequency o f occurrence from the regulation (10 −6 per
year). However, this is not an equivalent expression o f PCs as the exposure is more severe, i.e. the tolerable risk
would be higher. The criteria in this example relates only to individual risk and a proper analysis would require
also the inclusion o f a societal risk measure.
NOTE Examples o f PCs are provided in ISO/TR 16576.
1 0 C re a te fi re s a fe ty d e s i g n p l a n
The trial fire sa fety design plan is an elaboration o f the fire sa fety strategy and consists o f a set o f fire
sa fety design elements. In relation to the trial fire sa fety design, it is use ful to organize functions and
design elements into the following categories:
— initiation o f fire and e ffluent production;
— spread o f fire and propagation o f e ffluents;
— compartmentalization and structural stability;
— detection, activation and suppression;
— human behaviour and evacuation;
— fire-fighter intervention (i f relevant).
The fire sa fety design plan should be described and documented in a fire sa fety design report
(see Clause 12).

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1 1 Determine design scenarios
1 1 .1 General
Design scenarios can be divided into two categories of sub-scenarios:

— design fire scenarios (for fire behaviour);
— design behavioural scenarios (for human behaviour of occupants or rescue service personnel) —
addressing both li fe sa fety and possible impact on the fire development related to some aspects o f
fire scenarios.
Scenario development is typically proceeded by the identification o f hazards, which guides the scenario
selection process.
The selection o f design scenarios shall be documented in the fire sa fety design report (see Clause 12).
11.2 Hazard identification

It is necessary that hazard identification be conducted in a methodical and organized manner to
ensure that there are no omissions. Fire incident data applying to similar types o f built environment or
environmental conditions may be used in the hazard identification. Hazard can be internal or external.
a) Internal hazards should consider at least the following:
— occupancy type and associated utilization o f the built environment;
— type o f activities or uses;
— construction products and goods;
— equipment for normal use and fire sa fety.
b) External hazards should consider at least the following:
— neighbouring activities;
— natural environmental hazards.
11.3 Design fire scenarios
A fire scenario shall be described in terms o f the fire development in either qualitative terms (for
qualitative risk analysis) or quantitative terms (for deterministic analysis and quantitative risk
analysis). A quantitative description o f a fire scenario can include the incipient phase, growth phase,
fully developed phase, decay phase and extinction depending on the FSO being evaluated. A fire scenario
can also include the e ffect o f measures or actions influencing the development o f the fire.
EXAMPLE 1 It is possible that a design fire for the li fe sa fety o f building occupants (e.g. FSO1–FR1.1) only
needs to include the first three phases o f the fire development, i.e. incipient phase, growth phase, fully developed
phase, i f the fire is estimated to not reach the decay phase until a fter evacuation is completed.
EXAMPLE 2 It is possible that a design fire for the protection o f neighbouring buildings (e.g. FSO4–FR4.1) only
needs to include the fully developed phases, i f the likelihood o f spread to neighbouring buildings is significantly
lower for all other phases o f the fire.
A standardized method shall be used to identi fy a manageable group o f design fire scenarios for
analysis. Di fferent methods are applicable depending on the risk analysis approach. Consultation with
affected parties shall be made to ensure that all relevant scenarios are considered.
For probabilistic analyses, su fficient number o f design fire scenarios shall be chosen to ensure adequate
representation o f the scenario space. For deterministic analyses, design fire scenarios shall be chosen
to represent worst credible cases. This requires thorough consideration o f specific sa fety challenges
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o f the built environment, for example, conflicts between smoke spread and exit choice o f evacuees. In
order to deliver acceptable sa fety, design fire scenarios for deterministic analysis also need to cover the
risk associated with scenarios not explicitly included in the analysis.
EXAMPLE 3 A design team has decided to use a probabilistic analysis for li fe sa fety (e.g. FSO1–FR1.1). They
have chosen a hand ful (3 to 5) o f design fire scenarios to represent the entire scenario space o f the specific
building, which is a relatively complex building. However, it is very unlikely that all possible scenarios, i.e. the
scenario space, can be represented by a hand ful scenarios, and the design team needs to per form a thorough
review o f possible fires that can occur in the building.
EXAMPLE 4 A design team has decided to use a deterministic analysis for li fe sa fety (e.g. FSO1–FR1.1). One o f
the chosen design fire scenarios is a small, but frequently occurring, fire with limited consequences, e.g. a fire in
a small item. However, this scenario is not appropriate for the deterministic analysis as it does not represent a
severe exposure, i.e., it is not a worst credible case.
EXAMPLE 5 A design team has decided to use a deterministic analysis for li fe sa fety (e.g. FSO1–FR1.1). One o f
the chosen design fire scenarios is the biggest fire that can credibly occur in the building. However, this fire is
located in a large compartment and is not likely to influence the sa fety o f occupants. It is recommended that the
design team instead choose a slightly smaller fire in a critical location, e.g. a fire blocking the main path o f egress.
This fire can better address the specific sa fety challenges o f the building.
NOTE The selection o f design fire scenarios for probabilistic analysis is described in ISO 16732-1. The
selection o f design fire scenarios for deterministic analysis is described in ISO 16733-1.
1 1 .4 Design occupant behavioural scenarios
When li fe sa fety is the objective being considered, the evaluation o f a design requires an assessment
as to whether occupants are protected for the period o f time from a fter fire ignition until they reach a
place o f sa fety.
The location o f occupants within a built environment at any time and the way the location o f occupants
changes with time during normal use and emergency situations depend on the interaction o f a variety
o f parameters related to the characteristics o f the built environment and the occupants, the fire-sa fety
management system proposed and the developing fire scenario.
In order to account for the likelihood and consequence o f potential fire scenarios, it is necessary to
define the classes o f occupants who can be present. The response o f occupants to a fire condition is
influenced by a whole range o f variables related to the characterization o f the occupants in terms o f:
— their number;
— their distribution within the built environment at di fferent times;
— their familiarity with the built environment;
— their abilities and disabilities;
— their reaction to smoke and any physiological e ffects the fire e ffluent can have on them;
— their behaviours and other attributes;
— the characterization o f the built environment, including its use, layout and services;
— the provision o f warnings, means o f escape and emergency-management strategy;
— the interaction o f all these features with the developing fire scenario and provisions for emergency
intervention (rescue service and rescue facilities).
These attributes make up the occupant behavioural scenarios for consideration in evaluating the design.
Design behavioural scenarios can represent the conditions in a single enclosure or a group of similar
enclosures within a built environment. Any structure can contain a variety o f di fferent behavioural
scenarios to consider during a fire evacuation. A small number o f design behavioural scenarios can be

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ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
us e d to repre s ent the cond ition s i n d i fferent enclo s u re s i n a wide va rie ty o f s tr uc tu re s , a lthough the
i nd ividua l s cena rio s c an var y s omewhat i n p ar tic u la r c a s e s .
It is i mp o s s ible to ana lys e all s cenario s , even with the a id o f the mo s t s oph i s tic ate d computi ng
re s ou rce s . I t i s ne ce s s ar y to re duce th i s i n fi n ite s e t o f p o s s ibi l itie s to a manage ably s ma l l s e t o f s cenario s
that are amenable to ana lys i s and th at col le c tively repre s ent the range o f combi nation s o f o cc up ant
characteristics that can be present.

NO TE T he s ele c tio n o f de s ign o cc up a nt b eh aviou r s cen a r io s for de ter m i n i s tic a n a l ys i s i s de s c r ib e d i n I S O/
TS 29761.
12 Select engineering methods
12.1 General
It is ne ce s s ar y to s ele c t engi ne eri ng me tho d s to as s e s s whe ther the tri a l fi re s a fe ty de s ign pl an
me e ts the FS O s . T h i s s ele c tion pro ce s s i nvolve s the de term i nation o f wh ich engi ne eri ng me tho d s , as
mentione d b elow, h ave accep table acc u rac y a nd e fficienc y i n demon s trati ng that PC s a re s ati s fie d as
the re s u lt o f one or more de s ign fi re s cenario s .
T here a re s evera l p o s s ib le engi ne eri ng mo del s that c an b e u s e d i n p er formance -b a s e d fi re s a fe ty
de s ign, a nd 12.2 to 12.7 b elow on ly h igh l ight a s ele c tion o f me tho d s .
I t i s ne ce s s a r y that the s ele c tion o f engi ne eri ng me tho d s u s e d for eva luation are do c u mente d i n a fi re
s a fe ty de s ign rep or t. T h i s rep or t sha l l pre s ent enough de tai le d i n formation to a l low its eva luation
in terms of meeting the FSOs when assessed against design scenarios using selected engineering
Clause 5
me tho d s . I n order to ach ieve th i s , the rep or t s ha l l i nclude the s ele c te d F S E proj e c t s cop e (s e e ),
FSOs (see Clause 6 Clause 7 Clause 8

) , F Rs (s e e Clause 9 ) , cho s en ri sk ana lys i s appro ach (s e e ) , P C s (s e e ),
f Clause 10
tria l fi re s a e ty de s ign pla n (s e e Clause 11) and engineering methods ) , de s ign s cenario s (s e e
(see Clause 12).

T he fi re s a fe ty de s ign rep or t sh a l l re cei ve the agre ement o f the a ffe c te d p ar tie s , e s p e c ia l ly the authoritie s
havi ng j u ri s d ic tion when de a l i ng with re gu lator y obj e c tive s (i f releva nt) . Fol lowi ng com ments re ceive d
by a ffe c te d p ar tie s , it c a n b e ne ce s s a r y to ch ange one or more o f the item s contai ne d i n the rep or t.
T he fi re s a fe ty de s ign rep or t shou ld b e develop e d conti nuou sly th roughout the de s ign pro ce s s . T he
rep or t i s there fore typic a l ly up date d with new i n formation i n the d i fferent pha s e s o f the de s ign, but i s
made fi na l up on agre ement o f the a ffe c te d p ar tie s at the s tage o f s ele c tion o f engi ne eri ng me tho d s .
12.2 Fire models

Per formance -b a s e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign o ften re qu i re s the u s e o f mo del s , either a lgebra ic e quation s ,
ca lc u lation me tho d s or computer s i mu lation s o ftwa re, to e s ti mate the con s e quence s o f de s ign fi re
s cenario s . T he s e mo del s c an relate to a s p e ci fic fi re phenomena, e . g. fi re plume s , cei l i ng j e t flows ,
s moke layers or vent flows , or de s crib e fi re and s moke s pre ad at a more hol i s tic level, e . g. z one mo del s
or C omputationa l F lu id D ynam ics (C FD) mo del s . I t i s i mp or ta nt that the appropriate mo del i s cho s en
based on the problem at hand.

NO TE M o del s o f s p e c i fic fi re p henomen a a re de s c r ib e d i n I S O 1 67 3 4 (fi re p lu me s) , I S O 167 3 5 (s moke l ayers) ,
I S O 167 3 6 (cei l i ng j e t flows) , I S O 167 3 7 (vent flows) , a nd I S O 2 4 678 - 6 (fl a s ho ver) . Fu r thermore , gu id a nce o n the
use of zone models is provided in ISO/TS 13447.

12.3 Evacuation models
When the l i fe s a fe ty o f o cc up ants (and p o s s ibly re s c ue s er vice p ers on nel) i s con s idere d, the u s e o f mo del s
that are able to simulate evacuation processes are needed. These models can be either simple hand
ca lc u lation me tho d s or more advance d computer s i mu l ation s o ftwa re . T he complexity o f evac uation
mo del s ca n var y, and mo del s c an b e c ategori ze d i n d i fferent ways . O ne p o s s ible c ate gori z ation i s b as e d
on how the bu i lt envi ron ment i s repre s ente d, i . e . a s no de s and arcs (co ars e ne twork mo del s) , a s a grid
16
ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
(fi ne ne twork mo del s) or as a conti nuu m (conti nuou s mo del s) . O ther c ategori z ation s i nclude the level o f
tre atment o f hu ma n b ehaviour. D i fferent typ e s o f evac uation mo del s h ave d i fferent typ e s o f s treng th s
and we a kne s s e s , and it i s i mp or tant that the appropri ate mo del i s cho s en b a s e d on the s ituation that i s
to be simulated.
NO TE Gu id a nce o n mo del s for e va lu ati n g b eh aviou r a nd mo vement o f p e op le i s provide d i n I S O/ T R 167 3 8 .
1 2 . 4 Va l i d a ti o n a n d ve r i fi c a ti o n
Va l idation and veri fic ation o f c a lc u lation me tho d s s ha l l b e conduc te d for as s e s s i ng whe ther a given
calculation method is appropriate for given applications.

Fi re ca n h ave mu ltiple i mp ac ts on the bu i lt envi ron ment, its o cc up ants a nd the envi ron ment. I t i s
ne ce s s ar y to u s e va l idate d e quation s and mo del s to pre d ic t the s e i mp ac ts .
For tho s e c a lc u lation me tho d s th at con s i s t o f a lgebraic e quation s and computer mo del s appl ic able to
s p e ci fic fi re phenomena (e . g. fi re plu me, cei l i ng j e t, s moke layer, vent flow or fi re grow th) , a d i s ti nc tion
c an b e made b e twe en e quation s develop e d for wh ich va l idation i s ne e de d a nd e quation s/mo del s that
have a l re ady b e en va l idate d , p ar tic u la rly tho s e that h ave b e en publ i s he d a s I nternationa l Standard s
or Te ch n ic a l Sp e c i fic ation s . I t i s ne ce s s ar y that any e quation or mo del b e u s e d on ly with i n its field o f
va l id ity, o ther wi s e it i s ne ce s s ar y to provide j u s ti fic ation s .
NO TE T he pro ce s s o f va l idation a nd ver i fic atio n i s de s c r ib e d i n I S O 167 3 0 -1 a nd e xemp l i fie d for d i fferent
typ e s o f mo del s i n I S O/ T R 1 67 3 0 -2 (fi re z one mo del ) , I S O/ T R 167 3 0 -3 (C F D mo del ) , I S O/ T R 167 3 0 - 4 (s tr uc tu ra l
model) and ISO/TR 16730-5 (egress model).

1 2 .5 Data from test methods and surveys
D ata from te s t me tho d s or exp eri ments/s u r veys are typic a l ly used as i nput to variou s typ e s of
engi ne eri ng me tho d s . I t s hou ld b e s hown that the data from a te s t me tho d or exp eri ments/s ur veys
me e ts the s p e c i fic re qu i rements o f the releva nt engi ne eri ng me tho d u s e d, a nd i s s u itable a nd ade quate
for the design under consideration. It should also be shown that the data from a test method or
exp eri ments/s u r veys me e ts s p e ci fic rel iabi l ity (e . g. as me a s ure d by rep e atabi l ity a nd repro duc ibi l ity)
and acc u rac y re qu i rements that a re do c u mente d i n the te s t me tho d or s ur vey s tanda rd s .
1 2 . 6 A n a l ys i s o f re s u l ts f ro m r e f
e re n c e fi re s c e n a r i o te s t
Where c a lc u lation me tho d s are no t avai l able or a re no t va l id due to the complexity o f the phenomena
i nvolve d, a de s ign may b e eva luate d th rough the ana lys i s o f re s u lts from fi re te s ts havi ng a charac teri s tic
scale comparable (based on engineering judgement) to the largest dimension of the built environment
that c an i n fluence the outcome s . I t i s ne ce s s ar y th at s uch te s ts , that are de s igne d to repro duce a l l
i mp or ta nt fe atu re s o f fi re b ehaviour for the s ituation o f i ntere s t, b e deno te d as re ference fi re s cenario
te s ts . Re s u lts from th i s typ e o f fi re te s t shou ld b e ana lys e d to s how that the conclu s ion s d rawn are
applicable to the relevant design situation and that such conclusions do not represent an unwarranted
ex trap olationf f
rom te s t data . Such a te s t i s l i m ite d to s i mple con figu ration s o the bu i lt envi ron ment or
parts thereof.
1 2 .7 Engineering j udgement
When c a lc u lation me tho d s and/or data are no t avai lab le (or no t fu l ly appropriate) and the p er forma nce
o f re ference - s c a le te s ts are no t p o s s ible due to l i m ite d re s ource s , it c an be ne ce s s ar y to uti l i z e
engi ne eri ng j udgement to agre e on the data b ei ng u s e d or to de term i ne i f cer tai n p ar ts o f a fi re
s a fe ty de s ign me e t obj e c tive s b y s ati s fyi ng the PC s . I t i s de s i rab le that th i s b e a te am e ffor t i nvolvi ng
i nd ividua l s with releva nt a re a s o f exp er ti s e and e xp erience .

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ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
1 3 Evaluate design
1 3 .1 General
The trial fire sa fety design plan should be evaluated by carrying out an engineering analysis using
selected engineering methods to determine whether the PCs are achieved for the design fire scenarios.
This evaluation quantifies the per formance o f the trial fire sa fety design. Depending on whether the
PCs are expressed in a deterministic or a probabilistic manner, the evaluation can involve specific
calculations for each design fire scenario or a probabilistic representation o f calculations applying to a
range o f design fire scenarios.
13.2 Quantification o f design scenarios
1 3 .2 .1 Input data
Data is required to determine, with su fficient accuracy, input parameters for all the design scenarios.
Data can be obtained from tests and/or surveys, or from literature. For design fire scenarios, there is
a specific need to quanti fy the design fire associated to each design fire scenario and to estimate the
e ffects o f these design fire scenarios.
It is necessary to check care fully the data derived from tests and surveys regarding:
— the validity o f the methodology by which data was obtained;
— the range o f application o f the testing and survey results;
— the uncertainty attached to them.
In the majority o f cases, it is recommended to control the set o f data by using it when comparing the
results o f a calculation method with valid experimental or statistical results. For data taken from the
literature, the same checks as for data from tests and surveys is necessary.
An assessment o f the uncertainty o f the input data for calculation methods used in the analysis should
be made.
NOTE Guidance related to input data for design fires is provided in ISO 16733-1. Guidance related to input
data for occupant behaviour is provided in ISO/TR 16738.
1 3 .2 .2 Estimation of consequence
It is necessary to determine the consequences o f each design fire scenario taking into account the
per formance (such as e ffectiveness, level o f confidence, response time) o f the fire protection systems
and any influence o f the fire protection systems on the fire severity.
When dealing with li fe sa fety, behavioural scenarios shall be taken into account.
These analyses consider:
a) determination o f fire behaviour. The evaluation o f design fire scenarios through a deterministic
analysis or the evaluation o f all representative fire scenarios in a probabilistic analysis should
include the following aspects o f fire behaviour:
— design fire growth in the built environment;
— movement o f e ffluents caused by the design fire in the built environment;
— functioning and reliability o f active fire-protection systems;
— functioning and reliability o f passive fire systems;
— e ffects o f the fire-sa fety management.
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ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
b) determination o f fire impact. The evaluation o f fire behaviour should be made to identi fy the
impacts on the relevant fire sa fely objectives.
1 3 .2 .3 Estimation of frequency of occurrence
In the case o f probabilistic analysis, it is necessary to undertake an appropriate and detailed evaluation
o f the frequency o f occurrence o f each design scenario. For the deterministic analysis, design scenarios
are chosen to represent a severe exposure, i.e. a worst credible case approach. Quantification o f the
frequency o f occurrence is there fore mainly applicable for the probabilistic analysis.
1 3 .3 Uncertainty
In evaluating a fire sa fety design plan, as with any engineering evaluation, there are many sources o f
uncertainty. These can include uncertainties associated with:
a) the choice and definition o f the scenario(s);
b) the functioning o f fire protection measures;
c) the selection o f appropriate engineering methods for a chosen scenario;
d) the validity o f the selected engineering method;
e) the value o f input data and chosen parameters;
f ) assumptions made as part o f the analysis.
The magnitude o f uncertainty associated with each component o f the evaluation shall be considered
and then combined to establish an overall level o f uncertainty. This overall level provides the basis for
the choice o f method for addressing uncertainty.
The chosen risk analysis approach is inherently linked to the level o f treatment o f uncertainty in the
risk analysis (see Clause 8 ). Depending on the approach chosen, i.e. qualitative analysis, deterministic
analysis or probabilistic analysis, the uncertainty needs to be handled in di fferent ways.
In the qualitative analysis, uncertainties are addressed by identi fying areas o f increased risk compared
to a benchmark built environment. This means that uncertainty is partially handled by identi fying and
subsequently addressing all negative impacts.
The deterministic analysis attempts to handle uncertainties by applying a worst credible case approach.
However, some uncertainties, such as uncertainties related to failure o f fire protection systems, need
to be specifically handled in the deterministic analysis. One way to address the reliability o f technical
systems is to assign a less serious fire scenario or to accept more severe exposure for the less probable
case o f technical system failure. The basic idea is that i f a technical system fails, a reasonable sa fety level
shall still be achieved, bearing in mind that this situation is less likely for a well-maintained system. I f
the same fire scenario would have been considered for the two cases, e.g. functioning versus failing
sprinkler system, there would be no added benefit o f installing the system i f the same objectives were
to be fulfilled. Another way to address uncertainties in the deterministic analysis is a systematically
per formed sensitivity analysis where one variable at a time is varied to study the influence o f the
variation.
In the probabilistic analysis, some uncertainties can be explicitly quantified by, for example, assigning
distributions to input values. Care shall be taken to choose distributions that adequately represent the
underlying uncertainties.
Any sa fety factors or sa fety margins incorporated in a proposed solution involve a degree o f expert
judgement by the designer and, consequently, also by those responsible for assessing and approving the
solution. Wherever possible, this judgement should be in formed by an understanding o f the basis and
limitations o f the chosen scenarios, models and data, and should be made explicit in the reporting and
presentation o f the final design.

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ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
For the important practical case where a design is based on a single analytical expression, methods
have been developed in structural and other engineering areas to derive sa fety factors (partial
coe fficients) corresponding to a pre-determined level o f risk or failure. The method is usually termed as
a “reliability-based design” and assumes that relevant uncertainties are quantified in statistical terms.
It is not yet possible to quanti fy levels o f uncertainty for all stages o f the design process, nor is there yet
a generally accepted methodology for combining them.
13.4 Comparison with PCs

It is necessary to compare the results o f the evaluations o f the fire sa fety design for each design
scenario with the PCs for the relevant FSOs. I f the comparison is unsatis factory for one or several o f the
objectives or design scenarios, the following responses are possible.
— The trial design should be modified, to meet any PCs that are not met by the original trial design.
Any changes made in the fire sa fety design plan due to actions from Clause 13 should result in a
repeat of the procedures outlined in Clauses 10 to 13.
— When the objective under consideration is voluntary, it can be possible to change the PCs with the
informed agreement of the affected parties. This will result in a repeat of the procedures outlined
in Clauses 9 to 13.
— For some situations, it can be necessary to review the scope o f the project. In this case, the process
should return to Clause 5.
13.5 Identify other affected FSOs
Once a trial fire sa fety design plan has been shown to meet the FSOs o f concern, the fire sa fety designer
shall assess whether the design has negatively a ffected any prescribed FSOs not already considered
in the analysis. This is particularly relevant in cases where a comparative approach has been applied
and where FSOs are not explicit in the regulations. In these cases, it is possible that changes have been
made compared to the prescriptive regulations without realizing the influence on other FSOs. I f other
a ffected FSOs are identified, the process described in Clause 5 to 13 should be per formed for the newly
identified objectives.
EXAMPLE Regulations in an example country state that the maximum walking distance to the closest
emergency exit shall not exceed 30 m for a specific type o f building. The design team want to extent this distance
to 35 m. Due to the introduction o f a number o f fire sa fety features, a trial fire sa fety design plan is shown to
provide equivalent li fe sa fety for building occupants compared to a prescriptively designed building with a
maximum walking distance o f 30 m. Although the requirement o f 30 m in the prescriptive regulations is stated
as a requirement for evacuation routes, it can have an impact on other FSOs, e.g. the li fe sa fety o f rescue service
personnel. The design team there fore needs to identity other FSOs a ffected by the change o f maximum walking
distance to the closest emergency exit. The FSE process then needs to be repeated (in full or reduced form) for
these identified objectives.
1 4 D o c u m e n t i n fi n a l re p o r t
14.1 General
All o f the in formation which was involved in developing the fire sa fety design, from FSE project scope
to final design and ongoing operations and maintenance o f the facility, should be documented. The
following reflects the types o f in formation which should be reported.
14.2 FSE assessment

The FSE assessment shall clearly and completely explain the basis o f the assessment (including all
assumptions) and can include at least the following:
— reasons for choosing per formance-based design;
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ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
— de s crip tion o f the b ou nda rie s o f the a na lys i s (F S E proj e c t s cop e, FS O s , FRs , cho s en ri s k a na lys i s
appro ach and PC s) ;
— pre s entation o f the fi re s a fe ty de s ign plan;
— pre s entation o f the engi ne eri ng me tho d s a nd i nput data u s e d for the a s s e s s ments a nd j u s ti fic ation
for the choice s made;
— va riou s s tep s o f the eva luation o f the tria l de s ign for the de s ign fi re s cena rio s and re s u lts;
— comp a ri s on o f the re s u lts with PC s;
— s u m mar y conclu s ion;
— de s crip tion o f qua l ity as s u ra nce work.
1 4.3 Conditions of use of the built environment
T he cond ition s o f u s e o f the bu i lt envi ron ment, con s i s tent with as s u mp tion s made i n the de s ign, sh a l l
be documented. This serves as information for the owner/manager of the built environment throughout
its lifetime. The documentation shall include at least the following:
a) a de s c rip tion o f the bu i lt envi ron ment and its ac tivity, s uch as the fol lowi ng for the c as e o f a
building:
— numb er o f s torie s and flo or are a o f e ach s torey;
— lo c ation o f the bui ld i ng rel ative to prop er ty l i ne s and s tre e ts;
— u s e o f the bui lt envi ron ment;
— pu rp o s e/func tion and d i men s ion s o f e ach p a r t o f the bu i lt envi ron ment;
— de s crip tion o f the lo c ation o f a l l fi xtu re s , fu rni s h i ngs , de coration s , e quipment and combu s tib le
pro duc ts;
— for i ndu s tri a l i n s ta l lation s , a de s crip tion and ana lys i s o f the pro ce s s e s;
— o cc up a nc y o f e ach s p ace;
— acce s s o f fi re s er vice i nter vention;
— lo c ation a nd fe atu re s o f the fi na l re fuge;
— evac uation route s to the fi na l re fuge .
b) a l i s t o f a s s u mp tion s made i n the a s s e s s ment wh ich ne e d to b e fol lowe d, s uch a s:
— upp er l i m it and lo c ation o f fi re lo ad;
— upp er l i m it and lo c ation o f o cc up a nts;
— ac tive fi re pro te c tion me a s u re s (i nclud i ng i n-hou s e fi re -fighters) ;
— p as s ive fi re pro te c tion me as u re s;
— e gre s s tri a l s;
— inspection and maintenance.

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ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
14.4 Inspection and maintenance procedures

In formation as to how critical fire sa fety systems are to be maintained shall be provided. This should
include:
— whether the initial design input data are fulfilled (e.g. change or evolution o f the initial activity,
increase o f fuel quantity, etc.);
— which protection systems require periodic inspection and maintenance and how and when it is
necessary to be done.
14.5 Forms of documentation

The exact form o f documentation (reporting) can vary by jurisdiction and project, and can be
regulated or not. Four types o f reports that can be issued, which include the above in formation
(see 12.1 , 14.2 to 14.4), include;
— a fire sa fety design report, which includes agreed boundaries o f analysis, trial fire sa fety design
plan, design scenarios and engineering methods (see 12.1);
— an FSE assessment report, which documents the analysis o f the design and provides the final design
in formation (may include the fire sa fety design report);
— a report for the operational conditions o f use o f the built environment as relevant to the design,
including critical assumptions, bounding conditions, limitations on use and recommendations for
change o f conditions;
— a manual o f inspection and maintenance procedures relative to required fire sa fety systems for
application during the life of the built environment.
14.6 Global project review
It is necessary for the reports mentioned in 14.5 to receive full agreement from the affected parties to
ensure that all the requirements are taken into account and that the final project plan fulfils all the FSOs.
14.7 Agreement of relevant regulatory authorities

When dealing with regulatory FSOs, the agreement o f relevant authorities having jurisdiction is generally
necessary. In this respect, the FSE final assessment report shall be provided, i f necessary, with the other
reports. The authority having jurisdiction can provide their comments directly or request a peer review
o f the final design by a third party. This third party peer review can lead to additional evaluation and/or
modification to the final design. I f so, the process shall be repeated for the modified parts.
1 5 I m p l e m e n t fi re s a f e ty d e s i g n p l a n
1 5 . 1 I d e n ti fi c a ti o n a n d tre a tm e n t o f
c h a n g e s
A construction/manu facturing con formity assessment report shall be prepared.

When deviations from the final fire sa fety design plan are necessary, they shall be documented
and, depending on their e ffect on fire sa fety, agreement o f a ffected parties or the authority having
jurisdiction can be necessary.
15.2 Check of built environment conformity

Confirmation or evidence that products used in construction or components used in manu facturing are
in accordance with the assumptions made in the fire sa fety assessment shall be available and, where
applicable, properly certified.
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ISO 23932-1:2018(E)
In some specific uses, when in situ tests have been specified to confirm the expected operation o f, for
instance, active protection or detection devices, those tests shall be per formed and reported.
Confirmation or evidence shall be available that construction and manu facturing have been
accomplished according to the documented design.
15.3 Update of project documentation
When deviations are made in the construction o f the built environment, it is necessary to update the
final reports mentioned in 14.5.
16 Execute fire safety management
16.1 General
Once a fire sa fety design is implemented in the built environment, both fire sa fety management and
independent inspection shall be exercised during the li fetime o f the built environment. The management
and inspection processes ensure that the design scenarios used by fire sa fety designers are always
relevant.
16.2 Fire safety management
16.2.1 Requirement for fire safety management

Fire sa fety management procedures have a vital role to play in the prevention and control o f fires, the
evacuation o f occupants to protected areas and the maintenance o f fire sa fety systems. In certain types
o f locations, particularly those occupied by large numbers o f people, e ffective management procedures
are crucial to a speedy and orderly evacuation. The measures o f e ffective fire sa fety management are
evidence that the probability o f starting a fire has been reduced and evidence that the likelihood o f
successful evacuation has been enhanced.
16.2.2 Fire safety manual
The possibility o f failures in management procedures and fire protection systems should be considered.
This is particularly important as it is o ften di fficult to be certain that e ffective fire sa fety management
procedures can be maintained over the li fetime o f the built environment. To accomplish this, a fire
sa fety manual can be an e ffective means o f keeping a record o f maintenance o f fire protection systems
and a checklist o f procedures to follow in emergency situations. In-house inspection procedures should
also be implemented.
16.2.3 Liaison with fire service
An important element for a success ful fire sa fety management is e ffective liaison with rescue service
personnel over the li fe cycle o f the built environment. Such liaison should include pre-fire planning
that is relevant to current conditions, for example, that rescue service personnel be familiar with the
hazards and with the operation o f fire protection systems.
16.3 Inspection
Where an inspection o f fire protection and management procedures is carried out regularly, e.g. at least
once a year, it is reasonable to assume that fire protection systems and evacuation procedures are more
likely to work e ffectively than where there are no regular, independent audits. In a built environment
that is not subject to independent audit, additional fire protection measures can be necessary to achieve
a tolerable level o f risk.

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ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
1 6.4 Life-cycle analysis
When change s i n u s e, o cc up a nc y or fuel lo ad or when renovation/mo d i fic ation o f the bu i lt envi ron ment
i s identi fie d as s ign i fic ant b y i ndep endent i n s p e c tion or o ther me a n s , the fi re s a fe ty de s ign pro ce s s sha l l
Clause 5
b e rep e ate d or reviewe d , b e gi n n i ng with , at the op tion o f a l l a ffe c te d p a r tie s . I t i s pre ferable
to i ncorp orate i n a fi re s a fe ty de s ign, elements or device s that prevent i mprop er u s e or o cc up anc y o f a
built environment without due notice to all affected parties.
24
ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
Bibliography
[1] Fire sa fety engineering — Procedures and requirements for verification and validation
I S O 1 67 3 0 -1 ,
of calculation methods — Part 1: General
[2 ] I S O 1 67 3 2 -1 , Fire safety engineering — Fire risk assessment — Part 1: General
[3 ] Fire sa fety engineering — Selection o f design fire scenarios and design fires — Part 1:
I S O 1 67 3 3 -1 ,
Selection o f design fire scenarios
[4] I S O 1 67 3 4 , Fire safety engineering — Requirements governing algebraic equations — Fire plumes
[5 ] I S O 1 67 3 5 , Fire safety engineering — Requirements governing algebraic equations — Smoke layers
[6 ] I S O 1 67 3 6 , Fire sa fety engineering — Requirements governing algebraic equations — Ceiling jet flows
[7 ] I S O 1 67 3 7, Fire sa fety engineering — Requirements governing algebraic equations — Vent flows
[8 ] ISO Fire safety engineering — Requirements governing algebraic formulae — Part 6:

2 4 67 8 - 6 ,
Flashover related phenomena
[9 ] I S O/ T S 1 3 4 47, Fire sa fety engineering — Guidance for use o f fire zone models
[1 0 ] I S O/ T R 1 6 5 76 , Fire sa fety engineering — Examples o ffire sa fety objectives, functional requirements

and safety criteria
[1 1] Fire sa fety engineering — Assessment, verification and validation o f calculation

I S O/ T R 1 67 3 0 -2 ,
methods — Part 2: Example o f a fire zone model
[1 2 ] Fire sa fety engineering — Assessment, verification and validation o f calculation

I S O/ T R 1 67 3 0 - 3 ,
methods — Part 3: Example of a CFD model
[1 3 ] I S O/ T R 1 67 3 0 - 4 , Fire sa fety engineering — Assessment, verification and validation o f calculation

methods — Part 4: Example of a structural model
[14] Fire sa fety engineering — Assessment, verification and validation o f calculation

I S O/ T R 1 67 3 0 - 5 ,
methods — Part 5: Example of an Egress model
[1 5 ] I S O/ T R 1 67 3 2 -2 , Fire Sa fety Engineering — Fire risk assessment — Part 2: Example o f an o ffice

building
[1 6 ] I S O/ T R 1 67 3 2 - 3 , Fire safety engineering — Fire risk assessment — Part 3: Example of an industrial

property
[17 ] I S O/ T R Fire-safety engineering — Technical information on methods for evaluating

1 67 3 8 : 2 0 0 9 ,
behaviour and movement of people
[1 8 ] I S O/ T S 2 4 67 9, Fire sa fety engineering — Performance o f structures in fire
[19 ] I S O/ T R 2 4 67 9 -2 , Fire sa fety engineering — Performance o f structure in fire — Part 2: Example o f

an airport terminal
[2 0 ] I S O/ T R 2 4 67 9 - 3 , Fire sa fety engineering — Performance o f structure in fire — Part 3: Example o f

an open car park
[2 1] Fire sa fety engineering — Performance o f structures in fire — Part 4: Example o f

I S O/ T R 2 4 67 9 - 4 ,
a fifteen-storey steel- framed o ffice building
[2 2 ] Fire sa fety engineering — Performance o f structures in fire — Part 6: Example o f

I S O/ T R 2 4 67 9 - 6 ,
an eight-storey o ffice concrete building

25
ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
[2 3 ] I S O/ T S 2 9 761 , Fire safety engineering — Selection of design occupant behavioural scenarios
26

ISO 2 3 93 2 -1 : 2 01 8(E)
ICS 13.220.01
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INTERNATIONAL ISO

Fire safety engineering — General

I n tern ati o n al Org an i z ati o n fo r S tan d ard i z ati o n

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P ro vi d e d by I H S M arki t u n d er l i cen s e wi th vari o u s N ati o n al S tan d ard s B o d i e s

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P ro vi d e d by I H S M arki t u n d er l i cen s e wi th vari o u s N ati o n al S tan d ard s B o d i e s

14.2 FSE assessment.................................................................................................................................................................................... 20

15.2 Check o f built environment conformity ......................................................................................................................... 22

16.2 Fire safety management............................................................................................................................................................... 23

P ro vi d e d by I H S M arki t u n d er l i cen s e wi th vari o u s N ati o n al S tan d ard s B o d i e s

© ISO 2018 – All rights reserved

P ro vi d e d by I H S M arki t u n d er l i cen s e wi th vari o u s N ati o n al S tan d ard s B o d i e s

P ro vi d e d by I H S M arki t u n d er l i cen s e wi th vari o u s N ati o n al S tan d ard s B o d i e s

Fire safety engineering — General principles —

2) i mplementation for fi re s a fe ty de s ign pla n s , a nd

do c u ment a l s o provide s key elements l i n ke d to the i mplementation o f fi re s a fe ty de s ign p lan s a nd fi re

s a fe ty ma nagement. T h i s do c ument i s i ntende d no t on ly to b e u s e d on its own, but a l s o i n conj u nc tion

with a con s i s tent s e t o f FS E do c u ments coveri ng me tho d s i n p er forma nce -b as e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign,

implementation and management.

— prop er ty pro te c tion;

— conti nu ity o f op eration s;

— pro te c tion o f the envi ron ment;

but may no t b e appl ic able for con s tr uc tion s ite s .

I S O 1 3 9 43 , Fire safety — Vocabulary

3 Terms and definitions

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qua nti fic ation o f ri s k for a group o f fi re s cenario s

N o te 1 to entr y: M a nd ato r y fu nc tio n a l re qu i rements a re re qu i re d , e xp l ic itl y or i mpl ic itl y, b y n ation a l re gu l ation s

or bu i ld i ng co de s; vo lu nta r y fu nc tion a l re qu i rements a re e x pre s s e d b y o ther a ffe c te d p a r tie s .

c a lc u lation s , i nput d ata a nd as s u mp tion s

ca lc u l ation s , i nput data and a s s u mp tion s

relation s h ip s , or o f a fai lu re to i nclude a releva nt element

o f problem s add re s s e d b y the mo del

4 Overview of the FSE process

en hancement o f s e c u rity ( l i m itation o f me tho d s o f e gre s s) c a n i ntro duce u n i ntende d fi re s a fe ty de s ign

pro ce s s i nvolve s p er forma nce -b as e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign, i mplementation o f fi re s a fe ty de s ign pla n a nd

fi re s a fe ty ma nagement. I n Figure 1 , the p er formance - b a s e d fi re s a fe ty de s ign b egi n s with s e tti ng the

ana lys i s s cop e and end s with do c u mentation i n fi na l rep or t.

© ISO 2018 – All rights reserved

a S ee als o I S O /TR 1 6 5 7 6 (E xamp les ) .

d S ee als o I S O /TS 1 3 447 , I S O 1 67 3 0 - 1 , I S O /TR 1 6 7 3 0 - 2 to 5 (E xamp les ) , I S O 1 6 7 3 4, I S O 1 6 7 3 5 , I S O 1 6 7 3 6,

NO TE D o c u ments l i n ke d to l a rge p a r ts o f the F S E p ro ce s s : I S O 167 3 2 -1 , I S O 167 3 3 -1 , I S O/ T S 2 4 679, I S O/

Figure 1 — FSE process — Design, implementation and management

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5 Set FSE project scope

6.2 Life safety

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6.3 Property protection

6.4 Continuity of operations

6.5 Protection of the environment

6.6 Protection of heritage

8 Select risk analysis approach

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agai n s t s ome tolerable ri s k c riterion .

Figure 2 — Different types of analyses in the FSE process

determines the measures used for the comparison.

8.2 Comparative versus absolute approach

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8.4 Deterministic analysis

8.5 Probabilistic analysis

8.5 .2 Semi-quantitative risk analysis

8.5 .3 Quantitative risk analysis

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