•

The siege of umantla

How Scipio Ael11ilianus conquered
the bravest of all cities
ONE OF THE LOST BOOKS OF LlVY'S

GREAT ROMAN HISTORY DESCRIBED

HOW, "IN HISPANIA, THE CONSUL

QUINTUS POMPEI US DEFEATED THE

PEOPLE OF TERMANTIA, AND CON­

CLUDED A PEACE TREATY WITH THEM

AND WITH NUMANTIA, BUT IT WAS

ANNULLED BY THE ROMAN PEOPLE".

THE YEAR WAS 141 Be. UNTIL THEN,

­
Trave ~ aaas
",_ ..
NUMANTIA HAD HARDLY FIGURED

IN ROMAN HISTORY, BUTTHE INHAB­

ITANTS OF THE HILLTOP TOWN WERE

DESTINED TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN

THE UNFOLDING SAGA OF ROME.

By Duncan B Campbell

A decade earlier, the consul

~
Quintus Fulvius Nobilior was sent out 8
~
from Rome to the province of Hispania .~
Citerior (Nearer Spain ), where the ~
~
~
.~
Celtiberian tribes were creating
~
trouble. According to the historian ~
~
Polybius, the resulting war was known e
m
as the "fiery war"; unlike Rome's wars
~
with the Hellenistic states of the east­ ~

ern Mediterranean, which usually
hinged on one decisive clash, in Spain,
the fighting sparked and flared like an
unquenched fire. Men returning to the
capital after their tour of duty brought
back tales of ferocious fighting and
horrific loss of life. Six thousand
Romans were said to have fallen in a
single battle with the Celtiberians, and
the day, 23 August, went down in the
annals as a day of bad omen. In short,
Nobilior's Spanish campaign was a
complete disaster.
~
• g
The Roman fortifications around Numantia.
First blood at Numantia
In an attempt to bring matters to a elephants. As a secret weapon of ter­
close, Nobilior took the war to the main ror, they initially achieved great suc­
Celtiberian town of Numantia, the cess, for the Celtiberians had evidently
seat of the Arevaci. His army, unusu­ never seen such creatures. The Romans
ally, was supplemented by ten African reckoned to have won the day, until

28 I Ancient Warfare
one of the elephants was struck on the
head by a stone and rampaged through
the Roman ranks, in company with its
nine brothers. By nightfall, Nobilior had
lost four thousand men, along with all
credibility as a commander. Spanish
towns previously friendly to Rome now
considered changing their allegiance,
none more damagingly than Ocilis,
where the main Roman stores lay.
Nobilior's army was increasingly iso­
lated, and supplies ran short as winter
closed in.
"The Numantines were first-rate
soldiers, both horse and foot,
there being about 8,000 alto­
gether. Although small in num­
bers,yet they gave the Romans
great trouble by their bravery."
Appian, Iberica 76
His successor in the consulship was
Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the son
and grandson of war heroes, now
serving as supreme magistrate for the
third time. Arriving in Spain in 152 BC
at the head of a fresh army, this mas­
ter of diplomacy won back Ocilis and,
by imposing very lenient terms, also
won the trust of the Celtiberian tribes.
Hostilities were suspended and envoys
travelled to Rome to discuss an end to
the fiery war.
Unfortunately, Marcellus' generous
attitude met with criticism at Rome.
This was no way to deal with hostile
barbarians. The delegates from the pro­
Roman tribes demanded that legions
should be permanently quartered in
Hispania Citerior to ensure their safety;
or that, at the very least, the Arevaci
should be punished as the main bel­
ligerents. The Senate concurred. But
in the meantime, Marcellus had made
a settlement with the Arevaci, so they
gave no further trouble.
In time, the focus shifted to the
Lusitanian tribes of Hispania Ulterior
(Further Spain), where Roman atroci­
ties had stirred up a hornet's nest.
And Rome was preoccupied with the
Third Punic War and the final destruc­
tion of Carthage in 146 Be. A consular
army once more campaigned across
Celtiberian territory in 143 BC, but
its commander, Quintus Caecilius
Metellus Macedonicus, seems actu­
ally to have avoided Numantia, despite
having his command extended for a
year.
Many setbacks, great disgrace
So it was not until 141 BC that a Roman
army once more stood outside the
walls of Numantia, and a succession
of consuls (in the words of Cassius Dio)
"received many setbacks and incurred
great disgrace." First was Quintus
Pompeius, who evidently attempted
to divert Numantia's water supply
and flood her crop lands; his men were
constantly harassed as they worked,
and new recruits sent out to replace
losses fell ill and died from dysentery. A
favoured tactic of the Numantines was
to offer battle, but retire slowly, draw­
ing the Romans within range of the
town defences where they fell victim to
a withering barrage. Overwintering in
the bleak environs of Numantia took its
toll on Pompeius' army, and he secretly
colluded with the Numantines to end
the war.
Handing over command to Marcus
Popillius Laenas, he returned to Rome
and immediately denied having made
any treaty with Numantia. The lull
in hostilities had enabled Popillius to
make war in Hispania Ulterior during
139 BC, the year of his consulship, but
his command was extended so that he
might secure the final submission of
the Numantines. In the event, he too
failed. In the terse words of Livy's sum­
mary, "Marcus Popillius was defeated
and routed by the Numantines, along
with his army."
"The besieged Numantines did
not come out to form a battle­
line but remained inside, so that
Popillius Laenas had the con­
fidence to attack with scaling
ladders; but meeting no resis­
tance, he suspected a trap and
recalled his troops, whereupon
the Numantines rushed out
and attacked them as they were
climbing down."
Frontinus, Strategemata 3.17.9
His successor in the ongoing struggle
with Numantia was Caius Hostilius
Mancinus, one of the consuls for 137
BC, whose departure from Rome was
apparently dogged by ill omens. The
historian Plutarch reckoned he was
"not bad as a man, but most unfor­
tunate as a general". Further military
blunders culminated in the aban­
donment of the Roman camp and a
chaotic nocturnal withdrawal. When
daybreak found his soldiers defence­
less, disordered and at the mercy of
the Numantines, Mancinus agreed to
another shameful truce. The senate
were outraged. Nothing short of dedi­
tio, "unconditional surrender", was
acceptable. Mancinus was recalled,
tried, and condemned; his punishment
was to be handed over, naked and
unarmed, to the Numantines, but they
refused to receive him.
Good fortune and valour
Back at Rome, the people grew weary
of the Numantine war, as it dragged
on, year after year, with no resolution.
They needed a competent siege com­
mander, and whom better than Scipio
Aemilianus, the destroyer of Carthage?
When Scipio was denied fresh
troops by the Senate, on the spuri­
ous grounds that Italy would be left
unprotected, he raised a force of 4,000
by his own efforts. In particular, 500
men who owed him for his patronage
were formed into a kind of guard unit,
the "squadron of friends." Arriving
before Numantia, he was faced with
a greater struggle in the camp than on
the battlefield, for he found an army
in poor condition: lazy, insubordinate,
and demoralised from constant defeat
and failure.
He at once initiated a programme
of discipline that became legendary,
and many of his acts and sayings were
preserved down through the ages. Not
only were prostitutes and soothsayers
dismissed from the camp, but couches,
tables, and all the trappings of civilised
dining were thrown out, so that the
men had only a roasting spit, a cooking
pan, and a cup. He frowned on elabo­
rate bathing rituals and ridiculed the
men who kept slaves to massage them,
saying that only mules needed oth­
ers to rub them down. His wry sense
of humour led to his wearing a black
Ancient Warfare
 llTI:I~~~
The view looking north from the Peiia Redonda camp.
cloak, in mourning, he said, on account
of the disgraceful state of the army.
Once discipline was restored, Scipio
embarked on a gruelling training
regime, and soon he had forged the
rabble of his predecessors into a fight­
ing army.
"He did not dare to engage the
enemy until he had trained his
men by many laborious exer­
cises. He traversed all the plains
in th e vicinity, and daily had
one new camp after another
fortified and then demolished,
very deep trenches dug and then
backfilled, high walls built up
and pulled down, while he per­
sonally watched the work from
morning till night. "
Appian, Iberica 86
Scipio probably wintered at Renieblas,
a hill 5 km to the east of Numantia.
30 I Ancient Warfare
The remains of several Roman camps
were discovered here, each one overly­
ing its predecessor in a sequence that
must represent the visits of successive
consular armies . Only when he was
satisfied that his men were ready for
the task did he move up to Numantia
in the spring of 133 Be.
The bravest of all cities
Curiously, events at Numantia were
prefigured at Carthage, fifteen years
earlier, with astonishing accuracy.
There, the consuls of 149 BC had pinned
their hopes on a strategy of oppugna­
tio, the all-out assault. But their Siege
machinery had been easily destroyed by
the Carthaginians, leaving the Roman
attack to flounder. (Scipio won his
siege crown while serving as tribune in
this campaign .) Then the legate Lucius
Hostilius Mancinus had attempted an
escalade and even broke into the city,
but failed to make any headway and
had to be extricated. Finally, on his
arrival late in 147 BC, Scipio brought
order to the chaos by instigating a
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strategy of obsessio, or blockade, to cut
Carthage off from external assistance .
We can see each stage mirrored at
Numantia, though dragged out over
a longer timescale . So, rather than
repeat the failed assaults of Pompeius
and Popillius (not to mention Nobilior),
Scipio resolved to reduce the town
by blockade. It is well known that he
disapproved of generals who risked
lives unnecessarily. Like a physiCian,
he would operate with steel only as a
last resort. So it was entirely charac­
teristic that, having drilled his army
for months, he set about encircling the
town in an orderly fashion . And thus,
the fate of Numantia was sealed.
Camps, forts and towers
First, two camps were established, one
for himself, the other for his brother
Quintus Fabius Maximus . The construc­
tion of two camps, to ensure complete
oversight of the besieged town from
both sides, was a basic tenet of Roman
siegecraft. Next, he dispersed the army
in seven forts, sited on the hills around

Scipio Aemilianus
Publius Cornelius Scipio
Aemilianus was surnamed
Africanus Oike his grandfather
by adoption) to commemorate
his victory at Carthage in 146 BC,
where (according to the historian
Velleius Paterculus) he won a
reputation for good fortune and
valour. His distinguished war
record, including the award of a
corona muralis ('mural crown')
and a corona obsidionalis ('siege
cTOwn '), won him the consulship
_ in 147 BC, so that he could take up
the African command (although
technically he was too young). He
again required special dispensa ~
tion in 134 BC, although by now
50 years of age, because a new
law prohibited the holding of a
second consulship.
the town. Then he set his men the task
that he had prepared them for : the
construction of an encircling wall, or
circumvallation . But even here, their
safety was paramount, and he had
them erect a protective palisade first,
before commencing on the siege wall.
Finally, an early warning system was
devised - a red flag on a spear or, at
night, a flare - in case any of the work
gangs came under attack.
Adolf Schulten's eight-year cam ­
paign of excavations in the early
twentieth century revealed much of
these siege works. However, as with
Caesar's description of Alesia, the
archaeology does not always sit well
with the historical account. The histo­
rian Appian records a 50-stade Siege
wall (g km), eight feet wide (2.5 m) and
ten feet high (3 m) up to a wallwalk,
with towers every plethron (a Greek
measure eqUivalent to 1/6 stade, or 31
mi. But Schulten found only diSjointed
stretches of wall totalling less than 2
km. And different sectors were laid out
to different widths, from 2 m or less up
to 4 or 5 m, a variation that is greater
than sloppy gang work can explain. In
addition , Schulten found few traces
of the tower system that, according to
Appian, accommodated various artil­
lery-pieces. treaty, but SCipio demanded nothing
Schulten placed Scipio in the less than deditio. The man who had
north , at Castillejo, where he thought wept as Carthage burned now set his
he could discern th 1.~e separate face against Numantia. The Celtiberian
phases of occupation. It made sense war had been too long and humiliating
for Scipio to reuse a site previously to grant mercy to the perpetrators. Yet
occupied by the likes of Marcellus and Scipio, with his customary magnanim­
Pompeius. Certainly, the camp was ity, allowed the Numantines one extra
well placed for overall observation of day so that those who wi shed could
the town, an advantage not enjoyed by arrange their own death, and the
Schulten 's choice for Fabius Maximus. squalid few who remained were sold
Placing the other main camp at Pena into slavery. _
Redonda, high above the steep gorge
of the Rio Merdancho, would perhaps Duncan B Campbell currently diVides his
have restricted the Romans' ability to time between teaching ICT and lectur­
respond to a crisis on the west side. A ing on Roman archaeology. He would
more suitable candidate for Maximus' like to live and work in Spain but doe sn't
base is surely Dehesilla, the largest of speak the language.
the camps, with clear views ofthe west­
ern side.
Besides these three large camps,
Schulten discovered traces of another
four, to match Appian's total of seven
forts . But these forts were in addition
Further reading
to the two camps occupied by Scipio
Of'thetwo .heavyweight histori­
and Maximus, and more recent field­
arisof Republican Rome, livy's
work by Spanish archaeologists gives
work is lost for those . years that
us the required total of nine.
encompassed the wars in Nearer
Despite the encircling siege-wall,
Spain. and only the bare chapter
the Numantines could still be supplied
summaries survive .in the , so ~
by river, so SCipio rigged up a floating
caned Periochae.Polybius'his~
boom, studded with spikes and moored
tory ends with the momentous
to a tower on either river bank. The
year 146 BC, and his work on the
blockade was complete, and the star­
Numantine War has not survived.
vation of Numantia was assured.
Consequently, the only narrative
history we have is .the Iberica
(Spanish Affairs) of Appian, an
"Within a year and three
Alexandrian Greek who wrote
months of his arrival, Scipio
elUTing the reign of Antoninus
surrounded Numantia with his
Pius. His description of the siege
siege works, destroyed the city,
of Numantia perhaps derived
and levelled it to the ground . ...
from the eye-witness account of
By the destruction of Carthage
Scipio's tribune, Rutilius Rufus_
and Numantia, he liberated us,
Also see The SouTceill this vol ~
in the one case from fear, in the
ume.
other from a reproach upon our
In general, on the amlyof the
name."
Roman Republic: P. Erdkamp (ed.),
A Companion totheRomCln Army.
Velleius Paterculus 2-4.2
Oxford 2007. On Roman (and
other ancient) sieges: Duncan B
Campbell, BeSieged: Siege Warfare
And now, the once-proud Numantines,
in the Ancient World Oxford 2006.
like other victims of Roman siege­
And, more fully, on Roman artil ~
craft before and after, were reduced
lery: Duncan B Campbell, Greek
to eating boiled hides, and finally to
andRoman Artillery. Oxford 2003.
eating their fellow townsfolk. At last,
defeated by famine and illness, the
town leaders were ready to discuss a
Anc ient Warfare 31