MODULE 2

1. Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda[G.R. No. L-13250, October 29, 1971]

G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..

Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner.

Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as
to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an
international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code1 is now ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus
reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the
estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of
Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court
on the assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of
Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid
Section 122. Then came an order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that would manifest
that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision.
When the petition for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of novelty.
Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that
the "foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal
interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding
from the former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer
of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira.
Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a
Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her
demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September 29,
1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same
date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of
P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955,
an amended return was filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted
from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance
taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11,
1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... . In a
letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of
the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5%  ad
valorem  penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May
21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a
mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and
P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and
compromise penalties."4

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties regarding the values of
the properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the
reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the
meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In
fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of
international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or
whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized
by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5

Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as above indicated, instead of
ruling definitely on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent
back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads
as follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both
subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes
en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of
Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going into
the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of
evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as used in the Tangier
laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used in the Tax Code." 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of
Tax Appeals admitted evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws
of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including furniture
and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the payment
of any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an
order of such Court referring the matter back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on
September 9, 1963. Respondent presented no evidence." 7

The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That
no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was
a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country
of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of
every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country."8 The only obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the
acquisition of internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country". Deference to the
De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals.

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation
that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with
the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and
mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of
the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a
definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde
did opine. 15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case.
It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in  Collector of Internal Revenue v. De
Lara, 16 it was specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our
Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the
inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in
the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country
within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality,
that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an
opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity,
in Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted to it — proof
of the laws of Liechtenstein — that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property of
Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no
estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away."  20 Then came
this definitive ruling: "The Collector — hereafter named the respondent — cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who died
outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is
admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be
concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless, our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions
are such that demand reciprocity — as in this case. And the exemption must be honored." 21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as
to costs.

2. Magallona v. Ermita[G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011

G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES,
CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA,
ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE
DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA
MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN
RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING,
VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA 9522)
adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which,
however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS
II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in
North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted
by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution,
petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah
and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case
or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the
country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the
United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area
drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare
RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges
neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of
RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution
of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing
to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific
interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners. 18

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 20 Issues of constitutional import are
sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon
the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is
one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III
demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of
national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any
treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the
time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-
use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical
miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints
along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could
not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of
their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article
56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area
delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522
because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying
reefs of the archipelago."24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of
territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside
UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure
the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area. 27 Petitioners add that the
KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square
nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the configuration of the
baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a
reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie
this view.1avvphi1

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust
the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046,
as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago.
This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of
the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded
both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,  increased  the Philippines’ total
maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as
shown in the table below:29

Extent of maritime area

Extent of maritime area
using RA 3046, as
using RA 9522, taking
amended, taking into
  into account UNCLOS
account the Treaty of
III (in square nautical
Paris’ delimitation (in
miles)
square nautical miles)
Internal or
archipelagic waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive Economic
Zone   382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the
waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive
economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with
UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not
enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal
effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3)
of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed
100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that
any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago."

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing
during the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside
our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of
international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them
as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we]
call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking
circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating
archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by
respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones
including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as
amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:

1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles
x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length
of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines
enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."

2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines
system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" 36 of
UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,"
such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is
also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act  is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal
waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS
III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear
and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as "archipelagic waters" under
UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. –

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn
in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained therein.

xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status
of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty
over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political
branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical
highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage
rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43 thus automatically incorporated in the
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes
passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to
the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage
rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to
claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters
enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24
nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47

Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) 48 must
also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent
enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x." 49 Article II provisions serve as guides in
formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution.
Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception,
the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite,
relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section
752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the
Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to
UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the
exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. 54 We
have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of
choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep
price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is
recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA
9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

3. Edu v. Ericta [G.R. No. 32069, October 24, 1970]

G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970

ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and
TEDDY C. GALO respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres
for petitioner.
Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.

Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:.

Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the constitutionality of the
Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit
in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as
well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and
legal questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite categorical in his assertion that
both the challenged legislation and the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and non-
delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance by
respondent Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as
enacted and the executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this proceeding of the
constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and
Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and
insubstantial.

As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a
suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of
the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein
he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified
as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
held on May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28,
1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative
order. There was the day after, a motion for its reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the
meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the
required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970,
respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970.

In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the
enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking that the legal
questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged
to be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power be definitely decided. It was on until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this
petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the
authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition
was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear
during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under
consideration by this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.

We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2.

1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be proper for this
Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be
noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the challenged legislation
does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by the
attribution of the violation the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that
there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would
likewise to limited to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then
where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved
moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity,
could know the definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by
the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with
respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.

There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit,  Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving
the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question of the validity of the
presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of
which has caused considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters themselves."

There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the validity of a
legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt
need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve
public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the
executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly, there is
nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as
will now be shown too much for respondent Galo.

2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible
one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in
places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle
shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front
and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the
requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." 3 It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation
enacted under the police power to promote public safety.

Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." 6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in  Morfe v.
Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power.

It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public
needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the
well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.

It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent
Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the due
process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn
a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there
was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected
with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public
need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal.

Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of many American State Court decisions
referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned
against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American
public law, laissez faire.

It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court decisions on constitutional law. As
was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire  was not only a counsel of caution which would do
well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must obey."  12 For a long time legislation tending
to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract,
based on such a basic assumption.

The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and economic forces at work changed
matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of
property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift. He
did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-
faire  was no longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of  West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society
and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls."

While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines was
still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As early as
1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: "The
doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the
past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity. The
Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive
march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due process clause a provision providing for maternity
leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did have its day. It
is to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States,
and only recently the year before, the American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-
faire  theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.

What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of  laissez-faire  was rejected. It
entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of
control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No
constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is
likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because the  laissez-faire principle was
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication.

To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the
"vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry
and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current
tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy
not only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they
are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the
days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to
grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a
constitutional provision automatically imposes. 19

It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and was
one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of  Antamok
Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In the
course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the
government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in People v. Pomar no
longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21

It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was
found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum
wages, 24 compulsory arbitrations, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and control of public
services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy
laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirements of
separation pay for one month, 33 and social security scheme. 34

Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not
unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth
as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes. Yet
respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector
Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.

3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by
petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision
on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector
commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and
clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on
dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in
diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or
taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be
"placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be
installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front
and those in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass,
reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on
the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements contained in this
Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe
suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of
Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be
imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner,
as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue
rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express
provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not
less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative
power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In
the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in  Calalang v. Williams  is
"safe transit upon the roads." 43

This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the
practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority
non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in
this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes ... " 47

An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be
delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and
another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of  a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly
stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a
reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether
he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed. 848) ... It should be noted,
furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central
Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production,
employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These standards are sufficiently concrete and
definite to vest in the delegated authority, the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the
grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers ... " 48

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which
it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes
of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to
promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There
has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970
denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order
No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.

4. Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956]

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9657.  November 29, 1956.]
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET
AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants-Appellants.
 
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of
Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation
paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the
recovery of the amounts paid. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut Corporation,
being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General
issued an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct from the salary of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of
P25 every payday and from the salary of Mateo A. Matoto the amount of P10 every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To
prevent deduction of these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the National Coconut Corporation is not a
government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. After trial, the court found for the Plaintiffs declaring (1) “that Defendant National Coconut Corporation is not a
government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the payments already made by
said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein and received by the latter from the former in the total amount of P714, for copies of the
stenographic transcripts in question, are valid, just and legal; and (3) that Plaintiffs are under no obligation whatsoever to make a
refund of these payments already received by them.” This is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees
provided for therein, and among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by them
that may be requested by any interested person (section 8). The fees in question are for the transcript of notes taken during the
hearing of a case in which the National Coconut Corporation is interested, and the transcript was requested by its assistant
corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of
the Philippines” as follows:
“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central
Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government.”
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut Corporation may be considered as included in the term
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” refers to a government entity through which the
functions of government are exercised, including the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
government. This requires a little digression on the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S.
vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and
functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold constituted and ministrant. The former are those which
constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing
the general interests of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
1) “‘The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery.
2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt
or for crime.
4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
5) The definition and punishment of crime.
6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests.’“(Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations,
and regulations of trade and industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not
naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer
for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands,
pp. 19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote
its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it
may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs the organization
of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such
as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on
the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporations under the
Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation perform certain functions of government make them a part
of the Government of the Philippines?
The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities
for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has
chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our
government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner
as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said,
“The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation” (National Coal
Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587). “By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. Unlike the
Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company
remains an agency or instrumentality of government.” (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be
provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed
by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate
charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.
“Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State.” (Section 3, Republic Act No.
1459, Corporation Law).
“‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only include organized cities and towns, and like
organizations, with political and legislative powers for the local, civil government and police regulations of the inhabitants of the
particular district included in the boundaries of the corporation.’ Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 312.”
“In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include both towns and counties, and other public
corporations created by government for political purposes. In its more common and limited signification, it embraces only
incorporated villages, towns and cities. Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661.” (McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)
“We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and strict sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the
government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise
subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns. This power of local
government is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon, Municipal
Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less
than 200 words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but in this case the National
Coconut Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the services rendered by the  Plaintiffs and has not
raised any objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed by the Auditor General. The payment of the fees in
question became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
As regards the question of procedure raised by Appellants, suffice it to say that the same is insubstantial, considering that this
case refers not to a money claim disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of prohibition the purpose of which is to
restrain the officials concerned from deducting from Plaintiffs’ salaries the amount paid to them as stenographers’ fees. This
case does not come under section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the Auditor General.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

5. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court of Industrial Relations, 65 SCRA 416

G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REUEL ABRAHAM, MILAGROS ABUEG, AVELINO ACOSTA, CAROLINA
ACOSTA, MARTIN AGSALUD, JOSEFINA AGUINALDO, GLORIA ALBANO, ANTONIO ALUNING, COSME ALVAREZ,
ISABEL ALZATE, AURORA APUSEN, TOMAS ARCANGEL, LOURDES ARJONELLO, MANUEL AROMIN, DIONISIO
ASISTIN, JOSE AURE, NICASIO AZNAR, EUGENIO AZURIN, CLARITA BACUGAN, PIO BALAGOT, HEREDIO
BALMACEDA, ESTHER BANAAG, JOVENCIO BARBERO, MONICO BARBADILLO, HERNANDO BARROZO, FILIPINA
BARROZO, REMEDIO BARTOLOME, ANGELINA BASCOS, JOSE BATALLA, ALMARIO BAUTISTA, EUGENIO
BAUTISTA, JR., HERMALO BAUTISTA, JUANITO BAUTISTA, SEVERINO BARBANO, CAPPIA BARGONIA, ESMERALDA
BERNARDEZ, RUBEN BERNARDEZ, ALFREDO BONGER, TOMAS BOQUIREN, ANGELINA BRAVO, VIRGINIA BRINGA,
ALBERTO BUNEO, SIMEON CABANAYAN, LUCRECIA CACATIAN, LEONIDES CADAY, ANGELINA CADOTTE, IGNACIO
CALAYCAY, PACIFICO CALUB, RUFINO CALUZA, CALVIN CAMBA, ALFREDO CAMPOSENO, BAGUILITA CANTO,
ALFREDO CARRERA, PEDRO CASES, CRESCENTE CASIS, ERNESTO CASTANEDA, HERMINIO CASTILLO, JOSE
CASTRO, LEONOR CASTRO, MADEO CASTRO, MARIA PINZON CASTRO, PABLO CATURA, RESTITUTO CESPADES,
FLORA CHACON, EDMUNDO CORPUZ, ESTHER CRUZ, CELIA CUARESMA, AQUILINO DACAYO, DIONISIA DASALLA,
SOCORRO DELFIN, ABELARDO DIAZ, ARTHUR DIAZ, CYNTHIA DIZON, MARCIA DIZON, ISABELO DOMINGO,
HONORATA DOZA, CAROLINA DUAD, JUSTINIANO EPISTOLA, ROMEO ENCARNACION, PRIMITIVO ESCANO, ELSA
ESPEJO, JUAN ESPEJO, RIZALINA ESQUILLO, YSMAEL FARINAS, LORNA FAVIS, DAN FERNANDEZ, JAIME
FERNANDEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, MODESTO FERRER, JR., EUGENIO FLANDEZ, GUILLERMO FLORENDO, ALFREDO
FLORES, DOMINGA FLORES, ROMEO FLORES, LIGAYA FONTANILLA, MELCHOR GASMEN, LEILA GASMENA,
CONSUELO GAROLAGA, ALFONSO GOROSPE, CESAR GOROSPE, RICARDO GOROSPE, JR., CARLITO GUZMAN,
ERNESTO DE GUZMAN, THELMA DE GUZMAN, FELIX HERNANDEZ, SOLIVEN HERNANDO, FRANCISCO HIDALGO,
LEONILO INES, SIXTO JAQUIES, TRINIDAD JAVIER, FERMIN LAGUA, GUALBERTO LAMBINO, ROMAN LANTING,
OSCAR LAZO, ROSARIO LAZO, JOSEFINA DE LARA, AMBROSIO LAZOL, NALIE LIBATIQUE, LAMBERTO LLAMAS,
ANTONIO LLANES, ROMULA LOPEZ, ADRIANO LORENZANA, ANTONIO MACARAEG, ILDEFONSO MAGAT, CECILIO
MAGHANOY, ALFONSO MAGSANOC, AVELINA MALLARE, AUGUSTO MANALO, DOMINADOR MANASAN, BENITO
MANECLANG, JR., TIRSO MANGUMAY, EVELIA MANZANO, HONORANTE MARIANO, DOMINGO MEDINA, MARTIN
MENDOZA, PERFECTO MILANA, EMILIO MILLAN, GREGORIO MONEGAS, CONSOLACION NAVALTA, NOLI OCAMPO,
VICENTE CLEGARIO, ELPIDIO PALMONES, ARACELI PANGALANGAN, ISIDORO PANLASIGUI, JR., ARTEMIO PARIS,
JR., FEDERICO PAYUMO, JR., NELIA PAYUMO, BITUEN PAZ, FRANCISCO PENGSON, OSCAR PERALTA, PROCORRO
PERALTA, RAMON PERALTA, MINDA PICHAY, MAURO PIMENTEL, PRUDENCIO PIMENTEL, LEOPOLDO PUNO,
REYNALDO RABE, ROLANDO REA, CONSTANTINO REA, CECILIA RICO, CECILIO RILLORAZA, AURORA ROMAN,
MERCEDES RUBIO, URSULA RUPISAN, OLIVIA SABADO, BERNARDO SACRAMENTO, LUZ SALVADOR, JOSE
SAMSON, JR., ROMULA DE LOS SANTOS, ANTONIO SAYSON, JR., FLORANTE SERIL, MARIO SISON, RUDY SISON,
PROCEDIO TABIN, LUCENA TABISULA, HANNIBAL TAJANO, ENRIQUE TIANGCO, JR., JUSTINIANO TOBIAS, NYMIA
TOLENTINO, CONSTANTE TOLENTINO, TEODORO TOREBIO, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOVENCINTO TRINIDAD, LAZARO
VALDEZ, LUDRALINA VALDEZ, MAXIMINA VALDEZ, FRANCISCO VELASCO, JR., ROSITA VELASCO, SEVERO
VANTANILLA, VENANCIO VENTIGAN, FELICITAS VENUS, NIEVES DE VERA, ELISEO VERSOZA, SILVESTRE VILA,
GLORIA VILLAMOR, ALEJANDRO VELLANUEVA, DAVID VILLANUEVA, CAROLINA VILLASENOR ORLANDO
VILLASTIQUE, MAJELLA VILORIN, ROSARIO VILORIA, MAY VIRATA, FEDERICO VIRAY, MELBA YAMBAO, MARIO
ZAMORA, AUTENOR ABUEG, SOTERO ACEDO, HONRADO ALBERTO, FELIPE ALIDO, VICENTE ANCHUELO,
LIBERTAD APEROCHO, MARIANO BALBAGO, MARIO BALMACEDA, DAISY BICENIO, SYLVIA BUSTAMANTE,
RAYMUNDO GEMERINO, LAZARO CAPURAS, ROGELIO CARUNGCONG, ZACARIAS CAYETANO, JR., LILY CHUA,
ANDRES CRUZ, ARTURO CRUZ, BIENVENIDO ESTEBAN, PABLO JARETA, MANUEL JOSE, NESTORIA KINTANAR,
CLEOPATRIA LAZEM. MELCHOR LAZO, JESUS LUNA, GASPAR MARINAS, CESAR MAULSON, MANUEL MEDINA,
JESUS PLURAD, LAKAMBINI RAZON, GLORIA IBANEZ, JOSE SANTOS, ELEAZAR SQUI, JOSE TAMAYO, FELIPE
TENORIO, SILVINO UMALI, VICENTE ZARA, SATURNINO GARCIA, WILLIAM GARCIA, NORMA GARINGARAO,
ROSARIO ANTONIO, RUBEN BAUTISTA, QUIRINO PUESTO, NELIA M. GOMERI, OSCAR R. LANUZA, AURORA M.
LINDAYA, GREGORIO MOGSINO, JACRM B. PAPA, GREGORIO R. RIEGO, TERESITA N. ROZUL, MAGTANGOL
SAMALA, PORFIRIO AGOCOLIS, LEONARDO MONTE, HERMELINO PATI, ALFREDO PAYOYO, PURIFICACION ROJAS,
ODANO TEANO, RICARDO SANTIAGO, and MARCELO MANGAHAS, respondents.

Gov't. Corp. Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera, Trial Attorneys Manuel M. Lazaro and Vicente Constantine, Jr., for petitioner.

Renato B. Kare and Simeon C. Sato for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari  from an order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations is
one of constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased
responsibility to provide for the general welfare. More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the then
Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions
in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to the right answer. 1 It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to
the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept. For as noted in an earlier decision, the
welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." 2 It is much more so under the present Charter,
which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights. 3 There is manifest, to recall Laski, "a
definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common
good of its members."4 It does not necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the
objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. 5 We cannot then
grant the reversal sought. We affirm.

The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition
wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by
them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for
the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. 6 There was an answer filed by
petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction. 7 The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both parties presenting their
evidence.8 After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court
issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the
decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. 9 There was
a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc  denied the same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order
complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. 11 While, to repeat, its submission as to the
governmental character of its operation is to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is
devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is
not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear.

1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner's plea that it
performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265,  12 its purposes and
objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign
markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain
balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will
insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as
in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable
centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a
fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of
Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry."  13 The
amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155, 14 renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section
on the declaration of policy reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to
encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and
foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local
cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to
improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes." 15 The objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national policy the
following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit
Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in
order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding
exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from
the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration." 16

It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine
announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision 17 and why the objection of
private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth
in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation 18 if futile. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was
clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note, speaking of the reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration,
that functions of that sort "may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"),such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by
the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these
latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government."  19 Nonetheless, as he
explained so persuasively: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer
for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to
be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of
economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself
in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice." 20 Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation, 21 based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent
and ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into the
governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science, 22 the first edition of which was published in 1898, its author
being the then Professor, later American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was categorized by
him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as
they] are indeed the very bonds of society." 23 The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or optional.

It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the authoritative position which at one
time it held in the United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board  24 could affirm: "The doctrines
of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The
modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity."  25 The 1935
Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted in Edu v. Ericta:26 "What is more, to erase any doubts,
the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire  was rejected. It entrusted to our government the
responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." 27 Nor did the opinion in Edu stop
there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy
is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the
"vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry
and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current
tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy,
not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are
there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days
have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow,
the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a
constitutional provision automatically imposes." 28

It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration decision about which the
observation was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is even more in consonance with the
expanded role of government accorded recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental
function were not heeded. That path this Court is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather than to
advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor,
formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh
contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. 29 It is a response to a trend noted
by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams 30 for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the interest of all component
elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a compassionate
society" be attained. 31

2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than proprietary
functions cannot militate against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. So it was mentioned earlier. As
far back as Tabora v. Montelibano, 32 this Court, speaking through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was established by the
Government to protect the people against excessive or unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With
that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be deemed governmental. The Government owes its very
existence to that aim and purpose — to protect the people." 33 In a subsequent case, Naric Worker's Union v. Hon.
Alvendia, 34 decided four years later, this Court, relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35 which specified
the cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, included among which is one that involves hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass
upon that particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the fact that there were judicial as well as
administrative and executive pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was performing governmental functions did not suffice
to confer competence on the then respondent Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a complaint for damages,
which as pointed out by the labor union, was connected with an unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive
portion of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May 19, 1958 and May 27, 1958, are set aside,
and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn Corporation's seeking whatever remedy
it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial Relations." 36 Then, too, in a case involving petitioner itself, Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration, 37 where the point in dispute was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance that is possessed of
competence in a declaratory relief petition for the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily be
thought of as pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should
fall on the Court of Industrial Relations." 38 Reference to a number of decisions which recognized in the then respondent Court
the jurisdiction to determine labor controversies by government-owned or controlled corporations lends to support to such an
approach. 39 Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that proprietary rather than governmental functions did call for
such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that such a view was not previously bereft of plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it has, to use a Wilsonian
phrase, now lapsed into "innocuous desuetude." 40 Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.

3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41 does not apply to it hardly deserves any extended consideration.
There is an air of casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its petition for review as well as in its brief. In both
pleadings, it devoted less than a full page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a
terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the possession of
an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall
apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private ... ." 42 Nor are private respondents
included among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited  Marcelo v. Philippine
National Red Cross 43 and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos.44 Certainly, the activities to which the two above public
corporations devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged in by petitioner. A reference to the pertinent
sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain a ruling as to its governmental character should render
clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it
has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that
one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that
such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May 8, 1970 denying
a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find
how much each of them [private respondents] is entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his
authorized representative, is hereby directed to make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the possession of
respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to submit his report of his findings to the Court for further
disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code, this case is referred to the National Labor Relations
Commission for further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.

6. Gov’t of the Phililppine Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish
Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863.
Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to
distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted
$365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official
Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum
of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the  Monte de
Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn
over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were
received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the  Monte
de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were
made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de
Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the
$80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the
Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer,
and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed and makes
the following assignment of errors:

1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish
Government of these Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of
Spain should not approve the action taken by the former government.

2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000)
being at present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.

3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government
in its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the
earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these Island.

4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30,
1912, is unconstitutional.

5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular
Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros  for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars
($80,000) given to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.
 6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros  to reimburse the Philippine Government in
the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in
circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.

In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government
in what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered
damage by the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had
assumed toward the donors.

The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, which reads:

Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.

Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First:
That the funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and
there only remains the sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after
tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations
suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to
apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national subscription
for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there is held at the
disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by order of your
general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth:
That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte
de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central
relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same
conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not
be approved for any reason, either because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made
by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended
to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of the  Monte
de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or
the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the
money at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. — This is an urgent measure to save the  Monte de
Piedad in the present crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of
the other officials who have take part in the transaction.

The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:

GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

MANILA, February 1, 1883.

In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it
is stated that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the
small account remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats
the general Government that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be
turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national
subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this sum
should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by
means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled
to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report
upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the public treasury has on
hand a much greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general Government
has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds
obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either
as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the
donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity
which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious
effects of usury; and

Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be
frustrated, and that the great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the
aid it urgently seeks is not granted, since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the
ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and

Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the
present juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the
poorer classes resulting from the late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of
such poverty; and

Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in
question are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation
mentioned, this general Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity
with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as follows:

First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these
Islands obtained from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum
$80,000, as its needs may require, in installments of $20,000.
 Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the
sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution.

Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the
necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that
menaces the Monte de Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted.

H. M. Government shall be advised hereof (Signed) P. DE RIVERA.

By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform
this ministerio  what is the total sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the  Monte de
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants,
whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein
provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general
Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves,
without regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been
concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution
of the funds deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first
consulting the relief board and your general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the  Monte de
Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the
proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned
comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order
by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the
defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:

Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas  (General Treasury of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order
No. 1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in
your capital in the year 1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this
purpose, with observance of the rules specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before making the
payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time
that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general
needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and another part to meet
pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the fulfillment
of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that
is, for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the
Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the
donors) and this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the  Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the date of
February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within
the period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's demanding from
the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be
supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally
engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M.
Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes express mention of the
80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during
which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This  Intendencia  also supposed that
the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient
transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of
this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously received. But
the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused to
return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia  (Treasury), is entitled to order the
reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command,
the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos
which it received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in
the opinion of this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the
amount of the subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this
letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation
whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds are
already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the
mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by the  Monte
de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in
support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order
No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order
the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this
Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that
the said pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the
Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds.

The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government
or the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.

In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883,
$20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public
Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan,
and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the
amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the
Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-
mentioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two account which on this
date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente
Gerente of these institutions, $95,000."

On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000
and received the following reply:

MANILA, March 31, 1902.

To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.

SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and
for what purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the
subscription opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for
the report which your office is called upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious
Institutions, and which have been consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as
a reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own funds. On the
same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and
turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. — (Signed) Emilio
Moreta.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.

Manila, November 19, 1913

(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary

(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,

Managing Director.

The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain
and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de
Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more
working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the
central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, " at the disposal of
the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of
Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General,
after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M.
Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain
as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the
institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the
transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly
bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this
resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in
this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve
of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did not approve
such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to
inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to
the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing
else appearing, might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the
Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of
December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the $80,000. The Department of Finance,
acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the  Monte de Piedad well
knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was
transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account."
Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a
returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received
the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.

Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:

The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio  of
the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and
charitable institutions in his kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the
Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a
special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly
renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the
national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable purpose in these Islands; and
the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King,
gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not in all
cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal
patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary
Government though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious
matters, and inveterately maintained a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.

In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris,
which apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to
subrogate to the American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the
 funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take
over such things would result in great inconvenience to the American Government in attempting to do so. The question
was such a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it
cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government like the American. (U.
S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)

It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in
this regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract
was made, but became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands,
compliance therewith is excused and the contract has been cleared thereof.

The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the
erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity
founded by the donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first
proposition has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that
the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose — the relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other
purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish Government
remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain
and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official
capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The
church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de
Piedad (an institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an
ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as
royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions
could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act would have arisen out of the
special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was
completely separated with the change of sovereignty.

And in their supplemental brief counsel say:

By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the
trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine
Islands. The whole matter is one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish
Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund it could  not transfer the ownership.
Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of
property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have transferred its
trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have accepted such
a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It
follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could claim to be
damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the  cestuis que trustent, and this
Government is neither.

If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the
ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to
show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change
of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law
trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in
force at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the
instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto  vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)

The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and
which were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board
constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a
temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the
creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under
article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the
donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other
purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power
upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them
to some other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as
they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above
mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the
rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by
the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for
which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these
powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine
Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry
out the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than
mere trustees of the fund.

It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even
considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot
maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest
upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the
Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay
Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law,
belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said
that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a
necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable
property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded
to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27,
1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs. Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all
laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted
sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled
in the same public law that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in
force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.

If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they
are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in
force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very
nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish
Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The
present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general
supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).

Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States.
In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court
said:

The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and
gave their Acts the same force and effect.

In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States.
And this power still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government.
The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the  parens patriae.

Chancelor Kent says:

In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is
entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations,
said:

This prerogative of parens patriae  is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a
most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of
injury to those who cannot protect themselves.

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court
held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in
facts, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:

These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries
of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority,
acting as  parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into
exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of
charities as in any other cases whatever.

In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-
General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a
whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of
the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to
prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1
Younge & C. C., 417):

Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the
privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf
on the public generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually
to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec.
732.)

It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it
was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the
proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small
contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the
title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been
ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various
heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000.
The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the
object for which it was originally destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to
maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only
applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the
public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government.
(Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in
the future.

As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for
the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a
manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not,
as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take
property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the
disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine
Legislature.

In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its
present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of
the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of
the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the
old debt, said:

The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense,
the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is,
in law, subject to all of its liabilities.

In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the  Monte de Piedad declined to return the
$80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the
time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the
other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription
cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not
prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact,
prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.

The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the
same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the
royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad in June, 1893, to return the
$80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte
as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902,
the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan,
without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.

Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein
the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of
limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were
received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels'
theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after
March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)

Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:

It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all
governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or
agents to whose care they are confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign
government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it
should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14 Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92;
U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)

In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:

It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be
imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the
principle of public policy, that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the
negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act
through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests and property of the public. It is upon this
principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not
held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature
 that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State
has jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.

In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against
the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are
of such a nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in
competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or
government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands
were ceded to the United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty
with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds
could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became
the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the
beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands.
(Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39
U. C. Q. B., 397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things,
applicable to the Philippine Government.

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor
do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the
equivalent in Philippine currency.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

7. Cabañas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor
beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of
them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor
of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the
specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of
the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former
is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the
mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the
language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the
State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the
opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such
responsibility. We have to affirm.

The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " 1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian
Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on
October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted
as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him.
Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required
by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the
insurance policy.2

After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the
proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former
provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance." 3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may
acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or
mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; ... 4

Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to
the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor
lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property,
therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the
usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in
conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto  null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor,
Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to
raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." 5

It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be
disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning
is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical
language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application. 6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed
decision.

1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant 7 to blunt the force of legal
commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered.
What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that
Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event
that there is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added
circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision
arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity
to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting
on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la
obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la
presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho
antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia
del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte
aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de que trataremos mis adelante." 8

2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who
is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their
respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is
a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of  parens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case, 9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional
provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution."  10 If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a
stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide
as it did.

8. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113

G.R. No. L-5            September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.1

Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this
Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto governments.

On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief
proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also
provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive
and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in
their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was organized by
Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B.
Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central
administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in Chief,
who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1
and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First
Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same
jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in
Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be
observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said
Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing
statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."

On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby
in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the
laws they administered and enforced.

On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the
People of the Philippines which declared:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government
of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control.

On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the
Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."

In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be
reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23,
1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial
acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said
proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued
during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time
the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
United States and Filipino forces.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto  in a proper legal sense, is that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and
maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases
of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war
with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy
in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts
differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is
found in the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A
like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . .
Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments
at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of
1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides
"the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his
power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country."

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to
insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a  de facto government, and he can
suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to
respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the
country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand,
laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the
freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a
country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the
local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their
posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of
the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the
sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the
President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the
rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts
— in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights,
continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new
ones."

And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said
Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the
occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and
supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they
accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the
supervision of the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)

As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of
Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a  de facto government. In that
case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at
Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on the
account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are
examples. . . .

In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts
of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for the administration of justice
and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and
afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just
rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn  vs. Lockhart
(17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do
away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained,
crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of
property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or
legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose
or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."

And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured or was done in respect of
such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be
invalid merely  because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this,
because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the
insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or
the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the
enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government
organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with
actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-
called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to
the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on
January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established by the
British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an
enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the
conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be
called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a
government imposed by the laws of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those
laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was
a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806,
when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of a
french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France,
authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an English superior.
(Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own
officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the
Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of
its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation
of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the
'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will
nor the sanction of the Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or
transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military
occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of
peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in
Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear
allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty
over the territory controlled although the de jure  government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise
its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page,
9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived
by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or
turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so,
Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and
other allied nations.

Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the
withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had
organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have
been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. And
as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of
secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of
Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de
facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416).
According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having
first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took
possession of the Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the
United States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the class of de
facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government  de facto,
but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that the government
of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the same
principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in
international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one
reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the
whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil would
be scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be
contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the
intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been
each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror
and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the
Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain
valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to
abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other government" as used in the above-
quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 — that is, whether it was the intention of the
Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so
after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in
said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable
construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court proceedings, for
according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."

It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully
suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation
demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the
restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation
(although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the
United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full
respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the international
policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our
Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."

Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public interests would
be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights
nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may
have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been
destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great
inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)

The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied
by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the
right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the
social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit their
litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from
committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be
afterwards set aside.

That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese
regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines
on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have
heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision
impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been
invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases
which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to
March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of
by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the
Japanese regime.

The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's
acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no
crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does
happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than this."
(Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the
conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored
government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no
rule of international law that denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it
in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws,
regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact
that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not
necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is whether or not it was his intention,
as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by
necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this court
to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the
proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as
Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.

Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience, constitute or from the law of nations.
(Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague
Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the
obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to
declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any
declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of
Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to
establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing
therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government
is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of
occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and
void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military
occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same
time empower another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United
States Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in
construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general rules of international law and from
fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."

In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United
States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in
a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat.,
428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in command of the
several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of
March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the
States committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The
clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so
exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could
have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that
the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency
requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1
Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was void."

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and
proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts
and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.

3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to,
and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic
of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine
Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.

Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19,
1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International Public
Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.

Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January
3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and
ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their
duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in
Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and
February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of
courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was
inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having  in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a
state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing
of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of
Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final
judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the left pending therein,"
is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough,
laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws — and the courts had become the
institutions — of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions
of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."

The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if
continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily
occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not
serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may
continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the
occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the
law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which
prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit
everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to
innovate in the political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the
courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the
name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the victor
need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule
by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German
Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and
government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany
originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of
the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)

Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by the
some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of
Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the
Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into
existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once
created, it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change,
and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues
unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue
in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly
continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the
intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over
these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts
of these Islands had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over
cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until they are abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts
providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere
change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so
change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the
new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the
Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of
Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued
taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished
them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts
were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the Island were continued.

On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of
the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898,
the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is,
to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And
later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the
same section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. 183
were transferred to the latter.

That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue
the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by
Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said
Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended,
be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of
Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court
of Appeals abolished was the same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government;
for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had
theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of
First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was
not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese
occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been
dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of
political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth
Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of the
court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court,  mandamus is
the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of
jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these
Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of  mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case
No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DE JOYA, J., concurring:

The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the proceedings held in civil case No. 3012, in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation; and the effect on said
proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. The decision of this question requires
the application of principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal law in force in this country, before and during
Japanese occupation.

Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law (Juntington vs. Attril, 146 U.S., 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 224;
36 Law. ed., 1123); and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as, under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, it is a part of the fundamental law of the land (Article II, section 3).

As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever questions
of right depending upon it are presented for our determination, sitting as an international as well as a domestic Tribunal
(Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct. 552; 46 Law. Ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof of the
existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of nations to abide by that rule; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by
the usages and customs of nations, and to ascertain what these usages and customs are, the universal practice is to turn to the
writings of publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.S.,
677; 20 Sup. Cit., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320).

But while usage is the older and original source of International Law, great international treaties are a later source of increasing
importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declares that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation applies only to be territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.

ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the later
shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32 Stat. II, 1821.)

The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted by the nations giving adherence to them, among which is
United States of America (32 Stat. II, 1821).
The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority, but only when in actual
possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of international Law (New
Orleans vs. Steamship Co, [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S. 416; 33
Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law Ed., 1260; II Oppenheim of International Law, section 167).

There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese military occupation, from January, 1942, up to the time of the
reconquest by the armed forces of the United States of the Island of Luzon, in February, 1945.

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the hostile
occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory continue usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands, partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and
partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and partly because the latter are more
competent to administer the laws in force within the territory and the military occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the
judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military
authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him.(Young vs. U.S., 39; 24 Law, ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97
U.S., 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor on International Law,
sections 576. 578; Wilson on International Law; pp. 331-37; Hall on International Law, 6th Edition [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476;
Lawrence on International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332 335; Holland
on International Law pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake on International Law, 2d ed., pp. 121-23.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting the local courts to function and administer such laws, as
proclaimed in the City of Manila, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in
accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the territory under military occupation governmental agencies for the
preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance with the laws in force within territory it
must necessarily follow that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be
considered legal and valid, even after said government establish by the military occupant has been displaced by the legitimate
government of the territory.

Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely settling the rights of private
parties actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of
laws passed in aid of the rebellion had been declared valid and binding (Cock  vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164;
Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570;
Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of
a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for the purchase money of slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and
enforceable in 1871(French vs. Tumlin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).

Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of America were considered legal and
valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because they had been rendered by the courts of
a de facto government. The Confederate States were a de facto government in the sense that its citizens were bound to render
the government obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such acts of obedience
(Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.], 9; 19 Law. ed., 361).

In the case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Court held — "It is now settled law in this court that during the late
civil war the same general form of government, the same general law for the administration of justice and the protection of
private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as
the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just and legal rights of the
citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding." (William  vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176;
Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the following definition
of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government, called also by publicists, a government de facto, but which might,
perhaps, be more aptly denominateda government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1) that its
existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established
and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who,
by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrong doers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual government of this sort are established over
districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they
may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (Macleod  vs. United
States [1913] 229 U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and
should be considered as a de facto  government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts which had been
established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, are to be considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after
the liberation of this country by the American forces, as long as the said judicial proceedings had been conducted, under the
laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the settlement of property rights, under the
provisions of the Civil Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and during Japanese
occupation.
Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, under the provisions of the proclamation
issued by General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation "nullifies all the laws, regulations and
processes of any other government of the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."

In other words, petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, a
contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties.

When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the courts will
always adopt the former (U. S. vs. Coombs [1838], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of Granada
County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guarina [1913], 24 Phil., 37;
Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national welfare, can properly
incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy (Smith, Bell & Co.,
Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in
their application as not lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the
legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases
should prevail over its letter (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall. [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed., 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. U. S., 143 U. S.
461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U. S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann.
Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two
constructions to adopt that which saves is constitutionality, includes the duty of avoiding a construction which raises grave and
doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (U. S. vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct., 527; 53 Law.
ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the judicial proceedings
conducted before the courts of justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely applying the municipal law
of the territory, such as the provisions of our Civil Code, which have no political or military significance, should be considered
legal, valid and binding.

It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with said rules and principles, as International Law is an integral
part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. And it is also
to be presumed that General MacArthur his acted, in accordance with said rules and principles of International Law, which have
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our
courts, during Japanese occupation would lead to injustice and absurd results and would be highly detrimental to the public
interests.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Law must be obeyed. To keep the bonds of society, it must not be evaded. On its supremacy depends the stability of states and
nations. No government can prevail without it. The preservation of the human race itself hinges in law.

Since time immemorial, man has relied on law as an essential means of attaining his purposes, his objectives, his mission in life.
More than twenty-two centuries before the Christian Era, on orders of the Assyrian King Hammurabi, the first code was engrave
in black diorite with cunie form characters. Nine centuries later Emperor Hung Wu, in the cradle of the most ancient civilization,
compiled the Code of the Great Ming. The laws of Manu were written in the verdic India. Moses received at Sinai the ten
commandments. Draco, Lycurgus, Solon made laws in Greece. Even ruthless Genghis Khan used laws to keep discipline
among the nomad hordes with which he conquered the greater part of the European and Asiastic continents.

Animal and plants species must follow the mendelian heredity rules and other biological laws to survive. Thanks to them, the
chalk cliffs of the infusoria show the marvel of an animal so tiny as to be imperceptible to the naked eye creating a whole
mountain. Even the inorganic world has to conform the law. Planets and stars follow the laws discovered by Kepler, known as
the law-maker of heavens. If, endowed with rebellious spirit, they should happen to challenge the law of universal gravity, the
immediate result would be cosmic chaos. The tiny and twinkling points of light set above us on the velvet darkness of the night
will cease to inspire us with dreams of more beautiful and happier worlds.

Again we are called upon to do our duty. Here is a law that we must apply. Shall we shrink? Shall we circumvent it ? Can we
ignore it?

The laws enacted by the legislators shall be useless if courts are not ready to apply them. It is actual application to real issues
which gives laws the breath of life.

In the varied and confused market of human endeavor there are so many things that might induce us to forget the elementals.
There are so many events, so many problem, so many preoccupations that are pushing among themselves to attract our
attention, and we might miss the nearest and most familiar things, like the man who went around his house to look for a pencil
perched on one of his ears.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In October, 1944, the American Armed Forces of Liberation landed successfully in Leyte.

When victory in islands was accomplished, after the most amazing and spectacular war operations, General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur as a commander in Chief of the American Army, decided to reestablish, in behalf of the United States, the
Commonwealth Government.

Then he was confronted with the question as to what policy to adopt in regards to the official acts of the governments
established in the Philippines by the Japanese regime. He might have thought of recognizing the validity of some of said acts,
but, certainly, there were acts which he should declare null and void, whether against the policies of the American Government,
whether inconsistent with military strategy and operations, whether detrimental to the interests of the American or Filipino
peoples, whether for any other strong or valid reasons.

But, which to recognize, and which not? He was not in a position to gather enough information for a safe basis to distinguished
and classify which acts must be nullified, and which must validated. At the same time he had to take immediate action. More
pressing military matters were requiring his immediate attention. He followed the safe course: to nullify all the legislative,
executive, and judicial acts and processes under the Japanese regime. After all, when the Commonwealth Government is
already functioning, with proper information, he will be in a position to declare by law, through its Congress, which acts and
processes must be revived and validated in the public interest.

So on October 23, 1944, the Commander in Chief issued the following proclamation:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PROCLAMATION

To the People of the Philippines:

WHEREAS, the military forces under my command have landed in the Philippines soil as a prelude to the liberation of
the entire territory of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the seat of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines has been re-established in the
Philippines under President Sergio Osmeña and the members of his cabinet; and

WHEREAS, under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established
on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of
the United States, and is purporting to exercise Executive, Judicial and Legislative powers of government over the
people;

Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander in Chief of the military forces
committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and the only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. The laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free enemy occupation and
control; and

I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and extend to the people of the Philippines the sacred right
of government by constitutional process under the regularly constituted Commonwealth Government as rapidly as the
several occupied areas are liberated to the military situation will otherwise permit;

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government whose
seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

October 23, 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW?

In times of war the Commander in Chief of an army is vested with extraordinary inherent powers, as a natural result of the nature
of the military operations aimed to achieve the purposes of his country in the war, victory being paramount among them.

Said Commander in Chief may establish in the occupied or reoccupied territory, under his control, a complete system of
government; he may appoint officers and employees to manage the affairs of said government; he may issue proclamations,
instructions, orders, all with the full force of laws enacted by a duly constituted legislature; he may set policies that should be
followed by the public administration organized by him; he may abolish the said agencies. In fact, he is the supreme ruler and
law-maker of the territory under his control, with powers limited only by the receipts of the fundamental laws of his country.
California, or the port of San Francisco, had been conquered by the arms of the United States as early as 1846. Shortly
afterward the United States had military possession of all upper California. Early in 1847 the President, as constitutional
commander in chief of the army and navy, authorized the military and naval commander of our forces in California to
exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and form a civil government for the conquered country, and to impose
duties on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the government, and of the army which has
the conquest in possession. . . Cross of Harrison, 16 Howard, 164, 189.)

In May, 1862, after the capture of New Orleans by the United States Army, General Butler, then in command of the
army at that place, issued a general order appointing Major J. M. Bell, volunteer aide-de-camp, of the division staff,
provost judge of the city, and directed that he should be obeyed and respected accordingly. The same order appointed
Capt. J. H. French provost marshal of the city, the Capt. Stafford deputy provost marshal. A few days after this order the
Union Bank lent to the plaintiffs the sum of $130,000, and subsequently, the loan not having been repaid, brought suit
before the provost judge to recover the debt. The defense was taken that the judge had no jurisdiction over the civil
cases, but judgement was given against the borrowers, and they paid the money under protest. To recover it back is the
object of the present suit, and the contention of the plaintiffs is that the judgement was illegal and void, because the
Provost Court had no jurisdiction of the case. The judgement of the District Court was against the plaintiffs, and this
judgement was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. To this affirmance error is now assigned.

The argument of the plaintiffs in error is that the establishment of the Provost Court, the appointment of the judge, and
his action as such in the case brought by the Union Bank against them were invalid, because in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, which vests the judicial power of the General government in one Supreme Court and
in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, and under this constitutional provision
they were entitled to immunity from liability imposed by the judgment of the Provost Court. Thus, it is claimed, a Federal
question is presented, and the highest court of the State having decided against the immunity claimed, our jurisdiction is
invoked.

Assuming that the case is thus brought within our right to review it, the controlling question is whether the commanding
general of the army which captured New Orleans and held it in May 1862, had authority after the capture of the city to
establish a court and appoint a judge with power to try and adjudicate civil causes. Did the Constitution of the United
States prevent the creation of the civil courts in captured districts during the war of the rebellion, and their creation by
military authority?

This cannot be said to be an open question. The subject came under the consideration by this court in The Grapeshot,
where it was decided that when, during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent territory were occupied by the
National forces, it was within the constitutional authority of the President, as commander in chief, to establish therein
provisional courts for the hearing and determination of all causes arising under the laws of the States or of the United
States, and it was ruled that a court instituted by President Lincoln for the State of Louisiana, with authority to hear, try,
and determine civil causes, was lawfully authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. Its establishment by the military
authority was held to be no violation of the constitutional provision that "the judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may form time to time ordain and establish."
That clause of the Constitution has no application to the abnormal condition of conquered territory in the occupancy of
the conquering, army. It refers only to courts of United States, which military courts are not. As was said in the opinion
of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Chase, in The Grapeshot, "It became the duty of the National government,
wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, and the territory which had been dominated by it was occupied by the
National forces, to provide, as far as possible, so long as the war continued, for the security of the persons and property
and for the administration of justice. The duty of the National government in this respect was no other than that which
devolves upon a regular belligerent, occupying during war the territory of another belligerent. It was a military duty, to be
performed by the President, as Commander in Chief, and instructed as such with the direction of the military force by
which the occupation was held."

Thus it has been determined that the power to establish by military authority courts for the administration of civil as well
as criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the National forces, is precisely the same as that
which exists when foreign territory has been conquered and is occupied by the conquerors. What that power is has
several times been considered. In Leitensdorfer & Houghton vs. Webb, may be found a notable illustration. Upon the
conquest of New Mexico, in 1846, the commanding officer of the conquering army, in virtue of the power of conquest
and occupancy, and with the sanction and authority of the President, ordained a provisional government for the country.
The ordinance created courts, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. It did not undertake to change the municipal laws
of the territory, but it established a judicial system with a superior or appellate court, and with circuit courts, the
jurisdiction of which declared to embrace, first, all criminal causes that should not otherwise provided for by law; and
secondly, original and exclusive cognizance of all civil cases not cognizable before the prefects and alcades. But though
these courts and this judicial system were established by the military authority of the United States, without any
legislation of Congress, this court ruled that they were lawfully established. And there was no express order for their
establishment emanating from the President or the Commander in Chief. The ordinance was the act of the General
Kearney the commanding officer of the army occupying the conquered territory.

In view of these decisions it is not to be questioned that the Constitution did not prohibit the creation by the military
authority of court for the trial of civil causes during the civil war in conquered portions of the insurgent States. The
establishment of such courts is but the exercise of the ordinary rights of conquest. The plaintiffs in error, therefore, had
no constitutional immunity against subjection to the judgements of such courts. They argue, however, that if this be
conceded, still General Butler had no authority to establish such a court; that the President alone, as a Commander in
Chief, had such authority. We do not concur in this view. General Butler was in command of the conquering and the
occupying army. He was commissioned to carry on the war in Louisina. He was, therefore, invested with all the powers
of making war, so far as they were denied to him by the Commander in Chief, and among these powers, as we have
seen, was of establishing courts in conquered territory. It must be presumed that he acted under the orders of his
superior officer, the President, and that his acts, in the prosecution of the war, were the acts of his commander in chief.
(Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union Bank, 89 U. S. [22 Wall.], 276-298.)
There is no question, therefore, that when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued on October Proclamation, he did it in
the legitimate exercise of his powers. He did it as the official representative of the supreme authority of the United States of
America. Consequently, said proclamation is legal, valid, and binding.

Said proclamation has the full force of a law. In fact, of a paramount law. Having been issued in the exercise of the American
sovereignty, in case of conflict, it can even supersede, not only the ordinary laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, but
also our Constitution itself while we remain under the American flag.

"PROCESS" IN THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In the third section of the dispositive part of the October Proclamation, it is declared that all laws, regulations and processes of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth, are null and void.

Does the word "processes" used in the proclamation include judicial processes?

In its broadest sense, process is synonymous with proceedings or procedures and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a
judicial cause from it commencement to its conclusion.

PROCESS. In Practice. — The means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out the original writ, in
civil, and after indictment, in criminal cases.

The method taken by law to compel a compliance with the original writ or command as of the court.

A writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority law; also the means of accomplishing an end,
including judicial proceedings; Gollobitch vs. Rainbow, 84 la., 567; 51 N. W., 48; the means or method pointed out by a
statute, or used to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants, whether by writ or notice. Wilson vs. R. Co. (108 Mo., 588; 18
S. W., 286; 32 Am. St. Rep., 624). (3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 2731.)

A. Process generally. 1. Definition. — As a legal term process is a generic word of every comprehensive signification
and many meanings. It is broadest sense it is equivalent to, or synonymous with, "proceedings" or "procedure," and
embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is
also broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with it demands. "Process" and "writ" or
"writs" are synonymous in the sense that every writ is a process, and in a narrow sense of the term "process" is limited
to judicial writs in an action, or at least to writs or writings issued from or out of court, under the seal thereof, and
returnable thereto; but it is not always necessary to construe the term so strictly as to limit it to a writ issued by a court in
the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction; the term is sometimes defined as a writ or other formal writing issued by
authority of law or by some court, body, or official having authority to issue it; and it is frequently used to designate a
means, by writ or otherwise , of acquiring jurisdiction of defendant or his property, or of bringing defendant into, or
compelling him to appear in, court to answer.

As employed in the statutes the legal meaning of the word "process" varies according to the context, subject matter,
and spirit of the statute in which it occurs. In some jurisdictions codes or statutes variously define "process" as signifying
or including: A writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings; all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders
of courts of justice or judicial officers; or any writ, declaration, summons, order, or subpoena whereby any action, suit or
proceeding shall be commenced, or which shall be issued in or upon any action, suit or proceeding. (50 C. J., PP. 441,
442.)

The definition of "process" given by Lord Coke comprehends any lawful warrant, authority, or proceeding by which a
man may be arrested. He says: "Process of law is two fold, namely, by the King's writ, or by proceeding and warrant,
either in deed or in law, without writ." (People vs. Nevins [N. Y.] Hill, 154, 169, 170; State vs. Shaw, 50 A., 869; 73 Vt.,
149.)

Baron Comyn says that process, in a large acceptance, comprehends the whole proceedings after the original and
before judgement; but generally it imports the writs which issue out of any court to bring the party to answer, or for doing
execution, and all process out of the King's court ought to be in the name of the King. It is called "process" because it
proceeds or goes upon former matter, either original or judicial. Gilmer, vs. Bird 15 Fla., 410, 421. (34 Words and
Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 147.)

In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant
before it, or a compliance with it demands, and any every writ, rule order, notice, or decree, including any process of
execution that may issue in or upon any action, suit, or legal proceedings, and it is not restricted to mesne process. In a
narrow or restricted sense it is means those mandates of the court intending to bring parties into court or to require
them to answer proceedings there pending. (Colquitt Nat. Bank vs. Poitivint, 83 S. E., 198, 199; 15 Ga. App., 329. (34
Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

A "process" is an instrument in an epistolary from running in the name of the sovereign of a state and issued out of a
court of justice, or by a judge thereof, at the commencement of an action or at any time during its progress or incident
thereto, usually under seal of the court, duly attested and directed to some municipal officer or to the party to be bound
by it, commanding the commission of some act at or within a specified time, or prohibiting the doing of some act. The
cardinal requisites are that the instrument issue from a court of justice, or a judge thereof; that it run in the name of the
sovereign of the state; that it be duly attested, but not necessarily by the judge, though usually, but not always, under
seal; and that it be directed to some one commanding or prohibiting the commission of an act. Watson vs. Keystone
Ironworks Co., 74 P., 272, 273; 70 Kan., 43. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Process" has two qualifications: First, it is largely taken for all proceedings in any
action or prosecution, real or personal, civil or criminal, from the beginning to the end; secondly, that is termed the
"process" by which a man is called into any temporal court, because the beginning or principal part thereof, by which
 the rest is directed or taken. Strictly, it is a proceeding after the original, before the judgement. A policy of fire insurance
contained the condition that if the property shall be sold or transferred, or any change takes place in title or possession,
whether by legal process or judicial decree or voluntary transfer or convenience, then and in every such case the policy
shall be void. The term "legal process," as used in the policy, means what is known as a writ; and, as attachment or
execution on the writs are usually employed to effect a change of title to property, they are or are amongst the
processes contemplated by the policy. The words "legal process" mean all the proceedings in an action or proceeding.
They would necessarily embrace the decree, which ordinarily includes the proceedings. Perry  vs. Lorillard Fire Ins. Co.,
N. Y., 6 Lans., 201, 204. See, also, Tipton vs. Cordova, 1 N. M., 383, 385. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition,
1940 edition, p. 148.)

"Process" in a large acceptation, is nearly synonymous with "proceedings," and means the entire proceedings in an
action, from the beginning to the end. In a stricter sense, it is applied to the several judicial writs issued in an action.
Hanna vs. Russell, 12 Minn., 80, 86 (Gil., 43, 45). (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940, edition 149.)

The term "process" as commonly applied, intends that proceeding by which a party is called into court, but it has more
enlarged signification, and covers all the proceedings in a court, from the beginning to the end of the suit; and, in this
view, all proceedings which may be had to bring testimony into court, whether viva voce or in writing, may be
considered the process of the court. Rich vs. Trimple, Vt., 2 Tyler, 349, 350. Id.

"Process" in its broadest sense comprehends all proceedings to the accomplishment of an end, including judicial
proceedings. Frequently its signification is limited to the means of bringing a party in court. In the Constitution process
which at the common law would have run in the name of the king is intended. In the Code process issued from a court
is meant. McKenna vs. Cooper, 101 P., 662, 663; 79 Kan., 847, quoting Hanna vs. Russel, 12 Minn., 80. (Gil., 43 );
Black Com. 279; Bou vs. Law. Dict. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 149.)

"Judicial process" includes the mandate of a court to its officers, and a means whereby courts compel the appearance
of parties, or compliance with its commands, and includes a summons. Ex parte Hill, 51 So., 786, 787; 165 Ala., 365.

"Judicial process" comprehends all the acts of then court from the beginning of the proceeding to its end, and in a
narrower sense is the means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out the original writ in civil case
and after the indictment in criminal cases, and in every sense is the act of the court and includes any means of
acquiring jurisdiction and includes attachment, garnishment, or execution, and also a writ. Blair vs. Maxbass Security
Bank of Maxbass, 176 N. W., 98, 199; 44 N. D. 12 (23 Words and Phrases, permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 328.)

There is no question that the word process, as used in the October Proclamation, includes all judicial processes or proceedings.

The intention of the author of the proclamation of including judicial processes appears clearly in the preamble of the document.

The second "Whereas," states that so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines," based upon neither the free
expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States, and is purporting to the exercise
Executive, Judicial, and Legislative powers of government over the people."

It is evident from the above-mentioned words that it was the purpose of General MacArthur to declare null and void all acts of
government under the Japanese regime, and he used, in section 3 of he dispositive part, the word laws, as pertaining to the
legislative branch, the word regulations, as pertaining to the executive branch, and lastly, the word processes, as pertaining to
the judicial branch of the government which functioned under the Japanese regime.

It is reasonable to assume that he might include in the word "process." besides those judicial character, those of executive or
administrative character. At any rate, judicial processes cannot be excluded.

THE WORDS OF PROCLAMATION EXPRESS UNMISTAKABLY

THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHOR

The October Proclamation is written in such a way that it is impossible to make a mistake as to the intention of its author.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat in the Supreme Court of the United States, the following:

When the words in their literal sense have a plain meaning, courts must be very cautious in allowing their imagination to
give them a different one. Guild vs. Walter, 182 Mass., 225, 226 (1902)

Upon questions of construction when arbitrary rule is involved, it is always more important to consider the words and the
circumstances than even strong analogies decisions. The successive neglect of a series of small distinctions, in the
effort to follow precedent, is very liable to end in perverting instruments from their plain meaning. In no other branch of
the law (trusts) is so much discretion required in dealing with authority. . . . There is a strong presumption in favor of
giving them words their natural meaning, and against reading them as if they said something else, which they are not
fitted to express. (Merrill vs. Preston, 135 Mass., 451, 455 (1883).

When the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the
framer, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what needs no
interpretation.

Very strong expression have been used by the courts to emphasize the principle that they are to derive their knowledge of the
legislative intention from the words or language of the statute itself which the legislature has used to express it. The language of
a statute is its most natural guide. We are not liberty to imagine an intent and bind the letter to the intent.
The Supreme Court of the United States said: "The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the law-
maker is to be found in the language that he has used. He is presumed to know the meaning of the words and the rules of
grammar. The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will of the legislator. It is true that there are
cases in which the letter of the statute is not deemed controlling, but the cases are few and exceptional and only arise where
there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent. No mere ommission, no
mere failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise should have specifically provided for will justify any judicial
addition to the language of the statute." (United States vs. Goldenberg, 168 U. S., 95, 102, 103; 18 S. C. Rep., 3; 42 Law. ed.,
394.)

That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be the sole and only government in our country; that our
laws are in full force and effect and legally binding; that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government are null
and void and without legal effect", are provisions clearly, distinctly, unmistakably expressed in the October Proclamation, as to
which there is no possibility of error, and there is absolutely no reason in trying to find different meanings of the plain words
employed in the document.

As we have already seen, the annulled processes are precisely judicial processes, procedures and proceedings, including the
one which is under our consideration.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHES A CLEAR POLICY

Although, as we have already stated, there is no possible mistakes as to the meaning of the words employed in the October
Proclamation, and the text of the document expresses, in clear-cut sentences, the true purposes of its author, it might not be
amiss to state here what was the policy intended to be established by said proclamation.

It is a matter of judicial knowledge that in the global war just ended on September 2, 1945, by the signatures on the document of
unconditional surrender affixed by representatives of the Japanese government, the belligerents on both sides resorted to what
may call war weapons of psychological character.

So Japan, since its military forces occupied Manila, had waged an intensive campaign propaganda, intended to destroy the faith
of the Filipino people in America, to wipe out all manifestations of American or occidental civilization, to create interest in all
things Japanese, which the imperial officers tried to present as the acme of oriental culture, and to arouse racial prejudice
among orientals and occidentals, to induce the Filipinos to rally to the cause of Japan, which she tried to make us believe is the
cause of the inhabitants of all East Asia.

It is, then, natural that General MacArthur should take counter-measures to neutralize or annul completely all vestiges of
Japanese influence, specially those which might jeopardize in any way his military operations and his means of achieving the
main objective of the campaign of the liberation, that is, to restore in our country constitutional processes and the high ideals
constitute the very essence of democracy.

It was necessary to free, not only our territory, but also our spiritual patrimony. It was necessary, not only to restore to us the
opportunity of enjoying the physical treasures which a beneficent Providence accumulated on this bountiful land, the true
paradise in the western Pacific, but to restore the full play of our ideology, that wonderful admixture of sensible principles of
human conduct, bequeathed to us by our Malayan ancestors, the moral principles of the Christianity assimilated by our people
from teachers of Spain, and the common-sense rules of the American democratic way of life.

It was necessary to free that ideology from any Japanese impurity.

Undoubtedly, the author of the proclamation thought that the laws, regulations, and processes of all the branches of the
governments established under the Japanese regime, if allowed to continue and to have effect, might be a means of keeping
and spreading in our country the Japanese influence, with the same deadly effects as the mines planted by the retreating
enemy.

The government offices and agencies which functioned during the Japanese occupation represented a sovereignty and ideology
antagonistic to the sovereignty and ideology which MacArthur's forces sought to restore in our country.

Under chapter I of the Japanese Constitution, it is declared that Japan shall reigned and governed by a line Emperors unbroken
for ages eternal (Article 1); that the Emperor is sacred and inviolable (Article 3); that he is the head of the Empire, combining in
himself the rights of the sovereignty (Article 4); that he exercises the legislative power (Article 5); that he gives sanction to laws,
and orders to be promulgated and executed (Article 6);that he has the supreme command of the Army and Navy (Article 11);
that he declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties (Article 13).

There is no reason for allowing to remain any vestige of Japanese ideology, the ideology of a people which as confessed in a
book we have at our desk, written by a Japanese, insists in doing many things precisely in a way opposite to that followed by the
rest of the world.

It is the ideology of a people which insists in adopting the policy of self-delusion; that believes that their Emperor is a direct
descendant of gods and he himself is a god, and that the typhoon which occured on August 14, 1281, which destroyed the fleet
with which Kublai Khan tried to invade Japan was the divine wind of Ise; that defies the heinous crime of the ronin, the 47
assassins who, in order to avenge the death of their master Asano Naganori, on February 3, 1703, entered stealthily into the
house of Yoshinaka Kiro and killed him treacherously.

It is an ideology which dignifies harakiri or sepukku, the most bloody and repugnant from suicide, and on September 13, 1912,
on the occasion of the funeral of Emperor Meiji, induced General Maresuke Nogi and his wife to practice the abhorrent "junshi",
and example of which is offered to us in the following words of a historian:
 When the Emperor's brother Yamato Hiko, died in 2 B. C., we are told that, following the occasion, his attendants were
assembled to from the hito-bashira (pillar-men) to gird the grave. They were buried alive in circle up to the neck around
the thomb and "for several days they died not, but wept and wailed day night. At last they died not, but wept and wailed
day night. At last they did not rotted. Dogs and cows gathered and ate them." (Gowen, an Outline of History of Japan, p.
50.)

The practice shows that the Japanese are the spiritual descendants of the Sumerians, the ferocious inhabitants of Babylonia
who, 3500 years B. C., appeared in history as the first human beings to honor their patesis by killing and entombing with him his
window, his ministers, and notable men and women of his kingdom, selected by the priests to partake of such abominable
honor. (Broduer, The Pageant of Civilization, pp. 62-66.)

General MacArthur sought to annul completely the officials acts of the governments under the Japanese occupation, because
they were done at the shadow of the Japanese dictatorship, the same which destroyed the independence of Korea, the "Empire
of Morning Frehsness"; they violated the territorial integrity of China, invaded Manchuria, and initiated therein the deceitful
system of puppet governments, by designating irresponsible Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo; they violated the trusteeship
granted by the Treaty of Versailles by usurping tha mandated islands in the Pacific; they initiated that they call China Incident,
without war declaration, and, therefore, in complete disregard of an elemental international duty; they attacked Pearl Harbor
treacherously, and committed a long series of the flagrant violations of international law that have logically bestowed on Japan
the title of the bandit nation in the social world.

The conduct of the Japanese during the occupation shows a shocking an anchronism of a modern world power which seems to
be re-incarnation of one whose primitive social types of pre-history, whose proper place must be found in an archeological
collection. It represents a backward jump in the evolution of ethical and juridical concepts, a reversion that, more than a simple
pathological state, represents a characteristics and well defined case of sociological teratology.

Since they entered the threshold of our capital, the Japanese had announced that for every one of them killed they would kill ten
prominent Filipinos. They promised to respect our rights by submitting us to the wholesale and indiscriminate slapping, tortures,
and atrocious massacres. Driving nails in the cranium, extraction of teeth and eyes, burnings of organs, hangings, diabolical
zonings, looting of properties, establishments of redlight districts, machine gunning of women and children, interment of alive
persons, they are just mere preludes of the promised paradised that they called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

They promised religious liberty by compelling all protestant sects to unite, against the religious scruples and convictions of their
members, in one group, and by profaning convents, seminaries, churches, and other cult centers of the Catholics, utilizing them
as military barracks, munitions dumps, artillery base, deposits of bombs and gasoline, torture chambers and zone, and by
compelling the government officials and employees to face and to bow in adoration before that caricature of divinity in the
imperial palace of Tokyo.

The Japanese offered themselves to be our cultural mentors by depriving us of the use of our schools and colleges, by
destroying our books and other means of culture, by falsifying the contents of school texts, by eliminating free press, the radio,
all elemental principles of civilized conduct, by establishing classes of rudimentary Japanese so as to reduce the Filipinos to the
mental level of the rude Japanese guards, and by disseminating all kinds of historical, political, and cultural falsehoods.

Invoking our geographical propinquity and race affinity, they had the insolence of calling us their brothers, without the prejuce of
placing of us in the category of slaves, treating the most prominent Filipinos in a much lower social and political category than
that of the most ignorant and brutal subject of the Emperor.

The civil liberties of the citizens were annulled. Witnesses and litigants were slapped and tortured during investigations. In the
prosecuting attorney's offices, no one was safe. When the Japanese arrested a person, the lawyer who dared to intercede was
also placed under arrest. Even courts were not free from their dispotic members. There were judges who had to trample laws
and shock their conscience in order not to disgust a Nipponese.

The most noble of all professions, so much so that the universities of the world could not conceive of higher honor that may be
conferred than that of Doctor of Laws, became the most despised. It was dangerous to practice the profession by which faith in
the effectiveness of law is maintained; citizens feel confident in the protection of their liberties, honor, and dignity; the weak may
face the powerful; the lowest citizen is not afraid of the highest official; civil equality becomes reality; justice is admnistered with
more efficiency; and democracy becomes the best system of government and the best guaranty for the welfare and happiness
of the individual human being. In fact, the profession of law was annulled, and the best lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in
Fort Santiago and other centers of torture were the military police, concubines, procurers, and spies, the providers of war
materials and shameful pleasures, and the accomplices in fraudulent transactions, which were the specialty of many naval and
military Japanese officers.

The courts and Filipino government officials were completely helpless in the question of protecting the constitutional liberties and
fundamental rights of the citizens who happen to be unfortunate enough to fall under the dragnet of the hated  kempei. Even the
highest government officials were not safe from arrest and imprisonment in the dreaded military dungeons, where torture or
horrible death were always awaiting the defenseless victim of the Japanese brutality.

May any one be surprised if General MacArthur decided to annul all the judicial processes?

The evident policy of the author of the October Proclamation can be seen if we take into consideration the following provisions of
the Japanese Constitution:

ART. 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor.

ART. 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the executive
authority .. shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nobody dared challenge the validity of the October Proclamation.

Nobody dared challenge the authority of the military Commander in Chief who issued it.

Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Supreme
Commander, the military hero, the greatest American general, the Liberator of the Philippines, the conqueror of Japan, the
gallant soldier under whose authority the Emperor of the Japan, who is supposed to rule supreme for ages as a descendant of
gods, is receiving orders with the humility of a prisoner of war.

No challenge has been hurled against the proclamation or the authority of the author to issue it, because everybody
acknowledges the full legality of its issuance.

But because the proclamation will affect the interest and the rights of a group of individuals, and to protect the same, a way is
being sought to neutralize the effect of the proclamation.

The way found is to invoke international law. The big and resounding word is considered as a shibboleth powerful enough to
shield the affected persons from the annulling impact.

Even then, international law is not invoked to challenge the legality or authority of the proclamation, but only to construe it in a
convenient way so that judicial processes during the Japanese occupation, through an exceptional effort of the imagination,
might to segregated from the processes mentioned in the proclamation.

An author said that the law of nations, the "jus gentiun", is not a fixed nor immutable science. On the country, it is developing
incessantly, it is perpetually changing in forms. In each turn it advances or recedes, according to the vicissitudes of history, and
following the monotonous rythm of the ebb and rise of the tide of the sea.

Le driot des gens, en effet, n'est point une science fixe est immuable: bein au contraire, il se developpe sans cesse, il
change eternellement de formes; tour il avance et il recule, selon less vicissitudes de histoire et suivan un rhythm
monotone qui est comme le flux et le reflux d'un mer. (M. Revon, De l'existence du driot international sous la republique
romain.)

Another author has this to say:

International law, if it is or can be a science at all, or can be, at most a regulative science, dealing with the conduct of
States, that is, human beings in a certain capacity; and its principles and prescriptions are not, like those of science
proper, final and unchanging. The substance of science proper is already made for man; the substance of international
is actually made by man, — and different ages make differently." (Coleman Philippson, The International Law and
Custom of Ancient Greece of Rome, Vol. I, p. 50.)

"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." (Pound, Interpretations of Legal History., p. 1. ) Justice Cardozo adds: "Here
is the great antimony confronting us at every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive. The law,
like human kind, if life is to continue, must find some path compromise." (The Growth of Law p. 2.) Law is just one of the
manifestations of human life, and "Life has relations not capable of division into inflexible compartments. The moulds expand
and shrink," (Glanzer vs. Shepard, 233 N.Y., 236, 241.)

The characteristic plasticity of law is very noticeable, much more than in any other department, in international law.

In a certain matters it is clear we have made substantial progress, but in other points, he (M. Revon) maintains, we have
retrograded; for example, in the middle ages the oath was not always respected as faithfully as in ancient Rome; and
nearer our own times, in the seventeenth century, Grotius proclaims the unquestioned right of the belligerents to
massacre the women and the children of the enemy; and in our more modern age the due declaration of war which
Roman always conformed to has not been invariably observed. (Coleman Philippson, The International Law and
Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. I, p. 209.)

Now let us see if any principle of international law may effect the enforcement of the October Proclamation.

In this study we should be cautioned not to allow ourselves to be deluded by generalities and vagueness which are likely to lead
us easily to error, in view of the absence of codification and statutory provisions.

Our Constitution provides:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the Nation. (Sec. 3, Art. II.)

There being no codified principles of international law, or enactments of its rules, we cannot rely on merely legal precepts.

With the exception of international conventions and treaties and, just recently, the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in San
Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945, we have to rely on unsystemized judicial pronouncements and reasonings and on
theories, theses, and propositions that we may find in the works of authors and publicists.

Due to that characteristic pliability and imprecision of international law, the drafters of our Constitution had to content themselves
with "generally accepted principles."
We must insists, therefore, that the principles should be specific and unmistakably defined and that there is definite and
conclusive evidence to the effect that they generally accepted among the civilized nations of the world and that they belong to
the current era and no other epochs of history.

The temptation of assuming the role of a legislator is greater in international law than in any other department of law, since there
are no parliaments, congresses, legislative assemblies which can enact laws and specific statutes on the subject. It must be our
concern to avoid falling in so a great temptation, as its, dangers are incalculable. It would be like building castles in the thin air,
or trying to find an exit in the thick dark forest where we are irretrievably lost. We must also be very careful in our logic. In so
vast a field as international law, the fanciful wandering of the imagination often impair the course of dialistics.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is there any principle of international law that may effect the October Proclamation?

We tried in vain to find out in the majority opinion anything as to the existence of any principle of international law under which
the authority of General MacArthur to issue the proclamation can effectively be challenged.

No principle of international law has been, or could be invoked as a basis for denying the author of the document legal authority
to issue the same or any part thereof.

We awaited in vain for any one to dare deny General MacArthur the authority, under international law, to declare null and void
and without effect, not only the laws and regulations of the governments under the Japanese regime, but all the processes of
said governments, including judicial processes.

If General MacArthur, as commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces of Liberation, had authority, full and legal, to issue
the proclamation, the inescapable result will be the complete viodance and nullity of all judicial processes, procedures, and
proceedings of all courts under the Japanese regime.

But those who are sponsoring the cause of said judicial processes try to achieve their aim, not by direct means, but by following
a tortuous side-road.

They accept and recognize the full authority of the author of the proclamation to issue it and all its parts, but they maintain that
General MacArthur did not and could not have in mind the idea of nullifying the judicial processes during the Japanese
occupation, because that will be in violation of the principles of international law.

If we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion we will have to reach the conlusion that the world "processes" does not appear
at all in the October Proclamation.

It is stated more than once, and reiterated with dogmatic emphasis, that under the principles of international law the judicial
processes under an army occupation cannot be invalidated.

But we waited in vain for the specific principle of international law, only one of those alluded to, to be pointed out to us.

If the law exist, it can be pointed out. If the principle exists, it can stated specifically. The word is being used very often in plural,
principles, but we need only one to be convinced.

The imagined principles are so shrouded in a thick maze of strained analogies and reasoning, that we confess our inability even
to have a fleeting glimpse at them through their thick and invulnerable wrappers.

At every turn international law, the blatant words, are haunting us with the deafening bray of a trumpet, but after the transient
sound has fled away, absorbed by the resiliency of the vast atmosphere, the announced principles, which are the very soul of
international law, would disappear too with the lighting speed of a vanishing dream.

WEAKNESS OF THE MAJORITY POSITION

In the majority opinion three questions are propounded: first, whether judicial acts and proceedings during the Japanese
occupation are valid even after liberation; second whether the October Proclamation had invalidated all judgement and judicial
proceedings under the Japanese regime; and third, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth may continue the judicial
proceedings pending at the time of liberation.

As regards the first question, it is stated that it is a legal tourism in political and international law that all acts of a de
facto government are good and valid, that the governments established during the Japanese occupation. that is, the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, were de facto governments, and that it necessarily follows that the
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of those governments, "which are not of a political complexion," were good and valid,
and by virtue of the principle of postliminium, remain good and valid after the liberation.

In the above reasoning we will see right away how the alleged legal truism in political and international law, stated as a premise
in a sweeping way, as an absolute rule, is immediately qualified by the exception as to judicial acts and proceedings which are
of a "political complexion."

So it is the majority itself which destroys the validity of what it maintains as a legal truism in political and international law, by
stating from the beginning of the absolute proposition that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto governments are good and valid.
It is be noted that no authority, absolutely no authority, has been cited to support the absolute and sweeping character of the
majority proposition as stated in their opinion.

No authority could be cited, because the majority itself loses faith in the validity of such absolute and sweeping proposition, by
establishing an unexplained exception as regards the judicial acts and proceedings of a "political complexion."

Besides, it is useless to try to find in the arguments of the majority anything that may challenge the power, the authority of a de
jure government to annul the official acts of a de facto government, or the legal and indisputable authority of the restored
legitimate government to refuse to recognize the official acts, legislative, executive and judicial, of the usurping government,
once the same is ousted.

As to the second question, the majority argues that the judicial proceedings and judgments of the de facto governments under
the Japanese regime being good and valid, "it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur to refer to judicial processes, when he used the last word in the October Proclamation, and that it
only refers to government processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings."

The weakness and absolute ineffectiveness of the argument are self-evident.

It is maintained that when General MacArthur declared the processes of the governments under the Japanese regime null and
void, he could not refer to judicial processes, because the same are valid and remained so under the legal truism announced by
the majority to the effect that, under political and international law, all official acts of a de facto government, legislative, executive
or judicial, are valid.

But we have seen already how the majority excepted from said legal truism the judicial processes of "political complexion."

And now it is stated that in annulling the processes of the governments under Japanese occupation, General MacArthur referred
to "processes other than judicial processes."

That is, the legislative and executive processes.

But did not the majority maintain that all acts and proceedings of legislative and executive departments of a de
facto governments are good and valid? Did it not maintain that they are so as a "legal truism in political and international law?"

Now if the reasoning of the majority to the effect that General MacArthur could not refer to judicial processes because they are
good and valid in accordance with international law, why should the same reasoning not apply to legislative and executive
processes?

Why does the majority maintain that, notwithstanding the fact that, according to that said legal truism, legislative and executive
official acts of de facto governments are good and valid, General MacArthur referred to the latter in his annulling proclamation,
but not to judicial processes?

If the argument is good so as to exclude judicial processes from the effect of the October Proclamation, we can see no logic in
considering it bad with respect to legislative and executive processes.

If the argument is bad with respect to legislative and executive processes, there is no logic in holding that it is not good with
respect to judicial processes.

Therefore, if the argument of the majority opinion is good, the inevitable conclusion is that General MacArthur did not declare
null and void any processes, at all, whether legislative processes, executive processes, or judicial processes, and that the word
"processes" used by him in the October Proclamation is a mere surplusage or an ornamental literary appendix.

The absurdity of the conclusion unmasks the utter futility of the position of the majority, which is but a mere legal pretense that
cannot stand the least analysis or the test of logic.

A great legal luminary admonished that we must have courage to unmasks pretense if we are to reach a peace that will abide
beyond the fleeting hour.

It is admitted that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation as an agent of his government, "may not
unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory if and when exigencies of the military
occupation demand such action," but it is doubted whether the commanding general of the army of the restored legitimate
government can exercise the same broad legislative powers.

We beg to disagree with a theory so unreasonable and subversive.

We cannot accept that the commanding general of an army of occupation, of a rebellious army, of an invading army, or of a
usurping army, should enjoy greater legal authority during the illegal, and in the case of the Japanese, iniquitous and bestial
occupation, than the official representative of the legitimate government, once restored in the territory wrested from the brutal
invaders and aggressors. We cannot agree with such legal travesty.

Broad and unlimited powers are granted and recognized in the commanding general of an army of invasion, but the shadow of
the vanishing alleged principle of international law is being brandished to gag, manacle, and make completely powerless the
commander of an army of liberation to wipe out the official acts of the government for usurpation, although said acts might impair
the military operation or neutralize the public policies of the restored legitimate government.
We are not unmindful of the interest of the persons who might be adversely affected by the annulment of the judicial processes
of the governments under the Japanese regime, but we cannot help smiling when we hear that chaos will reign or that the world
will sink.

It is possible that some criminals will be let loose unpunished, but nobody has ever been alarmed that the President, in the
exercise of his constitutional powers of pardon and amnesty, had in the past released many criminals from imprisonment. And
let us not forget that due to human limitations, in all countries, under all governments, in peace or in war, there were, there are,
and there will always be unpunished criminals, and that situation never caused despair to any one.

We can conceive of inconveniences and hardships, but they are necessary contributions to great and noble purposes. Untold
sacrifices were always offered to attain high ideals and in behalf of worthy causes.

We cannot refrain from feeling a paternal emotion for those who are trembling with all sincerity because of the belief that the
avoidance of judicial proceedings of the governments under the Japanese regime "would paralyze the social life of the country."
To allay such fear we must remind them that the country that produced many great hereos and martyrs; that contributed some of
highest morals figures that humanity has ever produced in all history; which inhabited by a race which was able to traverse in
immemorial times the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific with inadequate means of navigation, and to inhabit in
many islands so distantly located, from Madagascar to the eastern Pacific; which made possible the wonderful resistance of
Bataan and Corregidor, can not have a social life so frail as to be easily paralyzed by the annulment of some judicial
proceedings. The Japanese vandalisms during the last three years of nightmares and bestial oppression, during the long period
of our national slavery, and the wholesale massacres and destructions in Manila and many other cities and municipalities and
populated areas, were not able to paralyze the social life of our people. Let us not loss faith so easily in the inherent vitality of
the social life of the people and country of Rizal and Mabini.

It is insinuated that because of the thought that the representative of the restored sovereign power may set aside all judicial
processes of the army of occupation, in the case to courts of a future invasions, litigants will not summit their cases to courts
whose judgement may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing offenses in the expectancy
that they may escape penalty upon liberation of the country. We hope that Providence will never allow the Philippines to fall
again under the arms of an invading army, but if such misfortune will happen, let the October Proclamation serve as a notice to
the ruthless invaders that the official acts of the government of occupation will not merit any recognition from the legitimate
government, especially if they should not conduct themselves, as exemplified by the Japanese, in accordance with the rules of
action of a civilized state.

One conclusive evidence of the untenableness of the majority position is the fact that it had to resort to Executive Order No. 37,
issued on March 10, 1945, providing "that all cases that have heretofore been appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision." The far-fetched theory is advanced that this provision impliedly recognizes
the court processes during the Japanese military occupation, on the false assumption that it refers to the Court of Appeals
existing during the Japanese regime. It is self-evident that the Executive Order could have referred only to the Commonwealth
Court of Appeals, which is the one declared abolished in said order. Certainly no one will entertain the absurd idea that the
President of the Philippines could have thought of abolishing the Court of Appeals under the government during the Japanese
occupation. Said Court of Appeals disappeared with the ouster of the Japanese military administration from which it derived its
existence and powers. The Court of Appeals existing on March 10, 1945, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 37,
was the Commonwealth Court of Appeals and it was the only one that could be abolished.

Without discussing the correctness of principle stated the majority opinion quotes from Wheaton the following: "Moreover when it
is said that occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must
be remembered that on crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be
committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the stored government, but the matter can hardly be
put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245)

Then it says that there is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier,
such as the laws, regulations and processes other than the judicial  of the government established by the belligerent occupant.

It is evident that the statement just quoted is a complete diversion from the principle stated in the in an unmistakable way by
Wheaton, who says in definite terms that "it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts (the
occupant's) should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed."

It can be clearly seen that Wheaton does not make any distinction or point out any exception.

But in the majority opinion the principle is qualified, without stating any reason therefore, by limiting the right of the restored
government to annul "most of the acts of the occupier" and "processes other than judicial."

The statement made by the respondent judge after quoting the above-mentioned principle, as stated by Wheaton, to the effect
that whether the acts of military occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government
to decide, and that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government the right to exercise its discretion
on the matter, is quoted without discussion in the majority opinion.

As the statement is not disputed, we are entitled to presume that it is concurred in and, therefore, the qualifications made in the
statement in the majority opinion seem to completely groundless.

THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON OCCUPANT ARMY ARE NOT LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT

The majority opinion is accumulating authorities to show the many duties imposed by international law on the military occupant
of an invaded country.
And from said duties it is deduced that the legitimate government, once restored in his own territory, is bound to respect all the
official acts of the government established by the usurping army, except judicial processes political complexion.

The reasoning calls for immediate opposition. It is absolutely contrary to all principles of logic.

Between the duties imposed in the military occupant and the legal prerogatives of the legitimate government there are no logical
relationship or connection that might bind the ones with the others.

The military occupants are duty bound to protect the civil rights of the inhabitants, but why should the legitimate government
necessarily validate the measures adopted by the said occupant in the performance of this duty, if the legitimate government
believes his duty to annul them for weighty reasons?

The military occupant is duty bound to establish courts of justice. Why should the legitimate government validate the acts of said
courts, if it is convinced that said courts were powerless, as was the case during the Japanese occupation, to stop the horrible
abuses of the military police, to give relief to the victims of zoning and Fort Santiago tortures, to protect the fundamental human
rights of the Filipinos — life, property, and personal freedom?

The majority opinion recognizes in the military occupant the power to annul the official acts of the ousted and supplanted
legitimate government, a privilege which is inversely denied to the last. This preference and predilection in favor of the military
occupant, that is in favor of the invader and usurper, and against the legitimate government, is simply disconcerting, if we have
to say the least.

PRESUMPTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS AGAINST TRUTH AND FACTS

The invading military occupant is duty bound to establish and maintain courts of justice in the invaded territory, for the protection
of the inhabitants thereof. It is presumed that the restored legitimate government will respect the acts of said courts of the army
of occupation. Therefore, it is a principle of international law that said acts are valid and should be respected by the legitimate
government. It is presumed that General MacArthur is acquainted with such principle, discovered or revealed through
presumptive operations, and it is presumed that he had not the intention of declaring null and void the judicial processes of the
government during the Japanese regime. Therefore, his October Proclamation, declaring null and void and without effect "all
processes" of said governments, in fact, did not annul the Japanese regime judicial processes.

So run the logic of the majority.

They don't mind the that General MacArthur speaks in the October Proclamation as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces
committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim  and declare:

xxx           xxx           xxx

3. That all laws, regulations and  processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. (emphasis supplied.)

General MacArthur says categorically "all  processes", but the majority insists on reading differently, that, is: "NOT ALL
processes." The majority presume, suppose, against the unequivocal meaning of simple and well known words, that when
General MacArthur said "all processes", in fact, he said "not all processes", because it is necessary, by presumption, by
supposition, to exclude judicial processes.

If where General MacArthur says "all", the majority shall insist on reading "not all", it is impossible to foresee the consequences
of such so stubborn attitude, but it is possible to understand how they reached the unacceptable possible conclusion which we
cannot be avoid opposing and exposing.

Are we to adopt and follow the policy of deciding cases submitted to our consideration, by presumption and suppositions putting
aside truths and facts? Are we to place in the documents presented to us, such as the October Proclamation, different words
than what are written therein? Are we to read "not all", where it is written "all"?

We are afraid to such procedure is not precisely the most appropriate to keep public confidence in the effectiveness of the
administration of justice.

That is why we must insists that in the October Proclamation should be read what General MacArthur has written in it, that is,
that, besides laws and regulations, he declared and proclaimed null and void "ALL PROCESSES", including naturally judicial
processes, of the governments under the Japanese regime.

THE COMMONWEALTH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO CONTINUE JAPANESE REGIME JUDICIAL PROCESSES

Now we come to the third and last question propounded in the majority opinion.

The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth tribunals is defined, prescribed, and apportioned by legislative act.

It is provided so in our Constitution. (Section 2, Article VIII.)

The Commonwealth courts of justice are continuations of the courts established before the inauguration of the Commonwealth
and before the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935. And their jurisdiction is the same as provided by existing laws at
the time of inauguration of the Commonwealth Government.
Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Organic Act of the courts of justice of the Philippines, is the one that
defines the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, Courts of First Instance, and the Supreme Court. It is not
necessary to mention here the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, because the same has been abolished by Executive Order
No. 37.

No provision may be found in Act. No. 136, nor in any other law of the Philippines, conferring on the Commonwealth tribunals
jurisdiction to continue the judicial processes or proceedings of tribunals belonging to other governments, such as the
governments established during the Japanese occupation.

The jurisdiction of our justice of the peace and municipal courts is provided in section 68, chapter V, of Act No. 136. The original
and appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance is provided in the sections 56, 57, Chapter IV, of Act No. 136. The
original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is provided in 17 and 18, Chapter II, of the same Act. The provisions of
the above-cited do not authorize, even implicitly, any of the decisions and judgements of tribunals of the governments, nor to
continue the processes or proceedings of said tribunals.

NECESSITY OF ENABLING ACT UNDER THE LEGAL DOCTRINE PREVAILING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND IN THE UNITED
STATES

Taking aside the question as to whether the judicial processes of the government established during the Japanese occupation
should be considered valid or not, in order that said processes could be continued and the Commonwealth tribunals could
exercise proper jurisdiction to continue them, under the well- established legal doctrine, prevailing not only in the Philippines, but
also in the proper enabling law.

Almost a half a century ago, in the instructions given by President McKinley on April 7, 1900, for the guidance of the Philippine
Commission, it was stated that, in all the forms of the govenment and administrative provisions which they were authorized to
prescribed, the Commission should bear in mind that the government which they were establishing was designed not for the
satisfaction of the Americans or for the expression of their of their theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity
of the people of the Philippines, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even
their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government.

Notwithstanding the policy so outlined, it was not enough for the Philippine Commission to create and establish the courts of
justice provided in Act No. 136, in order that said tribunals could take cognizance and continue the judicial proceedings of the
tribunals existing in the Philippines at the time the American occupation.

It needed specific enabling provisions in order that the new tribunals might continue the processes pending in the tribunals
established by the Spaniards, and which continued to function until they were substituted by the courts created by the Philippine
Commission.

So it was done in regards to the transfer of the cases pending before the Spanish Audiencia to the newly created Supreme
Court, in sections 38 and 39 of Act No. 136 quoted as follows:

SEC. 38. Disposition of causes, actions, proceedings, appeals, records, papers, and so forth, pending in the existing
Supreme Court and in the "Contencioso Administravo." — All records, books, papers, causes, actions, proceedings,
and appeals logged, deposited, or pending in the existing Audiencia or Supreme Court, or pending by appeal before the
Spanish tribunal called "Contencioso Administravo," are transferred to the Supreme Court above provided for which,
has the same power and jurisdiction over them as if they had been in the first instance lodged, filed, or pending therein,
or, in case of appeal, appealed thereto.

SEC. 39. Abolition of existing Supreme Court. — The existing Audiencia or Supreme Court is hereby abolished, and the
Supreme Court provided by this Act is substituted in place thereof.

Sections 64 and 65 of the same Act allowed the same procedure as regards the transfer of cases and processes pending in the
abolished Spanish Courts of First Instance to the tribunals of the same name established by the Philippine Commission.

SEC. 64. Disposition of records, papers, causes, and appeals, now pending in the existing Courts of First Instance . —
All records, books, papers, actions, proceedings, and appeals lodged, deposited, or pending in the Court of First
Instance as now constituted of or any province are transferred to the Court of First Instance of such province hereby
established, which shall have the same power and jurisdiction over them as if they had been primarily lodged,
deposited, filed, or commenced therein, or in case of appeal, appealed thereto.

SEC. 65. Abolition of existing Courts of First Instance. — The existing Courts First Instance are hereby abolished, and
the Courts of First Instance provided by this Act are substituted in place thereof.

The same procedure has been followed by the Philippine Commission even though the courts of origin of the judicial processes
to be transferred and continued belonged to the same government and sovereignty of the courts which are empowered to
continue said processes.

So section 78 of Act No. 136, after the repeal of all acts conferring upon American provost courts in the Philippines jurisdiction
over civil actions, expressly provided that said civil actions shall be transferred to the newly created tribunals.

And it provided specifically that "the Supreme Court, Courts of the First Instance and courts of the justice of the peace
established by this Act (No. 136) are authorized to try and determine the actions so transferred to them respectively from the
provost courts, in the same manner and with the same legal effect as though such actions had originally been commenced in the
courts created" by virtue of said Act.
MUNICIPAL COURTS UNDER ACT NO. 183

On July 30, 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted the Organic Act of the City of Manila, No. 183.

Two municipal courts for the city were created by section 40 of said Act, one for the northern side of Pasig River and the other
for the southern side.

They were courts with criminal jurisdiction or identical cases under the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace then existing in
Manila. Although both courts were of the same jurisdiction, in order that the criminal cases belonging to the justice of the peace
courts may be transferred to the municipal courts just created, and the proceedings may be continued by the same, the
Philippine Commission considered it necessary to pas the proper enabling act.

So on August 5, 1901, it enacted Act No. 186, section 2 of which provides that all criminal cases and proceedings pending in the
justices of the peace of Manila are transferred to the municipal courts, which are conferred the jurisdiction to continue said cases
and proceedings.

THE CABANTAG CASE

On August 1, 1901, Narciso Cabantag was convicted of murder by a military commission. (Cabantag  vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil., 273.)
The decision was confirmed on December 10, 1901, and his execution by hanging was set for January 12,1902. .

On December 26, 1901, he fled, but surrendered to the authorities on July 18, 1902. The Civil Governor on December 2, 1903,
commuted the death penalty to 20 years imprisonment. The commutation was approved by the Secretary of War, following
instructions of the President.

Cabantag filed later a writ of habeas corpus  on the theory that, with the abolition of the military commission which convicted him,
there was no existing tribunal which could order the execution of the penalty of imprisonment.

The Supreme Court denied the writ, but stated that, if the petitioner had filed the writ before the enactment of Act No. 865, the
question presented to the Supreme Court would have been different.

Act No. 865, enacted on September 3, 1903, is enabling law, wherein it is provided that decisions rendered by the provost courts
and military commission shall be ordered executed by the Courts of First Instance in accordance with the procedure outlined in
said Act.

It is evident from the foregoing that this Supreme Court has accepted and confirmed the doctrine of the necessity of an enabling
act in order that our Courts of First Instance could exercise jurisdiction to execute the decision of the abolished provost courts
and military commission.

It is evident that the doctrine is applicable, with more force, to the judicial processes coming from governments deriving their
authority from a foreign enemy state.

THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES

It is also evident that the Congress of the United States, by enacting the Bill of the Philippines on July 1, 1902, confirmed also
the same doctrine.

In effect, in section 9 of said Act, the Congress approved what the Philippine Commission did as to the jurisdiction of the courts
established and transfer of cases and judicial processes, as provided in Acts Nos. 136, 186, and 865.

The same doctrine was adopted by the United States government as part of its international policy, as could be seen in Article
XII of the Treaty concluded with Spain on December 10, 1898, in Paris.

Even in 1866 the Congress of the United States followed the same doctrine.

The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in the District Court of the United States for the District of
Louisiana, where a decree was rendered for the libellant. From the decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court,
where the case was pending, when in 1861, the proceedings of the court were interrupted by the civil war. Louisiana
had become involved in the rebellion, and the courts and officers of the United States were excluded from its limits. In
1862, however, the National authority had been partially reestablished in the State, though still liable to the overthrown
by the vicissitudes of war. The troops of the Union occupied New Orleans, and held military possession of the city and
such other portions of the State as had submitted to the General Government. The nature of this occupation and
possession was fully explained in the case of The Vinice.

Whilst it continued, on the 20th of October, 1862, President Lincoln, by proclamation, instituted a Provisional Court of
the State of Louisiana, with authority, among other powers, to hear, try, and determine all causes in admiralty.
Subsequently, by consent of parties, this cause was transferred into the Provisional Court thus, constituted, and was
heard, and a decree was again rendered in favor of the libellants. Upon the restoration of civil authority in the State, the
Provincial Court, limited in duration, according to the terms of the proclamation, by the event, ceased to exist.

On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits, causes and proceedings in the Provisional Court, proper for
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, should be transferred to that
court, and heard, and determined therein; and that all judgements, orders, and decrees of the Provisional Court in
causes transferred to the Circuit Court should at once become the orders, judgements, and decrees of that court, and
might be enforced, pleaded, and proved accordingly.
 It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment by the President of a Provisional Court was warranted by
the Constitution.

xxx           xxx           xxx

We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was properly established by the President in the exercise of
this constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power, upon the close of the war, and the dissolution of the
Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its judgement and decrees, to the
proper courts of the United States. (U. S. Reports, Wallace, Vol. 9, The Grapeshot, 131-133.)

JUDGEMENTS OF THE REBEL COURTS IN LOUISIANA WERE VALIDATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

During the civil war in 1861, the prevailing rebel forces established their own government in Louisiana.

When the rebel forces were overpowered by the Union Forces and the de facto government was replaced by the de jure
government, to give effect to the judgments and other judicial acts of the rebel government, from January 26, 1861, up to the
date of the adoption of the State Constitution, a provision to said effect was inserted in said document.

Section 149 of the Louisiana Constitution reads as follows:

All the rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, contracts, and all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, shall continue as if it had not been adopted; all judgments and judicial
sales, marriages, and executed contracts made in good faith and in accordance with existing laws in this State
rendered, made, or entered into, between the 26th day of January, 1861, and the date when this constitution shall be
adopted, are hereby declared to be valid, etc. (U. S. Report, Wallace, Vol. 22, Mechanics' etc. Bank  vs. Union Bank,
281.)

EVEN AMONG SISTERS STATES OF THE UNITED STATES JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT EXECUTORY

The member states of the United States of America belong to the same nation, to the country, and are under the same
sovereignty.

But judgements rendered in one state are not executory in other states.

To give them effect in other states it is necessary to initiate an original judicial proceeding, and therein the defendants in the
domestic suit may plead bar the sister state judgement  puis darrien continuance. (Wharton, on the Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, p.
1411.)

Under the Constitution of the United States, when a judgement of one state in the Union is offered in a court of a sister
state as the basis of a suit nil debet  cannot be pleaded. The only proper plea is nul tiel record. (Id., p. 1413.).

It is competent for the defendant, however, to an action on a judgement of a sister state, as to an action on a foreign
judgement, to set up as a defense, want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgement; and, as indicating such
want of jurisdiction, to aver by plea that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the state rendering the judgement, and
had not been served with process, and did not enter his appearance; or that the attorney was without authority to
appear. (Id., pp. 1414-1415.)

The inevitable consequence is that the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in the absence of an enabling act or of
an express legislative grant, have no jurisdiction to take cognizance and continue the judicial processes, procedures, and
proceedings of the tribunals which were created by the Japanese Military Administration and functioned under the Vargas
Philippine Executive Commission of the Laurel Republic of the Philippines, deriving their authority from the Emperor, the
absolute ruler of Japan, the invading enemy, and not from the Filipino people in whom, according to the Constitution,
sovereignty resides, and from whom all powers of government emanate.

The position of Honorable Asenio P. Dizon, the respondent judge of the Court of the First Instance of Manila in declaring himself
without jurisdiction nor authority to continue the proceedings which provoked the present controversy, being a judicial process of
a Japanese sponsored government, is absolutely correct, under the legal doctrines established by the United States and the
Philippine Government, and consistently, invariably, and without exception, followed by the same.

If we accept, for the sake of argument, the false hypothesis that the Commonwealth tribunals have jurisdiction to continue the
judicial processes left pending by the courts of the governments established under the Japanese regime, the courts which
disappeared and, automatically, ceased to function with the ouster of the enemy, the position of the Judge Dizon, in declining to
continue the case, is still unassailable, because, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if the judicial processes in said case
were not taken at all, as inevitable result of the sweeping and absolute annulment declared by the General MacArthur in the
October Proclamation.

In said proclamation it is declared in unmistakable and definite terms that "ALL PROCESSES" of the Japanese sponsored
governments "ARE NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT", and they shall remain so until the Commonwealth,
through its legislative power, decides otherwise in a proper validating act.

The fact that the Japanese invaders, under international law, were in duty bound to establish courts of justice during the
occupation, although they made them completely powerless to safeguard the constitutional rights of the citizens, and mere
figureheads as regards the fundamental liberties of the helpless men, women and children of our people, so much so that said
courts could not offer even the semblance of protection when the life, the liberty, the honor and dignity of our individual citizens
were wantonly trampled by any Japanese, military or civilian, does not change the situation. "ALL PROCESSES" of said court
are declared "NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT" in the October proclamation, and we do not have any other
alternative but to accept the law, as said proclamation has the full force of a law.

The fact that in the past, the legitimate governments, once restored in their own territory, condescended in many cases to
recognize and to give effect to judgments rendered by courts under the governments set up by an invading military occupant or
by a rebel army, does not elevate such condescension to the category of a principle, when Wheaton declares that no
international wrong is done if the acts of the invader are reversed.

Many irrelevant authorities were cited to us as to the duties imposed by the international law on military occupants, but no
authority has been cited to the effect that the representative of the restored legitimate government is a bound to recognize and
accept as valid the acts and processes of said occupants. On the contrary, Wheaton says that if the occupant's acts are
reversed "no international wrong would be committed."

Following the authority of Wheaton, undisputed by the majority, General MacArthur thought, as the wisest course, of declaring
"NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT," by official proclamation, "ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime, that is
legislative, executive and judicial processes, which fall under the absolute adjective "ALL".

That declaration is a law. It is a law that everybody bound to accept and respect, as all laws must be accepted and respected. It
is a law that the tribunals are duty bound to give effect and apply.

We are not unmindful of the adverse consequences to some individuals of the annullment of all the judicial processes under the
Japanese regime, as provided in the October Proclamation, but the tribunals are not guardians of the legislative authorities,
either an army commander in chief, during war, or a normal legislature, in peace time. The tribunals are not called upon to guide
the legislative authorities to the wisdom of the laws to be enacted. That is the legislative responsibility. Our duty and our
responsibility is to see to it that the law, once enacted, be applied and complied with.

No matter the consequences, no matter who might be adversely affected, a judge must have the firm resolve and the courage to
do his duty, as, in the present case, Judge Dizon did, without fear nor favor. We cannot see any reason why we should not
uphold him in his stand in upholding the law.

It is our official duty, national and international duty. Yes. Because this Supreme Court is sitting, not only as a national court, but
as an international court, as is correctly stated in the concurring opinion of Justice De Joya, and we should feel the full weight of
the corresponding responsibility, as the American courts with admiralty jurisdiction and the Prize Courts of England did feel. In
fact, it is in the judiciary where, more than in any point of view is more pressing, more imperative, more unavoidable. Justice has
no country. It is of all countries. The horizon of justice cannot be limited by the scene where our tribunals are functioning and
moving. That horizon is boundless. That is why in our constitution the bill of rights has been written not for Filipinos, but for all
persons. They are rights that belong to men, not as Filipinos, Americans, Russians, Chinese or Malayan, but as a member of
humanity. The international character of our duty to administer justice has become more specific by the membership of our
country in the United Nations. And let us not forget, as an elemental thing, that our primary duty is to uphold and apply the law,
as it is; that we must not replace the words of the law with what we might be inclined to surmise; that what is clearly and
definitely provided should not be substituted with conjectures and suppositions; that we should not try to deduce a contrary
intention to that which is unequivocally stated in the law; that we should not hold valid what is conclusively declared null and
void.

The October Proclamation declared "ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime "AND VOID WITHOUT EFFECT", so they
must stand. There is no possible way of evasion. "ALL PROCESSES", in view of the meaning of the absolute adjective "ALL",
include "JUDICIAL PROCESSES". Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons we conclude:

1. That General MacArthur had full legal authority to issue the October Proclamation, and that no principle of the international
law is violated by said proclamation, no international wrong being committed by the reversal by the legitimate government of the
acts of the military invader.

2. That said proclamation was issued in full conformity with the official policies to which the United States and Philippine
Governments were committed, and the annulment of all the facts of the governments under the Japanese regime, legislative,
executive, and judicial, is legal, and justified by the wrongs committed by the Japanese.

3. That when General MacArthur proclaimed and declared in the October Proclamation "That all laws, regulations and
processes" of the Japanese sponsored governments, during enemy occupation, "are null and void and without effect", he meant
exactly what he said.

4. That where General MacArthur said "all processes" we must read and understand precisely and exactly "all processes", and
not "some processes". "All" and "some" have incompatible meanings and are not interchangeable.

5. That the word "processes" includes judicial procedures, proceedings, processes, and cases. Therefore, "all processes" must
include "all judicial processes.".

6. That we have no right to attribute General MacArthur an intention different from what he has plainly, clearly, unmistakably
expressed in unambiguous words with familiar meaning generally understood by the common man.

7. That the judicial proceedings here in question are included among those adversely affected by the October Proclamation.
8. That the Commonwealth tribunals have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of nor to continue the judicial proceedings under the
Japanese regime.

9. That to exercise said jurisdiction an enabling act of the Congress is necessary.

10. That respondent Judge Dizon did not commit the error complained of in the petition, and that the petition has no merits at all.

We refuse to follow the course of action taken by the majority in the present case. It is a course based on a mistaken conception
of the principles of international law and their interpretation and application, and on a pinchbeck. It is a course based on
misconstruction or misunderstanding of the October Proclamation, in utter disregard of the most elemental principles of legal
here meneutics. It is a course that leads to nowhere, except to the brink of disaster, because it is following the dangerous path of
ignoring or disobeying the law.

Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived. The issue confronting us is not of passing importance. It is an issue of awesome
magnitude and transcendency. It goes to and reaches the very bottom. It is simple. Lacking in complexities. But it may shake the
very foundation of society, the cornerstone of the state, the primary pillar of the nation. It may dry the very foundation of social
life, the source of vitalizing sap that nurtures the body politic. The issue is between the validity of one or more Japanese regime
processes and the sanctity of the law.

That is the question, reduced to its ultimate terms. it is a simple dilemma that is facing us. It is the alpha and the omega of the
whole issue. Either the processes, or the law. We have to select between two, which to uphold. It is a dilemma that does not
admit of middle terms, or of middle ways where we can loiter with happy unconcern . We are in the cross road: which way shall
we follow? The processes and the law are placed in the opposite ends of the balance. Shall we inclined the balance of justice to
uphold the processes and defeat law, or vice versa?

We feel jittery because some judicial processes might be rescinded or annulled, but we do not tremble with sincere alarm at the
thought of putting the law under the axe, of sentencing law to be executed by the guillotine. We feel uneasy, fancying chaos and
paralyzation of social life, because some litigants in cases during the Japanese regime will be affected in their private interests,
with the annulment of some judicial processes, but we adopt an attitude of complete nonchalance in throwing law overboard.
This baffling attitude is a judicial puzzle that nobody will understand. So it is better that we should shift to a more understandable
way, that which is conformable to the standard that the world expects in judicial action.

No amount of arguments and lucubration's, no amount of speculative gymnastics, no amount of juggling of immaterial principles
of international law, no amount of presumptions and suppositions, surmises and conjectures, no amount of dexterity in juridical
exegesis can divert our attention from the real, simple, looming, hypostasis of the issue before us: Law. It is Law with all its
majestic grandeur which we are defying and intending to overthrow from the sacred pedestal where the ages had placed her as
a goddess, to be enshrined, obeyed, and venerated by men, forever. Let us not dare to lay our profaning hands on her vestal
virginity, lest the oracle should fling at us the thunder of his prophetic anathema.

We cannot therefore vote except for the denial of the petition.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion of the majority and, pursuant to the Constitution, proceed to state the reason for my dissent.

The proceeding involved in the case at bar were commenced by a complaint filed by the instant petitioner, as plaintiff, on
November 18, 1944, in civil case No. 3012 of the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila, the complaint bearing this heading
and title: "The Republic of the Philippines — In the Court of First Instance of Manila" (Annex X of Exhibit A of petition
for mandamus). The farthest that said proceedings had gone before the record was burned or destroyed during the battle for
Manila, was the filing by counsel for plaintiff therein of their opposition to a motion for dismissal filed by opposing counsel.

It is, therefore, plain that the case had not been heard on the merits when the record was burned or destroyed.

The respondent judge, in his order dated June 6, 1945, disposing of the petition dated May 25, 1945 filed by petitioner, as a
plaintiff in said case, and of the petition filed by respondent Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh, as defendant therein, on May 31, 19045,
held: " first, that by virtue of the proclamation of General MacArthur quoted above, all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth became null and void and without legal effect in Manila on
February 3, 1945 or, at the lates, on February 27 of the same year; second  that the proceedings and processes had in the
present case having been before a court of the Republic of the Philippines and in accordance with the laws and regulations of
said Republic, the same are now void and without legal effect; third, that this Court as one of the different courts of general
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, has no authority to take cognizance of and continue said proceedings to
final judgement, until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in the manner and form provided by
law, shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the
causes commenced and left pending therein, to the courts created and organized by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 4007, as
revived by Executive Order No. 36, or for the validation of all proceedings had in said courts."

Petitioner prays that this Court declare that the respondent judge should not have ordered the suspension of the proceedings in
civil case No. 3012 and should continue and dispose of all the incidents in said case till its complete termination. In my opinion,
the petition should denied.

In stating the reasons for this dissent, we may divide the arguments under the following propositions:

1. The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army MacArthur's proclamation of October
23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148);
2. (a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission "and later as the Republic of the Philippines",
established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by his order was not a  de-facto government —
the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court, and the judge who presided it was not a de facto judge;
(b) the rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto Government in territory belonging to a belligerent but
occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments thus established here by Japan;

3. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese
occupation;

4. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the acts of either or
both of those Japanese-sponsored governments.

5. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militates against petitioner's contention.

The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army MacArthur's proclamation of
October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148).

In this proclamation, after reciting certain now historic facts, among which was that the so-called government styled as the
"Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943 "under enemy duress, . . . based upon neither the free
expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States," the great Commander-in-Chief
proclaimed and declared:

xxx           xxx           xxx

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control; and

xxx           xxx           xxx

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government whose
seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted is, I think, that as the different areas of the Philippines were
progressively liberated, the declaration of nullity therein contained shall attach to the laws, regulations and processes thus
condemned in so far as said areas were concerned. Mark that the proclamation did not provide that such laws, regulations and
processes shall be or are annulled, but that they are null and void. Annulment implies some degree of the effectiveness in the
act annulled previous to the annulment, but a declaration of nullity denotes that the act is null and void  ab initio — the nullity
precedes the declaration. The proclamation speaks in the present tense, not in the future. If so, the fact that the declaration of
nullity as to the condemned laws, regulations, and processes in areas not yet free from enemy occupation and control upon the
date of the proclamation, would attach thereto at a later date, is no argument for giving them validity or effectiveness in
the interregnum. By the very terms of the proclamation itself, that nullity had to date back from the inception of such laws,
regulations and processes; and to dispel any shadow of doubt which may still remain, we need only consider the concluding
paragraph of the proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief of the army liberation solemnly enjoined upon all loyal citizens
of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws,
regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government. This is all-inclusive — it comprises not only the loyal citizens in
the liberated areas but also those in areas still under enemy occupation and control. It will be noticed that the complaint in said
civil case No. 3012 was filed twenty-six days after the above-quoted proclamations of General of the Army MacArthur. If the
parties to said case were to consider the proceedings therein up to the date of the liberation of Manila valid and binding, they
would hardly be complying with the severe injunction to render full respect for and obedience to our Constitution and the laws,
regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government from October 23, 1944, onwards. Indeed, to my mind, in choosing
between these two courses of action, they would be dangerously standing on the dividing line between loyalty and disloyalty to
this country and its government.

The proceeding in question, having been had before the liberation of Manila, were unquestionably "processes" of the Japanese-
sponsored government in the Philippines within the meaning of the aforesaid proclamation of General of the Army MacArthur
and, consequently, fall within the condemnation of the proclamation. Being processes of a branch of a government which had
been established in the hostility to the Commonwealth Government, as well as the United States Government, they could not
very well be considered by the parties to be valid and binding, at least after October 23, 1944, without said parties incurring in
disobedience and contempt of the proclamation which enjoins them to render full respect for the obedience to our Constitution
and the laws, regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government. Nine days after the inauguration of the so-called
"Republic of the Philippines," President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States declared in one of his most memorable
pronouncements about the activities of the enemy in the Philippines, as follows:

One of the fourtheenth of this month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Island with Jose P. Laurel,
formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as "president." Jorge Vargas, formerly as a member of the
Commonwealth Cabinet, and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with
Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second
act was a hyphocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was designed to
confuse and mislead the Filipino people.

I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present
"Philippine Republic " has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. . . .
 Our symphaty goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — that great majority of
the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.

October 23, 1943.

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

President of the United States

(Form U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, 1943, pp. 93, 94.).

It is a fact of contemporary history that while President Manuel L. Quezon of the Philippines was in Washington, D.C., with his
exiled government, he also repeatedly condemned both the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the "Philippine Republic," as
they had been established by or under orders of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces. With these two
heads of the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines condemning the "puppet regime" from
its very inception, it is beyond my comprehension to see how the proceedings in question could be considered valid and binding
without adopting an attitude incompatible with theirs. As President Roosevelt said in his above quoted message, "Our symphaty
goes out to those remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — that great majority of the Filipino people who
have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.

The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of occupation was in control in the Islands and their paramount
military strength gave those of our people who were within their reach no other alternative, these had to obey their orders and
decrees, but the only reason for such obedience would be that paramount military strength and not any intrinsic legal validity in
the enemy's orders and decrees. And once that paramount military strength disappeared, the reason for the obedience
vanished, and obedience should likewise cease.

As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 719), "In
the face of an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty.  No
concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority exercised." (Emphasis ours.) The court there refers to its own former
decision in Thorington vs. Smith, and makes it clear that the doctrine in the Thorington case, so far as the effects of the acts of
the provisional government maintained by the British in Casetine, from September, 1814 to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the
consideration of Tampico as United States territory, were concerned, was limited to the period during which the British, in the
first case, retained possession of Castine, and the United States, in the second, retained possession of Tampico. In referring to
the Confederate Government during the Civil War, as mentioned in the Thorington case, the court again says in effect that
the actual supremacy of the Confederate Government over a portion of the territory of the Union was the only reason for holding
that its inhabitants could not but obey its authority. But the court was careful to limit this to the time when that actual supremacy
existed, when it said: . . . individual resistance to its authority then  would have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable."
(Emphasis ours.)

Because of its pertinence, we beg leave to quote the following paragraph from that leading decision:

There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. Smith (supra), which conflicts with these views. In that case, the
Confederate Government is characterized as one of paramount force, and classed among the governments of which
the one maintained by great Britain in Castine, from September 1814, to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the one
maintained by the United States in Tampico, during our War with Mexico, are examples. Whilst the
British retained  possession of Castine, the inhabitants were held to be subject to such laws as the British Government
chose to recognize and impose. Whilst  the United States retained  possession of Tampico, it was held that it must
regarded and respected as their territory. The Confederate Government, the court observed, differed from these
temporary governments in the circumstance that its authority did not justifying acts of hostility to the United States,
"Made obedience to its authority in civil and local matters not only a necessity, but a duty." All that was meant by this
language was, that as the actual supremancy of the Confederate Government existed over certain territory, individual
resistance to its authority then would have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable. In the face of an overwhelming force,
obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No concession is thus made to
the rightfulness of the authority exercised. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 24 Law ed., 719; emphasis ours.)

The majority opinion, in considering valid the proceedings in question, invokes the rule that when a belligerent army occupies a
territory belonging to the enemy, the former through its Commander in Chief, has the power to establish thereon what the
decisions and treaties have variously denominated provisional or military government, and the majority holds that the Japanese-
sponsored government in the Philippines was such a government. Without prejudice to later discussing the effects which the
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy contained in our Commonwealth Constitution, as well as in the Briand-
Kellog Pact, must have produced in this rule in so far as the Philippines is concerned, let us set forth some considerations
apropos of this conclusion of the majority. If the power to establish here such a provisional government is recognized in the
Commander in Chief of the invasion army, why should we not recognize at least an equal power in the Commander in Chief of
the liberation army to overthrow that government will all of its acts, at least of those of an executory nature upon the time of
liberation? Considering the theory maintained by the majority, it would seem that they would recognize in the Japanese
Commander in Chief the power to overthrow the Commonwealth Government, and all of its acts and institutions if he had
choosen to. Why should at least an equal power be denied the Commander in Chief of the United States Army to overthrow the
substitute government thus erected by the enemy with all of its acts and institutions which are still not beyond retrieve? Hereafter
we shall have occasion to discuss the aspects of this question from the point of view of policy or the practical convenience of the
inhabitants. If the Japanese Commander in Chief represented sovereignty of Japan, the American Commander in Chief
represented the sovereignty of the United States, as well as the Government of the Commonwealth. If Japan had won this war,
her paramount military supremacy would have continued to be exerted upon the Filipino people, and out of sheer physical
compulsion this country would have had to bow to the continuance of the puppet regime that she had set up here for an
indefinite time. In such a case, we admit that, not because the acts of that government would then have intrinsically been legal
and valid, but simply because of the paramount military force to which our people would then have continued to be subjected,
they would have had to recognize as binding and obligatory the acts of the different departments of that government. But
fortunately for the Filipinos and for the entire civilized world, Japan was defeated. And I now ask: Now that Japan has been
defeated, why should the Filipinos be still bound to respect or recognize validity in the acts of the Japanese-sponsored
government which has been so severely condemned by both the heads of the United States and our Commonwealth
Government throughout the duration of the war? If we were to draw a parallel between that government and that which was
established by the Confederate States during the American Civil War, we will find that both met with ultimate failure. And, in my
opinion, the conclusion to be drawn should be the same in both cases.

As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra), referring to the Confederate Government, its failure
carried with it the dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking down in pieces of the whole fabric of its government. The Court
said among other things:

The immense power exercised by the government of the Confederate States for nearly four years, the territory over
which it extended, the vast resources it wielded, and the millions who acknowledged its authority, present an imposing
spectacle well fitted to mislead the mind in considering the legal character of that organization. It claimed to represent
an independent nation and to posses sovereign powers; as such to displace to jurisdiction and authority of the United
States from nearly half of their territory and, instead of their laws, to substitute and enforce those of its own enactment.
Its pretentions being resisted, they were submitted to the arbitrament of war. In that contest the Confederacy failed; and
in its failure its pretentions were dissipated, its armies scattered, and the whole fabric of its government broken in
pieces. (24 Law, ed., 719; emphasis ours.)

By analogy, if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines had been lawful — which, however, is not the case —
and if Japan had succeeded in permanently maintaining the government that she established in the Philippines, which would
have been the case had victory been hers, there would be more reason for holding the acts of that government valid, but
because Japan has lost the war and, therefore, failed in giving permanence to that government, the contrary conclusion should
legitimately follow.

The validity of legislation exercised by either contestant "depends not upon the existence of hostilities but upon the  ultimate
success of the party which it is adopted" (emphasis ours). And, referring to the overthrow of the of the Confederacy, the Court,
said, "when its military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it all its enactments" (emphasis ours)

The majority cite on page 9-10 of their opinion a passage from the same case of Williams  vs. Bruffy, supra, which is a
mere obiter dictum. The majority opinion says that in this passage the Court was "discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States." In the first place, an examination of the decision will reveal that the controversy dealt with an act of
the Confederate Government, not of the Confederate States individually; and in the second place, the quoted passage refers to
something which was not in issue in the case, namely, the acts of the individual States composing the Confederacy. But even
this passage clearly places the case at bar apart from the Court's pronouncement therein. The quoted passage commences by
stating that "The same general form of government the same general laws for the administration of justice and the protection of
private rights, which has existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remanded during (its) continuance and afterwards. "In the
case at bar, the same general form of the Commonwealth Government did not continue under the Japanese, for the simple
reason that one of the first acts of the invaders was to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution and, therefore, the
constitutional government which existed thereunder, as an effect of the following acts and decrees of the Commander in Chief of
the Imperial Japanese Forces:

1. Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942 of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces to the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission directed that, in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers in the Philippines, the
"activities" of the "administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing status, order,
ordinances and the Commonwealth Constitution (1 Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, page 34). Under the
frame of government existing in this Commonwealth upon the date of the Japanese invasion, the Constitution was the very
fountain-head of the validity and effects of all the "status, orders, and ordinances" mentioned by the Japanese Commander in
Chief, and in overthrowing the Constitution he, in effect, overthrew all of them.

2. Instruction No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration (Vol. 1, usages 36 et seq., Official Gazette, edited at the Office of the
Executive Commission) gave the "Detailed Instruction Based on Guiding Principle of the Administration," and among other
things required "The entire personnel shall be required to pledge their loyalty to the Imperial Japanese Forces. . . ." (This, of
course, was repugnant to the frame of government existing here under the Commonwealth Constitution upon the date of
invasion.)

3. Proclamation dated January 3, 19452 of the Japanese Commander in Chief provided in paragraph 3 that "The Authorities and
the People of the Commonwealth should sever their relations with the U.S. o . . ." (This is, likewise, repugnant to the
Commonwealth Constitution and the to the Government of that Commonwealth Constitution and to the Government of that
Commonwealth which was expressly made subject to the supreme sovereignty of the United States until complete
independence is granted, not by the mere will of the United States, but by virtue of an agreement between that Government and
ours, under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.)

The individual States of the Confederate and their governments existed prior to the Civil War and had received the sanction and
recognition of the Union Government, for which the Federal Supreme Court was speaking in the Williams-Bruffy case; while the
Japanese-sponsored governments of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Republic of the Philippines" neither existed
here before the war nor had received the recognition or sanction of either the United States or the Commonwealth Government
— nay, they had received the most vigorous condemnation of both.

The Court further says in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra):

No case has been cited in argument, and we think unsuccesfully attempting to establish a separate revolutionary
government have been sustained as a matter of legal right. As justly observed by the late Chief Justice in the case of
Shortridge vs. Macon, I Abb. U.S., 58, decided at the circuit, and, in all material respects like the one at bar, "Those who
engage in rebellion must consider the consequences. If they succeed, rebellion becomes revolution, and the new
government will justify is founders. If they fail, all their acts hostile to the rightful government are violations of law, and
originate no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and existence have been alike
assailed. S.C., Chase, Dec., 136. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 716, 718.) (Emphasis ours.)
I am of opinion that the principles thus enunciated for the case of an unsuccessful rebellion should be applied with greater force
to the case of a belligerent who loss the war. And since the founding of the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines
was designed to supplant and did actually supplant the rightful government and since all its acts could not but a hostile to the
latter (however blameless the officials who acted under enemy duress might be), and since Japan failed, all said acts,
particularly those of the Japanese-sponsored court in said civil case No. 3012, "are violations of law, and originate no rights
which can be recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and existence have been alike assailed", quoting the
language of the court in Shortridge vs. Macon, cited by Mr. Justice Field in Williams vs. Bruffy, supra  (24 Law. ed., 718).

II

(a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission" and later as the Republic of the Philippines",
established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by the his order was not a de
facto government--the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court and the who presided it was
not a de facto judge;

(b) The rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto government in territory belonging to a
belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments thus established
here by Japan.

Under the doctrine of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, and the pertinent cases therein cited, the short-lived provisional government
thus established by the Japanese in the Philippines should be classified, at best, as a government of paramount force. But this is
not all. The Constitution of this Commonwealth which has been expressly approved by the United States Government, in Article
II, section 3, under the heading "Declaration of Principles", renounces war as an instrument of national policy. This renunciation
of war as an instruments of national policy follows an equal renunciation in the Briand-Kellog Pact. The rules of International Law
, cited in support of the power or right of a belligerent army of occupation to set up a provisional government on occupied enemy
territory, were evolved prior to the first World War, but the horrors and devastations of that war convinced, at least the
governments of the United States and France, that they should thereafter renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and
they consequently subscribed the Briand-Kellog Pact. Those horrors and devastations were increased a hundred fold, if not
more, in this second World War, but even before this war occurred, our own people, through our Constitutional delegates, who
framed the Commonwealth Constitution also adopted the same doctrine, and embodied an express renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy in the instrument that they drafted. It is true that in section 3, Article II, above-cited, our Constitution
adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as a part of the law of the Nation. But, of course, this adoption is
exclusive of those principles of International Law which might involve recognition of war as an instrument of national policy. It is
plain that on the side of the Allies, the present war is purely defensive. When Japan started said war, treacherously and without
previous declaration, and attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on those two fateful days of December 7 and 8, 1941, she
employed war as an instrument of the national policy. Under the Briand-Kellog Pact and our Commonwealth Constitution, the
United States and the Commonwealth Government could not possibly have recognized in Japan any right, as against them, to
employ that war as an instrument of her national policy, and, consequently, they could not have recognized in Japan power to
set up in the Philippines the puppet government that she later set up, because such power would be a mere incident or
consequence of the war itself. The authorities agree that such a power, under the cited rules, is said to a right derived from war.
(67 C.J., p. 421, sec. 171.) There can be no question that the United States and the Commonwealth Governments were free to
refuse to be bound by those rules when they made their respective renunciations above referred to. Indeed, all the United
Nations have exercised this free right in their Charter recently signed at San Francisco.

As necessary consequence of this, those rules of International Law were no longer applicable to the Philippines and to the
United States at the time of the Japanese invasion as a corollary, it follows that we have no legal foundation on which to base
the proposition that the acts of that Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines were valid and binding. Moreover, I am
of opinion, that although at the time of the Japanese invasion and up to the present, the United States retains over the
Philippines, a certain measure of sovereignty, it is only for certain specified purposes enumerated in the Tydings-McDufie Act of
the Commonwealth Constitution. (Ordinance appended to the Constitution.) And our territory was at the time of the Japanese
invasion not a territory of the United States, within the meaning of the laws of war governing war-like operations on enemy
territory. Our territory is significantly called "The National Territory" in Article I of our Constitution and this bears the stamps of
express approval of the United States Government. The Philippines has been recognized and admitted as a member of the
United Nations. We, therefore, had our own national and territorial identity previous to that invasion. Our nation was not at war
with the Filipinos. And line with this, the Japanese army, in time, released Filipino war prisoners captured in Bataan. Lt. Gen.
Maeda, Chief of Staff, Imperial Japanese Forces, in his speech of January 2, 1942, said:

. . . we had not the slighest intensions to make your people our enemy; rather we considered them as our friends who
will join us has hand-in-hand in the establishment of an orderly Greater East Asia. . . ., (Official Gazette, edited at the
Office of the Executive Commission, Vol. I, p. 55.)

If the Philippines was a neutral territory when invaded by the Japanese, the following principles from Lawrence, International
Law (7th ed.), p. 603, are pertinent:

The Duties of Belligerent States Towards Neutral States. — . . . To refrain from carrying on hostilities within neutral
territory. — We have already seen that, though this obligation was recognized in theory during the infancy of
International law, it was often very imperfectly observed in practice. But in modern times it has been strickly enforced,
and any State which knowingly ordered warlike operations to be carried on in neutral territory . . . would bring down
upon itself the reprobation of civilized mankind. Hostilities may be carried on in the territory of either belligerent, on the
high seas, and in territory belonging to no one. Neutral land and neutral territorial waters are sacred.  No acts of warfare
may lawfully take place within them. . . . (Emphasis ours.)

In all the cases and authorities supporting the power or right to set up a provisional government, the belligerent had the right to
invade or occupy the territory in the first instance. Such was not the case with the Philippines. President Roosevelt, in his
message to the Filipino people, soon after the landing of American Forces in Leyte, on October 20, 1944, characterized Japan's
invasion and occupation of the Philippines as "the barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack upon the Philippines," and he
announced the American people's "firm determination to punish the guilty." (41 Off. Gaz., 149.) (Emphasis ours.) The illustrious
leader of the United Nations could not have in more unmistakable terms the utter illegality of that invasion and occupation. If the
establishment of a provinsional government in occupied territory by a belligerent is "a mere application or extension of the force
by which the invasion or occupation was effected" (67 C.J., p. 421, sec 171), the illegality of the invasion, would necessarily
permeate the government, which was its mere application or extention.

The fact that shortly before December 8, 1941, the date of the "barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack," the meager and
almost untrained forces of the Philippine Army had been inducted into the American Army, did not change the neutral status of
the Philippines. That military measure had been adopted for purely defensive purposes. Nothing could be farther from the minds
of the government and military leaders of the United States and the Philippines in adopting it than to embark upon any
aggressive or warlike enterprise against any other nation. It is an old and honored rule dating as far back as the 18th century
that even solemn promises of assistance made before the war by a neutral to a nation which later becomes a belligerent, would
not change the status of the neutral even if such promises were carried out, so long as they were made for purely defensive
purposes. In the words of Vattel "when a sovereign furnishes the succor due in virtue of a former defensive alliance, he does not
associate himself in the war. Therefore he may fulfill his engagements and yet preserve an exact neutrality." (Lawrence,
Principles of International Law [7th ed.], pp. 585, 586.)

If the Filipinos had, from contemptible cowardice and fear, allowed their shores to be invaded, and their territory occupied by the
Japanese without resistance, such invasion occupation would undoubtedly have been considered in violation of International
Law. Should the Filipinos be punished for having had the patriotism, bravery, and heroism to fight in defense of the sacredness
of their land, the sanctity of their homes, and the honor and dignity of their government by giving validity, in whatever limited
measure, to the lawless acts of the ruthless enemy who thus overran their country, and robbed them of the tranquility and
happiness of their daily lives? And yet, to my mind, to give any measure of validity or binding effect to the proceedings of the
Japanese-sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila, involved herein, would be to give that much validity or effect to the acts of
those same invaders. To equalize the consequences of a lawful and a wrongful invasion of occupation, would be to equalize
right and wrong, uphold the creed that might makes right, and adopt "the law of the jungle."

If said Japanese-sponsored government was not a de facto  government, it would seem clearly to follow that its "Court of First
Instance of Manila" was not a de facto court. But it should additionally be stated that for it be a de facto court, its judge had to be
a de facto judge, which he could not be, as presently demonstrated.

As said by President Osmeña, in replying to the speech of General of the Army MacArthur when the latter turned over to him the
full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, on February 27, 1945:

xxx           xxx           xxx

The time has come when the world should know that when our forces surrendered in Bataan and Corregidor, resistance
to the enemy was taken up by the people itself — resistance which was inarticulate and disorganized in its inception but
which grew from the day to day and from island until it broke out into an open warfare against the enemy.

The fight against the enemy was truly a people's war because it counted with the wholehearted support of the masses.
From the humble peasant to the barrio school teacher, from the volunteer guard to the women's auxilliary service units,
from the loyal local official to the barrio folk — each and every one of those contributed his share in the great crusade
for liberation.

The guerrillas knew that without the support of the civilian population, they could not survive. Whole town and villages
dared enemy reprisal to oppose the hated invader openly or give assistance to the underground movement. . . . (41 Off.
Gaz., 88, 89.)

Under these facts, taken together with the General of the Army MacArthur's accurate statement that the "Republic of the
Philippines" had been established under enemy duress, it must be presumed — to say the least — that the judge who presided
over the proceedings in question during the Japanese occupation, firstly, accepted his appointment under duress; and secondly,
acted by virtue of that appointment under the same duress. In such circumstances he could not have acted in the bona
fide  belief that the new "courts" created by or under the orders of the Japanese Military Commander in chief had been legally
created--among them the "Court of first Instance of Manila," — that the Chairman of the "Philippine Executive Commission" or
the President of the "Republic of the Philippines", whoever appointed him, and conferred upon him a valid title to his office and a
legitimate jurisdiction to act as such judge. Good faith is essential for the existence of a de facto  judge (Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53
Phil., 866, 872). The very idea of enemy duress would necessarily imply that but for the duress exerted upon him by the enemy
he would have refused to accept the appointment and to act thereunder. And why? Because he must be presumed to know that
the office to which he was thus appointed had been created by the enemy in open defiance of the Commonwealth Constitution
and the laws and regulation promulgated by our Commonwealth Government, and that his acceptance of said office and his
acting therein, if willfully done, would have been no less than an open hostility to the very sovereignty of the United Sates and to
the Commonwealth Government, and a renunciation of his allegiance to both. There is no middle ground here. Either the judge
acted purely under duress, in which case his acts would be null and void; or maliciously in defiance of said governments, in
which case his acts would be null and void for more serious reasons.

The courts created here by the Japanese government had to look for the source of their supposed authority to the orders of the
Japanese Military Commander in chief and the so-called Constitution of the "Republic of the Philippines," which had been
adopted in a manner which would shock the conscience of democratic peoples, and which was designed to supplant the
Constitution which had been duly adopted by the Filipino people in a Constitutional Convention of their duly elected
Constitutional Delegates. And it was decreed that the Commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces "shall exercise
jurisdiction over judicial courts." (Vol. 1, p. 7, Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, cited on pp. 2, 3, of the
order of the respondent judge complained of and marked Exhibit H of the petition for mandamus.) How can our present courts
legitimately recognize any efficacy in the proceedings of such an exotic judicial system, wherein the Commander in Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces possessed the highest judicial jurisdiction?

III
 The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese
occupation.

Executive Order No. 36 of the President of the Philippines, dated March 10, 1945, in its very first paragraph, states the prime
concern of the government "to re-establish the courts as fast as provinces are liberated from the Japanese occupation." If the
courts under the Japanese-sponsored government of the "Republic of the Philippines" were the same Commonwealth courts
that existed here under the Constitution at the time of the Japanese invasion, President Osmeña would not be speaking of re-
establishing those courts in his aforesaid Executive Order. For soothe, how could those courts under the "Republic of the
Philippines" be the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines when they were not functioning under the Constitution of the
Commonwealth and the laws enacted in pursuance of said Constitution? The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth courts was
defined and conferred under the Commonwealth Constitution and the pertinent legislation enacted thereunder, that of the
Japanese-sponsored courts was defined and conferred by the orders and decrees of the Japanese Commander in Chief, and,
perhaps, the decrees of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the laws of the so-called Legislature under the Republic,
which was not composed of the elected representatives of the people. The Justices and Judges of the Commonwealth courts
had to be appointed by the President of the Commonwealth with confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, pursuant to
the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was
appointed by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Judges of first Instance and of all inferior courts were
appointed by the Chairman of the Executive Commission, at first, and later, by the President of the Republic, of course, without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, the President and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and the Judges of First Instance
and of all inferior courts in the Commonwealth judicial system, had to swear to support and defend the Commonwealth
Constitution, while this was impossible under the Japanese-sponsored government. In the Commonwealth judicial system, if a
Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated to continue in the discharge of his official duties, his successor was appointed by
the Commonwealth President with confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and said successor had to swear to
support and defend the Commonwealth Constitution; in the exotic judicial system implanted here by the Japanese, if a Justice or
Judge should die or incapacitated, his successor would be appointed by the Japanese Commander in Chief, if the dead or
incapacitated incumbent should be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or otherwise, by the Chairman of the "Executive
Commission" or the President of the "Republic", of course without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
Commonwealth Congress, and, of course, without the successor swearing to support and defend the Commonwealth
Constitution.

If, as we believe having conclusively shown, the Japanese-sponsored courts were not the same Commonwealth courts, the
conclusion is unavoidable that any jurisdiction possessed by the former and any cases left pending therein, were not and could
not be automatically transfered to the Commonwealth courts which we re-established under Executive Order No. 36. For the
purpose, a special legislation was necessary.

Executive Order No. 37, in my humble opinion, does not, as held by the majority, imply that the President recognized as valid
the proceedings in all cases appealed to the Court of Appeals. Section 2 of that order simply provides that all cases which have
been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. The adverb "duly"
would indicate that the President foresaw the possibility of appeals not having been duly taken. All cases appealed to the Court
of Appeals before the war and the otherwise duly appealed, would come under the phrase "duly appealed" in this section of the
Executive Order. But considering the determined and firm attitude of the Commonwealth Government towards those Japanese-
sponsored governments since the beginning, it would seem inconceivable that the President Osmeña, in section 2 of Executive
Order No. 37, intended to include therein appeals taken to the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals, or from the Japanese-
sponsored inferior courts. It should be remembered that in the Executive Order immediately preceeding and issued on the same
date, the President speaks of re-establishing the courts as fast as provinces were liberated from the Japanese occupation.

IV

The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the acts of
either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments.

In the last analysis, in deciding the question of validity or nullity of the proceedings involved herein, we are confronted with the
necessity to decide whether the Court of first Instance of Manila and this Supreme Court, as re-established under the
Commonwealth Constitution, and the entire Commonwealth Government, are to be bound by the acts of the said Japanese-
sponsored court and government. To propound this question is, to my mind, to answer it most decidedly in the negative, not only
upon the ground of the legal principles but also for the reasons of national dignity and international decency. To answer the
question in the affirmative would be nothing short for legalizing the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines. Indeed,
it would be virtual submission to the dictation of an invader our people's just hatred of whom gave rise to the epic Philippine
resistance movement, which has won the admiration of the entire civilized world.

Even considerations of policy or practical convenience militate against petitioner's contention.

In this connection, the respondent judge, in his order of June 6, 1945, complained of, has the following to say:

It is contended, however, that the judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic
was the same as that of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation; that the laws administered and enforced by
said courts during the existence of said regime were the same laws on the statute books of Commonwealth before
Japanese occupation, and that even the judges who presided them were, in many instances, the same persons who
held the position prior to the Japanese occupation. All this may be true, but other facts are just as stubborn and pitiless.
One of them is that said courts were of a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced
were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws — and the
Courts had become the institutions-of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter, 27 F. Case No. 16,146), as they became later
on the laws and institution of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines. No amount of
argument or legal fiction can obliterate this fact.
Besides, I am of the opinion that the validity of the acts of the courts in the "judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic "would not depend upon the laws that they "administered and enforced", but upon
the authority  by virtue of which they acted. If the members of this Court were to decide the instant case in strict accordance with
the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth but not by the authority that they possess in their official capacity as the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, but merely as lawyers, their decision would surely be null and void. And yet, I am firmly of
opinion that whoever was the "judge" of the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila who presided over the said
court when the proceedings and processes in the dispute were had, in acting by virtue of the supposed authority which he was
supposed to have received from that government, did so with no more legal power than if he had acted as a mere lawyer
applying the same laws to the case. If duplication of work or effort, or even if confussion, should be alleged to possibly arise from
a declaration of nullity or judicial proceedings had before those Japanese-sponsored courts, it should suffice to answer that the
party so complaining in voluntarily resorting to such courts should be prepared to assume the consequences of his voluntary act.
On the other hand, his convenience should not be allowed to visit upon the majority of the inhabitants of this country, the dire
consequences of a sweeping and wholesale validation of judicial proceedings in those courts. Let us set forth a few
considerations apropos of this assertion. It is a fact of general knowledge that during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines,
the overwhelming majority of our people and other resident inhabitants were literally afraid to go any place where there were
Japanese sentries, soldiers or even civilians, and that these sentries were posted at the entrance into cities and towns and at
government offices; that the feared Japanese "M. P.'s" or Kempeitai's" were a constant terror to them; and lastly, that the greater
number who lived or had evacuated to places for from the Japanese, were found precisely in the cities and towns where the
courts were located; and as a consequence, the great majority of the people were very strongly adverse to traveling any
considerable distance from their homes and were, one might say, in constant hiding. Add to these circumstances, the fact of the
practical absence of transportation facilities and the no less important fact of the economic structure having been so dislocated
as to have impoverished the many in exchange for the enrichment of the few — and we shall have a fair picture of the practical
difficulties which the ordinary litigant would in those days have encountered in defending his rights against anyone of the favored
few who would bring him to court. It should be easy to realize how hard it was for instances, to procure the attendance of
witnesses, principally because of the fact that most of them were in hiding or, at least, afraid to enter the cities and towns, and
also because of then generally difficult and abnormal conditions prevailing. Under such conditions, cases or denial of a party's
day in court expected. Such denial might arise from many a cause. It might be party's fear to appear before the court because in
doing so, he would have had to get near the feared Japanese. It might be because he did not recognize any legal authority in
that court, or it might be his down-right repugnance of the hated enemy. And I dare say that among such people would be found
more than seventeen million Filipinos. These are but a few of countless cause. So that if some form of validation of such judicial
proceedings were to be attempted, all necessary safeguards should be provided to avoid that in any particular case the
validation should violate any litigant's constitutional right to his day in court, within the full meaning of the phrase, or any other
constitutional or statutory right of his. More people, I am afraid, would be prejudiced than would be benefited by a wholesale
validation of said proceedings.

Much concern has been shown for the possible confusion which might result from a decision declaring null and void the acts
processes of the Japanese-sponsored governments in the Philippines. I think, this aspect of the question has been unduly
stressed. The situation is not without remedy, but the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. As the courts
cannot create a new or special jurisdiction for themselves, which is a legislative function, and as the situation demands such
new or special jurisdiction, let the legislature act in the premises. For instance, the Congress may enact a law conferring a
special jurisdiction upon the courts of its selection, whereby said courts may, after hearing all the parties interested, and taking
all the necessary safeguards, so that, a party's day in court or other constitutional or statutory right under the Commonwealth
Government should not be prejudiced by any of said acts, processes or proceedings, particullarly, those in Japanese-sponsored
courts, and subject to such other conditions as the special law may provide, validate the corresponding acts, processes or
proceedings. This, to my mind, would be more conducive to a maximum of benefit and a minimum of prejudice to the inhabitants
of this country, rather than the procedure favored by the majority.

Finally, let us not equalize the conditions then prevailing in Manila to that prevailing in the provinces, where the greater number
of the people where then living outside the towns, in the farms and the hills. These people constitute the great majority of the
eighteen million Filipinos. To them the semblance of an administration of justice which Japanese allowed, was practically
unknown. But they constituted the majority of loyal citizens to whom President Roosevelt's message of October 23, 1943 refers.
They — the majority of our people — had an unshaken faith in the arrival of American aid here and the final triumph of the Allied
cause. They were willing to wait for the restoration of their rightful government, with its courts and other institutions, for the
settlement of their differences. May in their common hardship and sufferings under yoke of foreign oppression, they had not
much time to think of such differences, if they did not utterly forget them. Their undoubted hatred of the invader was enough to
keep them away from the judicial system that said invader allowed to have. Those who voluntarily went to the courts in those
tragic days belong to the small minority.

As to the public order — why! any public order which then existed was not due to the courts or other departments of the puppet
government. It was maintained at the point of the bayonet by the Japanese army, and in their own unique fashion.

9. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856

G.R. No. L-409             January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc.,  the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article
114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance,
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and
permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he
receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle  vs. Unite States, 21
Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web.
Works, 526);

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of
the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of  Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon  (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested
in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state)
must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without
putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what
may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied
by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government
in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th
Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention
rests;

Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the
decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the
cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon  and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra,  in connection with the
question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules
and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague
Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant;
that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second
case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete
after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as
descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military
government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen
residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government
or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate
government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the
allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for
the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on
one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship,
because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive,
while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate
government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to
govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military
occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear
relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by
the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence
with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and
disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become
inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative
as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their
allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented
by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he
has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or
make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the
occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76,
77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the
inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been
adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or
subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary
of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of
the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that,
therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat
or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for
small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public
conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight
against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel
those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue
and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of
depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;

(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114
of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of
the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime
against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of
section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine
Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;

Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to
certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was
recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence
Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among
others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status
as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood"
(Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that
the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the
country.

Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the
United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but
these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each
State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter
by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in
the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United
States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of
government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign
people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be
known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth
be known as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is
hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to
concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice
Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no
traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there
are no traitors until war has started.

As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-defense and self-preservation. The law of
treason is an emergency measure. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put
into effect. Any lukewarm attitude in its enforcement will only be consistent with national harakiri. All war efforts would be of no
avail if they should be allowed to be sabotaged by fifth columnists, by citizens who have sold their country out to the enemy, or
any other kind of traitors, and this would certainly be the case if he law cannot be enforced under the theory of suspension.

Petitioner's thesis that allegiance to our government was suspended during enemy occupation is advanced in support of the
proposition that, since allegiance is identical with obedience to law, during the enemy occupation, the laws of the
Commonwealth were suspended. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, the law punishing treason, under the theory, was one
of the laws obedience to which was also suspended.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to his government or his
sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.

"Allegiance", as the return is generally used, means fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a
citizen or subject. Murray vs. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch), 64, 120; 2 Law. ed., 208.

"Allegiance" was said by Mr. Justice Story to be "nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the
sovereign, under whose protection he is." United States vs. Wong Kim Ark, 18 S. Ct., 461; 169 U.S., 649; 42 Law. ed.,
890.

Allegiance is that duty which is due from every citizen to the state, a political duty binding on him who enjoys the
protection of the Commonwealth, to render service and fealty to the federal government. It is that duty which is
reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political relations between the government and the citizen.
Wallace vs. Harmstad, 44 Pa. (8 Wright), 492, 501.

By "allegiance" is meant the obligation to fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under
which he lives, or to his sovereign, in return for the protection which he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent
obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance
to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen
or subject of another government or sovereign, and an alien while domiciled in a country owes it a temporary allegiance,
which is continuous during his residence. Carlisle vs. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.), 147, 154; 21 Law ed., 426.

"Allegiance," as defined by Blackstone, "is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the King, in return for that
protection which the King affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two sorts, the one natural,
the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born
within the King's dominions immediately upon their birth, for immediately upon their birth they are under the King's
protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government.
Allegiance is a debt due from the subject upon an implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords
protection the other will demean himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they
acquire by being born within the King's liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehaviour; but the
rights of aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence, and lost whenever they remove. If an
alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe an allegiance equally permanent to the King, which
would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides, that thereby the nation might, in
time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences." Indians within the state are not aliens, but
citizens owing allegiance to the government of a state, for they receive protection from the government and are subject
to its laws. They are born in allegiance to the government of the state. Jackson  vs. Goodell, 20 Johns., 188, 911. (3
Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., 226-227.)

Allegiance. — Fealty or fidelity to the government of which the person is either a citizen or subject; the duty which is due
from every citizen to the state; a political duty, binding on him who enjoys the protection of the commonwealth, to render
service and fealty to the federal government; the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under which he lives in return for the protection he receives; that duty is reciprocal to
the right of protection he receives; that duty which is reciprocal to the right of protection, arising from the political
relations between the government and the citizen.

Classification. — Allegiance is of four kinds, namely: (1) Natural allegiance — that which arises by nature and birth; (2)
acquired allegiance — that arising through some circumstance or act other than birth, namely, by denization or
naturalization; (3) local allegiance-- that arising from residence simply within the country, for however short a time; and
(4) legal allegiance — that arising from oath, taken usually at the town or leet, for, by the common law, the oath of
allegiance might be tendered to every one upon attaining the age of twelve years. (3 C.J.S., p.885.)

Allegiance. — the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives,
or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. 15 R.C.L., 140. (Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 68.).

"Allegiance," as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which binds the citizen to his state — the obligation of
obedience and support which he owes to it. The state is the political person to whom this liege fealty is due. Its
substance is the aggregate of persons owing this allegiance. The machinery through which it operates is its
government. The persons who operate this machinery constitute its magistracy. The rules of conduct which the state
 utters or enforces are its law, and manifest its will. This will, viewed as legally supreme, is its sovereignty. (W.W.
Willoughby, Citizenship and Allegiance in Constitutional and International Law, 1 American Journal of International Law,
p. 915.).

The obligations flowing from the relation of a state and its nationals are reciprocal in character. This principle had been
aptly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion in the case of Luria vs. United States:

Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty
protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (3
Hackworth, Digest of International Law, 1942 ed., p.6.)

Allegiance. — The tie which binds the citizen to the government, in return for the protection which the government
affords him. The duty which the subject owes to the sovereign, correlative with the protection received.

It is a comparatively modern corruption of ligeance (ligeantia), which is derived from liege (ligius), meaning absolute or
unqualified. It signified originally liege fealty, i. e., absolute and qualified fealty. 18 L. Q. Rev., 47.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Allegiance may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one; the citizen or
subject owes the former to his government or sovereign, until by some act he distinctly renounces it, whilst the alien
domiciled in the country owes a temporary and local allegiance continuing during such residence. (Carlisle vs. United
States, 16 Wall. [U.S.], 154; 21 Law. ed., 426. (1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 179.).

The above quotations express ideas that do not fit exactly into the Philippine pattern in view of the revolutionary insertion in our
Constitution of the fundamental principle that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." (Section 1, Article II.) The authorities above quoted, judges and juridical publicists define allegiance with the idea that
sovereignty resides somewhere else, on symbols or subjects other than the people themselves. Although it is possible that they
had already discovered that the people and only the people are the true sovereign, their minds were not yet free from the
shackles of the tradition that the powers of sovereignty have been exercised by princes and monarchs, by sultans and
emperors, by absolute and tyrannical rules whose ideology was best expressed in the famous words of one of the kings of
France: "L'etat c'est moi," or such other persons or group of persons posing as the government, as an entity different and in
opposition to the people themselves. Although democracy has been known ever since old Greece, and modern democracies in
the people, nowhere is such principle more imperative than in the pronouncement embodied in the fundamental law of our
people.

To those who think that sovereignty is an attribute of government, and not of the people, there may be some plausibility in the
proposition that sovereignty was suspended during the enemy occupation, with the consequence that allegiance must also have
been suspended, because our government stopped to function in the country. But the idea cannot have any place under our
Constitution. If sovereignty is an essential attribute of our people, according to the basic philosophy of Philippine democracy, it
could not have been suspended during the enemy occupation. Sovereignty is the very life of our people, and there is no such
thing as "suspended life." There is no possible middle situation between life and death. Sovereignty is the very essence of the
personality and existence of our people. Can anyone imagine the possibility of "suspended personality" or "suspended
existence" of a people? In no time during enemy occupation have the Filipino people ceased to be what they are.

The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution.

There is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because some
external and insurmountable force precludes the husband from exercising his marital powers, functions, and duties and the wife
is thereby deprived of the benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely
share her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to enjoy her
charms during the former's stay in the invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her adultery the principle of suspended
conjugal fidelity?

Petitioner's thesis on change of sovereignty at the advent of independence on July 4, 1946, is unacceptable. We have already
decided in Brodett vs. De la Rosa and Vda. de Escaler (p. 752, ante) that the Constitution of the Republic is the same as that of
the Commonwealth. The advent of independence had the effect of changing the name of our Government and the withdrawal by
the United States of her power to exercise functions of sovereignty in the Philippines. Such facts did not change the sovereignty
of the Filipino people. That sovereignty, following our constitutional philosophy, has existed ever since our people began to exist.
It has been recognized by the United States of America, at least since 1935, when President Roosevelt approved our
Constitution. By such act, President Roosevelt, as spokesman of the American people, accepted and recognized the principle
that sovereignty resides in the people that is, that Philippine sovereignty resides in the Filipino people.

The same sovereignty had been internationally recognized long before the proclamation of independence on July 4, 1946. Since
the early part of the Pacific war, President Quezon had been sitting as representative of a sovereign people in the Allied War
Council, and in June, 1945, the same Filipino people took part — outstanding and brilliant, it may be added — in the drafting and
adoption of the charter of the United Nations, the unmistakable forerunner of the future democratic federal constitution of the
world government envisioned by all those who adhere to the principle of unity of all mankind, the early realization of which is
anxiously desired by all who want to be spared the sufferings, misery and disaster of another war.

Under our Constitution, the power to suspend laws is of legislative nature and is lodged in Congress. Sometimes it is delegated
to the Chief Executive, such as the power granted by the Election Code to the President to suspend the election in certain
districts and areas for strong reasons, such as when there is rebellion, or a public calamity, but it has never been exercised by
tribunals. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null and void all laws violative of the Constitution, but it has no power,
authority, or jurisdiction to suspend or declare suspended any valid law, such as the one on treason which petitioner wants to be
included among the laws of the Commonwealth which, by his theory of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty, he
claims have been suspended during the Japanese occupation.
Suppose President Quezon and his government, instead of going from Corregidor to Australia, and later to Washington, had fled
to the mountains of Luzon, and a group of Filipino renegades should have killed them to serve the interests of the Japanese
imperial forces. By petitioner's theory, those renegades cannot be prosecuted for treason or for rebellion or sedition, as the laws
punishing them were suspended. Such absurd result betrays the untenability of the theory.

"The defense of the State is a prime duty of Government, and in the fulfillment of that duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal, military or civil service." Thus, section 2 of Article II of the Constitution provides: That duty of defense becomes
more imperative in time of war and when the country is invaded by an aggressor nation. How can it be fulfilled if the allegiance of
the citizens to the sovereign people is suspended during enemy occupation? The framers of the Constitution surely did not
entertain even for the moment the absurdity that when the allegiance of the citizens to the sovereign people is more needed in
the defense of the survival of the state, the same should be suspended, and that upon such suspension those who may be
required to render personal, military or civil service may claim exemption from the indispensable duty of serving their country in
distress.

Petitioner advances the theory that protection in the consideration of allegiance. He argues that the Commonwealth Government
having been incapacitated during enemy occupation to protect the citizens, the latter were relieved of their allegiance to said
government. The proposition is untenable. Allegiance to the sovereign is an indispensable bond for the existence of society. If
that bond is dissolved, society has to disintegrate. Whether or not the existence of the latter is the result of the social compact
mentioned by Roseau, there can be no question that organized society would be dissolved if it is not united by the cohesive
power of the citizen's allegiance. Of course, the citizens are entitled to the protection of their government, but whether or not that
government fulfills that duty, is immaterial to the need of maintaning the loyalty and fidelity of allegiance, in the same way that
the physical forces of attraction should be kept unhampered if the life of an individual should continue, irrespective of the ability
or inability of his mind to choose the most effective measures of personal protection.

After declaring that all legislative, executive, and judicial processes had during and under the Japanese regime, whether
executed by the Japanese themselves or by Filipino officers of the puppet government they had set up, are null and void, as we
have done in our opinions in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), in Peralta vs. Director of Prison  (75,
Phil., 285), and in several other cases where the same question has been mentioned, we cannot consistently accept petitioner's
theory.

If all laws or legislative acts of the enemy during the occupation were null and void, and as we cannot imagine the existence of
organized society, such as the one constituted by the Filipino people, without laws of the Commonwealth were the ones in effect
during the occupation and the only ones that could claim obedience from our citizens.

Petitioner would want us to accept the thesis that during the occupation we owed allegiance to the enemy. To give way to that
paradoxical and disconcerting allegiance, it is suggested that we accept that our allegiance to our legitimate government was
suspended. Petitioner's proposition has to fall by its own weight, because of its glaring absurdities. Allegiance, like its synonyms,
loyalty and fidelity, is based on feelings of attraction, love, sympathy, admiration, respect, veneration, gratitude, amity,
understanding, friendliness. These are the feelings or some of the feelings that bind us to our own people, and are the natural
roots of the duty of allegiance we owe them. The enemy only provokes repelling and repulsive feelings — hate, anger, vexation,
chagrin, mortification, resentment, contempt, spitefulness. The natural incompatibility of political, social and ethical ideologies
between our people and the Japanese, making impossible the existence of any feeling of attraction between them, aside from
the initial fact that the Japanese invaded our country as our enemy, was aggravated by the morbid complexities of haughtiness,
braggadocio and beastly brutality of the Nippon soldiers and officers in their dealings with even the most inoffensive of our
citizens.

Giving bread to our enemy, and, after slapping one side of our face, offer him the other to be further slapped, may appear to be
divinely charitable, but to make them a reality, it is necessary to change human nature. Political actions, legal rules and judicial
decisions deal with human relations, taking man as he is, not as he should be. To love the enemy is not natural. As long as
human pyschology remains as it is, the enemy shall always be hated. Is it possible to conceive an allegiance based on hatred?

The Japanese, having waged against us an illegal war condemned by prevailing principles of international law, could not have
established in our country any government that can be legally recognized as de facto. They came as bandits and ruffians, and it
is inconceivable that banditry and ruffianism can claim any duty of allegiance — even a temporary one — from a decent people.

One of the implications of petitioner's theory, as intimated somewhere, is that the citizens, in case of invasion, are free to do
anything not forbidden by the Hague Conventions. Anybody will notice immediately that the result will be the doom of small
nations and peoples, by whetting the covetousness of strong powers prone on imperialistic practices. In the imminence of
invasion, weak-hearted soldiers of the smaller nations will readily throw away their arms to rally behind the paladium of the
invaders.

Two of the three great departments of our Government have already rejected petitioner's theory since September 25, 1945, the
day when Commonwealth Act No. 682 took effect. By said act, creating the People's Court to try and decide all cases of crime
against national security "committed between December 8, 1941 and September 2, 1945," (section 2), the legislative and
executive departments have jointly declared that during the period above mentioned, including the time of Japanese occupation,
all laws punishing crimes against national security, including article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, punishing treason, had
remained in full effect and should be enforced.

That no one raised a voice in protest against the enactment of said act and that no one, at the time the act was being considered
by the Senate and the House of Representatives, ever dared to expose the uselessness of creating a People's Court to try crime
which, as claimed by petitioner, could not have been committed as the laws punishing them have been suspended, is a
historical fact of which the Supreme Court may take judicial notice. This fact shows universal and unanimous agreement of our
people that the laws of the Commonwealth were not suspended and that the theory of suspended allegiance is just an
afterthought provoked by a desperate effort to help quash the pending treason cases at any cost.

Among the arguments adduced in favor of petitioner's theory is that it is based on generally accepted principles of international
law, although this argument becomes futile by petitioner's admission that the theory is advantageous to strong powers but
harmful to small and weak nations, thus hinting that the latter cannot accept it by heart. Suppose we accept at face value the
premise that the theories, urged by petitioner, of suspended allegiance and suspended sovereignty are based on generally
accepted principles of international law. As the latter forms part of our laws by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of Article II of
the Constitution, it seems that there is no alternative but to accept the theory. But the theory has the effect of suspending the
laws, especially those political in nature. There is no law more political in nature than the Constitution of the Philippines. The
result is an inverted reproduction of the Greek myth of Saturn devouring his own children. Here, under petitioner's theory, the
offspring devours its parent.

Can we conceive of an instance in which the Constitution was suspended even for a moment?

There is conclusive evidence that the legislature, as policy-determining agency of government, even since the Pacific war
started on December 7, 1941, intimated that it would not accept the idea that our laws should be suspended during enemy
occupation. It must be remembered that in the middle of December, 1941, when Manila and other parts of the archipelago were
under constant bombing by Japanese aircraft and enemy forces had already set foot somewhere in the Philippines, the Second
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, which came into effect on December 16, 1941. When we approved said
act, we started from the premise that all our laws shall continue in effect during the emergency, and in said act we even went to
the extent of authorizing the President "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative," (section 2, [d]), and also to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy," (section 2), that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting
emergency." (Section 1.) To give emphasis to the intimation, we provided that the rules and regulations provided "shall be in
force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide," foreseeing the possibility that Congress may not
meet as scheduled as a result of the emergency, including invasion and occupation by the enemy. Everybody was then
convinced that we did not have available the necessary means of repelling effectivity the enemy invasion.

Maybe it is not out of place to consider that the acceptance of petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance will cause a great
injustice to those who, although innocent, are now under indictment for treason and other crimes involving disloyalty to their
country, because their cases will be dismissed without the opportunity for them to revindicate themselves. Having been
acquitted upon a mere legal technicality which appears to us to be wrong, history will indiscriminality classify them with the other
accused who were really traitors to their country. Our conscience revolts against the idea of allowing the innocent ones to go
down in the memory of future generations with the infamous stigma of having betrayed their own people. They should not be
deprived of the opportunity to show through the due process of law that they are free from all blame and that, if they were really
patriots, they acted as such during the critical period of test.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion to the effect that during the so-called Japanese occupation of the
Philippines (which was nothing more than the occupation of Manila and certain other specific regions of the Islands which
constituted the minor area of the Archipelago) the allegiance of the citizens of this country to their legitimate government and to
the United States was not suspended, as well as the ruling that during the same period there was no change of sovereignty
here; but my reasons are different and I proceed to set them forth:

I. SUSPENDED ALLEGIANCE.

(a) Before the horror and atrocities of World War I, which were multiplied more than a hundred-fold in World War II, the nations
had evolved certain rules and principles which came to be known as International Law, governing their conduct with each other
and toward their respective citizens and inhabitants, in the armed forces or civilian life, in time of peace or in time of war. During
the ages which preceded that first world conflict the civilized governments had no realization of the potential excesses of which
"men's inhumanity to man" could be capable. Up to that time war was, at least under certain conditions, considered as
sufficiently justified, and the nations had not on that account, proscribed nor renounced it as an instrument of national policy, or
as a means of settling international disputes. It is not for us now to dwell upon the reasons accounting for this historical fact.
Suffice it to recognize its existence in history.

But when in World War I civilized humanity saw that war could be, as it actually was, employed for entirely different reasons and
from entirely different motives, compared to previous wars, and the instruments and methods of warfare had been so materially
changed as not only to involve the contending armed forces on well defined battlefields or areas, on land, in the sea, and in the
air, but to spread death and destruction to the innocent civilian populations and to their properties, not only in the countries
engaged in the conflict but also in neutral ones, no less than 61 civilized nations and governments, among them Japan, had to
formulate and solemnly subscribe to the now famous Briand-Kellogg Pact in the year 1928. As said by Justice Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court, as chief counsel for the United States in the prosecution of "Axis war criminals," in his report to
President Truman of June 7, 1945:

International law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international
legislature. Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the action of governments designed to
meet a change circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in
adopting settled principles to new situations.

xxx     xxx     xxx

After the shock to civilization of the war of 1914-1918, however, a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines
of international law took place. By the time the Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an
aggressive war or the institution of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer
available to those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive
war-making is illegal and criminal.
 The re-establishment of the principle of justifiable war is traceable in many steps. One of the most significant is the
Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 by which Germany, Italy, and Japan, in common with the United States and practically all
the nations of the world, renounced war as an instrument of national policy, bound themselves to seek the settlement of
disputes only by pacific means, and condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.

Unless this Pact altered the legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes close to being an act
of deception. In 1932 Mr. Henry L. Stimson, as United States Secretary of State, gave voice to the American concept of
its effect. He said, "war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means
that it has become illegal  throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It
is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an  illegal
thing. . . . By that very act we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task
of re-examining many of its Codes and treaties.

This Pact constitutes only one reversal  of the viewpoint that all war is legal and has brought international law into
harmony with the common sense of mankind — that unjustifiable war is a crime.

Without attempting an exhaustive catalogue, we may mention the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, signed by the representatives of forty-eight governments, which declared that "a war of
aggression constitutes .. an International crime. . . .

The Eight Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, on unanimous resolution of the representatives of forty-eight
member-nations, including Germany, declared that a war of aggression constitutes an  international crime. At the Sixth
Pan-American Conference of 1928, the twenty-one American Republics unanimously adopted a resolution stating that
"war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."

xxx     xxx     xxx

We therefore propose to change that a war of aggression is a crime, and that modern international  law has abolished
the defense that those who incite or wage it are engaged in legitimate business. Thus may the forces of the law be
mobilized on the side of peace. ("U.S.A. — An American Review," published by the United States Office of War
Information, Vol. 2, No. 10; emphasis supplied.).

When Justice Jackson speaks of "a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of international law" and "the re-
establishment of the principle of justifiable war," he has in mind no other than "the doctrine taught by Grotius, the father of
international law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war — the war of defense and the war of aggression"
to which he alludes in an earlier paragraph of the same report.

In the paragraph of said report immediately preceding the one last above mentioned Justice Jackson says that "international law
as taught in the 19th and the early part of the 20th century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and no crime at
law." But, as he says in one of the paragraphs hereinabove quoted from that report, the Briand-Kellogg Pact constitutes a
reversal of the view-point that all war is legal and has brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind
— that unjustifiable war is a crime. Then he mentions as other reversals of the same viewpoint, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; the 8th
assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, declaring that a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; and the 6th
Pan-American conference of 1928, which unanimously adopted a resolution stating that war of aggression constitutes an
international crime against the human species: which enumeration, he says, is not an attempt at an exhaustive catalogue.

It is not disputed that the war started by Japan in the Pacific, first, against the United States, and later, in rapid succession,
against other allied nations, was a war of aggression and utterly unjustifiable. More aggressive still, and more unjustifiable, as
admitted on all sides, was its attack against the Philippines and its consequent invasion and occupation of certain areas thereof.

Some of the rules and principles of international law which have been cited for petitioner herein in support of his theory of
suspended allegiance, have been evolved and accepted during those periods of the history of nations when all war was
considered legal, as stated by Justice Jackson, and the others have reference to military occupation in the course of really
justifiable war.

Japan in subscribing the Briand-Kellogg Pact thirteen years before she started the aggressive war which threw the entire Pacific
area into a seething cauldron from the last month of 1941 of the first week of September, 1945, expressly agreed to outlaw,
proscribe and renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and bound herself to seek the settlement of her disputes with
other nations only by pacific means. Thus she expressly gave her consent to that modification of the then existing rules and
principles of international law governing the matter. With the modification, all the signatories to the pact necessarily accepted
and bound themselves to abide by all its implications, among them the outlawing, prescription and renunciation of military
occupation of another nation's territory in the course of a war thus outlawed, proscribed and renounced. This is only one way of
saving that the rules and principles of international law therefore existing on the subject of military occupation were automatically
abrogated and rendered ineffective in all future cases of war coming under the ban and condemnation of the pact.

If an unjustifiable war is a crime; if a war of aggression constitutes an international crime; if such a war is an international crime
against the human species: a nation which occupies a foreign territory in the course of such a war cannot possibly, under any
principle of natural or positive law, acquire or posses any legitimate power or right growing out or incident to such occupation.
Concretely, Japan in criminally invading the Philippines and occupying certain portions of its territory during the Pacific war,
could not have nor exercise, in the legal sense — and only this sense should we speak here — with respect to this country and
its citizens, any more than could a burglar breaking through a man's house pretends to have or to exercise any legal power or
right within that house with respect either to the person of the owner or to his property. To recognize in the first instance any
legal power or right on the part of the invader, and in the second any legal power or right on the part of the burglar, the same as
in case of a military occupant in the course of a justifiable war, would be nothing short of legalizing the crime itself. It would be
the most monstrous and unpardonable contradiction to prosecute, condemn and hang the appropriately called war criminals of
Germany, Italy, and Japan, and at the same time recognize any lawfulness in their occupation invaded. And let it not be
forgotten that the Philippines is a member of the United Nations who have instituted and conducted the so-called war crimes
trials. Neither should we lose sight of the further fact that this government has a representative in the international commission
currently trying the Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. These facts leave no room for doubt that this government is in entire
accord with the other United Nations in considering the Pacific war started by Japan as a crime. Not only this, but this country
had six years before the outbreak of the Pacific war already renounced war as an instrument of national policy (Constitution,
Article II, section 2), thus in consequence adopting the doctrine of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Consequently, it is submitted that it would be absolutely wrong and improper for this Court to apply to the occupation by Japan
of certain areas of the Philippines during that war the rules and principles of international law which might be applicable to a
military occupation occurring in the course of a justifiable war. How can this Court recognize any lawfulness or validity in that
occupation when our own government has sent a representative to said international commission in Tokyo trying the Japanese
"war criminals" precisely for the "crimes against humanity and peace" committed by them during World War II of which said
occupation was but part and parcel? In such circumstances how could such occupation produce no less an effect than the
suspension of the allegiance of our people to their country and government?

(b) But even in the hypothesis — and not more than a mere hypothesis — that when Japan occupied the City of Manila and
certain other areas of the Philippines she was engaged in a justifiable war, still the theory of suspended allegiance would not
hold good. The continuance of the allegiance owed to a notion by its citizens is one of those high privileges of citizenship which
the law of nations denies to the occupant the power to interfere with.

. . . His (of occupant) rights are not, however, commensurate with his power. He is thus forbidden to take certain
measures which he may be able to apply, and that irrespective of their efficacy. The restrictions imposed upon him are
in theory designed to protect the individual in the enjoyment of some highly important privileges. These concern his
allegiance to the de jure sovereign, his family honor and domestic relations, religious convictions, personal service, and
connection with or residence in the occupied territory.

The Hague Regulations declare that the occupant is forbidden to compel the inhabitants to swear allegiance to the
hostile power. . . . (III Hyde, International Law, 2d revised ed., pp. 1898-1899.)

. . . Nor may he (occupant) compel them (inhabitants) to take an oath of allegiance. Since the authority of the occupant
is not sovereignty, the inhabitants owe no temporary allegiance to him. . . . (II Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 341-
344.)

The occupant's lack of the authority to exact an oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the occupied territory is but a corollary
of the continuance of their allegiance to their own lawful sovereign. This allegiance does not consist merely in obedience to the
laws of the lawful sovereign, but more essentially consists in loyalty or fealty to him. In the same volume and pages of
Oppenheim's work above cited, after the passage to the effect that the inhabitants of the occupied territory owe no temporary
allegiance to the occupant it is said that "On the other hand, he may compel them to take an oath — sometimes called an 'oath
of neutrality' — . . . willingly to submit to his 'legitimate commands.' Since, naturally, such "legitimate commands" include the
occupant's laws, it follows that said occupant, where the rule is applicable, has the right to compel the inhabitants to take an oath
of obedience to his laws; and since according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of obedience to his
laws; and since, according to the same rule, he cannot exact from the inhabitants an oath of allegiance, it follows that obedience
to his laws, which he can exact from them, does not constitute allegiance.

(c) The theory of suspended allegiance is unpatriotic to the last degree. To say that when the one's country is unable to afford
him in its protection, he ceases to be bound to it by the sacred ties of allegiance, is to advocate the doctrine that precisely when
his country is in such distress, and therefore most needs his loyalty, he is absolved from the loyalty. Love of country should be
something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth offspring. The outward manifestation of one
or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least
extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. And beyond the unavoidable consequences of the
enemy's irresistible pressure, those invisible feelings and promptings of the spirit of the people should never allow them to act, to
speak, nor even to think a whit contrary to their love and loyalty to the Fatherland. For them, indicted, to face their country and
say to it that, because when it was overrun and vanquished by the barbarous invader and, in consequence was disabled from
affording them protection, they were released from their sacred obligation of allegiance and loyalty, and could therefore freely
adhere to its enemy, giving him aid and comfort, incurring no criminal responsibility therefor, would only tend to aggravate their
crime.

II. CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." The Filipino people are the self-same people before and after Philippine Independence, proclaimed on July 4, 1946.
During the life of the Commonwealth sovereignty resided in them under the Constitution; after the proclamation of independence
that sovereignty remained with them under the very same fundamental law. Article XVIII of the said Constitution stipulates that
the government established thereby shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, "The
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines." Under this provision the
Government of the Philippines immediately prior to independence was essentially to be the identical government thereafter —
only the name of that government was to be changed.

Both before and after the adoption of the Philippine Constitution the people of the Philippines were and are always the plaintiff in
all criminal prosecutions, the case being entitled: "The People of the Philippines vs. (the defendant or defendants)." This was
already true in prosecutions under the Revised Penal Code containing the law of treason. "The Government of the Philippines"
spoken of in article 114 of said Code merely represents the people of the Philippines. Said code was continued, along with the
other laws, by Article XVI, section 2, of the Constitution which constitutional provision further directs that "all references in such
laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution" — of course, meaning the Commonwealth of the Philippines
before, and the Republic of the Philippines after, independence (Article XVIII). Under both governments sovereignty resided and
resides in the people (Article II, section 1). Said sovereignty was never transferred from that people — they are the same people
who preserve it to this day. There has never been any change in its respect.

If one committed treason against the People of the Philippines before July 4, 1946, he continues to be criminally liable for the
crime to the same people now. And if, following the literal wording of the Revised Penal Code, as continued by the Constitution,
that accused owed allegiance upon the commission of the crime to the "Government of the Philippines," in the textual words of
the Constitution (Article XVI, section 2, and XVIII) that was the same government which after independence became known as
the "Republic of the Philippines." The most that can be said is that the sovereignty of the people became complete and absolute
after independence — that they became, politically, fully of age, to use a metaphor. But if the responsibility for a crime against a
minor is not extinguished by the mere fact of his becoming of age, why should the responsibility for the crime of treason
committed against the Filipino people when they were not fully politically independent be extinguished after they acquire this
status? The offended party continues to be the same — only his status has changed.

PARAS, J.,  dissenting:

During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with
the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution(Article II, section 3) as a part of the law of
the Nation. Accordingly, we have on more than one occasion already stated that "laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, . . . are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation" (Co Kim Cham  vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113, 124), and that the rule "that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered
suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied
territory." (Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, 75, Phil., 875, 881.)

The principle is recognized by the United States of America, which admits that the occupant will naturally suspends all laws of a
political nature and all laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command, such action to be made known to the
inhabitants.(United States Rules of Land Welfare, 1940, Article 287.) As allegiance to the United States is an essential element
in the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of its position in our political structure prior to
the independence of the Philippines, the rule as interpreted and practiced in the United States necessarily has a binding force
and effect in the Philippines, to the exclusion of any other construction followed elsewhere, such as may be inferred, rightly or
wrongly, from the isolated cases 1 brought to our attention, which, moreover, have entirely different factual bases.

Corresponding notice was given by the Japanese occupying army, first, in the proclamation of its Commander in chief of
January 2, 1942, to the effect that as a "result of the Japanese Military operations, the sovereignty of the United States of
America over the Philippines has completely disappeared and the Army hereby proclaims the Military Administration under
martial law over the district occupied by the Army;" secondly, in Order No. 3 of the said Commander in Chief of February 20,
1942, providing that "activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing
statutes, orders, ordinances and customs until further orders provided that they are not inconsistent with the present
circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration;" and, thirdly, in the explanation to Order No. 3 reminding that "all
laws and regulations of the Philippines has been suspended since Japanese occupation," and excepting the application of "laws
and regulations which are not proper act under the present situation of the Japanese Military Administration," especially those
"provided with some political purposes."

The suspension of the political law during enemy occupation is logical, wise and humane. The latter phase outweighs all other
aspects of the principle aimed more or less at promoting the necessarily selfish motives and purposes of a military occupant. It
thus consoling to note that the powers instrumental in the crystallization of the Hague Conventions of 1907 did not forget to
declare that they were "animated by the desire to serve . . . the interest of the humanity and the over progressive needs of
civilization," and that "in case not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." These saving statements come to the aid of the
inhabitants in the occupied territory in a situation wherein, even before the belligerent occupant "takes a further step and by
appropriate affirmative action undertakes to acquire the right of sovereignty for himself, . . . the occupant is likely to regard to
himself as clothed with freedom to endeavor to impregnate the people who inhabit the area concerned with his own political
ideology, and to make that endeavor successful by various forms of pressure exerted upon enemy officials who are permitted to
retain the exercise of normal governmental functions." (Hyde, International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1879.)

The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power, whose interest
and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of the displaced government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to
demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the security of his forces, for the
maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940,
article 297), and to demand all kinds of services "of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part
in military operations against their own country" (Hague Regulations, article 52);and if, as we have in effect said, by the
surrender the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the government of the occupant and are bound by such laws,
and such only, as it chooses to recognize and impose, and the belligerent occupant `is totally independent of the constitution
and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the
purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions."
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 295), citing United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, and quoting Oppenheim,
International Law, Vol. II. Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944,p. 432.)

He would be a bigot who cannot or would refuse to see the cruel result if the people in an occupied territory were required to
obey two antagonistic and opposite powers. To emphasize our point, we would adopt the argument, in a reverse order, of Mr.
Justice Hilado in Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285, 358), contained in the following passage:

To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese
oppressors, by the laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have
been utterly unjust and downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being
simultaneously submitted to two mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative
enactments and institutions — on the one hand bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the
Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan.
The only sensible purpose of the treason law — which is of political complexion and taken out of the territorial law and penalized
as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant, incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the
occupant (Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 494), — must be the preservation of the nation, certainly not its destruction
or extermination. And yet the latter is unwittingly wished by those who are fond of the theory that what is suspended is merely
the exercise of sovereignty by the de jure  government or the latter's authority to impose penal sanctions or that, otherwise
stated, the suspension refers only to the military occupant. If this were to be the only effect, the rule would be a meaningless and
superfluous optical illusion, since it is obvious that the fleeing or displaced government cannot, even if it should want, physically
assert its authority in a territory actually beyond its reach, and that the occupant, on the other hand, will not take the absurd step
of prosecuting and punishing the inhabitants for adhering to and aiding it. If we were to believe the opponents of the rule in
question, we have to accept the absurd proposition that the guerrillas can all be prosecuted with illegal possession of firearms. It
should be borne in the mind that "the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws
that are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one. The territorial sovereign driven therefrom, can not compete with it
on an even plane. Thus, if the latter attempt interference, its action is a mere manifestation of belligerent effort to weaken the
enemy. It has no bearing upon the legal quality of what the occupant exacts, while it retains control. Thus, if the absent territorial
sovereign, through some quasi-legislative decree, forbids its nationals to comply with what the occupant has ordained obedience
to such command within the occupied territory would not safeguard the individual from the prosecution by the occupant." (Hyde,
International Law, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition, 1945, p. 1886.)

As long as we have not outlawed the right of the belligerent occupant to prosecute and punish the inhabitants for "war treason"
or "war crimes," as an incident of the state of war and necessity for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the
army of the occupant, against which prosecution and punishment such inhabitants cannot obviously be protected by their native
sovereign, it is hard to understand how we can justly rule that they may at the same time be prosecuted and punished for an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code, but already taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed
against the belligerent occupant.

In Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil., 285, 296), we held that "the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was
suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces or the belligerent occupant at regular war with the
United States," and the meaning of the term "suspended" is very plainly expressed in the following passage (page 298):

No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution
relating to the rights of the accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the
Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the
time of the re-occupation of the Philippines by the virtue of the priciple of postliminium, because "a constitution should
operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect,"
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and a case quoted and cited in the foot-note), especially
as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely.

In much the same way, we should hold that no treason could have been committed during the Japanese military occupation
against the United States or the Commonwealth Government, because article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was not then in
force. Nor may this penal provision be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the
principle of postliminium, because of the constitutional inhibition against any ex post facto law and because, under article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the accused. Why did we refuse
to enforce the Constitution, more essential to sovereignty than article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforesaid of  Peralta
vs. Director of Prisons if, as alleged by the majority, the suspension was good only as to the military occupant?

The decision in the United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), conclusively supports our position. As analyzed and described in
United States vs. Reiter (27 Fed. Cas., 773), that case "was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States — the court of
highest human authority on that subject — and as the decision was against the United States, and in favor of the authority of
Great Britain, its enemy in the war, and was made shortly after the occurrence of the war out of which it grew; and while no
department of this Government was inclined to magnify the rights of Great Britain or disparage those of its own government,
there can be no suspicion of bias in the mind of the court in favor of the conclusion at which it arrived, and no doubt that the law
seemed to the court to warrant and demand such a decision. That case grew out of the war of 1812, between the United States
and Great Britain. It appeared that in September, 1814, the British forces had taken the port of Castine, in the State of Maine,
and held it in military occupation; and that while it was so held, foreign goods, by the laws of the United States subject to duty,
had been introduced into that port without paying duties to the United States. At the close of the war the place by treaty restored
to the United States, and after that was done Government of the United States sought to recover from the persons so
introducing the goods there while in possession of the British, the duties to which by the laws of the United States, they would
have been liable. The claim of the United States was that its laws were properly in force there, although the place was at the
time held by the British forces in hostility to the United States, and the laws, therefore, could not at the time be enforced there;
and that a court of the United States (the power of that government there having since been restored) was bound so to decide.
But this illusion of the prosecuting officer there was dispelled by the court in the most summary manner. Mr. Justice Story, that
great luminary of the American bench, being the organ of the court in delivering its opinion, said: 'The single question is whether
goods imported into Castine during its occupation by the enemy are liable to the duties imposed by the revenue laws upon
goods imported into the United States.. We are all of opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. . . . The sovereignty
of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully
enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender the
inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance of the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it
chose to recognize and impose. From the nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them. . . . Castine was
therefore, during this period, as far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by
the inhabitants were subjects to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were in no correct
sense imported into the Unites States.' The court then proceeded to say, that the case is the same as if the port of Castine had
been foreign territory, ceded by treaty to the United States, and the goods had been imported there previous to its cession. In
this case they say there would be no pretense to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public or
municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. They add at the conclusion of the opinion: 'The authorities cited at the bar
would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question. But we think it too clear to require any aid from authority.' Does this
case leave room for a doubt whether a country held as this was in armed belligerents occupation, is to be governed by him who
holds it, and by him alone? Does it not so decide in terms as plain as can be stated? It is asserted by the Supreme Court of the
United States with entire unanimity, the great and venerated Marshall presiding, and the erudite and accomplished Story
delivering the opinion of the court, that such is the law, and it is so adjudged in this case. Nay, more: it is even adjudged that no
other laws could be obligatory; that such country, so held, is for the purpose of the application of the law off its former
government to be deemed foreign territory, and that goods imported there (and by parity of reasoning other acts done there) are
in no correct sense done within the territory of its former sovereign, the United States."

But it is alleged by the majority that the sovereignty spoken of in the decision of the United States vs. Rice should be construed
to refer to the exercise of sovereignty, and that, if sovereignty itself was meant, the doctrine has become obsolete after the
adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907. In answer, we may state that sovereignty can have any important significance only
when it may be exercised; and, to our way of thinking, it is immaterial whether the thing held in abeyance is the sovereignty itself
or its exercise, because the point cannot nullify, vary, or otherwise vitiate the plain meaning of the doctrinal words "the laws of
the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted
to the conquerors." We cannot accept the theory of the majority, without in effect violating the rule of international law,
hereinabove adverted to, that the possession by the belligerent occupant of the right to control, maintain or modify the laws that
are to obtain within the occupied area is an exclusive one, and that the territorial sovereign driven therefrom cannot compete
with it on an even plane. Neither may the doctrine in the United States  vs. Rice be said to have become obsolete, without
repudiating the actual rule prescribed and followed by the United States, allowing the military occupant to suspend all laws of a
political nature and even require public officials and inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare,
1940, article 309). In fact, it is a recognized doctrine of American Constitutional Law that mere conquest or military occupation of
a territory of another State does not operate to annex such territory to occupying State, but that the inhabitants of the occupied
district, no longer receiving the protection of their native State, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the
control and protection of the victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts
of Public Law [1931], p.364.)

The majority have resorted to distinctions, more apparent than real, if not immaterial, in trying to argue that the law of treason
was obligatory on the Filipinos during the Japanese occupation. Thus it is insisted that a citizen or subject owes not a qualified
and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, and that "temporary allegiance" to the military occupant may be
likened to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign to the territory wherein he resides in
return for the protection he receives therefrom. The comparison is most unfortunate. Said foreigner is in the territory of a power
not hostile to or in actual war with his own government; he is in the territory of a power which has not suspended, under the rules
of international law, the laws of political nature of his own government; and the protections received by him from that friendly or
neutral power is real, not the kind of protection which the inhabitants of an occupied territory can expect from a belligerent army.
"It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own
nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that States should provide system of law and of
courts, and in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean
that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or much less, all the political rights or privileges which
it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights
as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected."
(Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p. 360.)

When it is therefore said that a citizen of a sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country or, in the language of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, "elsewhere," a territory other than one under belligerent
occupation must have been contemplated. This would make sense, because treason is a crime "the direct or indirect purpose of
which is the delivery, in whole or in part, of the country to a foreign power, or to pave the way for the enemy to obtain dominion
over the national territory" (Albert, The Revised Penal Code, citing 3 Groizard, 14); and, very evidently, a territory already under
occupation can no longer be "delivered."

The majority likewise argue that the theory of suspended sovereignty or allegiance will enable the military occupant to legally
recruit the inhabitants to fight against their own government, without said inhabitants being liable for treason. This argument is
not correct, because the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulations (article 52) that
allows it to demand all kinds of services provided that they do not involve the population "in the obligation of taking part military
operations against their own country." Neither does the suspension prevent the inhabitants from assuming a passive attitude,
much less from dying and becoming heroes if compelled by the occupant to fight against their own country. Any imperfection in
the present state of international law should be corrected by such world agency as the United Nations organizations.

It is of common knowledge that even with the alleged cooperation imputed to the collaborators, an alarming number of Filipinos
were killed or otherwise tortured by the ruthless, or we may say savage, Japanese Army. Which leads to the conclusion that if
the Filipinos did not obey the Japanese commands and feign cooperation, there would not be any Filipino nation that could have
been liberated. Assuming that the entire population could go to and live in the mountains, or otherwise fight as guerrillas — after
the formal surrender of our and the American regular fighting forces, — they would have faced certain annihilation by the
Japanese, considering that the latter's military strength at the time and the long period during which they were left military
unmolested by America. In this connection, we hate to make reference to the atomic bomb as a possible means of destruction.

If a substantial number of guerrillas were able to survive and ultimately help in the liberation of the Philippines, it was because
the feigned cooperation of their countrymen enabled them to get food and other aid necessary in the resistance movement. If
they were able to survive, it was because they could camouflage themselves in the midst of the civilian population in cities and
towns. It is easy to argue now that the people could have merely followed their ordinary pursuits of life or otherwise be indifferent
to the occupant. The fundamental defect of this line of thought is that the Japanese assumed to be so stupid and dumb as not to
notice any such attitude. During belligerent occupation, "the outstanding fact to be reckoned with is the sharp opposition
between the inhabitants of the occupied areas and the hostile military force exercising control over them. At heart they remain at
war with each other. Fear for their own safety may not serve to deter the inhabitants from taking advantage of opportunities to
interfere with the safety and success of the occupant, and in so doing they may arouse its passions and cause to take
vengeance in cruel fashion. Again, even when it is untainted by such conduct, the occupant as a means of attaining ultimate
success in its major conflict may, under plea of military necessity, and regardless of conventional or customary prohibitions,
proceed to utilize the inhabitants within its grip as a convenient means of military achievement." (Hyde, International Law, Vol.
III, Second Revised Edition [1945], p. 1912.) It should be stressed that the Japanese occupation was not a matter of a few
months; it extended over a little more than three years. Said occupation was a fact, in spite of the "presence of guerrilla bands in
barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the
detachments of troops sent on patrol to those places." (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 371, 373.) The
law of nations accepts belligerent occupation as a fact to be reckoned with, regardless of the merits of the occupant's cause.
(Hyde, International Law, Second Revised Edition [1945], Vol. III, p. 1879.)
Those who contend or fear that the doctrine herein adhere to will lead to an over-production of traitors, have a wrong and low
conception of the psychology and patriotism of their countrymen. Patriots are such after their birth in the first place, and no
amount of laws or judicial decisions can make or unmake them. On the other hand, the Filipinos are not so base as to be
insensitive to the thought that the real traitor is cursed everywhere and in all ages. Our patriots who fought and died during the
last war, and the brave guerrillas who have survived, were undoubtedly motivated by their inborn love of country, and not by
such a thing as the treason law. The Filipino people as a whole, passively opposed the Japanese regime, not out of fear of a
treason statute but because they preferred and will prefer the democratic and civilized way of life and American altruism to
Japanese barbaric and totalitarian designs. Of course, there are those who might at heart have been pro-Japanese; but they
met and will unavoidably meet the necessary consequences. The regular soldiers faced the risks of warfare; the spies and
informers subjected themselves to the perils of military operations, likely received summary liquidation or punishments from the
guerrillas and the parties injured by their acts, and may be prosecuted as war spies by the military authorities of the returning
sovereign; those who committed other common crimes, directly or through the Japanese army, may be prosecuted under the
municipal law, and under this group even the spies and informers, Makapili or otherwise, are included, for they can be made
answerable for any act offensive to person or property; the buy-and-sell opportunists have the war profits tax to reckon with. We
cannot close our eyes to the conspicuous fact that, in the majority of cases, those responsible for the death of, or injury to, any
Filipino or American at the hands of the Japanese, were prompted more by personal motives than by a desire to levy war
against the United States or to adhere to the occupant. The alleged spies and informers found in the Japanese occupation the
royal road to vengeance against personal or political enemies. The recent amnesty granted to the guerrillas for acts, otherwise
criminal, committed in the furtherance of their resistance movement has in a way legalized the penal sanctions imposed by them
upon the real traitors.

It is only from a realistic, practical and common-sense point of view, and by remembering that the obedience and cooperation of
the Filipinos were effected while the Japanese were in complete control and occupation of the Philippines, when their mere
physical presence implied force and pressure — and not after the American forces of liberation had restored the Philippine
Government — that we will come to realize that, apart from any rule of international law, it was necessary to release the Filipinos
temporarily from the old political tie in the sense indicated herein. Otherwise, one is prone to dismiss the reason for such
cooperation and obedience. If there were those who did not in any wise cooperate or obey, they can be counted by the fingers,
and let their names adorn the pages of Philippine history. Essentially, however, everybody who took advantage, to any extent
and degree, of the peace and order prevailing during the occupation, for the safety and survival of himself and his family, gave
aid and comfort to the enemy.

Our great liberator himself, General Douglas MacArthur, had considered the laws of the Philippines ineffective during the
occupation, and restored to their full vigor and force only after the liberation. Thus, in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, he
ordained that "the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . are in full force and effect
and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," and that "all laws . . . of
any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control." Repeating what we have said in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 133), "it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
from the early period of its existence, applied by the President of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague
Conventions of 1907."

The prohibition in the Hague Conventions (Article 45) against "any pressure on the population to take oath to the hostile power,"
was inserted for the moral protection and benefit of the inhabitants, and does not necessarily carry the implication that the latter
continue to be bound to the political laws of the displaced government. The United States, a signatory to the Hague
Conventions, has made the point clear, by admitting that the military occupant can suspend all the laws of a political nature and
even require public officials and the inhabitants to take an oath of fidelity (United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, article
309), and as already stated, it is a doctrine of American Constitutional Law that the inhabitants, no longer receiving the
protection of their native state, for the time being owe no allegiance to it, and, being under the control and protection of the
victorious power, owe to that power fealty and obedience. Indeed, what is prohibited is the application of force by the occupant,
from which it is fair to deduce that the Conventions do not altogether outlaw voluntary submission by the population. The only
strong reason for this is undoubtedly the desire of the authors of the Conventions to give as much freedom and allowance to the
inhabitants as are necessary for their survival. This is wise and humane, because the people should be in a better position to
know what will save them during the military occupation than any exile government.

"Before he was appointed prosecutor, Justice Jackson made a speech in which he warned against the use of judicial process for
non judicial ends, and attacked cynics who "see no reason why courts, just like other agencies, should not be policy weapons. If
we want to shoot Germans as a matter of policy, let it be done as such, said he, but don't hide the deed behind a court. If you
are determined to execute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trial; the word yields no respect for courts that are
merely organized to convict." Mussoloni may have got his just desserts, but nobody supposes he got a fair trial. . . . Let us bear
that in mind as we go about punishing criminals. There are enough laws on the books to convict guilty Nazis without risking the
prestige of our legal system. It is far, far better that some guilty men escape than that the idea of law be endangered. In the long
run the idea of law is our best defense against Nazism in all its forms." These passages were taken from the editorial appearing
in the Life, May 28, 1945, page 34, and convey ideas worthy of some reflection.

If the Filipinos in fact committed any errors in feigning cooperation and obedience during the Japanese military occupation, they
were at most — borrowing the famous and significant words of President Roxas — errors of the mind and not of the heart. We
advisedly said "feigning" not as an admission of the fallacy of the theory of suspended allegiance or sovereignty, but as an
affirmation that the Filipinos, contrary to their outward attitude, had always remained loyal by feeling and conscience to their
country.

Assuming that article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was in force during the Japanese military occupation, the present Republic
of the Philippines has no right to prosecute treason committed against the former sovereignty existing during the Commonwealth
Government which was none other than the sovereignty of the United States. This court has already held that, upon a change of
sovereignty, the provisions of the Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, rebellion and sedition are no longer in
force (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887). It is true that, as contended by the majority, section 1 of Article II of the Constitution of
the Philippines provides that "sovereignty resides in the people," but this did not make the Commonwealth Government or the
Filipino people sovereign, because said declaration of principle, prior to the independence of the Philippines, was subervient to
and controlled by the Ordinance appended to the Constitution under which, in addition to its many provisions essentially
destructive of the concept of sovereignty, it is expressly made clear that the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines
had not then been withdrawn. The framers of the Constitution had to make said declaration of principle because the document
was ultimately intended for the independent Philippines. Otherwise, the Preamble should not have announced that one of the
purposes of the Constitution is to secure to the Filipino people and their posterity the "blessings of independence." No one, we
suppose, will dare allege that the Philippines was an independent country under the Commonwealth Government.

The Commonwealth Government might have been more autonomous than that existing under the Jones Law, but its non-
sovereign status nevertheless remained unaltered; and what was enjoyed was the exercise of sovereignty over the Philippines
continued to be complete.

The exercise of Sovereignty May be Delegated. — It has already been seen that the exercise of sovereignty is
conceived of as delegated by a State to the various organs which, collectively, constitute the Government. For practical
political reasons which can be easily appreciated, it is desirable that the public policies of a State should be formulated
and executed by governmental agencies of its own creation and which are not subject to the control of other States.
There is, however, nothing in a nature of sovereignty or of State life which prevents one State from entrusting the
exercise of certain powers to the governmental agencies of another State. Theoretically, indeed, a sovereign State may
go to any extent in the delegation of the exercise of its power to the governmental agencies of other States, those
governmental agencies thus becoming quoad hoc parts of the governmental machinery of the State whose sovereignty
is exercised. At the same time these agencies do not cease to be Instrumentalities for the expression of the will of the
State by which they were originally created.

By this allegation the agent State is authorized to express the will of the delegating State, and the legal hypothesis is
that this State possesses the legal competence again to draw to itself the exercise, through organs of its own creation,
of the powers it has granted. Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and
reserve to themselves a right of control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and
improbable occurence; yet, so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is
conceded to be founded upon a grant and the continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those
mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and
not political independence. Again, as will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, in the so-called Confederate or
Composite State, the cooperating States may yield to the central Government the exercise of almost all of their powers
of Government and yet retain their several sovereignties. Or, on the other hand, a State may, without parting with its
sovereignty of lessening its territorial application, yield to the governing organs of particular areas such an amplitude of
powers as to create of them bodies-politic endowed with almost all of the characteristics of independent States. In all
States, indeed, when of any considerable size, efficiency of administration demands that certain autonomous powers of
local self-government be granted to particular districts. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931],
pp. 74, 75.).

The majority have drawn an analogy between the Commonwealth Government and the States of the American Union which, it is
alleged, preserve their own sovereignty although limited by the United States. This is not true for it has been authoritatively
stated that the Constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, that such autonomous powers as they now possess are had
and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national sovereignty, and that the sovereignty of the
United States and the non-sovereign status of the individual States is no longer contested.

It is therefore plain that the constituent States have no sovereignty of their own, and that such autonomous powers as
they now possess are had and exercised by the express will or by the constitutional forbearance of the national
sovereignty. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, even when selecting members for the national
legislature, or electing the President, or ratifying proposed amendments to the federal constitution, the States act, ad
hoc, as agents of the National Government. (Willoughby, the Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], p.250.)

This is the situation at the present time. The sovereignty of the United States and the non-sovereign status of the
individual States is no longer contested. (Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 251, 252.)

Article XVIII of the Constitution provides that "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of
the Philippines." From this, the deduction is made that the Government under the Republic of the Philippines and under the
Commonwealth is the same. We cannot agree. While the Commonwealth Government possessed administrative autonomy and
exercised the sovereignty delegated by the United States and did not cease to be an instrumentality of the latter (Willoughby,
The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law [1931], pp. 74, 75), the Republic of the Philippines is an independent State not
receiving its power or sovereignty from the United States. Treason committed against the United States or against its
instrumentality, the Commonwealth Government, which exercised, but did not possess, sovereignty ( id., p. 49), is therefore not
treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Philippines. Article XVIII was inserted in order, merely, to make
the Constitution applicable to the Republic.

Reliance is also placed on section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all laws of the Philippines Islands shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent therewith, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and on
section 3 which is to the effect that all cases pending in courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force,
thereby insinuating that these constitutional provisions authorize the Republic of the Philippines to enforce article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code. The error is obvious. The latter article can remain operative under the present regime if it is not
inconsistent with the Constitution. The fact remains, however, that said penal provision is fundamentally incompatible with the
Constitution, in that those liable for treason thereunder should owe allegiance to the United States or the government of the
Philippines, the latter being, as we have already pointed out, a mere instrumentality of the former, whereas under the
Constitution of the present Republic, the citizens of the Philippines do not and are not required to owe allegiance to the United
States. To contend that article 114 must be deemed to have been modified in the sense that allegiance to the United States is
deleted, and, as thus modified, should be applied to prior acts, would be to sanction the enactment and application of an  ex post
facto law.
In reply to the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court of the United States has held in the case of
Bradford vs. Chase National Bank (24 Fed. Supp., 38), that the Philippines had a sovereign status, though with restrictions, it is
sufficient to state that said case must be taken in the light of a subsequent decision of the same court in Cincinnati Soap
Co. vs. United States (301 U.S., 308), rendered in May, 1937, wherein it was affirmed that the sovereignty of the United States
over the Philippines had not been withdrawn, with the result that the earlier case only be interpreted to refer to the exercise of
sovereignty by the Philippines as delegated by the mother country, the United States.

No conclusiveness may be conceded to the statement of President Roosevelt on August 12, 1943, that "the United States in
practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations--in fact all the attributes
of complete and respected nationhood," since said statement was not meant as having accelerated the date, much less as a
formal proclamation of, the Philippine Independence as contemplated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law, it appearing that (1) no less
also than the President of the United States had to issue the proclamation of July 4, 1946, withdrawing the sovereignty of the
United States and recognizing Philippine Independence; (2) it was General MacArthur, and not President Osmeña who was with
him, that proclaimed on October 23, 1944, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; (3) the Philippines was not given
official participation in the signing of the Japanese surrender; (4) the United States Congress, and not the Commonwealth
Government, extended the tenure of office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines.

The suggestion that as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same
way treason may have been committed against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth, is immaterial because, as we have already explained, treason against either is not and cannot be
treason against the new and different sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

10. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-533. August 20, 1946.]

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., Petitioners, v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., Respondents.

Placido C. Ramos, for Petitioners.

Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA, for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. WAR; MILITARY OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINES; STATUS OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF PHILIPPINE ARMY. — By the
occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not cease to be fully in the
service, though, in a measure, only in a measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty.
In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a
breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty, or disobedience of orders, or mutiny or subject to a military trial
therefor; but for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an offense of the class specified in
the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION OF LAWS OF POLITICAL NATURE DURING MILITARY OCCUPATION, EXTENT OF. — The
rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind
the enemies in arms.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners come within the general application of
the clause in sub- paragraph (a) of Article 2 of the 2d Article of War; "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered
into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey
the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military
District, they became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area received supplies and
funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th
Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United
States Army.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 93D ARTICLE OF WAR, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF; ABSENCE OF APPEAL TO SUPREME
COURT FROM JUDGMENTS OF COURTS MARTIAL IMPOSING DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT; COURT MARTIAL,
NATURE OF. — The 93d Article of War which fails to allow a review by the Supreme Court of judgments of courts martial
imposing death or life imprisonment does not violate Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution which provides that
"the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment." Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the
ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief,
independently of legislation." Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine
Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having
been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of
one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L.
Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last- named four petitioners now seek in their
memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the
General Court Martial be ordered certified to this court for review.

The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had
been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article
of War is unconstitutional.

An outline of the petitioners’ previous connection with the Philippine Army, the Philippine Constabulary, and/or with guerilla
organizations will presently be made. This outline is based on allegations in the petition and the answer, and on exhibits
attached thereto and to the parties’ memoranda, exhibits which were offered in the course of the oral argument and admitted
without objection. The said exhibits are public documents certified by the officials who had them in custody in their official
capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we have no doubt they are.

It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M.
Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When,
on February 27, 1942, the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to
the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area.
Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the last then a civilian joined Major Ruffy’s organization towards the
latter part of 1942, while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its members some time in
1943.

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Army, also took to the hills of
Panay and led the operation of the 6th Military District, one of the districts into which the Philippine Army had been divided
before the war. About November, 1942, Colonel Peralta succeeded in contacting the General Headquarters of General
MacArthur in Australia as the result of which on February 13, 1943, the 6th Military District was recognized by the Headquarters
of the Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit and part of its command.

Even before General MacArthur’s recognition of the 6th Military District Colonel Peralta had extended its sphere of operation to
comprise Mindoro and Marinduque, and had, on January 2, 1943, named Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two
provinces and Commanding Officer of the 3d Batallion, 66th Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps. After the recognition, 2d
Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco, by virtue of Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2, 1943, and signed by Enrique L. Jurado,
Major, OSE, Commanding , was assigned as S-3 in the Bolo Area. Major, later Lieut. Col., Jurado, it should be noted, had been
dispatched by the 6th Military District to Mindoro to assume operational control supervision over the Bolo Area unit and to make
and direct the necessary report to the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in Panay. On April 26, 1944, by General Orders No. 40
of the 6th Military District, 2d Lieutenant Francisco was promoted to the rank of 1st Lieutenant (Brevet), effective April 15, 1944,
subject to approval by the President of the Philippines, and was re-assigned to the same Bolo Area as probationary 3d
lieutenant for two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the 6th Military District, as per Special Orders No. 70,
dated May 15, 1944.

According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, dated January 16, 1943, and signed by L. R. Relunia,
Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Staff, Jose L. Garcia and Dominador Adeva were appointed 3d lieutenants, infantry, as of December 31,
1942. Garcia later was promoted to the rank of captain, effective March 15, 1943, as per Special Orders No. 82, issued in the
field, 6th Military District, and dated August 28, 1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L. Garcia took his oath before Captain Esteban P.
Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 66 Infantry Regiment, 61st Division, 6th Military District.

As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team
in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of military character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943,
assigned Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva and 2d Lieut. Prudente M.
Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan as Finance Officer, as per Special Orders no. 99 dated November 2,
1943. In a memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was stated that Captain Garcia had
been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut. Francisco P9,000, P5,0000 for palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B Company.

A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his
assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy’s place. On October 19,
1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged,
seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioners’ trial, the legality of which is now being
contested.

On July 26, 1941, the President of the United States issued a military order the pertinent paragraph of which stated." . . as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of
the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of the general officer, United States
Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the
Commonwealth." Following the issuance of President Roosevelt’s order General Douglas MacArthur was appointed
Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East.

It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the
National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the
Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation."

The paragraph quoted in petitioners’ memorandum from Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents and the subsequent paragraph
which has been omitted furnish a complete answer to petitioners’ contention. Paraphrasing the author, by the occupation of the
Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not cease to be fully in the service, though, in a
measure, only in a measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter case,
like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of discipline of
the command or of a neglect of duty, or disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military trial therefor; but for an act
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War,
they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial. "So a prisoner of war, though not subject, while held
by the enemy, to the discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged or paroled, be not exempt from liability for such
offenses as criminal acts or injurious conduct committed during his captivity against other officers or soldiers in the same status."
(Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, pp. 91, 92.)
The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in
abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not
intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a
contrary ruling should readily manifest itself. Under the petitioners’ theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied
territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the very lifeblood of an army, the
right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.

The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not profit the petitioners who were former members of the
Philippine Constabulary any more than does the rule of war or international law they cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did
not end the war. It did not, legally or otherwise, keep the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines from
organizing a new army, regular or irregular, out of new men and men in the old service who had refused to surrender or who,
having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight through other diverse means and methods. The fall of Corregidor and
Bataan just marked the beginning of the gigantic preparation for the gigantic drive that was to fight its way to and beyond the
Philippines in fulfillment of General MacArthur’s classic promise, "I shall return." The heroic role which the guerrillas played in
that preparation and in the subsequent liberation of the Philippines is now history.

Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary, Captain Francisco and
Lieutenant Fortus as well as Major Garcia and Lieutenant Adeva were subject to military jurisdiction.

The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows:

"Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as
included in the term ’any person subject to military law’ or ’persons subject to military law,’ whenever sued in these articles:
"(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists,
from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other
persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by
the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;

"(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;

"(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war
or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles;

"(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial."

It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph (a); "and all other persons
lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the
terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the
General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War.
The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contingent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been
recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area
received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo
Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders
of the United States Army.

The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military status of guerrillas who had been called
into the service of the Philippine Army. If the invaders refused to look upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops,
that did not stop the guerrillas who had been inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being component parts
thereof, bound to obey military orders and subject to military discipline. The official and military status of guerrillas was to be
judged not by the concept of the enemy but by their relations to the government and the army of the country for which they
fought.

The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person subject to military law who
commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." It is argued that since
"no review is provided by that law to be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life
imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which provides that
"the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment."
We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the
authority for their creation.

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to
be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop’s
Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court
of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the
army, excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows:
’These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the
manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and
the 3d Article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely
independent of each other.’

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department;
and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in
Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or
those of his authorized military representatives.’ (Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents; 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of equal interest
Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military
tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop’s Military
Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.) .

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
We agree with the rule that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered in abeyance during
enemy military occupation, although we maintain that the rule must be restricted to laws which are exclusively political
in nature. We agree with the theory that the rule is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms, but we do
not agree with the theory that the rule is intended for the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory without exception. We
are of opinion that the rule does not apply to civil inhabitants who occupy official positions in the legitimate civil
government of the occupied territory. Enemy occupation does not relieve them from their sworn official duties.
Government officers wield powers and enjoy privileges denied to private citizens. The wielding of powers and
enjoyment of privileges impose corresponding responsibilities, and even dangers that must be faced during emergency.

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the 93d Article of War, providing that "any person subject to military law who
commits murder in time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court-martial may direct," because no
review is provided by said law to be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life
imprisonment or death, such omission being a violation of section 2(4), Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines.

Petitioners are mistaken. The silence of the law as to the power of the Supreme Court to review the decisions and
proceedings of courts-martial, especially when the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, should not be
understood as negating such power, much more when it is recognized and guaranteed by specific provisions of the
fundamental law. At any rate, any doubt in interpreting the silence of the law must be resolved in favor of a construction
that will make the law constitutional.

Furthermore, it may not be amiss to recall the fact that the National Assembly, in approving the Articles of War
(Commonwealth Act No. 408), had never intended to deny or diminish the power of the Supreme Court to review,
revise, reverse or modify final judgments and decrees of courts martial created and organized under the Articles of War.
On the contrary, it was clearly understood that the decrees and decisions of said courts-martial or subject to review by
the Supreme Court. The last committee report on the Articles of War was rendered to the National Assembly by its
Committee on Third Reading, commonly known as the "Little Senate," which submitted the bill printed in final form. As
chairman of the committee and in behalf of the same, we submitted the report, recommending the approval of the bill on
third reading with the express statement and understanding that it would not deprive the Supreme Court of its
constitutional revisionary power on the final judgments and decrees of courts-martial proposed to be created, which
were and are to be considered as part of the judicial system, being included in the denomination of inferior courts
mentioned in section 1, Article VIII, of the constitution. With the said statement and understanding, the National
Assembly, without any dissenting vote, approved the Articles of War as recommended by the Committee on Third
Reading.

Consequently, petitioners’ contention is untenable, the premise upon which they assailed the constitutionality of the 93d
Article of War being groundless in view of the actuation of the National Assembly.

The majority appear to concur in petitioners’ premise that, by the silence of the Articles of War, the Supreme Court is
deprived of its constitutional power to review final decisions of courts-martial. The majority even go as far as to justify
the constitutionality of such deprivation on the theory that courts martial belong, not to the judicial branch of the
government, but to the executive department, citing as authority therefor Winthrops’s Military Law and Precedents. The
majority are in error.

In our opinions in Yamashita v. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) and in Homma v. Styer (L-244), we have shown that
this Supreme Court enjoys the power to revise the actuations and decisions of military commissions, especially if they
act without jurisdiction or violate the law, military commissions being included within the denomination of inferior courts
under the provisions of our Constitution. Courts-martial are, like military commissions, inferior courts. The fact that they
are military tribunals does not change their essence as veritable tribunals or courts of justice, as agencies of the
government in the administration of justice. Their functions are essentially judicial. Except in cases where judicial
functions are specifically entrusted by the Constitution to other agencies — such as impeachment to Congress,
legislative electoral contests to the Electoral Tribunals — all judicial functions are vested in the Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be established by law. Courts-martial are inferior courts established by law.

The majority’s theory is based on an authority which has no bearing or application under the Constitution of the
Philippines. Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents has in mind the Constitution of the United States of America, the
provisions of which regarding the judicial department are essentially different from those contained in our own
Constitution.

Article III of the Constitution of the United States of America is as follows:

"SECTION 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the Supreme and Inferior Courts, shall
hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office.

"SEC. 2. The Judicial Power shall extend to all case, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; — to all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; — to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; — to controversies to which
the United States shall be a party; — to controversies between two or more States; — between a State and citizens of
 another State; — between citizens of different States; — between citizens of the same State claiming lands under
grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

"In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall
make.

"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the
said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or
places as the Congress may be law have directed.

"SEC. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

"The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption
of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attached."

A comparison of the above provision with that of the Constitution of the Philippines will readily show that the former
does not have the negative provision contained in the latter to the effect that our Supreme Court may not be deprived of
certain specific judicial functions.

Section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution is as follows:

"SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in —

"(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in
question.

"(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

"(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial courts is in issue.

"(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

"(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved."

It is our considered opinion that the theory maintained in Winthrop’s Military Law and Precedents and in the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States cited therein to the effect that the trial and punishment of military and naval
offenses by courts- martial are executive functions because the only legitimate object of military tribunals "is to aid the
Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army," as applied in the Philippines, is basically wrong, being
rooted in the English monarchical ideology.

Military tribunals are tribunals whose functions are judicial in character and nature. No amount of logodaedaly may
change the nature of such functions. The trial and punishment of offenses, whether civil or military, naval or aerial, since
time immemorial, have always been considered as judicial functions. The fact that such trial and punishment are
entrusted to "tribunals or courts-martial" shows the nuclear idea of the nature of the function. Tribunals and courts are
the agencies employed by government to administer justice.

The very fact that in this case the Supreme Court has given due course to the petition, required respondents to answer,
set the case for hearing and, in fact, heard it, instead of ordering the outright dismissal of the petition as soon as it was
filed, thus following the same procedure in Reyes v. Crisologo (L-54, 41 Off. Gaz., 1096) and in Yamashita v. Styer
(supra), is a conclusive evidence of the fact that this Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and power to review the
proceedings and decisions of military tribunals, such as courts- martial, military commissions, and other similar bodies
exercising judicial functions limited to military personnel.

It appearing that petitioners are impugning the jurisdiction of the court-martial which has tried and convicted them, we
are of opinion that the petition must be granted in the sense that the records of the court-martial in question should be
elevated to the Supreme Court for revision, so that we may decide the question on the court-martial’s jurisdiction and
give petitioners the justice they are claiming for.

11. People v. Gozo[G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973]

G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo
for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance
of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by
invoking due process,1 a contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo.2 If such a ground
were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to
her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to
the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our
sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. To state the proposition is to make
patent how much it is tinged with unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed with the sole modification
that she is given thirty days from the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the same.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The accused bought a house and lot located inside the
United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another
one in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an
assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not necessary for the
construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office,
Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters
working on the house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation.
... After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City
Fiscal's Office."3 The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and
sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal,
found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00
and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue
the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her
dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional
question raised, certified the case to this Court.

There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law for the stand taken by appellant.

1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid of authority to require building permits. This Court,
from Switzer v. Municipality of
Cebu,4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much too late in the day to contend that such a
requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably concerned about the unfavorable impression that could be
created if she were to deny that such competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in her
brief: "If, at all; the questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ." 5 Its scope is wide, well-nigh
all embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the wellbeing and good order of the
community.6

It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise is violative of any constitutional right,
then its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So
much is settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process question may indeed be raised in view of
what for her is its oppressive character. She is led to such a conclusion, relying on  People v. Fajardo.7 A more careful scrutiny of
such a decision would not have led her astray, for that case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the opinion follow:
"It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality
of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: "... 1. Any person or
persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal
Mayor. ... 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. ...
3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less
than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the
court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of
the owner of the building or house. ... ." Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his
son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek ... . On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza ... . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit ..., but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with
the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property." 8

Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A conviction therefore for a violation thereof both
in the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this
case, on the contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she
would assert in her brief: "The evidence showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor, the same
would not have been granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit before constructing her house would be an exercise in
futility. The law will not require anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in law or in fact: ... ." 9 It would be from her own
version, at the very least then, premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which
certainly lends itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of interpretation suffices to
remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly announced in  Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it appears from this
portion of the opinion of Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the
Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the
applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the
risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that
is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the
permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or
procession may pass or the meeting may be held." 11 If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to assembly,
this Court could construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a constitutional provision, there is
nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of approach in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance
requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is
taken out of context, considering the admitted oppressive application of the challenged measure in that litigation. So much then
for the contention that she could not have been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that
she did suffer the same fate twice, once from the City Court and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason is
obvious.Such ordinance applies to her.

2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on
the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with
controlling and authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the
power to govern. Two leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of
sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 13 As was so emphatically set forth by
Justice Tuason in Acierto: "By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United
States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The
Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to
make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express
provisions of the treaty." 14 There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the
Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty."  15 Then came this paragraph
dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from
the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is
at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some
persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another
power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows
that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." 17

Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted and unjustified, from what is settled and
orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency" becomes one of
obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national security,
the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does
appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the
national government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a
municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised.
Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien
country. What is even more to be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by the American naval
authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the
provisions of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by
the treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a matter about which
the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that
country and can not be raised by the offender." 18 If an accused would suffer from such disability, even if the American armed
forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is there for appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no showing of
any alleged grant of what is quaintly referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough, to make
manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of
P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that
is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain
the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be enforced.
Costs against the accused.

12. People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887

G.R. No. L-18463             October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:

The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person
who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.

About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office.
Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the
Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The day
following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto,
published an article reading as follows:

Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept
and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or
authors of the crime will ever be discovered.

To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the
investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they
should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.

In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.

After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does not surprise
us at all.

The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do
not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?

The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the
example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.

The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on elections and
privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference to the article published in  La Nacion. On September
15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his
study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion  and its editor, Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the
editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal
of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in
force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:

This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of
the Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe
punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's
representative than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code, was
extended to the Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines
might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives of His Majesty. We now have no
Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme
Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .

The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined
by proper authority.

In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is attached to
them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or
exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such
publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under which
this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes
punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain
doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain.
Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme
Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark
about the President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it
would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall
be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
 In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information and under
article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances.

The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made
in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which was announced
in the beginning of this decision.

It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United
States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the
President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the
instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional right of cross-
examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of
reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the
accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and
ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is
not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court.

There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above
described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto
case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only
this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged
upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence
to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.

This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of the court are of
the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code
as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be
acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the Penal Code.
Three members of the court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the two main points just
mentioned.

1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel Law, Act No.
277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel
as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical
exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or
publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict
herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."

That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated
certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of
calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de
Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting
Spanish law on the subject of calumnia  and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel Law on the
provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the
subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
(People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)

The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.

The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a
libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such,
in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be
proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a
legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal
Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority," etc.

The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that
where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose
of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary
implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the
effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.

Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this
point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.

2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code. — Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court was that
 article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This view was
indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.

Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason,
crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of
the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of
ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is
found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts,
insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public
officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt
committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in
authority. The with an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the
balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult  any Minister of the
Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such performance,
provided that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of  arresto
mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain  (for there could not be
a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.

It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason,  lese
majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present
task, therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the
nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the
sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court
stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co.  vs. McGlinn,
supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and
Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power —
and the latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion
or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of
obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: " It cannot be
admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much
less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or
otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government
ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and
by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and
providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of
things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the military
occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a
new political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration
were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems  vs. United States ([1910], 217 U.
S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal
provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to the " 'great principles of liberty
and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the
appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions
and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273;
U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)

The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was outlined by President
McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President
said:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission
should bear in mind that he government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands,
and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the
fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the
same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand,
that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system,
which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have,
unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government
which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these
principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty
and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is
evident that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles
and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.

The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United
States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which
American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of
individual rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand
obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.

According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish
officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of
the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual
citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the
citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and
a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence
as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide therein, if
he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and attainments and conduct of each
person for himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or does not
infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)

It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are derived, there were once
statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made
actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The
Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus,
Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the United States, the
offense of scandalum magnatum  is not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making
it an offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much popular
disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person
holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead
of affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder
for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890],
151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide
as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by
implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the
gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the
American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government
in the Islands. 1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although
its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than
the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience
when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to
enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who
happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks.

The crime of lese majeste  disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have
no place under the American flag.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment
should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:

I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the
facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force
with respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason
thereof, outside of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed
against an authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.

ROMUALDEZ, J.,  concurring:

I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal
Code or under the Libel Law.

I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do
not have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing, committed against an authority in the
performance of his duties or by reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.

13. Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the
Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for
investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes,
the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the
deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with
Felisa Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with
Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first
wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there
was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part
is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and
the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of

evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2)
Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145
as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa
Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses
Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot
No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa
Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265,
4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475,
4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the
exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot
No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-
fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing
the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or
grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-
twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par
2, New Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes,
Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the
total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from the
hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd
Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall have become
final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of the hereditary estate in the
proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind, quality, nature
and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third
(1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all
other claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of
partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
 The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the
following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable
Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of
the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of
the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded
under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is
made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of
Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this
Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by
themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of
Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for
the vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective properties
adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as
are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving
authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of
title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area
of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and
Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court
the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and
V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of
Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306
sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was
declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
 On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in
Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale
the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs.
Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of
action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that
he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder
and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys
and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by
respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein
complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is
prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al.,
defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of
the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the
civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against
defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta
Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on
June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear
and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and
"C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND
FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo
Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of
the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO

WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
 (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the
appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession
[emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to
the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88
SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963  was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March
6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963  approving the October
16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from
said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely,
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled
that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz
Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was
issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to
respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on  August 31, 1966  by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968  an action before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well
as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence,
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963  in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated
October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid
facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after
the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the
litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to
respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of
the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a
portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the
President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of
partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the
Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon
had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon
acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to
this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he
bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or
previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was
not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly
that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was
committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was
assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client
to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such
written authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's
Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the
project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November
26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22,
1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In
this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having
been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and
annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated October
16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on
November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot
1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the
project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by
virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is
absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother,
Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the
herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154
only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22,
1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her
deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted
during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr.
Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant
of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to her
were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties when she
could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value
of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in
the distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "...
it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or
had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers
at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining
the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations
must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of
respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion
and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was
purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it
for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that
his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave
cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and
fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any
office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within
the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to
those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between
the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including
the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications
made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal
Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs  (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue
in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int.
Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator
vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of
Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign
are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of
those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily
changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals,
remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto  (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce
after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court
of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent
participated or intervened in his official  capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in
his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the
Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime;
it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who
intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A.
40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations
by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by
or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled " Bernardita R. Macariola,
plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"  wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation,
having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any
prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other
vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated,
deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in
litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale
of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving
the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an
officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same,
however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last
portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any
business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in
the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute
graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that
the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule
XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any
private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the
recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts
as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil
Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or
employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount
not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil
service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they
belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the
only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII
cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them,
would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only
two grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and
exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases
against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to
pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline"
(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government
as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in
interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to
the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that
he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not
in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such
disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the
corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon
25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its
incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and
acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree,
however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid
causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized
with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1
and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not
a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he
believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an
attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I
and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have
accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is
guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr.
Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any
canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his
official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that
herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted
in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any,
on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
 Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining
close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social
or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of
Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for
disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias
and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in
his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE
MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

14. Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 US 345

United States Supreme Court

VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA(1911)

No. 53

Argued:Decided: April 3, 1911

[220 U.S. 345, 346]   Messrs. Frederic R. Coudert, Howard Thayer Kingsbury, Paul Fuller, and Harry Weston Van Dyke
for plaintiffs in error and appellants.

[220 U.S. 345, 349]   Messrs. Paul Charlton andIsaac Adams for appellee.

[220 U.S. 345, 351]  

Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are creditors of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States by the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 1754]. Upon the theory that the
city, under its present charter from the government of the Philippine Islands, is the same juristic person and liable upon the
obligations of the old city, these actions were brought against it. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands denied relief,
holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish
municipality. [220 U.S. 345, 352]   The fundamental question is whether, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to
the United States, followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city
incurred prior to the cession to the United States.

We shall confine ourselves to the question whether the plaintiffs in error are entitled to judgments against the city upon their
several claims. Whether there is a remedy adequate to the collection when reduced to judgment is not presented by the record.
But whether there is or is not a remedy affords no reason why the plaintiffs in error may not reduce their claims to judgment. Mt.
Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 530 , 25 S. L. ed. 699, 703. The city confessedly may be sued under its existing charter,
and that implies at least a right to judgment if they establish their demands.

The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all of its causes
of action. There is identity of purpose between the Spanish and American charters and substantial identity of municipal powers.
The area and the inhabitants incorporated are substantially the same. But for the change of sovereignty which has occurred
under the treaty of Paris, the question of the liability of the city under its new charter for the debts of the old city would seem to
be of easy solution. The principal question would therefore seem to be the legal consequence of the cession referred to upon
the property rights and civil obligations of the city incurred before the cession. And so the question was made to turn in the court
below upon the consequence of a change in sovereignty and a reincorporation of the city by the substituted sovereignty.

This disposes of the question of the jurisdiction of this court, grounded upon the absence from the petition of the plaintiffs of any
distinct claim under the treaty of Paris, since, under 10 of the Philippine organic act  [220 U.S. 345, 353]   of July 1, 1902 [32
Stat. at L. 695, chap. 1369, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 226], this court is given jurisdiction to review any final decree or
judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands where any treaty of the United States 'is involved.' That treaty was
necessarily 'involved,' since neither the court below nor this court can determine the continuity of the municipality nor the liability
of the city as it now exists for the obligation of the old city, without considering the effect of the change of sovereignty resulting
from that treaty. See Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16, 22 , 54 S. L. ed. 72, 75, 30 Sup. Ct. rep. 1.

The historical continuity of a municipality embracing the inhabitants of the territory now occupied by the city of Manila is
impressive. Before the conquest of the Philippine Islands by Spain, Manila existed. The Spaniards found on the spot now
occupied a populous and fortified community of Moros. In 1571 they occupied what was then and is now known as Manila, and
established it as a municipal corporation. In 1574 there was conferred upon it the title of 'Illustrious and ever loyal city of Manila.'
From time to time there occurred amendments, and, on January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization of the city government
under a royal decree of that date. Under that charter there was power to incur debts for municipal purposes and power to sue
and be sued. The obligations here in suit were incurred under the charter referred to, and are obviously obligations strictly within
the provision of the municipal power. To pay judgments upon such debts it was the duty of the ayuntamiento of Manila, which
was the corporate name of the old city, to make provision in its budget.

The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere change of sovereignty is obviously
one which is without a shadow of moral force, and, if true, must result from settled principles of rigid law. While the contracts
from which the claims in suit resulted were in progress, war between the United  [220 U.S. 345, 354]   States and Spain ensued.
On August 13, 1898, the city was occupied by the forces of this government, and its affairs conducted by military authority. On
July 31, 1901, the present incorporating act was passed, and the city since that time has been an autonomous municipality. The
charter in force is act 183 of the Philippine Commission, and now may be found as chapters 68 to 75 of the compiled acts of the
Philippine Commission. The 1st section of the charter of 1901 reads as follows:

'The inhabitants of the city of Manila, residing within the territory described in 2 of this act, are hereby constituted a
municipality, which shall be known as the city of Manila, and by that name shall have perpetual succession, and shall
possess all the rights of property herein granted or heretofore enjoyed and possessed by the city of Manila as organized
under Spanish sovereignty.'

The boundaries described in 2 include substantially the area and inhabitants which had theretofore constituted the old city.

By 4 of the same act, the government of the city was invested in a municipal board.

Section 16 grants certain legislative powers to the board, and provides that it shall 'take possession of all lands, buildings,
offices, books, papers, records, moneys, credits, securities, assets, accounts, or other property or rights belonging to the former
city of Manila, or pertaining to the business or interests thereof, and, subject to the provisions herein set forth, shall have control
of all its property except the building known as the ayuntamiento, provision for the occupation and control of which is made in 15
of this act; shall collect taxes and other revenues, and apply the same in accordance with appropriations, as hereinbefore
provided, to the payment of the municipal expenses; shall supervise and control the discharge of official duties by subordinates;
shall institute judicial proceedings to recover property and [220 U.S. 345, 355]   funds of the city wherever found, or otherwise to
protect the interests of the city, and shall defend all suits against the city,' etc.

Section 69 of the charter expressly preserved 'all city ordinances and orders in force at the time of the passage of this act, and
not inconsistent herewith,' until modified or repealed by ordinances passed under this act.

Section 72 is the repealing clause, and provides for the repeal of 'all acts, orders, and regulations' which are inconsistent with
the provisions of the act.

The charter contains no reference to the obligations or contracts of the old city.

If we understand the argument against the liability here asserted, it proceeds mainly upon the theory that inasmuch as the
predecessor of the present city, the ayuntamiento of Manila, was a corporate entity created by the Spanish government, when
the sovereignty of Spain in the islands was terminated by the treaty of cession, if not by the capitulation of August 13, 1898, the
municipality ipso facto disappeared for all purposes. This conclusion is reached upon the supposed analogy to the doctrine of
principal and agent, the death of the principal ending the agency. So complete is the supposed death and annihilation of a
municipal entity by extinction of sovereignty of the creating state that it was said in one of the opinions below that all of the public
property of Manila passed to the United States, 'for a consideration, which was paid,' and that the United States was therefore
justified in creating an absolutely new municipality, and endowing it with all of the assets of the defunct city, free from any
obligation to the creditors of that city. And so the matter was dismissed in the Trigas Case by the court of first instance, by the
suggestion that 'the plaintiff may have a claim against the Crown of Spain, which has received from the United States payment
for that done by the plaintiff.' [220 U.S. 345, 356]   We are unable to agree with the argument. It loses sight of the dual character
of municipal corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business
character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by
delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter
character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for
which its governmental powers are conferred.

The distinction is observed in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461 , 50 S. L. ed. 261, 269, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110,
4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 737, where Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 369, 374, 55 Am. Dec. 347, and Western Sav. Fund Soc. v.
Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 72 Am. Dec. 730, are cited and approved. In Lloyd v. New York, supra, it is said:

'The corporation of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers: one governmental and public, and to the extent
they are held and exercised, is clothed with sovereignty; the other private, and to the extent they are held and
exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public purposes, the latter for private purposes. While
in the exercise of the former, the corporation is a municipal government; and while in the exercise of the latter, is a
corporate legal individual.'

See also Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. 66; Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321, 343, 26 Am. Rep. 357, and Oliver v. Worcester,
102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485.

In view of the dual character of municipal corporations there is no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere
consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The suspension of such governmental functions as are obviously
incompatible with the new political relations thus brought about may be presumed. [220 U.S. 345, 357]   But no such implication
may be reasonably indulged beyond that result.

Such a conclusion is in harmony with the settled principles of public law as declared by this and other courts and expounded by
the text-books upon the laws of war and international law. Taylor, International Pub. Law , 578.

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws
theretofore in force which are in confiict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose
their force, is also plain. Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 , 54 L. ed. 432, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. But it is equally
settled in the same public law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in
force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 , 29 S. L. ed. 270,
271, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005, it was said:

'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction
and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of
the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or
changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the
other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful
use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character,
institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction
and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of
an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the [220 U.S. 345, 358]   press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the
laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon
the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed
to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a
municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the
new government, they are altered or repealed.'

The above language was quoted with approval in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 298 , 45 S. L. ed. 1088, 1110, 21 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 770.

That the United States might, by virtue of its situation under a treaty ceding full title, have utterly extinguished every municipality
which it found in existence in the Philippine Islands, may be conceded. That it did so, in view of the practice of nations to the
contrary, is not to be presumed, and can only be established by cogent evidence.

That during military occupation the affairs of the city were in a large part administered by officials put in place by military order
did not operate to dissolve the corporation, or relieve it from liability upon obligations incurred before the occupation, nor those
created for municipal purposes by the administrators of its affairs while its old officials were displaced. New Orleans v. New York
Mail S. S. Co. 20 Wall. 387, 394, 22 L. ed. 354, 358. During that occupation and military administration the business of the city
was carried on as usual. Taxes were assessed and taxes collected and expended for local purposes, and many of the officials
carrying on the government were those found in office when the city was occupied. The continuity of the corporate city was not
inconsistent with military occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power. This [220 U.S. 345, 359]   is made
evident by the occurrences at the time of capitulation. Thus, the articles of capitulation concluded in these words: 'This city, its
inhabitants, . . . and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the
American Army.' This was quoted in President McKinley's instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Philippine Commission, and
touching this he said: 'I believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept.' And the commission was directed to labor for the full
performance of this obligation. This instruction was in line with and in fulfilment of the 8th article of the treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. Under the 3d article of that treaty the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United
States, the latter agreeing to pay to Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the 8th article, Spain
relinquished to the United States 'all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable
property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.' It is under this
clause, in connection with the clause agreeing to pay to Spain $20,000,000 for the cession of the Philippine group, that the
contention that all of the public rights of the city of Manila were acquired by the United States, which country was therefore
justified, as absolute owner, in granting the property rights so acquired to what is called the 'absolutely new corporation' created
thereafter. But the qualifying words touching property rights relinquished by Spain limit the relinquishment to 'property which, in
conformity with law, belonging to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.' It did not affect property which
did not, in 'conformity with law, belong to the Crown of Spain.' That it was not intended to apply to property which, 'in conformity
with law,' belonged to the city of Manila as a municipal cor- [220 U.S. 345, 360]   poration, is clear. This is demonstrated by the
second paragraph of the same article, which reads: 'And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the
peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments . . . having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals.' Thus, the
property and property rights of municipal corporations were protected and safeguarded precisely as were the property and
property rights of individuals.

That the cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations is herein recognized, for the stipulation against
impairment of their property rights has this plain significance.

The conclusion we reach, that the legal entity survived both the military occupation and the cession which followed, finds support
in the cases which hold that the Pueblos of San Francisco and Los Angeles, which existed as municipal organizations prior to
the cession of California by Mexico, continued to exist with their community and property rights intact. Cohas v. Raisin, 3 Cal.
443; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326, 18 L. ed. 547; Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592, 602, 19 L.
ed. 683, 686; Moore v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70 , 32 L. ed. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1067; Los Angeles Farming & Mill. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 217 U.S. 217 , 54 L. ed. 736, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452.

Were corporate identity and corporate liability extinguished as a necessary legal result of the new charter granted in 1901 by the
Philippine Commission? The inhabitants of the old city are the incorporators of the new. There is substantially identity of area.
There are some changes in the form of government and some changes in corporate powers and methods of administration. the
new corporation is endowed with all of the property and [220 U.S. 345, 361]   property rights of the old. It has the same power to
sue and be sued which the former corporation had. There is not the slightest suggestion that the new corporation shall not
succeed to the contracts and obligations of the old corporation. Laying out of view any question of the constitutional guaranty
against impairment of the obligation of contracts, there is, in the absence of express legislative declaration of a contrary
purpose, no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of an old municipality is intended to permit an escape from the
obligations of the old, to whose property and rights it has succeeded. The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise
affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and
property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities. Broughton v. Pensacola 93 U.S. 266 ,
23 L. ed. 896; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 520 , 25 L. ed. 699; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 , 29 L. ed. 620, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 398; Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646, 655 , 42 S. L. ed. 310, 313, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6
Lea, 730; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866, 1870, in which case, when a municipality became disabled to act and obtained a
new charter, in an action upon an obligation of the old corporation, there was judgment for the creditor, Lord Mansfield saying:

'Many corporations, for want of legal magistrates, have lost their activity, and obtained new charters. Maidstone,
Radnor, Carmarthen, and many more are in the same case with Colchester. And yet it has never been disputed but that
the new charters revive and give activity to the old corporation; except, perhaps, in that case in Levinz, where the
corporation had a new name; and even there the court made no doubt. Where the question has arisen upon any
remarkable metamorphosis, it has always been determined 'that they remain the same as to debts and rights."

Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728, 730. [220 U.S. 345, 362]   In Shapleigh v. San Angelo, supra, this court said in a similar case:

'The state's plenary power over its municipal corporations to change their organization, to modify their method of
internal government, or to abolish them altogether, is not restricted by contracts entered into by the municipality with its
creditors or with private parties. An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is therefor effectual so far as it abolishes the
old corporate organization; but when the same or substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation,
whether with extended or restricted territorial limits, such new corporation is treated as in law the successor of the old
one, entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities.'

The cases of Trigas and Vilas went off upon demurrers, and no question of remedy arises here.

The appeal of Aguado is from a decree upon a final hearing denying him all relief.

That all three of the plaintiffs in error are entitled to proceed to judgment when they shall establish their several claims is obvious
from what we have said. But in the Aguado Case it is sought to establish his claim as a charge against certain property and
funds held by the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund. In 1734 one Don Francisco Carriedo y Perodo bequeathed to the
city a fund for the establishment of waterworks, to be kept as a separate fund and devoted to the erection and maintenance of
the works. This fund was loyally kept and greatly increased, and was enlarged by a special tax upon meat, devoted to that
purpose. The works were finally completed in 1878, and have been since operated by the city, the income and special tax going
to maintenance. Certain securities belonging to the fund are now held by the city, the income being applied to the operation of
the works. Aguado took a contract to supply coal for the use of the [220 U.S. 345, 363]   Carriedo works, and made a deposit to
guarantee the contract. When the city was occupied by the American Army it was indebted to him for coal so supplied, as well
as for the deposit so made. That the coal was bought for and used in the operation of the Carriedo works is not denied. But
there is no evidence that the credit was given to the Carriedo fund so held in trust under the will of Carriedo. The contract was
made with the ayuntamiento of Manila, just as all other contracts for city supplies or works were made. The contract not having
been made with special reference to the liability of the fund held in trust by the city, but apparently upon the general credit of the
city, we are not disposed to reverse the judgment of the court below, holding that the claim of Aguado did not constitute a charge
upon the Carriedo fund.

Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled to a judgment. The designation of the city in the petition as trustee may be regarded as
descriptive. The debt having been incurred by the city, it must be regarded as a city liability. Taylor v. Davis (Taylor v. Mayo),
110 U.S. 330, 336 , 28 S. L. ed. 163, 165, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147.

Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado Case must be reversed and the case remanded, with direction to render
judgment and such other relief as may seem in conformity with law. The judgments in the Trigas and Vilas Cases will be
reversed and the cases remanded, with direction to overrule the respective demurrers, and for such other action as may be
consistent with law, and consistent with this opinion.

15. Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285

G.R. No. L-49            November 12, 1945

WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

William F. Peralta in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.
City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae.

FERIA, J.:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the
production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by
section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he
commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of
Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred
upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one
established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial
violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of
which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United
States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the
fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that
the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal
Code."

The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons expressed in his
brief in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G. R. No. L-22
(p. 612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and
therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in
his reply memorandum in support of his contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created,
and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the
Chairman of the Executive Commission are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7
does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused
persons under their legitimate Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the cases of Texas vs. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn vs. Lockart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United
States vs. Home Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprott vs. United States (20 Wall., 459).

The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiae. In his memorandum he submits that the petition
for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the
Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes
and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent necessity, according to the preamble
of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure
established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section 1
(1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as
impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to
clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if
from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted;
and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed
unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices.

Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present case, it is
necessary to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forces of
occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines.

In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon  (G. R. No. L-5, pp. 113, 127, ante), recently decided, this Court,
speaking through the Justice who pens this decision, held:

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippines Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1,
issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the
military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto  government of the second kind. It was not different from the
government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tanpico, Mexico. As Halleck says,
"the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given
by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is
of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and
the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it
concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of
its acts." (vol. 2 p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government
and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence.

And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision, this Court said:

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from
any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent
occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General
MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy
duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based
upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan
had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or
recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had
matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the
law of nations.

As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), as the
government established in Castine, Maine, during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico, Mexico, occupied
during the war with that the country by the United State Army, the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the
light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant  was totally independent of the
constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States,
considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines
which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be
applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant,
whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.

In the case of United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by the military
occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the
United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to
the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and
were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International
Law, says that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, " the (belligerent) occupant is
totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance
and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all
circumstances or conditions. (Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342.)

The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700;
Horn vs. Lockart, 17 Wall., 570; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176 United States vs. Home Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 249;
Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459, and others) that the judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired
the rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States, or were in conflict with those constitutions,
were null and void, is not applicable to the present case. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of
belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . . . sanctioned no hostile legislation . . . and it impaired in no respect the
rights of loyal and citizens as they existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Bruffy, supra);that the Union is
perpetual and indissoluble, and the obligation of allegiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the estate
constitution, subject to the Constitution of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession
(Texas vs. White, supra) and that the Confederate States "in most, if not in all instances, merely transferred the existing state
organizations to the support of a new and different national head. the same constitution, the same laws for the protection of the
property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers." (Sprott vs. United States, supra). In fine,
because in the case of the Confederate States, the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union
continued in force in those states during the War of Secession; while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was
suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the belligerent occupant at regular war with the
United States.

The question which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation
of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the
validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the
effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only
factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in
International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the
laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The
authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military
code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International Public
Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had
therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise
as to whether or not a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the
law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the
nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in
question.

With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the
conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the
occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the
country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary
punishment of any one doing such acts." (Hall's International Law, seventh ed., p. 5000). A belligerent "occupant may where
necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of
justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless, so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public
order and safety temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as
the laws regarding procedure." (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p.349.)

No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating
to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military
occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the re-occupation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the
words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh
edition, page 97, and cases quoted and cited in the footnote), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already
terminated completely.

The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones,
especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his
control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary
procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and
public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of
criminal procedure than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other
countries in continental Europe.
(2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life
imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act
No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted.

Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the
occupant consist of, first, the territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order and social and commercial life of
the district in a relation of mutual adaptation, so that any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is
enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial law as may be required by real necessity and are not
expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns
the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers, it being necessary for the
protection of the latter, and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them, that acts committed to their detriment shall not
only lose what justification the territorial law might give them as committed against enemies, but shall be repressed more
severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects. Indeed the entire relation between the
invaders and the invaded, so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or
in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to
what is called martial law." (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, p. 96.)

According to Hyde (International Law, Vol. II, p. 386), the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation
to belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or system of law, or to a special agency entrusted with its
administration. The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied, having the sanction of military authority, is
essentially martial. All law, by whomsoever administered, in an occupied district martial law; and it is none the less so when
applied by civil courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestive of
the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit; that is, to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to
establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders, to fix penalties, and generally to administer justice through such agencies
as the found expedient.

And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and
regulations as military necessity demands, and in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of
military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control
of the country and the protection of the army, for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading
army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76, 77.)

From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through
the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes
of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws
and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum.
Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different
and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for
the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and
efficiency, and the success of its operations.

They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. — The criminal acts penalized by said Act No.
65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier
than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of
the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by
Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the
belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in
order that, in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right
to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907).
Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had
depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.

The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, to wit: treason,
espionage, inciting war, violation of neutrality, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, piracy; and the
crimes against public order, such as rebellion, sedition and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms and other, penalized by
Ordinance No. 7 and placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political
complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than
private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent
occupant. While it is true that these offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government, are
defined and also penalized by the territorial law Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier
upon the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made
punishable by said Ordinance No. 7, for they were not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against
the belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Island. They are also considered by some writers as war
crimes in a broad sense. In this connection Wheaton observes the following:

"Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or
forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. Thus, in the Anglo-
Boer war, the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law; — Being in possession
of arms, ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending prohibited goods; holding meetings other than those allowed;
using seditious language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods; wearing uniforms without due authority; going out
of doors between certain hours; injuring military animals or stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles,
cycles, etc.; hindering those in execution of military orders; trespassing on defense works. Such offenses, together with several
others, were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war." (Wheaton's International Law, War,
seventh edition, 1944, p. 242.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the
petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.
(3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government;
that is whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased
to be valid from that time.

In order to resolve this last question, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. It is sufficient to
quote the opinion on the subject of several international jurists and our recent decision in the case of  Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, supra.

Hall, commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the
belligerent occupant, opines "that judicial acts done under this control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative
acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same
time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . . Political acts on the other hand fall through as of
course, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the
working of that already in existence. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had
reference to acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against the security or control
of the invader." (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518.)

Westlake, speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question, which is within
the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to punish, says that: "To the extent to which the legal power of the
occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the
duty of giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations, not indeed so as to be debarred from carrying out his will without
notice, when required by military necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment,
but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be
outrageous. But the law made by the occupant within his admitted power, whether morally justifiable or not, will bind any
member of the occupied population as against any other member of it, and will bind as between them all and their national
government, so far as it produces an effect during the occupation. When the occupation comes to an end the authority of the
national government is restored, either by the progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace, no redress
can be had for what has been actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation. A prisoner
detained under it must be released, and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced. The enemy's law depends on him
for enforcement as well as for enactment. The invaded state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his
commands. (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, pp. 97, 98.)

And Wheaton, who, as above stated, considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. 7 and Act No.
65, says: "In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law should not be abrogated by the
subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e.g., alienation of
the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for 'war treason' and  'war crimes,' to acts of a political character, and to
those that beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been
carried out." (Wheaton's International Law, supra, p. 245.)

We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all
judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the
islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which
convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid  ipso facto upon the
reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas
MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which
petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered
against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect.

We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto  upon the reoccupation of these Island and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be
released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Moran, C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA, J.,  concurring:

Amidst the forest of opinions that have cropped up in this case it would seem unnecessary to plant an additional tree. To justify
our effort — lest we seem intent to bring coal to Newcastle — we ought to state that the following opinion had been prepared
before the others were tendered. It has been impossible for the Court to reconcile and consolidate the divergent views of its
members although they arrive at practically the same result.

Accused of robbery in the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila, the petitioner was found guilty and
sentenced to life imprisonment. He commenced to serve the sentence on August 21, 1944. He now petitions this Court for the
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that Ordinance No. 7, by which the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction was
created and which was promulgated on March 8, 1944, by the President of the "Republic of the Philippines," was null and void
ab initio. The Solicitor General, answering the petition on behalf of the respondent Director of Prisons, expressed the opinion
that "the acts and proceedings taken and before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in
the conviction and imprisonment of the herein prisoner should now be denied force and efficacy," and recommended "that the
writ of habeas corpus prayed for be granted and that the City Fiscal be instructed to prepare and file the corresponding
information for robbery against the petitioner herein in the Court of First Instance of Manila."

The case was argued before us on September 21 and 22, 1945, by the First Assistant Solicitor General on behalf of the
respondent and the City Fiscal as amicus curiae — the former impugning and the latter sustaining the validity of said Ordinance
No. 7. Section 1 of the ordinance in question reads as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby created in every province and city throughout the Philippines one or more courts of special
criminal jurisdiction as the President of the Republic of the Philippines may determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice, which courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine crimes and offenses penalized by
Act No. 65 entitled "An Act imposing heavier penalties for crimes involving robbery, bribery, falsification, frauds, illegal
exactions and transactions, malversation of public funds and infidelity as defined in the Revised Penal Code and
violations of food control laws, when committed by public officers and employees, and for similar offenses when
committed by private individuals or entities, and providing for a summary procedure for the trial of such offenders."

Section 2 confers upon the court mentioned in section 1 exclusive jurisdiction also to try the following crimes as defined in the
Revised Penal Code: crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, brigandage, arson and
other crimes involving destruction, illegal detention committed by private individuals and kidnapping of minors; and illegal
possession of firearms, as defined in an executive order. Section 3 provides for the appointment of one judge of first instance to
preside over the court above mentioned and of a special prosecutor in each special court. Section 4 authorizes the court to
impose a longer term of imprisonment than that fixed by law, or imprisonment for life or death where not already fixed by law, for
the crimes and offenses mentioned in section 2. The remaining sections read as follows:

SEC. 5. The trial of the cases arising sections 1 and 2 hereof shall be started within two days after the filing of the
corresponding information, shall be summary in procedure, and shall aim at their expeditious and prompt disposition.
Technicalities shall be avoided, and all measures calculated to serve this end shall be taken by the trial judge. Said
cases shall be decided within four days after the same are submitted for decision. The summary procedure provided in
Act No. 65 insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, shall govern the trial of the cases
enumerated in said sections 1 and 2 hereof.

SEC. 6. The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except where the penalty imposed is death, in
which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated en consulta to a special division of the Supreme Court
composed of the three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The clerk of each
special court, upon the promulgation of a decision imposing the death penalty, shall immediately forward the records of
the case to the special division of the Supreme Court herein created, which shall decide the case within fifteen days
from the receipt of the records thereof.

SEC. 7. The interest of public safety so requiring it, the privileges of the writ of  habeas corpus are hereby suspended
with respect to persons accused of, or under investigations for, any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections
1 and 2 hereof.

SEC. 8. All laws, rules or orders, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions hereof, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

SEC. 9. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its promulgation.

The summary procedure provided in Act No. 65 of the "Republic," as referred to in section 5 above quoted, is in turn that
established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, dated May 18,
1943. Under said procedure (section 17) "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer, authorizing
peace officers to search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant, including those which may be regarded as
evidence of an offense under this Order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2,
Rule 122, of the Rules of Court." Section 18 reads as follows:

SEC. 18. The accused or his representative may be examined by the court, and with the permission of the court, by the
fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him or his principal; and either may apply
to the judge for the examination of the co-accused or the representative of the latter in matters related to the defense of
the accused. Statements made by the accused, his co-accused, or the representative of the accused or a person acting
in a similar capacity, irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made, shall be admissible in evidence if
material to the issue.

Section 21 provides for the summary trial in the following manner:

Such trials shall be conducted according to the following rules:

(a) After arraignment and plea, the court shall immediately cause to be explained to the accused the facts constituting
the offenses with which he is charged, and the judge shall interrogate the accused and the witnesses as to the facts and
circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted.

(b) Refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to
him.

(c) Except for justifiable reasons, the accused shall not be allowed to plead and assert defenses that are inconsistent
with each other.

(d) If from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogation, it should appear that the accused is guilty of the crime
charged in the information, or in any other information, or in any other information, or in any other information
 subsequently filed by the prosecuting officer, a sentence of conviction may be immediately rendered against the
accused. Otherwise, the judge shall dictate an order distinctly specifying the facts admitted by the accused and those
which are in dispute, and the trial shall be limited to the latter, unless the judge, for special reasons, otherwise directs.

(e) Unjustified absence of an accused who has been released on bail, or of his representative shall not be a ground for
interrupting the proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment.

The provisions of Rules 115 to 117 of the Rules of Court shall be suppletory to the foregoing insofar as they are not in
conflict therewith.

The records shows that during their existence the courts of special and exclusive criminal jurisdiction created by the ordinance in
question convicted and sentenced a total of 94 individuals, 55 of whom had been prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms
and 15 for robbery; and that of the 94 convicts only 3, including the herein petitioner, remain in confinement, 21 having escaped,
37 having been released, and 33 having died.

In synthesis, the argument of the Solicitor General is as follows: Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by
the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations, are null and without effect as against the legitimate government.
(Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed., p. 245.) Acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or intended
to defeat the just rights of citizens, and other Acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void.
(Texas vs. White, 74 U. S., 733; 19 Law. ed., 240.) Judicial or legislative acts in the insurrectionary states were valid where they
were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government, and did not impair the
rights of citizens under the Constitution. (Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570-581; 21 Law. ed., 660.) All the enactment of the de
facto legislatures in the insurrectionary states during the war, which were not hostile to the Union or to the authority of the
General Government and which were not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or of the states, have the same
validity as if they had been enactments of legitimate legislatures. (United States vs. The Home Insurance Co., 22 Wall., 99-104;
22 Law. ed., 818.) Tested by these principles of international law, Ordinance No. 7 must be declared void (1) because it favored
the forces of occupation and the civilian Japanese inasmuch as it provided an excessively heavy penalty for the summary trial of
possession of firearms and violations of food control regulations and (2) because it impaired the rights of citizens under the
Constitution inasmuch as the procedure therein prescribed withdrew the privilege of the accused against self-incrimination and
his right to appeal to the Supreme Court even where the penalty imposed was life imprisonment or death.

In substance, the City Fiscal argues that the heavier penalty for the illegal possession of firearms than that fixed by the
Administrative Code was not directed toward the suppression of underground activities against the Japanese army, and the rigid
enforcement of the food control measures was not intended to insure the procurement of supplies by said army, because in any
event the Japanese military occupant freely exercised the power to go after and punish his enemies directly without recurring to
the agencies of the "Republic," for there were even cases where the offenders were already in the hands of the police or courts
of the "Republic" but they were unceremoniously taken from said agencies by the Japanese military police and punished or
liquidated by it at Fort Santiago or elsewhere; and as regards food control, the Japanese forces did not have any need of the
measures or agencies established by the "Republic" because the Japanese forces themselves commandeered what they
needed or sent out their own agents to purchase it for them at prices even much higher than those fixed by the "Republic"; that
the procedure prescribed afforded a fair trial and did not violate any fundamental rights; that the military occupant was not in
duty bound to respect the constitution and the laws of the occupied territory; that he could abrogate all of them and promulgate
new ones if he so chose; that the cases cited by the Solicitor General are not applicable because they deal with the validity of
acts and processes of the governments of the rebel states during the Civil War and are based upon the indissolubility of the
Union; that the validity or nullity of the ordinance in question should be judged in the light of the provisions of the Constitution
and the laws of the "Republic" and of generally accepted principles of international law; that even assuming that it should be
judged by the standard or the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the ordinance satisfies all the requirements of said
Constitution; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional but a purely statutory right which may be granted or
withheld at the pleasure of the state; and, finally, that the supposed invalidity of the sentence imposed against the petitioner
cannot be raised by habeas corpus.

There is no question that in virtue of that of the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148),
Ordinance No. 7 is no longer of any force and effect since the restoration of the Government of the Common wealth of the
Philippines. The question before us is whether said ordinance ever acquired any force and effect or was null and void ab initio.

Invoking decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in cases involving the validity of Acts of the Confederacy and of a
rebel state as a de facto government during the Civil War, the Solicitor General maintains that the ordinance in question was null
and void because it impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution and because it was hostile in its purpose to the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The decisions invoked would be applicable if the so-called Republic of the Philippines should be considered as a government
established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the Commonwealth and the Sovereignty of the United States. The
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States declaring invalid Acts of a rebel state or of the Confederacy which were in
furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States or which impaired the rights of citizens under the Constitution, rest
on the proposition that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble and that the obligations of allegiance to the state, and obedience
to her laws, subject to the Constitution of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession. (See
Texas vs. White, 74 U.S., 700; 19 Law. ed., 227, 237; William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed. 716.) Obviously, that
proposition does not hold true with respect to a de facto government established by the enemy in an invaded and occupied
territory in the course of a war between two independent nations. Such territory is possessed temporarily so possessed
temporarily by lawful government at war with the country of which the territory so possessed is a part, and during that
possession the obligations of the inhabitants to their country are suspended, although not abrogated (United States vs. Rice, 4
Wheat., 253; Fleming vs. Page 9 How., 614; Baldy vs. Hunter, 171 U.S., 388; 43 Law. ed., 208, 210.) In the case of
Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, the court, speaking though Mr. Justice Field, observed: "The rule stated by Vattel, that the justice of
the cause between two enemies being by law of nations reputed to be equal, whatsoever is permitted to the one in virtue of war
is also permitted to the other, applies only to cases of regular war between independent nations. It has no application to the case
of a war between an established government and insurgents seeking to withdraw themselves from its jurisdiction or to overthrow
its authority. The court further stated that the concession of belligerent rights made to the Confederate Government sanctioned
no hostile legislation and impaired in no respect the rights loyal citizens as they had existed at the commencement of hostilities.
On the other hand, in a war between independent nations "the rights of the occupant as a law-giver have broad scope." He
many "suspend the existing laws and promulgate new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action.
According to the Rules of Land Warfare he will naturally alter or suspend all laws of a political nature as well as a political
privileges, and laws which affect the welfare and safety of his command." (Hyde on International Law, vol. 2, p. 367.) It will be
seen then that in a war between independent nation the army of occupation has the right to enact laws and take measures
hostile to its enemy, for its purpose was to harass and subdue the latter; and it is not bound to respect or preserve the rights of
the citizens of the occupied territory under their Constitution.

Let us now look into the nature and status of the government styled "Republic of the Philippines "in order to determined the
criterion by which the validity of its enactments should be tested. In the recent case of  Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
Dizon  (G.R. No. L-5, p. 113, ante), this Court speaking through Justice Feria, had occasion to comment upon the nature of said
government in the following words:

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from
any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent
occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippines Executive Commission,
and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General
McArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which had been already quoted, "under enemy
duress a was established on October 14, 1943, base upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the
sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or
transfer the sovereignty of the United State to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its
military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty
by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in internal law,
recognized in the law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the
population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation,  being
essentially provisional, does not severe to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure
government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of
Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan
to delude of the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or
turning over the rights of governments into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that, by
doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the
United States and other allied nations.

We reaffirmed those statements. To show further the fictitious character of much-propagandized "independence" which Japan
purported to grant to the Philippines through the establishment of the "Republic", we may add that, as matter of contemporary
history and of common knowledge, in practice the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines never treated the "Republic of
the Philippines" as an independent government after its inauguration. They continued to impose their will on its executive
officials when their interests so required. The Japanese military police arrested and punished various high officials of said
government, including the First Assistant Solicitor General, and paid no attention to the protests and representations made on
their behalf by the President of the "Republic." As a climax of their continual impositions, in December 1944 the Japanese
military authorities placed the President and the members of his Cabinet under the "protective" custody of the military police, and
on the 22nd of the month forced them to leave the seat of the government in Manila and hide with them in the mountains. The
only measure they did not succeed in imposing upon the "Republic" was the conscription of the Filipino youth into an army to
fight with the Japanese against the United States. So, while in theory and for the purpose of propaganda Japan professed to be
a benefactor and liberator of the Filipinos, hoping thereby to secure their willing cooperation in her war efforts, in practice she
continued to enslave and oppress the Filipinos, as she saw that the latter remained loyal to the United States. She found that the
Filipinos merely feigned cooperation as their only means of self-preservation and that those who could stay beyond the reach of
her army of occupation manifested their hospitality by harassing and attacking that army. Thus Japan continued to oppress and
tyrannize the Filipinos notwithstanding the former's grant of "independence" to the latter. It would therefore be preposterous to
declare that the "Republic of the Philippines" was a government established by the Filipino people in rebellion against the
Commonwealth and the sovereignty of the United States.

The said government being a mere instrumentality of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army as military occupant, the
ordinance question promulgated by the President of the "Republic" must be deemed as an act emanating from the power or
authority of said occupant. The question, therefore, is whether or not it was within the competence of the military occupant to
pass such a law.

Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides as follows:

ART. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall
take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

Commenting upon this article, Hyde in his work on International Law, volume 2, pages 366, 367, 368, says:

In consequence of his acquisition of the power to control the territory concerned, the occupant enjoys the right and is
burdened with the duty to take all the measures within his power to restore and insure public order and safety. In so
doing he is given great freedom may be partly due to circumstance that the occupant is obliged to consider as a
principal object the security, support, efficiency and success of his own force in a hostile land inhabited by nationals of
the enemy. . . .

xxx           xxx           xxx

The right to legislate is not deemed to be unlimited. According to the Hague Regulations of 1907, the occupant is called
upon to respect, "unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force the ordinary civil and criminal laws which do not conflict
with security of his army or its support, efficiency, and success."
In the exercise of his powers the commander must be guided by his judgment and his experience and a high sense of justice.
(President McKinley, Order to the Secretary of War, July 18, 1898, on the occupation of Santiago de Cuba by the American
forces, Moore, Dig. VII, p. 261.)

Acts of the military occupant which exceed his power tested by the criterion set forth in article 43 of the Hague Regulations, are
null and without effect as against the legitimate government. (Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed. [1944], p. 245.)

Hall in his Treatise on Internal Law, (7th edition), discussing the extent of the right of a military occupant, states:

If occupation is merely a phase in military operations, and implies no change in the legal position of the invader with
respect to the occupied territory and its inhabitants, the rights which he possesses over them are those which in the
special circumstances represent his general right to do whatever acts are necessary for the prosecution of his war; in
other words he has the right of exercising such control, and such control only, within the occupied territory as is required
for his safety and the success of his operations. . . . On occupying a country an invader at once invest himself with
absolute authority; and the fact of occupation draws with it as of course the substitution of his will for previously existing
law whenever such substitution is reasonably needed, and also the replacement of the actual civil judicial administration
by the military jurisdiction. In its exercise however this ultimate authority is governed by the condition that the invader,
having only a right to such control as is necessary for his safety and the success of his operations, must use his power
within the limits defined by the fundamental notion of occupation, and with due reference to its transient character. He is
therefore forbidden as a general rule to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations, or which
regulate the moral order of the community. . . . (Pages 498, 499.)

We deduce from the authorities that the power of the occupant is broad and absolute in matters affecting his safety. But in affairs
which do not affect the security, efficacy, and success of his military operations, his power is qualified by the transient character
of his administration. He is forbidden "to vary or suspend laws affecting property and private personal relations, or which
regulate the moral order of the community." Unless absolutely prevented, he is bound to laws, and civil and criminal, in force in
the country.

Tested by this criterion, was it within the power or competence of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese army of occupation
of the Philippines to promulgate Ordinance No. 7? In so far as said ordinance created new court of special criminal jurisdiction
we think his power to promulgate and enforce it during the occupation cannot be seriously disputed; but in so far as that
ordinance varied radically our law of criminal procedure and deprived the accused of certain rights which our people have
always treasured and considered inviolate, we are of the that it transcended his power or competence. We base this opinion
upon the following considerations:

1. The occupant was not absolutely prevented from respecting our law of criminal procedure and the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal jurisdiction. The application or nonapplication of said law did not affect the security, efficacy, and success of
his military operations. The crimes over which the said court was vested with jurisdiction were mostly crimes against property
penalized in our Revised Penal Code, which crimes did not affect the army of occupation. As to the illegal possession of firearms
the City Fiscal himself, who the validity of the ordinance, informs us that the occupant did not avail himself of said court but
punished his enemies direct without recurring to the agencies of the "Republic"; and he further informs us that "as regards food
control, the Japanese forces did not have any need of the measures or agencies established by "Republic", nor did they make
use of them.

2. The summary procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 was inquisitorial, repugnant to the humanitarian method of
administering criminal justice adopted by all progressive, democratic, and freedom-loving countries of the world, and, therefore,
devoid of that high sense of justice by which the military occupant must be guided in the exercise of his powers. This concept is,
we think, borne out by an examination of the following features of said procedure:

(a) Under the rule of procedure embodied in said ordinance any prosecuting officer may, on his own volition and even without
probable cause, issue a search warrant for the seizure of documents and articles which may be regarded as evidence of an
offense — in violation of section 2, Rule 122 of the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, which
guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures," and prohibits the issuance of warrants except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

(b) The trial must be commenced within two days after the filing of the information — in violation of section 7, Rule 114, which
give the accused at least  two days after the plea of not guilty within which to prepare fort trial.

(c) The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in all criminal prosecutions until the contrary is proved, which is
likewise guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, is violated in that, after the arraignment and before the presentation of any proof for the
prosecution, the accused is interrogated by the judge as to the facts and circumstances of the case, and if from the facts
obtained by such interrogation it should appear (to the judge) that accused is guilty a sentence of conviction may be immediately
rendered against him, thereby also depriving him of his right to meet the witnesses face to face and of his privilege against self-
incrimination.

The City Fiscal justifies this feature of the procedure by giving the following hypothetical case: "In the house of Juan and under
his bed a policeman finds a revolver. Juan is arrested and an information for illegal possession of firearms is filed against him by
the fiscal. He is brought before the judge of the corresponding special court for the preliminary interrogatory. He is asked
whether or not he admits that the revolver was found in his house. He answers in the affirmative but says that he is not the
owner of the revolver and he does not know how it placed there. Asked whether he knows of anybody who could have placed
the revolver under his bed, he answers that it might have been place there by a guest who slept on his bed the night previous to
its discovery by the polices. He is asked to give the name of the guest reffered to and his address, but he refuses to answers.
Asked if he has other witnesses to support his claim, he answer that he has none. As may be seen, the evidence of guilt is
complete, and there being no further evidence to be presented that may change the result the accused may be then and there
sentenced by the court. In this case, the conviction of the accused is reasonable and fair, for his refusal to reveal the identity of
his alleged guest may due, either to the fact that there was no such guest, or that the cause for concealing his identity is worth
suffering for. Volente non fit injuria."
But to us that hypothetical case is a good illustration of the injustice of such procedure. There the accused was convicted not
because the prosecution had proved his guilt but because he was unable to prove his innocence. His inability to prove who the
owner of the revolver was, did not to our mind prove him guilt, beyond reasonable doubt, under the circumstances. He was
accused of illegal possession of firearm, an offense punishable under the ordinance in question with imprisonment for six to
twelve years. He pleaded not guilty, for according to him the revolver was not his and he did not know how it got into his house.
He had no time to investigate and try to find out whether the policeman himself or some the other person who wished to do him
harm had planted it there, sooner was the revolver seized than he was brought before the court and interrogated about it when
he was naturally dazed and in a state of alarm. If the law of criminal procedure had been followed, he would have had ample
time to reflect and endeavor to unravel the mystery. He could have consulted a lawyer, and he would have been entitled to at
least two days after the information was read to him to investigate the facts and prepare for the trial. At the trial he would not
have been required to answer to any proof in his defense until the prosecution had presented its witness, principally the
policeman. His lawyer could have cross-examined the policeman and found out from him whether he had any grudge against
the accused and how he happened to search the latter's house. From the testimony of the policeman the accused might have
been enlightened as to how and by whom the revolver was place in his house. Suppose that the policeman should say that his
informant as to the presence of the revolver under the bed of the accused was a houseboy of the latter, and suppose that
houseboy was really the one who planted the revolver because of some grievance he had against his master but that the latter
had not suspected before that his houseboy had any revolver. In view of the revelation of the policeman he would had been able
to investigate and ascertain that fact. In that he way he could have satisfactory explained how and by whom the revolver was
placed under his bed. But under the procedure in question as outlined by the City Fiscal, the accused was of course utterly
unable to do that and was consequently doomed to at least six years' imprisonment for a crime he had not committed.

(d) Section 6 of the Ordinance in question provided: "The decisions of the special courts herein created shall be final except
where the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated  en consulta to a special
division of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines."
Under our law of criminal procedure, which the military occupant was bound to respect unless absolutely prevented, all persons
accused of any offense have the right to appeal to the Court Appeals or to the Supreme Court. It is true that as rule that right is
statutory and may be withdrawn by the legislature except in certain cases where the right to appeal is provided in the
Constitution itself, as in the cases involving life imprisonment and death penalty; but the question here is not whether the
legislative department of the legitimate government has the power to abrogate that right but whether it was within the
competence of the military occupant to do so.

(e) In the instant case the penalty imposed upon accused by the special court, after a summary trial was  life imprisonment, and
he was denied the right to have that sentence reviewed by the Supreme Court, altho under sub-section 4, section 2, Article VIII
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, he could not have been deprived by law of that right.

( f ) Section 7 of the Ordinance suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons accused of or
under investigation for any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2. The Constitution of the Commonwealth
prohibit the suspension of that privilege except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
The suspension by the ordinance was not motivated by any one of these cases but by the necessity for waging a campaign
against certain classes of crime; martial law was not declared; and the suspension of  habeas corpus did not apply to all persons
living in the specified territory (as should have been done if the public safety required such suspension) but only to those
accused of or investigated for certain specified crimes or offenses. The result of such partial suspension was that persons
accused of or under investigation for any of the offenses specified in section 1 and 2 could be held in detention indefinitely,
whereas person accused of or under investigation for crimes other than those specified, such for example as theft, physical
injuries, homicide, murder, and parricide, had the right to demand their release by  habeas corpus after the lapse of six hours.
The same discrimination holds true with reference to the other features already noted above, namely, unreasonable searches
and seizures, summary trial, denial of the presumption innocence, self-incrimination, and denial of the right to appeal. Such
discrimination was unwarranted and unjust and was contrary to the concept of justice prevailing in all democratic countries,
where every person is entitled to the equal protection of the laws.

3. It is apparent from the foregoing examination of the main features of the ordinance that while the methods thus adopted may
not be unusual under totalitarian governments like those of the aggressor nations in the recent global war, they are strange and
repugnant to the people of the democratic countries which united together to defeat said aggressors and "to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, . . . and to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." (Preamble Charter for Peace adopted by the United Nations at San
Francisco, California, June 26, 1945.) The recent global war was a clash between two antagonistic ways of life, between facism
and democracy. It would be strange indeed if his Court, which functions under a democratic government that fought with the
other democratic nations in that war, should sanction or approve the way of life, against which that war was fought and won the
cost of million of lives and untold sacrifices.

4. The case involves the interpretation not of constitution but of international law, which "is based on usage and opinion"; and
"he who in such a case bases his reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in
accordance with humanity and justice." (Principles of International Lawrence, 7th ed., pp. 12, 13.) We think the contentions for
the petitioner against the validity of the ordinance in question are in accord with humanity and justice.

Before concluding this opinion we deem it pertinent to comment on the remark of the City Fiscal that, as stated in its preamble,
the ordinance in question was promulgated in response to "an urgent necessity for waging an immediately and relentless
campaign against certain classes and expediting the trail and determination thereof in order to hasten the re-establishment of
peace and other throughout the country and promote a feeling of security among the people conducive to the earlier return of
normalcy in our national life." We concede that the objective of the author of the ordinance was commendable, but we think —
and in this we are supported by the actual result — it was unattainable thru the means and methods prescribed in said
ordinance. Peace and order and normalcy could not be restored unless the root cause of their disturbance were eliminated first.
That cause was the presence in the country of the Japanese army, which wrecked our political, social, and economic structures,
destroyed our means of communication, robbed the people of their food, clothing, and medicine and other necessities of life,
ejected them from their own homes, punished and tortured innocent men and women, and other wise made life unbearable. The
relative rampancy of the crimes mentioned in said ordinance was but the effect of that cause. The cornering and hoarding of
foodstuffs would not for the scarcity produced by the Japanese army and the disruption of our commerce and industries on
account of the invasion. The possession of firearms was rendered desirable to many person to defend themselves against or
attack the invader. Robberies and other crimes against property increased as a resulted of hunger and privation to which the
people were subjected by the rapacity of the Japanese. It was a delusion to expect peace and normalcy to return without
eliminating the cause of their disturbance or destruction of the Japanese army in the Philippines — an objective to which the
ordinance was not addressed. So, even from the point of view of the Filipino people and not of the Japanese army of
occupation, the ordinance in question results untenable.

Having reached the conclusion that the enactment of the procedure embodied in said ordinance for the special court therein
created was beyond the competence of the occupant, inasmuch as that procedure was inseparable from the first part of the
ordinance which creates the special court and prescribes the jurisdiction thereof, we are constrained to declare the whole
ordinance null and void ab initio. Consequently the proceedings in said court which resulted in the conviction and sentence of
the petitioner are also void.

PARAS, J.,  concurring in the result:

Charged with robbery, the petitioner herein was found guilty and sentence to suffer life imprisonment. He commenced to serve
the term on August 21, 1944. Inasmuch as he was a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, the basis of the information was
Act No. 65, passed during the Japanese — sponsored Republic of the Philippines and amending certain articles of the Revised
Penal Code. The trial was held by the then existing Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which was authorized to
conduct proceedings in a special manner. Ordinance No. 7 of the "Republic.")

After General of the Army Douglas McArthur had issued the Proclamation dated October 23, 1944, the Act under which the
petitioner was charged and convicted stands nullified, and the original provisions of the Revised Penal Code restored. By virtue
of article 22 of the said Code, "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."

In the absence of other details, it may here be assumed that the offense committed is that defined in article 294, paragraph 5,
which provides as follows:

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

The penalty of prision correccional  to  prision mayor  in its medium period in other cases.

In accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts Nos. 4103 and 4225 ), the maximum penalty that
can be imposed is six months of arresto mayor.

This Court has already dismissed cases wherein the defendants were charge with the violation of law in force at the time of the
commission and trial of the crime, after said laws have been repealed by subsequent legislation, People vs. Moran (Phil., 44
387); People vs. Tamayo (61 Phil., 226 ), and also repeatedly released on writs of habeas corpus prisoners who, were given the
benefit of subsequent legislation either repealing statute under which they had been convicted or modifying the same by
imposing lesser penalties, Escalante vs. Santos (56 Phil., 483); Directo vs. Director of Prisons  (56 Phil., 692).

Prisoners who behave well are almost always liberated upon the expiration of the minimum penalty fixed in the judgments of
conviction or within a reasonable time thereafter. In the present case, there being no information that the double the period of
the minimum penalty that could be imposed upon him, he should be released. As this is the effect of the decision of the majority,
I concur in the result.

DE, JOYA, J.,  concurring:

The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the judicial proceeding held in criminal case No. 66 of the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, established in the City of Manila, during Japanese occupation, under the authority of
Ordinance No. 7, issued by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, and the effect on said proceeding of the
proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, dated October 23, 1944.

In said criminal case, herein petitioner was accused of the crime of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment, on August 21,
1944.

There can be doubt that the government established in this country by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial
Forces, under the name of the Philippine Executive Commission, was a de facto government, as already held by this Court in
civil case G.R. No. L-5 entitled Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, decided on September 17, 1945 (p. 133, ante).
Said government possessed all the characteristics of a de facto government as defined by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the following language:

But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government  de facto, but which might,
perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its
existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established
and lawful government; and (2), that while it exist it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who,
by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over
districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they
may be administrated, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod  vs. United
States [1913,] 229 U. S., 416.)

Under a de facto government, the courts of the country, under military occupation, should be kept open, and whenever
practicable, the subordinate officers of the local administration should be allowed to continue in their functions, supported by the
military force of the invader, because the responsibility of maintaining peace and public order, and of punishing crime, falls
directly upon the commander in chief of the occupying forces. And in the performance of this duty, he may proclaim martial law
(Davis, Elements of International Law [3d.], pp. 330-332).

In occupied territory, the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing authority, and to assume to such extent as it
may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers
and clothe them with designated powers, according to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues to be paid, and apply them to
its own use or otherwise. It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the
powers that may be exerted in such cases, save those which are found in the laws and customs and usages of war
(Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How., 164 ; Leitensdorfer vs. Webb, 20 Id., 176; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall.[ U.S.], 129; New
Orleans vs. Steamship Co., [1874], 20 Wall., [ U.S.], 287.

It is generally the better course for the inhabitants of the territory, under military occupation, that they should continue to carry on
the ordinary administration under the invader; but the latter has no right to force them to do so. If they decline, his only rights,
and it is also his duty, is to replace them by appointees of his own, so far as necessary for maintaining order and the
continuance of the daily life of the territory: other purposes, as these of the superior judicial offices, can bide their time
(Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).

Though the fact of occupation imposes no duties upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory, the invader himself is not left
equally free. As it is a consequence of his acts that the regular government of the country is suspended, he is bound to take
whatever means are required for the security of public order; and as his presence, so long as it is based upon occupation, is
confessedly temporary, and his rights of control spring only from the necessity of the case, he is also bound to alter or override
the existing laws as little as possible (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., 476).

The government established here under the Philippine Executive Commission was more in consonance with the general
practice among civilized nations, in establishing governments for the maintenance of peace and order and the administration of
justice, in territories of the enemy under military occupation; because said government was of a temporary character.

The government subsequently established under the so-called Philippine Republic, with a new constitution, was also of the
nature of a de facto government, in accordance with International Law, as it was established under the authority of the military
occupant and supported by the armed forces of the latter. But it was somewhat different from that established under the
Philippine Executive Commission, because the former apparently, at least, had the semblance of permanency, which however,
is unusual in the practices among civilized nations, under similar circumstances.

Under military occupation, the original national character of the soil and of the inhabitants of the territory remains unaltered; and
although the invader is invested with quasisovereignity, which give him a claim as of right to the obedience of the conquered
population, nevertheless, its exercise is limited by the qualification which has gradually become established, that he must not, as
a general rule, modify the permanent institutions of the country (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 460).

The Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted at The Hague in 1899, lays down (Arts. 42, 43)
definite rules concerning military authority over the territory of a hostile state. In addition to codifying the accepted law, it
provides that the occupant must respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

It will thus be readily seen that the municipal law of the invaded state continues in force, in so far as it does not affect the hostile
occupant unfavorably. The regular courts of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation;
and it is not customary for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, as it is easier to preserve order
through the agency of the native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws of the territory;
and the military occupant, therefore, generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial officers as are willing to serve under him,
subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young  vs. United
States, 97 U. S., 39; 24 Law. ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. United States,
229 U. S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57; Law. ed., 1260; Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578; Wilson, International Law, pp.
331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. (1909), pp. 464, 465,475,476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., pp. 421-413; Davis,
Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356-57, 359; Westlake, International
Law, Part II, War 2d ed., pp. 121-123).

The judicial proceedings conducted, under the municipal law of the territory, before the court established by the military
occupant are general considered legal and valid, even after the government established by the invader had been displaced by
the legitimate government of said territory.

Thus the judgment rendered by the Confederate courts, during the Civil War, merely settling the rights of private parties actually
within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in
aid of the rebellion, had been declared legal, valid and binding (Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S 509., 24 Law. ed., 1118;
Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 660; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 249; 22
Law. ed., 371)

When the military forces of the Confederate states were destroyed, their government perished, and with it all its enactments. But
the legislative acts of the several States forming the Confederacy stood on a different ground, and so far as they did not impair
or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Federal constitution, they were
considered as legal, valid and binding (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 177; 24 Law. ed., 716; Ford vs. Surget, 97 U. S., 594; 24
Law. ed., 1018; United States vs. Ins. Co., 22 Wall. [ U. S.], 99; 22 Law. ed., 816; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U. S.,188;
Johnson vs. Atlantic G. & W. I. Transit Co., 156 U. S., 618; 15 Sup. Ct., 520).

In the later case, the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed that the judicial and legislative acts of the rebellious States,
as de facto governments, should be respected by the courts, if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to
the authority of the national government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Federal Constitution.
(Baldy vs. Hunter, 171 U. S., 388; 18 Sup. Ct., 890; Law. ed., 208.)
Under the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944, declaring null and void all laws, regulations and
processes issued and promulgated by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation, said Ordinance No. 7 promulgated on March 8, 1944, creating the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction, ostensibly for the speedy reestablishment of peace and order, and Executive Commission, prescribing summary
rules of procedure, and other allied laws, such as Act No. 65 of the puppet republic, prescribing heavier penalties, became null
and void, once the Japanese armies in the Philippines had been defeated, as with them the  de facto governments, successively
established under them, perished, and with them all their enactments and processes of a hostile character.

But there are other considerations equally important why judicial proceedings held and conducted before the courts established
by said de facto governments, under laws promulgated by them, should be declared null and void, without violating, in the least,
settled principles, judicial precedents or public policy.

Said Ordinance No. 7 adopted as integral parts thereof said Executive Order No. 157, as well as said Act No. 65 of the National
Assembly of the puppet republic, prescribing exceptionally heavy penalties for the crimes enumerated therein.

The principal crimes mentioned in said Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65 of the puppet republic and the other allied laws are
illegal possession of firearms, robbery, violations of food-control laws, falsification malversation and bribery; and it was under
said laws that herein petitioner was prosecuted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime robbery.

The penalty of life imprisonment or death for robbery was aimed principally at the underground forces resolute and determined
to seize and remove stores of food provisions, whenever possible, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The penalty of twelve years' imprisonment for illegal possession of firearms was directed mainly against those underground
forces, that had been receiving arms from the forces of liberation across the seas.

Violation of food-control laws were included and used as a pretext and justification for the seizure and confiscation of food
provisions so badly needed by the invader.

And the inclusion under said Ordinance No. 7 of the crime of bribery and other was used as a cloak to conceal its venom and
make said law look innocent.

By the imposition of excessive penalties , by the denial of the remedy of  habeas corpus, by compelling the accused to testify
against themselves, and by denying them the right of appeal to the highest court of the land, except where the death penalty
was imposed, and by its summary procedure, said Ordinance No. 7 and the other allied laws impaired and defeated the just and
legal rights of Filipino citizens under the Commonwealth Constitution, and the supremacy of the authority of the legitimate
Government. Under said laws, the persons accused were deprived of liberty without due process of law.

In the language of this Court, "the phrase 'due process of law' used in the Philippine Bill should receive a comprehensive
interpretation, and no procedure should be treated as unconstitutional which makes due provision for the trial of alleged criminal
before a court of competent jurisdiction, for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet,
for giving him an opportunity to be heard, for the deliberation and judgement of the court, and for an appeal from such
judgement to the highest tribunal" (United States vs. Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122).

In their conception, in their purpose and mode of enforcement and execution said laws were hostile to the authority of the
Commonwealth Government and that of the United States of America; as they had been promulgated in furtherance of the war
aims of the enemy, and they are, therefore, of political character and complexion.

Those repressive laws were aimed at the men and women who had kept the faith, and whose heroes and martyrs now lie in
graves still unknown and whose names remain unsung; but whose heroic efforts and sacrifices have made immortal the legends
of Filipino resistance, and made possible our participation in the councils of free and liberty-loving peoples and nations.

Said laws are contrary to the principles of Democracy, championed by North America, whose gigantic efforts and heroic
sacrifices have vindicated human rights, human dignity and human freedom, and consecrated them anew all over the earth with
the generous blood of her children. They violate the fundamental principles of Justice for which civilized Mankind stands, under
the benign leadership of Totalitarianism and given all the nations of the earth a new birth as well as a new character of freedom,
to enable each and everyone to live a nobler and more worthy life and realize the justice and prosperity of the future.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the dispositive part of the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Feria.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

On October 21, 1944, petitioner William F. Peralta began to serve, in the Muntinglupa Prison Camp, a sentence of life
imprisonment imposed by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 issued by
President Laurel of the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese regime, and now seeks a writ of  habeas corpus in order
that his liberty may be restored to him, contending that said Ordinance No. 7 was null and void  ab initio  because it was of a
political complexion and its provisions are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

Petitioner alleges that sometime in the month of September, 1943, he joined the Constabulary forces as a private, against his
will, and before joining it, he was for several times arrested and maltreated as a guerrilla member, he being then a minor only 17
years old, and that he was prosecuted, not because he committed any crime, but because he joined the guerrilla organization,
deserted the Constabulary forces, and followed political and military activities in open allegiance to the Commonwealth
Government and the United States of America.

The Solicitor General, appearing in behalf of respondent Director of Prisons, answered the petition agreeing that the acts and
proceedings taken and had before said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied force and efficacy,
and therefore, recommended that the writ prayed for be granted.
At the hearing held on September 21, and 22, 1945, there appeared to argue the First Assistant Solicitor General, impugning the
validity of said Ordinance No. 7, and the City Fiscal of Manila, as amicus curiae, who sustained the validity if the said Ordinance
and the proceeding by virtue of which petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment.

I. ORDINANCE NO. 7 AND PROCESSES UNDER IT NULLIFIED BY THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION OF

GENERAL MACARTHUR

On October 23, 1944, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Philippine-American Forces, which
fought in Bataan and later liberated the whole Philippines, as an aftermath of the liberation, issued a proclamation declaring:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government
of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control.

It appears that Ordinance No. 7 in question has been issued under the Japanese regime and that the judicial process under
which petitioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment, having been held in a court not belonging to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines but organized and established under the authority of the enemy, became null and void and without effect since
October 23, 1944, by virtue of the above-quoted October Proclamation of General MacArthur.

We have explained at length our position as to the effects of said October Proclamation in our dissenting opinion in the case
of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, 153, ante), and we deem it unnecessary to repeat what we
stated in said opinion.

It is fortunate that all the members of the Supreme Court arrived at a unanimous conclusion as to the absolute nullity of the
process under which petitioner is now being held in prison.

The shocking character of the provisions of Ordinance No. 7 and the processes held under it show once more how General
MacArthur was absolutely right and justified in issuing the October Proclamation.

There are indications that more processes held under the Japanese regime will come to our knowledge, revealing strong
grounds for their annulment, justifying, like the process here in question, the wisdom of the decision of General MacArthur in
nullifying in a sweeping manner all judicial processes held during enemy occupation.

The October Proclamation is, in keeping with the following official statement of the President of the United States:

On the fourteenth of this month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Islands with Jose P. Laurel, formerly
a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court as president. Jorge Vargas, formerly a member of the Philippine
Commonwealth Cabinet and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with
Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second
act was a hypocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was designed to confuse
and mislead the Filipino people.

I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present
Philippine Republic has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. . . .

Our sympathy goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — that great majority of
the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy. . . .

October 23, 1943

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

President of the United States

(From U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1943, pp. 93, 94.)

Putting aside the October Proclamation, by a mere perusal of the ordinance in question, we will see immediately how such law
and the processes held under it are incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure,
universally recognized in civilized modern nations and how such ordinance and processes can only be justified by a
retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural, and political atmosphere of the era of darkness.

II. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Section 5 of Ordinance No. 7 provides that cases arising under it shall follow the summary procedure provided in Act No. 65 of
the Laurel Philippine Republic, which, in turn, is the same as that established by Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the
Chairman of the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission, dated May 18, 1943.
Under said procedure, "search warrants may be issued by the court or by any prosecuting officer, authorizing peace officers to
search for and seize any articles or objects described in the warrant, including those which may be regarded as evidence of an
offense under this order even if such articles or objects are not included among those described in section 2, Rule 122, of the
Rules of Court." This provision is repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, sense
of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in the following words of our fundamental law:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 3, Constitution of the Philippines.)

This constitutional provision is violated by the summary, unreasonable, and arbitrary procedure provided under the authority of
the ordinance in question:

(1) By authorizing "any prosecuting officer" to issue search warrants, when under our Constitution such search warrants should
be issued only by a judge;

(2) By trespassing the limits established by section 2, Rule 122, of the Rules of Court, considered as a necessary element to
make the warrant reasonable;

(3) By authorizing the search and seizure of articles or objects not described in warrant, which is the real meaning of the words
"including those which may be regarded as evidence of an offense under this Ordinance."

III. DISCRIMINATORY AND INIQUITOUS SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7 in question provides that "the privileges of the writ  habeas corpus are hereby suspended with
respect to persons accused of, or under investigation for, any of the crimes and offenses enumerated in sections 1 and 2
hereof."

This provision is also violative of one of the fundamental guarantees established in the Constitution of the Philippines, which
provides that the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended only in case of "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" and only "when
the public safety requires it."

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 14, Constitution of the Philippines.)

Again, it is evident that the ordinance in question is repugnant to the deep sense of right of our people. It is so, not only because
it suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, without the circumstances which can only justify said suspension, but
because it flagrantly violates the fundamental principle of equality before the law, by depriving the accused, in cases falling
under the ordinance in question, of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which is not denied to the accused in all other
cases:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.)

IV. VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF- INCRIMINATION

Under section 18 of Executive Order No. 157, above mentioned, "the accused or his representative may be examined by the
court, and with the permission of the court, by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to
him of his principal." (Emphasis ours.)

It is also provided that "statements made by the accused, his co-accused, or the representative of the accused or a person
acting in a similar capacity, irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made shall  be admissible in evidence if
material to the issue." (Emphasis ours.)

Under section 21 of Executive Order No. 157, after arraignment and plea, "the judge shall interrogate the accused . . . as to facts
and circumstances of the case in order to clarify the points in dispute and those which are admitted." In the same section it is
also provided that "refusal of the accused to answer any questions made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable
to him." (Emphasis ours.)

Under the same section the absence of an accused or of his representative "shall not be a ground for interrupting the
proceedings or attacking the validity of the judgment."

From the foregoing, it appears:

(1) That the accused may be examined by the court or any prosecuting officer as to any matters favorable or unfavorable to him;

(2) That the refusal of the accused to answer may be considered unfavorable to him;

(3) That statements made by the accused, "irrespective of the circumstances under which they were made" (that is, even under
third degree procedure, or exacted through brutal kempei tortures), shall be admissible in evidence;
(4) That not only the accused, but "his representative" (his lawyer, whose personal security was jeopardized under the Japanese
regime), may be examined by the court or by the fiscal or other prosecuting officer, as if said representative or attorney is facing
the same criminal prosecution instituted against his client;

(5) That the statement made by said representative or attorney, although exacted under duress, intimidation, or torture, shall be
admissible in evidence;

(6) That statements made by any person acting in a similar capacity as a representative of the accused which may be a relative
or a friend or, even an impostor who might pose as a representative to assure the doom of the accused, "irrespective of the
circumstances under which they were made (that is, even if made in the absence of the accused, or in the same circumstances
under which masked spies decreed the death of innocent citizens pointed by them during zoning concentrations), shall be
admissible in evidence;

(7) That trial shall proceed in the absence of the accused;

(8) That trial shall proceed in the absence of his attorney or other representative.

It is evident that the procedure established violates the following provisions of our fundamental code:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 17, Constitution of the Philippines.)

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 18, Idem.)

The procedure is so revolving, so nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes a real courage to keep our
equanimity while we are compelled to analyze it.

It is beyond our comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure,
which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice.

We must be very careful to retain zealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. We must not forget that that
constitutional guarantee was acquired as a result of protest against all inquisitorial and third degree procedures. We must not
forget how, not very long ago, in the thirteen colonies of America, alleged witches were burned at the stake, as a means of
compelling them to confess their fantastic compacts with the devil. We must not forget how an institution created in the twelfth
century was the cause of so much tortures and sufferings, and that the terroristic menace of its rakes was abolished in Spain,
and therefore in Philippines, only in 1834.

We must not forget that during normal times, under the twentieth century lights, just before the last global war started, in the
United States of America and in the Philippines, denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents the law were
often heard. This very Supreme Court, not only once, had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even
today, among criminal cases we have under consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal
means.

No matter what merits can be found, from the theoretical point of view, in the arguments of those who are championing the
suppression of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, the undeniable reality of human experience shows
conclusively the absolute need of such guarantee if justice must be served. Even with the existence of such guarantee, there are
officers of the law who cannot resist temptation of using their power to compel, through third degree methods, innocent or guilty
persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self-
incrimination, and no man, however innocent he may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life.

V. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF APPEAL TRAMPLED UPON

In section 6 of Ordinance No. 7, it is provided that "the decision of the special courts herein created shall be final except where
the penalty imposed is death, in which case the records of the particular case shall be elevated  en consulta to a special division
of the Supreme Court composed of three members to be designated by the President of the Republic of the Philippines."

This provision is a clear violation of the fundamental right of appeal, constitutionally guaranteed to all accused in the Philippines.
Under the Constitution of the Philippines, all accused are entitled to appeal to the Supreme Court:

(1) In all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in
question. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.)

(2) In all cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (Art. VIII,
sec 2, No. 2, Idem.)

(3) In all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 3, Idem.)

(4) In all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 4, Idem.)

(5) In all cases in which an error or question of law is involved. (Art. VIII, sec. 2, No. 5, Idem.)

Before the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, it was the prevailing theory in judicial decisions that the right of appeal
is not a fundamental one, but it is a mere privilege or mere statutory grant.
The drafters of our Constitution, taught by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one
of the most irretrievable human weaknesses.

The drafters of our Constitution, therefore, considered it necessary to establish constitutional guarantees to reduce to its
minimum the effects of such innate human weakness by providing that the appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be
enjoyed by any accused, who, under the specific provisions of the Constitution, believed himself to be the victim of a wrong in
any inferior court.

The fact that the provisions of section 2, of Article VIII, of the Constitution, instead of stating that the accused shall not be denied
of the right of appeal in the cases mentioned therein, provide that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts, in the specified cases, does not impair nor diminish the fundamental character of the
right of appeal of the accused to the Supreme Court.

The provisions of section 2, of Article VIII, of the Constitution, have been enacted by our Constitutional Convention, not for the
benefit and well-being of the people.

In fact, the Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. The
Supreme Court is not an entity or institution whose rights and privileges must be constitutionally guaranteed. It is only a means.
It is one of the means considered necessary by our Constitution to better serve the supreme interest of the people.

As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of the United States itself declared that the elimination of said tribunal is not incompatible
with the existence of a government of laws. In a case of denaturalization wherein the Government of the United States sought to
deprive a person of his American citizenship, on the ground that the 1928 platform of the Communist Party of the United States,
to which the respondent belonged, advocated the abolition of the supreme Court, of the Senate and the veto power of the
President, and replacement of congressional districts with "councils of workers" in which legislative and executive powers would
be united, the Federal Supreme Court declared:

These would indeed be significant changes in our governmental structure — changes which it is safe to say are not
desired by the majority of the people in this country — but whatever our personal views, as judges we cannot say that
person who advocates their adoption through peaceful and constitutional means is not in fact attached to the
Constitution — those institutions are not enumerated as necessary in the government's test of "general political
philosophy", and it is conceivable that "orderly liberty" could be maintained without them. The Senate has not gone free
of criticism and one object of the Seventeenth Amendment was to make it more responsive to the popular will. The
unicameral legislature is not unknown in the country. It is that this Court has played a large in the unfolding of the
constitutional plan (sometimes too so in the opinion of some observers), but we be arrogant indeed if we presume that a
government of laws, with protection for minority groups would be impossible without it. Like other agencies of
government, this Court at various lines its existence has not escaped the shafts of critics whose sincerity and
attachment to the Constitution is beyond question — critics who have accused it of assuming functions of judicial review
not intended to be conferred upon it, or of abusing those function to thwart the popular will, and who advocated various
remedies taking a wide range. (Schneiderman vs. United States of America, June 21, 1943.)

VI. ABRIDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is evidently abridged in the summary procedure in criminal cases
under Ordinance No. 7:

(1) By the fact that the accused therein are victims of search warrants specially provided for them, where the guarantees against
unreasonableness in search warrants issued against other accused are specially eliminated.

(2) By depriving the accused, under the Ordinance No. 7, the privilege of the writ of  habeas corpus enjoyed by the accused in
other cases.

(3) By depriving the accused, under Ordinance No. 7 of the fundamental right of appeal in all cases, except when sentenced of
death is imposed.

(4) By discriminating against the accused, under Ordinance No. 7, where the right of appeal is retained for them, that is, in cases
where the sentenced imposed is death, by entrusting the power to revised said sentence to small minority of the Supreme Court,
under the Japanese regime, and a minority of three justices to be specially called out by the President of the Laurel Philippine
Republic, undoubtedly with the evident purpose of the confirmation of the conviction of the accused, and to make the appeal  en
consulta just an empty gesture to make the situation of the accused more pitiful by lengthening is days of agony.

(5) By placing the accused, in the case in question, under the sword of Damocles of an unfavorable presumptions, should he
refuse to answer any question that the court or any prosecuting officer might propound to him.

Under our constitution, no one shall be deprived of the "equal protection of the laws". (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 1, Constitution of the
Philippines.)

VII. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS VIOLATED

Since the American flag began to fly over our soil, the fundamental guarantee that in all criminal prosecution the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt, has been implanted in our country to remain
forever.

That guarantee was consecrated in our Constitution:

 In all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and a public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf. (Art. III, sec. 1, No. 17, Constitution of the Philippines.)

This guarantee is undoubtedly violated when, in the summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7, it is provided that the
refusal of the accused to answer any question, propounded by the court or any officer, "may raise unfavorable presumption
against him."

If we have to keep democracy in our country, we must be vigilant in upholding the constitutional principle that all persons shall
be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

This principle is the opposite of that prevailing under autocracies, or under facist or totalitarian regimes. During the Japanese
occupation all persons who might fall under the suspicion of any Japanese or their spies and lackeys, were presumed to be
guilty of any imaginary crime until they were able to convince their victimizers of the contrary, beyond any reasonable doubt.
Even then, they were submitted to preventive tortures and long months of imprisonment, just in case they might think later of
committing any offense against the Japanese or their collaborators.

VIII. ORDINANCE NO. 7 VIOLATED THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899

In the convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land, adopted by the Hague in 1899, it is provided that the military
occupant must respect the laws in force in the occupied country, unless absolutely prevented. (Arts. 42 and 43.)

The provision of the Convention has been flagrantly violated when, under the enemy occupation the Laurel Philippine Republic
enacted Ordinance No. 7 which suspended our laws, including the fundamental one, by substantially subverting the judicial
procedures in the special criminal cases instituted under said ordinance.

For this reason, said ordinance, being violative of international law, was null and void ab initio.

Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the legitimate government, once restored to its own territory,
after expelling the enemy invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or of nullifying any and all acts of the invader,
including those internationally legal ones. The situation is exactly the same as that of the owner of the house who can do
anything in it that pleases him, after expelling the bandit who was able to usurp its possession for a while.

General McArthur exercised correctly that power by the sweeping nullification decreed in his October Proclamation.

But even without the October Proclamation, the judicial process — maybe it is better to say injudicial process — which resulted
in the imprisonment of petitioner, must be shorn of all effects because it had taken place under the authority of an ordinance
which was null and void ab initio.

IX. THE DECISION CONVICTING THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY IS
UNENFORCEABLE

The decision by which petitioner William F. Peralta was convicted and is being confined for life having been rendered by a
tribunal created, functioning, and acting under the authority of a foreign State, the Emperor of the Imperial Government of Japan,
is unenforceable.

It has, therefore, the nature of a foreign decision or judgment. For that reason, it is unenforceable within the Philippines or under
the Commonwealth, as we have shown in our opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon  (G.R. No. 5,
p. 153, ante)

Said decision, having been rendered under Ordinance No. 7, which was null and void  ab initio, carries the same vice as the
ordinance under which it was rendered.

But even admitting arguendo  that said decision is valid, because it is so under international law, and is not included in the
nullification decreed by General Douglas MacArthur, still it cannot be enforced, being a foreign decision. A foreign decision can
only be enforced through the institution of an action before our tribunals. Even decisions of a court of the United States or of any
of its States or territories can be enforced in the Philippines only by the institution of an action or special proceeding before our
own courts. This theory is confirmed by sections 47 and 48, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, which read:

SEC. 47. Effect of record of a court of the United States. — The effect of a judicial record of a court of the United States
or of a court of one of the States or territories of the United States, is the same in the Philippines as in the United
States, or in the States or territory where it was made, except that it can only be enforced here by an action or special
proceeding, and except, also, that the authority of a guardian, or executor, or administrator does not extend beyond the
jurisdiction of the Government under which he was invested with his authority.

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgement of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgement, is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgement against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgement against a person, the judgement is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgement may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
 X. THE STUNNING FACTS REVEALED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS.

At the hearing of this case, respondent Director of Prisons was required to submit statistical data concerning the number of
prisoners and the various crimes for which they were convicted by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.

In submitting said statistical data, the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondent, calls our attention to the fact that, out of the
92 prisoners committed by said courts to the Bureau of Prisons for confinement, fifty-five (55), that is more than one-half, were
convicted of illegal possession of firearms, and that only 3 are now actually in confinement serving sentences, among them the
petitioner in this proceeding, thus dissipating the unfounded fear entertained by the City Fiscal of Manila, to the effect that a
pronouncement by this Supreme Tribunal that the sentences of the courts in question are null and void, will signify the release of
hundreds of criminals, whose liberty and mixing with society will endanger public peace and order.

Of the other two remaining prisoners serving sentence, one has been committed for evasion of service of sentence, and the
other for illegal possession of firearms.

Of the 55 prisoners convicted for illegal possession of firearms, 25 died, 23 were released, and 6 escaped, and this is the reason
why only one remains in confinement.

It is striking that so many prisoners died, 25 of those convicted for illegal possession of firearms, that is, almost 50% of them, 33
of the total of 94 prisoners committed, or more than one-third of them. This unusual and shocking percentage of mortality is
worth inquiring into and, certainly, cannot be counted very favorably to judicial proceedings which eventually lead to such
wholesale death, if not outright massacre.

The fact that a big number of the prisoners, 21 of them, were able to escape, was not explained to us. Is it reasonable to
surmise, from the ruthless cruelty of the proceedings and of the penalties imposed, which exacted from the mouth of the First
Assistant Solicitor General, who appeared to argue the case in behalf of the respondent, the adjective "ferocious", that the
wardens themselves, moved by pity, directly or indirectly helped the escape?

More than one-third of the prisoners committed by the said courts in confinement to the Bureau of Prisons, that is, 33 of them
died. May we ask if they died because they were executed? Of those who died, one was convicted of profiteering in rice, one of
robbery, one of kidnapping of minor, one of violation of certain sections of Act No. 66, four of crimes against public order, and 25
of possession of firearms. If all of them were executed by virtue of sentences rendered by the courts in question, that fact does
not speak very highly of their proceedings. If the accused died by natural death, there must be something physically or morally
fatal in said proceedings.

If a tree must be judged by the fruits it bears, how shall we judge proceedings so deadly, so fatal, so wantonly inhuman as the
proceedings had in the special courts in question?

The City Fiscal of Manila exerted great efforts to show that the fact that in the proceedings in question "the refusal of the
accused to answer any question made or allowed by the court may be considered unfavorable to him," does not violate the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. He even goes to the extent of maintaining the theory that such constitutional
guarantee is not essential for the protection of the substantial rights of an accused.

His argument centered on the alleged freedom of the accused to refuse to answer any question made or allowed by the court,
alleging that, if the accused chooses to refuse to answer, the court cannot compel him to answer under menace of punishment
for contempt or through any other coercive or minatory measures.

The City Fiscal seems to labor under the belief that the fact that the silence of the accused "may be considered unfavorable to
him", is of no consequence at all.

Such belief can logically be entertained alone by ignoring completely the lessons of experience in human conduct.

If the refusal to answer can be considered unfavorably to the accused, is not that the same as placing him on the hard
predicament of choosing between testifying self-incriminating and risking the fatal effects of a legal presumption of guilt? Is not
that the same as placing him between the two steel cages of a dilemma: self-incrimination or presumption of guilt? Is not that the
same as placing him between Scylla and Charybdis, between a dagger and a wall? Either way, he will always find himself under
the inexorable sword of Damocles of sure punishment, whether he testifies or refuses to testify. It is not impossible to open a
debate upon the abstract question whether the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should not remain. But the
value of such a moot question, for purposes of this case, is nil.

The constitutional guarantee had to be adopted as a protest against inquisitorial method of the past, when accused and
suspects were submitted to the most brutal torture to compel them to confess real or imaginary crimes. That past is not far away.
It seems that we are still smelling the stench of human flesh burned in the stakes, where suspected witches suffered iniquitous
death.

There is no doubt that the procedure in question shows the purpose of pandering to the most flagitious doctrines in criminal
proceedings. The transgressions of the bill of rights in all its phases cannot be hidden even to a chela in constitutional law. It is
the very negation of the administration of justice. Such procedure has absolutely no place in the framework of our juridical
system. We will feel mere whifflers in our professed convictions, principles, and creed, if we should permit ourselves to fall into
the weakness of abetting it even for a moment, which could only happen once the flambeau of reason has ceased completely to
burn. No one but the truckling lackeys of the arrogant enemy could have the servility of applauding the implantation of the
criminal procedure in question.

All arguments and dissertations are useless to conceal the real fact. Behind and under said criminal process stealthily crawls
and trundles the Nippon psychosis, like a cobra with fangs overflowing with venom. To ferret it out from the hole where it lurks,
waiting for its victims, and crush its head with one hammer blow, is an imperative measure of national self-defense.
 XI. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE RIGHT, TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE

After showing the absolute nullity of the judicial process under which petitioner has been convicted to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, the inevitable consequence is that he is entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to be immediately released, so that
he can once again enjoy a life of freedom, which is the natural boon to law-abiding residents of our country, and of which he was
unjustly deprived through means most abhorrent to human conscience.

We must not hesitate for one moment to do our duty in this case. The sooner we comply with it, the better. The process and
judgement under which petitioner has been convicted and is now undergoing an unjust imprisonment, is one of the hateful
vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. The seriousness of this matter
cannot be viewed with insouciance. We must not lose time to wipe out such vestiges if we must protect ourselves against their
poisonous effects in our political, social, and cultural patrimony.

We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride
of our people and country, under which we are enjoying the blessings of freedom and with which we hope to assure the well-
being and happiness of the unending generations who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures accumulated by a
bountiful nature in this Pearl of the Orient.

If we allow such vestiges to remain we are afraid that some historian may write about Philippine democracy, Philippine race, and
Philippine culture, what, on ancient art, Hegel said in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit", according to Kohler, the greatest work
of genius that the nineteenth century has produced:

The statues set up are corpses in stone, whence the animating soul has flown; while the hymns of praise are words
from which all belief has gone. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink, and from his games and
festivals, man no more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the Divine Being. The works of the muse lack the force
and energy of the Spirit which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of goods and
men. They are themselves now just what they are for us — beautiful fruit broken off the tree, a kindly fate has passed
on those works to us, as a maiden might offer such fruit off tree. It is not their actual life as they exist, that is given us,
not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements, which constituted their substance, nor the climate that
determined their constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which controlled the process of their growth. So, too,
it is not their living world that fate preserves and gives us with those works of ancient art, not the spring and summer of
that ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of this reality.

Our sense of national self-preservation compels us, as an imperative duty, not only to restore immediately the petitioner to his
personal liberty, but, all possible means, to obliterate even the memory of the inquisitorial summary procedure depicted in the
present case.

Such procedure exhibits either inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores
completely and debases the high purposes of a judicial procedure. It represents a hylistic ideology which proclaims the
supremacy of the state force over fundamental human rights. We must never allow the neck of our people to be haltered by the
lethal string of that ideology. It is a virus that must be eliminated before it produces the logical disaster. Such ideology is a
cancerous excrescence that must be sheared, completely extirpated, from the live tissues of our body politic, if the same must
be saved.

We cannot understand how any one can justify the summary process in question under the principles embodied in our
Constitution. To profess attachment to those principles and, at the same time, to accept and justify such kind of criminal
miscarriage of justice, is just sheer hypocrisy. It is a repetition of what Seneca did when, after preaching moral virtues, justified
without any compunction the act of Nero, the sanguinary Roman Emperor, of murdering in cold blood his own mother. It is
reproducing the crooked mentality of Torquemada, who, upon the pretext of combating and persecuting heresy to save souls
from hell, conceived the diabolical idea of condemning their victims to an advanced version of hell in this life, and among those
who suffered under the same spirit of intolerance and bigotry which was its very essence are counted some of the greatest
human characters, such as Galileo, Giordano Bruno, and Girolamo Savonarola. That procedure might find justification in the
thick heads of the Avars, Huns, Vandals, and Teutons, or in the stratified mentality of Japanese cullions, but not in a healthy
mind of a cultured person of modern times. To allow any vestige any vestige of such procedure to remain is tantamount to
reviving the situation during which our citizens endured sleepless nights in constant fear of the hobnail terror stalking in the
darkness, when their personal security and their life were hanging by the thin of chance.

We wish a way could be found to free completely our people of the sense of shame, which they cannot help feeling, engendered
by members of our race who justified such abhorrent summary procedure and allowed themselves to become a party to the
execution of a scheme only acceptable to the undeveloped mentalities of the dark ages. It is a shame that makes our blood boil
when we think that countrymen of Father Gomez, of Rizal, of Mabini, could accept procedures representing the brutal ideology
which is the very opposite of the humane, lofty, and dignified ideology that placed said heroes and martyrs among the purest
and noblest specimens that humanity produced in all countries, in all time, for all ones and light years to come.

It is with joy and pride that we agree with all our brethren in unanimously granting petitioner the redress he seeks in his petition.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result, as well as in the reasons stated in the majority opinion not inconsistent with the views expressed in my
dissenting opinion in G. R. No. L-5, Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 199, ante).

However, I would additionally base my conclusion upon broader grounds.

Firstly, I reiterate here by reference the arguments advanced in said dissenting opinion in additional support of the conclusion
that the writ of mandamus herein sought should be granted. Secondly, the importance and transcendence of the legal principles
involved justify further elaboration.
From the allegations of the petition herein, it can be deduced that the petitioner William F. Peralta was a "guerrillero" when he
was arrested, tried and convicted; and that he had never voluntarily submitted to the Japanese forces in his civil capacity.

No attempt is made in the Solicitor General's answer to controvert the facts alleged in the petition from which the foregoing
deduction flows, and from the record nothing appears which may tend to gainsay them. Even when he was forced temporarily to
join the Constabulary, which had been organized under orders of the Japanese Army in the Philippines, he did so against his
will.

Even granting for the sake of argument, and laying aside for the moment the reasons to the contrary set forth in my aforesaid
dissenting opinion, that the rules of International Law regarding the power of a belligerent army of occupation to establish a
provisional government in an occupied enemy territory, are still binding upon the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, yet such rules would not be any avail to bind the herein petitioner by the laws, regulations, process and other acts of
the so-called "Republic of the Philippines", under and by virtue of which said petitioner has been convicted to life imprisonment
by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of Manila in Criminal Case No. 66 thereof.

If we analyze the different adjudications and treatises which have been cited in support of the validity or binding force of the acts
of such provisional governments, which have been variously called de facto governments, or governments of paramount force,
with a view to finding the real ground and philosophical justification for the doctrine therein announced, we will see that reason
and that justification are made to consist in the submission of the inhabitants upon whom the said acts have been held to be of
obligatory or binding force, to the army of occupation. Thus, to cite just a few typical examples, we quote the following excerpts
from three leading cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States:

Excerpts from Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall. [U. S.], 1; 19 Law. ed., 361)

That while it (government of paramount force) exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens
who, by acts of obedience, rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for those
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government (p. 363; Emphasis ours).

The authority of the United States over the territory was suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer
be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqueror. (P.
364; Emphasis ours.).

Excerpts from Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard. [U. S.], 603; 13 Law. ed., 276):

While it (Tampico) was occupied by our troops, they were in an enemy's country, and not in their own; the inhabitants
were still foreigners and enemies and owed to the United States nothing more than the submission and obedience,
sometimes called temporary allegiance, which is due from a conquered enemy, when he surrenders to a force which he
is unable to resist. (P. 281; Emphasis ours.)

Excerpts from United States vs. Rice (4 Wheat. [U. S.], 246; 4 Law. ed., 562):

The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States
could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who  remained and submitted to the
conquerors. (P. 564; Emphasis ours.)

It results from the above-quoted pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States that the laws, regulations,
processes and other acts of the government that the occupying belligerent establishes are made binding only and precisely
upon those inhabitants from whom obedience could be effectively exacted, namely, those who remain within the effective reach
of the occupying forces and submit to them. This is plain common sense. Those who conceived and developed the doctrine
could not logically have thought of the army of occupation setting upon a civil government for those who still continued
resistance. As to them, further military operations would be necessary to reduce them to submission, before one could think of
civilly governing them.

In the Philippines, during the occupation by the Japanese of Manila and certain other portions of the Archipelago, the
overwhelming majority of the people never submitted to the Japanese invaders, and never recognized any legality in the
invasion of their country, and to the very date of liberation refused to accept the alleged protection or benefits of the puppet
governments of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the "Republic of the Philippines." The majority of our people lived in
the provinces, in the farms, hills and other places beyond the effective reach of the Japanese military garrisons. Only a small
minority submitted to the invaders for various reasons, such as their having been caught in Manila or other parts of the Island
occupying government positions, or residing therein without adequate facilities for escaping from or evading said invaders,
reasons of ill health, disabling them from living the hard life of the mountains, hills, or country places, and the like.

To have bound those of our people who constituted the great majority who never submitted to the Japanese oppressors, by the
laws, regulations, processes and other acts of those two puppet governments, would not only have been utterly unjust and
downright illegal, but would have placed them in the absurd and impossible condition of being simultaneously submitted to two
mutually hostile governments, with their respective constitutional and legislative enactments and institutions — on the one hand
bound to continue owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth Government, and, on the other, to owe
allegiance, if only temporary, to Japan. Among them we find the petitioner William F. Peralta. The surrender of the Fil-American
forces in Bataan and Corregidor did not matter so far as this was concerned. Much less did that surrender obligate all the civil
population to submit to the Japanese, and obey all their future dictations. If it did, President Roosevelt and President Osmeña
would not have so heartily commended the Philippine resistance movement and so enthusiastically extolled the firm stand of
those who participated therein, in the former's message of October 23, 1943, and in the latter's speech of February 27, 1945,
cited in the writer's above mentioned dissenting opinion. If these historic utterances should seem incompatible with any provision
of the Hague Convention, we should understand from them that both Presidents must have considered such provision as no
longer applicable to, or binding upon, the United States and the Philippines. Who knows but that their attitude was based upon
the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy by their respective peoples, which renunciation necessarily includes
all the "rights" or "powers" which may be claimed to be delivered from war so employed? Or else, upon the ground that such
provisions does not support the wrongful acts of Japan in the Philippines?

Another reason advanced to justify the creation of a provisional civil government, with its courts and other departments, in
occupied enemy territory, is the alleged convenience of the civil population. It can immediately be asserted in reply that the
convenience of the above-mentioned overwhelming majority of our people, far from requiring the establishment of such
government, was in the very nature of things positively opposed thereto. They not only did not need the supposed benefits of
such a government, but they actually reputed them as inimical to the larger interest of the very ideology and cause for which
they were continuing their resistance to those who would extend here the brutal power and pernicious influence of the now
exploded "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." They suffered, yes, and suffered much — but they placed that ideology and
that cause high above their private comfort. Let us not penalize them for it. If this government is democratic, and when it comes
to a question of convenience, whose will and whose convenience should prevail, that of the majority or that of the minority? Are
we going to force those free citizens of this free country to accept the alleged benefits and assume the burdens of a government
they have never consented to own?

I am furthermore, of opinion that there is another important consideration which argues against the recognition of the said
government as a de facto government or government of paramount force during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine
Islands. Japan, in starting and prosecuting this war against the United States and her allies by breaking the most vital rules of
civilized warfare as prescribed by International Law, must be deemed to have forfeited the right to invoke that law in so far as
specific provisions thereof would favor her or her acts. Japan in treacherously attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines,
successively on December 7 and 8, 1941, violated the rule providing for the necessity of declaring war as established at the
Hague Conference of 1907 (Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 7th ed., pp. 321-322, 325); she has infringed the rule
requiring that war prisoners be cared for and treated with humanity (Ibid, p. 377); the rule imposing the obligation to properly
tend the sick and wounded (Ibid, 384), the rule interdicting bombing of open and defenseless cities (Ibid, 522, 523) when she
bombed Manila after it had been declared an open city and all its military defenses had been removed; the rule exempting
noncombatants from personal injury (Ibid, 397) — her violations of one or the other of which were matters of daily occurrence,
one might say, during her three and a half years of tyranny and oppression in this country, and were climaxed by the
ignominious and indescribable atrocities of the mass massacre of innocent civilians during the battle for Manila. In the
interpretation of doubtful provisions of International Law, Doctor Lawrence, in his work cited above, has the following to say:

. . . If a point of Municipal Law is doubtful, men resort to supreme court for a decision, or to a supreme legislature for an
interpreting statute; but if a point of International Law is doubtful, they can resort only to general reasoning for a
convincing argument, unless, indeed, they settle the question by blows. And International Law in many of its details is
peculiarly liable to disputes and doubts, because it is based on usage and opinion. He who in such a case bases his
reasoning on high considerations of morality may succeed in resolving the doubt in accordance with humanity and
justice. (Pp. 12, 13.).

It would seem that to deny Japan benefits, because she has refused to carry the burdens of the law, is to base our reasoning
"on high considerations of morality", and to resolve any doubt, there be, as to the point in question, "in accordance with humanity
and justice." In other words (even if we applied said rules to the instant case), Japan, under the circumstances of this case,
could not be heard to say that the government which she established here was a  de facto government, or a government of
paramount force, as in the cases where such a government was deemed to exist.

In additional to what has been said above, let us see if the Japanese-sponsored "Republic of the Philippines" did not introduces
such fundamental and drastic changes in the political organization of this country, as it existed upon the date of the Japanese
invasion, as to vitiate with invalidity the acts of all its department, executive, judicial, and legislative. To begin with, the
Commonwealth Constitution was completely overthrown. It was replaced by the so-called constitution of the "Republic." A casual
comparison of these two instruments cannot fail to reveal a most revolutionary transformation of the political organization of the
country. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the retention of American sovereignty over the Philippines is expressly
recognized, for the purposes specified in the ordinance appended thereto, in the very preamble of the constitution of the
"Republic" the independence " of the Philippines is proclaim. While under the Commonwealth Constitution the President and
Vice-President are elected "by direct vote of the people "Art. VII, sec. 2), under the constitution of the "Republic" the President
(no Vice-President is provided for) was elected "by majority of all the members of the Assembly" (Art. II, sec. 2). While under
Commonwealth Constitution the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of
Representatives (Art. VI, sec. 1), under the constitution of the "Republic" that power was vested in a unicameral National
Assembly (Art. III, sec. 1). While under the Commonwealth Constitution the Senators are chosen at large by the qualified
electors of the Philippines (Art. VI, sec. 2) and the Representatives by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art. VI,
sec. 2) and the Representative by the qualified electors in the respective districts (Art. VI, 5), under the constitution of the
"Republic" the National Assembly was composed of the provincial governors and city mayors as members ex-oficio, and of
delegate elected every three years, one from each and every province and chartered city (Art. III, sec. 2), While under the
Commonwealth Constitution, respecting the Judicial Department, the members of Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress (Art. VII, sec.),
under the constitution of the "Republic" the members of the Supreme Court were appointed by the President with the advice of
the Cabinet, and all judges of interior courts, by the President with the advice of the Supreme Court (Art. IV, sec. 4).

These changes and innovations can be multiplied many times, but the foregoing will suffice for our purpose.

It has been said constantly in this discussion that political acts or acts of a political complexion of a de facto government of
paramount force, are the only ones vitiated with nullity. Of course, I disagree with those who so hold. But even by this test the
"Republic" — or, which is the same, the Imperial Japanese Forces which gave it birth — in thus introducing such positive
changes in the organization of this country or suspending the working of that already in existence, executed a political act so
fundamental and basic in nature and operation that all subsequent acts of the new government which of course had to be based
thereon, inevitably had to be contaminated by the same vitiating defect.

Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the
extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and various acts done during the same time by private
persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.. Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course,
whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the
working of that already in existence.(Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 483; Emphasis ours.)
Finally, upon closed scrutiny, we will find that all of the de facto governments or governments of paramount force which have
been cited in all this discussion were at the same time bona fide governments. The British established such a government in
Castine, and ran it is a purely British organization. The Americans established another such government in Tampico, and ran it
as an American organization. The Confederate States established a like government in the seceding States, and ran it as the
Government of the Confederacy. They were all frank, sincere, and honest in their deeds as well as in their words. But what
happened in this country during the Japanese occupation? When the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October
14, 1943, under duress exerted by the Japanese Army, did the Japanese openly, frankly, and sincerely say that government
was being established under their orders and was to be run subject to their direction and control? Far from it! They employed all
the means they could conceive to deceive the Filipino people and the outside world that they had given the Filipinos their
independence, and that "Republic" thereunder. But behind the curtain, from beginning to end, there was the Imperial Japanese
Army giving orders and instructions and otherwise directing and controlling the activities of what really was their creature for the
furtherance of their war aims. I cannot believe that those who conceived and developed the doctrine of  de facto government or
government of paramount force, ever intended to include therein such a counterfeit organization as the Japanese contrived here
— an organization which, like its counterparts in Manchukuo, Nanking, Burma, and Vichy, has been appropriately called
"puppet" by the civilized government of the world.

BRIONES, M., concurrente:

El mandamiento de habeas corpus que se solicita debe concederse.

La proclama del General McArthur de 23 de Octubre de 1944, lanzada cuatro dias despues de su desembarco en Leyte con las
fuerzas libertadoras, reza en parte lo siguiente:

3. Que todas las leyes, regulaciones y procesos de cualquier otro gobierno en Filipinas que no fuera el del
Commonwealth son nulos e invalidos y carecen de efecto legal en areas de Filipinas liberadas de la ocupacion y
control del enemigo.

Recientemente se ha discutido mucho en esta jurisdiccion sobre si la anulacion de que trata dicha proclama puede referirse
tambien a actuaciones judiciales (  judicial processes). En el asunto de Co Kim Cham contra Valdez Tan Keh y Dizon, R.G. No.
L-5 (pag, 133, ante), he opinado afirmativamente, esto es, que el alcance de esa proclama puede extenderse a veces a ciertos
actos o  procesos judiciales. Reafirmo ahora mi opinion y con mayor vigor y enfasis si cabe. Porque, a mi juicio, la sentencia de
reclusion perpetua impuesta al recurrente bajo la ocupacion militar japonesa es de aquellos actos judiciales del passado
regimen que por su naturaleza y circunstancias reclaman una decidida y pronta accion de parte nuestra en el sentido de
anularla y dejarla sin efecto. Mis razones se exponen a continuacion.

Parece innegable que la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado y convicto el recurrente durante la ocupacion japonesa era
absolutamente incompatible con las salvaguardias y garantias de un proceso justo, imparcial y ordenado que la constitucion y
legislacion procesal del Commonwealth de Filipinas otorgan a todo acusado en una causa criminal. Hay en dicha ley ciertos
aspectos decididamente repulsivos para una conciencia disciplinada en las normas y pricipios de una democracia
constitucional.

Bajo nuestro sistema procesal el acusado tiene derecho a que no se le ponga en situacion de acriminarse. Tiene a derecho a
callarse sin que esto pueda astribuirsele cargo inculpatorio alguno. Este es un derecho fundamental, garantido por la
constitucion.

Empero bajo el sistema procesal que se discute, "la negativa del acusado a constestar cualqueira pregunta formulada por el
tribunal o permitida por el mismo, puede ser considerada en contra de dicho acusado." (Seccion 21, Orden Ejecutiva No. 157.)
Bajo este mismo sistema el caracter sumarisimo del proceso llega a tal extremo que "una sentencia condenatoria puede
dictarse inmediatemente contra el acusado siempre que los hechos discubiertos en el interrogatorio preliminar  demuestren que
el acusado es culpable."

Bajo el sistema procesal del Commonwealth, cualquier acusado convicto ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia tiene el derecho
de apelar de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal superior de revision; y en los casos de condena a reclusion perpetua o a muerte,
el Tribunal Supremo es el llamado a revisar la causa, siendo compulsoria la revision en el caso de condena a muerte. Esta
jurisdiccion del Tribunal Supremo en los casos de condena a reclusion perpetua  y a muerte no se halla estatuida simplemente
por una ley ordinaria, sino que esta proveida en la misma constitucion del Commonwealth. Asi que el derecho del condenado
a reclusion perpetua o a muerte para que se revise su cuasa por el Tribunal Supremo es constitucional y, por ende, no puede
ser abolido por un simple fiat  legislativo.

En cambio, bajo el sistema procesal en controversia las sentencias de los tribunales o sumarias eran de caracter final, excepto
cuando la pena impuesta fuera la de muerte, en cuyo caso los autos se elevaban en consulta a una division especial del
Tribunal Supremo compuesta de tres miembros (Ordenanza No. 7 de la llamada Republica de Filipinas por la que se crearon
las tribunales especiales o sumarios). De modo que en esta ordenanza no solo se suprimia de una plumada el derecho de
apelar reconocido y establecido por la legislacion procesal del Commonwealth aun en los casos de delitos y penas ordinarios,
sino que inclusive quedaba abolido el derecho de apelar otorgado por la constitucion del Commonwealth al acusado condenado
a reclusion perpetua. Por este motivo el recurrente, a quien se le habia impuesto esta pena por el alergado delito de robo, no
pudo apelar de al sentencia para ante el Tribunal Supremo.

La cuestion que ahora tenemos que determinar y resolver es si debemos reconocer validez y eficacia en la sentencia por la cual
el recurrente se halla extinguiendo su condena de reclusion perpetua, o debemos anularla ahora que esta en nuestras manos el
poder hacerlo, restablecida como esta enteramente la normalidad juridica y constitucional en nuestro pais.

En favor de la validez de dicha sentencia se arguye que fue dictada por un tribunal creado por un gobierno  de jure; que aun
admitiendo el caracter inquisitorial, anti democratico de la ley procesal bajo la cual fue enjuiciado el acusado, el gobierno  de
facto era dueño de establecer los procedimientos legales que quisiera; y que, segun las reglas y doctrinas conocidas de
derecho international, las sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o delitos politicos" generalmente validas aun despues de
restablecido el gobierno de jure. Se alega que en estos casos el derecho no tiene mas remedio que ceder a la fuerza,
aceptando la realidad de los hechos consumados.

Se admite, sin embargo, que la regla tiene sus excepciones. Una de allas esque "los actos del ocupante militar que rebasen su
poder a tenor del criterio establecido en el articulo 43 de las Regulaciones de La Haya, son nulos y sin efecto con relacion al
gobierno legitimo." (Wheaton's International Law, 7th ed. [1944], p. 245.) Segun esto, las sentencias por "crimenes de guerra" o
"delitos politicos" cometidos durante la ocupacion son, por razones pecfetamente comprensibles, nulas e invalidas al
restablecerse la soberania legitima. Tambien quedan comprendidos bajo esta excepcion los denominados actos de caracter o
complexion politica.

Otra limitacion a los poderes de un gobierno de ocupacion militar es que elejercicio de tales poderes debe extenderse tan solo
hasta donde fuese necesario para su seguridad y el exito de sus operaciones, teniendo particularmente en cuental el caracter
transeunte de su occupacion. Como regla general, al invasor se le  prohibe alterar o suspender las leyes referentes a la
propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas, o las leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad . (Hall, Treatise on
International Law, 7th ed., 498,499). Lo que se hace fuera de estas limitaciones es en exceso de su competencia y es
generalmente nulo al rstaurarse la soberania legitima.

Otra excepcion es la que se refiere a los actos de un gobierno de facto resultante de una insurreccion, rebelion, revolucion o
guerra civil. A esteefecto se ha declarado, peo ejemplo. que los actos en fomento o apoyo de unarebelion contra los Estados
Unidos, o encaminados a anular los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, y otros actos de igual indole, deben ser considerados,
por lo general, invalidos y nulos (Texas vs. White, 74 U. S.,733; 19 Law, ed., 240). En otro caso se ha declaro la validez de
ciertos actos judiciales o legislativos en estados insurreccionados, siempre que su proposito o modo de operacion no fuerte
hostil a la autoridad del gobierno nacional, o no conculcaren derechos de los ciudadanos bajo la Constitucion . —
Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Well, 570-581; 2 Law. ed., 660.)

Visto el caso que nos ocupa a la luz de estas doctrinas, ¿cual de ellas debemos adoptar para determinar si es o no valida la
sentencia por la la cual el recurrente sufre ahora pena de reclusion perpetua y pide ser liberado mediante peticion de  habeas
corpus?

Se aservera que no procede aplicar al presente caso la doctrina establecida en la jurisprudencia americana sobre gobiernos  de
facto resultantes de una insureccion, revolucion o guerra civil porque evidentemente la llamada Republica de Filipinas
instaurada durante la ocupacion militar japonesa no tenia este caracter, sino que era mas bien un gobierno establecido
mediantefuerza y coaccion por los mismos invasores para promover ciertos designios politicos relacionados con sus fines de
guerra. En otras palabras, era el mismo gobierno militar de ocupacion con fachada filipina arreglada y arbitrada coercitivamente.

Mientras estoy conforme con una parte de la asercion, esto es, que la aludida republica no tenia caracter insurreccional ni
revolucionario, en disfrute de plena autonomia, sino que era simple producto de la coaccion y estaba mediatizada
continuamente por el invasor, difiero de la otra parte, aquella que declara inaplicable la conocida doctrina americana
mencionada arriba sobre gobiernos de facto establecidos en el curso de una insurreccion, revolucion o guerra civil. Y la razon
es sencilla. Si a un gobierno de factode este ultimo tipo — gobierno establecido, despues de todo, por compatriotas,por
conciudadanos — se le coarta con la restriccion de que sus actos legislativos o judiciales, en tanto son validos, al restaurarse el
regimende jure, en cuanto no conculcaren los derechos justos de los ciudadanos, a los derechos garantidos por la constitucion,
parece que no existe ninguna razon por que no se ha de aplicar la misma restriccion al gobierno de facto establecido como
incidente de una guerra entre dos naciones independientes y enemigas. En realidad, la razon de nulidad es mucho mas
poderosa y fuertecuando, en su caso como el de Filipinas, el enemigo invasor incio la agresion de una manera inicua y
traicionera y la ejecuto luego con vesania y sadismo que llegaron a extremos inconcebibles de barbarie. En este caso
la conculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o de los derechos garantidos por la constitucion cobra  proporciones
de mucha mayor gravedad porque viene a ser tan solo parte de un vasto plan de rapiña, devastacion y atrocidades de todo
genero cometidas contra la humanidad y contra las leyes y usos de la guerra entre naciones civilizadas. El invasor, en este
caso, es como el foragido que se coloca fuera de toda ley. Por tanto, no hay absolutamente ninguna razon para no aplicarle una
restriccion que se estimabuena para el insurrecto o revolucionario.

La ventaja de extender hasta cierto punto la doctrina sobre gobiernos de facto resultantes de una insurreccion, rebelion o
guerra civil a gobiernos de facto establecidos como incidente en el curso de una guerra entre dos naciones independeientes
enemigas es que, frente a casos de conculcacion de los justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o de los garantidos por
laconstitucion para los efectos de declararlos validos o nulos al restablecerse el gobierno de jure, ya no se hace preciso
examinar si los actos conculcatorios fueron motivados por razones o exigencias de las seguridad y exito de las operaciones del
ocupante militar, sino que la piedra de toque de la validez o nulidad viene a ser tan solo el acto positivo mismo de la
conculcacion.

Esta forma de racioncinio no solo no es heterodoxa a la luz de los pincipiosestablecidos de derecho internacional, sino parece
ser una logica inferenciade los mismos. Ya hemos visto que al ocupante militar en el curso de unaguerra internacional  se le
prohibe, como regla general, alterar o suspenderlas leyes referentes a la propiedad y a las relaciones personales privadas, olas
leyes que regulan el orden moral de la comunidad. (Hall, Treatise on International Law, supra.) Ahora cabe preguntar: ¿Son los
justos derechos de los ciudadanos, o los fundamentales garantidos por la constitucion  inferiores en categoria a la propiedad, o
las relaciones personales privadas, o al ordenmoral de la comunidad? ¿No son en cierto sentido hasta superiores? Por tanto,a
nadie debe chocar que la prohibicion se extienda a estas materias. Es unainclusion y perfectamente natural, mas que justificada
por los avances y conquistas del moderno derecho internacional. Notese que en las fraguas de esta ultima guerra se han
forjado unas modalidades juridicas harto originalesque denotan el esfuerzo supremo y gigante dela humanidad por superar la
barbarie y por dar al traste con las formulas arcaicas, reaccionarias. Para citar solamente algunos ejemplos los mas destados,
tenemos el enjuiciamento de los llamados criminales de la guerra, y la responsabilidad que se exige a los jefes militares por las
atricidades cometidas por las tropas bajo su mando.

Mi conclusion, por tanto, es que desde cualquier angulo que se mire la sentencia impuesta al recurrente por el tribunal sumario
de la llamada republica de Filipinas debe ser declarada nula, acotando las palabras delProcurador General, "no solo por
razones fundadas en principios de derecho internacional, sino tambien por la mas apremiante y poderosa de las razones,la de
preservar y salvaguardar a nuestros ciudadanos de los actos del enemigo."
Dar validez a esa sentencia ahora, en plena atmosfera de libertad que respiran a pulmon lleno de resto de nuestros
conciudadanos menos el recurrente y otras que corrieron su suerte durante la ocupacion japonesa,equivaldria tanto como
prolongar el regimen de opresion bajo el cual se tramito y se dicto la referida sentencia. Es mas, equivaldria a sancionar
laideologia totalitaria, despotica, medieval contra la cual nuestro pueblo lucho tan heroicamente jugandose todo; vida libertad y
bienes materiales.

Ciertamente no nos hemos librado de la opresion para llegar a tan irrisorioresultado.

Concedase el remedio pedido.

16. Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 749

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6            November 29, 1945

ANICETO ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondent.

Buenaventura B. Martinez for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is
unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said
sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and
twenty-one days of arresto mayor  to three years, nine months and three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified
became final on September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.

Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court
was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the
Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices
constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision
on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to our decision in the
case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called Republic of the Philippines
and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de
facto  organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after
the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion. In that the same case this Court held
that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed
prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into
several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called
Republic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the  de
facto  governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the court which were continued during the
Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or
occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its decision
in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein
cited.

Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an
offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal
laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and
penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of
the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private
reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and
security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and
against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government
under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DE JOYA, J., concurring:

The principal question involved in this habeas corpus  case is the validity of the judicial proceedings held, during the Japanese
occupation, in the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which herein petitioner was accused of frustrated murder, and in the
Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, in which, on appeal, said petitioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less
serious physical injuries, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from four moths and twenty-one days of  arresto
mayor  to three years, and nine months and three days of prison correccional; and the effect on said proceedings of the
proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, dated October 24 1944. The decision of this questions requires the application of
principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal law of this country.

Under the Constitution Commonwealth of the Philippines, International Law is part of the Fundamental law of the land (Article II,
sec. 3). As International Law is an integral part of our law, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever
question of right depending upon it are presented for our determination (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S. 146; 22 Sup. Ct., 552;
46 Law. ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof of their existence is
to be found in the consent of the nations to abide by them; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of
nation, as found in the writings of publicist and in the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The
Habana, 175 U. S., 677; 20 Sup. Ct., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320.).

But while usages and customs are the older original source of International Law, great international treaties are a latter source of
increasing importance, such as The Hogue Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declare that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.

ART. XLII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all
steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32 Stat., II, 1821.).

The above provisions of the Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations giving adherence to them, among which is
the United States of America (32 Stat., II, 1821).

The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority, but only when in actual
possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of International Law (New
Orleans vs. Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. United States 229 U.S.
416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; II Oppenheim on International Law, sec. 167).

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the hostile
occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial tribunals of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military
occupation, and is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, because it is easier to preserve
order through the agency of the native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws of the
territory; and the military occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to
serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him
(Young vs. United States, 97 U.S. 39; 24 Law. ed 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509; 24 Law ed., 1118;
MacLeod vs. United States, 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260 Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578; Wilson,
International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th
ed., 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3d ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356, 357, 359;
Westlake, International Law, Part II, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).

In 1811, during the occupation of Catalonia, Spain, by the French army, a Frenchman, accused of the murder of a Catalan in
that province, was tried and convicted by the assize Court of the Department of the Pyrenees Orientales, France. Upon appeal
to the French Court of Cassation, the conviction was quashed, on the ground that the courts of the territory within which the
crime had been committed had exclusive jurisdiction to try the case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by French troops and
its government by the French authorities had not communicated to its inhabitants the character of French citizens, nor to their
territory the character of French territory, and that such character could only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which
had not been gone through." (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 461.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the name of the Philippine Executive Commission, or the
so-called Philippine Republic, afterwards, during Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and
permitting our courts to function and administer said laws, as proclaim in the City of Manila, by the commander in chief of the
Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory under military occupation governmental agencies for the
preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance with the local laws, it must
necessarily follow that the judicial proceeding conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be
considered legal and valid, even after said government established by the military occupant had been displaced by the
legitimate government of the territory.

Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely setting the rights of private
parties actually within their jurisdiction, not only tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in
furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion, had been declared valid and binding (Cook  vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed.
Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509;24 Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176; Horn vs. Lockhart,
17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188);
and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for the purchase money slaves was held valid judgment
when entered, and enforceable in 1871 (French vs. Tumllin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).

The judgments by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of the America were considered legal and valid
and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because they had been rendered by the courts of a  de
facto  government. The Confederate States were a de facto government, in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the
government obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such act of obedience
(Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.] 9; 19 Law ed., 361).

In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Supreme Court of the United States held-- "It is now
settled law in this court that during the late civil war the same general law for the administration of justice and the protection of
private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as
the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of the citizens,
under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding." (Williams  vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176;
Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White 7 Wall., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the following definition
of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government de facto, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might,
perhaps, he more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics (1) that its existence is
maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in
extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil
authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod vs. United States [1913], 229 U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the so-called Philippine
Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and should, therefor, be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial
proceedings conducted before the courts has been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, and are should
be considered as legal and valid enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as a long a said
judicial proceedings had been conducted, in accordance with the law of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the prosecution of the petitioner in this case,
for the crime of frustrated murder, which was reduced to illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and during
Japanese occupation.

Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, and that the accused should be immediately
released from the custody, under the provisions of the proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur dated October 23,
1944; as said proclamation nullifies all the laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

In other words petition demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by the General Douglas McArthur, a
contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties. When an act is
susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the Courts will always adopt the
former (United States vs. Coombs [1838]], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of Grenada County vs. Brown
[1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons
[1924], 46 Phil., 22; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national
welfare, can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public
policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction as not to lead it
injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exception to
its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter
(United States vs. Kirby, 7 Wall [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed, 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. United States, 143 U.S., 461; 12 Sup.
Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U.S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765;  In
re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt
that which saves its constitutionality, includes the duty of a avoiding a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional
questions, if it can be avoided (United States vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct. 527; 53 Law. ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the judicial proceedings
conducted before the court of the justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely applying the provisions
of the municipal law of the territory, as the provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case which have no political or
military significance, are and should be considered legal, valid and binding. It is to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur
knows said rules and principles of International Law, as International Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land,
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. And it is also to be presumed that General Douglas
McArthur has acted, in accordance with said principles of International Law, which have been sanction by the Supreme Court of
the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts, during the Japanese occupation
would be highly detrimental to public interests.

For the forgoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion, and the petition for habeas corpus filed in this case should, therefore, be
denied.

PERFECTO, J.,  dissenting:
Following our opinions in this cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 153, ante), and Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons  (p. 334, ante), G.R. No. L-5 and G.R. No. L-49 respectively, the proceedings attacked by petitioner belong to the judicial
processes declared null and void in the proclamation issued by General McArthur on October 23, 1944, and therefore, we vote the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus prayed for.

HILADO, J.,  dissenting:

Upon the grounds stated my main dissenting opinion, in G.R. No. L-5 Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon  (p. 199, ante), and
in my concurring opinion in G.R. No. L-49, Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 355, ante), I dissent from the opinion of the majority herein.
The writ of habeas corpus sought by petitioner should be granted because the nullity of the judgment and proceedings under which he
has been imprisoned and restrained of his liberty. As stated in the majority opinion, the sentence against him became final on
September 122, 1944, and had been pronounced by the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon upon appeal from a
judgment of conviction by the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.