28. Republic Vs. Batugas presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted.
Accordingly, the RTC
G.R. No. 183110 : October 7, 2013
BY: BAUTISTA
TOPIC: Naturalization, Citizenship
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del
Sur. She believes that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2
and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473 ("Revised Naturalization Law.) OSG filed its Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade ( Requirement in C.A 473)
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through
either 1. judicial naturalization under CA 473 or 2. administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found
under Section 15 of CA 473,
She first availed of derivative naturalization, but was denied. Then she
availed of judicial naturalization under CA 473, which was then granted by
the Court, she complied with all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
FACTS:
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she has all the
qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473. However (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena
failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473 had
been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in
a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds
relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion. Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucenas evidence was
then set on May 18, 2004.
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the
day of the hearing. Hence, Azucenas counsel moved that the evidence be
designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucenas
evidence. During the ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG
appeared despite due notice.
The RTC found that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance
with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.
In its Omnibus Motion,the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of
evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473,as
the law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,contending that
Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The
OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (RA
No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the
commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done
in chambers, without the public in attendance.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the OSGs appeal,the CA found that Azucenas financial
condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the
demands of human dignity. Petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino
husband, nonetheless, was able to send all her children to college, pursue a
lucrative business and maintain a decent existence. The Supreme Court, in
recent decisions, adopted a higher standard in determining whether a
petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that
would qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to which
petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her ability to provide for
herself and avoid becoming a public charge or a financial burden to her
community.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as
required by law to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines?
RULING:
HELD:YES!
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through
either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found
under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that : "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
qualifications and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine
citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA.
The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during
the initial hearing. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to
order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on
November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding,
but despite notice, again failed to appear.

Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently

naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Moy Ya Lim Yao
v. Commissioner of Immigration

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the
then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation
of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set
aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucenas
husband is a Filipino citizenas only their marriage certificate was presented
to establish his citizenship.

Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to
file a Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. The choice of what
option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the
applicant.

In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization
under CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under
Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking
judicial naturalization under the same law.

It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not

because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husbands
citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it
is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine
whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based
on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from
any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of the same Act. However, the
case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on
Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The
lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of her
 29. DOJ ET AL. vs. MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI
GR 169958
March 5, 2010
BY: Cantimbuhan
TOPIC: General
QUICK SUMMARY In 1999, Michael Pennisi petitioned for recognition as
Filipino citizen. BI agreed, ayaw pa ni DOJ nung una, but eventually agreed.
Thereafter, he was drafted in the PBA, where he played. In 2003, some
Senate committees recommended the deportation of several Fil-foreign PBA
players, including Pennisi, and a review of all orders of recognition. Pennisi
was included since the verification of the authenticity of the documents he
submitted 4 years earlier revealed highly suspicious circumstances as
alleged by a Brgy. Captain and a Brgy. Treasurer. DOJ issued a resolution
revoking Pennisi’s recognition; later on the BI directed the deportation of
Pennisi. CA sided with Pennisi. SC affirmed CA and said the case was not
rendered moot and academic.
FACTS:
• Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland,
Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T.
Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen.
• In March 1999, Pennisi filed a petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI).
o He submitted the ff:
▪ Certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Quintos, and a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that
Quintos was born on 14 August 1949 of Filipino
parents, Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, in
Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija;
▪ Certified true copy of the certificate of marriage of
respondent’s parents dated 9 January 1971,
indicating the Philippines as Quintos’ birthplace;
▪ Certified true copy of Quintos’ Australian certificate
of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as
Filipino;
▪ Certified true copy of respondent’s birth certificate
stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and
indicating the Philippines as his mother’s birthplace;
and
▪ Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July 1999 of
the Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, stating that as of 14 July 1999,
Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
• On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo Yap
issued an order granting Pennisi’s petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen.
• In a 2nd Indorsement dated 28 February 2000, the DOJ Secretary
disapproved the order. However, upon Pennisi’s submission of
additional documents, BI Commissioner granted the order – which
the DOJ affirmed.
• Thereafter, Pennisi was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a
professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association
(PBA).
• On 7 August 2003, the Senate Committees on Games, Amusement
and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted
Committee Report No. 256 recommending, among other things that;
o the BI should conduct summary deportation proceedings
against several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including
respondent; and
o the DOJ Secretary shall conduct an immediate review of all
orders of recognition. Pennisi was included in the list on the
basis of the following findings of the Senate Committees.
• Pennisi was able to present before the BI and the committees, the
documents required in granting recognition of Philippine citizenship.
o However, a verification on the authenticity of the above
documents reveals highly suspicious circumstances.
• His alleged mother and other relatives, who were mentioned in his
application for recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not
known and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija according to the affidavits of the Barangay Captain
and Barangay Treasurer of the abovementioned place.
• Moreover, Pennisi’s mother’s certificate of birth was issued on the
basis of an application for late registration, which is ten (10) years
after the date of birth.
• On 18 October 2004, the DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisi’s
certificate of recognition and directing the BI to begin summary
deportation proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-
foreign PBA players.
o Pennisi and Davonn Harp, another Filipino-foreign PBA
player, filed a petition for prohibition with an application for
TRO and PI with the RTC of Pasig to enjoin the DOJ and BI
from instituting summary deportation proceedings against
them.
• During the hearing, OSG manifested that Pennisi would not be
subjected to summary deportation and that he would be given an
opportunity to present evidence of his Filipino citizenship in a full-
blown trial on the merits.
o However, in a Summary Deportation Order dated 26
October 2004, the BI directed the deportation of several
Filipino-foreign PBA players, including Pennisi.
o RTC granted the withdrawal of the petition by Pennisi and
Harp, who filed a petition for review with an application for
TRO and PI with the CA.
• CA: Granted the petition and set aside DOJ resolution and
Deportation Order and ruled that Pennisi’s citizenship was previously
recognized by the BI and DOJ and it was only after 4 years that the
BI and DOJ reversed themselves in view of the finding in the
Committee Report.
o It further ruled that apart from the affidavits of the Brgy.
Captain and Brgy. Treasurer regarding the highly suspicious
circumstances, no other evidence was presented to prove
that Quintos was not a Filipino citizen or that her birth
certificate was false or fraudulently obtained;
o Pennisi’s documentary evidence before the BI and DOJ have
more probative value and must prevail over the allegations of
Soliman and Peralta.
• In their Memorandum, DOJ et al. alleged that Pennisi’s petition was
filed out of time. Moreover, Pennisi’s voluntary departure from the
Philippines had rendered the petition moot and that the cancellation
of Pennisi’s certificate of recognition as a Filipino citizen and the
issuance of the deportation order against him are valid.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition had been rendered moot because respondent already
left the country. (NO)
2. Whether Pennisi’s certificate of recognition attained finality. (NO)
HELD:
1. No, prior to his deportation, Pennisi was already recognized as a Filipino
citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the country because his Filipino
wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the petitions
before the CA and before this Court showed his intention to prove his Filipino
lineage and citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in
causing his deportation from the country. He was precisely questioning the
DOJ’s revocation of his certificate of recognition and his summary
deportation by the BI. Therefore, the Court ruled that respondent’s
deportation did not render the present case moot.
2. No, Pennisi’s certificate of recognition has not yet attained finality. In Go v.
Ramos, the Court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own
and can be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. A person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in
the resolution thereof; and
3. The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI.
Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial
evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.
• When the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and
the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
Courts may review the actions of the administrative offices
authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no
evidence to sustain the rulings.
 30. REPUBLIC v. KERRY LAO ONG
G.R. No. 175430
June 18, 2012
BY: EUSEBIO
TOPIC: NATURALIZATION LAW
QUICK SUMMARY
Ong filed a petition for naturalization. RTC and CA granted but SC reversed
the decision. Ong failed to comply with the requirements of Section 2 (4) of
Revised naturalization law (see footnote). See doctrine on naturalization in
the ruling.
FACTS:
● November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,5 filed a
Petition for Naturalization before the RTC
● Petition was published in the Official Gazette and newspaper of
general circulation posted in a public place for three consecutive
weeks, six months before the initial hearing. (decreed by the Revised
naturalization law CA no. 473, amended by RA 530)
● Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese
citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958. He is
registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of
registration and a native-born certificate of residence from the
Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently
residing in the Philippines from birth up to the present.
○ Can write and speak Tagalog, English, Cebuano and Amoy.
○ Elementary and high school education at Sacred Heart
School for Boys in Cebu City.
○ Graduated from ADMU with a degree: Bachelor of Science in
Management
● Ong married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen. They have four
children all born and raised in the PH.
○ The children of school age were enrolled at the Sacred Heart
School for Boys and Sacred Heart School for Girls.
● At the time of the filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children
were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Niño Village, Banilad, Cebu
City.
● Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a
"businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average
annual income of ₱150,000.00.39 When he testified, however, he said
that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in
1978.40 Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his
business.
○ Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to
1997.42 Based on these returns, Ong’s gross annual income
was ₱60,000.00 for 1994; ₱118,000.00 for 1995;
₱118,000.00 for 1996; and ₱128,000.00 for 1997.
● RTC: granted the petition of Ong.
● Solicitor General appealed to the CA. Sol gen argued:
○ Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong’s petition
despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required
under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
○ respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a
businessman/business manager earning an average income
of ₱150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the
value of his income.
○ failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or
trade, which is the source of his income.
○ Considering that he has four minor children (all attending
exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property
and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a
family home, his alleged income cannot be considered
lucrative.
● CA denied Sol Gen’s appeal and MR.
ISSUE:
WON Ong has sufficiently proved that he has some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2 1 , fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law? NO
HELD:
DOCTRINE: Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest.79 Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.80 The burden
1Section 2 (4) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation
of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with of his income over his family’s expenses, his income cannot be expected to
the requirements of law. provide him and his family "with adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work."96
Definition according to jurisprudence of Sec 2 (4) → some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth
must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is paragraph, of
an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to the Revised Naturalization Law.
provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a
public charge. His income should permit "him and the members of his family
to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of
our civilization.
• The courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her
spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment. The
spouse’s additional income is immaterial.

Court finds that the foregoing guidelines have not been observed. To recall,
respondent Ong and his witnesses testified that Ong is a businessman but
none of them identified Ong’s business or described its nature. The Court
finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of his business,
whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own (leasing of office
space).
• Ong did not present any documentary evidence like business
permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to
demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business.
• Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of
"some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation." Bare,
general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is
required of an applicant for naturalization.
• a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average
gross annual income around the time of his application, which was
only ₱106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor
children; and (c) that Ong’s children were all studying in exclusive
private schools in Cebu City.

Ong’s gross income might have been sufficient to meet his family’s basic
needs, but there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an
appreciable margin of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin
 31. Republic v. Li Ching Chung
G.R. No. 197450
March 20, 2013
BY: Garcia
DOCTRINE: The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to
become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to
acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions
and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to
the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the
naturalization process.
FACTS:
On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or
Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention to
Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. Almost seven months
after filing his declaration of intention, respondent filed his Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC.
On April 5, 2008, respondent filed his Amended Petition for Naturalization,
wherein he alleged that he was born in China, which granted the same
privilege of naturalization to Filipinos; that he came to the Philippines on
March 15, 1988; that on November 19, 1989, he married Cindy Sze Mei
Ngar, a British national, with whom he had 4 children, all born in Manila; that
he had been continuously and permanently residing in the country since his
arrival and is currently a resident of Manila with prior residence in Malabon;
that he could speak and write in English and Tagalog; that he was entitled to
the benefit of Sec 3 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473 reducing to 5 years
the requirement under Sec 2 of ten years of continuous residence, because
he knew English and Filipino having obtained his education in Manila; and
that he had successfully established a trading general merchandise
business. He attached several documentary evidence in support of his
application.
The petition was set for initial hearing on April 3, 2009 and its notice was
posted in a conspicuous place at the Manila City Hall and was published in
the Official Gazette and in the Manila Times.
Thereafter, respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting praying that the
hearing be moved from April 3, 2009 to July 31, 2008 so he could acquire
real estate properties.
The OSG filed its Opposition, arguing that the said motion for early setting
was a "clear violation of Sec 1, RA 530, which provides that hearing on the
petition should be held not earlier than 6 months from the date of last
publication of the notice." The last publication in the newspaper of general
circulation was on June 13, 2008, the earliest setting could only be
scheduled 6 months later or on December 15, 2008.
The RTC granted respondent’s application for naturalization as a Filipino
citizen. And CA affirmed. The CA held that although the petition for
naturalization was filed less than 1 year from the time of the declaration of
intent before the OSG, this defect was not fatal.
The OSG argues that "the petition for naturalization should not be granted in
view of its patent jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it was filed
within the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of declaration of
intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is indispensable to the validity of
the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition; and 3) respondent’s
failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements set under CA
473." In particular, the OSG points out that the publication and posting
requirements were not strictly followed, specifically citing that: "(a) the
hearing of the petition on 15 December 2008 was set ahead of the scheduled
date of hearing on 3 April 2009; (b) the order moving the date of hearing
(Order dated 31 July 2008) was not published; and, (c) the petition was
heard within six (6) months (15 December 2008) from the last publication (on
14 July 2008).
ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino citizen
despite his undisputed failure to comply with the requirements provided for in
CA No. 473, as amended – which are mandatory and jurisdictional in
character – particularly: (i) the filing of his petition for naturalization within the
one (1) year proscribed period from the date he filed his declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen; (ii) the failure to attach to the petition
his certificate of arrival; and (iii) the failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements prescribed by CA No. 473.
HELD: NO
Section 5 of CA No. 473,47 as amended,48 expressly states:
Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition
for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship
shall file with the Bureau of Justice (now Office of the Solicitor General) a
declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation,
personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the
date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if any, in which he came to
the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of
making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for
permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the
date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must
also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of
the Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere
or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the applicant
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be
for naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be
photographs of himself. (Emphasis supplied) given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute
confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all
As held in Tan v. Republic, "the period of one year required therein is the the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional
time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the qualifications of the requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal
applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no or severance of the naturalization process.
sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and
gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as
the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present to
contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his
petition." The period is designed to give the government ample time to
screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and to measure the
latter’s good intention and sincerity of purpose. Stated otherwise, the waiting
period will unmask the true intentions of those who seek Philippine
citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to, those who
are merely interested in protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those
who have truly come to love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to
become genuine partners in nation building.

The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is

specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of

intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and have received their primary
and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have
resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more
before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a
declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this
Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the
applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the
public schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable
with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared
his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is
actually naturalized.

Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt
individuals that would excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one
year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization. Contrary to the CA
finding, respondent’s premature filing of his petition for naturalization before
the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.

In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to

show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The
 32 SOBEJANA-CONDON V COMELEC
GR NO. 198742
AUGUST 10, 2012
BY: Hernandez, E.
FACTS:
• CONDON is a natural-born Filipino whose parents are both Filipino.
She became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to
a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
• She filed an application to re-acquire her Phil. Citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225. Her application was accepted and She took her oath of
allegiance on Dec. 5, 2005.
• On September 18, 2006, the Condon filed an unsworn Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she
has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
• Condon ran for the office of mayor in La Union in the 2007 election
but she lost. She ran again, but this time for the office of Vice mayor
during the 2010 election. She won and declared the winning
candidate.
• Private respondent, Picar, Pagaduan, and Bautista, filed a Quo
Warranto against the Condon questioning the eligibility of the
Condon to hold a public office. The petitions similarly sought the
Condon’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
• RTC, Comelec 2nd division and Comelec en banc disqualified
Condon to hold a public office on the ground that she holds a dual
citizen. As admitted by Condon herself during trial, the personal
declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath.
The law, Sec.5(2) of RA 9225, clearly mandates that the document
containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before any public officer authorized to administer oath.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Condon is qualified to run for an elective position?
2. Whether or Not the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an
appeal after ruling on its reinstatement
3. Whether or not the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a
judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case?
HELD:
• No. The language of Section 5(2) RA 9225 is free from any
ambiguity. a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any
elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally
swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing
the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law
who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
• Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country,
but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take
the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to
additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify
as candidates in Philippine elections.
• R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
• The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5, viz:
• Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
• (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
 • Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the Condon has
validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
• On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective
public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in
Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under
oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned
by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending
appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has
lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, we stressed the import of the
provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in
election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes
those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC
whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

On ISSUE 2:

• Yes. The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election

cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, viz.:
• Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
• A complementary provision is present in Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
• Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except
motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be
resolved by the division which issued the order.
• Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the
COMELEC en banc's prerogative in resolving a motion for
reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly
adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that
initially dismissed it.

On ISSUE 3:

• Yes. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary

execution of judgment.

• There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC's authority to order

discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the
 33. Maquiling v. COMELEC
GR NO. 195649
April 16, 2013
BY: Hinanay
TOPIC: Citizenship
QUICK SUMMARY
Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen who became a citizen of the USA.
Later on, he applied for repatriation and became a filipino citizen again.
Arando then filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan Lanao del Norte. His
opponent, Balua filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
COC. The COMELEC 1st division granted the petition of Baluwa but it was
reversed by the COMELEC EB. Maquiling, the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes intervened to question the proprietary of
declaring Arnado disqualified to run for public office despite his continued
use of his US passport and to be proclaimed as the winner. The SC ruled
that by using his US passport, Arnado reverted back to his status as a dual
citizen. Hence, Arnado’s COC is void from the beginning and the votes cast
in his favor should not be counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
FACTS:
• Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. As a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. He applied
for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance
on July 10, 2008. On the same day, an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
• In 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
• On April 28, 2010, respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty
candidate filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
COC in connection with the May 10, 2010 local and national
elections.
o Balua’s contentions: Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner.
o He attached a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated April 23, 2010 indicating Arnado’s
nationality as “USA-American” He also presented a
computer-generated travel record dated December 3, 2009
indicating Arnado has been using his US Passport in
entering and departing the Philippines. Arnado left the
country on April 14, 2009 and returned on June 25, 2009,
and again departed on July 28, 2009 and went back on
November 24, 2009. This was also supported by a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated April 23,
2010
• COMELEC 1st division ruling: Granted petition for disqualification
and/or to cancel COC.
o Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a COC based on misrepresentation, they
considered it as one for disqualification.
o Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the US was
dismissed because he failed to present evidence but the
COMELEC 1st div. could still not conclude that Arnado failed
to meet the 1 year residency requirement under the LGC.
o In the matter of citizenship, they disagreed with Arnado’s
claim that he is a Filipino citizen. Although Arnado appears
to have substantially complied with the requirements of RA
9225, his act of consistently using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship negated his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
• Arnado sought reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections intervened through a MR together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended MR.
o Maquiling’s Argument: while the 1st division was correct in
disqualifying Arnado, the order of succession under Sec. 44
of the LGC is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner
• COMELEC En Banc Ruling: reversed ruling of 1st division and
granted Arnado’s MR.
o By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No.
9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was
 at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a
pure Philippine Citizen again.
o The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his
status as dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no
law saying such. The use of the US passport does not
operate to “un-renounce” what he has earlier on renounced.
o Arnado presented a plausible explanation as to the use of
his US passport. His Philippine passport was issued on June
18, 2009 but he was not notified of the issuance so he was
only able to get it three months later. After he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, Arnado used it in his
subsequent travels abroad.
o As to Maquiling’s intervention – Sec. 6 of RA 6646 allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
elections if no final judgment has been rendered but as the
second placer, he would not be prejudiced by the outcome of
the case as it agrees with the order of succession under Sec.
44 of the LGC.
• Hence, the petition before the SC questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado disqualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport and praying that Maquiling be
proclaimed as the winner. He also seeks to review the applicability of
Sec. 44 of the LGC.
ISSUE:
1. WON intervention is allowed in a disqualification case?
2. WON the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s disqualification to run for public office?
3. WON the rule of succession in the LGC is applicable to this case?
HELD:
Issue 1: Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper
when
there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
• Maquiling had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against Arnado is clear from Sec. 6 of RA 6646. Under
this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
Issue 2: The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position.
• Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
• Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.
He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship.
There is no question that after performing these twin requirements
required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public
office.
• Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on
10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April
2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed
American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
• After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. By
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country.
• However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is
open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.
o Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when,
after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
 passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate
of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
o Between April 3, 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship,
and November 30, 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an
American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and
privileges granted by the United States of America.
• The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship
and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.
• While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.
• The SC agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which
he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position.
• Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship
is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is
distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
• By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009,
Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino
and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he
was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
• In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
• Jurisprudence cited by the court:
o Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any
of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.
o The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of
the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
• Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance
to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign
citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
Issue 3: Maquiling is not a second placer as he obtained the highest number
of votes from among the qualified candidates
• Aratea v. COMELEC & Jalosjos v. COMELEC: void COC cannot
produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.
• The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his COC
is rendered void from the beginning. The affirmation of Arnado’s
disqualificarion although made long after the elections, reaches back
to the filing of his COC. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at
all in the May 2010 elections.
• Since he is a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the LGC will not apply.
 34. In Re: Petition to Re-acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
Philippines; Epifanio B. Muneses citizenship under RA 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
B.M. No. 2112
July 24, 2012 However, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. RA 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the
BY: Jallorina Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
TOPIC: Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship engage in such practice. Such is the case since the practice of law is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the
QUICK SUMMARY State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and
Petitioner Epifanio Muneses, a former member of the Philippine Bar, lost his promote the public welfare.
Philippine citizenship when he became a US citizen in 1981. Subsequently,
he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and filed a petition before the Court, After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that
praying that the latter grant him the privilege to practice law in the PH. The the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
Court granted the petition, seeing that Muneses complied with the statutory for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be
requirements laid down by the Office of the Bar Confidant. allowed to resume his practice of law. Upon this favorable recommendation
of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's
FACTS: resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
● Epifanio Muneses became a member of th IBP on March 21, 1966.
He, however, lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
citizen of the US in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, DC.
● Muneses filed a petition to re-acquire the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines, as he intends to retire in the Philippines. His petition
was supported by several documents, including his oath of
allegiance, attendance forms of MCLEs, letter evidencing payment of
membership dues with the IBP, a petition for reacquisition of PH
citizenship and an order for re-acquisition of PH citizenship.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may be allowed to practice law in the Philippines?

HELD:
YES. Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law.

Under RA 9225, Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar

and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss
thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
 35 Nicolas-Lewis v COMELEC
GR 162759 ISSUE:
August 04, 2006 Whether or not those who have retained and/or acquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA 9189
BY: Ko
TOPIC: Citizenship; Overseas Absentee Voting HELD:
Yes, those who have retained and/or acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant
QUICK SUMMARY to RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA 9189.
Nicolas-Lewis, et al was successful applicants of the Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act. Before the 2004 elections, they sought registration As the Court noted, there is no provision in RA 9225 which requires dual
and certification as overseas absentee voter but was denied due to a citizens to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines
COMELEC letter which stated that they have no right to vote yet due to them first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in
lacking the 1 year residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution. recognizing that dual citizens are most likely not residents, grants the same
right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189.
FACTS:
● Nicolas-Lewis, et al are successful applicants for recognition of As discussed in Macalintal v COMELEC, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re- much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their
Acquisition Act of 2003) domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend this to young
● Before the May 2004 national and local elections, they sought Filipinos who reached voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is
registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” under RA in the Philippines.
9189
○ According to the Philippine Embassy, per a COMELEC
letter, they have no right to vote yet in the elections due to
their lack of the 1 year residency requirement prescribed by
the Constitution
● Nicolas-Lewis sought clarification on the residency requirement
○ It was the COMELEC’s position that those who have availed
of RA 9225 cannot exercise the right of suffrage given under
the Overseas Absentee Voter Law (OAVL) because the
OAVL was not enacted for them
○ As Filipinos who have reacquired their citizenship on
September 18, 2003 at the earliest, they are considered
regular voters who have to meet the requirements of
residency
● Nicolas-Lewis et al filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and
mandamus
● May 20, 2004: OSG filed a Manifestation stating that “all qualified
overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the
right of suffrage, may do so” however, the conclusion of the 2004
elections have rendered the petition moot and academic