Mariategui vs.

CA

GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first
wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s
second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married
for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupo’s
descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa.
The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute
or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life. Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have
successional rights.

Silverio vs Republic

G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery, sought to have his
first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to female. Trial court granted his
petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the
trial court decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.

RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name through the
intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is
allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved. Changes sought by Silverio
will have serious legal and public policy consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations as peovided in Article 1 of the Family code that marriage
ahould be between a man and a woman. Second, there will be major changes in statutes that
underscore the public policy in relation to women.

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased. Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina)
on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). Tecla alleged
that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was recorded with the
local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio
begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954. In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got
married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null
and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony,
the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that the marriage certificate/records
were destroyed. Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
who died on 22 September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed
the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio. RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as
useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records. The CA, on
appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and
testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation
of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: TECLA While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. It is an error on the part of the
RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted. The execution of a
document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof. In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of
Tecla herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating
priest. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage. The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage. Every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

Republic vs. CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.
They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant
that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter,
they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of
her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD: The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported
by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her
case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

FACTS: On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children were born
out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to
her. Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when
she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him. The Trial Court
convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was granted by repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage citing psychological incapacity. The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her
petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their
marriage.
ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony.

RULING: The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner
and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever
resided in Carmona. The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in
this case.

JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.

FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination, duress, and
intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage
contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he
alleged that there was no marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following
dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere
to be found. On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of
Jaime and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a church
on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in
Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having
been married to her for 25 years. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage
of the parties based on the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before a
solemnizing officer. And that without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of
marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious. Respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the marriage,
because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due effort as testified by certain
Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage
License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare the
marriage void from the beginning
HELD: The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance
of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said
logbook, we can not easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein. The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.

Nollora vs Republic

G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011

FACTS: Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years
has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001. Jesusa filed an
instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral damages she
suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for
return of her money in the amount of P 50,000. Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages,
however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of
Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992.
And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not
know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the one
lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told her so prior
to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim
convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also got married in accordance
with the Muslim rites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is void ab initio.

RULING: Yes,the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family
Code because such marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is
legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the
second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due
to his prior marriage. Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole
defense. Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with
Articles 14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws . In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws states that any marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in
accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious
affiliation or his claim that his marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of
his professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. His second
marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines providing:
"[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship
and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases." Only with the permission
of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of
court shall serve a copy to the wife or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration
Council shall be constituted. If the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed
marriage, the Court shall subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws) Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is
"single." Both of his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood
of the declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil status is thus
further compounded by these omissions. It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent
attempt to escape criminal liability, he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites.
However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249

FACTS: Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees
to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie
Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy
Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not
reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did
not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code
thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the
civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of
which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized
because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not
included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and
that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract. An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s
marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of
Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon
who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days
after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together
as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge
explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering
that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other
hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed
it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the
contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got
married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when
they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his
duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint
affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement. Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently
provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares, complainant, versus Justice Onofre A. Villaluz (retired), respondent.
Adm. Case No. 4431 June 19, 1997

FACTS: Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while
respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission. Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo
Mijares. She obtained a decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years.
Thus, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna Lim
Verano. They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of the
son of Mijares. During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an
illicit affair with another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the
complainant judge. As a result, they lived separately and did not get in touch with one another and the
respondent did not bother to apologize for what happened. Through Judge Ramon Makasiar,
complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez. Complainant then filed a complaint against
respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and bigamously entered into a second marriage
while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single. In his
defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham marriage”; that he
voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for immorality filed
against her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with
complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the
annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory or published. Judge Purisima the
found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on affirmed by the Court.

ISSUE: a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid b. Whether or not the marriage
of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage
RULING: a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under
Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was
facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in civil case
declaring the annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife had not attained complete
finality, the marriage between complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.

b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. Thus,
former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; he is hereby suspended from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.

ARAÑEZ vs. OCCIANO, 380 SCRA 402

FACTS:

On February 17, 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner’s marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of his marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pension of
Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanction for solemnizing marriage with lack of
marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?

RULING:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur there is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law
on marriage.

The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined Php 5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost
contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore, constant communication took place between them. They later became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines
and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete
before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely
signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.  Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
ALCANTARA v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara
alleging that on December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a “fixer” who could arrange a
marriage for them  before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day.  Restituto 
and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983.  The
marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.  The alleged
marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham,
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place.  In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives.  Restituto prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract
and its entry on file.     Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite; that   Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children;
that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.
Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. Restituto cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the
validity of his marriage.  The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage
contract between the parties reflects a marriage license number.  A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in
fact issued to the parties herein. Restituto, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of
the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. 
Even then, the Supreme Court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage. 
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage.  An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.  The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds.  The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor.  It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

ABBAS v. ABBAS
689 SCRA 646 (109 OG 7469) 
VELASCO JR., J.:

FACTS: In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother
of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome
him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was
actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as
well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained
the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the
marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to
Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license issued
to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is the
issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification
enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local civil
registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there was in
fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was
issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while
Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go.
Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign
a purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as
non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.

GARCIA-RECIO v. RECIO
GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987.  They lived as husband and wife in Australia.  However, an
Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of
Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. 
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City.  Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.  As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March
3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha
Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence

to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.  However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree.  The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

REPUBLIC v. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said
Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr.,
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request.
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came
back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to
bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation
of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely
herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus,
and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines. After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, denied its Motion
for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds:
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling
that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.
ISSUE: IS Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines not applicable to the
case at bar?
RULING: YES. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one
of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not
have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
BRION, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto.
Tomas but subsequently filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court
Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years later, Corpuz fell in love with another
Filipina. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce
decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration,
an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still
subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the
petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry
in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the
right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING: No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens BUT the foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven
in court and recognized according to our rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines On 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage. Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared voidab
initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the National Statistics Office (NSO).
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of
the provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition
for review.The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC be set
aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. The
Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured
party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void. Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castroand Nil v.
Bayadog which declared that "the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive
for them to comment on the petition.Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. Maekara also denied that he inflicted
any form of violence on Marinay.On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.
ISSUE: Is Article 26 applicable in this case?
RULING: Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"under the laws of
his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the
Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared that the Filipino
spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served."
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will
be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
NIÑAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first
wife Teodulfa’s death. Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license
because they lived together for 5 years and thus exempt from marriage license. Some
years after, Pepito died in a car accident.

The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only

occurs after the death of an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for
declaration for nullity of marriage’ (a.k.a. declaration of nullity of void
marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a marriage
license as a legal basis.

ISSUE:
The lower court dismissed the petition because:

(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a ’cause of action’. Can there be
such a petition when the heirs’ parent is deceased?

(2) Are the heirs a ‘proper party’?

(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is a
must but is a different matter. Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.
(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.

The lower court ruled:

(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their father’s marriage
before the latter’s death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were used
as a basis to dismiss petitioner’s case.

Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that:

(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the
Family Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in
force at the time the marriage was contracted.)

(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage
void ab initio. The exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one
described by the Civil Code. It is not the one described by the Civil Code because the
cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires
five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years and months before
the second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first
marriage. This is in violation of the law.

(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count
cohabitation.

“This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.”
(4) The judge’s ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made
identical is erroneous.  Void and voidable marriages are not identical.

“A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place.”
 “A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while a void marriage can never be ratified.”
 “A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while
a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.”
 “Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.”
 “The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes.”
 “Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.“
“Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided
in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.”
 (5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before
determining succession rights.
“Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.”
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.”

Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1

 
FACTS:
  Herminia and David married on May 21, 1966 and had four children
 
 Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano, the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
charges respondent Judge Sanchez with gross ignorance of the law. Facts
 
 On 22 March 1993, David contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge which he solemnized knowing that such is void and bigamous,
as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.”
 
 The respondent claimed that he did not know that Manzano was legally married, and
had he known such facts, he should have advised David Manzano not to marry again.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
 
 Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the
Court to two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly
unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both
Manzano and Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
Domingo Relos, and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with
their spouses anymore.
 
 Respondent Judge alleged that he believed Manzano and Payao so he solemnized
marriage in accordance with Article 34 of the FC which states that no marriage license is
necessary for two persons cohabitating provided that they follow these following
requisites:
o The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
o The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
o The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at
the time of marriage;
o The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
o The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to
their marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized the marriage.

RULING:
One of the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties have subsisting marriage , as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO
545 SCRA 162

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as
husband and wife.
ISSUE: Is their marriage valid?

RULING:
NO, Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable.
In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the
formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit
which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT VS JOSE DAYOT
550 SCRA 435

FACTS:
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years without any legal impediment to marry. On August 31, 1990 Jose married Rufina
Pascual. Subsequently, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. He then filed a Complaint
for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that the
testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was
valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of
Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license.  Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was
that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under
Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Is the marriage between Jose and Felisa void ab initio?

RULING:
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid
marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because
they started living together five months before the celebration of their marriage. The five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 requires that it covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage
between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.

CARLOS VS SANDOVAL
574 SCRA 116

FACTS:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have
three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death,
two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995,
Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court. In his complaint, Carlos
asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother
was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the
properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents
as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

ISSUE: Can Juan De Dios Carlos file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage?

RULING:
Generally, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before
the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.

However, the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right and question the validity of the marriage
of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.

In this case, although the marriage was celebrated before Aug. 3, 1988and the petition
was filed before March, 15, 2003, Juan should first show that he is a real party-in interest before
he may be allowed to file the said petition.

SANTOS VS CA
JANUARY 4, 1995

FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court
and thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr.
Occasionally, the couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia's
parents into their family affairs. Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that
she will return once her contract will expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US
but somehow failed to contact her or get in touch with her.
Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the
Family Code. He argued that Julia's failure to return home and communicating with him for more
than 5 years constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Can their marriage be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code?

RULING:
No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c)
incurability.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity
of marriage.

CHI MING TSOI VS CA

JANUARY 16, 1997

FACTS:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their
marriage contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to no avails. Medical
examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual conduct. Gina
was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a motion for declaration of
nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court
citing that it was she and not he that had the problem regarding sexual intimacy.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to declare
the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Aligned with this is the essential marital obligation, “the procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage.

After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA

FEBRUARY 13, 1997

FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore
a son.  After a year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a
husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his
parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in
frequent quarrels between them.  The Regional Trial Court granted Roridel petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Does opposing or conflicting personalities constitute to or is equivalent to psychological

incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code?

RULING:
No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code:  1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI must be (a) medically or clinically identified (b) alleged in the
complaint (c) sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) it must be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; 4) it must be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable; 5) it must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the marital obligations of marriage; 6) the marital obligations must be embraced by
Articles 68 to 71, and Articles 220, 221 and 225 in regard of parents and their children; 7)
interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic of Church of the
Philippines, although not binding, should be given great respect; and 8) the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.

MARCOS VS MARCOS
343 SCRA 755

FACTS:
Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that
Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void
under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a

physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity

RULING:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition since qua non
for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological
illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner
to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

HERNANDEZ VS CA AND HERNANDEZ

DECEMBER 8, 1999

FACTS:
Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario C. Hernandez were married and had three children.
Lucita, petitioner, filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City a petition for annulment on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the respondent, Mario. The petitioner claimed that the respondent
failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the
household. Respondent engaged in drinking sprees, gambled and womanized at which came a
point that he had an illegitimate child.

Petitioner also added in her petition full custody of her three children, Php 9,000 monthly
financial support for the children, sole ownership of the parcel of land purchased during their
marriage as well as of the jeep which private respondent took when he left his family.
Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mario is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations

RULING:
No, The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage.  More so, chronic sexual
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of
psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time
of their marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the “borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

TERRE VS TERRE
211 SCRA 11

FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin.  Atty.
Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason
of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage.  They got married in 1977 where he
wrote single under Dorothy’s status.  After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986.  Atty. Terre
was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.

RULING:
Yes, Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first
cousin thereby against public policy.  However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of
their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is
void.  Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr. 243 SCRA 32

FACTS:
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against
Judge Brillantes.
 Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro, who are living together in a home
purchased by him in 1987 in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Upon
inquiry, the houseboy told that Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Lupo left the home
without confronting Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children
and even alienated the affection  of his children  from him. Lupo claims that Brillantes is married
to Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged that Lupo was not
married to de Castro and that he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits having 5 children
with her. Brillantes claims that when he married de Castro in 1991 at California, he believed in
all good faith and with all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because her first
marriage was solemnized without a marriage license.

Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines while the second marriage which took place in 1991 was governed by the Family
Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to Brillantes.

RULING:

  Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988
regardless of date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code said Art. 15 is
given “retroactive effect” insofar as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Respondent is the
last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman.

SANTIAGO CARINO vs. SUSAN CARINO

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
FACTS:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with
Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee
Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago
passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio
because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court
ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.

RULING:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the
marriage does not fall within any of those exceptionsand a marriage license therefore
was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao
and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is
void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at
the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NOLASCO

G.R. NO. 94053 MARCH 17, 1993

FACTS:

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with
him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique.  They got married in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In
January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to
their son, she left. He cut short his contract  to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several
letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the
RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article 41
of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However,   Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not
explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very difficult
to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
 ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO VERSUS CALISTERIO
G.R. NO. 136467. APRIL 6, 2000

FACTS:

On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving parcel of land with an estimated value of P
604,750 Teodorico was survived by his wife respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was
second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on 13
January 1946 at Caloocan City. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later without
court declaration that James presumptively dead. On October 9, 1992 petitioner Antonia Armas y
Calisterio a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled “In matter of Intestate Estateof
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio, claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta being bigamous and thereby
null and void. On January 17 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia. On appeal the Court of Appeal rendered decision in favor of Marietta
declaring her marriage to Teodorico valid and entitling her to estate of Teodorico.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of Marietta between the deceased Teodorico valid that in turn would
determine her right as surviving spouse.

RULING:

The marriage of Marietta having contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be thus
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of judicial declaration of marriage of presumptive
death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, upon
its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should be rightly divided one portion to
the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when
the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a
civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the
course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel.
The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera
was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6
years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code

RULING:

The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or
evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEGRO

GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005

FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in
February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her
to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house
but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house
and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the
Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his
free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to
the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in
NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his
petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the
Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to
corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility
had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's
father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities
and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in
RTC.

SSS & SSC V. JASQUE VDA. DE BAILON,

GR. NO 165545 March 24, 2006

FACTS:

In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Fifteen plus years
later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee.
The petition was granted in 1970.

In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque
then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other
hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain
Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral
spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.

They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa
and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s
presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could
have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place.
She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.

SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to
Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because
her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the
RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the
decision of the SSS before the Social Security Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA
however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

HELD:

There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s death. Likewise
there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clemente’s death.
SSS is correct in ruling that it is inutile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance
before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the
SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the RTC.

The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is indeed
empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits obtained by
a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power to
review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s
marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her
reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no
longer file such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer
be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not
collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be
attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

VALDEZ VS. REPUBLIC

GR NO. 180863, SEPTEMBER 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971.  She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy.  They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money.  In March 1972, the latter left their house.  Angelita and her child waited until in May
1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home.  3 years have passed without any word from
Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect.  It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since.  Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. 
Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with
Sofio was subsisting.  Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil
Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is
only needed.  Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and
valid.

SANTOS VS. SANTOS

G.R. NO. 187061, OCTOBER 8, 2014

FACTS:

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had
filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on
June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao,
Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her
from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it
was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when
she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was
deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence,
misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had
been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result
of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the
petition declaring her presumptively dead.

Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never resided in
Tarlac and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was
not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their
conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to
cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to
support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's
petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court
of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring
her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that the
proper remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance as
stated in Article 42 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead,
that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.
The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that
the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the
second marriage.

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse
was absent.

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent
marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.

Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of
its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family
Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and
the property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages. If it
is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before
the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive
death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely
by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to
be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is
not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying
the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of
judgment will, therefore, lie.

Republic vs. Edna Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929

FACTS:
Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a
mechanic in Valencia, Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.
While she was in Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband left their home
without telling them his whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to the
Philippines to look and find his husband. Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband
thru their common friends, and parents-in-law in Iligan and Valencia City and even went far as
to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.
15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article
41 of the Family Code. During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.

RTC grants her petition.

The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the
decision of the RTC on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct
opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S.
v. Biasbas.

CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of her husband.

RULING.:
NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was
found out that it was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on
record. Edna did not present additional witnesses (her children, their common friends, parents-
in-law) but herself alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at
the time her husband disappeared.
Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared
presumptively dead is DENIED

Republic vs. Sarenogon Jr. GR No.199194

FACTS:
Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie. He
testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to
work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive
any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to
contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned home after his contract expired, then inquired from
Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts. They also did not know where she was.
Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before
the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Jose’s
testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt. These two witnesses testified
that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the
Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s
location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose
to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.

The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation
of evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong
recourse in elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with (CIVIL LAW)

HELD : No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required “well-founded belief”
standard.
Sarenogon’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness
stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest
for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined
and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the
particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying
the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

Republic vs. Tampus GR No. 214243

FACTS :
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante I. Del Mundo on November 29,1975. Three days
thereafter, or on December 2,1975, Danta a member of AFP, left respondent,and went to Jolo,Sulu where
he was assigned. The couple had no children.Since then,Hilda heard no news from Dante.She tried
everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14,2009, she filed before the RTC a
petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for thr purposr of remarriage,alleging that after the lapse
of 33 years without any kind of communication from him,she firmly believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead

HELD: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent
spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil
Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did
not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself
in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission
to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the
said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore,
Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

Villanueva vs. CA 505 SCRA 565

FACTS:

In 1988, Orly married Lilia. In 1992, Orly filed an annulment case of their marriage on the ground
that he was forced to marry Lilia becaue he received phone calls from a certain Ka Celso, a member of
NPA, who threatened him to be killed if he won’t marry Lilia. He also claimed that he was defrauded by
Lilia by making him believe that he was pregnant. Lilia denied these allegations, claiming Orly freely
cohabitated with her and showed 14 letters as proof of Orly’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE: Whether or not there really was fraud in obtaining Orly’s consent to marry Lilia

HELD: No. It is obvious that Orly seeks to annul his marriage because of a pending bigamy case filed by
Lilia. Also, Orly’s contentions were not concretely established, taki8ng in consideration that he is a
security guard who is knowledgeable of self-defense. His allegations that he never had an erection during
their sexual intercourse is a lie. Also, it took him four years to file an action, which only supports Lilia’s
contention that he freely cohabitated with her.

Manuel Almelor vs. RTC of Las Pinas City and Leonida Almelor 563 SCRA 447

FACTS :

Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11
years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh
disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are often unconventional and was the cause of
their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children but is
remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor
which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as
evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from
Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone
and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null
and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the
concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a
homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the public’s perception against Manuel’s sexuality.
His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are
not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.

Ancheta vs. Ancheta 424 SCRA 725FACTS:

FACTS;
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and
had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their
conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the
petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed before
the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the
ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to
their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said
petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage
of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with
respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She
alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the
case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now
comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?

HELD:NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion,
says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing
any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”
“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.”

Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment
against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not
challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.”

The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.”

Noveras vs. Noveras GR No. 18828

FACTS:
David and Leticia are (former Filipino) US citizens who own properties in the USA and in
the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June
2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

ISSUE: Whether facts in the case give ground to grant a decree of judicial separation of property
of the spouses.

HELD: YES. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one
year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
RATIO:1. As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before
the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is
judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136
of the Family Code.18 Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of
property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit: Art. 135. Any of the
following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2)
That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of
parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of
the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligation to the family
as provided in Article 101:(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power : and (6) That the time of the petition the spouses
have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

SIOCHI V. GOZON 616 SCRA 807

FACTS:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land. The property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila
and is registered in the name of “Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira).”On 23
December 1991, Elvira filed with the RTC of Cavite City a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. On Jan 2, 1992, Elvira filed a notice of
lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT no. 5357.While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an agreement to buy and sell
involving the property for the price of P18 million.However, despite repeated demands from Mario,
Alfredo failed to comply with the stipulations provided in the agreement. After paying the P5 million
earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property. On
September 6, 1993, the agreement was annotated on TCT no. 5357.Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the
Cavite RTC rendered a decision in the legal separation case, which granted the same. The RTC ordered
among others that, the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared dissolved and
liquidated. As regards the property, it held that it is deemed conjugal property.Alfredo executed a deed of
donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. Later on, Alfredo through an SPA
executed by his daughter Winifred, sold the property to IDRI and the latter paid the purchase price in full.
A new TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of IDRI.Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC
a complaint for specific performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

ISSUE:Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal property, being the sole administrator of the same
without obtaining the consent of Elvira

HELD:NO.This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the
property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Article
124 of the family code.

Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao 675 SCRA 642

FACTS :
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
liabilities.Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.Neither party filed a motion for
reconsideration and appeal within the period 20 days7 later or after more than nine months from the
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the
RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.

 ISSUE :Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership.

HELD:N0,In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.  First, he was well-
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In
fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of
all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed
as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.

Ilusurion vs. Bildner 332 SCRA 169

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board
in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In
1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that
the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such
petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or
by any other process.

Arcaba vs. Tabancura,et al. November 22,2011

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A
located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco.
Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his
niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took
care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was
his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual
intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started
working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as
househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging.Francisco’s health deteriorated and
became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his
lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to
Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was
made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the
deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was
valid.

HELD:The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation
is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was
not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and
women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Muller vs. Muller G.R. No. 180572

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s
parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds
for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of
a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner,
Elena Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property,
the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC.  It
held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and
not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner
the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the
construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner may receive a reimbursement.

Ruling:
No, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse
during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore,
inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein
spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties
purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by
the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its
acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave
the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of
the said real property.

Beumer vs. Amores G.R. No. 195670

FACTS:

Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980. Their marriage was
declared null by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed
a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were
acquired during their marriage.

The respondent averred that she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.

He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City
was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.

He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City
was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can claim for a reimbursement.

HELD:

No, the petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are
no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two
houses are considered co-owned by the parties. While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase the lot, he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. The Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject
properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. A contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.

Abrenica vs Abrenica G.R. No. 180572

FACTS:

Petitioner and Respondent were law firm partners. The respondent filed a case against the Petitioner to
return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover
from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash
advance that he obtained.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to
his children and petitioner Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her step-
children owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied and that it was under their
Absolute Community Property.

A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the Petitioner’s
properties, he has been previously married to another woman but their marriage has already been
dissolved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Joena had the right to the claim.

Held:

No, the two of these step children were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to one of
the children, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney
authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannotbe sustained.  Under Art. 92, par. (3)
of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of
a spouse whohas legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of
that property. Thus, neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.

LUZON SURETY CO VS DE GARCIA30 SCRA 111

FACTS:

 Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of Philippine
National Bank where Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB
filed complaint against Luzon Surety which subsequently prompted Luzon Surety to file a complaint
against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first case
and ordered the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. Court of first instance DECISION:
issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff levied his sugar
quedans which were conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which
the lower court found in their favor based on Art.161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which
affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be
held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party infavor
of a surety company.

Held:

No, Art. 163 of the New Civil Code states that as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the
husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit
of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the
family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or surety
for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Such inference is more emphatic in this case, when no proof is presented that
Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Article 161 of the CC, a conjugal partnership under that
provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case.

GELANO VS CA103 SCRA 90

FACTS:

 Insular Sawmill, Inc. leased the paraphernal property of Guillermina M. Gelano (wife) and Carlos Gelano
(husband) obtained cash advances but refused to pay his unpaid balances. Guillermina M. Gelano
refused to pay on the ground that said amount was for the personal account of her husband asked for
by, and given to him, without her knowledge and consent and did not benefit the family. Spouses
Gelano’s purchased lumber materials on credit for the repair and improvement of their residence,
leaving unpaid amounts. Joseph Tan Yoc Su, as accommodating party, executed a joint and several
promissory note with Carlos Gelano in favor of China Banking Corporation bank payable in 60 days to
help renew the previous loan of the spouses but Carlos only paid a fraction of it. Guillermina refused to
pay on the ground that she had no knowledge of such accommodation. Insular filed a complaint for
collection against the spouses before the court of first instance. The court held Carlos liable. On the
court of appeal’s decision held that the spouses are jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the couple’s conjugal property is liable.

Held:
YES. Pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally can still be
found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code, The obligation/debt contracted by petitioner-
husband Carlos Gelano redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal property is liable for
his debt.

G TRACTORS INC VS CA135 SCRA 192

FACTS:

Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He operates a logging concession, Luis Narciso entered into
Contract and Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former
tractors. Contract stipulated payment for rental. However, Luis was not able to pay. The property of Luis
was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land. Wife’s contentions: whatever
transpired in the civil case against them could be binding only on the husband Luis. Narciso and could
not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case that the
nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the
money judgment against him that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made
liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in the civil case considering that the subject matter of said
case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment debt of private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a conjugal debt for which the
conjugal partnership property can be held answerable.

Held: 

Yes, Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for “all the
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.” There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to
enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the
right to embark the conjugal partnership. The obligations were contracted in connection with his
legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal
partnership. The debts contracted by the husband for and inthe exercise of the industry or profession
bywhich he contributes to the support of thefamily cannot be deemed to be his exclusiveand private
debts.

Nobleza vs. Nobleza G.R. No. 193038

FACTS:
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1, 1990.
Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina
where they had planned to eventually build their home. The following year, or on September 13, 1989,
Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) from
Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989,
she settled the balance for the equity over the subject property with the developer through SSS8
financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations. 

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The following
year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that Rogelio had
brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, and was able to
confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as
his wife. 

In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC
of Pasig City. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of
selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their neighbor
and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) - of the existence of the cases that she had filed against
Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and
terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the
subject property to petitioner without Shirley's consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner's undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on
the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real property taxes
due thereon. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale valid even for lack of the consent of the wife.

HELD:
Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for
value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances
relevant to the sale.

The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent's financial contribution in
the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece
of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property. 
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter. 

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the
Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement. 
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: 
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as
the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they
shall form part of the community property; 
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the
community property; 
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore
forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective
contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name
appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.

Dar vs. Legasto G.R. No. 143016

FACTS:

Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners
where they were sued as “Mr.and Mrs.” in the said case. Petitioners were found guilty of failure to
comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy
Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their
respective spouses did not sign the same. Petitioner’s contention: since what is involved in the instant
case is their common rights and interest to abode under the system of absolute community of property,
either of the spouses can sign the petition. Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to
and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to
prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or
agencies as a form of forum shopping.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signing of one of the spouses in the certification substantially complies with the rule
on certification of non-forumshopping.

Held:

YES. The petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property in which they have
a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially
complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.

Uy vs. Court of Appeals November 29, 2000

FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.  Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a
petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to
sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.  She further contest
that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities.  RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such
decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made
by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father.  As
such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it
should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits.  He further
reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband
and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind.  Hence, he argued that
this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.  Upon the
appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

Yes, the supreme court ruled in favor of Teodoro.  The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.  In this case,
trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract.  Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under
the Revised Rules of Court.  The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has
the same powers and duties as a guardian.  Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as
administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate
required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC.  SC further held that
such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground
of lack of due process.

HEIRS OF GO VS SERVACIO GR 157537

FACTS:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later
Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it
was his father, Protacio Go,Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the
property). Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio, Sr. andmother of the petitioners). Protacio, Sr. and his
son Rito sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio(Servacio). The petitioners demanded the
return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio. Petitioner’s
contention: following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the
sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. The regional trial court’s decision: affirmed the validity of the
sale- declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,
Rito, and Dina)- that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs
of the late Marta- that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was
acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was
proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.

Held:

No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code, their property
relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon
Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article175 (1) of the Civil Code, and
an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect
to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in
the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. NONETHELESS, a co-owner
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Also, it should not impair vested rights.

UGALDE VS YSASI

GR NO 130623

FACTS: On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married
before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March 1951, Rev. Msgr.
Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City.
Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de
Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly
contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay
City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and
personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded
of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.

On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial
court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In particular, petitioner asked for her
conjugal share in respondents inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondents parents,
Juan Ysasi and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979,
respectively.Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the
conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third
persons without her consent; and payment of appearance and attorneys fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for dissolution of the CPG should be dismissed.

RULING:

YES.

Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their
marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code),
which took effect on 30 August 1950. Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of gains.

Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains:

Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)

The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties separation of property
resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement because the
case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under
Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this ground. A
judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and
conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons that are not
parties to it.

BUENAVENTURA VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 127358

FACTS: Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas,
Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their
respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6
parcels of land executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their
co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names. In seeking the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint,
aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed
to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale.
RULING:

NO.

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the
appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only
upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their
properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While
the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

DINO VS DINO

GR. NO 178044

FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36.
Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent
was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their
marriage void ab initio.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code

HELD:

The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x
x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration
of nullity of marriage.

YU VS REYES-CARPIO

GR NO. 189207
FACTS: Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of
Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated
April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the
exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September
12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody,
support, and property relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity
of the parties’ marriage.

Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that
the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on
nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric
opposed this motion.

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under
Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.

RULING:

NO.

It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised with
grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which “does not finally
dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse
of discretion and that those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify
certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial
court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.

It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents
on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge
merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the
trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:

Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.

Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a
decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial
court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:

Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial
proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as
of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
matters.

Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody,
support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject
incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of
marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that ruling the main issue without
receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is
certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical manner,
much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left
to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said
to have committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in
ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.

MUNOZ JR. VS CARLOS

GR NO. 156125

FACTS: Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to secure
a housing loan (200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a residential house on said
lot.
It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS.
The balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender of the title over the property
and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be executed by the husband. While the
spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ
refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k
(which was already paid to GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over the property and subsequently, caused the
issuance of a new one in his own name.

The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor of
MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the property was the wife’s exclusive paraphernal property (since she
inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid even without the husband’s consent.

The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal property of the
wife, it became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid
through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is Conjugal.

RULING:

NO.

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. In this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the
wife’s exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).

It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True,
respondents were married during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their
property relations. With the enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal
partnership of gains superseded those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not
the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in the value are more than the value of the property at the time
of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement.

In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to
assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the
husband. Thus, the property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she
contracted with MUNOZ; the written consent of the husband was not necessary.

QUIAO VS QUIAO

GR NO. 176556

FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after
more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code, which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership–

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community?

RULING:

1. ARTICLE 129 WILL GOVERN. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same
are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. NO. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that
the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
3. NO. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And
since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to
the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142
of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property
and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts.
The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

TITAN CONSTRUCTION VS DAVID

GR NO. 169548

FACTS: Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25, 1957. In
1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was
registered in the name of MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
[6] In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated with each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale[8] dated April 24, 1995, and
that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 130129 in the name of Titan.

Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance
against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of
Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and
TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be
issued in their names.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in

good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4, 1995
signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Titan
thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

In his unverified ReplyManuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to
be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.

Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint which was granted by the
trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint impleading Martha as a co-
defendant in the proceedings. However, despite personal service of summons upon Martha, she failed
to file an Answer. Thus, she was declared in default. Trial then ensued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership.

RULING:

YES.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of the celebration of the marriage between
Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides:

Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides:

Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

These provisions were carried over to the Family Code. In particular, Article 117 thereof provides:

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition is for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that [a]ll property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

We are not persuaded by Titans arguments that the property was Marthas exclusive property because
Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could not have had
the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted
that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. In consonance with our ruling
in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds
of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear. Here, we find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property,
purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.

IMANI VS METROBANK

GR NO. 187023

FACTS: Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-sureties
binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding 6 Million php. CPDTI incurred an indebtednessaround 164,000 php to which it defaulted in
paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties.
Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by Imani and filed to consolidate the title to its
name.

Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC annulled
the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

RULING:

NO.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the
party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a conditionsine qua nonto the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership.Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.

As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name ofEvangelina Dazo-Imani
married to Sina Imaniis no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does
not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to
substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.Thus, it cannot be rightfully
said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.

LAPERAL VS KATIGBAK

GR NO. 16991
FACTS: CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property
of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its
improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage.
Ramon’s occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was
registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”. The latter declared that
her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The
husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his
wife.

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in
recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month
after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of
property and separate administration, which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by
the Laperals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

RULING: All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not
conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the
husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it
was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not
have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income.

Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.

TERESITA FRANCISCO VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 102330

FACTS: Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by hissecond
marriage filed a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorneyauthorizing Conchita
Evangelista (Eusebio’s daughter in his first marriage) to administer thehouse and lot together with the
apartments allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio duringtheir conjugal partnership. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents dueto petitioner’s failure to establish proof
that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they
pertained exclusively to the petitioner. As such, theCA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to
Eusebio, and that he has the capacity toadminister them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trialcourt's ruling
that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capitalproperties of Eusebio
exclusively.

RULING:

NO.

SC resolved the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on theprovisions of the New Civil
Code. Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have beenrepealed by the Family Code of the
Philippines. Nonetheless, SC cannot invoke the new law inthis case without impairing prior vested rights
pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article 105(second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the
repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of theNew Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect
rights, which have becomevested or accrued while the said provisions were in force.

 
Berciles v. GSIS
“Premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment though exclusivefunds” 

Facts:

• GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and otherprivate respondents
Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, mercy Berciles Patacsil andRhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge
Pascual Berciles with FlorFuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement benefits
• This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and their children.

ISSUE: WON GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a natural child andillegitimate children

HELD: NO
- Art 287 pf NCC – illegitimate children other than natural are entitled tosupport and such
sucsessional rights are granted in the code, but for thisarticle to be applicable, there must be
admission or recognition of paternityof illegitimate child.

No evidence of admission
o(X)There was no evidence that he intervened when his namewas put in the birthcertificate of
Pascual Berciles, thus his part in the birth certificate isnull and void
o (X) baptismal certificate has no weight as well
o (X) living together does not prove filiation
o (X) pictures are not proof of filiation
o Their mother was not recognized to be married to the deceased
RESULT: retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his marriage to
Iluminda Ponce who is also an heir.
- Art 966 of NCC – if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children
- Art 980 of NCC – children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.

 
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS GR No. L-45038, April 30, 1987TOPIC:
Administration of exclusive property

FACTS:
•Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara
de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres
Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would
eventually buy the lot.
•April 2, 1950
oThe owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal
properties covering the lot occupied by the respondent were placed under custodia legis
•April 22, 1950
- Vicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of respondent amounting to
P1,500 for the lot
- Respondent had a remaining balance of P5,700which he did not pay or was unable to
paybecause the heirs of Tambunting could not settle their differences.
•April 28, 1950
- Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate and the
respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
•March 13 and 20, 1959
- Petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became thesuccessful and vendee of the Tambunting de
Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine
Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The
lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale provided for terms and
conditions.
•Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the
occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. This
includes respondent among others who refused to vacate the lots
• Trial Court dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is
to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor
(Don Vicente Legarda).

ISSUE: Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property?

DECISION: NO.
Decision of CA is reversed and set aside
RATIO: The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the
paraphernal properti es of Dona Clara Tambunti ng during the lifeti me of the latt er. T h u s ,
it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by the private
r e s p o n d e n t a n d D o n Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Clara
Tambunti ng and was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf of Clara Tambunti ng but
was only consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly
d i s p o s e d o f t h e l o t i n d i s p u t e a s a c o n ti n u i n g administrator of the
paraphernal properti es of Dona Clara Tambunting

.Art. 136 NCC.

T h e w i f e r e t a i n s t h e o w n e r s h i p o f t h e paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC.
The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the
husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it. In this case, the public
instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the husband shall
give adequate security

 
Ong vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-63025, November 29, 1991

FACTS:
 Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted her own logging business. In
furtherance of said business, she loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix, private respondent. Due to
mismanagement, she defaulted on her obligation. Boix filed a complaint, based on the promissory notes
issued by Teodora. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix, he then moved to execute the judgment.
 The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-respondent) levied and attached a parcel of land. An
auction sale was held and Boix was adjudged the highest bidder and a writ of possession was issued.
 Ramon filed a motion with the CFI of Manila to quash the writ of possession and was denied. He then
brought the case to the CA to annul the auction sale, alleging that the property is conjugal and thus
could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife.
 The CA found that the subject property is paraphernal property, it was declared in the name of
Teodora Ong, while the house erected thereon was declared in the name of  Ramon Ong and Teodora
Ong.

ISSUE:
Whether the parcel of land is exclusive property of the wife or part of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:
Yes, it is exclusive property. The mere use of the husband’s surname in the tax declaration is not
sufficient proof that the said property was acquired during the marriage and therefore conjugal. It is
undisputed that the parcel of land was declared solely in the wife’s name but the house built thereon
was declared in the name of the spouses. When the property is registered in the name of the spouse
only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication
that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. The party who invokes the presumption that all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife is entitled to engage in business
although the husband may object. The wife’s exclusive (paraphernal) properties, as well as those of their
conjugal partnership, shall be liable for obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business.
Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS:

Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964.  They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately.   During the marriage or
on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate.  Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan
where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95.  Katrina failed to return
the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value.  Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds.  The spouses Anita Chan
and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband
Romarico.  The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina.  Trial court ruled in favor of
the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name
of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson.  2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito
Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson.  A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the
conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita.  The
husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such.  The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the
husband obtained the money to repay the loan.  Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though
they had been living separately.  A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for support of the family.  The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and
the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor.  The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without
the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family.  There was also no
evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred.  In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against
Katrina, personally and exclusively.

DELA PENA V. AVILA 

G.R. No. 187490, [February 08, 2012]

FACTS:

Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of
P250,000.00 with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a promissory note and a notarized
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the
improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner
Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan
obligation.

Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma
Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As such Gemma caused the
transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over
same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.

Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was the true
and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her
title was simulated. The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.

FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property
due to Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the
premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in
its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina registry.

Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for
annulment of deed of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who was already dead
by that time.

RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia
executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130
of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315
conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.

HELD:

No. Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the
party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to
proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono.
Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was
already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the
realty can be ascertained.

In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.

As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly
erred in nullifying Antonia’s sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under
Article 130 of the Family Code. Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property
may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the
P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.

Villanueva v Court of Appeals

FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are
her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Eusebia is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas. Out of the lawful
wedlock, they begot five (5) children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all
improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of
land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as
well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations.

In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who
received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with
Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. From
the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been
receiving the income of his properties Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in
favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA
upheld trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Procopio are conjugal

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and
Eusebia even if they were married before the effectively of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code
explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the
Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is
counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October
1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996.Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Since
the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia,
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas
and Eusebia.

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154

FACTS: Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6,
were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly obtained a loan to pay their balance. The
corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her
signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital
consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO
REYES."

While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question
Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of
Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.

Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land contending that
said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to
petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent.

Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had
purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration.  Julia testified that she bought the
two parcels of land on installment basis and that the first payment came from her personal funds.   The
CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia and ruled that she could validly
dispose of the same without the consent of her husband.

ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties.

HELD: Yes. The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano.
Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in order that the same may
be deemed conjugal property. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous
title during the marriage.

Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil
Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership are liabilities of the partnership.

Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which she herself prepared and
filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid to her
were income of the conjugal partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital
assets of the conjugal partnership.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later
registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that
property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its
conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.

AGUETE V. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 

 FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for annulment against PNB before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a real
estate mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted
by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB.

Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the
land which is part of their conjugal property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of
the proceedings. She interposed in her defense that the signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.

RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage and within ten years from the
transaction mentioned, may ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB,
Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without
adequate proof. It also found that the loan was used in the expansion of the family business.

ISSUE: How is the benefit to the family proven so as to render the loan contracted by the husband
binding upon the conjugal property?

HELD: If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term “x
x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

Jovellanos v. CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992

Facts: Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale agreement of a property.
When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor, with whom he had
three children. Leonor died on January 2, 1959.  On May 30, 1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette
(respondent). On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her husband, built an
extension at the back of the said property. On January 8, 1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife
executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said property to his
children in the first marriage (petitioners). On September 8, 1985, Daniel died.

Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage
due to the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8,
1975).

Issue: To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?

Held: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also proclaims that
reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC).

The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and
Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel
had only the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary use and
enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, however, the
ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made.

Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be given, entitling
the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to the property. The time
when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married to his second wife, Annette,
which makes the said property as their conjugal property.

ART 118: “any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed”

Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during
the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.

Munoz, Jr. vs Ramirez (spouses)

FACTS: On April 6, 1989, Eliseo(husband), a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged a property owned by
Erlinda(with consent) to the GSIS. This was done to secure a loan of 136,500.00 housing loan payable within 20
years. The money was then used to construct a 2 story residential home.

It is alleged that Petitioner(Munoz) granted the respondents a loan of P600,000.00 which is secured by the disputed
property. The deal was that Petitioner would give Erlinda 200k advance to cancel the GSIS mortage and the balance
of 402k after the title is surrendered to petitioner.
When Erlinda gave the title to the petitioner the husband did not sign the title which prompted the petitioner to not
give the balance of 402k and want to cancel the mortage. Since Erlinda already used the 200k to pay for the GSIS
Loan and could not return the 200k, Petitioner kept the title.

Sometime in 1993, the respondents discovered that their previous title named after them has been cancelled in favor
of the petitioner.
RTC RULING
The RTC dismissed the complaint,
CA RULING
The CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.

THE ISSUE
whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal

RULING: Paraphernal

 As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugalunless the contrary is proved.
In this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of
conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the wife’s exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article
92 and 109 of FC).

It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were
married during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the
enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the
CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which
supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are
more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement.

In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume that
the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property
remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted with MUNOZ; the written consent
of the husband was not necessary.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. No. 118305
February 12, 1998
FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making
him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the
loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering
PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending
the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3
of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners
on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE: What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered “for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?

HELD:

Article 121 of the Family Code provides that “The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: … (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.The burden of proof
that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to
prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains.

Jurisprudence provides that if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract,
i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized
as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety
or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof
must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

The petitioners claim that the benefits were: employment of Ching would be prolonged,
his shares would appreciate, and it would enhance his career. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from
the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 124642
February 23, 2004
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with
the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC
filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo
Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion
to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner
spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 121 and
that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses,
in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not
contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.

ISSUE: WON the 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans
guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband, or to the wife. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during
the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of
stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the
name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was
done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to
adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The
barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment
Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
 Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3]of the Family Code of the
Philippines) provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners
was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between
the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or
a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK

vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO
G.R. No. 153802

March 11, 2005

FACTS:

Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Salewas executed
only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank. He constituted as real estate mortgage the subject property, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. The mortagaged property was foreclosed.
A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and
that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises.

Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages
against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents
null and void. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision. Hence, this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family

HELD:

Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade the Court.
Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding
that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

PAQUITO V. ANDO
vs.
ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 184007
February 16, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Paquito Ando was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc.
(PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other respondents were hired by
PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were dismissed from employment. Consequently filing a case for
illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents’ favor.
PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorney’s
fees). PACSI and Ando appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Respondents
moved for its execution. To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on
Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of “Paquito V. Ando … married to Erlinda S.
Ando.” Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC. Ando claims that the property
belonged to him and his wife and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of the
execution sale. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the NLRC Sheriff.
Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued that the property to be levied
belonged to him – and his wife – in their personal capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It
was likewise denied.

ISSUE: WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a debt incurred by
him, in his representative capacity and his company, PACSI.

HELD:

No. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. Thus, a sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any
person except that of the judgment debtor. The property in question belongs not only to Ando, but his
wife as well. She stands to lose the property subject to execution without ever being a party to the case
– which is tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY

vs.
MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA
G.R. No. 143382
November 29, 2006

FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied
for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent
corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
 Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business
reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
corporation and individual respondents.

RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the
lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC's decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered
into by the husband to accommodate a third party

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil
Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or
surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the
benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if

the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the
term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband
contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such
obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an
obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family.

In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden
of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction.
It failed to discharge that burden.
 PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA
vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK
D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE
G.R. No. 160708
October 16, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located
in Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is
adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely
in his name under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early
1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage
their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the
house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and
notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots
without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary
Ann did not sign on top of her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting
in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.

When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the
Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter.
Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that
one flunked at school.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or
conjugal property, and
(2) Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.

HELD:
1. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."
 There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive
property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot
covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No
evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro. Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT
No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built
thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had
even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.

2. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s
inability, the authority of the court.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years
from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to
the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.

MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES

vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO
G.R. No. 178902
April 21, 2010
FACTS:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six
years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help
of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the
agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php
140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the
consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to
complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized
the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano
and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in
1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on
the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’
signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action
to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the
testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the
action has already prescribed.
 On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not
prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal
Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10
years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well
within the prescriptive period.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of
their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;

2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed; and

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul
that sale.

HELD:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document
giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was
correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely
different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there was such
difference in the handwriting.

2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989,
after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already
established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano
without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a
given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has already
prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses
since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On
the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not
prescribe since it is a void contract.

3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to
assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action
anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the
beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale.
When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As
lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from
its enjoyment and disposal.
 SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 145222
April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Civil case for damages that arose from slander filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol.

RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to pay for damages, which was affirmed by CA and SC.

Court issued a writ of execution, directing the sheriff to collect indemnification from Erlinda.
Finding Erlinda’s personal properties insufficient, sheriff deigned to issue a notice of levy on real
property on execution, and thereafter a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.

Two days prior to the bidding, a Third Party Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from one
Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. Sale proceeded with the
spouses Buado emerging as the highest bidder.

One year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda filed a complaint for annulment of
Certificate of Sale and Damages with Preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff
and alleged that the property was directly levied upon without exhausting the personal properties of
Erlinda.

ISSUE: WON wife’s criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

NO. Article 122 of FC explicitly provides that payment of personal debt contracted by the
husband or wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
in so far as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The CPG has no duty to make payments for the
liability of debtor-spouse.

EFREN PANA
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR.
G.R. No. 164201
December 10, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was
acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death
and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.
 Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently,
a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

HELD:
Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that “ The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.”

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses may be enforced against the
partnership assets if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be
enforced against their conjugal asset.

Guiang vs CA
Facts:
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses
Sometime in 1983, the couple brought a 421sqm property in cotabato. They later sold half of this property
to the petitioners. The petitioners built their home on that said property.
While private respondent was seeking employment in manila, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal property(without consent of the wife), consisting
of their residence and the lot on which it stood.
Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went back to the subject property.
Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable settlement between the parties.
Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain, respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her
husband and petitioners. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void.
Issue:Whether the sale was void or merely voidable and was ratified by the amicable settlement
Held:
Respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. The
nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a
valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements:
(1) cause,
(2) object, and
(3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by
the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear:
after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which
the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a
motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the
property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

UY VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.  Gilda, wife of the
latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal
property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated
to discharge his functions.  She further contest that such illness of the husband
necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its
improvement to meet such necessities.  RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that
such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are
governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person
and properties of his father.  As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly
the need for notice and a hearing on the merits.  He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of
the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife”
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind.  Hence, he argued
that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in
law.  Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a

cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties,
may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a
parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro.  The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent.  In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was
in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract.  Hence, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.  The law
provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers
and duties as a guardian.  Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as
administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the
ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings
under FC.  SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

HEIRS OF GO vs. SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537,  

FACTS:

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. 23 years
later, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath
that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said
property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the
property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The contention of the
petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null
and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that
Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to
the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the
portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not
also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the
sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
entitled to as heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made
without prior liquidation? –
 
RULING:
 
NO, Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the termination of the marriage
by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement
proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership
property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any
disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void. 

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without 
c o m p l i a n c e   w i t h   t h e   f o r e g o i n g requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.

UGALDE v YSASI

GR No. 130623, February 29, 2008

Facts:

Ugalde and Ysasi got married before the MTC. They did not execute any ante-nuptial
agreement, and had a son. In 1957, petitioner and respondent separated. Respondent
allegedly contracted another marriage with Smith. At the same time, petitioner alleges
that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal
properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. She alleges that she has been defrauded
of rental income, profits and fruits of their conjugal properties.

December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of
gains against respondent. Petitioner asks for her conjugal share in respondents
inheritance as per the settlement of the state of respondent’s parent. Respondent
countered that he and petition entered into an agreement which provided that their
conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of April 1957 (Amicable
settlement). That the Amicable settlement was approved. Respondent also alleges
petitioner obtained a divorce in Mexico and contracted a second marriage with Galoway.
Finally respondent alleges that their marriage was void because it was executed without
the benefit of a marriage license.
 
RTC ruling dismissed the petition, considering that the marriage was void without a
marriage license. Also, there was no proof that petitioner and respondent acquired
properties during their union .Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. This
lead to the instant petition.

 Issue:

Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision which
dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains.

Held:

No. Regarding the dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, the existence of conjugal
partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage, which petitioner and respondent
don’t have due to the absence of a marriage license. Petitioner and respondent’s
marriage was held on February 1951, and the applicable law wasthe Civil Code. So
when the RTC decided their case, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved.

Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358
March 31, 2005

Facts:

Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded
the care and custody of the minor to his mother.

Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20,
000. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC
decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held:

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in
case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by
the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the
parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.

DIÑO V. DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044,  January 19, 2011

FACTS:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14

January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision
holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

HELD:

Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of
the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.

YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU

G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011

FACTS:

Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC
of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer of
evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have
been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of
Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues)
were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.
Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.

Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another
branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-
Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the
incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.

Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then
filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first
before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations.

HELD:

NO. It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one
which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating
the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous.

Munoz Jr. vs. Carlos 

G.R. No. 156125

FACTS:

The residential lot in the subject property was registered in the name of Erlinda
Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of
Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged said lot, with Erlinda’s consent, to the GSIS to
secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly
salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructeda thirty-six (36)-
square meter, two-story residential house on the lot. On July 14, 1993, the title to the
subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale,
dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo,
for a stated consideration of P602,000.00.

On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a
mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s name
were falsified. The respondents presented the results of the scientific examination
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseo’s purported signatures in
the Special Power of Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights
dated April 29, 1992, showing that they were forgeries. The petitioner, on the other
hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject property since it
was registered in Erlinda’s name.

The RTC ruled for petitioner finding that the property is paraphernal and consequently,
the NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and in the
affidavit were forgeries was immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was not
necessary. The CA reversed and held that pursuant to the second paragraph of Article
158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon.  Fortun, the subject property,
originally Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it
was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds –
Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is paraphernal orconjugal

HELD:

The property is paraphernal property of Erlinda. As a general rule, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the
residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption
of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code. The
residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.

QUIAO V. QUIAO 

G.R. No 176556,  July 04, 2012

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby
awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is

forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days
later or after more than nine months  from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the
term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse
and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does
not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No.
(2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the
Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

 1. Whether or not Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129

on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in
the conjugal partnership.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the

same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

HELD:
1. Art 129 will govern. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation
of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.

2. NO. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the

operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership
of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”

Quiao vs quiao

FACTS:

Respondent Rita filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido
RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor
childrenin favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to
the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more
than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63,
No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead
of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:

 1. WON Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. WON the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership–
NO.
(1) Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with
the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

HELD
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule
is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to
Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolutecommunity, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And
since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to
the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of
the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From
the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not
intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the
absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime,
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

Topic: Support during the liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains

1) Santero vs. CFI

153 SCRA 728

FACTS: Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with
Felixberta Pacursa namely Princesita, Federico, and Willie (petitioners). He also had four children with
Anselma Diaz namely Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (private respondents). These children are
all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero
died.

During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate of the
late Pablo, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision of
CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) to private respondents which includes tuition
fees, clothing materials, and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator.
The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying,
that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed,
and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.

The private respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita,
Estelita, and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. This
was granted by theCFI-Cavite. Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz,
mother of private respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three
children included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the
last four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have
been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their
shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to
get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to receive allowance.

RULING: Yes. Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and
medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes the education
of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.

The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should
not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of
Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil
Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents
Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from
their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a
substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be
the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
Topic: Chapter 5. Separation of Property of the Spouses and Administration of Common Property by One
Spouse During the Marriage

2) Maquilan vs. Maquilan

G.R. No. 156689

FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life
and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter
when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour,
which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's
paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private
respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property. The Petition was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

RULING: Yes. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily
or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds
true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the
Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the
conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the
Family Code.
Topic: For sufficient cause

3) Ugalde vs. Ysasi

G.R. No. 130623

FACTS: Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married. Petitioner and
respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. They
separated sometime in April 1957. Respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria
Eleanor Smith (Smith). Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and
disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she
had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.

Ugalde filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent. She asked
for her conjugal share in respondent’s inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent’s
parents. Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the
conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third
persons without her consent; and payment of appearance and attorneys fees.

Respondent countered that he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among
others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant
to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 then pending before
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI). The Amicable Settlement stipulates:

2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in full
satisfaction of and/or consideration for and to cover any and all money and/or property claims she has
or may have against the petitioner in the future, including but not limited to pensions, allowances,
alimony, support, share in the conjugal property (if any), inheritance, etc.;

3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the payment of THIRTY THOUSAND pesos
(P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged and confessed by and to the entire
satisfaction of the respondent, she hereby completely and absolutely transfer, convey, assign, set over,
waive, remise, release and forever quitclaim, unto petitioner, his successors and administrators, any and
all rights, claims and interests which the respondent has or may hereafter have against the petitioner
arising, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the petitioner and respondent were married on March 1,
1951, including but not limited to any and all money and/or property claims mentioned in the paragraph
immediately preceding;

4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the parties herein hereby waive any and all
rights to question the validity and effectivity of the provisions of this amicable settlement, as well as the
right to raise these matters on appeal.

The CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained
a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage
with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway’s death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with
Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Futhermore, respondent
alleged that the marriage between him and petitioner was void because it was executed without the
benefit of a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was dissolution of the petitioner and respondent’s conjugal partnership of
gains

RULING: Yes. The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution
of the petitioner and respondents conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner and respondent were
married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.
Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal
partnership of gains, thus:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains:

Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)

The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties separation of property
resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement because the
case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under
Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this ground. A
judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and
conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not
parties to it. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it
was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFIs approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June
1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent
on even date.

Topic: Voluntary separation of property/Effects of judicial separation of property

4) Laperal vs. Katigbak

March 31, 1934

FACTS: CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property
of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its
improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage.
Ramon’s occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was
registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak”. The latter declared that
her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The
husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his
wife.

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in
recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month
after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of
property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by
the Laperals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

RULING: Yes. All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not
conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the
husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it
was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not
have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income.

Topic: Chapter 6. Regime of Separation of Property

5) Ugalde vs. Ysasi

G.R. No. 130623

FACTS: Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married. Petitioner and
respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. They
separated sometime in April 1957. Respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria
Eleanor Smith (Smith). Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and
disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she
had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.

Ugalde filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent. She asked
for her conjugal share in respondent’s inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent’s
parents. Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the
conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third
persons without her consent; and payment of appearance and attorneys fees.

Respondent countered that he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among
others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant
to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 then pending before
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI). The Amicable Settlement stipulates:

2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in full
satisfaction of and/or consideration for and to cover any and all money and/or property claims she has
or may have against the petitioner in the future, including but not limited to pensions, allowances,
alimony, support, share in the conjugal property (if any), inheritance, etc.;

3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the payment of THIRTY THOUSAND pesos
(P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged and confessed by and to the entire
satisfaction of the respondent, she hereby completely and absolutely transfer, convey, assign, set over,
waive, remise, release and forever quitclaim, unto petitioner, his successors and administrators, any and
all rights, claims and interests which the respondent has or may hereafter have against the petitioner
arising, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the petitioner and respondent were married on March 1,
1951, including but not limited to any and all money and/or property claims mentioned in the paragraph
immediately preceding;

4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the parties herein hereby waive any and all
rights to question the validity and effectivity of the provisions of this amicable settlement, as well as the
right to raise these matters on appeal.

The CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained
a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage
with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway’s death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with
Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Futhermore, respondent
alleged that the marriage between him and petitioner was void because it was executed without the
benefit of a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was dissolution of the petitioner and respondent’s conjugal partnership of
gains

RULING: Yes. The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution
of the petitioner and respondents conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner and respondent were
married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.
Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal
partnership of gains, thus:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the
conjugal partnership of gains:

Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)

The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties separation of property
resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement because the
case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under
Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this ground. A
judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and
conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not
parties to it. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it
was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFIs approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June
1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent
on even date.
Topic: Chapter 7. Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage/Unions under Art. 147
6) Valdez vs. RTC Branch 102 of Quezon City
260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. Begotten during the marriage were 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the
other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.
During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their
father.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code governs

RULING: Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code.
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.

"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

7) Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127358

FACTS: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel
Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of
court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. RTC and CA declared the marriage
entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura
null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties should be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
RULING: Yes. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to
have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be
sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

8) Abing vs. Waeyan

July 31, 2006

FACTS: Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan met and fell in love with each other. The
duo cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They bought a 2-storey residential
house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned by a certain Alejandro. Consequent
to the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the name of Juliet. On
December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would send money to John who
deposited the same in their joint bank account. In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house
underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new
structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved in this case. In 1994, Juliet returned
from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a
mine employee. In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they
decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto.
Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples dwelling with Juliet paying him the
amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s share in all their properties. Juliet paid John the sum of
P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet
in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995. Juliet, however, failed to make good the
balance. John demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused,
prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet. John
alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru
money he borrowed from his relatives. John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject structure, which
thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter’s failure to pay the agreed balance
due him under the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner
John

RULING: No. Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live

exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void

marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property

acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-

ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-
law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint
efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common in equal shares. Being
herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected
therefrom.

9) Metrobank vs. Pascual

547 SCRA 246

FACTS: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and his ex-wife Florencia Nevalga had their marriage declared
void on the ground of the former’s psychological incapacity. Their conjugal property was dissolved as
ordered by the RTC, but the same was not liquidated. Florencia later on filed a Php 58 million loan from
Metrobank with spouses Oliveros, mortaging some properties in order to secure the loan. One parcel of
land that belonged to the conjugal property of her previous marriage was included in the mortgage.
Among the documents she submitted to procure the loan were the copy of the said lot’s TCT and a
“waiver” allegedly executed by Nicholson in favor of Florencia. The said lot however was not one of the
properties covered by this “waiver.” Metrobank ordered the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties
due to their (Florencia and spouses Oliveros) failure to pay the loan, including the lot in question.
Nicholson then filed an action for declaring the mortgage null and void on the ground that the lot is still
a conjugal property which was mortgaged without his consent. The RTC declared the mortgage void,
ruling that the lot is a conjugal property by virtue of the provisions of Article 116 of the Family Code.
Furthermore, the RTC found that the “waiver” submitted by Florencia was fatally defective in that the
signature of Nicholson in the said document is forged, and that the same was executed before their
marriage was declared void. Additionally, the RTC found Metrobank to be a mortagee in bad faith on the
reason that it was negligent in checking the validity of the documents, failing to see the true nature of
the said “waiver.” Metrobank moved for reconsideration but was denied. The appeal by petitioner was
also dismissed by the CA for failing to overcome the presumption of a property being part of the
conjugal partnership under Article 116 of the Family Code. With the presumption not being overcome,
the said disposition of the lot by Florencia is governed by Article 124 of the same Code, which invalidates
the disposition of a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot in question is part of the conjugal property, and thus its disposition by
Florencia is invalid.

RULING: Yes. While Metrobank is correct in its contention that Article 116 of the Family Code does not
apply, the Court finds Metrobank’s argument that Nicholson failed to prove that the said property was
bought using conjugal funds to be invalid. The governing law in this case is Article 160 of the Civil Code,
which governs the presumption of a property acquired during the marriage to be part of the conjugal
partnership. There is no provision in the law that states that for a property to be deemed conjugal, the
same should have also been bought using conjugal funds. The fact that the property is acquired during
the marriage suffices, whether conjugal funds is used or not. On the second contention by Metrobank,
the same is still wrong. It was established that the same property was mortgaged two years after the
dissolution of the conjugal property, but the mortgage was before the liquidation of their conjugal
properties. In this scenario, the Court applied Article 493 of the Civil Code which deals with the
disposition of conjugal property prior to its liquidation. It ruled that Florencia had the right to mortgage
the said property, but Metrobank’s right, as a mortgagee, is limited only to Florencia’s share of the
conjugal property.
The mortgage on one-half of the said lot is therefore invalid, as there was no consent given by
Nicholson. Furthermore, the “waiver” Nicholson allegedly executed in favor of Florencia was found to be
invalid, therefore giving additional basis to this ruling.

Dino vs Dino

FACTS:
The Parties were once childhoon sweethearts who lived together and later got separated. On January 1998
petitioner and respondent got married.
On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriage against respondent citing
psychological incapacity under article 36.
Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with
her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
RTC declared their marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code”

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code
HELD:
YES. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of
its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which
are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In
short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., VS. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA,

Facts:Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married in September 1985. Five months after, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Josan
Jiselle. Salas left their conjugal dwelling and since then no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter. In 2003, Aguila
filed a petition for nullity of marriage, stating that they have “no conjugal properties whatsoever”. In 2007, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring the nullity of marriage. After this declaration, Aguila filed a manifestation stating that she discovered two
properties belonging to Salas. The registered owner of the Discovered properties is “Juan S. Salas”, married to Rubina C. Salas.
Rubina is Salas’ common-law wife. The RTC granted the petition of the said discovered properties that are among the conjugal
properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention,
claiming that the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties. She claims that she authorized her brother to purchase
the same, but because he was not well- versed with legal documentation, he registered the properties in the name of “Juan S.
Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas”.

Issue: Whether Rubina owns the Discovered Properties

Held: No, On both Salas and Rubina's contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered
Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong
presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to
the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina's statement that she owns the Discovered
Properties.

Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene
in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action."

In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., v. SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA,

FACTS: In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to Leonora. Edilberto Sr.
and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a
subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of
the death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was purchased by
Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had small business establishments
located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the
properties to Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners mother discovered the sale
sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over
the properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to
Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or
interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban.
CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties

HELD: NO. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were
acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through
the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the
Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres." The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property.The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the
Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since
Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the
acquisition of the Delpan property.

WILLEM BEUMER VS. AVELINA AMORES

FACTS: Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29, 1980. Their marriage was declared null by
the RTC on November 10, 2000 by reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage.

BY PURCHASE: (a.)Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, including a
residential house constructed thereon (b.)Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, including a residential house constructed
thereon (c.)Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre (d.)Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre

BY INHERITANCE:(a.) 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre(the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is
376.45 sq.m. (b.) 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre(the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24
sq.m.).

The respondent averred that she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and
2055-I by way of inheritance. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12
since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. During
trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of
Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?

HELD: The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to
the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are
considered co-owned by the parties. While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s
personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. The Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that
he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. A contract
that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.

VIRGINIA OCAMPO vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO,

FACTS: On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her
Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage. On March
31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties, and if they

failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to
each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.

RULING: NO. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides: In the
absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. This
particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The trial court and the
appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the
properties were acquired solely on her own efforts. We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they
acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage.

ERLINDA AGAPAY VS. CARLINA PALANG

FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted
to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in
Pozzorubio Pangasinan. The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and
lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon
Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed
the decision.

ISSUE: WON the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is
Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of
Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed money for the said property, so, the court found no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to
the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. With respect with the house
and lot, the transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation,
under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against
donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
MALLILIN JR. V CASTILLO

FACTS: Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During their union, they set up
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties
which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a
complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in her
answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-
ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married,
they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner
of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely   out
of her own money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING: Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article
144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of
the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

JACINTO SAGUID VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and cohabited
with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent
filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she
be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to
the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD: it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married
to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.
Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual
contribution is required.Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof
of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property. In the case at bar, the controversy
centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials. While there is no
question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount
of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

ATIENZA VS DE CASTRO

Facts: Lupo Atienza hired Yolanda De Castro as accountant for his two corporations (Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian
Maritime Corporation) in 1983 Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man, they lived together
in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against
Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property
with his own funds Yolanda on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds. Trial Court said that the contested
property is owned common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts. CA reversed the Trial Court
Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.

Issue: WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda

Held: Yes Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under this regime only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their
contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he
contributed in the parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she was capacitated
to buy the said land. Evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money
lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of dealings with clients, bank account statements, and business transactions = had
financial capacity on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t
provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such property.

BORROMEO VS DESCALLAR

FACTS: Jambrich (Austrian) and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the
Contracts to Sell covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale was
likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of
Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name was erased from the document. Transfer Certificate of Title over the properties were
issued in respondent’s name alone. However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend
while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons for only two months after
the break up. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business.
He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from
petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in
the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." On July 26, 1991,
when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the
name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property before RTC of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell and the Deed of Absolute Sale
over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for
the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner
acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in
his favor.
ISSUE: WON the property regime of co-ownership exist between the two.

HELD: The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the
financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not help respondent.
The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still
legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not
apply.

Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna

FACTS:

ATTY. Juan Lucas LUNA, a practicing lawyer at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-
appellant Eugenia

After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each
other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement
entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby
they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY.
LUNA was the managing partner
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation
the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit)

but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY.
LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another
law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 19

After the death of ATTY. JUAN

The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the
said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the
said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will
and testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in
the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and
that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

RTC
ISSUE: WON THE DIVORCE DECREE OF ATTY LUNA AND EUGENIA WAS VALID?
HELD: NO, The 1st Marriage Subsisted.

Both were Filipinos, Married in the Philippines. The law in force of at the time was the Spanish Civil Code which
adopted the nationality rule. And continued by The Civil Code. In effect,
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents
of a locality.

GUERRERO VS HERNANDO TO CABANIA VS CA (NOT IN ORDER)

Hector Dominic U. Sistual – Case Digest

HIYAS SAVINGS BANK V. ACUNA

FACTS:

On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe
and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that
he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its
favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that
benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.

ISSUE:

W/N HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. can invoke Article 151 of the Family Code.

HELD:

No. The Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in
cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that
the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family, as provided for by
Article 150 of the Family Code.

MODEQUILLO V. BREVA

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under
Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought
to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural
land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original
possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present
case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that
the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability
which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

PATRICIO V. DARIO

FACTS:

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among
the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition
the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by
spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein
namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:

W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing
therein.
HELD:

No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1)
the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next
nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

Cabatania vs CA

Facts: Florencia Regodos filed a petition in behalf of her minor son for recognition and support from
petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania, however, denied the alleged paternity and insisted that
Florencia was already pregnant when they had sex. The RTC gave more probative weight to the
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality,
her husband was alive.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be compelled to acknowledge private respondent Camelo
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.

Ruling: No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The fact that Florencias husband is living and
there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within
that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue
of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation
before the courts of law.

Cabang vs Basay

Facts:

In this case, Cabang has been occupying the Lot 7777owned by Basay. Cabang believed that the said
property is Lot 7778 that they rightfully owned. SC ruled in favor Basay filed a complaint for recovery of
the said lot. RTC ruled in favor of Cabang. CA ruled in favor of Basay. Case was elevated to the SC.
Cabang argued that the said lot cannot be be subject of Motion for Execution as it is a family home.
Issue: Whether or not the contested lot is a family home.

Held:

The SC held that it is not a family home but a residential house because a family home cannot be
established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. It must be established on the
properties of ACP, CPG, or exclusive property of either spouse.

A family home cannot be established on property held in coownership with third persons. The family
home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal
partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other.

Pablito Taneo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Two of the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.

One was a parcel of land located in Bario Igpit, Municipality of Opol Misamis Oriental and the other was
the family home also located at Igpit, Opol Misamis Oriental. On February 12, 1966, the said properties
were sold at a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. The petitioners failed to
redeem the same so a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling,
transferring and conveying said properties to the private respondent. On November 5, 1985, the
petitioner filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. They argued that the property was acquire through free
patent therefore it is inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant
to Commonwealth Act No. 141. They further alleged that the Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance issued by
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February 1968 in favor of the private respondent over the
subject property including their family home was extrajudicially constituted. Private respondent refuted
the petitioner’s contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject Properties described as Lot
No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale on February 12, 1966. Private
respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to
Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being a private
land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free patent which was made final only in 1979. RTC ruled in
favor of Gilig. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

Issue: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution

Held: NO

A debt was incurred before the house was deemed a family home. Before the effectivity of the FC, a
family home must be constituted judicially (filing of petition) and extra-judicially (registration). It turns
out that the instrument constituting the family home was registered only in JAN 24, 1966 while the
money judgment was rendered on JAN 24 1964. The family home is not exempt from execution since
there was a debt incurred before the registration of the house as a family home.
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such
constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was
erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very
definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides
and the land on which it is situated, it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not
belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case
was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail.

Guerrero vs Hernando

Facts: Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to
dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer.

PRE-TRIAL: Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr.: NOTED THAT: GUERRERO and HERNANDO were related as brothers-
in-law then JUDGE gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege
that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to
be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed and
considered this deficiency a JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT

MR was filed by GUERRERO: brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not
required to exert efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the
court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.”

Issue:Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art.
217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of
Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted
and maintained

Held:

The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic
autonomous social institution. This is also embodied in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family
Code, which provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the
enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-
law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-
in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art.
150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find
no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling
that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.

Eulogio vs Bell Sr.

Facts:

 Respondents the Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and
Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Sps. Bell). In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 4581 at the (RTC) of Batangas City for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). The Complaint
sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their residential house and
lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed. The RTC granted
respondents' prayers and ordered the Register of Deeds of Batangas City to cancel TCT in the name of
defendants the Eulogios and to reconstitute TCT as "family home" of the plaintiffs the Bell siblings and
Sps. Bell. However RTC declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12%
interest per annum.

Issue:

Whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

Held:

Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of
the Family Code.

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the
preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon
the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted
with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are
determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the
specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.
Concepcion vs CA

FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989,
and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990.  The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to
have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in
December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC.  Trial court ruled
that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights.  Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child”.  She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her
maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname.  After the requested oral argument, trial
court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario.  Hence, the child was a legitimate
child of Theresa and Mario. 

ISSUE: WON THE CHILD IS ILLEGITIMATE

HELD:

Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the former’s husband
and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child.  Theresa’s contention was to have his son be
declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo.  In this case, the mother
has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.  Hence, she is not permitted by law to question
the son’s legitimacy.  Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”.  Having the best
interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court.  As a legitimate child, the son
shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on
surnames.  Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is
not related to him in any way.       

Estate of Ong vs. Diaz

 540 SCRA 480
FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin
Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly
rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died
during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with
the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute."

ISSUE: 
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.

RULING:
Yes.
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the
person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials-
that is susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be

difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

Benitez-Badua vs. CA
 229 SCRA 468

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in
Laguna.  Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989.  Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew,
herein private respondent.  The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the
deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted.  The
latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as
her certificate of live birth where the spouses name was reflected as her parents.  She even
testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter.  On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child.  Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses. 

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:

The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit.  The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption.  It does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights.  Such act amounts to simulation
of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter.  In the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”.  In
executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner
where it appeared that the was the petitioner’s father.

De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon

 366 SCRA 499

Facts:

Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses Danilo and Carolina. However, they
were acknowledged as illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized document. Juan died.

Issue:

Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the purpose of inheriting from him.

Ruling:

No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
children of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo and Carolina in a valid marriage.

Babiera vs. Catotal

 333 SCRA 487

Facts: 

Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan
City, a petition for the cancellationof the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry
of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively.

Presentacion alleged that a baby girl was delivered by a ‘hilot’ on September 20, 1996 on, in the
house of the spouses, by their housemaid Flora Guinto,who without the knowledge of the parents
of the petitioner, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating
that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years
old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature. Presentacion,
who was then fifteen, said that she witnessed the livebirth.

The Regional Trial Court found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Teofista
Guinto filed a motion to dismiss on thegrounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it
being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC and held that Teofista is not
the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. Hence this appeal.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiff has no legal capacity to file instant petition pursuant to article
171 of the Family code

(2) Whether or not it is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170?

Held:

(1) The court held that respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section
2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of
the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner.
In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

(2) . The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it does not
impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code
does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it
was allegedly void ab initio.
 Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao
378 SCRA 563
March 7, 2002
Fact:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married but has been living separately from RamonYulo for more
than 10 years. She cohabited with William Liyao from 1965 up to his death. Some witnesses,
however, testified that Corazon and her husband were seen in each other’s company during the
supposed time Corazon cohabited with William Liyao.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. Since birth, William Jr, also known as
Billy, had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/ or
acknowledge child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt act. During William Liyao
birthday he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his daughters, “Look, this
is my son, very guapo and healthy”. He talked about plans for the baptism of Billy.
Unfortunately, it did not happen due to his untimely death on December 2, 1975.

On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr, represented by his mother Corazon G.Garcia filed a
civil action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate son the late William Liyao. The
Regional Trial Court granted his petition, however the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. The petition
was filed for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim
from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao.

Held:
No. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of the child, is a strictly personal right of
the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that the is the one directly
confronted with the scandal. Only in exceptional cases may his heirs allowed to contest such
legitimacy. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away
at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of proceedings. The Court
held that it is settle that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress; the child himself cannot choose his own affiliation – if the husband, presumed to be
the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child if fixed, and
the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s paramour.
 Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals
230 SCRA 130

FACTS:

Violeta Esguerra, single, mother and guardian of petitioners Claro Antonio Fernandez and John
Paul Fernandez, pointed to respondent Carlito S. Fernandez as the father of the petitioners. She
claimed the she and Carlito started their illicit sexual relationship six months after their first
meeting sometime in 1983. The trust resulted in the birth of petitioners Claro on 1984 and John
Paul on 1985. Violeta averred that they were married in civil rights in October 1983. She further
claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. In
March 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.

Petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: certificates of live birth, identifying
respondent as their father, the baptismal certificate of Claro which also states that his father is
respondent, photographs of respondent taken during baptism of Claro; and pictures of respondent
and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners was insufficient to prove
their filiations

HELD:

No, they were insufficient. First, petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence
of the private respondent in the baptism of the petitioner. These photographs are far from proofs
that private respondent is the father of the petitioner Claro. As explained, he was merely a
sponsor to the baptism. Second, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing respondent
showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. Third, the
baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming respondent as his father has scant evidentiary
value because there is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. Fourth,
the certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying respondent as their father are not also
competent evidence on the issue of paternity because, again the records do not show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation thereof.
 Fernandez vs. Fernandez
363 SCRA 811

FACTS:

Spouses Dr. Jode Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia were childless. So, they purchased from a
certain Miliang a baby boy they name as Rodolfo Fernandez. Jose died in 1982, leaving his wife
and Rodolfo an estate consisting of a parcel of land and 2 storey residential building. In 1989,
Generosa and Rodolfo executed a deed of extra-judicial partition dividing and allocating to them
selves properties of the estate. On the same day, Generosa executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Eddie Fernandez, Rodolfo’s son, over the land and the residential buiding which was
allocated to her. After leaning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose
Fernandez filed an action to declare the extra-judicial partition of estate and deed of sale void ab
initio. They alleged that Rodolfo and Eddie took advantage of the total physical and mental
incapacity of Generosa, and that Rodolfo is not the son of the spouses. Meanwhile, Rodolfo
presented his baptismal certificate and an application for recognition of backpay rights by Jose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rodolfo’s baptismal certificate is admissible as proof of filiation

HELD:

While one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action, this doctrine has no application
in the instant case considering the respondents claimed was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born
to the spouses Fernandez. It is not a situation wherein they dent that Rodolfo was a child of their
uncle’s wife.

Petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. While
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of thee
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. Neither the family portrait
offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation. Pictures do not constitute proof of
filiation.
 Labagala vs. Santigao
371 SCRA 360

FACTS:

Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it
in his name alone, his sisters sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. When Jose died
intestate, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against
herein petitioner, Ida Labagala to recover from her 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose
but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death.

Respondent alleged that Jose’s share in the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate without issue. They
claimed that the deed of sale of the property executed by their brother to petitioner is a forgery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the daughter of
the late Jose Santiago

HELD:

The certificate of record of birth plainly states that Ida was the child of the spouses Leon
Lagabala and Cornelia Cabrigas. Therefore, this certificate is proof of filiation of
Ida. If the birth certificate presented in the evidence is not hers, then where is hers? She did not
present any thought it would have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her
baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. But then, a baptismal certificate Is not a
proof of the percentage of the baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of the
baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the priest
who administered the sacrament, nothing more.
 Locsin vs. Locsin
G.R. No. 146737, Dec. 10, 2001

FACTS:

Juan Locsin, Jr., herein respondent, filed with the RTC a petition praying that he be appointed
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Juan Locsin Sr. He alleged that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the
decedent. The heirs of Juan Locsin, Sr., herein petitioner, filed an opposition averring that
respondent is neither a child nor an acknowledged natural child of the former.

Respondent submitted a machine copy of his certificate of live birth found in the bound volume
of birth records in the office of the local Civil Registrar. To prove its existence and authenticity,
he presented the Local Civil Registrar as witness. He also offered in evidence a photograph
showing him and his mother in front of the coffin bearing Juan Locsin’s dead body. Respondent
claims that the photograph shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family
members of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Which of the two documents, the certificate of live birth from the local civil registrar or
certificate of live birth from the civil registrar general, is genuine?

HELD:

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a testament before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself a consummated act of acknowledgement of the
child, and no further court action is required.

Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exist strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth entered in the
records of the Local Civil Registry has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic
copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.

A person’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the alleged father cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation, less that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody
can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in
claiming the estate of the deceased.
 Bernabe vs. Alejo
374 SCRA 181

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born
on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the
aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death
of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the
interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil
Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect

HELD:
Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733.       January 27, 2006.

Facts:

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of

Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and GuillermoRustia (died 1972
and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by MarcianaRustia, a sister of Guillermo,
claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed
GuillermaRustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she
possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be the sole
heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together without
marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The
RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting that Josefa and
Guillermo did not contract marriage? No.

Ruling:

The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses,that marriage between Josefa
and Guillermo never occurred. Although it is presumed that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies
shall prevail. Since, no marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must be settled in
different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of
the estate of the deceased.

VERCELES v. POSADAS

522 SCRA 518

Facts: Respondent Maria Clariss Posada, a young lass from Pandan, Catanduanes, in 1986 met a
close family friend, Teofisto I. Verceles, Mayor of Pandan. He then called on Posadas and at the
end of the visit offered a job. Clarissa accepted petitioner’s offer and worked as a casual
employee in the mayor’s office starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986,
with other companions, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town
planning.

On November 11, 1986, Clarissa was told by petitioner that they would have lunch at Mayon
Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her companions
were nowhere to be found. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
her> She panicked, ran and closed herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone
knocked. Afraid of the Mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as a casual
employee. One of her tasks was following up barangay road and maintenance projects. On
December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds
for barangay projects. She went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to
be briefed omn the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs
because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor. Instead petitioner
opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, and she succumbed to his
advances. She got pregnant on February 1987. Petitioner wrote a letter saying that he will take
care of the child. On September 23, 1987 she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissa’s mother Francisca filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite
against petitioner.

Issue;

Whether or not Verna Aiza Posada was an illegitimate child of the petitioner.

Held:

Yes. A perusal of the Complaints shows its captions states “ Damages coupled with Support
Pendente Lite.” Clasrissa’s Averments therein all clearly establish a case of recognition of
paternity. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in record of birth, a will, a testament
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Under Art. 172 and 175
Legitimate and illegitimate children may establish their filiation. The action must be brought
within the same period specified in Art. !73, except when action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.

SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the
signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock  and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more  capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia.
The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian
can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through
an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative
father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1)      Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and

2)      Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
CASE DIGEST: ANTONIO PERLA v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA

FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio)

were allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became
pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio
started to evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint
for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to
support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and
Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified
that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a
decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

HELD: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged

illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation
must be established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create
an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no
probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the
same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on
the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.
Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation
and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
***
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the
Court. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA
is based on misapprehension of facts. As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is
constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts.

GRANTED

SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the
signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock  and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more  capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia.
The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian
can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes.Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to
use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative
father in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1)      Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and

2)      Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Eugenio San Juan Geronimo Vs. Karen Santos
September 28, 2015 G.R. No. 197099

G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015 - EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner, v.`
  KAREN.

G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015

EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner, v. KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession
against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father.
She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the parcel
of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and
belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she
discovered that defendants executed a document entitled PagmamanasaLabas ng
Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and
adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that consequently they took
possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names. She prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the
land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.

In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child
and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo
were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad's
sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was
allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos
Sur because they had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad, who was an
elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service
from August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad Geronimo.
The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the
children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino
co-owned Lot 1716 with the defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when
the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In 1998,
some 18 years later, Caridad and she executed an extra-judicial settlement of Rufino's estate
entitled Pagmamanahan Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the
plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufino's share and in the land in question to
her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to
have been instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was
established that the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her late husband Rufino.
Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and estate of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the real estate taxes on
the property, but in 2000, the defendants took possession of the land and had the tax
declaration transferred to them. This compelled her to file the present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and
legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the
couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad's niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It
was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents' household.
Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should succeed to
the estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement
called PagmamanasaLabas ng Hukuman.

Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate. It had irregular
features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was
erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma Daño was
superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant's signature.

ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Santos was the legitimate child of Rufino and Caridad Geronimo?
Was the birth certificate tampered?

Held: No. Karen Santos was not the legitimate child of Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The birth
certificate was tampered.
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a
legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a
misapprehension of facts.

A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was tampered
specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of the
informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 - and the name of
the informant -Emma Daño - were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring
erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and
regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done
and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent's
filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The appellate court did not agree with this
finding and instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid
registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant
pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x xx The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not identified as either
the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14,
legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as
shadowy as Emma Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the
order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172 as
another proof of filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent
court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship
to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.35
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her
filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
x xx The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative
parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school
paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial
benefits of Caridad before the GS1S; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and.
was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by
Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.36
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that
the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of
the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes,
a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the
signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document
questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain
such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Daño, whose name was superimposed as the informant regarding
the birth of respondent, remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the Department of
Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave
during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her
Service Record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated
by a certification from Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did
not file any maternity leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was
also offered to prove that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the marriage of
the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When respondent of marriage, all of a sudden
conceived and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child
of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document, (emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements
made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and
her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a quo and rule that
the confluence of the circumstances and the proof presented in this case do not lead to the
conclusion that respondent is a child of the deceased spouses. The petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88650 dated January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery
of Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
ARADO v. ALCORAN
GR No 163362

Facts: Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage produced a son
named Nicolas Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia, but their union had no offspring.
Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent
AnacletoAlcoran on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas’ marriage to Florencia.

Raymundo died leaving properties to Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died subsequently leaving the
properties to his illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims
entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child has a right to inherit from his father.

HELD: No, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code; in the
same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified
in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Anacleto could
not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter’s last will and testament. Article 838
of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. In Gallanosa v. Arcangel that in
order that a will may take effect, “it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.”
321 Phil. 562
De Santos Vs. Angeles
251 SCRA 206
ROMERO, J.
ISSUE: Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized? No.

Facts:

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with
a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos.  After some time, their relationship
became strained to the breaking point.  Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.

Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then,
as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private
respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia.  This
union produced eleven children.  On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala.  Less than a
month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in
Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws.  On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate
leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court [1] asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate.  She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner.  There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.

After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. 
Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that private
respondent's children were illegitimate.  This was challenged by private respondent although the
latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the
court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion.  The court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's order dated
January 9, 1992.

Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.

ISSUE: Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?

No. Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:

"Art. 269.  Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural."

In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time
of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting.  That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time.  Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines.  It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged
wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in
Tagaytay.

It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and
Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a provision subsumed
under the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable marriages and
secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their offspring.  It creates another category of
illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from the
beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as
"acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations
as such kind of children.  In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void
from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still
subsisting.  It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural
children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying
each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.

What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper (those "born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other")?  A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that
device contrived by law to simulate a fact or condition which, strictly and technically speaking,
is not what it purports to be.  In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was
invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused
with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with
acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of
the latter. Does this cluster of rights include the right to be legitimated?

Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of rights granted
by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing the substantive provisions of the law in
force.

Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new provisions
of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on the classification of children vis-a-
vis their parents, and the corresponding rights they are entitled to under the law.  Thus, the title
on "Paternity and Filiation" devotes two whole chapters to legitimate children alone, and one
chapter on those deemed by law to be possessed of the rights of the former, such as legitimated
children, because of their compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other
chapters deal with illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children, and those other
than natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not.  The well-ordered delineation of such
distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the framers of the Civil
Code to compartmentalize and separate one from the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy
determines the substantive rights accruing to the different categories of children.

A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is declared a nullity
is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law which accords him the
rights of an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively
denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins.  There is no marriage   valid or
otherwise which would give any semblance of legality to the child's existence.  Nothing links
child to parent aside from the information appearing in the birth certificate.  When such child is
recognized by one or both parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching those of his
legitimate counterparts.

The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children,
depending on their filiation:  use of surname, succession, and support.

Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. Thus, they "shall principally
use the surname of the father," and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants
and descendants, as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both
parents, and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation.  "These rights as
effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced."

Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally
use the surname of the father. If a natural child is recognized by only one parent, the child shall
follow the surname of such recognizing parent. Both types of children are entitled to receive
support from the parent recognizing them. They also cannot be deprived of their legitime
equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the
recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate.

Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their minority,
under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the latter's surname. The only
support which they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, and their legitime, also to be
taken from the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural
child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child.

It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured by law, the
legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free portion of the hereditary
estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said
portion.

Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned.

These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated child may
enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction
cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his
hereditary rights are concerned.

It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's half siblings
can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they failed to meet
the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the
meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be
legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children.

It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural children and,
therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction.  This conclusion is arrived at
through a syllogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs as follows:

The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction.

Therefore, they have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children.

Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated.

Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed
legitimated" by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967).
The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that things equal to the
same thing are equal to each other.  This may hold true in the realm of instructional, as opposed
to descriptive science, where the former calls for the application of absolute, mathematical rules
with precision but not to the latter, particularly those which deal with the social sciences where
human relationships are central to a study whose main concern is not to leave out anything of
significance.  The former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as
the "dead aspect of nature," excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining absolute
results and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole truth as with those
aspects or parts only through which the inexorable result can be obtained.  To apply the strict
rules of syllogism, where the basic premise is defective, to the arena of paternity and filiation,
especially in the determination of the status and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate
children vis-a-vis the legitimate ones, is bound to spawn mischief and results never intended by
the framers of the provisions of the law under review.

Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be postulated that "adulterous
children shall enjoy the status, rights and obligations of legitimate children," a doctrine which no
moral philosophy under our social and cultural milieu can countenance.

This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural" can be
legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children (and, consequently,
natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when no such right exists. 
Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child.  It is a privilege, available only
to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children by legal fiction
have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to
conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily
so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father
and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.

The question that must be confronted next is:  How are the offspring of the second union affected
by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and
his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion.  Our archaic law on family
relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegal relations such that the
benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to
extend, to natural children by legal fiction.  Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of
legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder.  There was, therefore, from the outset, an
intent to exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.

Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural
children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be
legitimized.  As has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be
legitimized.  The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be
adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten
surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled
to only half of her share.

The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and unmistakable
language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all point to the correctness of petitioner's
claim.  If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gray area of law that calls for
interpretation, or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud
unintentionally created by the letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this case
one which decidedly favors legitimacy over illegitimacy.  The hierarchy of children so
painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be
shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children
to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their
parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions
of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children:
legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
The instant petition is hereby GRANTED.  The assailed orders of the court a quo dated
November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.  Petitioner Maria
Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio
de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
Republic vs. Miller,
GR No. 125932, April 22, 1999
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles
City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the
basis of its evaluation.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino
child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in
force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected
by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
Lahom Vs Sibuto 406 SCRA 135
G.R. No. 143989  July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted  the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial
court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose
Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree
of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities.  Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of
Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of
adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was
already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already
abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right
to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Manuel vs Ferrer
Facts:

The petitioners in this case were the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling.
During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, from which
Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name.
He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple were not blessed with a
child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta
Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own “daughter”.

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro
over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later,
or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislao Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of
the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional
Trial Court, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments.

Issue:

Whether or not can sougth for declaration of nullity of the instrument.

Held:

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that
where the illegitimate child had 
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral
relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural
father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the
estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is
animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be
construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy
expressed in Article 978 through 
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and

Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and

Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and

Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving

of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse

Illegitimate Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and

Illegitimate Parents

(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/

Nephews and Nephews and Nieces

Nieces and Surviving Spouse

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

 (within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

The complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3)
TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was
properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint

Concept of Adoption
Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa vs Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. De Damian
480 SCRA 334

Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without descendants. Guillermo
outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives claiming
rights to their intestate estate. 

The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were
never married. According to petitioners, sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to
Josefa. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never
married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado
as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children
without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis
Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo
which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s
and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only
child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded
from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were
never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s
intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between
Felisa and Ramon. 

Held: 

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx 
 (aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record
of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness attesting that they were not married, and
a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption
of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth
of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to
Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage. 

The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio

Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are

inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong,
may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the
contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad
Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. (Dela Rosa vs
Heirs of Rustia Vda De Guzman, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006).

Nature of Adoption
Ellis vs Republic 7 SCRA 962

Facts: Court of First Instance of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C.
Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September
3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the
United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital.
Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa — an institution
for unwed mothers and their babies — stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose
without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother’s family.)
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the
hearing of the petition on January 14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in
the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United
States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in
the Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953.

Issue: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to
adopt Baby Rose.
Held: No .Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that non-residents aliens
cannot adopt.
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the
parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the latters’ nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political law, which is
patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter’s view
to the effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction
of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws
by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does
not permit adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the
validity of foreign decrees of divorce — regardless of the grounds upon which the same are
based — involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even
when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855;
Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v.
Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)”.
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines -and, hence, non-resident
aliens - we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality
theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above -quoted provision of said Art.
335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the res or merely affects the cause of action, we
have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so held in
Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L-15472 (June 30, 1962).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
denying the petition in this case.

Joint Adoption of Spouses

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim & Michael Jude P. Lim
588 SCRA 98

Facts: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.  Michelle
was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. 
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption
executed in an affidavit.
Issue: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Held: Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. 
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar.  In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority.  The use of the
word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. 
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that
he must comply as an American Citizen.  He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552.  The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.  Parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption.  It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Consent of his/her spouse

De Castro vs. Gregorio
GR No. 188801

Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate
court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Respondents’ decree of
adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had
been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-
handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts
to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two
children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied
the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always
offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children that’s why he adopted them.  Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of
the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Petitioner alleged that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. Petitioner also alleged that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry.  Petitioner further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter
should be personally notified of the hearing.”

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth
certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could
not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

Issues: Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter
is required?

Held: RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7,
RA 8552) 
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings,
it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

Biological parents
Landingin vs. Republic 493 SCRA 415

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who
went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children .

Issue: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological
mother?

Held: No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as
claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them,
she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Legitimate children
De Castro vs. Gregorio
GR No. 188801

Facts: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies.
Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from
birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the Trial Court, the petition was
granted.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of
the Trial Court approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Petitioner alleged that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. Petitioner also alleged that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO
certificates shows the father to be Larry.  Petitioner further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were
married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter
should be personally notified of the hearing.”

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth
certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could
not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

Issues: Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter
is required?
Held: RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7,
RA 8552) 
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings,
it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

Who may be adopted

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim & Michael Jude P. Lim
588 SCRA 98

Facts: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.  Michelle
was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. 
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption
executed in an affidavit.

Issue: WON Michelle and Michael can be adopted.

Held: Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. 
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar.  In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority.  The use of the
word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.  This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. 
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that
he must comply as an American Citizen.  He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552.  The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.  Parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption.  It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Santos, Jr. vs. Republic

21 SCRA 379

Facts: Spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos filed the petition before the court on
January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
(petitioner's) son by adoption. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa
and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos
and the minor.

It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958 and he was a sickly
child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners
who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed
between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each other. The natural
parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of
their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and conformity to the
adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child
by the petitioners.

Issue: whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

Held: Yes. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it
has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor
child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and
education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of
such children by person who can properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord's Estate, 34
S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).

With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption.

For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition
for the adoption of the subject minor, granted

Decree of Adoption
Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

Facts: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he
was living the time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc.  Such
petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.  

Issue: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make

adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child
where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

Held: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of

parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the
child.  In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was
still lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the
suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”. 

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during
the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period neither had not yet begin
nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then
with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

Bartolome vs SSS

Facts:

Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome (Bartolome) was the biological mother of John Colcol (John). John was
a seaman and he died due to an accident while on duty. Bartolome sought to claim death benefits from
the SSS as she was the sole heir and beneficiary of John.

Her request was denied. The SSS explained that she is “no longer considered the parent of JOHN as he
was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on the documents you submitted to us.

Cornelio Colcol was John's great grandfather. The decree of adoption attained finality in February of
1985 while john was just 2 years old.

Based on these facts, the SSS claimed that Bartolome is no longer the legitimate parent of John and is
thus not entitled to Employees compensation. That the legitimate parent is now Cornelio Colcol.

Respondents cite the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation which states:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time
of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he
remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not
gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated
and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during
minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children,
they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self -
support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent notwithstanding her son's adoption by
someone else.

Held:
   The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right
to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely
demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under
the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining
beneficiary

Lahom v Sibulo

406 SCRA 135

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted  the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the
trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name
Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband,
their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his
dealing and activities.  Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect.
The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of
adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was
already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the
child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an
action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already
abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to
the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the
right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within
a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled
to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.

Patricio v. Dario 111

507 SCRA 438

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla
G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario
III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building.

 Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention
to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to
partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-
44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

 Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by
spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living
therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still
residing therein.

 HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art.
159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus,
the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is
imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal
support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age.

Canonizado vs Benitez
127 Scra 610

Facts:
Somewhere along the way in the marriage of the private respondent and the petitioner, the
sweetness soured. The spouses separated, and soon enough they were involved in a bitter
wrangling that would reach the courts, including this one, and fester for more than three and a
half decades.
It all began in an action for support filed by the petitioner against her estranged husband, the
private respondent on March 13, 1956 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
The trial court granted the claim for their minor child Christina in the amount of P100.00 monthly
but denied similar support for the petitioner on the ground that she was gainfully employed.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to support petitioner and his child?

Held: Yes. There has been too much temporizing in this case that should not be permitted to
continue even longer in defiance of the constitutional mandate for speedy justice. The
respondent judge is directed to act with an possible dispatch on the pending incidents and to
finally decide this protracted controversy once and for all.

WHEREFORE, the respondent judge is hereby directed to order the immediate enforcement of
the alias writ of execution of August 14, 1984, and the collection from the private respondent of
arrearages in support due to the petitioner from March 1956 to December 1972 in the sum of
P17,200.00 and to the daughter Christina from March 1956 to April 1969 in the sum of
P16,150.00. For contempt of this Court, the private respondent is also punished as above
indicated.
Mendoza vs Parungao
41 Phil 271

Facts:
In the case at bar, petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza filed a writ of certiorari against Gorgonia
Paruñgao, Nueva Ecija ex-officio sheriff Gabriel Belmonte and Judges Eduardo David (Nueva
Ecija CFI) and Manuel Moran (Vacation Judge of Nueva Ecija) to prohibit the carrying out of
sale of property of petitioner and forward the case to the Supreme Court for revision.

On August 1925, the CFI declared Mendoza and Paruñgao’s marriage null and void upon the
reappearance of the Paruñgao’s first husband Antonio Buenaventura, who was considered
dead after an absence of more than 7 years. (Buenaventura died later on.)

While the first judgment was on appeal, Paruñgao filed for alimony and settlement of her
conjugal property with Mendoza on September 1925.

Subsequently, the court directed Mendoza to give Paruñgao monthly support. However, the
writs of execution were not complied with.

On July 10, 1926, the CFI denied Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration regarding support. On
July 23, the Supreme Court affirmed the nullity of Mendoza and Paruñgao’s marriage.

Issue:
W/N Paruñgao, when she filed for liquidation of conjugal property and alimony, is entitled to
support during pendency of the action

 
Ruling:
No. While a wife is entitled to support during the pendency of an annulment suit, this right
ceases along with other mutual obligations of marriage after the decree of nullity is issued.
The marriage between Mendoza and Paruñgao was annulled on August 1925. She was,
therefore, no longer entitled to support on September 1925 when she filed the complaint.
However, Paruñgao is entitled to payment in advance of her share to the conjugal property, if
such exists. CFI’s order of monthly payment is to be considered an advance of conjugal
property share but no writ of execution can be issued thereon because of excess of jurisdiction
and its interlocutory character.

Remedy applied granted, writs of execution void; with costs against the respondents.

Quimiguing vs Icao
34 Scra 132

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal
from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages
and request for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual
relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite
efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly
support, damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the
fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and
subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was
allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to
allege fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying
and an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn
child, which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa
mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive
donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil
Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage
caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the
decision; with costs against Icao. 

Lim vs Lim
604 Scra 691

In 1980, the heirs of Jose Lim alleged that Jose Lim entered into a partnership agreement with
Jimmy Yu and Norberto Uy. The three contributed P50,000.00 each and used the funds to
purchase a truck to start their trucking business.  A year later however, Jose Lim died. The
eldest son of Jose Lim, Elfledo Lim, took over the trucking business and under his management,
the trucking business prospered. Elfledo was able to but real properties in his name. From one
truck, he increased it to 9 trucks, all trucks were in his name however. He also acquired other
motor vehicles in his name.
In 1993, Norberto Uy was killed. In 1995, Elfledo Lim died of a heart attack. Elfledo’s wife, Juliet
Lim, took over the properties but she intimated to Jimmy and the heirs of Norberto that she
could not go on with the business. So the properties in the partnership were divided among
them.
Now the other heirs of Jose Lim, represented by Elenito Lim, required Juliet to do an accounting
of all income, profits, and properties from the estate of Elfledo Lim as they claimed that they are
co-owners thereof. Juliet refused hence they sued her.
The heirs of Jose Lim argued that Elfledo Lim acquired his properties from the partnership that
Jose Lim formed with Norberto and Jimmy. In court, Jimmy Yu testified that Jose Lim was the
partner and not Elfledo Lim. The heirs testified that Elfledo was merely the driver of Jose Lim.
ISSUE: Who is the “partner” between Jose Lim and Elfledo Lim?
HELD: It is Elfledo Lim based on the evidence presented regardless of Jimmy Yu’s testimony in
court that Jose Lim was the partner. If Jose Lim was the partner, then the partnership would
have been dissolved upon his death (in fact, though the SC did not say so, I believe it should
have been dissolved upon Norberto’s death in 1993). A partnership is dissolved upon the death
of the partner.  Further, no evidence was presented as to the articles of partnership or contract
of partnership between Jose, Norberto and Jimmy. Unfortunately, there is none in this case,
because the alleged partnership was never formally organized.
But at any rate, the Supreme Court noted that based on the functions performed by Elfledo, he
is the actual partner.
The following circumstances tend to prove that Elfledo was himself the partner of Jimmy and
Norberto:
1.) Cresencia testified that Jose gave Elfledo P50,000.00, as share in the partnership, on a date
that coincided with the payment of the initial capital in the partnership;
2.) Elfledo ran the affairs of the partnership, wielding absolute control, power and authority,
without any intervention or opposition whatsoever from any of petitioners herein;
3.) all of the properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership, were registered in the
name of Elfledo;
4.) Jimmy testified that Elfledo did not receive wages or salaries from the partnership, indicating
that what he actually received were shares of the profits of the business; and
5.) none of the heirs of Jose, the alleged partner, demanded periodic accounting from Elfledo
during his lifetime. As repeatedly stressed in the case of Heirs of Tan Eng Kee, a demand for
periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to adduce any evidence to show that the real and personal
properties acquired and registered in the names of Elfledo and Juliet formed part of the estate of
Jose, having been derived from Jose’s alleged partnership with Jimmy and Norberto.
Elfledo was not just a hired help but one of the partners in the trucking business, active and
visible in the running of its affairs from day one until this ceased operations upon his demise.
The extent of his control, administration and management of the partnership and its business,
the fact that its properties were placed in his name, and that he was not paid salary or other
compensation by the partners, are indicative of the fact that Elfledo was a partner and a
controlling one at that. It is apparent that the other partners only contributed in the initial capital
but had no say thereafter on how the business was ran. Evidently it was through Elfredo’s
efforts and hard work that the partnership was able to acquire more trucks and otherwise
prosper. Even the appellant participated in the affairs of the partnership by acting as the
bookkeeper sans salary.

Manganon vs CA

FACTS:

On March 17, 1994 , Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed a petition for the declaration of Legitimacy and
Support, with application of pedente lite in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. In the petition filed by Belen, it was alleged that on February 16 1975,
Federico Delgado, 19 years of age were civilly married to Ma. Belen Mangonon, 21 years of age by then
City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent as per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the marriage was annulled on August 11 1975
by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On March 25 1976, petitioner gave birth to
twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time
of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of
America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and
finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was
accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to
said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

Issue:.

Whether or not the support can be givrn to Rica and Rina

Held:
Yes, Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto.

Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his
obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he
may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there
are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.

In this case, the Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option.
From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between
respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed
quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of
thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as
part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are
now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the
parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and
Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any
familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the
Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.

TOPIC: Amount of Support

G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
JOSE LAM vs. ADRIANA CHUA.
Facts:
on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua
against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition
that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul
Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became
manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in
womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains.
Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim
and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She testified that her
marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was
abnormal because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and instead kept asking for
money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one spending for all the expenses of their
only child, John Paul. After her testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary
evidence. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or the
capacity of Jose to give support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open4 on the ground that she was able to secure
additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial
court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional evidence.
The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one
Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,
showing that Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
xxxx
Likewise, Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the
amount of ₱20,000.00.
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the decision
awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of ₱20,000.00. He argued that there was already a
provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision dated February 28, 1994 of the Makati RTC
wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the
child, to wit:
xxx
8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to their son. In the
best interest of the child, the Second Party shall retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the
First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements.
9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the Second Party
shall initially contribute ₱250,000.00 each to a common fund, to be increased as required, to be used
solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and administered
by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the son reaches majority age.
xxx
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even amounted to
₱500,000.00.
RTC: Denying Jose Lam’s motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into
by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio
by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court.
CA: affirming the Pasay RTC’s decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision but in a Resolution dated October 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Legal Issue: W/N the amount of support stated on the RTC ruling prevails over the compromise
agreement.
Held:
NO. The case is remanded to determine further the amount of support needed by the child, John Paul.
From the Full Text of the case:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded, such
amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient,
pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include
his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 19521 and 196, shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources
or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The
evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their
children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.
In this case, the only evidence presented by Adriana regarding her claim for support of the child is her
testimony.
Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the
parents are reasonably able to give.
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA vs. DANILO Y. LUA.
Facts:
Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Danilo Lim. She prayed
for support pendente lite in the amount of Php500,000 as monthly support, citing DANILO’s huge
earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
RTC granted the support pendente lite and ordered Danilo Lua to give Php 250,000 a month and Php
135,000 for Susan’s eye operation. Php250,000 per month since September 2003 as support in arrears.
Danilo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied by the RTC. Order had already decome final and
executory. Motion for Reconsideration had been filed beyond the 3-day notice period
CA deducted the monthly support to Php 115,000 a month in arrears as well as future monthly support.
DAVID paid the support in arrears (September 2003 - March 2005) to Susan. However, he deducted the
following:
(a) BMW 316i for Daniel Ryan
(b) Car Maintenance for the same
(c) Credit Card Statements of Daniel Ryan
(d) Volkswagen Beetle for Angelii Suzanne
(e) Car maintenance fees of Angeli Suzanne
SUSAN asserted that none of the expenses deducted by DANILO may be chargeable as part of the
monthly support
RTC ruled in favor of the SUSAN and ordered the full payment of the support in arrears
DANILO filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for inhibition against the RTC judge. Both were
denied.
Danilo refused to pay the support in arrears
CA dismissed Susan’s motion for contempt of court with damages against Danilo as it granted the
repsondent’s motion for review.
1. arrears was correctly deducted by DAVID
2. ordered Danilo to resume payment of monthly support
SUSAN goes to SC
Legal Issue: W/N certain expenses already incurred by the DAVID may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to SUSAN and her children
Held:
NO. The CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by DAVID to be credited against the
accrued support pendent lite. The monthly support pendente lite granted by the RTC was intended
primarily for food, household expenses such as salares of drivers and house helpers, and also SUSAN’s
scoliosis therapy.
Hence the value of the 2 expensive cars bought by DAVID for the children plus their maintenance cost,
travel expenses of SUSAN and Angelli, purchases through credit card items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgement awarding
support pendente
Article 201. The amount of support in the cases referred to in Article 195 and 196, shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities to the recipient.
Article 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase to the necessities of the recipient and the resources
or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
The deductions should be limited to the basic needs and expenses considered by the RTC and CA. The
assailed ruling of the CA is inconsistent with the executory decision and it completely ignored the unfair
consequences to SUSAN whose sustenance and well-being was given due regard by the RTC and the CA.
Only the following expenses of DAVID may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente
lite for SUSAN and her children:
1. Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
2. Dental expenses
3. Credit Card purchases Angelli Suzanne (grocery and clothing)
4. Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan

TOPIC: Right to Receive Support Cannot Be Waived

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC,
Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D.
ANDRES.
Facts:
Vircel Andres as the legal guardian/mother of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action for the
maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis.
Manuel de Asis - father of Glen Camil; refused to acknowledge Glen Camil
Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal of the case.
According to the MANUEL, it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim to support from defendant.
After 6 years, Vircel files another action for support against Manuel
RTC ordered Manuel to provide Php 2,000 a month for support in arrears, Php 5,000 monthly support
pendente lite, and Php 5,000 as monthly allowance
MANUEL De Asis moved for the case to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata, alleging that the
case is barred by the dismissal of the first case
RTC states that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support. A renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law
CA dismissed De Asis’s motion as well
Legal Issue: W/N future support can be renounced / waived
Held:
NO. According to Article 301 of the Civil Code, The right to receive support can neither be renounced
nor transmitted to a 3rd person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor.
Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. Article 2035 provides that no compromise upon
the following questions shall be valid: (1) civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or legal
separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) jurisdiction of courts, (6) future
legitime.
Why? According to Tolentino, the right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to
maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning
the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the
means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation
of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow eithter suicide or the conversion of the
recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy.
The manifestation or the agreement entered into between the MANUEL and GLEN’s mother for the
dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition
against any compromise of the right to support.
In order to claim support, filiation and paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent.
However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties.

TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
TOPIC: Concept of Parental Authority
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA
BEDIA.
Facts:
Santos Jr. the son of Leouel Santos, Sr. and Julia Bedia has been in the custody of Julia’s parents,
Leopoldo Bedia and Ofelia Bedia. Julia is in the States, working as a nurse. SANTOS, SR. claims that he
couldn’t find the whereabouts of Julia. Nevertheless, the latter still sends support for their son. RTC
granted the petition of spouses Bedia of the care and custody of Santos, Jr. SANTOS, SR. herein, assails
that decision.
Legal Issue: W/N the custody should be granted to Santos, Sr.
Held:
YES. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The child's welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the
mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, Santos, Sr., is present.
Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal
separation and SANTOS, SR.'s attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat SANTOS, SR.'s parental authority and
the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been
shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Spouses LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA's demonstrated
love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, SANTOS, SR. is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's
custody. While SANTOS, SR.'s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism,
it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts
to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a
chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father
can give. His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their
children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary
separation from their families.
SANTOS, SR.’s employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable,
is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. SPS LEOPOLDO & OFELIA BEDIA’s attachment
to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the law
considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent
present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a
fact which has not been proven here.

TOPIC: Over whom Exercised

G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969
ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, vs. DRA. VENANCIA L.
MAKABALI.
Facts:
On February 4, 1961, Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali
Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted
at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her
own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he
recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited
her child, and never paid for his expenses.
The trial disclosed that Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children
apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere,
albeit the offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a
month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when
he reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster
mother and denied the writ prayed for. The real mother appealed, as already stated.
Legal Issue: W/N Joseph Casero should stay with her foster mother Dra. Makabali.
Held:
YES. We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a parent
to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered
separated from the mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions,
the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman
law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution,
due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed
out by Puig Peña, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual
and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the Court below, Zenaida
Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care
but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the
most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could derive from being coerced to abandon
MAKABALI's care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular menage a
trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.
It is hinted that MAKABALI's motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce to pay for the
rearing of the child. This is not acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any
expectation on her part is illusory, given Zenaida's meager resources, yet expressed willingness to care
and educate him.

TOPIC: Parental Authority over Illegitimate Children

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
DAVID T. DAVID, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR.
Facts:
DAVID T. David worked as secretary of Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. VILLAR is a
married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between DAVID
and VILLAR developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on
March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private VILLAR's wife when DAVID took Christopher J, to Villar's
house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked DAVID to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. DAVID agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he
had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, DAVID filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
RTC: in favor of the DAVID and against the Ramon
CA: reversed the holding. This is not proper in a habeas corpus case. Law and jurisprudence wherein the
question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation
where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the Family Code,
the father and mother have joint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation
of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in
an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the
parental authority of the mother by express provision of the law.
Admittedly, RAMON is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, DAVID
depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported DAVID and her three
minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain
under the custody of VILLAR until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a
proper case.
Legal Issue: W/N DAVID should have custody of Christopher J validly exercising parental authority.
Held:
YES. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of
minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason
separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For
example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy
to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant
to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein
DAVID, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly,
DAVID has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by VILLAR, she is entitled to issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that RAMON has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support
to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise."
Nor is the fact that RAMON is well-off a reason for depriving DAVID of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born.
DAVID is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision
was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc.
earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can
personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost
during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is
not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are
characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
DAVID and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that VILLAR promises if the child lives
with him. It is enough, however, that DAVID is earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
JOEY D. BRIONES, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P.
MIGUEL.
Facts:
The BRIONES alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with Loreta P. Miguel.
He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The Loreta P. Miguel
is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
The BRIONES further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to the
Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the
BRIONES enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City,
where he finished the nursery course.
According to the BRIONES, his parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted
him in taking care of the child.
On May 2, 2001, Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the BRIONES in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to
bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring
him back in the afternoon, to which the BRIONES agreed. However, the SPS Miguel did not bring him
back as promised by them.
The BRIONES went several times to Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed
that the child is with the latter’s mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, Francisca P.
Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring
him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711. However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
The BRIONES prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological
father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the BRIONES that he was the one who brought their child to the
Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.
Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies BRIONES’s allegation that Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel
were the ones who took the child from the BRIONES or the latter’s parents. She averred that she was the
one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the BRIONES when she returned to the Philippines and that
the latter readily agreed and consented.
Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the BRIONES was deported from Japan under
the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of
the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the BRIONES arrived in the Philippines, he has
not been gainfully employed. The custody of the child, according to Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to
BRIONES’s parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that even before the custody of
the child was given to the BRIONES’s parents, she has already been living separately from the BRIONES
in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his
deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of
availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send
money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she has no intention of staying
permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she
could.
Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213,
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CA: awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Loreta P. Miguel. While
acknowledging that BRIONES truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and expense
he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless found no compelling reason to
separate the minor from his mother. BRIONES, however, was granted visitorial rights.
BRIONES concedes that Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists, however, that
custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays
there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the mother would have custody
when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
According to BRIONES, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take care of
their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her
Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,8 granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor.
Legal Issue: W/N the custody of the child be given to Briones since the biological mother is working
abroad.
Held:
NO. At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying, thus
rendering BRIONES’s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA,
BRIONES filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein that
sps Miguel were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her
Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of BRIONES and
Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines12 explicitly provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the
records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth.
Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a
ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers
to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the
father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own
illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
There is thus no question that Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the
minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be
deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by
law."
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor, we hold that the
CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Loreta. There is no showing at all
that she is unfit to take charge of him.

TOPIC: Visitation Rights

G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
CARLITOS E. SILVA, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES.
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited
without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales
decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by
Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any
rate, the two eventually parted ways.
In February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous
understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights
over the children before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was
opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she
feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
RTC: judgment is rendered directing respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children
during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the written
consent of the mother or respondent herein.
CA: ruled in favor of Gonzales. We find it to the best interest of the minor children, to deny visitorial
and/or temporary custodial rights to the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent. After all, if
indeed his love for the children is genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a little self-sacrifice
and self-denial may bring more benefit to the children. While petitioner-appellee, as father, may not
intentionally prejudice the children by improper influence, what the children may witness and hear while
in their father's house may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of morality and rectitude where they
should be brought up.
Legal Issue: W/N Silva should be deny of the visitorial rights to the children.
Held:
NO. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves
to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional
rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly
encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity
of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to
the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that
detrimental to the children.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs
more than a parent's natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure,
i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the mother.

TOPIC: Tender – Age Presumption

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V.
Facts:
Crisanto filed a petition for the nullity of his marriage with Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for custody
pendente lite of their 4 year old son Rafaelo, whom Joycelyn took away with her from the conjugal home
and his school
Joycelyn failed to appear despite notice therefore Crisanto presented evidence ex parte
Joycelyn took their child. Despite efforts exerted by him, he has failed to see his child. Joycelyn and the
child are presently staying with the former’s stepfather in Occidental Mindoro
Renato Santos, commissioned by Crisanto to do a surveillance on Joycelyn, testified that Joycelyn was
having lesbian relations with a Noreen Cuidadano in Cebu City
Findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, the house helper of the spouses. She
testified that Joycelyn was always out of the house and saw one time slap Rafaelo.
RTC awarded the custody to Crisanto
1. Mother’s authority is subordinated to that of the father
2. Joycelyn had no reason to take the child with her
Joycelyn filed a motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto. RTC awarded
the custody to Joycelyn:
1. Rafaello is barely 4 years old and and pursuant to Art. 213 of the Family Code, he shall not be
separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
2. The grounds stated by Crisanto are not compelling reasons to deprive the mother of her child’s custody
3. Visitation rights were granted to Crisanto
Crisanto filed a petition for certiorari, charging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion for issuing the
Order granting Joycelyn the custody of their child.
CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the RTC:
1. The only incident to resolve was Joycelyn’s Motion to Dismiss, not the issuance of the earlier Order
2. The previous Order, granting the custody to Crisanto must prevail because the trial court did not
resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
3. Ordered the trial court judge to “consider, hear, and resolve the motion to lift the award of custody
pendente lite” without any motion of Joycelyn
Joycelyn brings this case to the SC:
1. CA erred in granting the custody to Crisanto in violation of
Art. 213 of the FC
2. Is it Article 213 or 211 which applies in this case?
8. Crisanto brings up this issue (among others):
1. CA gravely abused its discretion by ordering the trial court to hear the motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite.
Legal Issue: W/N CA erred in granting the custody to Crisanto in violation of Art. 213 of the Family
Code
Held:
Article 213 applies in this case as the parents are separated legally or otherwise.
Given the mandatory character of Article 213 of the Family Code, and the statutory recognition of tender-
age presumption, Joycelyn should be granted the custody of her child pendente lite.
As a general rule, mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of 7. The so
called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.
The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances:
(1) Neglect
(2) Abandonment
(3) Unemployment
(4) Immorality
(5) Habitual Drunkeness
(6) Drug Addiction
(7) Maltreatment of the child
(8) Insanity or
(9) affliction with a communicable disease
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive
Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral
conduct may constitute a compelling reason.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercing the proper parental care. (Espiritu vs. CA; Unson III vs. Navarro)
It is not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that
she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or
under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such a fact has not been
shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or
that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.

Espiritu vs CA
Facts:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City. Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as
a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. Reynaldo was sent by his
employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita began to maintain a common-law
relationship of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind Therese. During their vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the time they returned to the United States,
Reginald Vince was born. The relationship soon deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to
California. Because his assignment is not yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his
sister, Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.

Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that the child
experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with her mother. She
even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a “bad” man who worked for her
father. Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay with their father and aunt.

Issue: Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.
Held:

NO, AS BOTH CHILDREN ARE NOW OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, THEIR CHOICE OF PARENT SHOULD BE
GIVEN RESPECT BY THE COURT.

The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the mother, unless there
are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore. As the children can now ascertain what is
right and moral, the court should give due respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in
the Philippines. Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from one man to another is considered by
the court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody to her, for said behaviour forms an
immoral environment especially to a growing child. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus
meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.

Perez vs. CA

GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996

ROMERO, J.

Facts:

Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in
the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their
son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.

Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded
custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the
child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the
child’s best interest and welfare.

Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that “No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.
Issue: Whether or not custody of the child is to be given to the father.

Held:

No, the provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.

The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old
shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3
of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age to 5 years.
 Dacasin v. Dacasin

G.R. No. 168785 February 05, 2010

CARPIO, J.

Facts:

On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines. The following year
respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In June of
1999respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against petitioner. In its
ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent
sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28th of
January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement)for the joint custody
of Stephanie.

Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner
claimed that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce
decree.

Issue: Whether the agreement or contract is valid

Held:

The agreement is void; it is contrary to law.

In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to
the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning." For
lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve
as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed:
(1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner
and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce
decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother x x x." (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the
mother is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not
alleged to obtain here.) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.
 Vanal vs. Belmes

G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts:

The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the
natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and Appointment
of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over
the subject minors.

Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached
the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who between
the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

Issue: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

Held:

Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Art.
211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes' unsuitability. Assuming that
Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted
in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the
Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within
the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
 Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995

ROMERO, J.

Facts:

Leouel Santos, Sr. and Julia Bedia begot only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18,
1987.

From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in
the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia.

Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well
as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr." After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. The CA
affirmed the RTC.

Issue: Who has the custody of the child?

Held:

The father should have the custody of the child.

 The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at
bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father,
petitioner Santos, Sr., is present.

The grandparent’s wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at
the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the
child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him
and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also
give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and
support which a father can give.
 St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos

G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002

PARDO, J.

Facts:

For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive through visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying. Among
the students of SMA who took part in the campaign was Sherwin and James. Sherwin and other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by James, then
15 years old. On their way to Dapitan City, the jeep turned turtle resulting in the death of Sherwin.

The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his parents, Vicente and SMA. At the trial, the
traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the
steering wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic investigator
was not disputed by any of the parties.

After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it had special
parental authority at the time of the accident. The parents of Dino were found to be only subsidiarily
liable and were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the school. Dino was absolved for being
only a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Vivencio, the vehicle owner was not
held liable at all.

Issue: Was the lower court correct?

Held:

No, the lower court is not correct.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
 This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises
whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And
the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.

In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was
not the negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded.

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed the minor James
to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did not allow James to drive the jeep. So
whether the accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which it had
no control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who should
be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.
 Valino vs. Adriano

G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

Mendoza, J

Facts:

Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple
had 5 children and 1 adopted child, also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage did turn sour
and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued to support his wife and children.

Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his
immediate family, including respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to bury
Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the death and
requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.

Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
transferred to the family plot.

Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum
and that the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded to the
US on vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned, Valino had been introducing her as his wife
for the past 20 years.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of
Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.

CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the
remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of
the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving
spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For
the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty.
Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.]
Issue: Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano) are entitled to the
remains of Atty. Adriano.

Held:

Yes, the wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano.

The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance
with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or
of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a
better right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of
the persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance.
To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.

It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes
that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property
right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is
a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.
 Tomas Eugenio, Sr. vs. Velez

G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

PADILLA, J.

Facts:

On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a petition for habeas corpus against
Eugenio for forcibly taking Vitaliana (respondents’ sister) from her residence in 1987 and confined by
the former in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. The respondent-brothers, however, were not
knowledgeable of Vitaliana’s death on August 28, 1988 due to heart failure, prior to their filing of the
writ of habeas corpus. Hence, Eugenio did not release the body of Vitaliana claiming that the writ of
habeas corpus is invalid because it was filed after the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers
claimed that there was no existing marital relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and therefore
they have the custody over the body of the latter. The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse
or children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common law spouse, her brothers and sisters
have the custody. Also, it was held that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.

Issue: Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and sisters
or her common law spouse.

Ruling:

Yes, the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and sisters.

The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. And even if it was recognized, the co-
ownership requires that the man and the woman must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage.

In this case, Eugenio was legally married to another woman, which bars him from being legally
capacitated to contract marriages. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines “spouse” as a lawfully
wedded spouse not including common law spouses. Hence, the custody of Vitaliana’s body is given to
her brothers and sisters.
 In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts:

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname,
and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. Trial court granted the petition and
declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is
now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and
under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name.

Ruling:

Yes, there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may
use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on
the matter.
 Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang

G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005

TINGA, J.

Facts:

Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his
middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be
discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot
just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could
then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

Issues: Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held:

Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
 When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears
both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point
may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
Alfron vs Republic
Facts:

This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was
published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together
with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).

At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner
and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel
for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was
appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution of the Court.

From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was
registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15,
1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church
Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been
residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23)
years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first
grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-
1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished
Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-4). Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that
she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under
the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3
and G-4).

Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;

2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;

3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and
acquaintances know her by this name;

4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.

Issue:
Whether or not can be granted for change of name.

Held:

Yes, The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant
the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or
is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change
is necessary to avoid confusion Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S.
Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this
name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion

PADILLA VS CA TO YU KHENG CHIAU VS REPUBLIC (NOT INORDER)

MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998

Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2,
1989. The presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father
signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child’s name
is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of
the child. The person in charge at the hospital refused to place the presumed
father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong
for registration.

Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar’s
offi ce, rejected the registrati on on the basis of the Civil Registrar General’s
Circular No. 4, which provides that under Arti cle 176 of the Family Code,
illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their
mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the status of the registrati on of
his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General
denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary
to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel
the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using
his surname. His petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a
motion to for leave to amend the petition to substitute the child’s mother as the
petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but motion for reconsideration was denied.
He elevated the peti ti on to the Court of Appeals, which affi rmed the RTC’ s
decision

Issue:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to
register thecerti fi cate of live birth of an illegiti mate child using the alleged
father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity.

Ruling:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the
surname of their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been
acknowledged by their fathers in their record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code
effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code, which gives a natural child the right to
use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been acknowledged by both
parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the surname
of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be enti tled to support
inconformity with the provisions of the Family Code.

NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

 REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ
GR No. 117209 February 9, 1996

Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said
adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he
acquired consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for
change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding,
arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name
are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are
not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.
Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the
adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of
one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption
with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows
permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line
with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that
there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name
being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the
given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of
adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of
the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper
name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or
first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in
nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted
in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the
name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by
filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a
special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein
the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in
and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means
of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another
special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial law system.
 USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000.  Petitioner being married to Francisco
R. Rallonza, the following entries appears in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname,
“Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry
of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the
renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
replacement passport.
However, the petitioner’s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition
to change her surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle
name “Remo” in her passport.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her
husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name,
except in the cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1)
death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. since
petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in
the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239
which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance  must prevail over the
provisions of title xiii of the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames.  a
basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.

Wherefore, the court denied the petition andaffirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
 USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE

YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of
Muslim Law of the Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to
resume the use of her maiden name and surname. The petition was denied by the
respondent court on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name
and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of Court on change of name is
necessary if the position is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use
of petitioners maiden name and surname.

Issue:
Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a
petition for change of name.

Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name
should not be applied to judicial conformation of the right of divorced woman to
resume her maiden name and surname. Wherefore the petition is granted.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Facts: 
Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his
birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has
underwent sex re-assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to
change his first name from “Rommel” to “Mely.” 

Issue: 
 Should the court allow the change of name?

Ruling:
No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-
assignment, the determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable. It held that “while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes
the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. There is no special law
in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.” 

The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public
policy in relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, etc.

Grande vs. Antonio

G.R. No. 206248 : February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized
by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The
parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the
entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their
respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation
of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right and
immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the
persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of
the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant
of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil
Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and
record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to
their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition
made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction
with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by
the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

HELD: The petition is partially granted

CIVIL LAW Filation

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother.
The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname
of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a
notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the
paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate childre

Calderon v. Republic

L-18127, Apr. 5, 1967

FACTS: A mother who had a natural child by legal
fiction, subsequently married a man other than the child’s
father.
ISSUE: May the child successfully petition to change,
his surname from the real father’s name to that of the
stepfather, who has no objection thereto?
HELD: Yes, for an illegitimate child need not bear
the stigma of illegitimacy during his whole lifetime. After
all, the stepfather was willing. Moreover, the change of
name allowed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not
alter one’s status, rights, duties, or citizenship. It merely
changes the appellation by which a person is known,
identified or distinguished from others.

Padilla vs Court of Appeals 129 SCRA 558

G.R. No. L-39999
May 31, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: Roy Padilla and others , by confederating and mutually helping one another, and
acting
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by
means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close
their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter
brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in
concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of
P20,000.00
as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
Issue: Whether or not the awarding of damages extinguishes upon the judgement of
acquittal
Held: In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much
sophistry and
no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings
damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine
must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an
acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or
institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages
not
because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured
thereby
(Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29
clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has
been
acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision
does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A
separate
civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and
exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established
or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated
and
a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on
the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate
action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in
this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
URSUA VS CA

Facts:

On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation regarding bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits and it
was found out that the petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources
officer was involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and illegally-cut logs in the area. So, a
complaint was filed against him which was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman
to furnished him a copy of the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the Office of the
Ombudsman since his messenger had to attend to some personal matters which the latter complied.
Before proceeding to the office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and the latter advised him
that he could sign his name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When
he arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City, he was asked to sign his name on a log book
and instead of writing his own name, he wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the
Administrative Division and hand in the letter to Loida Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative Division in
order to get a furnished copy of the complaint. Before petitioner left, he was greeted by an
acquaintance and from there Loida learned that the one who introduced his name as Oscar Perez is
actually the petitioner himself so the latter reported the matter immediately to the Deputy Ombudsman
who ordered that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name was
fatal to its cause. Petitioner contends that no document from the civil registry was presented to show
the registered name of the accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity
of his conviction.The RTC rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of
Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085. On May 31,1993, The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of the said petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the C.A. contending that he has not
violated C.A. No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he never used any alias name, he only used such
name on one occasion with an express consent of Oscar Perez himself.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or
otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.

Held:

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by
petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent
provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was
approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the
one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall
be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for
the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which
such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register
Petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of
an alias name.

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly
and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at
birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A mans name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as
aliases.[11] Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition
to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended. This is so in the case at bench.