CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
1. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied
GR 190582
April 8. 2010
BY: Rodriguez
TOPIC: Legislative Branch
QUICK SUMMARY
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme
Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application .
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation
of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the
conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad
would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on
the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere..
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-
228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transgender) community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members
and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On August 17, 2009,
Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which
accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it
said that it “or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply
with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.” Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang
Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of
our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010,
upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the
May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad,
as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
HELD:
1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious
matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality.” The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of
the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able
to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.
2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that “there should have
been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are
committing immoral acts.” Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our
system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also
to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not
for the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve
to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
under-represented sectors. This is in accord with the country’s international obligations
to protect and promote human rights. The principle of non-discrimination as it relates
to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR should
be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public
opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate due
to conflicting opinions.

The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the
COMELEC was directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

2. PGBI v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529
April 29, 2010
BY: Saraza
TOPIC: Legislative department; House of Representatives
QUICK SUMMARY
COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system because it failed to get
2% of the votes cast in 2004 and did not participate in the 2007 elections.
The Court held that although the COMELEC has the power to remove party-list groups,
delisting PGBI was improper. It held that the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the
Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered.
FACTS:
• For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups pursuant to Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941, to
wit:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, remove
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain
at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
• Among the delisted party-list organizations delisted was PGBI because it
failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and did not participate in the 2007
elections.
• PGBI opposed to RA 8779. It argued that the requirement of Section 6(8) has
been relaxed by the Court's ruling in Banat v. COMELEC and the exclusion of
PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws
– COMELEC denied for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC may delist a party-list?
2. Whether or not PGBI was validly delisted?
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HELD:
1. Yes.
• The law is clear, the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
2. No.
• Banat v. COMELEC: in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representative
• The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two
preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling,
to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
• PGBI's situation — a party list group or organization that failed to garner
2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the
preceding election — is something that is not covered by Section 6 (8) of
RA 7941.

3. MAGDALO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190793
June 19, 2012
BY: Titular
TOPIC:
QUICK SUMMARY
MAGDALO filed petition for registration before the COMELEC to participate in the
2010 National Elections. COMELEC-2nd Division and En Banc denied its petition
because of the violence its members employed during the Oakwood Mutiny.
MAGDALO alleged that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it took
judicial notice of the facts surrounding the said Mutiny i.e. those were pure
conjectures and not evidence on record. MAGDALO filed this Petition for Certiorari to
the SC praying that it will grants its registration and participation in the national
elections and the subsequent ones to come. SC ruled in favor of COMELEC insofar
as it did not commit grave abuse of discretion but in view of the amnesty granted in
favor MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no
longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from
party registration.
FACTS:
▪ Petitioner Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a
regional political party based in the NCR for participation in the 2010 National and
Local Elections.
▪ COMELEC-2nd Division directed MAGDALO to cause the publication of the Petition
for Registration and the said Order in three daily newspapers of general circulation.
Petitioner complied. On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which
MAGDALO (a) established its compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b)
presented Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its documentary evidence in
support of its Petition for Registration. The following day, MAGDALO filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence.
▪ COMELEC-2ND Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO. It ruled that because of the Oakwood Mutiny, “this and the
fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show
their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve
their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.”
▪ Magdalo filed an MR and a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation of the May 2010 National Elections.
▪ MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23
December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the National
Elections.
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▪ COMELEC En Banc denied its MR.
▪ MAGDALO: maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the
authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, the latter
nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its determination on
pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.
▪ COMELEC: It had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO for
registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this
determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use
of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this
Court in a petition for certiorari.
▪ MAGDALO prays for this Court to: (a) reverse and set aside the COMELEC
Resolutions; (b) grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to
issue a Certificate of Registration. The Petition likewise includes a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO, PI to direct the COMELEC to allow it to participate in the
National Elections.
▪ SC denied its TRO.
▪ Before it went to ruled on the substantial issues, the SC discussed whether this
case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even date, it specifically asked for
accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent elections
▪ This case comes under the exceptions on mootness that it is “exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; and
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The instant action brings
to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of
violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party registration.
Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent
elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the case at
bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal
questions once and for all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.
HELD:
No, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted
in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood
incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the
disqualifications from party registration.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
taking judicial notice

of the
 Oakwood incident.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of “public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.” Further, E.O. No.
292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifically
empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence
commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially
cognizable facts.
In a string of cases, SC has already taken judicial notice of the factual circumstances
surrounding the Oakwood standoff. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took
cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence
thereon.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that
MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means”
shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P.
881, which provides that “no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence.
To achieve its goals in the Oakwood Mutiny, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel
occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions,
and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO
opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from
the government constituted clear acts of violence.
The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of
full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices,
engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the very least, the totality
of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the vulnerability
of civilians.
The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or
unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of
BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility
of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In
exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability,
as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of
this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable:
“An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that
the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.
They are standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative
proceedings.“
Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required
for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions. In and Administrative
Proceeding, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
applies.
In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational
objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the
members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to
make that determination in the first place. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the
COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate
to support this conclusion.
On the other hand, MAGDALO’s Criminal Case is a criminal action charging members
of MAGDALO with coup d’etat following the events that took place during the
Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary.
On the Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel involved in the
Oakwood standoff
In People v. Patriarca, Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for
their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach,
the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as
regards the use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for
Registration, its officers must individually execute affidavits renouncing the use of
violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives of their organization. Further,
it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include
military officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run
counter to the express provisions of the Constitution

4. DEMETRIA vs ALBA
GR 71977 February 27, 1987
BY: Bautista
TOPIC: Legislative Branch
QUICK SUMMARY
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of
1977.
It is unconstitutional because - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the
privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department, ,without regard to whether or not the funds to be transferred are savings,
or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the
transfer is to be made.
It completely disregards the standards set in in the fundamental law, amounting
to an undue delegation of legislative power
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Appropriations Act or approved after for their respective offices from
its enactment. savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public
moneys
- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for
which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
- It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by
the Constitution in approving appropriations
- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by the
President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer are
without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction
- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the
implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines are
without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners. He further contended that:

-The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII
FACTS: of the 1973 Constitution
-Prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to
1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the enjoin the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of responsibility
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as
parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as 4.) On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment.
taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance.
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of
1977” on the ff. grounds: 5.) The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as
ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution, which has allegedly rendered the petition moot and academic
Par. 1, section 44, PD 1177 Section 16(5) of Article VIII of 1973
Constitution Main Issue:
The President shall have the authority Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
to transfer any fund, appropriated for authorizing any transfer of WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
unconstitutional because there was undue delegation of legislative power?
the different departments, bureaus, appropriations, however, the
offices and agencies of the Executive President, the Prime Minister, the Held:
Department, which are included in the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
General Appropriations Act, to any Supreme Court, and the heads of YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant
program, project or activity of any constitutional commis ions may by to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
department, bureau, or office law be authorized to augment any
included in the General item in the general appropriations law - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: “The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”

- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: “No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may
by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of public
funds, the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition for which
funds may be transferred were specified.
- The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned

- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under

Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.

It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to

an undue delegation of legislative power

Other Issue:
whether the case is justiciable?

Yes. The case is justiciable. The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said
that: “This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and
tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.” - According to Pascual
v Secretary of Public Works, “... taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.”.As regards
taxpayers’ suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not (Tan
v Macapagal).

- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence
of judicial power conferred by the Constitution “in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.”

5. Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita
GR NUMBER 169777
April 20, 2006
BY: Cantimbuhan
TOPIC: Legislative branch – Power of Inquiry of the Congress
QUICK SUMMARY/DOCTRINE
Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and its
power of inquiry extends to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operation. If the information possessed by executive officials on
the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity
of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.”
FACTS:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in GOCC, AFP, and the PNP.
The Committee of the Senate as a whole-issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on
North Rail Project which was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Enrile urging
the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project;
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued invitations to various
AFP officials for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing for the inquiry
with the respect to the Presidential election which includes: "The Philippines as the
Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; "Clear and Present Danger"; "Gloriagate Scandal";
"Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"
September 28, 2005: The President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
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The officials of the Executive department and the officers of the AFP failed to attend
the hearing due to lack of consent from the President as provided for in the E.O. 464
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused his power by issuing E.O. 464. They thus pray for its declaration
as null and void for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress -YES, only as
to Sections 2(b) and 3.
HELD:
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is invalid
per se since it is not asserted but merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient
for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In
fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of
office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is
presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official
from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such official.
These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature
of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to
information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role
and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption
from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities.
The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information,
in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
As to Sections 1 and 2(a) of E.O. 464:

Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and its
power of inquiry extends to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operation. If the information possessed by executive officials on
the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity
of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.”
Executive privilege has been defined as “the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress,” as well as “the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.”
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session.”
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as
it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec.
22, Art. 6 of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour
is discretionary on their part.
No infirmity can be imputed to Sec. 2(a) of E.O. 464 as it merely provides
guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Sec. 2(b), on what
is covered by executive privilege.

When the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation”
under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance is mandatory.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power—the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.

Sec. 1 of E.O. 464 specifically applies to department heads. The required prior consent
under Section 1 is based on Art. 6, Sec. 22 of the Constitution on what has been
referred to as the question hour.

Sec. 22 provides that “The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but
may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
6. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives 2. MAIN ISSUE: WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
G.R. No. 193459 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed
February 15, 2011 Resolutions? NO.
a. On Due Process – Public Respondents did not violate.
BY: EUSEBIO b. 1-year Bar Rule- the 2 complaints were referred to the Committee
TOPIC: IMPEACHMENT AT THE SAME TIME.
c. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure- It’s applicable, the
FACTS: Constitution mandates Congress to implement other procedures in
• 2 impeachment complaints were filed in this case, against Ombudsman, Ma. the Impeachment Process
Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner).
o 1st on July 22, 2010 by Baraquel group: Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, RULING:
Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño
▪ endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao [FIRST ISSUE- Judicial Review]
and Walden Bello; Respondents Arguments
▪ July 27, 2010: Secretary General of HOR transmitted the • SC does not have jurisdiction • The Constitution did not grant
complaint to to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. because respondents are not SC and lower courts judicial
▪ Aug 2, 2010: House Speaker issued a Memorandum, exercising any judicial, quasi- review to be only discretionary;
directed the Rules to include it in the Order of Business. judicial or ministerial function • The power is expressly granted
o 2nd on August 3, 2010 by Reyes group: Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother in taking cognizance of the 2 to the SC and lower courts in the
Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite impeachment complaints; Constitution and it is also a duty,
and James Terry Ridon • It was exercising a political act and was given an expansive
▪ Also this was endorsed that is discretionary in nature definition to correct any grave
▪ Secretary General also transmitted to the House Speaker akin a preliminary abuse of discretion on the part
▪ August 9, 2010: A memorandum was issued, directed the investigation; of any government branch or
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business • Judicial review undermines instrumentality.
• House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II (chairperson of the Committee on the finality of impeachment • The Constitution provides for
Rules), instructed to include the 2 impeachment complaints in the Order of proceedings which will lead to the limitations of the power of
Business on Aug 11, 2010. conflicts between Congress HOR in impeachment
• Aug 11, 2010: at 4:47pm during plenary session the HOR simultaneously and the Judiciary. proceedings embodied in
referred both the complaints to public respondent. (important fact) Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5),
• After hearing, Resolution of Sept 1, 2010 – both complaints are sufficient Article XI;
in form, considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. • These limitations include the
• Sept 2, 2010: Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th manner of filing, required vote to
Congress was published. impeach, and the one year bar
• Sept 6: Petitioner filed an MR, but public respondent refused to accept the on the impeachment of one and
motion on the ground it is premature the same official;
• Sept 7, 2010: Public Respondent passed a Resolution – both complaints • the Constitution did not intend to
are sufficient in substance. leave the matter of
o Both complaints alleged: Culpable violation of the Constitution impeachment to the sole
and discretion of Congress. Instead,
o Betrayal of public trust. it provided for certain well-
• On the same date, petitioner was served a notice directing her to file an defined limits;
answer within 10 days. • Thus, the Constitution gave
• 6 days after petitioner receipt the notice to file an answer, PETITIONER FILED power of judicial review
WITH SC: application of injunctive reliefs whenever there’s grave abuse
o SC En Banc: issued status quo ante order of discretion on the part of the
o Required Respondents and OSG to Comment legislative branch when its
ISSUES: actions is seriously alleged to
1. WON SC can exercise judicial review on impeachment proceedings? YES have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but

• Petitioner’s petition is
premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication since petitioner
has at her disposal a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of the
proceedings before public
respondent
[SECOND ISSUE-Public Respondents GADALEJ? NO]
DUE PROCESS
Petitioner’s Arguments
Public Respondent’s Chairperson Rep.
Niel Tupas, Jr., is the subject of an
investigation she is conducting while his
father Niel Tupas, former Iloilo Governor,
had been charged by her with violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan.
• Petitioner is arguing bias an
vindictiveness played a big part
in arriving at the finding of
sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints
against her;
in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute.
• In the case of Francisco, Jr. v.
House of Representatives,
characterizes the power of
judicial review as a duty which,
as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction.
• An aspect of the "case-or-
controversy" requirement is the
requisite of ripeness.24 The
question of ripeness is
especially relevant in light of the
direct, adverse effect on an
individual by the challenged
conduct;
• Questions on, inter alia,
the validity of the simultaneous
referral of the two complaints
and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which
call for immediate interpretation.
• Hence, not premature.
SC Said: it’s bereft of merit
• The act of the head of a
collegial body cannot be
considered as that of the entire
body itself;
• Rep. Tupas, merely presided
over the proceedings and did
not in fact vote when Public
Respondents decided on the
sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints.
• The committee was not a one-
man committee and there’s
nothing in any law or rule
which makes it mandatory for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Petitioner is assailing the standards used
on the determination of sufficiency of
form and substance of an impeachment
complaint.
• Petitioner then urges SC to look
into the facts constitutive of the
offenses and her submissions in
disclaiming the allegations in the
complaints.
the chair of the committee to
inhibit given that he had
previously been found liable
for violation of a law;
• But petitioner said it only took
5 minutes so arrive in a
decision? An abbreviated
pace in the conduct of
proceedings is not per se an
indication of bias;
• The presumption of regularity
includes the public officer’s
official actuations in all phases
of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent
upon Petitioner to present
contradictory evidence other
than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation.
• Contrary to petitioner’s
position that the Impeachment
Rules do not provide for
comprehensible standards in
determining the sufficiency of
form and substance, the
Impeachment Rules are clear
in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing
that there must be a "verified
complaint or resolution,"36 and
that the substance
requirement is met if there is "a
recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and
determinative of the
jurisdiction of the
committee."37
• It is only in the Impeachment
Rules where a determination
of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment
complaint is made necessary.
This requirement is not
explicitly found in the organic
law, as Section 3(2), Article XI
of the Constitution basically
merely requires a
"hearing."38 In the discharge of
its constitutional duty, the

• Petitioner then urges SC to look
into the facts constitutive of the
offenses and her submissions in
disclaiming the allegations in the
complaints.
Petitioner questions the delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules.
• 15th Congress opened on July
26;
• Public respondents adopted the
rules of the 14th Congress on
Aug 3, 2010;
• The 15th Congress
Impeachment Rules were
published on Sept 2, 2010 in 2
newspapers of general
circulation.
Petitioner contends that she was
deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only
on September 2, 2010 a day after public
respondent ruled on the sufficiency of
form of the complaints.
• She likewise tacks her
contention on Section 3(8),
Article XI of the Constitution
which directs that "Congress
shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this
section."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
House deemed that a finding should be presumed as self-
of sufficiency of form and executing unless it is
substance in an impeachment expressly provided a
complaint is vital "to effectively legislative enactment is
carry out" the impeachment necessary. In case of doubt,
process, hence, such the Constitution should be
additional requirement in the considered as self-executing.
Impeachment Rules. • Even assuming arguendo that
publication is required, lack of
• SC can’t do this. Such a it does not nullify the
determination is a purely proceedings taken prior to the
political question which the effectivity of the Impeachment
Constitution has left to the Rules which faithfully comply
sound discretion of the with the relevant self-
legislature. executing provisions of the
Constitution
• SC differentiated the words • Rules on impeachment, as
“Promulgate” and contemplated by the framers
“Publication”. There’s a of the Constitution, merely aid
statutory difference in their or supplement the procedural
usage. aspects of impeachment.
• Promulgation- is to make • Given that the Constitution
known. itself states that any
• It is within the discretion of promulgation of the rules on
Congress to determine on how impeachment is aimed at
to promulgate its "effectively carry[ing] out the
Impeachment Rules; purpose" of impeachment
• It is not for this Court to tell a proceedings, the Court finds
co-equal branch of no grave abuse of discretion
government how to when the House deemed it
promulgate when the proper to provisionally adopt
Constitution itself has not the Rules on Impeachment of
prescribed a specific method the 14th Congress, to meet the
of promulgation.. exigency in such situation of
• Publication in the Official early filing and in keeping with
Gazette or a newspaper of the "effective" implementation
general circulation is but one of the "purpose" of the
avenue for Congress to make impeachment provisions.
known its rules; • The provisional adoption of the
• This is different from inquiries previous Congress’
in aid of legislation in SEC 21, Impeachment Rules is within
ART VI because under this the power of the House to
there is a categorical directive promulgate its rules on
from the Constitution. But in impeachment to effectively
Impeachment proceedings carry out the avowed purpose.
there’s NONE. • Besides it’s a procedural rule,
• ART XI, SEC 3(8) is self- Petitioner doesn’t have vested
executing. In general rights. Procedural rules can
provisions of the constitution have retroactive application.

1 -YEAR BAR RULE
Petitioner Arguments
1 year bar reckoned from July 22, 2010 • Francisco58 states that the term
hence can’t file a 2 nd impeachment "initiate" means to file the
complaint. complaint and take initial action
on it.
• The interpretation of “no
verified 2nd impeachment
complaint may be accepted
and referred to the Committee
of Justice for action” means
that if the 1st complaint was
already referred then the 2nd
complaint is prohibited.
• initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or
endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at
least one-third61 of the
members of the House of
Representatives with the
Secretary General of the
House.
o Once an
impeachment
complaint has been
initiated, another
impeachment
complaint may not be
filed against the same
official within a one
year period.
• The filing of an impeachment
complaint is like the lighting of
a matchstick. Lighting the
matchstick alone, however,
cannot light up the candle,
unless the lighted matchstick
reaches or torches the candle
wick. Referring the complaint to
the proper committee ignites
the impeachment proceeding.
With a simultaneous referral of
multiple complaints filed, more
than one lighted matchsticks
light the candle at the same
time. What is important is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Petitioner complains that an
impeachable officer may be subjected to
harassment by the filing of multiple
impeachment complaints
Applicability of Criminal Procedure
Petitioner’s Argument
petitioner posits that public respondent
gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment
Rules, the same rules she earlier
chastised
that there should only be
ONE CANDLE that is kindled in
a year, such that once the
candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.
• purpose of the one-year bar is
two-fold:
o to prevent undue
or too
frequent harassment;
o to allow the legislature
to do its principal task
[of] legislation,"
• The intended limitation
hence is an element of time
and not the number of
complaints.
The requirements or restrictions of a
one-year bar, a single proceeding,
verification of complaint, endorsement
by a House member, and a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance – all
these must be met before bothering a
respondent to answer – already weigh
heavily in favor of an impeachable
officer.
What the Constitution assures an
impeachable officer is not freedom from
arduous effort to defend oneself.
The Constitution does not promise an
absolutely smooth ride for them,
especially if the charges entail genuine
and grave issues.
The measure of protection afforded by
the Constitution is that if the
impeachable officer is made to undergo
such ride, he or she should be made to
traverse it just once
SC Said
• In the exercise of the power to
promulgate rules
"to effectively carry out" the
provisions of Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
House promulgated the
Impeachment Rules, Section
16 of which provides that "the
Rules of Criminal Procedure
under the Rules of Court
shall, as far as practicable,
apply to impeachment
proceedings before the
House."
• Constitution, by express grant,
permits the application of
additional adjective rules that
Congress may consider in
effectively carrying out its
mandate
Petitioner invokes the application of • the Constitution allows the
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on indictment for multiple
Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] impeachment offenses, with
complaint or information must charge each charge representing an
only one offense, except when the law article of impeachment,
prescribes a single punishment for assembled in one set known as
various offenses." the "Articles of
• Petitioner is claiming since Impeachment."94 It, therefore,
there are 2 charges she’ll be follows that an impeachment
confused in preparing her complaint need not allege only
defense one impeachable offense.
• It’s also in the discretion of the
Committee to whether
consolidate the impeachment
complaints or not.
• Since public respondent,
whether motu proprio or upon
motion, did not yet order a
consolidation, the Court will not
venture to make a
determination on this matter, as
it would be premature,
conjectural or anticipatory

7. CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200242
17 July 2012
BY: Garcia
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: On December 12, 2011, the majority bloc of the House of Representatives
filed a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner then Chief Justice Corona,
which was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. Complaint was
voted in session and 188 members signed and endorsed it, which is way above the 1/3
vote required by the constitution.
Complaint was then transmitted to the Senate and convened as an impeachment court.
Petitioner Corona was charged with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
public trust and graft and corruption.
The following are contained in the Articles of Impeachment:
Art. 1 – Betrayal of public trust through his track record marked by partiality and
subservience in cases during the arroyo administration.
Art. 2 – Failure to disclose to the public his SALN, which constitutes culpable violation
of the constitution and betrayal of public trust. (Mega world property)
Art. 3 – Failing to meet and observe the stringent standards of the constitution providing
that a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence, by:
(1) allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which
caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executor cases;
(2) In creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her
appointment of his wife to office; and
(3) In discussing with the litigants regarding cases pending before the SC.
Art. 4 – Blatant disregard of the principles of separation of powers by issuing a “status
quo ante” order against the house of representatives in the case concerning the
impeachment of then ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.
Art. 5 – Wanton Arbitrariness and Partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of
res judicata in the cases involving the 15 newly-created cities, and the promotion of
dinagat island into a province.
Art. 6- Abrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and
jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the supreme court for the purpose of
exculpating him.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Art. 7- In granting a TRO in favor of former president Arroyo and her husband to give
them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice. Failure
and refusal to account for the judiciary development fund (JDF) and special allowance
for the judiciary Collections.
Herein petitioner Corona prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to
meet the requirements of the constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a
judgment of acquittal for all the articles of the impeachment.
Impeachment court ordered the prosecution to introduce evidence in support of the
Articles of impeachment and granted the prosecution to issue subpoena to the officers
of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited 1M peso and dollar
currencies.
Petitioner filed the present case arguing that the impeachment court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it:
(1) Proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives
which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause;
(2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from
being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much
less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo
that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain
Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to
prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief,
bringing no real protection to petitioner;
(3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and
unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II
does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for
impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft
and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable violation of the
Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and
(4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as
requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act ("fruit
of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution
violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426
(Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
The Solicitor General argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in
character which may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and HOR, with the
manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents "without submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding

the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment
and of the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of,
Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow a public official being
impeached to raise before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the
impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that
may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case.
Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
ISSUE: whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked
to assail matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to
obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person
being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
HELD: NO. Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy," was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will be
regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations
of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political character, the precise role of
the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure
the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure
of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally
entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if
tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for
serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism
designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was
adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the
Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US
Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par.
4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a
complaint, which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the
Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality
exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during
the hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental
Petition regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the
impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three
express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded
judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the
nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-
Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and
counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on
the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were
followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of
expanded judicial review.
The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity
of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner
Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-
year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether
respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess
of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of
petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner
immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the
Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief
Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted
by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted
by supervening events and his own acts.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In
such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled
to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
8. REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
SOCORRO B. TAN
GR NO. 207264
JUNE 25, 2013

BY: HERNANDEZ, E.
TOPIC: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

QUICK SUMMARY
Tan filed a petition to cancel Reyes’ COC on the ground of material
misrepresentations. COMELEC granted petition, resolution became final and
executory. Reyes questions COMELEC’s jurisdiction. SC held COMELEC had
jurisdiction.

FACTS:
• Reyes was running as representative of Marinduque.
• Tan, a registered voter, filed in COMELEC a petition to deny Reyes a
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for material misrepresentation on her status,
birthdate, residence, and citizenship.
• COMELEC granted Tan’s petition and cancelled Reyes’s COC.
• Reyes filed an MR. COMELEC en banc dismissed it.
• Incidentally, four days after the COMELEC en banc decision, Reyes won the
election.
• On June 5, 2013, the House of Representatives proclaimed her the winner
and thereafter she took her oath. She is yet to assume office.
• Reyes filed in the present court arguing that HRET, not COMELEC, has
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction?
HELD:
Yes. COMELEC has jurisdiction because Reyes is not a member of the House yet.

To be member of the House, the representative should have been proclaimed, taken
her oath, and assumed office. In this case, although Reyes has indeed been
proclaimed and had taken her oath, she has not yet assumed office.

The Constitution provides that the assumption of office is at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. Reyes has not assumed office yet, hence COMELEC
still has jurisdiction.

1. Macalintal v. PET
GR NO. 191618 | November 23, 2010 | Justice Nachura
Topic: Executive Branch
Doctrine: The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-
presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral
Tribunal.
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is an institution independent but it is not a separate
and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
ER: Macalintal questioned the constitution of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution. He chafes at the creation of a separate
tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and
confidential employees to effect the constitutional mandate. The main issue is WON
the constitution of the PET is unconstitutional. The SC ruled that it is constitutional and
the petition filed by Macalintal is without merit. The SC, as a PET, specifically and
exclusively clothed with jursidiction by Constitution to act respectively as “sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications.” of the President and
Vice-president. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a
grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. It is intended to be an institution
independent but not separate from the judicial department. When the SC, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power.
Facts:
• Macalintal filed a petition questioning the constitution of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Sec. 4, Art.
VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
• Macalintal concedes that the Supreme Court is “authorized to promulgate its
rules for the purpose,” he chafes at the creation of a separate tribunal
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, as set of personal and
confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. The provisions
of the 2005 Rules of the PET (2005 PET Rules) specifically states:
(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as
"Chairman and Members," respectively;
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(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint
employees and confidential employees of every member thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the
Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the
Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk
of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the
Supreme Court seal.
• Although Macalintal acknowledges that the invoked constitutional provision
does allow the “appointment of additional personnel”
• Macalintal then cited the decision in Buac v. COMELEC which peripherally
declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power." On this point, he reiterates that the constitution of the
PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and
Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Issue:
1.) WON Macalintal has standing to file the petition? No.
2.) WON the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is
unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution? No.
Held: Petition is dismissed.
Issue 1:
The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3. The
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators
Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a
generalized interest in the outcome of this case. Even if his submission is valid,
petitioner’s standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his
appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-
Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr.
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, because judicial inquiry, as mentioned
above, requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have
been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution.
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before
which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in
2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled
with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was
defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper
invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition
ought to be dismissed outright.
Issue 2:
Prior to petitioner’s appearance as counsel for then protestee Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Court had affirm the grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal in the case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections where the petitioners invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of a case and urged
the SC to instead take the petition they directly instituted before it. The Court ruled that
the said provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
The Court in the case of Tecson dismissed the petition. The word "contest" in the
provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election
and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest" before a
winner is proclaimed.
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The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral
tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution
to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In
a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise
jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto may be
filed after the proclamation of the winner.
On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment
of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains
divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his
restrictive view – one which really does not offer a solution.
The Court then stated that it is guided by the principles of constitutional construction:
the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and the Court must harmonize
the provisions and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read
with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the
Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests
involving our country’s highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in
connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the
exercise thereof.
Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between two
presidential candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over
it. So, it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have
done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the
separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial
power.
The establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was before the 1987
Constitution. R.A. No. 1793, established an independent PET to try, hear, and decide
protests contesting the election of President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were tasked to sit as its Chairman and
Members, respectively. The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate

rules for the conduct of its proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding
presidential and vice-presidential contests and authorized to exercise powers similar to
those conferred upon courts of justice, including the issuance of subpoena, taking of
depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance, production of documents
and other evidence, and the power to punish contemptuous acts and bearings. The
tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and employees necessary for the
efficient performance of its functions.
The 1973 Constitution rendered the PET irrelevant. It was revived by BP 884 in 1985.
The statutory PET was then transformed into the 1987 Constitution. The framers
intended to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET to undertake the
task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential
candidates. This justifies the budget allocation of the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority
to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which
the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant
of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The
Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive
in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight
the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in
contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court pointed out that
the issue in Buac v. COMELEC involved the characterization of the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. However, petitioner latches on to the
enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that "contests involving the President
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in
the exercise of quasi-judicial power." The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined
than real.
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential
system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it
remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. At the barangay and
municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in
the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and
senatorial – exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the
House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of
judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the
HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial
review – via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that
the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.46
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara
pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And
yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial
power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court,
in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
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2. Ople v. Torres power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
GR No. 127685 duties effectively.
July 23, 1998
Administrative power enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
BY: Jallorina efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
TOPIC: Scope of administrative orders issued by the Executive administrative orders, rules and regulations.

QUICK SUMMARY
AO 308 established a national computerized identification reference system, which
was challenged by Ople on the ground that it usurps legislative power. The Court
granted his petition, ruling that such matter cannot be covered by a mere AO, since
AOs are only issued for the purpose of setting a minimum standard of conduct of
government employees for governmental operations.
FACTS:
● AO 308 was issued by then President Fidel Ramos. The said issuance was
for the purpose of requiring a computerized system to properly and efficiently
identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not
totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations. Thus, AO
308 established a decentralized identification reference system among the
key basic services and social security providers.
Here, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is defined as an act of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head.
AO 308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of
our citizenry (privacy) vis-a-vis the State (national defense) as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative
power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.

● Petitioner, Senator Blas F. Ople, challenged the constitutionality of AO 308.

He contends, inter alia, that the said issuance was a usurpation of the power
of the Congress to legislate.

● For its part, respondents Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, et. al. counter
that AO 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of
the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of the Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of AO 308 is an usurpation of legislative power?

HELD:
YES. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them." Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest. On the other hand, executive power is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws.

The President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
3. Fortich v Corona "Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
GR 131457 entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases."
April 24, 1998
It is further provided for in Sec 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable."
BY: Ko
TOPIC: Executive Branch When the OP issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 which declares that the Decision
of March 29, 1996 is final and executory as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
QUICK SUMMARY: reconsideration, the OP had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case or modify the
A group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike protesting the March 29, 1996 Decision.
Decision of the OP which led the OP to issue a “Win-Win” Resolution dated November
Having lost jurisdiction, the OP has no more authority to entertain the second motion
7, 1997 which substantially modified the already final and executory Decision. for reconsideration which became the basis of the “Win-Win” Resolution. AO 18 and
Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only 1 motion for
FACTS: reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. Even if a
● March 29, 1996: The OP rendered a Decision approving the conversion of a second MR was permitted in “exceptionally meritorious cases”, it should still not have
144 hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area been entertained since the first MR was not seasonably filed.
● May 20, 1996: DAR filed a motion for reconsideration
Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March
● June 23, 1997: The March 29, 1996 Decision was declared final and executory 29, 1996 Decision was in gross disregard of the rules and the basic legal concept that
in an Order accord finality to administrative determinations.
● July 11, 1997: DAR filed a second motion for reconsideration
● October 9, 1997: A group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in
front of the DAR compound, protesting the March 29, 1996 Decision of the
Office of the President
● The OP the issued a so called “Win-Win Resolution” on November 7, 1997
which substantially modifies the earlier Decision
○ The extent of the land conversion to agro-industrial area became
only 44 hectares and the remaining 100 hectares are to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries
● The farmers sought nullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution claiming that the
OP was prompted to issue the resolution only after their hunger strike
pressured the OP to come up with the purely political decision to appease the
farmers

ISSUE:
Whether or not the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be
substantially modified by the “Win-Win” Resolution –NO

HELD:
The rules and regulations governing appeals to OP are embodied in AO 18, Sec 7
which provides:
"SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

4. Joson V. Executive Secretary Torres
G.R. No. 131255
May 20, 1998
BY: Laguesma
TOPIC: Executive
FACTS:
• Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint
charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority
o scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, petitioner
belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door
and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close
behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who
encircled the area.
• They were saying that this was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija
obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank;
• They prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency
audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the
proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province
• Pres. RAMOS instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG) Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace."
• Secretary Barbers notified Joson of the case against him
And directed petitioner "to submit [his] verified/sworn answer
within fifteen (15) days from receipt."
• Petitioner requested for an extension of thirty (30) days to submit his answer
because he was "trying to secure the services of legal counsel experienced in
administrative law practice." (This was granted and happened 3x)
• DILG granted petitioner's request "for the last time" but gave him an extension
of only ten (10) days and failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver
• Undersecretary Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order
declaring petitioner in default and to have waived his right to present evidence.
o respondent failed to submit his answer to the complaint despite the
grant to him of three (3) extensions, such unreasonable failure is
deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf
o declared in default but was reconsidered in the interest of justice.
• On recommendation of Secretary Barbers, ExecSec Torres issued an order,
by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension
for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.
• Joson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default.
• USec Sanchez issued an order denying petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" and
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration."
o he required the parties to submit their position papers within an
inextendible period of ten days from receipt
o admitted the "Answer Ad Cautelam" as petitioner's position paper
• Petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation." Petitioner prayed
that a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions
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of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order
No. 23; and that this be held at the province of Nueva Ecija.
• Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition
• Proceedings before the DILG continued
o denied petitioner's "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation"
declaring that the submission of position papers substantially
complies with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings
• ExecSec Torres imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office
for six (6) months without pay
ISSUES:
1.Whether a complaint against an elective official shall be filled in the Office of the
President? Yes.
2.Whenther the SILG has jurisdiction over the case? Yes
3. Whether the position papers were enough to justify the suspension, or should there
have been a Formal investigation? FORMAL INVESTIGATION
HELD:
1. Yes. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the
Office of the President.
• Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint
against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.
2. Yes. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority is the President,
whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
• Investigating Authority is the SILG, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee.
• The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective
local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local
governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
• power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The
President's power of general supervision means no more than the power
of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers
act within the law
• the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of
the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires
• The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As
the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority
• What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
• the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to
on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency appointive officials but not to those elected.
• This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.
• "Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
• Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As
head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate
some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required
by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for
and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.
• In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not
err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive
suspension during the investigation
• procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
• The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of one's
defense
• To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. Thus, when respondent failed to submit his
position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct of formal
investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural process.
• The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is
erroneous.
• The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.
• An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights
of an accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due
process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory
attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence.
These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local
Government Code and in A.O. No. 23.
• Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the
complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers.
• The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are
more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a

5. De Castro v. JBC
G.R. No. 191002,
March 17, 2010
BY: Ligon
TOPIC:
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president can appoint a vacancy in the supreme court despite the
prohibition under Sec.15 Art. VII which prevents the president from making
appointments 2 months immediately before the next presidential election up to the end
of his term?
HELD:
The president may make appointments to fill a vacancy in the supreme court despite
the prohibition under Section 15, Art. VII since the prohibition only applies to
appointments made in the Executive Department
Section 15, Art. VII (Executive Department) - Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) - The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Section 9, Article VIII (Judicial Department) -- The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list
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Section 4 (1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Furthermore, The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the
Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination
and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary.
The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even
candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the
President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of
the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster
there.
Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current
incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure
judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority.
In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of
compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30,
2010.
Thus, the Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

6. PEOPLE V. VERA
G.R. No. 45685
16 November 1937
BY: Limjoco
TOPIC: Separation of powers, undue delegation, determination of contingencies, test
of completeness
DOCTRINE:
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the
judicial. The power to make laws is with the legislature. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void on the principle that potestas delegate non delegare
potest (one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power).
The legislature may delegate its authority to make finding of fact and the fact-finding
power may be conferred for putting into effect, suspending or applying the law. But
where delegation to a fact-finding body empowers it to create the conditions which
constitute the fact, the delegation is invalid. In testing whether a statute constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power or not, the statute must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing is left to
the judgment of any delegate of the legislature.
FACTS:
1. This case involves a previous case wherein accused (Cu Unjieng) filed for
probation. The previous case was People vs Cu Unjieng where Cu Unjieng
was found guilty in the CFI of Manila (the Case mentioned that the length of time
of the trial was unparalleled in Philippine Jurisprudence at that time). Cu Unjieng
filed for probation while he was waiting for the decision of the SC on his motion for
reconsideration.
2. The Insular Probation Office denied the application.
a. Judge Vera denied the petition for probation.
b. Judge failed to execute the sentence of imprisonment
c. After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for
probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment
of its rendition.
d. However, Cu Unjieng filed a request for appeal and the judge granted it,
setting a date of hearing.
3. Fiscal of CFI of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation.
4. Private prosecution alleged that on Act No. 4221(Probation Law) was
unconstitutional as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution)
5. People of the Philippines as petitioners also say that granting probation is a form
of reprieve, which is the power of the executive department only and thus is an
encroachment to the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons.
ISSUES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Whether or not said Act is constitutional and does not unduly delegate power to the
Provincial Board – NO, it is unconstitutional.
HELD
NO, the law is unconstitutional due to undue delegation of powers.
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the
judicial.
The power to make laws is with the legislature. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void on the principle that potestas delegate non delegare potest
(one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power).
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and
inflexible. One exception is that the central legislative body may delegate legislative
powers to local authorities.
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not,
the statute must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing is left to the judgment of any delegate of the legislature. The
general rule is limited by the rule that to a certain extent, matters of detail may be left
to be filled in by the rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by the executive
officers.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon
the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221, Section 11: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary
of a probation officer...
The provincial boards of the various provinces are left to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer.
As the law failed to fix a standard for which the administrative agencies must follow, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
law constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is therefore unconstitutional.

Delegation of power to make law must be distinguished with delegation of discretion as

to the execution of the law. The latter is void as it involves a discretion as to what the
law shall be, the former is valid as it is exercised in pursuance of the law.

The legislature may delegate its authority to make finding of fact and the fact-finding
power may be conferred for putting into effect, suspending or applying the law. But
where delegation to a fact-finding body empowers it to create the conditions which
constitute the fact, the delegation is invalid. In this case, it is the provincial boards who
have the discretion to put the law into effect by conforming to the conditions in the law,
making it an undue delegation of legislative power.

7. Tesoro v. Director of Prisons (1939)
68 Phil. 154
1939
FACTS:
• On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the
Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public
document and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three
(3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one
hundred pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November
14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a
parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions:
o 1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his
residence without first obtaining the consent of the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence;
o 2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself
in an orderly manner;
o 3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive
Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first
year, once a month, and thereafter, once every three months.
• Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall
again be in full force and effect.
• On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court
of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed
with one Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To
the complaint were attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar, of
Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter forwarded to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the
corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for non-
appearance of the
complainant.
• Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a
complaint with Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts
supporting the criminal action aforementioned, charged the petitioner with
violation of the conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was
summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the aforecited
complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until the day following. On
February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a letter to the board denying the
charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife the included therewith the
supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his
former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole officer assigned
to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the strength
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thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed
a communication to the President of the Philippines, recommending the arrest
and reincarceration of the petitioner. And on February 19, 1938, the President
issued the following order:
• To any lawful officer: Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of
First Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of an official document, and
sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 2 years to 3 years, 6 months and
21 days' imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on parole by His
Excellency, the Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain
conditions, one of which provides that he will not commit any other crime and
will conduct himself in an orderly manner, and Whereas, said Eufemio P.
Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the latter part of September, 1937,
and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the confidence of his brother-in-law,
Jose Nagar, by maintaining adulterous relations with the latter's wife, under
the following circumstances: Upon the death on September 18, 1937, of
parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose Nagar) and in order to mitigate the grief
of the bereaved family and to help in the keeping of the house and caring of
the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar and his wife came to live with the
parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking advantage of the frequent absences of
Jose Nagar from the house, parolee Tesoro made advances to Jose Nagar's
wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded in having illicit relations with her and even
went to the extent of taking away the woman from her legitimate husband,
after the couple had moved from his home, and he is now living with her in
adultery.
• Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio P.
Tesoro and to commit him to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila,
who is hereby authorized to confine said person for the service of the
unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison.
• By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the
custody of the Director of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of
habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the
trial court, took the present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial for writ of habeas corpus by the trial court is proper?
HELD: Yes
Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted
parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties: To grant to
convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the

discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may
impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his
judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence.
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as
follows: The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in
cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations
as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the National Assembly.
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so
far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has
been impliedly repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted
to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President
of the Philippines. This contention is untenable. The power to pardon given the
President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke
paroles. If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as
a denial thereof to the President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally
parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution, have been released
conditionally by the Chief Executive. That such effect was never intended by the
Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal
authority to investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of
his parole. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary
of the board once a month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every
three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the
supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a
corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori
to make recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. Besides,
the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to
inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational
and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and investigation, the
President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making
use of any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary
assistance. When, therefore, the President chose to intrust his power of inquiry upon
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the
concern of persons released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good
judgment.
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Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated
his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he
"will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner."
(Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court,
of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to
have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief
Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon,
parole, or suspension of sentence." (Emphasis ours.)
Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the
conditional parole. He claims that, according to the weight of the evidence, the violation
took place, not "in the latter part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but
after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to expire. But that as
it may, where, as in the instant case, the determination of the violation of the conditional
parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will
not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having
consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has
granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may
be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after
October 28, 1937, when his maximum penalty was to have expired, we still find no error
in the order of the arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention that, upon
the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires,
and, therefore, his liberty becomes absolute subject to no conditions contained in his
parole. In other words, he holds the view that the period during which he was out on
parole should be counted as service of his original sentence. We do not subscribe to
this contention.
In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said: When a conditional pardon is
violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the time the pardon
was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio
[1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-
settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by
his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court should
not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as
time served on the original sentence. (20 R.C.L., p. 570; State vs. Horne [1906], 52
Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss.,
282.)
This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C.J., 1209.)
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The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the
duration of the penalty he has yet to serve after his recommitment. Act No. 1561
provided that a convict released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its conditions,
shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole has ever been granted
him, the time between the parole and the subsequent arrest not being considered as
part of the term of his sentence in computing the period of his subsequent confinement.
But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative Code, and section 64 (i) thereof
omitted such provision. Act No. 4103, section 8, provides that any prisoner released on
parole who violates any condition thereof, shall, upon re-arrest and confinement, serve
the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison. This Act is not, however, applicable to the present case, as the
petitioner was paroled not under the provision thereof, but by virtue of section 64 (i) of
the Administrative Code. There is, thus, no statutory provision squarely governing the
case with respect to the duration of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment.
In the absence of such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From
the express terms of the parole that "should any of the conditions stated be violated,
the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is evident that the
petitioner herein should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed
upon him by the court.

8. TOLENTINO v CESARIO CATOY
G.R. No. L-2503. December 10, 1948
FACTS: Tolentino was a Hukbalahap and was found guilty of the crime of illegal
assembly held in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs on May 11, 1948. On June
21, the President issued Proclamation No. 76 granting amnesty under certain
conditions to leaders and members of the Hukbalahap and the PKM organizations. On
July 16, within the 20-day period for surrender imposed as a condition by the amnesty,
the petitioner, already serving sentence, sent the President a petition for his release
under the provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on this petition and the
petitioner came to court with the present application.
The Judge Enriquez decided the petition that "the petitioner is clearly covered by the
amnesty proclamation" but refused to grant the writ because he has failed to follow the
procedure outlined by the implementing circulars so that he may avail of the benefits
thereof.
Attached to the record of the CFI a certificate drawn in the form prescribed in the
Secretary of Justice's circulars stating that petitioner presented himself with a
Remington .45 caliber pistol and ammunition. The Provincial Fiscal who appeared with
the SolGen’s office admitted the authenticity of the Constabulary Commanding Officer's
and also said that the firearm mentioned in the certificate belonged to another man and
had been surrendered by the latter.
ISSUE: W/N the surrender of firearms under Circular 27-A is a necessary requirement
for the petitioner to avail amnesty under Proclamation 76? (NO)
HELD: The majority of the Court believe that by its context and pervading spirit the
proclamation extends to all members of the Hukbalahap and PKM organizations. It
makes no exception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed "in favor of the
leaders and members of the associations known as Hukbalahap and Pambansang
Kaisahan ng Magbubukid." No compelling reason is apparent for excluding
Hukbalahaps of any class or condition from its object, which is "to forgive, and forego
the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc.," as a "just and wise measure
of the Government." We are to suppose that the President and the Congress, knowing
that a good number of Hukbalahap and PKM affiliates had been or were being
prosecuted, would have, in clear terms, left them out if that had been the intention,
instead of leaving their exclusion to inference.
The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and
obedience to the constituted authorities and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits
and occupation. This objective cannot be expected to meet with full success without
the goodwill and cooperation of the Hukbalahaps who have become more embittered
by their capture, prosecution and incarceration. It was known that those dissidents who
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had been arrested and prosecuted were not going to remain in jail forever, and that
discrimination against them might in itself be a driving force for them and their
sympathizers to take up arm again.
Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Mr.
Justice Field in Knote vs. United States, said that "the distinction between them is one
rather of philological interest than of legal importance." It seems to be generally
conceded in the United States that the word "'pardon' includes amnesty." This being
so, the rules for interpreting pardon and amnesty ought not to vary. Now then, according
to a well-recognized doctrine, pardon is construed "most strictly against the state."
"Where general words are used, their natural meaning is not to be restricted by other
words unless the intention to do so is clear and manifest."
At best, the contention that the grace and beneficence of the amnesty are denied the
Hukbalahaps who were in prison rests on the idea that being restrained of liberty they
cannot surrender. Our answer is that surrender is required merely as a token of
willingness to abide by the conditions of the grant. It is not intended as, and cannot
accomplish the purpose of, a security. As evidence of good faith, surrender by
Hukbalahaps from the field is not more effective than a prisoner's written and more
solemn manifestation of his acceptance. If physical presence be deemed essential,
prisoners not only present themselves but are under the custody of the authorities
subject to their absolute control until released.
If the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of this proclamation and he is unable to obtain
his release through executive channels, it devolves on the courts to protect his rights.
This is a fundamental right which cannot be left to the decision of executive
officers. This should be especially true where, as in this case, the implementation
committee was not the creation of the proclamation nor was it even mentioned in this
document. The committee was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as an
instrumentality to facilitate, not to hinder or obstruct, the carrying out of the provisions
of the amnesty.

9. Barrioquinto v Fernandez
G.R No. L-1278
January 21, 1949
BY: Your last name
TOPIC: Pardon and amnesty
QUICK SUMMARY
Petitioners were charged with murder. They claimed that it was one Hipolito who
killed the victim. Proclamation 8 of 1946 came into effect and they tried to apply for
amnesty. The amnesty commission said that they cannot avail of its benefits since
they did not confess to the commission of the offense. SC said, that they do not need
to confess to the commission of the offense since it can be shown in the trial if they
did it or not.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez were charged with the crime of Murder.
● They filed a petition for Mandamus to compel the respondents, as
commissioners of the 14th Guerilla amnesty commission to decide if
petitioners are entitled to amnesty.
● Before the period for perfecting an appeal expired, Jimenez came to know of
the Proclamation 8 of 1946 which grants amnesty to those who committed
crimes under the RPC in furtherance on resistance against the enemy or
persons aiding the efforts of the enemy. Back in WW II
● Jimenez submitted his case to the Guerilla Case and Barrioquinto followed
in the application for amnesty.
● The two mentioned one Agapito Hipolito who actually shot the victim that
died, as members of the same group.
● However, the Commission stated that since neither of them have admitted to
committing the offense due to their allegation, they cannot invoke the
benefits of amnesty.
● The commission returned the case to the CFI of Zamboanga.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez are entitled to the benefits of
amnesty even if they did not admit to the commission of the offense. – Yes, they are
entitled.
HELD:
The SC ruled that in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
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precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense.
It is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that
the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the
nature of a plea of confession and avoidance."
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits.
Whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party,
conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or
hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with
the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
Differentiation of pardon and amnesty
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; and looks forward as it forgives the
punishment and the restoration of right to hold public office must be explicitly stated in
the pardon.
Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself as if
no offense was committed.

10. Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34 (1940)
BY: Mangudadatu
TOPIC: Pardon
QUICK SUMMARY
Santos was convicted of estafa. Later, he was released. He wanted to run for office
and he became municipal president. Later, there was a law enacted stating that a
person declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property is
disqualified to vote. He applied for absolute pardon for him to be qualified. It was
granted. Petitoner argues that the pardon does not restore his political rights. The
court said it did and he was eligible to vote.
FACTS:
CFI found Teofilo C. Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six
months of arresto mayor and the accesories provided by law, to return to the offended
parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the amounts P375 and P125,
respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. He was confined in the provincial jail.
As to his civil liability consisting in the return of the two amounts aforestated, the
same was condoned by the complaints. Notwithstanding his conviction, Teofilo C.
Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and
was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipality of
Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated
as the municipal president of that municipality.
Later, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was
approved by the national Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies
the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against the property." In view of this provision, the respondent forth with applied
to the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939.
It was granted restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that
with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no
money or property responsibility."
It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by the President of the
Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondents
to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the
Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power
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here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative
function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accesory
penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
Issue: Whether or not the pardon restored the political rights of Santos- yes
Decision:
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:
(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in
cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as may be deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be
exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power does not
extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be
exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the disability is the
result of conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from voting.
Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who
violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the
pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction.
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in
the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical
or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute
insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." While
there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power does not
restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned judge below,
in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the
State and not in the hands of the Federal Government. Even then, there are cases to
the contrary. Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment
of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution,
and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
11. FLORENCIO PELOBELLO VS. GREGORIO PALATINO
GR NO. L-48100
June 20, 1941

BY: MANLANGIT
TOPIC: ABSOLUTE PARDON

FACTS:
● Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding against Palatino. Gregorio Palatino
is a public officer;
● In year 1912, Palatino was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
which carries a sentence of Prision Correcional (2 years and 4 months
imprisonment);
● 1915, Governor General granted Palatino a conditional pardon;
● He ran for public office. 1918-1921- he became a councilor; 1922-1931- he
served as municipal president for 3 terms; then 1940- he won the mayor post;
● Before palatino assume his office. President Manuel Quezon granted him an
absolute pardon;
● Pelobello questioned his right of suffrage and his right to be voted for because
of his prior conviction.
● He invoked Section 167 in relation to Section 94 of C.A 357.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Gregorio Palatino is eligible to run for public office? YES

HELD: The grant of ABSOLUTE PARDON removed the disqualification of a public

officer. It blots out his criminal offense and removes the defect. More so, it restores
both his civil and political rights. The purpose of granting him an absolute pardon was
to enable him to assume position in deference to the popular will. The pardon was
extended on the date mentioned before he assumed office.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
12. In Re Wilfredo Torres in his judgment shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole
2 SCRA 109 or suspension of sentence."
July 23,1987
BY: Martinez The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
TOPIC: Executive Branch pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

FACTS Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
● Sometime before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the CFI Manila of the and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
of from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day, Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 The maximum sentence would expire Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
on 2 November 2000. period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
● On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has
President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
law.”Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
● On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend
to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the
petitioner. The evidence before the Board showed petitioner had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa in which cases were then pending trial
before the RTC of Rizal and that petitioner had been convicted by the RTC of
Rizal of the crime of sedition.This conviction was then pending appeal before
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
● The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve
the unexpired portion of his sentence.
● Petitioner now impugns the validity of the recommitment. He claims that he
did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the twenty counts of estafa charged nor of the crime of sedition.
ISSUE:
W/N a conviction of crime by final judgement is needed to be recommitted?(NO)

HELD:
In Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran,
held that the determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro’s parole had been
breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that
such determination would not be reviewed by the courts.This Court relied upon Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General

"to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,

conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and
order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as
he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who,

13. Ampatuan et al. v. Hon Puno et al
G.R. No. 190259
June 07, 2011
BY: Mendoza
TOPIC: Executive Branch
QUICK SUMMARY: Petitioners challenges the constitutionality of the issuances of
President Arroyo alleging that it violates the principle of local autonomy and that there
is no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, the deployment of troops and
taking over of ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of her emergency powers. Issue
is WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out
the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.
FACTS:
• In 2009, after the Maguindanao massacre, the then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, pursuant to Proclamation 1946, placed the provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato under a State of
Emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in those provinces.
• Three (3) days later, Pres Gloria Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273
and Administrative Order 273-A which transfers the supervision of the ARMM
from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG).
• Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s autonomy,
petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan and all other ARMM officials, filed a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 contending that the proclamation and the
orders empowering the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and
regional govt’s powers, are in violation of the principle of Local Autonomy
under Republic Act 9054 also known as the Expanded ARMM Act and the
Constitution.
• They said that the President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise,
not only administrative supervision, but CONTROL over the ARMM. According
to them, this control includes the power to suspend and replace ARMM
officials.
• The petitioners also claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred.
• The deployment of the AFP and PNP and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the President's emergency powers.
• Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as the Administrative Orders
previously issued be declared unconstitutional.
OSG:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
• In its comment for the respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the
ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places.
• She issued the proclamation pursuant to her "calling out" power as
Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely
on her wisdom. She must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and
such best information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to
suppress and prevent lawless violence.
• Further, the President merely delegated through the Administrative Orders her
supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter
ego any way. These orders did not authorize a takeover of the ARMM. They
did not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials. The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.
Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide
for the exercise of emergency powers.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution,
and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers
when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City; and
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.
HELD:
1. Whether or not the issuances (Proclamation and AOs) violate the local autonomy.
NO.
ANS: NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
In fact, at that time, ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the
vacated post on December 10, 2009. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM
Vice-Governor. This goes to show that the there was no suspension and replacement
of ARMM Officials. They are able to select officials based on the autonomy of the
ARMM.
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. NO
1

ANS: No. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency
powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places
mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
SECTION 23.. . . (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority
to exercise the same.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence
network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential
or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if
it were to have any effect at all. x x x.”
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under
a state of emergency, it follows that the take-over of the entire ARMM by the DILG
Secretary had no basis too.

3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions. YES.

ANS: Yes. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment
on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of
the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court
said:

“If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible
to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.

2
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
14. LIM V. EXEC SECRETARY can observe and assess the performance of the AFP Forces
G.R. No. 151445/4.11.2002 8. US exercise participants shall not engage in combat, without prejudice to their
Ryan right of self-defense.
9. These terms of Reference are for purposes of this Exercise only and do not create
TOPIC: EXECUTIVE BRANCH; VFA additional legal obligations between the US Government and the Republic of the
PETITIONER: ARTHUR LIM and PAULINO ESRANDO Philippines.
RESPONDENTS: EXEC SECRETARY as alterego of PGMA and SND ANGELO II. EXERCISE LEVEL
REYES 1. TRAINING
PONENTE: DE LEON a. The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military assisting, advising and
FACTS: training of RP and US Forces with the primary objective of enhancing the
operational capabilities of both forces to combat terrorism.
1. The US armed forces (USAF) and the AFP took part in Balikatan in 2002, which is
b. At no time shall US Forces operate independently within RP territory.
a combined training. It simulates joint military maneuvers pursuant to the 1951
c. Flight plans of all aircraft involved in the exercise will comply with the local air traffic
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The last Balikatan was held in 1995.
regulations.
2. The time-gap was due to the lack of any formal agreement between USAF visiting
2. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS
PH. In the meantime, the 2 countries held scaled back joint exercise and the lack
a. RP and US participants shall be given a country and area briefing at the start of the
of consensus was concluded with the VFA in 1999.
Exercise. This briefing shall acquaint US Forces on the culture and sensitivities of
3. The ratio for the entry of USAF was due to the Bush-led US Anti-Terrorism
the Filipinos and the provisions of the VF A. The briefing shall also promote the full
Campaign after the 9/11 attacks. Petitioners, here assail the constitutionality of
cooperation on the part of the RP and US participants for the successful conduct
these joint exercises and were joined by 2 party-list orgs, SANLAKAS and PM, who
of the Exercise.
intervened in the case, saying they will be affected as the military operations will be
b. RP and US participating forces may share, in accordance with their respective laws
held in Mindanao which some of their members are based.
and regulations, in the use of their resources, equipment and other assets. They
4. SFA Teofisto Guingona presented the Draft Terms of Reference (DTOR) before the
will use their respective logistics channels.
Senate as reproduced below
c. Medical evaluation shall be jointly planned and executed utilizing RP and US assets
I. POLICY LEVEL
and resources.
1. The Exercise shall be consistent with the Philippine Constitution and all its activities
d. Legal liaison officers from each respective party shall be appointed by the Exercise
shall be in consonance with the laws of the land and the provisions of the RP-US
Directors.
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS
2. The conduct of this training Exercise is in accordance with pertinent United Nations
a. Combined RP-US Information Bureaus shall be established at the Exercise
resolutions against global terrorism as understood by the respective parties
Directorate in Zamboanga City and at GHQ, AFP in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
3. No permanent US basing and support facilities shall be established. Temporary
b. Local media relations will be the concern of the AFP and all public affairs guidelines
structures such as those for troop billeting, classroom instruction and messing may
shall be jointly developed by RP and US Forces.
be set up for use by RP and US Forces during the Exercise
c. Socio-Economic Assistance Projects shall be planned and executed jointly by RP
4. The Exercise shall be implemented jointly by RP and US Exercise Co-Directors under
and US Forces in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, and in
the authority of the Chief of Staff, AFP. In no instance will US Forces operate
consultation with community and local government officials.
independently during field training exercises (FTX). AFP and US Unit Commanders
5. Petitioners present the following arguments to invalidate such exercise:
will retain command over their respective forces under the overall authority of the
a. PH and US signed the 1951 MDT in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance
Exercise Co-Directors. RP and US participants shall comply with operational
in accordance with the 'constitutional processes' of each country only in the case
instructions of the AFP during the FTX
of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country against
5. The exercise shall be conducted and completed within a period of not more than six
one of them. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf
months, with the projected participation of 660 US personnel and 3,800 RP Forces.
bandits (ASG) in Basilan constitute an external armed force that has subject the
The Chief of Staff, AFP shall direct the Exercise Co-Directors to wind up and
PH to an armed external attack to warrant US military assistance under the MDT
terminate the Exercise and other activities within the six month Exercise period
of 1951.
6. The Exercise is a mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and training Exercise
b. Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize US soldiers to engage in combat
relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG, and will be conducted on the Island
operations in PH territory, not even to fire back "if fired upon".
of Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises shall be conducted in
6. ISSUES: –
Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related activities in Cebu will be for support
WoN the conduct of the Balikatan Exercises is within the ambit of the VFA – YES
of the Exercise.
WoN US troops may engage in combat in PH - NO
7. Only 160 US Forces organized in 12-man Special Forces Teams shall be deployed
RULING:
with AFP field, commanders. The US teams shall remain at the Battalion
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BALIKATAN EXERCISES
Headquarters and, when approved, Company Tactical headquarters where they

7. The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty
antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The MDT has been described as
the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally,
the United States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities
of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the
"Balikatan" is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT's
objectives. It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations thereunder
which it seeks to reaffirm.
8. It should be recalled that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of 11-3, the SC upheld the
validity of the VFA. It The VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "US
military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the PH in connection with
activities approved by the PH Government." It contains provisions relative to entry
and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal
jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft,
as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which
gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary
goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between US and PH military
forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.
9. The first question that should be addressed is whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered
by the VFA. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself but the SC
conceded that not much help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since the
terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA permits US
personnel to engage, on an temporary basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of
which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of
undertakings subject only to the approval of the PH government. The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United
States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other
words, are fair game.
10. To address this, the SC looked at the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties
Article 31 - General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ill accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the tenus of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the party .
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 :
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd unreasonable.
11. The cardinal rule of interpretation involves looking at the text which is presumed to
manifest parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as
aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty,
as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid
context. As explained by a writer on the Convention ,
THE DOTR FALLS WITHIN THE VFA’S CONTEXT
12. SC held that the “activities” contemplated in VFA was to pertain in a way to give
both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may
sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the
joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to
protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist
vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the
building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
13. With this, the VFA legitimizes the Balikatan exercises. It can be assumed falls under
the sanctioned activities in the context of the agreement. d training exercise," falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement. Both the history and intent of the MDT and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the
one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
14. Granted that Balikatan is allowed, may US forces engage in direct combat. The
DOTR was explicit enough in Section 1(8) that US forces may not engage in combat
except for self-defense.
15. SC noted that this sentiment, though admirable, is difficult to implement. The target
of Balikatan, the ASG, cannot reasonably be expected to sit idly while the battle is
brought to their very doorstep. They cannot be expected to pick and choose their
targets for they will not have the luxury of doing so. We state this point if only to
signify our awareness that the parties straddle a fine line, observing the honored
legal maxim "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum."
(No one can transfer to another a larger right than he himself has). The indirect
violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1 " is actually a
war principally conducted by the US government, and that the provision on self-
defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A
clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.
MDT/VFA DISALLOWS US TROOPS TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT IN PH
16. The UN Charter provides
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall
act in accordance with the following Principles.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

15. Harvey V. Defensor-Santiago
G.R. No. 82544. June 28, 1988
BY: Patiag
TOPIC: Executive Branch
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
▪ Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power.
▪ It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of
the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed
itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]).
Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
QUICK SUMMARY
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three months close surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension 17
opted for self-deportation, one released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by
another offense, working without a valid working visa. Thus, three was left to face the
deportation proceedings. Seized during petitioners’ apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute shown in salacious poses as
well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. There were also posters and other
literatures advertising the child prostitution. Warrant of arrest was issued by
respondent against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration
act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative Code. SC said (see doctrine FOR THE
EXECUTIVE RULING and Ratio for the specific ruling on criminal procedure)
FACTS:
• American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years,
respectively, and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen, are all residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission
Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended
petitioners at their residences.
• The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two
young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room.
While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of
ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
some time now.
• Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and
photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys
and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child
prostitutes were also found.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
• Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who
were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
• Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against
petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID denied.
• Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to
a self-deportation” and praying that he be “provisionally released for at least 15
days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs
the country.” However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid
Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed
the present petition.
• Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the
Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral
argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners
to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any
authority to arrest and detained petitioner pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause
HELD:
YES.
▪ The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons, including aliens,
whether accused of a crime or not.
▪ One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
is that it must be based upon probable cause.
▪ The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were
monitored.
▪ The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
▪ But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its
inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed
against them, as undesirable aliens.
▪ That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
▪ Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with
John Sherman being naked.
▪ Under those circumstances, the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion
involving children.
▪ The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in
accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation
to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The requirement of probable
cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.”
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
▪ What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the
assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by
competent evidence.
▪ The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also
challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to
bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation proceedings do not
partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may
not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
▪ Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power.
▪ It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of
the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed
itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]).
Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
17. In the same breath, both the MDT/VFA must be read in context of our Constitution.
Though the MDT preexisted the Constitution, it still remains valid as a source of int’l
obligation. In the Declaration of Policies, to wit;
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self- determination.
SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a
policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.
THE CONSTITUTION REGULATES FOREIGN RELATIONS POWERS OF THE
EXECUTIVE
18. The Constitution provides that “no treaty or int’l agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred 2/3 of all Senate members. To add, the Transitory
Provisions provide
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
19. This evinces PH’s antipathy towards foreign military presence or influence hence
US troops are allowed entry in PH only by way of exception.
20. In Philip Morris Inc v CA, the fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied
in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior,
to national legislation.
21. From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal
law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."
Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." But our Constitution adopts the
opposing view as the SC may review the constitutionality of any treaty as provided
in Sec. 5, Art VIII.
22. In jurisprudence, SC ruled that treaty provisions are always subject to qualification
or amendment by subsequent law or subject to the State’s police power.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and
substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.

16. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS V. JUNG KEUN PARK
G.R. No. 159835
January 21, 2010
BY: Ramos, V
TOPIC: Executive Branch; Deportation of undesirable aliens
QUICK SUMMARY
When Park’s passport was cancelled by the Korean government, he was arrested and
deported to Korea by the BID. When he re-entered the Philippines without a valid
passport, he was indicted for violating the Philippine Immigration Act and the BID
issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against him after finding that he indeed
violated said law. Park argues that the SDO violated his right to due process because
there was no full-blown hearing.
SC: The BID Office Memorandum Order No. 19 on Summary Deportation lists aliens
with cancelled passports to be covered under Summary Deportation Proceedings.
Thus, Park’s case was properly heard as one for summary deportation, and a full-blown
deportation hearing was not necessary.
FACTS:
● Sometime in 2000, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received
a letter dated July 6, 2000 (July 6, 2000 letter) from Gyung Taek Cha,
Consul/Police Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila,
requesting the BID's assistance and cooperation in deporting Park as he was
purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea for which a warrant for his arrest
had been issued by the Korean Police. The letter also stated that Park's
Korean Passport No. NW0057145 had been cancelled on March 8, 2000
and no other passport had been issued to him since.
● Acting on this July 6, 2000 letter, the BID officials arrested Park and deported
him to Korea on July 24, 2000.
● On October 28, 2000, Park returned to the Philippines, entering via
Zamboanga City from Malaysia, aboard the Sampaguita Ferry 2. Believing
that Park re-entered the country without a valid passport, the BID again
arrested Park on December 11, 2000 and, through a Charge Sheet dated
December 22, 2000, indicted him for violating Section 37(a)(7) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended (Immigration Act).
● On the very same date that Park was indicted, the BID issued a Summary
Deportation Order (SDO) against Park after finding that he had indeed
violated the Immigration Act. Accordingly, the BID ordered Park to be
deported, imposed upon him administrative fines and fees, and included him
in its Blacklist.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
● To secure his provisional release pending deportation, Park filed on January
19, 2001 a Petition for Bail. Park also claimed that he should no longer be
considered an undocumented alien because (a) he had been issued a Travel
Certificate by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila that was valid
from January 16, 2001 up to June 19, 2001, and (b) he was a holder of a
Special Investor's Resident Visa (SIRV).
● About six months after the BID issued the SDO, Park filed a motion to have it
set aside. Park assailed the BID's SDO and October 15, 2001 Resolution,
through a certiorari petition filed before the CA.
● Park claimed that he had been denied of his right to due process, since no
hearing of his case was conducted before the BID’s Board of Special Inquiry
or the Board of Commissioners; the SDO was in fact issued on the same day
that the Charge Sheet was filed.
● In its Decision dated June 13, 2002, the CA found Park's certiorari petition
meritorious. BID filed to the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SDO was issued in violation of Park’s right to due process, under
Section 37(c) of the Immigration Act, which reads:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed
by the Commissioner of Immigration.
HELD:
No. All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas
prior to their admission into the Philippines under Section 10 of the Immigration Act:
Section 10. Non-immigrants must present for admission into the Philippines
unexpired passports or official documents in the nature of passports issued by
the governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel
documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, and valid
passport visas granted by diplomatic or consular officers, except that such
document shall not be required of the following aliens: (a) a child qualifying as a non-
immigrant, born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of the accompanying
parent, the visa not having expired; and (b) a seaman qualifying as such under section
(9) of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Park was indicted for violating this requirement because when he returned to the
Philippines on October 28, 2000, he used his Passport No. NW0057145 - a
passport that had already been cancelled according to the Korean Embassy's
July 6, 2000 letter. At the time Park was indicted, there was no official document
repudiating the July 6, 2000 letter. Park did not present other competent proofs that his
Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled. In deportation proceedings, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW | SUNGA
alien bears the burden of proving that he entered the Philippines lawfully. We do not
believe that Park was able to discharge this burden by belatedly presenting a
photocopy of his Passport No. NW0057145 that bore stamp marks of the date of his
arrival in and departure from Malaysia, just days before his return to the country. In all
his pleadings before the BID and the CA, he never mentioned this prior Malaysian trip,
and he conveniently excused the presentation of his Passport No. NW0057145 by
claiming he had misplaced/lost it. Since the authenticity of the arrival and departure
stamp marks in Park's Passport No. NW0057145 had not been passed upon by either
the BID or the CA, we cannot accord it weight and credence.

We likewise do not agree with Park’s claim that his case should be heard under the
regular deportation proceedings where a full hearing is required before the BID’s Board
of Special Inquiry. Section 1, Rule X of the Deportation Rules states that:

Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien is
overstaying or expiration of his passport. In such case, the Board of Special Inquiry
shall merely require the presentation of the alien’s valid passport and shall submit the
appropriate recommendation on the bases thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]

Park was charged for having a cancelled passport, which theoretically is equivalent to
an expired passport – in either case, the alien does not possess the valid passport
required under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. The July 6, 2000 letter in fact stated
that "Park’s Korean Passport No. NW0057145 has been expired and cancelled." The
BID Office Memorandum Order No. 19 on Summary Deportation lists aliens with
cancelled passports to be covered under Summary Deportation Proceedings. Thus,
Park’s case was properly heard as one for summary deportation, and a full-blown
deportation hearing was not necessary.