Garcia seems to have a controversial past that's easy to find on the internet, and it's unclear why York
York County Prison hires controversial contractor C-SAU
for $120,000
ydr.com/story/news/watchdog/2021/05/17/york-county-prison-c-sau-corrections-special-operations-contractor-joseph-
garcia-tactical-weapons/5077223001
Dylan Segelbaum
York Daily Record
Prisoners wearing unmarked orange jumpsuits stand facing the wall while handcuffed in a gym.
"Ready, Steady, Go," an electronic dance music song by Paul Oakenfold, blares over the footage.
The video appears to have been shot with a GoPro-style camera, which is positioned on the back of a
giant schnauzer wearing some sort of tactical vest. “Senior Team Leader” Joseph Garcia posted the
flashy promotional clip on his Facebook page, along with a verse from the Bible, Romans 3:23, “for all
have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.”
The timestamp in the bottom left-hand corner of the video reads 8:07 a.m. on March 31, 2021.
That’s the same date and time when, two people who are incarcerated at York County Prison told the
York Daily Record/Sunday News, corrections officers took them out of their cells, handcuffed them and
made them face the wall for several hours in the gym.
Later, the prisoners reported, a man who was leading the guards instructed them to ready and aim their
weapons.
"It's definitely something that I've never in my life been exposed to, and unfortunately, I've been in and
out of prison for over 23 years," said Christopher Schwenk, 50, of York, who’s being held on $100,000
bail while he awaits trial on felony drug and firearms charges.
When a reporter asked a spokesperson for York County about the video, it was deleted off Garcia's
Facebook page less than 30 minutes later.
In November, the York County commissioners unanimously approved a $122,850 contract with
Garcia’s company, CSAU-1 LLC, a “corrections special operations” organization that’s based in
Greenville, South Carolina. The acronym stands for Corrections Special Applications Unit.
The agreement calls for the business to provide equipment including Kel-Tec KSG tactical, pump-action
shotguns, "less lethal rounds," "COVID-19 Chem Agent" and “confidential training” for up to 18
corrections officers, according to a copy of the document obtained through a Right-to-Know Law
request.
The contract further states that C-SAU “agrees to provide support and to defend ‘York County’ and York
County Prison and any of its Corrections Officers, agents, or employees in any litigation, disputes, or
arguments regarding the training tactics, and use of force application by providing expert witness
testimony and guidance as needed.”
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County decided to award the business a six-figure contract.
His former company, U.S. Corrections Special Operations Group, came under scrutiny for its work at
Rikers Island in New York City.
And though they’re not named as defendants in the case, Garcia and C-SAU are mentioned more than
60 times in a civil rights lawsuit that’s pending in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The
complaint asserts that, at the Weld County jail, he helped teach and implement the Special Operations
Group, which “functions as a militarized combat force trained to intimidate, terrorize, and brutalize
people.”
Garcia could not be reached for comment.
The former warden of York County Prison, Clair Doll, who was in that position when the jail entered
into the contract, also could not be reached. He is now executive director of the York County Human
Services Department.
“It is our position that we do not comment on any matters that relate to security inside of our facility,”
Interim Warden Adam Ogle said in an email, “so I cannot offer a comment at this time.”
‘I was scared to death’
Schwenk and his cousin, James Thompson, 36, of York, who was also incarcerated on felony drug and
firearms charges before being transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, knew
something was up when their cell doors did not open as usual at 6 a.m.
Next, the two heard a commotion coming from a nearby pod.
Corrections officers, they said, strip-searched them, took them to the gym and made them face the wall
for several hours while handcuffed. The prisoners weren't sure what precipitated the action.
Toward the end, the cousins said, a man they believed was a private contractor told corrections officers
to ready and aim their weapons. He had a dog with him.
Schwenk said the man told the prisoners that the corrections officers were going to take the handcuffs
off. He stated that the team would use deadly force if anyone moved in the slightest.
At one point, Schwenk said, he was fearful of getting shot. “I was scared to death. It just didn't make
any sense to me."
Thompson said the prisoners were not sure if the shotguns were loaded with pellets or beanbags or
rubber bullets. He said “nothing we did called for the threat that was made.”
“Nothing that was done in this institution recently, let alone not ever, called for them to be walking
around with these weapons,” Thompson said.
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In 2020, York County Prison saw five instances when prisoners assaulted staff members, according to
statistics that counties reported to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Meanwhile, Dauphin
County reported 50 assaults. Lancaster County detailed 12 cases.
But York County detailed more instances of use of force in multiple categories, according to the data.
The Pennsylvania Prison Society, a nonprofit organization that advocates for humane conditions in jails
and prisons, sent a letter expressing concerns about the March 31 incident.
Claire Shubik-Richards and Noah Barth, executive director and prison monitoring director of the
Pennsylvania Prison Society, respectively, wrote on April 21 that the two realized there are some
discrepancies in accounts about what happened.
But there is agreement, the letter states, that York County Prison staff members led an exercise during
which about 40 people were removed from their cells, handcuffed, taken to the gym, and made to stand
facing the wall for several hours. Shubik-Richards and Barth said loaded “less lethal” weapons were
pointed at the prisoners, and a dog was present.
Several people who called the society, though, thought the weapons were “loaded firearms with live
rounds.” The letter states that one prisoner reported that a guard advised that “if they moved, the
officers would use deadly force and be able to justify it.”
“We are deeply concerned for the welfare of the people forced to participate in this incident, their
neighbors inside of York County Prison, and their families and loved ones outside of the prison,”
Shubik-Richards and Barth said. “We are also concerned for the future ability of the facility to meet the
needs of individuals incarcerated there.”
York County President Commissioner Julie Wheeler said what happened was not a training exercise —
there had been a real issue with security — but she declined to go into further detail.
The Pennsylvania Prison Society, she said, is set to visit York County Prison on Thursday.
“Of the most serious allegations that were made, I can say that they are false," Wheeler said.
She declined to specify what allegations were “the most serious.”
Garcia posted another video on his Facebook that appears to show the same event inside the gym.
The clip depicts a group of prisoners sitting handcuffed against the wall, while some corrections officers
who appear to have tactical weapons move across the frame. “Sweet Emotion” by Aerosmith plays over
the scene.
A giant schnauzer again makes an appearance.
When a reporter asked Garcia on Facebook why he posted a video of prisoners, presumably without
their knowledge, to promote his own brand, he did not respond.
York County Solicitor Michélle Pokrifka denied a Right-to-Know Law request for surveillance video,
writing in a letter, "The requested record is maintained by the agency in connection with a public
protection activity that if disclosed would be reasonably likely to jeopardize or threaten personal
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security and public safety and protection activities of the County."
The York Daily Record has appealed the decision to the Office of Open Records.
No-bid contract in New York City
Before C-SAU, Garcia's former company was called U.S. Corrections Special Operations Group, which
did business as Ops Groups LLC and had been registered in Williamsburg, Virginia, according to court
documents.
In 2016, the New York City Department of Correction awarded a $1.1 million no-bid contract to U.S.
Corrections Special Operations Group to provide training at Rikers Island.
The contract later drew scrutiny.
The New York City Department of Investigation launched an inquiry, which found that the agency did
not follow all relevant city procurement rules for the agreement, according to documents obtained
through a Freedom of Information Law request.
The investigation determined that a number of allegations were unsubstantiated. But it’s unclear what
claims were not founded because they’re redacted in the records.
The inquiry, though, was specific to certain allegations. For instance, documents state, the department
did not look into the curriculum that Garcia taught to the Emergency Services Unit.
‘A militaristic battle force similar to Army Special Forces or Navy
SEALS’
In 2020, a man who was a student at the University of Colorado at Boulder filed a lawsuit against a
number of people including Weld County Sheriff Steve Reams.
C-SAU and Garcia are not named as defendants. But the lawsuit references them more than 60 times,
asserting the sheriff hired him to help implement “unconstitutional policies and training” that are
“contrary to any legitimate penal justification, contrary to appropriate standards in the detention
setting, and extremely dangerous and unnecessary.”
The man was placed in a “detox hold” and later brought to the Weld County North Jail Complex and
detained for "unclear reasons" on June 23, 2018. The lawsuit states that he was not charged with a
crime.
Deputies later fired multiple “concussion explosives” from shotguns in his direction and “smashed his
face into the floor while he lay face-down and helpless,” the lawsuit alleges. The man suffered a
concussion, hemorrhaging in the left eye and a large gash on his forehead.
Garcia, the lawsuit asserts, has aggressively pushed the use of military tactics and weapons in the
corrections setting. The complaint describes the concept as “a militaristic battle force similar to Army
Special Forces or Navy SEALS, but with a twist.”
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In Weld County, Garcia trained and encouraged staff members to employ "intimidation, harassment,
aggression, threats of violence, physical violence, and weaponry, to terrify pretrial detainees and other
inmates in the jail," the lawsuit claims.

“Joseph Garcia strives to keep his unconstitutional training and policies secretive, as evidenced by
public statements falsely claiming his practices are ‘classified,’ when in fact they involve matters of
grave public concern,” the lawsuit reads. “However, aspects of his training have been leaked publicly.”

The lawsuit describes several additional incidents, including one that a prisoner reported took place in
about 2018.

The prisoner, Nicholas Bateman, asserted that Garcia conducted an operation during which all the
guards came into a unit and ordered everyone to put their hands against the wall.

Next, Bateman claimed, the Special Operations Group ordered the prisoners to form a single-file line
and escorted them out with shotguns and dogs. Then, the corrections officers “put the inmates against
the wall and took photos of themselves standing together like soldiers with the inmates huddled up and
afraid,” the lawsuit alleges.

That's a similar scenario to the one that the prisoners described at York County Prison.

U.S. District Judge William J. Martínez recently denied most of a motion to dismiss the case.

Joe Moylan, a spokesperson for the Weld County Sheriff’s Office, said he could not comment on the
lawsuit.

Moylan said the sheriff’s office hired Garcia as a contractor to provide training to deputies.

“Once we were made aware of his tactics, we did cut ties with him,” Moylan said.

The sheriff’s office, he said, has “no intention” of ever working with Garcia again.

Contact Dylan Segelbaum at 717-771-2102.

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EXECUTIVE ACTION: 6596-21

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� Paid by Voucher (OS)
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Use of Force Analysis
related to the death of
Jamal Sutherland
in the
Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center
Charleston County Sheriff’s Office
Charleston, South Carolina
July 24, 2021
Summary
In about 2008, the Charleston County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) made the decision to contract
tactical training for the jail to a vendor who taught highly aggressive tactics. The evidence shows
the CCSO believed they were having too many staff and inmate injuries during forcible cell
extractions with their existing tactical team and the vendor promised to reduce those.
The vendor renamed the SACDC tactical team the Special Operations Group (SOG) and brought
them tactics that emphasized the use of weapons and intimidation to gain compliance from
detainees.
The SOG operated under this outsourced training until about the end of 2018 when the SACDC
became unsatisfied with the vendor’s practices and behaviors. The training contract ended and in
2019 the SACDC began providing the training with internal instructors. The aggressive tactics
and the presence of weapons continued.
By the time of the event with Sutherland, the practice of the SACDC was that only SOG members
were to be involved in forcible cell extractions. However, the number of SOG members had
dwindled and there were often only one or two people available each shift.
Additionally, the custom and practice of the SACDC was to forcibly compel a detainee’s
attendance at any Bond Court hearing even though that violated SACDC policy.
On January 4, 2021, Jamal Sutherland was arrested at the Palmetto Lowcountry Behavior Health
facility in North Charleston for striking a staff member. Sutherland was taken to the SACDC for
booking but was uncooperative. He was placed into an isolation cell in the Behavioral Management
Unit.
On January 5, 2021, at about 9:00 AM Sutherland was scheduled to appear in Bond Court but he
refused to cooperate. The on-duty jail commander followed the long-standing custom and practice
that Sutherland should be forced to appear in Bond Court in person. Deputy Brian Houle was the
only SOG member on duty so he was summoned to help. Houle asked Sergeant Lindsay Fickett
to help because she had several years of experience in SOG, even though she had left the team
when she was transferred to a housing assignment in about October 2020.
4 5
July 24, 2021
Solicitor Scarlett Wilson
Ninth Circuit Solicitor’s Office
Charleston, South Carolina
Solicitor Wilson:
You have asked for opinions on generally accepted jail practices as they pertain to the tragic death
of Jamal Sutherland. There was ample evidence in this case for me to confidently form those
opinions and reach conclusions as to whether the actions, policy, training, supervision and general
practice of the Sheriff Al Cannon Detention Center (SACDC), and its employees, conformed to
standards and generally accepted jail policy, training and practices regarding the death of Jamal
Sutherland. Additionally, there was ample evidence regarding the effect of these matters on the
involved deputies.
I have relied upon my education, training and experience to form these opinions, which includes:
� 31 years in a career with the Ada County Sheriff’s Office in Boise, Idaho where the jail
was similarly sized to the SACDC.
� 10 years as the elected sheriff Ada County, Idaho.
� 7 years serving as a US Attorney General’s appointment to the National Institute of
Corrections – the leading federal agency in corrections policy and practice.
� Appointments by two federal courts to monitor Consent Decrees in jails regarding the
unreasonable use of force.
� Master’s degree in criminal justice administration from Boise State University
� Graduate of the FBI National Academy, FBI National Executive Institute, FBI Law
Enforcement Education and Development Seminar, FBI Command College, Northwestern
University School of Police Staff & Command, National Sheriffs Institute and others.
� Analysis and review of over 50 controversial incidents across the United States, mostly
involving the use of force and in-custody deaths.
Sutherland continued to refuse to submit to handcuffing, so Fickett and Houle eventually used
oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray), their electronic control weapons (commonly referred to as a
TASER) and physical force to help gain control of Sutherland. After an intense struggle, Fickett
and Houle were able to control Sutherland, handcuff him and bring him out of the cell. As they
began putting him into an emergency restraint chair, they noticed he was unresponsive. Medical
staff were present and provided treatment, but Sutherland died.
This analysis relied upon evidence obtained from the CCSO, the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (SLED), the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Axon (TASER).
It is worth noting that the CCSO apparently had great difficulty locating and producing much of
the evidence in this case, causing significant delays. Additionally, there was a considerable
amount of evidence that would have been available and considered in most cases but was
apparently not retained and available from the CCSO.
 Summary of Major Conclusions History of SACDC’s Tactical Response Team

Fickett and Houle’s actions contributed to the death of Sutherland. However, the SACDC customs, The contemplation of criminal charges against Fickett or Houle should consider how the deputies
practices, training, and lack of policy and capable supervision were significantly responsible for were trained, supervised and governed by policy. While the following does not directly relate to
the situation itself and the actions the deputies took. The most tragic finding is that this event was the events of January 5, 2021, it is very relevant as to how Fickett and Houle came to be in the
unnecessary and only happened because of the failures of leadership in the SACDC. incident and what the SACDC custom and practice was.

Specific findings: Lieutenant Tyrone Shaw had long been involved in SOG and was one of the key leaders throughout
the vendor’s contract and then when the SACDC took charge of their own training. He said that
1. The SACDC had adopted dangerous and unproven tactics for cell extractions.
prior to about 2008, the SACDC used five-person deputy teams for forcible cell extractions, but
2. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff in mental health awareness and practices.
staff and detainee injuries were frequent. There was no evidence in the record that showed the
3. The SACDC failed to provide a sufficient number of deputies to safely conduct a cell
numbers of injuries SACDC was experiencing. There was also no evidence of their tactics to know
extraction.
if poor training may have contributed to the injuries. Four to six person teams are common for
4. The SACDC failed to train and reinforce de-escalation techniques to avoid the use of force.
jails the size of the SACDC and most operate with only a minimal frequency of injuries to staff or
5. The SACDC commander ordered Sutherland to be forcibly taken to Bond Court without
detainees.
cause and in violation of SACDC policy.
6. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff on waiting periods after the use of OC. Contract with Untested Vendor
7. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff on limiting the number of TASER deployments
In about 2008, SACDC Chief Willis Beatty contracted with a private vendor, to redesign the
by a single individual and precautions against simultaneous deployments.
training and tactics for the SACDC tactical response team. There was no evidence as to why the
8. The SACDC failed to adequately train staff on the precautions against compressional and
vendor was chosen or what his qualifications were. The vendor renamed the Emergency Response
positional asphyxia.
Team the Special Operations Group (SOG). The training sought to form a specialized group of
9. The SACDC had an unreasonable custom and practice of always putting a spit hood over
deputies that would serve as a full-time tactical team within the jail. SOG members were called
the head of someone who had been the subject of force.
“operators” rather than deputies and wore tactical clothing, including loadbearing vests. They also
10. The SACDC ranking staff failed to adequately supervise the line staff, allowing customs
adopted a practice, unheard of in most jails, that the SOG members routinely carried tactical 12-
and practices that were dangerous and in violation of SACDC policies.
gauge shotguns loaded with less lethal munitions, regardless of whether there was an immediate
11. The SACDC failed to establish proper policies that governed weapons and uses of force.
need for them or not. Probably most significant to this event, the vendor changed the number of
deputies involved in an extraction to only two, and sometimes one.

It is highly unusual for a jail the size of Charleston County to have a full-time tactical team and it
is virtually unheard of for anyone to routinely carry firearms inside a jail. The SACDC website
reports a physical capacity of 1,693 detainees. Most jails of this size have a tactical team but call
on them as needed from the ranks of deputies who are otherwise involved in routine duties such

6 7

as supervising housing units, intake processing, transportation, etc. When called upon, those jail when a SOG operator may not be able to don their gas mask. The vendor said it was to make
deputies often don protective gear and obtain equipment and weapons as needed. The only sure the candidate would be able to have good use of force decision-making and to see if they
evidence about the frequency of violence or resistance in the SACDC was that on average there could maintain their mental composure and professionalism under stress.
was a cell extraction every few weeks to few months. This is consistent with similarly sized jails
The second video clip (a screenshot
and does not explain the need for the SOG.
shown at right) began about 45 minutes
The vendor began teaching aggressive tactics, emphasizing the use of weapons and physical force. later and showed Fickett, already
The evidence included verbal and printed statements emphasizing humane treatment, force doused in OC, as the vendor shouted
avoidance and similar practices, but the evidence did not show that those practices were part of questions and “whooped” loudly while
the curriculum. In fact, the evidence suggests just the opposite – that the SOG was taught emptying two riot control-sized
aggression and intimidation as a way to avoid resistance. canisters of OC at her. During this, there
was nothing that would demonstrate any
The SACDC did not possess or retain any of the training objectives or lesson plans for the SOG
test of her use of force decision making
training. In fact, it appears the only written materials used for training was a schedule and
or anything other than the tolerance of unnecessary pain and discomfort. This excessive OC
PowerPoint slides, but the students were not given copies of the slides. According to Shaw, the
exposure did not meet any legitimate jail training objective, nor did it accomplish what the vendor
vendor claimed his training materials were “classified”. Furthermore, there was no policy, written
said it was intended for.
procedure or testing to select and certify SOG deputies. Certification was solely at the discretion
of the vendor. The third video clip started a few
minutes later with someone narrating
Failing to review, approve and retain records of training, especially high-liability training, violates
that each of the two candidates (Fickett
generally accepted law enforcement practices. It is critical for an agency to know what their
and another) had by then been exposed
deputies are being taught and as will be explained in more detail, the absence of that in the CCSO
to two grenades (presumably OC), and
is shocking. It is also important to provide reference material to trainees and the SACDC failed to
six cannisters of OC. Both candidates
do so.
were then brought back before the

As evidence of the SOG training trickled in from the CCSO for this analysis, the SACDC practices group. It is clear that both were in
became more and more concerning. Three videos emerged, likely from around 2011 of the vendor distress from the immense amount of

leading training sessions where two deputies, one being Fickett, were the subject of what can only OC to which they had been exposed.

be called hazing. Six other SACDC deputies were also present and appeared to be the existing Some of the deputies present told the candidates they should quit, but they refused. Again, this

SOG team, or part of it. In the first video the vendor refers to himself as a “Senior Team Leader” was clearly a hazing exercise and had no legitimate training purpose. The vendor gave each of the

and appears to narrate for the benefit of the video camera saying they were going to test the two a fresh canister of OC and had them face off at each other. He then asked them a series of

candidate’s ability to deal with stress. He went on to explain that there would be an oleoresin questions and, per his instructions, they replied by yelling, “No, I will not!” while discharging the
capsicum (OC), commonly known as pepper spray, exposure to simulate a potential event in the

8 9
OC canister into the other candidate’s face. Once those canisters were empty, the vendor sprayed
three more canisters into the faces of the candidates.
I do not have sufficient words to describe how ridiculous this was. The unnecessary and excessive
exposure to OC can cause respiratory, skin, eye and other medical issues. I am not versed in South
Carolina’s hazing, torture, assault and similar statutes, but the vendor’s actions may have
amounted to criminal conduct.
While some of the vendor’s verbalizations and written statements emphasized force avoidance,
there was no evidence of meaningful de-escalation or avoidance training in the SOG training.
Fickett later said SOG training was a lot of physical work – carrying things, lifting things, running,
tactics, weapons manipulation and some “combatives.” She said they were pepper sprayed once
a week or more when the vendor ran the training. She was also clear that there was no meaningful
SOG training on de-escalation techniques, even when she later became an SOG instructor. A
training flyer from the vendor’s company for a 5-day SOG course listed 17 training topics but none
were related to de-escalation or force avoidance.
Two documents in the evidence appeared to be PowerPoint slide printouts from the vendor’s
training. There was no indication of the timeframe the slides were created or used – or if they were
even used to train SACDC deputies. When compared against generally accepted jail training
practices, the PowerPoint slides were seriously insufficient to instruct and direct deputies how to
avoid the use of force, judge when and how much force to use, or how to recognize unreasonable
force, etc. Examples include:
� The slides included broad, sometimes confusing statements, like “However, operational
pause should be given when consideration about using the necessary force on in [sic]
inmate.”
� In the slides addressing mentally ill detainees, the instruction discussed various weapons
to use but failed to address when they are appropriate.
� Some slides provided clinical explanations or behavioral patterns of mental health
disorders, while another slide entitled “Profiling Inmates” seemed to suggest deputies
should identify whether a detainee is bipolar, schizophrenic, has “manic depressive
disorders” or is “mentally retarded.” I am not qualified to evaluate the psychological
accuracy of the vendor’s slides, but generally accepted correctional training recognizes that
deputies are not qualified to differentiate these disorders. Moreover, the terminology used
is clearly inappropriate.
At the same time, there were elements of the PowerPoints that were applicable to the event
involving Sutherland. Examples include:
� Instruction to know the mental health history of inmates.
o “When dealing with the mentally ill, we do not resort to using an ECD (Taser)
without first offering options, issuing commands and when safe or reasonable,
attempting physical skills.”
o Regarding mentally ill detainees: “Extreme caution should be given when
attempting to use physical control techniques. Mentally ill inmates have a tendency
of posing a high level of pain tolerance and have demonstrated extra human
strength.”
� Instruction to be aware of an inmate’s situation.
o “Reframe [sic] from using OC to gain compliance as it will only exacerbate the
situations further.”
o “Inmates that have been exposed to OC have a propensity not to listen to verbal
instructions as they are pushed further into a mental state.”
� Direction for conducting dynamic cell extractions.
o “Have multiple plans worked out.”
o “Don’t be afraid to reset, close the door and re-access [sic].”
In the document, there were about 17 pages labeled Student Handout & Study Guide however
many of the pages contained no instructional information and the testimonial evidence showed the
students were not provided any handout materials.
In-house SOG Training and Tactics
By 2018 the vendor’s reputation and business practices had come into question. Four SOG
members wrote statements about the training. The complaints centered on the vendor’s bias, poor
training of new recruits, use of CCSO time and personnel for personal marketing materials and

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serious inconsistencies in training. A senior SOG leader wrote, “The command staff have been significant deficiencies for dealing with the mentally ill, de-escalation practices, tactics and safety
aware of all these issues with trainings, his uncontrollable canines attacking officers, his language and the actual applications of force. While it appears the SACDC envisioned a highly trained and
etc. for some years now. It has placed a serious drop in morale on the SOG team. It has even competent tactical team, the evidence in this case demonstrates insufficient staffing, training and
hindered the amount of new officers willing to come out to training because they know that they supervision and a fundamental lack of competency. SACDC sanctioned and continued rogue
will have to bear the burden of dealing with the inconsistencies that come with [the vendor] and practices with the SOG training and failed to address policy violations and poor practices. This is
SOG training.” Another deputy wrote, “Many of the command staff who would stay in the indefensible and a fundamental cause of why the events unfolded prior to Sutherland’s death.
trainings for minutes, we felt would not stay or attend for long because many of the trainings did
not fit the policy of this detention center. So why then, where [sic] the staff of this detention center
being placed under such a strain? Placed under a training program that would not be utilized and
went against the policy of the detention center.” The deputy went on to say, “SOG operators were
basically told by command staff after [the vendor’s] trainings were over, forget what he has trained
and stick to policy. That has placed a strain on Operators…. [the vendor] is known for directing
an operator to go tactical one-way and five minutes to an hour later he will tell another operator
that’s not the way he wants it done.”

The contract between the CCSO and the vendor ended sometime in early 2019 and CCSO brought
the training in-house. By this time, Shaw had been promoted to lieutenant and Fickett had been
promoted to sergeant, and they took primary responsibility for revising and delivering the new, in-
house, SOG training. Much of the philosophy and confrontational tactics carried over into the new
training; however, Fickett said that much of the vendor’s training “…was more extreme than what
our policy allows” so they aligned it more closely with CCSO and SACDC policy. Still, no one
created any standardized objectives, lesson plans or training handouts that documented what was
taught and ensured consistency between SOG members. Fickett said that when policies changed
that affected SOG operation, they would simply adopt them by word-of-mouth.

When recently asked about de-escalation training, Fickett said, “From the amount of time that we
had and the amount of stuff that we had to cover, and none of us are really de-escalation trainers,
and we just didn’t even think to add it in. It was like, we have so much time for this much topics,
it wouldn’t — didn’t even cross our mind at all.”

The training practices used by the SACDC seriously failed to conform with generally accepted jail
practices. While more will be discussed on the topic later in this report, the evidence shows

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