Man-Made Hazard Disaster Risk Management

– Understanding Prevention and

Preparedness in contributing to the Sendai
Framework

MARK HAILWOOD

SECTION 31 – AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY

 Disaster Risk Management
 Man-Made Hazards are part of the Sendai Framework
 For the first time:
Natural disaster risks
Humanitarian disaster risks, and
Man-Made disaster risks

are covered in one Disaster Risk Management Framework!

 Challenges for Success
 For Disaster Risk Management to be successful across all disaster
fields there is a need to develop common understandings and
appreciation of differences for:
Terminology
Concepts associated with the use of the terminology
Approaches to effective Disaster Risk Management.

 Currently there are differences in approaches and differences in

concepts. This can lead to misunderstanding and failure to
communicate effectively.
 Natural and Humanitarian Disasters
 Mitigation of consequences towards reduction of magnitude:
e.g. pumping strategies and sand sack deployment to defend a
location against flooding

 Response to needs occurring as a result of particular

consequences:
e.g. temporary accommodation, heavy lifting equipment, emergency
drinking water supplies, emergency health care facilities

 Planning and strategies to be able to fulfil these two requirements:

National, regional planning, international networks, lists and databases
of resources, structures to trigger activities and activate resources
 Major Chemical Accident Risk Management
 Major Chemical Accident Risk Management (part of the field of
Man-Made Hazards):
Has existed for over 40 years.
Has developed extensive experience at local, national and
international level.
Experience is documented in policies, regulations, standards, as well
as research published in journals and shared at conferences.

 However major chemical accidents still happen.

01.01.2013 -> Datum über <Einfügen>, <Kopf- und Fußzeile> ändern Folie 5
 Major Chemical Accidents / Disasters
Feyzin, France 1966 Fire and explosion of an LPG storage in a
refinery,

Flixborough, UK 1974 Fire and explosion of a 30 t release of

cyclohexane, 28 killed, 89 injured

Seveso, Italy 1976 Release of contents of a chemical reactor,

contamination of several km² with contents
including ca. 2 kg TCDD (Dioxin), evacuation
of 5700 people, numerous cases of chlor-acne
Bhopal, India 1984 Release of a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate
from a storage tank, > 3000 killed, > 170000
injured, the site is still contaminated
Schweizerhalle, 1986 Fire in a warehouse storing pesticides. 10000
Basle, CH m³ contaminated fire-fighting water containing
30 tonnes of chemicals released to Rhine.
Major disruption to drinking water supply,
ecological damage over 500 km.
 Major Chemical Accidents / Disasters (2)
Baia Mare, 2000 Collapse of a dam at a tailings pond released
Romania 100000 m³ liquid conatinin 50 – 100 tonnes of
cyanides and heavy metals to the Somes,
Tisza and Danube rivers (ca 2000 km river
pollution)
Enschede, 2000 A stock of ca. 100 t of explosives was
Netherlands detonated by a smaller fire. This led to a
massive explosion and fireball which destroyed
and damaged property over a wide area, 21
killed, > 900 injured.
Toulouse, France 2001 An explosion in an ammonium nitrate and
fertiliser factory destroyed the facility and
caused widespread damage in the surrounding
area, 29 killed, ca. 2500 injured
Buncefield, UK 2005 The massive overfilling of a petroleum storage
tank by pipeline at a fuel storage depot led to
several explosions and a fire which engulfed
22 storage tanks, substantial property damage
 Major Chemical Accidents / Disasters (3)
Viareggio, Italy 2009 5 of 14 rail tank wagons carrying LPG derailed
close to the railway station of Viareggio before
midnight. Release of LPG ignited and railcars
exploded, 32 killed, 26 injured, several houses
destroyed
Evangelos 2011 Explosion of confiscated munitions at a naval
Florakis, Cyprus base destroyed a neighbouring power plant, 13
killed, 62 injured, widespread power-cuts,
economic costs ca. 10% GDP.
Sant'Angelo, Italy 2013 Explosion at a pyrotechnics factory, 5 killed

Gorni Lom, 2014 Munitions factory dismantling anti-personnel

Bulgaria mines. An explosion killed 15 (10% workforce),
3 injured, huge craters – buildings
“disappeared”, debris flew up to 1 km.
Modugno, Italy 2015 Explosion at a pyrotechnics factory, 6 killed
 Stakeholders in Major Chemical Accident
Risk Management
 Industry:
primary responsibility to take all measures necessary to prevent the
occurrence of major accidents and to limit their effects should they
occur.
 Public authorities:
responsible for the inspection and enforcement activities to ensure
that operators comply with their responsibilities. Also responsible
for land-use planning.
 International co-operation:
exists between EU, OECD, UN-ECE, UNEP, ILO, WHO, ICCA
(industry associations) to share experience and exchange good
practice and lessons learned.
 Bow-Tie Diagram
Preventative measures Limiting measures

Initiator
Consequence

Initiator

Initiator
Hazards

Incident* Consequence

Effects
Initiator

Consequence

Initiator

Barrier * Release of energy or

hazardous substance
 Major Chemical Accident Prevention &
Preparedness
 Prevention of Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC)
Understanding the inherent risks in the chemicals and their reactions
Principles of inherent safety
Design and construction of the plant and equipment
Control and alarm systems
Qualification and training of personnel
Planing and execution of maintenance and inspection

 Limiting the effects

Secondary and tertiary containment
Fire protection systems including fire-fighting crews
Physical barriers to protect against fire & blast

 Land-use planning and siting of facilities

Relationship between the risk management principles,
framework and processes (ISO 31000:2009)
 Tools for Risk Management from the
Major Chemical Accident Context
 Systematic Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Dow Fire & Explosion Index
Hazard and operability Study (HAZOP)
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

 Safety Management System

Responsibilities, Processes and Procedures
Management of Change (MoC)
Continual Control Process, Senior Management Review

 Land-Use Planning
 Accident Reporting and Lessons Learned
How can we work together to improve
Disaster Risk Management?
 Bow-Tie Diagram for DRM
Preventative measures Limiting measures

Initiator
Consequence

Initiator

Initiator
Hazards

Incident* Consequence

Effects
Initiator

Consequence

Initiator

* Potential for impact

Barrier
on people, property or
environment
 „Bow-tie” diagram technical effects

Sudden snow melt Damage to the defenses/dam cut

Using reservoirs Strengthening of defenses

(dam)

Flooding/isolation of settlement
Using sand bags
Exceptional amount
of precipitation

Dam cut
Dam cut
Damage to buildings
FLOOD

Using sand bags

Water level rise in
neighbouring countries
TOP EVENT
Damage to critical infrastructures

Safety barriers Safety barriers

causes consequences

Source: Hungarian DRA by ZGyenes

 Exchange of Knowledge and Experience

 What can be done to reduce or prevent exposure to a disaster

hazard?
 How can “Management of Change” but built in to Disaster Risk
Management systems to provide robustness?
Data and information exchange between authorities to be able to
“discover change”

 How can engineers be encouraged to “think the unthinkable” and

support the planning for disasters? – Recognising that systems will
fail.
 Exchange of Knowledge and Experience (2)

 How can disasters be better documented to understand causal

chains and develop lessons learned?
Which disasters / major accidents / hazardous incidents should we be
recording?
What should the data look like, e.g. Loss Data Initiative?
What is the natural & humanitarian disaster equivalent to eMARS?
 Conclusions
 Man-made hazards, including major chemical accidents, are part of
the disaster risk management framework (Sendai)
 There is over 40 years of experience in the field of major chemical
accident risk management.
 Accidents still happen!
 Disaster Risk Management needs to recognise that measures to
prevent exposure to hazards are an effective step in preventing
loss of life, damage to property and the environment.
 The fields of engineering need to recognise that engineered
systems can and will fail and strategic planning is necessary.
 Communication and sharing amongst practioners is essential.
Thank you for
your attention