Mind Association

The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction over Accommodation

Author(s): Roger White
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 112, No. 448 (Oct., 2003), pp. 653-683
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 The EpistemicAdvantageof Prediction
over Accommodation
ROGER
WHITE

Accordingto the thesis of StrongPredictionism,we typicallyhave strongerevidence

for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberatelycon-
structedto accommodatethose same data, even if we fully graspthe theory and all
the evidenceon which it was based.This thesis facespowerfulobjectionsand the ex-
isting argumentsin supportof it areseriouslyflawed.I offer a new defenceof Strong
Predictionismwhich overcomesthe objectionsand providesa deeperunderstanding
of the epistemic importance of prediction. I conclude by applying this account to
strategiesfor defendingscientificrealism.

Shouldwe havemoreconfidencein a theoryif it correctlypredicted a

certaindatum,than if it was merelydesignedto accommodate that
datum?Manyphilosophershavethoughtso, but havehad difficulty
explainingwhy,anddefendingtheirclaimagainstpowerfulobjections.
Theyhaveoftenreasonedroughlyas follows.Wearerightlyimpressed
by theorieswhichnot onlyfit the existingdata,but leadto predictions
whicharelaterconfirmed.Afterall,it is not hardto cookup a falsethe-
ory to accountfor knownfacts.Butthatour theorymakessuccessful
novelpredictionsseemsto indicatethatit is true,sinceit is unlikelythat
a falsetheorywouldbe so successful.l
Recentlyhowever,a growingnumberof philosophershaveargued
thatthis allegedepistemicdifferenceis bogus.2Theirreasonsareoften
roughlyas follows.Whatmorecouldbe relevantto assessingthe truth
of a theorythanthe contentof the theoryandthe data(andauxiliary
assumptions,and backgroundtheory), and the relationsbetween
them?Theorder in whichthe theorywasconstructedandthe datadis-
covered,andeventhe motivations of the theorist(whetherthe theory
wasconstructed withthedatain mind)seembesidethepoint.Indeedit
shouldmakeno difference whetherthetheorywasconstructed at all,or

1Philosophers on this side of the debate include Peirce (1931-58), Whewell (1860), Duhem
(1954), Geire (1983), Maher(1988), and Worrall(1989).

2 They include Mill (1843), Keynes (1921), Horwich (1982), Schlesinger (1987), Howson and

Franklin(1991),Achinstein(1994), and Collins (1994).

Mind,Vol. 112 . 448 . October2003 t White 2003

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654 RogerWhite

just fell out of the sky.Toassessits truthwe mustsimplyconsiderits

inherentplausibilityandhowit fitswithallthe evidencewe have.
The issue is not only important in itself, but is connected to a
numberof prominentissuesin epistemologyand philosophyof sci-
ence.Forinstance,one centralargumentfor scientificrealismclaims
thatthe predictivesuccessof scientifictheoriesin generalis significant
evidencefortheirtruth.3
I havemuchsympathywiththe lattercamp,who downplayor deny
the epistemicsignificance of predictionversusaccommodation. Never-
theless,I willmakea casefora versionof predictionism, theviewthatin
a wide classof circumstances, the factthata theorypredicted,rather
thanaccommodated a certaindatum,providessupportforthe theory,
beyondthatprovidedby the datumitself.I will givean explanationof
whypredictionhas an epistemicadvantageoveraccommodation,an
explanationwhichallowsus to see whichfactorsgovernthe degreeof
thisadvantage andthe circumstances in whichit holds.Whilesupport-
ing a versionof predictionism, thisdeeperunderstanding of whenand
how predictionmattersmayactuallyleadus to downplayits signifi-
cance.
I will beginby presentingwhatI taketo be the mostpowerfulargu-
ment againstpredictionism,followedby an examinationof the most
common defenceof predictionism,and why it does not work.My
defenceof predictionism willbe in the samespiritas the standardone,
but overcomesthe anti-predictionist objections.I will concludewith
somesuggestedapplications of thisdiscussionto debatesoverscientific
realism.

1. Clarificationof the issues

Firstlet me clarifymyuseof theexpression'thedatum'.Wewillbe con-
cernedwith casesin which a theory T entailsa certainproposition
which,eitherbeforeor afterthe constructionof T,is discoveredto be
true. But the mere fact that T entails a known proposition is not
remarkable byitself,sincealltheoriesentailknowntruths.Forinstance,
Tentailsthedisjunction( T or P), foranyknownpropositionP (and( T
or P) can be knownif P is known).So we need some restrictionon
whichentailedtruthsarerelevantto confirmation.I will not address
3 Collins (1994) mentions a number of relatedissues, including Lakatos's account of scientific
methodology, accordingto which one researchprogrammecan supersedeanother,only if it pre-
dicts new, unforeseen phenomena, Popper'sview of science as a form of knowledge superior to
other explanatoryenterprisessuch as history or psychoanalysis,and the legitimacyof the distinc-
tion, advocatedby the positivists,betweenthe 'logic of discovery'and the 'logic of justification'.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation655

the interesting
problemof givinga generalaccountof the conditionsin
whichentailmentof a truthcountsas evidencefor a theory.Forour
purposeswe canunderstandentailmentof dataas relativeto a certain
experiment, andcorresponding classof mutuallyexclusivepossibleout-
comes.Relativeto experimentE, 'thedatum',refersto thatproposition
whichspecifiesthe uniqueactualoutcomeof E.
Second,we shouldbe clearon justwhatthe prediction/accommoda-
tion distinctionis. In a typicalcaseof successfulprediction,a theoryis
firstconstructed,then testedby derivingsome of its consequences,
whicharelaterdiscoveredto be true.In a caseof accommodation the
datumis alreadyknownbeforethe theoryis constructed.Thismight
suggestthatthe crucialdistinctionconcernsthe temporalorderof the-
ory constructionanddatadiscovery.Butwhilesomediscussionshave
focusedon thisdistinction,it seemsthatwhatreallymattersis not tem-
poralorder,but a causalrelation.Intuitively,a theoryis lesswellcon-
firmedif it wasdesignedto entailthe datum,thatis, the conditionof
entailingthatdatumactedas a constrainton the constructionof the
theory.4Of coursethe reasonwhya theorywasnot designedto entaila
datumis usuallythatthis datumwasnot knownat the time. Butif it
was known,yet the theorywas not constructedwith this datumin
mind,it seemsthatit shouldsupportthetheoryin thesamewayandto
the sameextentas it wouldhavehadit not beendiscovereduntilafter
the theorywasconstructed.Thefollowingdefinitionscapturethe dis-
tinctionwhichmattershere.
A theoryT accommodated D iff T entailsD, D is true,and Twasde-
signedto entailD, (thatis, the conditionthat the theoryentailD
actedas a constrainton the selectionof T as theacceptedtheory).5
T correctly
predictedD, iff T entailsD, D is true,and T was not de-
signedto entailD.
We can now statethe questionwhichconcernsus: In whatcircum-
stances,if any,shouldtheinformationthatT correctlypredicted,rather
thanaccommodatedD, giveus greaterconfidencein T?It is usefulto
distinguisha weakanda strongversionof predictionism:

4 This account of accommodationis close to what Zahar(1973)and Worrall(1985)call lack of

heuristicnovelty.
5 Of course, a theory rarelyentails any specific experimentaldata on its own, but only in con-

junction with a set of auxiliaryassumptionsand backgroundtheory.So entailmenthere should be

understood as entailment relativeto a set of backgroundassumptions. In comparisonsbetween
cases of predictionand accommodation,these backgroundassumptionsshould be kept fixed.

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656 RogerWhite

WeakPredictionism: ThatT correctlypredictedratherthanaccom-

modated D, typicallyprovidesfurtherevidence for T, if we are
ignorantof eitherthe contentof T or the independentevidencethat
supportsit.
StrongPredictionism:ThatT correctlypredictedratherthanaccom-
modatedD, typicallyprovidesfurtherevidencefor T,evenif we are
familiarwith the contentof T and the independentevidencethat
supportsit.
Theweakthesisis not controversial. It is agreedon all sidesthatif we
wereto surveyall the actualtheories that havebeen proposed,we
shouldexpectto findthaton average,thosetheoriesfromwhichsuc-
cessfulpredictionshadbeen madewouldbe bettersupportedby the
totalevidence,thanthosewhichhavemerelyaccommodatedexisting
data.Thereare at least a coupleof reasonsfor this. First,as Keynes
(1921)pointedout, as a matterof practice,rarelyis a theorytestedby
deducingits consequencesunlessit alreadyhas evidentialsupport,
whereasa theorywilloftenbe proposedto accommodate existingdata,
evenif it haslittleor no independentsupport.Second,as Lipton(1991)
argues,the accommodationof dataoften resultsin a clumsy,ad hoc,
andhencelesssimpletheory,one whichgivesa lessunifiedaccountof
the total evidence,especiallyin the casewherean existingtheoryis
modifiedto accountfor new data.So theorieswhichsuccessfullypre-
dict datatend to be moreplausible,all thingsconsidered,thanthose
thatmerelyaccommodate data,byvirtueof theirgreatersimplicity.
As a consequence, informationas to whethera datumwaspredicted
ratherthanaccommodatedby the theorycan rationallyincreaseour
confidencein the theory,at least in so far as we are ignorantof its
degreeof simplicityandthe additionalevidencethatsupportsit. Forin
this case,learningthatthe datumwaspredictedshouldincreaseour
confidencein thetheorybyvirtueof increasingourestimateof thethe-
ory'ssimplicityandindependentevidentialsupport.So WeakPredic-
tionism seems clearly correct. But in a situation where we are
thoroughlyfamiliarwithwhatthe theorysays(andhenceits degreeof
simplicity),andalltheevidencesupportingit, we canassessits simplic-
ity andevidentialsupportfirst hand,andit seemsthatourjudgement
should not be affected upon learning thatthe datumwaspredictedor
accommodated. So StrongPredictionism is not supportedby consider-
ationsof simplicityandindependentevidence.6
6Or is it? Lipton (1991)makes an interesting case for Strong Predictionism which hinges on
simplicity.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation657

Most of the debate over predictionversus accommodationhas

focusedon the strongthesis.Thisthesisis opento seriousobjections,
andits opponentsoftensuspectthatits popularitystemsfroma confu-
sion with caseswhichonly supportWeakPredictionism.Myaccount
willbothsupportStrongPredictionism andprovidea newunderstand-
ing of why both the strong and weaktheses hold, one which goes
beyondthe standardexplanations in the literature.FirstI will consider
whatthe defenderof StrongPredictionism is up against.

2. Theanti-predictionistchallenge
Thereare a numberof reasonswhy the strongpredictionistthesis
seemshighlydubious,someinvolvinganalysesof individualcases,and
othersinvolvinggeneralarguments.First,manyof the caseswhich
mightbe takento illustratethe epistemicadvantageof predictionare
eitherhistoricallydubious,7or can be diagnosedas involvingsome
otherfactor,suchas simplicity,whichmakesthe epistemicdifference.
Whenwe arecarefulto constructa casewhicheliminatestheseother
differences,we often findthatthe epistemicadvantageof prediction
seemsto disappear.SupposeI watcha coin beingtossedfifty times,
landing heads every time. After five heads, I tentativelyform the
hypothesisthat the coin is double-headed,and correctlypredictthe
remainingoutcomes.You,on the otherhand,learnof the outcomes
afterthe sequenceis completed,andsimilarlyconcludethatthe coinis
double-headed. SurelyI haveno morereasonto believethishypothesis
thanyou,justbecauseI madean earlyprediction.Thiscaseeliminates
variousindependentfeatureswhichcanmakean epistemicdifference
(webothfullygraspthetheoryandits evidence).It is temptingto gen-
eralizeto the viewthatwheneverwe fullygraspthe theoryandall the
evidence,whetherthe datumwaspredictedor accommodatedmakes
no epistemicdifference.Second,a rathercompellingcasecanbe made
againstStrongPredictionism,as we will see presently.Andthird,the
standardandinitiallycompellingpredictionistargumentturnsout to
be flawedon closerinspection;I willexaminethisargumentin sections
3-4.
The followingargument,basedon Collins (1994),bringsout just
how implausiblethe strongpredictionistthesiscan seem.Supposewe
knowthatD is trueandthatT entailsD. Wearealsothoroughlyfamil-

7 For example,Worrall(1989)challengesGeire's(1983)historicalaccount of Fresnel'slight dif-

fraction predictions and Brush (1994) challengesMaher's(1988) and Lipton's(1991)accounts of

Mendeleev'spredictionof the elements, among many other cases.

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658 RogerWhite

iarwiththe contentof T andall the independentevidencesupporting

it. Ourquestionis whetheruponlearningthatT predictedratherthan
accommodated D, we shouldreviseour confidencein T.Notethatthe
differencebetweenaccommodation andpredictionconsistssimplyin
the occurrenceof a certainpsychologicalprocessin thosewho devel-
opedthe theoryT,namelythe processof designingthe theoryto entail
D. Theanswerto ourquestionnowhingeson whetherthe information
thatthispsychological processoccurred,shouldhaveanyaffecton our
confidencein T.
Theproblemis thatthereseemsto be no plausible,non-mysterious
waythatthe factthatthispsychological processtookplacein the theo-
rist'sheadcouldbe epistemicallyrelevantto the truthof her theory.
One way in which one fact mayprovideevidencethat anotherfact
obtains,is whenwe havereasonto suspectthat thereis some causal
connectionbetweenthe two facts.Couldtherebe a causalconnection
between the truth of the theory T and the theorist's not having
designedT to entaila certaindatum?Let T be the theoryof General
Relativity,which,as it happens,Einsteindid not designto entailthe
correctdegreeto whichlightbendsaroundthe sun (thoughit doesin
factentailit). Thetheoryof GeneralRelativityis truejust in casecer-
tainphysicalstatesof affairsobtain,suchasthatspace-timeis curvedto
the degreegivenby the fieldequations,andso on. Butit canhardlybe
that the goingson in Einstein'sheadarecausallyresponsiblefor the
structureof space-time.Nor doesthereseemto be a causalconnection
in the otherdirection.It is certainlynot the curvatureof space-time
whichpreventedEinsteinfromdesigninghis theoryto entailthe cor-
rectdegreeof lightbending.
Nowof coursea causalconnectionis not the onlypossiblebasisfor
an evidentialconnectionbetweenstatesof affairs.Butin the present
case it is hardto see whatotherkind of evidentialconnectionthere
mightbe. The predictionistthereforefacesthe followingchallenge:
explainhowthefactthatthepsychological processof designingthethe-
ory T to entailthe datumoccurred,can, in some plausibleand non-
mysteriousway,rationallyaffectourconfidencein T.

3. The No-Coincidence Arwment for Predictionism

the-
ThethirdreasonthatI suggestedasto whythe strongpredictionist
sis seems dubious was that the strongestargumentin its favouris
flawed.Let'snowturnto considerthisargument,sometimescalledthe
No-CoincidenceArgument.The most commonline of argumentfor

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation659

StrongPredictionism is someversionof the following.8 If ourtheoryT

correctlypredicted D, a goodexplanationof thisfactis thatT is true,for
the truthof T guarantees the successof its predictionssuchasD. Butif
T is false,thenit is highly unlikelyto correctlypredictdatathatwe later
discover;we shouldhaveto saythatits predictivesuccesswasa mere
coincidence. Thefactthatthe truthof T can explainits predictivesuc-
cess,whichwouldotherwisebe a strikingcoincidence,is significant
evidencefor T.However,if T merelyaccommodates D, we do not need
to invokethe truthof T to explainthis fact. Forif T was designedto
entailD, it is no surprisethatit doesso, regardless of whetherT is true
or false.So whenwe knowthatT merelyaccommodated D, it doesnot
gainthisextrasupport.
Thepointis sometimesput in termsof two competingexplanations
forthe factthatT entailsthe datum:(i) the truthhypothesis thatT is
true,and (ii) the designhypothesis that T wasdesignedto entailthe
datum.If T predictedD, thenthe truthhypothesisis the onlyexplana-
toryoptionandhenceis confirmed.Butif T merelyaccommodated D,
the designhypothesisis sufficientto explainthe factthat T entailsthe
datum,andhenceit rendersthetruthhypothesisotiose.HenceTis bet-
ter supportedoverall, giventhat it predictedratherthan accommo-
datedthedata.9

4. Problems with the No-Coincidence Argument

I willarguein thissectionthatno versionof theNo-Coincidence Argu-
ment is successful.The argumentinvolvesa kind of inferenceto the
best explanation,so it will payus to examinejustwhatthe explanans
andexplanandum are.Twocompetingexplanantia appearin the argu-
ment:theoryrs beingtrue,andrs havingbeendesignedto entailthe
datum. The explanandumhas to do with the entailment relation
betweenthe theoryandthe datum.Unfortunately, preciselywhatthe
explanandum is takento be variesamongdifferentversionsof theargu-
8 Versions Whewell(1860),Geire(1983)andWorrall(1989).
canbe foundit Peirce(1931-51),
Opponentsof StrongPredictionism suchas Keynes(1921),Horwich(1982),andCollins(1994)
differsfrom
Mydiagnosisof theargument
identifythisasthemajormotivationforpredictionism.
theirs.
9Anothervariationon theargument, foundin Geire(1983)andWorrall(1989)is thatpredic-
tionhasanepistemicadvantage becauseonlyin thecaseof prediction doestheexperiment whose
outcomeis specifiedbyD, constituteagood testof T,thatis, onewhichhasa goodchanceoffalsi-
fying T.Theunderlying reasoning hereis essentially thesame.Ina caseof prediction,T is farmore
likelyto passthetestif it is true,thanif it is false,whereasin a caseof accommodationT is guaran-
teedto passthetest.I willnot discussthisversionof theargumentdirectlyin whatfollows,butI
believethatmycriticismsapplyequally.

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660 RogerVffiite

ment,or is justleftunclear,so we willhaveto surveya numberof alter-

natives.
Takingourdatumto be D, ourfirstcandidatefortheexplanandum is
(E) T entailsD.
sinceentailmentsarenecessary;T wouldhave
Butthisis a non-starter,
of
entailedD regardless the or any-
truthof T,or howit was'designed',
thingelseforthatmatter.Perhapsa morepromisingsuggestionis
(P) T correctlypredictedD.
Thisis at leasta contingentfact,andhenceopento explanation.Taking
P as ourexplanandum, argumentproceedsas follows.
the predictionist
In a caseof prediction,P maybe explainedbythe truthof T,andhence
P confirmsrs truth.Butin a caseof accommodation, we haveno such
factasP to explain;insteadwe have
D.
(A) T accommodated
Andwe do not need the truthof T to explainA. IndeedA needs no
explanation,sinceit is all too easyto get a theoryto accommodatea
datum,regardlessof its truth.Hencein a caseof predictionwe have
strongerconfirmation for T.
Butnow notethatthe factthatT correctlypredictedD is a conjunc-
tion of threefacts:thatT entailsD, thatTwasnot designedto entailD,
andthatD is true.Wehavejustnotedthatrs entailingD is not opento
explanationat all.As forthe factthat T wasnotdesignedto entailD, it
seemsratherimplausible thatthiscouldbe explainedby the truthof T.
Forexample,the factthatGeneralRelativityis true,thatis, thatspace-
timeis curvedandso on, doesnot explainthefactthatEinsteindidnot
designhis theoryto entailthe datumthatlightbendsaroundthe sun.
So it seemsthatthe truthof T canexplainthe factthatT correctlypre-
dictedD, only by explainingD's beingtrue. This it maywell do, for
sinceT entailsD, thetruthof T guarantees the truthof D.
Butpreciselythe sameholdsin the casewhereT merelyaccommo-
datedD. T'saccommodating D consistsin the factthat T entailsD, T
wasdesignedto entailD, andD is true.Aswiththe caseof prediction,
the truthof T is irrelevantto the firsttwo conjuncts,but entailsthe
third.If the truthof T explainsrs correctlypredictingD, by virtueof
entailingthatD is true,thenit seemsit shouldalsoexplainrs accom-
modatingD, forthe samereason.So this approachfailsto bringout a
difference betweentheweightof predictedandaccommodated data.10
10This objectionis loosely based on Collins (1994).

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation661

Our first suggestion failed because entailments hold necessarily

betweenpropositions,and'T' and'D' referrigidlyto certainproposi-
tions. WhateverpropositionD is, T cannothelp but entailthatvery
ButT neednot haveentailedthedatum,where'thedatum'
proposition.
is takento refernon-rigidlyto whicheverpropositiondescribesthe
actualoutcomeof ourexperiment,or in otherwords,T mightnothave
beendatum-entailing.Sowe mighttake
(DE) T is datum-entailing
as a goodcandidatefor the explanandum. Thepredictionistargument
wouldthen go as follows.In a caseof prediction,the truthof T may
explainDE,andhencebe confirmedby DE.13utin a caseof accommo-
dation, DE is adequatelyexplainedby T'shavingbeen designedto
entailthe datum;thereis no needfor rs truthin the explanation. And
hencethe inferenceto rs truthis undermined.
Now T'sbeing true mightwell explainits being datum-entailing,
sincenecessarily,theentailments of a truetheoryaretrue.Thequestion
is whetherrs beingdesigned to entailthe datumoffersa rivalexplana-
tion.Heretheword'design'canbe misleading. Wecannotdesigna the-
oryto entailthe datum,in the sensethatwe designa houseto facethe
ocean,wherethatveryhousewouldnot havefacedthe oceanhadwe
not designedit to. A theoryis a proposition whichcannotbe moulded
into shapeto fit the data;it hasits truth-conditions andhenceentail-
mentsessentially. A bettermetaphorfortheprocessof theorizingis that
of selectinga theoryoff the platoniclibraryshelf.Theoriesalready
exist,andnecessarilyentailwhattheydo, independentlyof our selec-
tion of one.Tomodifyour currenttheoryto fit a datumis reallyto dis-
cardit andselecta slightlydifferentone. Tosaythat T wasdesignedto
entailthe datumjustmeansthatT wasselectedundera certainrestric-
tion,namelythatthe chosentheoryentailwhateverthedatumhappens
tobe.
Butnow the factthat T wasselectedunderthis restrictiondoesnot
helpexplainthe factthatit meetsthe restriction,anymorethanJane's
choosingto buy a housethatfacesthe oceanhelpsexplainwhyit faces
the ocean.Thatveryhousewouldhavefacedthe oceanregardlessof
Jane'scriteriain choosinga house.Similarly,T is datum-entailing just
in casethe possibleexperimental outcomewhichT necessarily entails,
does in fact obtain.But of coursewhichoutcomeobtainsin no way
dependson the theorist'smethodof theoryselection(the degreeof
lightbendingcouldhardlybe explainedby the waythatEinsteincame
up withGeneralRelativity). So in the caseof accommodation, rs hav-

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662 RogerWhite

ing been designedto entailthe datumdoes not serveas a rivalto rs

truth,as anexplanationof DE,forit doesnot serveasan explanationof
thatfactat all.

5. Introducingthe roleof the theorist

Wehaveconsideredthreecandidates fortheroleof explanandum in the
No-CoincidenceArgument,all of which fail to makethe argument
work.Thefollowingsuggestiongoesbeyondthe standardNo-Coinci-
denceArgument,by focusingon the theorist. I willarguethatit willnot
savethe No-CoincidenceArgument,yet it providesthe basisfor the
successfulargumentpresentedin the nextsection.
Perhapsthe temptationto supposethat rs beingdesignedto entail
the datumexplainsthe factthat it does entailthe datum,is due to a
confusionbetweenthis andanotherfact,namely,thatthetheoristnow
holdsa theorywhichentailsthedatum.Thismightbe explainedby her
theoryselectionhavingbeenrestricted to datum-entailingtheories,just
as the factthatJanenow inhabitsa housewhichfacesthe oceancanbe
explainedby her having deliberatelychosen one that does. So we
shouldconsider
theory
(ES) Thetheoristselecteda datum-entailing
as our explanandum.Letus callthis factthetheorist's entailment-suc-
cess.Thetroublehereis thatourpreferred explanans,namelyrs being
true,does not explainES.A concreteexamplemakesthis clear.That
GeneralRelativityis true,thatis, thatspace-timeis curvedandso on,
doesnot explainwhyEinsteincameup witha theorywhichmakestrue
predictions.Einstein'ssuccesshadmoreto do withhis epistemicrela-
tion to thefacts,thanwithwhatthosefactshappenedto be. It is tempt-
ing to supposethat T'sbeing true might help explainthe theorist's
entailment-success by helpingexplainwhythe theoristholdsT, since
T'struthguaranteesthatit is datum-entailing. But T'struthcanhelp
explainthe theorist'sholdingof T,onlyif the theoristhassomekindof
propensityto hold true theories.But if so, then the fact that it is T
whichis true,is irrelevantto the theorist'sentailment-success. What
mattersis justthatshe is reliablyconnectedwith the truth,thatis, she
willtendto acceptthetruth,regardless of whetherthetruthhappensto
be T.If,by contrast,the theorist'sholdingof T hasno reliableconnec-
tion withthe facts,say,if it is justa wildguess,thenthe luckyfactthat
she holds a datum-entailingtheoryhas nothingat all to do with the

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation663

truth of T. Eitherway,the truth of T is irrelevantwhen it comes to

explainingthetheorist'sentailment-success.
I will canvasone last attemptto taketruthto explainthe theorist's
entailment-success. Insteadof takingthe truthofT asourexplanans, we
mighttrythe truthof the theorist's theory,where'thetheorist'stheory'
refersnon-rigidly,or better,the factthatthetheoristholdsa truetheory.
Thishas the advantagethatit does entailES,that the theoristholdsa
datum-entailing theory.But it does not seemto explainit. ThatJane
ownsa housefacingthe NorthAtlanticentailsthatsheownsan ocean-
facinghouse,but it does not explainit. Theexplanationmusthaveto
do with the wayin whichherhousewaschosen,for instancethatshe
wanteda housefacingthe oceanandso triedhardto getone.
In anycase,this doesnot helpthe predictionist's caseunlesswe can
explainwhythe inferenceto truthis undermined bythedesignhypoth-
esis.Ifwe do not knowthe locationof Jane'shouse,ourlearningthatit
is ocean-facingsupportsthe hypothesisthatit facesthe NorthAtlantic
(not becauseeitherfact explainsthe other,but just becausewe have
narroweddownthepossibilities, andallhousesfacingtheNorthAtlan-
tic facethe ocean).But it is not clearwhythe informationthat Jane
choseherhouseon the conditionthatit facethe ocean,diminishesthis
support.Similarly,the factthat the theoristholds a datum-entailing
theory supports the hypothesisthat she holds a true theory (not
becauseone factexplainsthe other,butjustbecausewe havenarrowed
downthe possibilities,andall truetheoriesaredatum-entailing). But
now why shouldwe supposethatthe informationthat she choseher
theoryon the conditionthatit entailsthe datum,diminishesthis sup-
portat all?It is not yetclearwhyit should.

6. A newargumentfor StrongPredictionism
Our attemptsto savethe standardNo-CoincidenceArgumenthave
Weshould
failed.I wishto presenta newargumentwhichis persuasive.
stilltake
(ES) Thetheoristselecteda datum-entailing
theory
Aswe havenoted,thismightbe explainedby the
as our explanandum.
designhypothesis
(DS) The theoristdesignedher theoryto entailthe datum,that is,
knowingthe experimental outcome,sheselectedhertheoryon
the conditionthatit entailthisdatum.

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664 RogerWhite

WhatotherhypothesismightexplainES?Wemighttryto explainit by
supposingthatsheselectedhertheoryon theconditionthatit wastrue,
forthiswouldguarantee thatsheselecteda datum-entailing theory.But
unfortunately,
theoriesdo not comewithclearlabelsattacheddeclaring
theirtruth-value,so theycannotbe straightforwardly selectedby this
criterion.Theoryselectionmay,however,be moreor lesswellaimedat
thetruth.Thisnotionrequiresfurtheranalysis,but it mightroughlybe
characterizedas the degreeto whichthe causalchainof mechanisms
whichled to herselectionof the theorywerereliablyconnectedto the
facts.Obviouslythisis a matterof degree,but forthe sakeof simplicity
we canfocuson thetruthor falsityof thehypothesis
(RA) Thetheorist'sselectionof hertheorywasreliablyaimedat the
truth
by whichI meanroughlythatthe mechanismswhichled to herselec-
tion of a theorygaveher a good chanceof arrivingat the truth.This
hypothesisat least raisesthe theorist'schancesof holdinga datum-
entailingtheory,byraisingherchancesof holdinga truetheory.

7. Thearcheranalogy
TherelationsamongES,DSandRAcanbe illustrated by a simpleanal-
ogy.Wemayrepresentourtheoriesanddataon a mapof logicalspace,
whereregionson the maprepresentsetsof possibleworldsin whicha
propositionis true,theareaof a regionbeingproportional to theprob-
abilityof the proposition.ThedottedregionD representsour datum,
the outcomeof a certainexperiment.Thesmallcircularregionsrepre-
sentvarioustheories.Onlythosewhicharesub-regionsof D, entailthe
actualexperimental outcome,andregionTR,whichcontainsthe actual
world,is theonlytruetheory.
Now supposethat this map is drawnon the side of a barnand an
archershootsan arrowat it. Wedo not knowif the archeris aimingat
TR or even how good his aim is. Without seeing wherethe arrow
landed,we learnthatit landedwithina circlein regionD. Thequestion
whichconcernsus is whetherthe arrowlandedin TR.Theinformation
that the arrowlandedin D, shouldincreaseour confidencethat the
arrowlandedin TR,sinceTRis containedwithinD, andD is a smaller
regionthanthe wall.(Thisis analogousto the waythatlearningthata
theoryentailsthe datum,canprovideevidencethatthe theoryis true,
" Maher (1988)seems to be onto a similaridea, but develops it along differentlines. For criti-
cisms of Maher'sargumentsee Howson and Franklin(1991).

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation665

quiteapartfromwhether
thedatumwaspredicted
oraccommodated).

O ° D C

fi \ _° o O / ' o O
O ,'o OrA O ,

O ' -o _°. un OO

But now considerhow our confidencethat the arrowlandedin TR

shoulddifferdependingon whetherwe makethe followingassump-
tion.
(DS*) Thearcheris reliablyaimingat regionD (he mayor maynot be
aimingmorespecifically at TR).
Whetheror not we knowthisto be the case,willaffectwhether
(ES*) ThearrowlandedwithinD
supports
(RA*) Thearcherwasreliablyaimingat TR.12
12 DSs and RA* should be understood to be logically independent. DSt says simply that the

archer,knowing the location of D, restricts his aim so that he is guaranteed to hit somewhere
within D. He may or may not attemptto hit some more specific region such as TR. The denial of
DSs is consistentwith his reliablyaiming at TR. Of course in one sense, if the archeris aiming at
TR, he must also be aiming at D, since TR lies within D. But there is anothersense the one rele-
vant to our discussion accordingto which the archermay aim at TR without aiming at D, that
is, without intendingto hit D, if he does not even know where region D is, or at any rate, if his
knowledgeof the location of D has no influenceon how he shoots. Similarlywith DS and RA, the
theorist may design her theory to entail the datum with or without also reliablyaiming for a true
theory.And she may reliablyaim at the truth, without designingher theory to entail the datum, if
she does not know the datum, or her knowledge of the datum plays no role in her selection of a
theory.

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666 RogerWhite

Let'sbeginwiththe assumptionthatDSs is not true,indeed,let'ssup-

posethatthearchercouldn'thaveaimedat D, sinceit isn'tevenmarked
on the map(he stillmayor maynot havebeenaimingat TR).On this
assumption,the factESt,thatthe arrowlandedin D, lendssomesup-
portto the hypothesisRA*,thatthe archerwasreliablyaimingat TR.
Forif he wasreliablyaimingat TR,he is morelikelyto hit it, andhence
hit D, sinceTRis a sub-regionof D. He is farlesslikelyto hit TRif he
wasnot reliablyaimingat it, andhencelesslikelyto hit D.
Buton the assumptionof DSt, he is guaranteedto hit D, regardless
of whetherhe is aimingmorespecifically atTR.SogivenDSt,RAsdoes
not renderESsmoreprobable,andhenceESsprovidesno supportfor
RA*.Hencethe reliableaimingtheoryis bettersupportedby ES*,on
theassumptionthatthearcherdid notaimat regionD.Andthisin turn
rendersit moreprobablethatthe arrowlandedon TR,giventhatthe
archerdidnot aimat D.
Wecansummarizethe reasoninghereas follows.Uponlearningthat
the arrowlandedwithinD, we shouldincreaseour confidencethatit
landedon TR,sinceTRlieswithinD andwe havenarroweddownthe
regionin whichit mighthavelanded.Uponfurtherlearningthatthe
archerwasnot restricting his aimto regionswithinD, we haveafurther
reasonto supposethatit landedon TR. Thefactthatthe arrowlanded
withinD shouldincreaseour confidencethatthe archerwas reliably
aimingatTR(sincehisaimingatTRwouldmakehimmorelikelyto hit
withinD), andhenceincreaseourconfidencethathe hitTR.13 If,on the
otherhand,we learnthatthe archerrestricted his aimto regionswithin
D, we haveno groundsto furtherincreaseourconfidencein his aimat
TR, or his hittingTR. Forin thiscasehis hittingwithinD is no further
indicatorof his aim at TR (sincehe wasboundto hit D, regardlessof
whetherhe wasaimingmorespecifically at TR).
The analogyshouldbe clear.Wecan thinkof the processof theory
selectionaslikeshootingan arrowat logicalspace,wherewe areuncer-
tainas to howwellthe theoristis aimingat the truth,thatis, the relia-
bilityof the processbywhichsheselectedhertheory.Thatthe theorist
holdsa datum-entailing theoryES,supportsthereliableaimhypothesis
RA,but onlyif we canruleout the designhypothesisDS.Theanalogy
betweenDSt andDS is as follows.Thearcher,if he knowswhereregion
D is, canrestricthis aimto circleswithinthis region,with or without

13 It is important here that TR is not just any sub-region of D, but a salient target, one which
stands out by being painted black.We do not know if the archeris aiming at any small region or
how good his aim is, but if he is aiming, he is somewhat more likelyto aim at TR, since it stands
out from the surroundingregions.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation667

aimingmorespecifically at TR.Similarly, the theoristif sheknowsthe

datum,can restricthertheoryselectionto theorieswhicharedatum-
entailing,withor withoutaimingmorespecifically forthetruth.
On the assumptionof not-DS,the factES,supportsthe hypothesis
RA.Forthe theoristis morelikelyto selecta truetheory,givenRA,and
a truetheoryis morelikelyto entailthe datumthana falseone. ButES
doesnot supportRAon the assumptionDS.Foron this assumptionit
is to be expectedthatshewillselecta datum-entailing theory,regardless
of how well she was aimingat the truth. Hencethe reliableaiming
hypothesisRA,is bettersupportedby ES)on the assumptionthatthe
theorywasnotdesignedto entailthe datum.Andthisin turnrendersit
moreprobablethathertheoryis true,giventhatit wasnot designedto
entailthe datum.
Aswiththearcheryanalogy,we cansummarizethereasoninghereas
follows.Regardless of whetherthetheoristdesignedhertheoryto entail
the datum,upon learningthat hertheorydoes entailthe datum,we
shouldincreaseourconfidencein itstruth)sincenecessarily, truetheo-
ries aredatum-entailing)and we havenarroweddown the regionof
logicalspacein whichthe theoryis contained.Butnow upon further
learningthatthetheoristdidnot restricthertheoryselectionto datum-
entailingtheories,we haveafurtherreasonto supposethatsheselected
a true theory.The fact that a datum-entailingtheorywas selected,
shouldincreaseour confidencethatthe theoristwasreliablyaimingat
the truth(sinceheraimingat the truthwouldmakehermorelikelyto
selecta datum-entailingtheory),and henceincreaseour confidence
thatsheselecteda truetheory.14 If,on the otherhand,we learnthatthe
theoristrestrictedhertheoryselectionto datum-entailing theories,we
haveno groundsto increasefurtherour confidencein her aim at the
truth,or herselectionof a truetheory.Forin thiscaseherselectionof a
datum-entailing theoryis no furtherindicatorof her aimat the truth
(since she was bound to come up with a datum-entailingtheoryy
regardless of howwellshewasaimingat thetruth).

7.1 TwoobjectionslS
Objection
1:Yourargumentmightseemto involvea kindof illicitdou-
blecountingof evidence,by usingtheevidenceto providedirectinduc-

14 Hereit is important
thatthetruthis a salienttarget.Wedo notknowif theprocessof theory
selectionwasdirectedtowardanyspecifickindof theory,butinsofaras it was,it is mostlikelyto
havebeendirectedtowardthetruth(it wouldbe oddforthetheoristto tryto constructa specific
kindof falsetheory).
15 Theseweresuggested
byananonymous
refereeforMind.

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668 RogerWhite

tivesupportforthetheory,andforthetheorist'saimatthetruth,which
in turnsupportsthetheory.
Reply: Here it is importantto note that there are two independent
sourcesof evidencefortheoryT.ThedatumD mayprovidedirectevi-
dence for T.But it is not D, but ES,the theorist'sholdinga datum-
entailingtheorywhichprovidesevidencethatshewasreliablyaimedat
the truth,andhenceforthe truthof hertheoryT.It is onlythe signifi-
canceof thislatteritemof evidencewhichis affectedbywhetherD was
predictedor accommodated.
Objection2: Onefactorwhichdetermines a theorist'saimat thetruthis
how muchevidenceshe has to go on. A theoristwill havemoreevi-
denceto go on if she accommodatesa datumthanif she choosesher
theorywithoutthatdatum,butpredictsit. Hence,it mightseem,in the
a caseof accommodation, the theoristhasa betteraimat the truthand
hencewe havemorereasonto believehertheory.
Reply:Notice that whetherthe theoristpredictsor accommodatesa
datumgivesus no indicationat all as to her abilityat assessingevi-
dence,the reliabilityof herequipmentandmethods,or anythingalong
thoselines.Thatthetheoristaccommodated datumD entailsthatsheis
aimed at the truthjust in this she
respect: will comeup with a theory
whichentailsD, andsinceD is true,sheis somewhatmorelikelyto hit
upon a true theory than if her theory did not entail D. But in this
respect,sheis no betteroffthanif shehadpredictedD, forin eithercase
hertheoryentailsD.

8. Thelotterypredictionexample
Theadvantage witha casein which
of predictioncanbestbe illustrated
the datumD provideslittle or no evidencefor the theoryT,when T
merelyaccommodates D. Comparethe followingtwo cases:
Accommodation:Wereadin the paperthatJanewon the national
lottery.Fredproposesthe followingtheoryto explainthis fact:the
lotterywasriggedin Jane'sfavour.
Prediction:Beforethe lotteryis evendrawn,Fredproposesthetheo-
ry thatit is riggedin Jane'sfavour.WelaterdiscoverthatJanewon.
Inthesecondcasewe arefarmoreinclinedto believeFred'stheorythan
in the first.In the secondcasewe suspectthathe musthavebeenonto
something,thathe musthavehad somekindof reliableaccessto the
factsconcerningthe lotterysetup,to havebeenableto predictthe lot-
tery'soutcome.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation669

Firstlet'slookbrieflyatwhythe datum
(D) Janewon
doesnot renderthe theory
(T) Thelotterywasriggedin Jane'sfavour
veryprobableif T merelyaccommodatesD. WhileT does entailD, it
does so onlyat the expenseof beinghighlyimprobable.TheoryT,we
mightsay,inheritsthe arbitrarinessof D, for even if the lotterywas
rigged,we haveno morereasonto supposethatit wouldbe riggedin
Jane'sfavour,than we haveto supposethat Janewould win just by
chance.Indeedthe factthatJanewon hardlycallsforan explanationin
thefirstplace;someonehadto win,andit couldjustaseasilybe Jane,as
anyone.In Bayesianterms,we cannotethatthereis a weakertheory1>,
whichstatessimplythatthelotterywasrigged,whichis not confirmed
at all by Jane'swinning,sinceJaneis no morelikelyto win giventhat
the lotterywasrigged.Butnow since T entails1>, T canbe no more
probablethan 18. Thatis, Jane'swinningrendersthe hypothesisthat
the lotterywasriggedin Jane'sfavourno moreprobablethanthatthe
lotterywasriggedat all.
Butthereis somethingelse whichwe mightwantto explain,apart
fromJane'swinning,namelyFred'sholdingof a theorywhichentails
herwinning.Or rather,Fred'sholdinga theorywhichentailstheactual
outcomeof thelottery,(hisholdinga theorythatentailsJane'swinningis
significantonlyif Janewasthe actualwinner).Thequestionthatstrikes
us is, out of all the possibletheoriesconcerningthe mechanicsof the
lottery,howdidFredmanageto getone intohisheadwhichhappensto
entailthe actuallotteryresult?Now of coursein the accommodation
case,the answeris straightforward. SinceFredknewthatJanewon,he
couldselecthis theoryundertheconstraintthatit mustentailthisout-
come. Apartfromthis constraint,his theoryconstructionneed not
havebeenaimedat thetruth,it mayhavebeenjusta wildspeculation.
In the predictioncase,Freddid not selecthis theoryunderthe con-
straintthatit entailthe data,so we needa differentexplanation.The
naturalhypothesisthatcomesto mindis thatFredwassomehowrelia-
blyhookedup to the facts.On thisassumption,he is farmorelikelyto
comeupwitha theorywhichentailsthe actualoutcome.Itwouldbe an
extraordinary fluke,if he justguesseda theorywhichentailedtheactual
outcome.So in the casewhereFred'stheorypredictsthe data,we have
reasonto supposehe wasreliablyhookedup to the facts,whichin turn
givesus reasonto supposethathe is right.

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670 Roger V%hite

challenge
9. Meetingtheanti-predictionist
Wearenow in a positionto see howthe newaccountavoidsthe prob-
lems of the standardNo-CoincidenceArgumentandmeetsthe anti-
predictionistchallenge.Wehavetwo potentialexplanatory hypotheses
for the fact ESthat the theoristchose a datum-entailingtheory:the
designhypothesisDS, andthe reliableaimhypothesisRA.Thedesign
hypothesisrendersthe reliableaiminghypothesisunnecessary,with
respectto explainingthe theorist'sentailment-success.Forwhatwe
haveherearetwo causalhypothesesconcerningthe processby which
the theorywasselected,eachof whichpotentiallyexplainsthe resultof
the selection.Thisis a caseof causal pre-emption. Perhapsthetheorist's
processof theoryselectionhada goodchanceof producinga true,and
hencedatum-entailingtheory.Butin a caseof accommodation,this
causalexplanationis pre-emptedby the factthatnon-datum-entailing
theorieswerenot even open to selection.The factthat,knowingthe
datum,the theoristrestrictedhertheoryselectionto datum-entailing
theoriesguarantees thatshewouldselecta datum-entailing theory,and
no furtherhypothesisregarding heraimat truthis necessaryto explain
herdoingso.
Wecannow see the plausiblenon-mysterious waythatinformation
concerninga certainpsychologicalprocessin the theorist'shead,
namelydesigninghertheoryto entaila certaindatum,is epistemically
relevantto the truthof hertheory.Thisinformation,DS,is relevantin
thatit screens offtheconfirmation of thehypothesisthatthetheorywas
reliablyselected,by the factthatthe theoryentailsthe datum.In doing
so, it diminishesthe supportthatthe theorist'sentailment-successpro-
videsforhertheory.
A verysimpleBayesiananalysisbringsthis out, by comparingthe
relationbetweenESandRA,firston the assumptionof mDS,andthen
assumingDS:
P(ES|RAA nDS) > P(ES|DS)
A nDS) > P(RA|'DS)
andso, P(RA|ES (1)
thatis, relativeto nDS,ESconfirmsRA.However:
P(ESIRAA DS)=P(ES#DS)
andso, P(RA|ESA DS)= P(RA|DS) (2)
So DSscreensoffthe
thatis, relativeto DS,ESandRAareindependent.
supportthatESprovidesto RA.Furthermore, addingthe assumption
that:

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation671

P(RAIDS)' P(RAl'DS) (3)

thatis, withoutknowingwhetherthe theoristholdsa datum-entailing

theory,her designingher theoryto entailthe data,makesit no more
likelythathertheorizingwasreliablyaimedatthetruth,it followsfrom
(1)-(3)that:
P(RAIESA nDS)> P(RAIESA DS)
herhavingdesignedher
thatis, giventhe theorist'sentailment-success,
theoryto entailthe datum,rendersit lessprobablethathertheorizing
wasreliablyaimedat the truth,andhencelessprobablethathertheory
is true,whichis thethesisof StrongPredictionism.

10.Thedegreeandcircumstancesof the epistemicadvantageof

prediction
Grantedthat the successfulpredictionof a datumcan, in principle,
havean epistemicadvantageoverthe mereaccommodationof that
datum,it remainsto be seenin whatrangeof circumstances thisholds
andto whatdegree.In particular,we shouldaddressa certainworry,
namelythatI haveshownonlythattheweakpredictionist thesisis true
(whichwasneverin disputeanyway)but not the strongthesis.Recall
thataccordingto StrongPredictionism,the factthat T correctlypre-
dictedratherthan accommodatedD, typicallyprovidesfurtherevi-
dencefor T,even if we arefamiliarwith the contentof T and all the
background evidencesupportingit. Nowaccordingto thenewaccount,
informationthat a datumwas predictedby a theory,can rationally
affectourconfidencein the theory,by indicatingsomethingabouthow
welltheprocessof theoryselectionwasaimedatthetruth.Butthisthe-
ory selectionprocessjust consistsin the evaluationof evidence.So it
mightseemthatin a casewherewe knowwhatthe theorist'sevidence
is, we can see for ourselveshow well her theorizingwas aimedat the
truth,andhenceanyotherindicationsof heraim,suchaswhethershe
designedhertheoryto entailthedata,willbe irrelevant.
In response,it mustbe grantedthatour knowledgeof the theorist's
totalevidencediminishes the relevanceof whetherhertheorypredicted
or accommodated a particulardatum.Forknowingwhatevidenceshe
hadto go on givesus at leasta goodindicationof howwellhertheoriz-
ing wasaimedat the truth.Thecrucialquestionis whetherknowledge
of the theorist'sevidence,entirelyscreensoffthe relevanceof further

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672 RogerWhite

informationconcerninghertheoryselectionprocess,suchaswhethera
certaindatumwaspredictedor accommodated.
It seemsclearthatknowledgeof thetheorist'stotalevidencedoesnot
entirelyscreenoff the relevanceof this furtherinformation.Forwhile
informationconcerningthe evidencethatthe theoristhadto go on is
veryrelevantto how reliablyhertheorizingwasaimedat the truth,it
does not settlethe matter.It is usefulhereto considertwo important
factorslinkingevidenceandtheory.First,therearecertaina prioriepis-
temicconstraintson howevidenceshouldbe assessed in formingtheo-
ries.Wecanthinkof this in termsof a rangeof degreesof confidence
that an idealepistemicagentmighthavein a theory,givena bodyof
evidence(how wide this rangeis, that is, how tightthe a prioriepis-
temicconstraintsare,is an open question).Second,therearevarious
causalrelationswhicharenot knowablea priori:theseincludetherelia-
bilityof ourperceptual faculties,thetrustworthiness of varioussources,
the accuracyof our measuringinstruments,and so on. The crucial
point hereis thatthe degreeof reliableaim of theorizingdependson
bothfactors,neitherof whichis entirelytransparent to us.16
Concerningthe first,sincewe arenot idealepistemicagents,we are
falliblein our assessmentof evidence.Forinstance,constructionof a
theorymightinvolvecomplexmathematical derivationswherethereis
plentyof opportunityfor errors,evenif we doublecheckourwork.In
some cases,the inferencefromevidenceto theoryinvolvesintuitive
judgements, theprinciplesof whicharenot easyto spellout.A particu-
larlystrikingcaseof thisis our abilityto 'read'a person'sfacialexpres-
sions, even thoughwe cannoteasilysay how we interpretthe visual
cueson whichourjudgementsarebased.Wehaveno troubleforming
suchjudgements,butthe degreeto whichthe visualevidencesupports
ourjudgementmaybe in doubt,and no amountof doublechecking
ourinferencecanhelpus.
Supposenow the theoristcomesup withtheoryT via complexderi-
vationsandintuitiveinferencesfroma multifarious collectionof back-
ground evidence E. T entails D, a possible outcome of a crucial
experiment.Upon laterdiscoveringthatD is true,we havereasonto
increaseour confidencein herassessmentof the evidenceE. Forif her
assessmentof the evidencewas well attunedto the actualdegreeof
epistemicsupportbetweenthe evidenceandthevariouscandidatethe-
ories,shehada betterchanceof hittingupona true,andhencedatum-
entailingtheory.Supposeon the otherhandthatknowingthe datain
advance,she narroweddownthe pool of candidatetheories,by elimi-
16 Lipton (1991)makesa similarclaim that the theory'ssimplicity need not be transparent.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation673

nating those which do not entail the datum, and then appliedthe
mathematicalcalculationsand intuitivejudgementsto selectamong
thisnarrower pool,in thelightof backgroundevidenceE.In thiscaseit
is no surprisethatthe resultingtheoryentailsthe datum,andhencewe
haveno furthergroundsfor confidencein her assessmentof the evi-
dence.
Similarpointsapplyto thevariouscausalrelationswhichtheprocess
of theoryselectioninvolves.Forinstancein choosingtheorieswe often
relyon the use of measuringinstruments,opinionof experts,andour
own perceptualfaculties,the reliabilityof whichis open to question.
Thatthe theoristcameup witha datum-entailing theorymayindicate
thatsuchcausalconnectionswereindeedreliable,butonlyif hertheory
selectionprocessdid not involvenarrowingdownthe candidatetheo-
ries in the light of the knowndatum.Foras before,if the measuring
devices,opinionsof colleaguesandso on, did not leadto theoryT on
theirown,but only whenvariousnon-datum-entailing theorieswere
alreadyeliminated,it is no surprisethatthe selectedtheoryentailsthe
datum,andhencethetheorist'sentailment-success wouldbe no indica-
tion of thereliability of thesedevices.
So StrongPredictionismis vindicated.Evenif we knowall the evi-
denceon whichthe theoristbasedher theory,the factthat a certain
datumwaspredictedratherthanaccommodated, mayprovidefurther
evidencefor the theory.Whenit comesto our actualtheoreticalprac-
tices however,the strongthesisis not particularlyrelevant,sincewe
typicallydo notknowalltheevidenceon whicha theorywasbased.The
multifariousconsiderationswhichleadto the acceptanceof a theory
areoftentoo subtleand complexto be easilycommunicated.Indeed,
evenin our owncase,we do not typicallykeepcarefultrackof all the
reasonswe everhadfor adoptinga certaintheory.Wemightcometo
questionjusthowgood all our reasonswere,in whichcasethe predic-
tivesuccessof ourtheorycansuggestthatour reasonswerenot badat
all.
The degreeto which predictionhas an epistemicadvantageover
accommodationcan be seen now to dependon how well we under-
standtheprocessbywhichthe theoryin questionwasselected,andthe
bearingof the new predictedor accommodateddata.In some casesa
datummightprovideoverwhelmingsupportfor the theoryby itself,
even if we know nothing of the independentevidence, and hence
whetherthedatumwaspredictedor accommodated canmakelittledif-
ference.Thecoin'slandingheadsfiftytimesforinstance,wasalltheevi-
dencewe everneededto concludethat it is double-headed;whether

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674 RogerWhite

theselandingswerepredictedor accommodated canmakelittlefurther

difference.In othercasesthe new datummaybe less thanconclusive,
but we havea veryfirmgripon the otherfactorswhichled to the the-
ory'sacceptance, andhencelearningthatthe datumwaspredictedwill
affectour estimationof the reliabilityof the processof theorizingonly
to a negligibledegree.It is in caseswherethe newdatumprovidesless
than conclusivesupportfor the theory,andwe haveeitherlimited
knowledgeof the background evidence,or limitedabilitiesin assessing
it, thatthe informationthatthe datawaspredicted,ratherthanaccom-
modatedis mostsignificant.

11. Super-strongPredictionism
WhatI havecalled'StrongPredictionism' is strongenoughto be dis-
putedby many,whileweakerthanthatwhichsomepredictionists may
accept,andsomeanti-predictionists see as theirrealtarget.Thestruc-
tureof my argumentforStrongPredictionism wassimilarto the argu-
mentsforWeakPredictionism. In eachcasethe epistemicsignificance
of predictionto thetruthof a theorywasin a certainsenseindirect. The
factthat the theorypredictedratherthan accommodatedthe datum
increasesourestimateof someintermediate factor,whichin turncon-
firmsthe theory.In the caseof WeakPredictionism,the intermediate
factorswerethetheory'ssimplicityandbackground evidentialsupport.
Forthe strongthesisit wasthetheorist'saimat thetruth.
Wecan imaginean evenstrongerthesis,callit Super-strong Predi-
tionism,accordingto whichthe factthata theorypredictedratherthan
accommodateda datumis evidenceall by itselffor the theory,quite
apartfromour estimatesof these intermediaries.It is not clearthat
anyonehasexplicitlyendorsedthisthesis,butit maybe whatsomehave
in mind,andmaybewhatmanywhoconsiderthemselvesopponentsof
predictionismarereallyopposedto. So it is worthnotingthatmy dis-
cussionin no waysupportsSuper-strongPredictionism.Indeedmy
accountof when and how predictionmattersmight underminethe
temptationto acceptthe super-strong thesis.Forthis temptationmay
be due to a simplisticgeneralization fromcaseswherepredicteddata
seem to carrymore weight, the antidoteto which is a more subtle
accountwhenandhow predictionmatters.In this waymy defenceof
predictionismmaybe welcomedby thosein the broadlyanti-predic-
tionistcamp.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation675

12.TheNo-MiraclesArgumentfor scientificrealism
I will concludewith someverygeneralsuggestionsas to howmy
accountof theepistemic advantage of prediction mightbeappliedto a
defenceof scientific realism.l7 Thosewhobelievethatourcurrentsci-
entifictheoriesaretrue,or atleastapproximately true,mustfacethe
factthatno matterwhatdatawehavesupporting a theory,thereare
numerous alternative theorieswhichentailthesamedata(orindeed
coincideinalltheirobservable entailments). Thechallenge forthereal-
istis to explainwhysometheoriesaremorelikelyto betruethanthe
manyothertheorieswhichentailthe sameobservabledata.One
response to thechallenge is to appealto further principlesof confirma-
tion;forinstance, it mightbeargued thatsometheories provide a better
explanationof the datathanothers,wherethe criterionfora good
explanation goeswellbeyondmereentailmentof data.Thisis notthe
strategy I wishto focuson.ThereiswhatI believeis supposed to bean
independent argument, whichclaims,in Putnam's (1975)words,that
scientificrealism 'istheonlyphilosophy whichdoesn'tmakethesuccess
of sciencea miracle.' (p.73)Itwouldbea miracle,it is sometimes sug-
gested,thatanaeroplane shouldflymesafelyhometo Sydneyif the
aerodynamical theoriesonwhichitsdesignis basedwerenottrue.Aer-
oplaneflightis a trickybusiness. Ofcourseit ispossibleforawildlyfalse
theoryto entailthecorrect results butwhywouldanysanepersonget
in a planeif hedidnotthinkthetheoriesonwhichitsdesignwasbased
werecloseenoughto correct?
TheNo-Miracles Argument involvesaninference to thebestexpla-
nationof thesuccessof science,wherethissuccessjustconsistsin the
factthatourtheoriesentailcertaindataconcerningsay,aeroplane
behaviour. Theclaimisthatthetruthofthesetheories canexplaintheir
success, whichseemsfairenough,sincenecessarily, truthsentailtruths.
Butlet'slookmorecloselyatwhatthissuccessconsistsin.LetD specify
theaeroplane behaviour thatourtheoryTentails.SinceTnecessarily
entailsD, T is successful if andonlyif D is true.Soto explainthefact
thatTis successful, isjustto explain D.Butnowthereis something odd
abouttheideathattruthcouldplaysomeexplanatory role,overand
abovethe factswhichobtain,if ourtheoriesaretrue.If anything
explains thefactthataeroplanes stayup,it is (roughly) thatthepressure
on theunderside of a movingairfoilis greater thanthepressure on its

17 Theversion of scientificrealismthatI amconcernedwithherestatesthatourbestcurrent

scientifictheoriesare(approximately) I havein mindis onewho,like
true.Thekindof antirealist
vanFraassen(1980)insiststhatourtheoriesshould'savethe phenomena', thatis, fit allpossible
observational data,butremainsagnosticasto whichof themanytheorieswhichdo so,aretrue.

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676 RogerWhite

overside.Thereis nofurtherexplanationto be foundby appealingto its

being truethat the pressureon the undersideof a movingairfoilis
The appealto truthseems
greaterthanthe pressureon its overside.18
andhencethislineof argumentcarriesno moreforcethan
superfluous,
strengthof theoryT.l9
justthe appealto the explanatory
Tosee moreclearlywhatit goingon here,comparethe followingtwo
explanatoryarguments.

OriginalArgument Argument
No-miracles

Explanandum: D T is successful
Explanans: T T is true

Originally,T is defendedon the basisof its explainingthe datumD.

Rightlyor wrongly,theantirealistis not therebypersuadedof rs truth,
but only of its empiricaladequacy.It is a mistaketo supposethatthe
No-miraclesargumentprovidessomefurthercasefor the truthof T.
Fortheexplananda andexplanatia of thetwoargumentsareequivalent.
Indeed,the No-miraclesargumentseemsto carrylessforceagainstthe
antirealistchallenge.The antirealistis alreadyconvincedthat T is
empiricallyadequate(not on the basisof a fancyphilosophicalargu-
ment,but the regularevidencefoundin the physicsjournals).So she
believesthatthe truthlies somewherein the classof theoriesempiri-
callyequivalentto T.Ourjobis to persuadeherthatit is T whichis true
in particular.No matterhowstrongourargumentis in supportof T,if
an argumentof equalstrengthcanbe proposedin supportof eachof
T'sempiricallyequivalentrivals,then our argumentis irrelevantto
meetingthe antirealistchallenge.So anyargumentwhichhasanyhope
of answeringtheantirealistmustappealto somefeatureof Twhichdis-
tinguishesit fromits empiricallyequivalentrivals.But of coursethe
propertyof beingpredictively successfulis sharedby all of rs empiri-
callyequivalentrivals.AnyempiricallyequivalenttheoryT' will also
entailthe datumD, and hencebe successful.So we couldjust as well
arguethatthe successof T' is bestexplainedby its beingtrue,andso
on, forallof rs empiricallyequivalentrivals.

18 point.
Theexampleis adaptedfromLevin(1984),whousesit to makea somewhatdifferent
19 Thisdoesnot depend on a controversial accountof truth,butmerelythatprop-
deflationary
ositionsof theformit is truethatP andP,areknownto be necessarily andhenceone
equivalent,
cannotexplainanymorethantheotherdoes.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation677

Clearlywe aremakingno progressin meetingthe antirealistchal-

lengethis way.At leastin the originalargument,wherewe werenot
merelyappealingto the truthof T,but spellingout the detailsof this
specifictheoryas an explanationof D, therewassomehopeof showing
thatT hadan explanatory advantageoverT'. Forin seekingto explain
D, we mayappealto featuresof T in whichit differsfromT' andother
rivals.The No-MiraclesArgumentfailsto discriminateamongthese
rivals.

13. Reconstructingthe No-MiraclesArgument

So the No-Miracles Argumentis not verysatisfactory as it stands.Nev-
ertheless,it carriesconsiderable intuitiveforce.Perhapswe canrecon-
structit alongmorepromisinglines,followingmy explanationof the
epistemicadvantageof prediction.Note that the No-MiraclesArgu-
mentassumes,at leastimplicitly,thatsuccessfulpredictions havea spe-
cialepistemicstatus.20 Forif ourtheoriessimplyaccommodated masses
of datacollectedaboutaeroplaneflight (supposewe neverdesigned
planes,but Martiansgavethemto us longbeforewe couldgraspaero-
dynamictheory)the argumentwouldhavemuchless bite. Forwhat
then would be the miracle?Our theories would entail these data
becausewe madesuretheydo.And,theantirealist willbe quickto add,
thereareplentyof othertheorieswe arefreeto choosefromwhichdo
likewise.
Thekeyto reconstructing the No-MiraclesArgumentis to see that
whatneedsto be explainedis not justthe factthatour aerodynamical
theoriesentailthataeroplanesstayup, or thataeroplanesdo stayup,
butthatscientistshavemanagedto hit upontheorieswhichentailthat
they do, and in general,that they havehit upon theorieswhich are
remarkably successfulin a varietyof practicalapplications. Thiswould
be a miracle,if therewereno explanationfor it, andan obviouscandi-
dateexplanationis thatthe methodsof sciencetendto get at the truth.
Thisline of argumenthas at leastthe potentialto meetthe antirealist
challenge,becauseit doesdiscriminate betweenempiricallyequivalent
rivaltheories.T andT' mayentailthe sameobservational data,butit is
by choosingr that the scientistmanagedto successfullypredictthe
data,andif herdoingso suggeststhathertheorizingwasreliablyaimed
atthetruth,thiswillsupportToverT'.Ourargumentdoesnot directly
supportT,butsupportsthe reliability of the scientist'stheoryselection.

20 whois explicitaboutit.
Leplin(1997)is onerecentproponentof theargument

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678 Roger Wlite

T is therebysupportedover T' and otherrivals,sinceT is the theory

thatthe scientistsactuallyaccept.21

14. Limitations of the reconstructedNo-MiraclesArgument

The reconstructedNo-MiraclesArgumentis far fromconclusive.It
appealsto scientist'spropensityto get at the truth, to explaintheir
empiricalsuccess.Butperhapswe can explainthis by supposingthat
theyhavea propensityto get at empiricallyadequatetheories,without
the morespecifictendencyto getat the truth.Of course,scientistscan-
not straightforwardlyselecttheirtheoriesto entailallthe data,sincea
fairamountof the datais not knownwhenthe theoryis chosen(it is
theirpredictions,not accommodations whichneedexplaining).Still,
theremightbe someindirectmeansby whichthe processof scientific
theorizingtends towardsuccessfultheories,without tendingmore
specifically
towardthetruth.A thoroughdefenceof realismwillhaveto
showwhytruth-propensity providesa betterexplanationof scientific
successthanempirical-adequacy-propensity.22
A thoroughassessmentof thesecompetingexplanationsis beyond
the scopeof thispaper.Butit is interestingto considerthe prospectsof
a more aggressiveantirealistresponse,which tries to show in more
detailhowthesuccessof scienceneedhavenothingto do withan aimat
the truth.Hereit is worthconsideringthe neo-Darwinianresponse
whichvanFraassen(1980)offersto the No-Miracles Argument:
Thesuccessof currentscientifictheoriesis no miracle.It is not evensurpris-
ing to the scientific(Darwinist)mind.Foranyscientifictheoryis borninto
a lifeof fiercecompetition,a jungleredin toothandclaw.Onlythesuccess-
fultheoriessurvive.(p. 40)
Theforceof thisobjectiondependson howwe construethe argument
againstwhichit is directed.Againstthe standardNo-MiraclesArgu-
ment,it carriesno forceat all. Thefactthatunsuccessfultheoriesare
selectedagainstmayexplainwhyno suchtheoriesarecurrentlyheld,
that is, that all currentlyheld theoriesaresuccessful.But it does not
21 On the surface,
RichardBoyd's(1984)subtleversionof theNo-Miracles Argument seemsto
be morealongthelinesI amsuggesting, ashisproposedexplanandum is not thesuccessof scien-
tifictheories,butthe successof the methodologyin producingsuccessfultheories.However,in-
steadof appealingto the truth-aimof the methodology,to explainits success,whichin turn
supportstheresultsof themethodology, Boydexplainsthemethodology's successin termsof the
approximate truthof thebackground theorieson whichthemethodology crucially
depends.
22 Notethatthisresponse doesnot underminetheargument forStrongPredictionism.
A theo-
rist'saimat the truthis stillmorestronglyconfirmedgiventhata datumwaspredictedthanif it
wasaccommodated, evenif thisdifferenceis diminishedby the alternative
empirical-adequacy
aimhypothesis.

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 TheEpistemicAdvantageof PredictionoverAccommodation679

explainwhy thoseverytheoriesaresuccessful.(Compare:the factthat

penswhichdo not workarequicklydiscarded,explainswhyno such
pensareused,thatis, thatallcurrentlyusedpenswork.Butit doesnot
explainwhythoseverypenswork).Thereremainsthequestion,foreach
currentlyacceptedtheory,why it entailsthe data.23And a potential
explanationfor this factis thatthe theoryis true (eventhough,as we
haveseen,thisdoesnot by itselfmeetthe antirealist challenge).
Somethinglike VanFraassen'sresponse,however,might seem to
underminethe reconstructedversionof the No-MiraclesArgument.
Forherethe explanandum is thefactthatscientistshappento holdsuc-
cessfultheories.Andit looksas thoughwe canexplainthisfactby not-
ing thatunsuccessfultheoriesarequicklydiscarded.Butherewe need
to be careful.Whatwe need to explainis not just thatscientistscur-
rentlyholdonlysuccessfultheories,thatis, thattheyholdno unsuccess-
ful ones thiswouldbe the caseif theyheldno theoriesat all.Wealso
wantto explainwhytheyhold manysuccessfultheories.Thefactthat
Janedrivesonlyreliableusedcarsmightbe explainedby herpolicyof
gettingridof carsthatdo not work.Butwe mightstillwonderhowshe
managedto get a reliableusedcarat all since(let'ssuppose)the vast
majorityof usedcarson themarketarelemons.Theanswermightlie in
her skillin checkingthe engine,transmission,and so on, and hence
beingableto picka goodcarfroma badone.
Recallthe strikingfactthat Fredcameup with a successfultheory
concerningthe riggingof the lottery.Of course,if Janehadnot won,
thenFred'stheorythatthe lotterywasriggedin herfavourwouldhave
beenquicklydiscarded.ButthefactthatFredcurrentlyholdsa success-
ful theory,is hardlyexplainedawayby the factthatif it hadnot been
successful,then Fredwouldnot still hold it. Wearestill struckby the
factthathe managedto come up with a successfultheoryin the first
place.TotaketheDarwiniananalogyseriously,it wouldbe a miracleif a
single mutationproducedan entirelynew complexorganismwell
adaptedto its environment.Wecould not dispelits amazingnessby
notingthat if the organismhad not turnedout just the wayit did, it
wouldnot havesurvived.
Whatis requiredto dispelthe miracle,is a vast plenitudeof such
mutations,mostof whichareselectedagainst.Theplenitudeof muta-
tions explainswhy thereare some 'successful'organisms,while the

23 Something like this has been noted by proponents of the No-Miracles Argument, such as

Musgrave(1988), Lipton (1991),Leplin (1997)and Psillos (1999). This might partly explain why
they insist on the standardversion of the argument,the versionwhich I have arguedfails to meet
the antirealistchallenge.

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680 RogerWhite

selectionexplainswhythereareonlysuccessfulones.Perhapsif Fredhad
been in the habitof proposinglotteryriggingtheorieseverydayfor
years,we shouldfindit less remarkable thathe managedto come up
with a successfulone eventually(similarly,perhapsJane'ssuccessin
pickingreliableusedcarshasnothingto do withautomotiveexpertise,
but ratherherpolicyof buyingdozensof cars,andditchingthosethat
stop working).The plenitudeof Fred'sattemptedtheorieswouldnot
explainwhy,in the caseof Jane'slotteryhe managedto hit upona suc-
cessfultheory.Heretheremaybe no explanationat all,thatis, he was
justlucky.Buttheywouldmakehis successlesssurprising, andhence
lessin needof an explanationin termsof his reliableconnectionto the
truth.
So we at leastget a glimpseat howwe mightrenderit non-miracu-
lousthatscientistsmanageto comeup withtheorieswhicharemarve-
louslysuccessfulin applicationssuchas aeronautics.Veryroughly,it
mightbe a matterof trialand error.Plentyof dud theoriesaresug-
gestedandrejectedwhentheyfail,renderingit unremarkable thatsci-
entistscurrentlyholdsuccessfulones.Therearetwocomponentsto the
explanation, as therearetwofactsto explain:
(S1) Scientistscurrentlyholdsomesuccessfultheories
(S2) Scientistscurrentlyholdonlysuccessfultheories
VanFraassen's pointaboutthe harshenvironmentinto whichtheories
arebornexplainsS2, whilethe multipleattemptsat successfultheories
explainS1.
Thismereglimpsehowever,seemsinsufficient to groundanyconclu-
sions. We need to look at such factorsas just how remarkablethe
successesof scienceareandtheratioof successfulto unsuccessful theo-
ries,amongthosetheoriesthathavebeenproposed,not merelythose
currentlyheld.At leaston the faceof it, it doesnot seemthatscientists
havebeenchurningout so manyunsuccessful theoriesthata fewstar-
tlingsuccessesareto be expected by chance. What I hopeto havedone
in the precedingdiscussionis clarifyhowthedebateshouldgo.Asmat-
ters stand,it seemsthat we need to explain,or at least rendernon-
miraculous,the factthatscientistsmanageto come up with so many
remarkably successfultheories.An explanationmightlie in the mecha-
nisms of theory selectionbeing directedtowardthe truth, and the
acceptanceof suchan explanationshouldincreaseour confidencein
thetruthof scientifictheoriesin general.Butthisexplanation threatens
to be undercutby the alternativeexplanation that the mechanisms of

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 ofPrediction
Advantage
TheEpistemic 681
overAccommodation

theoryselectionaredirectedtowardsuccessfultheories,withoutbeing
morespecificallydirectedtowardthe truth.VanFraassenGs attemptto
showhow this mightworkis suggestive,yet not compellingwithouta
lot moredetail.Howmatterswillstandwhenthe detailsareconsidered
is an openquestion.24

DepartmentofPhilosophy ROGER WHITE

NewYor1c University
503SilverCenter
100WashingtonSquareEast
NewYork, NY10003
USA
rlwS@nyu.edu

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