268 • Chapter 6 Consumer Buyer Behaxriour

European Journal of Marketing, 28, 1 (1990), pp. 56-71.
32. Keith B. .Murray, 'A test of services marketing theory:
consumer information acquisition theory', Journal of
Marketing (January 1991], pp. 10-25.
3,1. The ratings are based on those given in 'Product test:
compaei cameras', Whifh? (November 1994), pp. 21-6.
34. This was developed by Martin Fishbein. See Martin Fishbein
and leek Ajzen, Belief, Attittule, Intention, and Bvhaviow
(Reading, MA: Addistin-Wesley, 1975). For a eritiual review of
this model, see Paul W. Miniard and Joel B. Cohen, 'An
examination of the Kishbein-Ajzen behavioral intentions
model's concepts arid measures', Journal of Kxperimetual
Social Psychology (May 1981), pp. 309-99
35. Raymond A. Bauer, 'Consumer behaviour as risk taking*, in
Donald K Cox (ed.), Risk Taking and Information Handling
in Consumer Behaviour (Boston, MA: Division of Research,
Harvard Business Sehool, 1967); John W. Vann, 'A multi-
distributional conceptual framework for the study of
perceived risk', in Thomas C. Kinnear (ed.), Advances in
Consumer Research, vol. 11 (Provo, LIT: Association for
Consumer Research, 1983), pp. 442-6; Robert B. Settle and
Pamela L. Alreck, 'Reducing buyers' sense of risk'. Marketing
Communications (January 1989), pp. 19-24.
' 36. See Leon Pestinger, A Theory of Gognitfae l>issonance
(StunlYird, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957); Schiffman
and Kanuk, Consumer Behaviour, op. cit., pp. 304-5.
37. See Karl Albreot and Ron Zernke, Service America.'
(Ilomewood, IL: Dow-Jones Irwin, 1985), pp. 6-7; Frank
Rose, 'Now quality means service too', Fortune (22 April
1991), pp. 97-108.
38. The following discussion draws heavily from Everett M.
Rogers, Diffusion o/Innowoffens, 3rd edn (New York: Free
Press. 1983); see also Hubert Gangnon and Thomas S.
Robertson, 'A prepositional inventory for new diffusion
research', Journal of Consumer Research (March 1985),
pp. 849-67.
39. See Sohiffman and Kanuk, Consumer Behaviour, op. eit,
ch. 18,
40. For these and other examples, see ibid.
41. Mir Maqbool Alam Khan, 'Kello^ reports brisk cereal sales in
India', Advertising Age, 14 November 1994, p, 60.
42. For these and other examples, see William J, Stanton,
Michael J. Etzel and Bruce J. Walker, Fundamentals <if
Marketing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 536.

Case 6
Bic Versus Gillette: The Disposable Wars
ABOUT HALF OF ALL WESTERN men get up each morning, confront their
stubble in the bathroom mirror and reach for a cheap disposable plastic
razor. Schiek, Bic, Gillette, Wilkinson or whatever, most men think that one
brand does as well as the next. Also, the razor makers seem always to have
them on sale, so you can scoop up a dozen of them for next to nothing.
The Gillette Company does not like this sort of thinking. Of course,
women also use Gillette's razors, but Gillette worries about the growing
number of men who use disposables. The company makes about three times
more money per unit on cartridge refills for its Atra and Trac 11 razor
systems than it does on its Good News! disposables. However, since the first
disposables appeared in 1975, their sales have grown faster than those of
system razors. By 1988 disposables accounted for 40 per cent of shaving-
product money sales and more than 50 per cent of unit sales.

Gillette: The Defender

Gillette dominates the world wet-shave industry with a 61 per cent share.
Schiek is second with a 16.2 per cent share, Bic has 9.3 per cent and others,
including Wilkinson, account for most of the rest of the market. In 1988
Gillette's blades and razors produced 32 per cent of its $3.5 billion sales and
61 per cent of its $268 million net income.
 Case 6: Bic Versus Gillette • 269

Gillette earned its dominant position in the market through large invest-
ments in research and development and through careful consumer research,
Every day, about 10,000 men carefully record the results of their shaves for
Gillette. Five hundred of these men shave in special in-plant cubicles under
carefully controlled and monitored conditions, including observation
through two-way mirrors and video cameras. Shavers record the precise
number of nicks and cuts. In certain cases, researchers even collect sheared
whiskers to weigh and measure. As a result, Gillette scientists know that an
average man's beard grows 0.04 cm a day (14 cm per year) and contains
15.500 hairs. During an average lifetime, a man will spend 140 days scraping
8.4 metres of whiskers from his face. Gillette even uses electron micro-
scopes to study blade surfaces and miniature cameras to analyze the actual
shaving process.
Armed with its knowledge of shavers and shaving, Gillette prides itself in
staying ahead of the competition. As soon as competitors adjust to one
shaving system, Gillette introduces another advance. In 1971 Gillette intro-
duced the Trac II, the first razor system featuring two parallel blades
mounted in a cartridge. Tn 1977, following $8 million in R & D expenditure,
the company introduced Atra, a twin-blade cartridge that swivels during
shaving to.follow the face's contours. In 1985 Gillette launched the Atra Plus,
which added a lubricating strip to the Atra cartridge to make shaving even
smoother.
Although the company's founder, King Gillette, considered developing a
disposable product early in the company's life, Gillette's marketing strategy
has focused on developing products that use refill blades on a permanent
handle. Gillette works to give its blades, and especially its handles, an aura
of class and superior performance. By promoting new captive systems, in
which blade cartridges fit only a certain razor handle. Gillette raises price
and profit margins with each new technological leap. Atra cartridges do not
fit the TVac II handle, so men had to buy a new handle to allow them to use
the Atra blades when Gillette introduced that system.
Gillette has never bothered with the low end of the market - cheap,
private-label blades. Status-seeking men, it believes, will always buy a classy
product. Most men see shaving as a serious business and their appearance as
a matter of some importance. Therefore, most men will not skimp and settle
for an ordinary shave when, for a little more money, they can feel confident
that Gillette's products give them the best shave.

Bic: The Challenge

The rapid rise of the disposable razor has challenged Gillette's view of men's
shaving philosophy. Bic first introduced the disposable shaver in 1975 in
Europe and then a year later in Canada. Realizing that the United States
would be next, Gillette introduced the first disposable razor to the US
market in 1976 - the blue plastic Good News! which used a Trac 11 blade.
Despite its defensive reaction, Gillette predicted that men would use the
disposable only for trips and in the changing room when they had forgotten
their real razor. Disposables would never capture more than 7 per cent of
the market, Gillette asserted.
Marcel Bich, Bic's French founder, is devoted to disposability. Rich made
his money by developing the familiar ballpoint pen. lie pursues a strategy of
turning status products into commodities. Often a product has status
because it is difficult to make and must sell at a high price. However, if a
manufacturer develops ways to mass produce the product at low cost with
little loss of functional quality, its status and allure disappear. Consumers
270 Chapter 6 Consumer Buyer Behaviour

will then not fee] embarrassed to buy and be seen using the new, cheaper
version of the product. Bich brands his products, strips them of their
glamour, distributes them widely and sells them cheaply. His marketing
strategy is simple: maximum service; minimum price.
Bic attacks the shaving business in a very different manner from
Gillette. It docs not have anyone exploring the fringe of shaving technology;
it does not even own an electron microscope; and it does not know or care
how many hairs the average man's beard contains. The company maintains
only a small shave-lesting panel consisting of about 100 people. The Bic
shaver has only one blade mounted on a short, hollow handle. Nevertheless,
the Bic disposable razor presents Gillette with its most serious challenge
since the company's early days. In 1988 Bie's shaving products achieved $52
million in sales with a net income of $9.4 million and held a 22.4 per cent
share of the disposable market.

Early Battles
In their pursuits of disposability, Gillette and Bic have clashed before on
other product fronts. First, in the' 1950s, they fought for market share in the
writing pen market. Gillette's Paper Mate products, however, were no match
for Bic's mass-market advertising and promotion skills. The two firms met
again in the 1970s in the disposable eigarette lighter arena, where they again
made commodities of what had once been prestigious and sometimes expen-
sive items. Ahhough Gillette did better in disposable lighters than it had in
pens, Ric's lighter captured the dominant market share.
In the most recent skirmish, however, Gillette's Good News! brand is
winning with a 58 per cent market share in the disposable razor market. For
Gillette, the victory is bittersweet. Good News! sells for a lot less than any of
Gillette's older products. The key to commodity competition is price. To
stay competitive with the Bic razor and with other disposables, Gillette has
to sell Good News! for much less than the retail price of an Atra or Trac 11
cartridge. As many Trac II and Atra users have concluded; why pay more for
a twin-blade refill cartridge from Gillette when the same blade mounted on a
plastic handle costs half as much? Good News! not only produces less
revenue per blade sold, it also costs more because Gillette has to supply the
handle as well as the cartridge. Each time Good News! gains a market share
point, Gillette loses millions of dollars in sales and profits from its Atra and
Trac II products,

The Psychology of Shaving

The battle between Bic and Gillette represents more than a simple contest
over what kinds of razor people want to use. It symbolizes a clash over one
of the most enduring daily rituals. Before King Gillette invented the safety
razor, men found shaving a tedious, difficult, time-consuming and often
bloody task that they endured at most twice a week. Only the rich could
afford to have a barber shave them daily.
Gillette patented the safety razor in 1904, but it was not until World War
1 that the product gained wide consumer acceptance. Gillette had the bril-
liant idea of having the military give a free Gillette razor to every soldier. In
this manner, millions of men just entering the shaving age were introduced
to the daily, self-shaving habit.
The morning shaving ritual continues to occupy a very special place in
most men's lives - it affirms their masculinity. The first shave remains a rite
of passage into manhood. A survey by New York psychologists reported that,
although men complain about the bother of shaving, 97 per ecnt would not
 Cast' 6: flic Versus Gillette 271

want to use a cream that would permanently rid them of all facial hair.
Gillette once introduced a new razor that eame in versions for heavy,
medium and light beards. Almost no one bought the light version because
few men wanted to acknowledge publicly their modest beard production.
Although shaving may require less skill and involve less danger than tt once
did, many men still want the razors they use to reflect their belief that
shaving is a serious business. A typical man regards his razor as an impor-
tant personal tool, a kind of extension of self, like an expensive pen, ciga-
rette lighter, attache case or set of golf clubs.

Gillette's Fight Back

For more than 80 years Gillette's perception of the men's shaving market
and the psychology of shaving has been perfect. Its products hold a substan-
tial 61 per cent share and its technology and marketing philosophy have
held sway over the entire industry. CJillette has worked successfully to main-
tain the razor's masculine look, weight and feel as well as its status as an
item of personal identification. Now, however, millions of men are scraping
their faces each day with small, nondescript, passionless pieces of plastic -
an act that seems to be the ultimate denial of the shaving ritual. Good News!
is bad news for Gillette. Gillette must find a way to dispose of the dispos-
ables.

QUESTIONS
1. Who iw involved in a man's decision to buy a disposable razor and what
roles do various participants play?
2. Do these participants and roles differ for the decision to buy a system
razor?
3. What types of buying-decision behaviour do men exhibit when
purchasing razors?
4. Examine a man's decision process for buying a wet-shave razor. How
have Gillette and Bic pursued different strategies concerning this
process?
5. What explains Bic's differing success in competing against Gillette in
the disposable pen, lighter and shaver market? Why do you think Bie
perfume failed?
6. What marketing strategy should Gillette adopt to encourage men to
switch from disposables to system razors? How would buyer decision
processes towards new products affect your recommendations?

SOURCE: Portions adapted from 'The Gillette Company', in Subhash C. Jain, Marketing
Strategy and Pnlicy, 3rd edn {Cincinnati, OH: Sou tli we stern, 1990). Used with permission.