Mathay vs CA

320 SCRA 703

1999

FACTS: During his administration, Simon appointed the three private respondents for

the Civil Service Units pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later
held in an opinion of the Ministry of Justice that the PD wasn’t published in the Official
Gazette and therefore, didn’t become a proper law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an
order for the revocation of same appointments. The then mayor Simon remedied this by
issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the appointees to the
created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department didn’t quite reach
fruition due to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be
filled. The mayor then issued contractual appointments, which was carried over by the
next mayor Mathay. But at the expiration of the said contractual appointments, it was
no longer approved, prompting the private respondents to file a complaint with the
CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the
previous ordinance issued.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether or not private respondents should be reinstated?; and

2) Whether or not the CSC has the authority to direct the mayor to reinstate private
respondents?

HELD:

1) NO. It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The
right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring
it. Since Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it could not
be a source of rights. Neither could it impose duties. It could not afford any
protection. It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never
passed.

In Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that "a void appointment

cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the
appointment."

While the Court of Appeals was correct when it stated that "the abolition of an
office does not mean the invalidity of appointments thereto," this cannot apply to
 the case at bar. In this case, the CSU was not abolished. It simply did not come
into existence as the Presidential Decree creating it never became law.

At the most, private respondents held temporary and contractual appointments.

The non-renewal of these appointments cannot therefore be taken against
petitioner.

2) NO. The CSC has no authority to direct the mayor to reinstate

the private respondents.

Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of

the ordinance in ordering the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. The
questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of the defunct
CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions.
Hence, the city council is in effect through the ordinance dictating who
shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions. However, a review of the
old Local Government Code shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively
with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the
city council through a simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides
for the absorption of specific persons to certain positions.

In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of

the personnel without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the
mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping statement that the doctrine
of separation of powers doesn’t apply to local governments, which is wrong. The
powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated separately
and delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor
while the power to create, consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions
supported by local funds belongs to the city council.
By ordering the mayor to reinstate private respondents, the CSC substituted its
own judgment to the appointing power of the mayor. This cannot be done. The
CSC’s power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It doesn’t
have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made.