Northern Alliance

The Northern Alliance, officially known as the

United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of United Islamic National Front for
Afghanistan (Dari: ‫ﺟﺒﻬﻪ ﻣﺘﺤﺪ اﺳﻼﻣﯽ ﻣﻠﯽ ﺑﺮای‬ the Salvation of Afghanistan
‫ ﻧﺠﺎت اﻓﻐﺎﻧﺴﺘﺎن‬Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islāmi-yi Millī
barāyi Nijāt-i Afghānistān), was a military alliance of
groups that operated between late 1996 to 2001[4] after
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) took over
Kabul. The United Front was originally assembled by
key leaders of the Islamic State of Afghanistan,
particularly president Burhanuddin Rabbani and
former Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud.[5]
Initially it included mostly Tajiks but by 2000, leaders
of other ethnic groups had joined the Northern
Alliance. This included Karim Khalili, Abdul Rashid
Dostum, Abdullah Abdullah, Mohammad Mohaqiq,
Abdul Qadir, Asif Mohseni, Amrullah Saleh and
others.[6]

The Northern Alliance fought a defensive war against

the Taliban regime.[4] They received support from
India, Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, Israel, Turkmenistan, Top: Flags flown by the United Islamic Front
United States and Uzbekistan,[7] while the Taliban Bottom: The territorial control of the Northern
were extensively backed by the Pakistan Army and Alliance (blue) against that of the Taliban (red)
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.[3] By 2001 the in Afghanistan in 1996
Northern Alliance controlled less than 10% of the
Leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani
country, cornered in the north-east and based in
Abdullah Abdullah
Badakhshan province. The US invaded Afghanistan,
providing support to Northern Alliance troops on the Ahmad Shah Massoud
ground in a two-month war against the Taliban, which Abdul Rashid Dostum
they won in December 2001.[8] With the Taliban Haji Abdul Qadeer
forced from control of the country, the Northern Muhammad Mohaqiq
Alliance was dissolved as members and parties Karim Khalili
supported the new Afghan Interim Administration,
Dates of operation September 1996 –
with some members later becoming part of the Karzai
December 2001
administration.
Headquarters Taloqan, Afghanistan
Amidst the Fall of Kabul in 2021, former Northern (until September 2000)[1]
Alliance leaders and other anti-Taliban figures have Fayzabad, Afghanistan
now been regrouped as the National Resistance Front (2000–November 2001)[2]
of Afghanistan.
Active regions Afghanistan
Ideology Anti-Taliban
Anti-Terrorism
Contents Anti-Al-Qaeda
Commanders and factions Allies
Headquarters India
History Russia
Background Iran
Creation of the United Front
Tajikistan
Pakistani military interference
Turkmenistan
Taliban massacres
Ahmad Shah Massoud United States

Post 9/11 Uzbekistan

Legacy Opponents
Taliban
Reformation (2011)
al-Qaeda
2021 resurgence
Pakistan[3]
Human rights issues (1996–2001)
Area of Ahmad Shah Massoud Battles and wars the War in Afghanistan
Area of Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Global War on
Terrorism
See also
References
External links

Commanders and factions

The United Front was formed in late 1996 against the Taliban government by opposition factions. Since
early 1999, Ahmad Shah Massoud was the only main leader able to defend his territory against the Taliban,
and as such remained as the main de facto political and military leader of the United Front recognized by
members of all the different ethnic groups. Massoud decided on the main political line and the general
military strategy of the alliance. A part of the United Front military factions, such as Junbish-i Milli or
Hezb-e Wahdat, however, did not fall under the direct control of Massoud but remained under their
respective regional or ethnic leaders.

Military commanders of the United Front were either independent or belonged to one of the following
political parties:

the Sunni Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e Islami and Shura-e Nazar, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani
and Ahmad Shah Massoud
the Shia Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat, led by Muhammad Mohaqiq and Karim Khalili
the Sunni Uzbek and Turkmen-dominated Junbish-i Milli, led by Abdul Rashid Dostum
the Sunni Pashtun-dominated Eastern Shura, led by Haji Abdul Qadeer
the Shia Tajik and Hazara-dominated Harakat-e Islami, led by Asif Mohseni and Sayed
Mohammad Ali Jawid

Military commanders and subcommanders of the United Front included:

From northern Afghanistan: Bismillah Khan Mohammadi (Jamiat-e Islami), Atta Muhammad
Nur (Jamiat-e Islami), Mohammed Daud Daud (Jamiat-e Islami), Mohammed Fahim (Jamiat-
e Islami), Gul Haidar (Jamiat-e Islami), Muhammad Mohaqiq (Hezb-e Wahdat), Abdul
Rashid Dostum (Junbish-i Milli), Qazi Kabir Marzban;
From eastern Afghanistan: Haji Abdul Qadeer (Eastern Shura), Hazrat Ali (Eastern Shura),
Jaan Daad Khan, Abdullah Wahedi, Qatrah and Najmuddin;
From southern Afghanistan: Qari Baba, Mohammad Arif Noorzai and Hotak;
 From western Afghanistan: Ismail Khan (Jamiat-e Islami), Doctor Ibrahim, and Fazlkarim
Aimaq;
From central Afghanistan: Sayed Mustafa Kazemi (Hezb-e Wahdat), Said Hussein Aalemi
Balkhi, Akbari, Sayed Mohammad Ali Jawid, Karim Khalili (Hezb-e Wahdat) and Sher Alam
Ibrahimi (Ittehad-e Islami).

The two main political candidates in the 2009 Afghan presidential election both worked for the United
Front:

Abdullah Abdullah (was a close friend of Ahmad Shah Massoud and the foreign minister of
the alliance)
Hamid Karzai (his father was killed by the Taliban, he subsequently went on a diplomatic
mission to gather support for Massoud in Europe and the U.S in 2000/2001)

Headquarters

Initially, the city of Mazar-i-Sharif under Dostum's control served as one of the Northern Alliance's
headquarters, until the city was overrun in 1997. Under Massoud's control, Taloqan in Takhar Province,
north of Panjshir, was the group's headquarters until September 5, 2000, when the city was taken by the
Taliban[9] and led to its base moving to Badakhshan Province.[2] Massoud also maintained a private
residence in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. It was there where Massoud would meet international diplomatic staff
who supported the Northern Alliance.[10]

History

Background

After the fall of the Soviet-backed communist Najibullah

government in 1992, the Afghan political parties agreed on
a peace and power-sharing agreement (the Peshawar
Accords). The accords created the Islamic State of
Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a
transitional period to be followed by general elections.
According to Human Rights Watch:

The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested

formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan,
an entity created in April 1992, after the fall of
the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. [...]
With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties [...] were
ostensibly unified under this government in
April 1992. [...] Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami,
for its part, refused to recognize the
government for most of the period discussed
in this report and launched attacks against
government forces and Kabul generally. [...]
Shells and rockets fell everywhere.[11]
Afghanistan after the Soviet retreat. Shura-e
Nazar/Jamiat-e Islami (blue), Hezb-e Wahdat
and Harakat-e Islami (yellow), Ittehad-e Islami
(violet), communist groups including Junbish-i
Milli (red), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (dark
green), Hezb-e Islami Khalis (white-green
striped), Harakat-i-Inqilab including many later
Taliban (light green).
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from Pakistan.[12] Afghanistan
expert Amin Saikal concludes in Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival:

Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia. [...] Islamabad could not
possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders [...] to subordinate their own nationalist
objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. [...] Had it not been for the
ISI's logistic support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not
have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul.[13]

In addition, Saudi Arabia and Iran, as competitors for regional hegemony, supported Afghan militias hostile
towards each other.[13] According to Human Rights Watch, Iran was backing the Shia Hazara Hezb-e
Wahdat forces of Abdul Ali Mazari in order to "maximize Wahdat's military power and
influence".[11][13][14] Saudi Arabia supported the Wahhabite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittehad-e Islami
faction.[11][13] A publication by the George Washington University describes:

[O]utside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own security
and political agendas.[15]

Conflict between the two militias soon escalated into a full-scale war.

Due to the sudden initiation of the war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice
and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities
were committed by individuals of the different armed factions while Kabul descended into lawlessness and
chaos as described in reports by Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Justice Project.[11][16] Because
of the chaos, some leaders increasingly had only nominal control over their (sub-)commanders.[17] Human
Rights Watch writes:

Rare ceasefires, usually negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah

Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani [the interim government], or officials from the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days.[11]

Meanwhile, southern Afghanistan was under the control of local leaders not affiliated with the central
government in Kabul. In 1994, the Taliban – a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam–run
religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan – also developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious
force.[18] In November 1994 they took control of the southern city of Kandahar and subsequently
expanded their control into several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan not under the central
government's control.[17]

In late 1994, most of the militia factions which had been fighting in the battle for control of Kabul were
defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic State's Minister of Defense Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Bombardment of the capital came to a halt.[16][19][20] The Islamic State government took steps to restore
law and order.[21] Courts started to work again.[21] Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process
with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process
but they refused as they opposed a democratic system.[22]

The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995 but were defeated by forces of the Islamic State
government under Ahmad Shah Massoud.[19] Amnesty International, referring to the Taliban offensive,
wrote in a 1995 report:
 This is the first time in several months that Kabul
civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and
shelling aimed at residential areas in the city.[19]

The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of

defeats that resulted in heavy losses which led analysts to believe
the Taliban movement had run its course.[17] At that point Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia drastically increased their support to the
Taliban.[13][23] Many analysts like Amin Saikal describe the
Taliban as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan's regional Map of the situation in Afghanistan in
interests.[13] On September 26, 1996, as the Taliban with military late 1996; Massoud (red), Dostum
(green) and Taliban (yellow)
support by Pakistan and financial support by Saudi Arabia,
territories.
prepared for another major offensive against the capital Kabul,
Massoud ordered a full retreat from the city.[24] The Taliban seized
Kabul on September 27, 1996, and established the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan.

Creation of the United Front

Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, former enemies, created the United Front (Northern
Alliance) against the Taliban that were preparing offensives against the remaining areas under the control of
Massoud and those under the control of Dostum. The United Front included beside the dominantly Tajik
forces of Massoud and the Uzbek forces of Dostum, Hazara troops led by Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq and
Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq and Haji Abdul Qadir. Notable
politicians and diplomats of the United Front included Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, Abdullah Abdullah and
Masood Khalili. From the Taliban conquest of Kabul in September 1996 until November 2001 the United
Front controlled roughly 30% of Afghanistan's population in provinces such as Badakhshan, Kapisa,
Takhar and parts of Parwan, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan, Kunduz, Ghōr and Bamyan.

Pakistani military interference

Due to the involvement of Indian intelligence (RAW) in supporting the Northern Alliance, Pakistan looked
to neutralise this threat by cultivating the Taliban.[25] The assistance provided by India was extensive,
including uniforms, ordnance, mortars, small armaments, refurbished Kalashnikovs, combat and winter
clothes, as well as funds.[26] In 2001 alone, according to several international sources, 28,000–30,000
Afghans, who took refuge in Pakistan during Afghan jihad, 14,000–15,000 Afghan Taliban and 2,000–
3,000 Al Qaeda militants were fighting against anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan as a roughly 45,000
strong military force.[22][27][28][29] Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf – then as Chief of Army Staff –
was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and Bin Laden against
the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud.[22][23][30] Of the estimated 28,000 Afghan refugees returned from
Pakistan fighting in Afghanistan, 8,000 were militants recruited in madrassas filling regular Taliban
ranks.[27] A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirms that "20–40 percent of [regular]
Taliban soldiers are returned Afghans from Pakistani refugee camps".[23]

Human Rights Watch wrote in 2000:

Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting [in
Afghanistan], Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its
efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations,
 providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for
Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies,
planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel,
and ... directly providing combat support.[31]

On August 1, 1997 the Taliban launched an attack on Sheberghan, the main military base of Abdul Rashid
Dostum. Dostum has said the reason the attack was successful was due to 1500 Pakistani commandos
taking part and that the Pakistani air force also gave support.[32]

In 1998, Iran accused Pakistan of sending its air force to bomb Mazar-i-Sharif in support of Taliban forces
and directly accused Pakistani troops for "war crimes at Bamiyan".[33] The same year Russia said that
Pakistan was responsible for the military expansion of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan by sending large
numbers of Pakistani troops, some of whom had subsequently been taken as prisoners by the anti-Taliban
United Front.[34]

In 2000, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against military support to the Taliban, with
UN officials explicitly singling out Pakistan. The UN secretary-general implicitly criticized Pakistan for its
military support and the Security Council stated it was "deeply distress[ed] over reports of involvement in
the fighting, on the Taliban side, of thousands of non-Afghan nationals".[35] In July 2001, several countries
including the United States, accused Pakistan of being "in violation of U.N. sanctions because of its
military aid to the Taliban".[36]

In 2000, British Intelligence reported that the ISI was taking an active role in several Al Qaeda training
camps.[37] The ISI helped with the construction of training camps for both the Taliban and Al
Qaeda.[37][38][39] From 1996 to 2001 the Al Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became
a state within the Taliban state.[40] Bin Laden sent Arab and Central Asian Al-Qaeda militants to join the
fight against the United Front among them his Brigade 055.[40][41]

With the fall of Kabul to anti-Taliban forces in November 2001, ISI forces worked with and helped Taliban
militias who were in full retreat.[42] In November 2001, Taliban, Al-Qaeda combatants and ISI operatives
were safely evacuated from Kunduz on Pakistan Air Force cargo aircraft to Pakistan Air Force bases in
Chitral and Gilgit in Pakistan's Northern Areas in what has been dubbed the "Airlift of Evil".[43]

The role of the Pakistani military has been described by international observers as well as by the anti-
Taliban leader Ahmad Shah Massoud as a "creeping invasion".[44] The "creeping invasion" proved unable
to defeat the severely outnumbered anti-Taliban forces.[44]

Taliban massacres

According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over
northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians.[45][46] UN officials
stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001.[45][46] They also said, that "[t]hese have
been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar
himself".[45][46] Al Qaeda's so-called 055 Brigade was also responsible for mass-killings of Afghan
civilians.[27] The report by the United Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab
fighters "carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people".[45][46]

Ahmad Shah Massoud

 The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is Ahmad Shah Massoud.[47]

After longstanding battles especially for the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, Abdul Rashid Dostum and his
Junbish-i Milli forces alongside allied Hezb-e Wahdat forces were defeated by the Taliban and their allies in
1998. Dostum subsequently went into exile. Ahmad Shah Massoud remained the only major anti-Taliban
leader inside the country who was able to defend vast parts of his territory against the Pakistani Army, the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda, not once leaving Afghanistan except for diplomatic purposes.[48][49]

The Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud money and a position of power to make him stop his resistance.
Massoud declined. He explained in one interview:

The Taliban say: "Come and accept the post of prime minister and be with us", and they
would keep the highest office in the country, the presidentship. But for what price?! The
difference between us concerns mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of the
society and the state. We can not accept their conditions of compromise, or else we would
have to give up the principles of modern democracy. We are fundamentally against the system
called "the Emirate of Afghanistan".[50]

There should be an Afghanistan where every Afghan finds himself or herself happy. And I
think that can only be assured by democracy based on consensus.[51]

Massoud wanted to convince the Taliban to join a political process leading towards democratic elections in
a foreseeable future.[50][52] He also stated:

The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the people
now. They are weaker than in the past. There is only the assistance given by Pakistan, Osama
bin Laden and other extremist groups that keep the Taliban on their feet. With a halt to that
assistance, it is extremely difficult to survive.[51]

In early 2001 the United Front employed a new strategy of local military pressure and global political
appeals.[53] Resentment was increasingly gathering against Taliban rule from the bottom of Afghan society
including the Pashtun areas.[53] In total, estimates range up to one million people fleeing the Taliban.[54]
Many civilians fled to the area of Ahmad Shah Massoud.[55][56] National Geographic concluded in its
documentary "Inside the Taliban": "The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is
Ahmad Shah Massoud".[30] In the areas under his control Massoud set up democratic institutions and
signed the Women's Rights Declaration.[57] At the same time he was very wary not to revive the failed
Kabul government of the early 1990s.[53] Already in 1999 the United Front leadership ordered the training
of police forces specifically to keep order and protect the civilian population in case the United Front would
be successful.[22] In early 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud addressed the European Parliament in Brussels
asking the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan.[54] He
stated that the Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without
the support of Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for
up to a year.[54] On this visit to Europe he also warned that his intelligence had gathered information about
a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent.[58]
On September 9, 2001, two Arab suicide attackers, allegedly belonging to Al Qaeda, posing as journalists,
detonated a bomb hidden in a video camera while interviewing Ahmed Shah Massoud in the Takhar
province of Afghanistan. Commander Massoud died in a helicopter that was taking him to a hospital. He
was buried in his home village of Bazarak in the Panjshir Valley.[59] The funeral, although taking place in a
rather rural area, was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourning people.

The assassination of Massoud is considered to have a strong connection to the attacks in the U.S. two days
later, which killed nearly 3,000 people and which appeared to be the terrorist attack that Massoud had
warned against in his speech to the European Parliament several months earlier. John P. O'Neill was a
counter-terrorism expert and the Assistant Director of the FBI until late 2001. He retired from the FBI and
was offered the position of director of security at the World Trade Center (WTC). He took the job at the
WTC two weeks before 9/11. On September 10, 2001, John O'Neill told two of his friends,

We're due. And we're due for something big. ... Some things have happened in Afghanistan
[referring to the assassination of Massoud]. I don't like the way things are lining up in
Afghanistan. ... I sense a shift, and I think things are going to happen. ... soon.[60]

O'Neill died the following day, when the south tower collapsed.[60]

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, United Front troops ousted the Taliban from power in
Kabul with American air support in Operation Enduring Freedom, using intelligence reports offered by Iran
during the Six plus Two Group meetings at the United Nations Headquarters. In November and December
2001 the United Front gained control of much of the country and played a crucial role in establishing the
post-Taliban interim government of Hamid Karzai in late 2001.

Post 9/11

After the September 11 attacks in the United States in 2001, the

United Front succeeded in retaking Kabul from the Taliban with
air support from US-led forces during Operation Enduring
Freedom. Despite fears of a return to the chaos similar to that of
the 1992–1996 civil war, all the Afghan leaders met in Germany to
create a new government. Hamid Karzai was chosen to lead the
country and most key positions were given to Tajik members of
the Northern Alliance. This created a major international issue.
While Pakistan has always favored Afghanistan's major ethnic
group, the Pashtun, India saw an opportunity for increasing its Territorial control of Northern Alliance
regional power by jumping on board with the support of the before the U.S invasion of
Northern Alliance in the early days of the war.[61] With both Afghanistan
nations seeking to increase or maintain their regional power
through opposing factions on the ground, the conflict in
Afghanistan has increasingly been seen by observers as a proxy-war between these powers.[62][63]

From 2002 to 2004 Afghanistan witnessed relative calm. By 2006, however, with the support of Pakistan, a
Taliban insurgency was increasingly gaining strength. In 2010, Afghan President Karzai decided that the
only way to end the Taliban insurgency is to call for peace. This process became accepted and supported
by all international partners of Afghanistan, except by several key figures of the Northern Alliance such as
Abdullah Abdullah, Ahmad Zia Massoud, Mohammad Mohaqiq, and others. The opposition, by then
splintered into several parties, warned that Karzai's appeasement policy could come at the cost of
Afghanistan's political and economic development, and the progress made in areas such as education and
women's rights. As the opposition leaders were excluded from
secret talks with the Taliban by NATO and the Karzai
administration and Karzai's political rhetoric was increasingly
adjusted to Taliban demands, United Front leaders, in late 2011,
regrouped to oppose a return of the Taliban to Afghanistan.
United Front troops lined up next to
Legacy the runway at Bagram Airfield in
Parwan Province. (December 16,
2001)
Between 1996 and 2001, the Northern Alliance blocked the
Taliban and al-Qaeda from gaining control of the entirety of
Afghanistan. Many internally displaced persons found shelter in areas controlled by Ahmad Shah Massoud.
After the September 2001 attacks in the United States, U.S. air raids followed by ground troops of the
United Front ousted the Taliban from power in Kabul. Between November and December 2001, the
United Front gained control of most major Afghan cities. Had it not been for the United Front, the U.S.
would have needed to deploy large number of ground troops, as was done in the Iraq War.

The United Front was influential in the transitional Afghan Government of Hamid Karzai from 2001 until
2004. Notably, Mohammed Fahim became the Vice President and Defense Minister, Yunus Qanuni became
the Minister of Education and Security Advisor and Abdullah Abdullah became the Foreign Minister. Most
foreign observers expected this dominance to continue and for Fahim or Qanuni to be selected as Karzai's
Vice President in the 2004 elections. However, Karzai instead selected Ahmad Zia Massoud, younger
brother of the former United Front leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. Karzai easily won the 2004 Presidential
election with 55.4% of the vote, followed by three former leaders of the Northern Alliance, Quanuni
(16.3%), Mohaqiq (11.7%) and Dostum (10%).

Some of the military strength of the UIF has now been absorbed into the military of Afghanistan, while
many of the remaining soldiers were disarmed through a nationwide disarmament program. The existence
and strength of the Afghan National Army has significantly reduced the threat of the former UIF elements
attempting to use military action against the new NATO-backed Afghan government. Most of the country's
senior military personnel are former members of the UIF, including Defense Minister Bismillah Khan
Mohammadi.

Some members of the alliance are now part of the United National Front (Afghanistan) which is led by
Rabbani and includes some former leaders of the UIF such as Yunus Qanuni, Mohammed Fahim, and
Abdul Rashid Dostum. The United National Front has positioned itself as a "loyal" opposition to Hamid
Karzai. Others like Abdul Rasul Sayyaf claim to be loyal to Hamid Karzai while, however, following their
own agenda.

Abdullah Abdullah, a doctor of medicine and one of Ahmad Shah Massoud's closest friends, ran as an
independent candidate in the 2009 Afghan presidential election and came in second place. On November 1,
2009, Abdullah, however, quit the runoff election because of widespread allegations of election fraud.
Some of his followers wanted to take to the streets but Abdullah called for calm. Massoud Khalili, another
of Ahmad Shah Massoud's close friends, became ambassador to India and subsequently to Turkey, while
the younger brother of Massoud, Ahmad Wali Massoud, serves as ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Massoud's ex-commander Bismillah Khan Mohammadi was chief-of-staff of the Afghan National Army,
then as Minister of the Interior followed by Minister of Defense. One of Massoud's close intelligence
agents, Amrullah Saleh, became director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in 2004 but had to
resign in 2010.

Reformation (2011)
The National Front of Afghanistan, which was created by Ahmad Zia Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum
and Mohammad Mohaqiq in late 2011 to oppose peace talks with Taliban, is generally considered as a
reformation of the military wing of the United Front.[64] Meanwhile, much of the political wing has
reunited under the National Coalition of Afghanistan led by Abdullah Abdullah.[65][66]

Former head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Amrullah Saleh, created a new movement,
Basej-i Milli, with support among the youth. It mobilized about 10,000 people in an anti-Taliban
demonstration in the capital Kabul in May 2011.[67][68][69] Former Northern Alliance strongman
Mohammed Fahim, Vice President of Afghanistan, remained in an alliance with Hamid Karzai until
Fahim's death in 2014.

2021 resurgence

Following a complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2021, the National Resistance Front of
Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud, son of late Afghan politician Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Vice
President Amrullah Saleh started gathering strength in Panjshir Valley.[70][71] The flag of the ‘Northern
Alliance’ or the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan was hoisted for the first time since
2001 in Panjshir valley signalling their return.

Human rights issues (1996–2001)

The human rights situation during combat was heavily dependent on the specific commander and his
troops. The situation for different leaders and their troops of the United Front thus shows sharp contrasts.
Also, the quality of life of the Afghan population was heavily dependent on the specific leader that was
directly controlling the area in which they lived. Sharp contrasts could also be witnessed regarding life and
structures in those areas.

Area of Ahmad Shah Massoud

Ahmad Shah Massoud controlled the Panjshir area, some other parts of Parwan and Thakhar province.
Some parts of Badakshan were under his influence while others were controlled by Burhanuddin Rabbani.
Badakshan was the home region of Rabbani.

Massoud created institutions which were structured into several committees: political, health, education and
economic.[22] In the area of Massoud women and girls were allowed to work and to go to school,[22] and
in at least two known instances Massoud personally intervened against cases of forced marriage.[72]
Women also did not have to wear the Afghan burqa.[22] While it was Massoud's stated conviction that men
and women are equal and should enjoy the same rights, he also had to deal with Afghan traditions which
he said would need a generation or more to overcome. In his opinion that could only be achieved through
education.[22]

Hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled from the Taliban to the areas controlled by Massoud.[73] There was
a huge humanitarian problem as there was not enough to eat for both the existing population and the
internally displaced Afghans. In 2001, Massoud and a French journalist described the bitter situation of the
displaced people and asked for humanitarian help.[73]

Area of Abdul Rashid Dostum

Until the conquest of Balkh by the Taliban in 1998, Abdul Rashid
Dostum controlled the following provinces: Samangan, Balkh,
Jowzjan, Faryab, and Baghlan provinces. According to Human
Rights Watch many of the violations of international humanitarian
law committed by the United Front forces date from 1996–
1998[74] when Dostum controlled most of the north.

According to Human Rights Watch in 1997, some 3,000 captured

Taliban soldiers were summarily executed in and around Mazar-i
Sharif by Dostum's Junbish-i Milli forces under the command of Northern Alliance troops under
Abdul Malik Pahlawan. The killings followed Malik's withdrawal General Dostum's command in
from a brief alliance with the Taliban and the capture of the Mazar-e Sharif, December 2001
Taliban forces who were trapped in the city.[31] With the U.S. War
on Terror, troops loyal to Dostum also returned to combat. In
December 2001, during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, between 250 and 3,000 (depending on sources)
Taliban prisoners were shot and/or suffocated to death in metal truck containers. The prisoners were killed
while being transferred from Kunduz to Sheberghan. This became known as the Dasht-i-Leili massacre[75]
In 2009, Dostum denied the accusations.[76][77][78]

Dostum belonged to those commanders making their own, often draconian, laws. Human Rights Watch has
released documents alleging widespread crimes targeted against the civilian population.[31] Human Rights
Watch asked to actively discourage and refuse support in any way to any group or coalition that includes
commanders with a record of serious violations of international humanitarian law standards, specifically
naming Abdul Rashid Dostum; Muhammad Mohaqiq, a senior commander of the Hezb-e Wahdat; Abdul
Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the erstwhile Ittehad-e Islami; and Abdul Malik Pahlawan, a former senior Junbish-
i Milli commander.[31]

See also
War in Afghanistan (1996–2001)
War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

References
1. Davis, Anthony. "Fateful Victory" (http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/98/0828/nat_1
_taliban.html). Asia Week. Retrieved 15 September 2021 – via CNN.
2. "Military Assistance to the Afghan Opposition: Human Rights Watch Backgrounder October
2001" (https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1005.htm). Human Rights
Watch. Retrieved 15 September 2021.
3. Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden,
from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Group. pp. 289–297.
ISBN 9781594200076.
4. "Northern Alliance" (https://fas.org/irp/world/para/northern_alliance.htm). fas.org. Retrieved
2020-03-03.
5. "Who are the Northern Alliance?" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm).
2001-11-13. Retrieved 2020-03-03.
 6. "Who are the Northern Alliance?" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm). BBC
News. 13 November 2001. Retrieved 11 December 2012. "The alliance is primarily
comprised of three non-Pashtun ethnic groups – Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Hazaras – and in
the past relied on a core of some 15,000 troops to defend its territories against the
predominantly Pashtun Taleban."
7. "Afghanistan's Northern Alliance" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1552994.stm). BBC
News. 19 September 2001. Retrieved 11 December 2012. "Until recently, the alliance's
main backers were Iran, Russia and Tajikistan."
8. "USATODAY.com - Taliban flees Kandahar" (http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/attack/20
01/12/07/handover.htm). usatoday30.usatoday.com. Retrieved 2020-03-03.
9. Anderson, Jon Lee (2 December 2001). "The Surrender" (https://www.newyorker.com/magaz
ine/2001/12/10/the-surrender). The New Yorker. Retrieved 15 September 2021.
10. Sudarshan, V. (1 September 2019). "How India secretly armed Afghanistan's Northern
Alliance" (https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-india-secretly-armed-ahmad-shah-
massouds-northern-alliance/article29310513.ece). The Hindu. Retrieved 15 September
2021.
11. "Blood-Stained Hands, Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity" (http
s://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/06/blood-stained-hands). Human Rights Watch.
12. Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War,
and the Future of the Region (2002 1st ed.). Palgrave, New York.
13. Amin Saikal (27 August 2004). Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival
(2006 1st ed.). I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London New York. p. 352. ISBN 1-85043-437-9.
14. GUTMAN, Roy (2008): How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the
Hijacking of Afghanistan, Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1st ed.,
Washington, D.C.
15. "The September 11 Sourcebooks Volume VII: The Taliban File" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarc
hiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/). gwu.edu. 2003.
16. "Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978–2001" (https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20131004221455/http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/warcrimesandcrime
sagainsthumanity19782001.pdf) (PDF). Afghanistan Justice Project. 2005. Archived from
the original (http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity1
9782001.pdf) (PDF) on 2013-10-04.
17. "II. BACKGROUND" (https://www.hrw.org/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0-01.htm#P81_13959).
Human Rights Watch.
18. Matinuddin, Kamal, The Taliban Phenomenon, Afghanistan 1994–1997, Oxford University
Press, (1999), pp. 25–26
19. Amnesty International. "Document – Afghanistan: further information on fear for safety and
new concern: Deliberate and arbitrary killings: Civilians in Kabul". November 16, 1995.
Accessed at: Amnesty.org (https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa11/015/1995/en/)
20. "Afghanistan: escalation of indiscriminate shelling in Kabul" (http://www.icrc.org/eng/resourc
es/documents/misc/57jly2.htm). International Committee of the Red Cross. 1995.
21. "BBC Newsnight 1995" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jnia-TUuCDs). Youtube.com.
Retrieved February 4, 2012.
22. Marcela Grad (March 1, 2009). Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan
Leader. Webster University Press. p. 310.
23. "Documents Detail Years of Pakistani Support for Taliban, Extremists" (http://www.gwu.edu/~
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#17). George Washington University. 2007.
24. Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin, 2005), 14.
25. AFP, Dawn com | (2015-02-13). "ISI cultivated Taliban to counter Indian action against
Pakistan: Musharraf" (http://www.dawn.com/news/1163376). DAWN.COM. Retrieved
2020-03-03.
26. Sudharshan, V (1 September 2021). "How India secretly armed Afghanistan's Northern
Alliance" (http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-india-secretly-armed-ahmad-shah-m
assouds-northern-alliance/article29310513.ece). www.thehindu.com/news. The Hindu.
Retrieved 15 August 2021.
27. "Afghanistan resistance leader feared dead in blast" (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl
dnews/asia/afghanistan/1340244/Afghanistan-resistance-leader-feared-dead-in-blast.html).
The Telegraph. London. September 11, 2001.
28. Edward Girardet. Killing the Cranes: A Reporter's Journey Through Three Decades of War
in Afghanistan (August 3, 2011 ed.). Chelsea Green Publishing. p. 416.
29. Rashid 2000, p. 91
30. "Inside the Taliban" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpQI6HKV-ZY). National
Geographic Society. 2007.
31. "Pakistan's support of the taliban" (https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-0
2.htm). Human Rights Watch. 2000.
32. Clements, Frank (2003). Conflict in Afghanistan: a historical encyclopedia (https://archive.or
g/details/conflictafghanis00clem). ABC-CLIO. p. 54 (https://archive.org/details/conflictafghani
s00clem/page/n92). ISBN 978-1-85109-402-8.
33. "Afghanistan: Arena for a New Rivalry" (https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/acces
s/34079877.html?dids=34079877:34079877&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&da
te=Sep+16%2C+1998&author=Pamela+Constable&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Afg
hanistan%3A+Arena+for+a+New+Rivalry&pqatl=google). Washington Post. 1998.
34. "Pak involved in Taliban offensive – Russia" (https://web.archive.org/web/20050128030041/
http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19980812/22450054.html). Express India. 1998.
Archived from the original (http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19980812/22450054.html)
on 2005-01-28.
35. "Afghanistan & the United Nations" (https://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-his
tory.shtml). United Nations. 2012.
36. "U.S. presses for bin Laden's ejection" (http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_pr
oduct=WT&p_theme=wt&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_topdoc=1&p_text_direct-0=
0ED02FA7F968789D&p_field_direct-0=document_id&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D
&s_trackval=GooglePM). Washington Times. 2001.
37. Atkins, Stephen E. (2011). The 9/11 Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 540. ISBN 978-1-59884-
921-9.
38. Litwak, Robert (2007). Regime change: U.S. strategy through the prism of 9/11 (https://archiv
e.org/details/regimechange00robe/page/309). Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 309 (http
s://archive.org/details/regimechange00robe/page/309). ISBN 978-0-8018-8642-3.
39. McGrath, Kevin (2011). Confronting Al-Qaeda. Naval Institute Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-1-
59114-503-5. "the Pakistani military's Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (IsI) provided
assistance to the taliban regime, to include its military and al Qaeda–related terrorist training
camps"
40. "Book review: The inside track on Afghan wars by Khaled Ahmed" (https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20080913183649/http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C08%5C31%
5Cstory_31-8-2008_pg3_4). Daily Times. 2008. Archived from the original (http://www.dailyti
mes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\story_31-8-2008_pg3_4) on 2008-09-13.
41. "Brigade 055" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Grugy2txSvc&feature=search). CNN.
42. Hussain, Zahid (2007). Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam (https://archive.o
rg/details/warindistantcoun0000isby/page/49). Columbia University Press. p. 49 (https://arch
ive.org/details/warindistantcoun0000isby/page/49). ISBN 978-0-85368-769-6. "However,
Pakistani intelligence agencies maintained some degree of cooperation with the Taliban
elements fleeing the fighting."
43. Hersh, Seymour M. (2002-01-28). "The Getaway" (http://www.NewYorker.com/fact/content/ar
ticles/020128fa_FACT). The New Yorker. Retrieved 2008-02-15.
44. Maley, William (2009). The Afghanistan wars. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 288. ISBN 978-0-230-
21313-5.
45. Newsday (October 2001). "Taliban massacres outlined for UN" (http://articles.chicagotribun
e.com/2001-10-12/news/0110120312_1_taliban-fighters-massacres-in-recent-years-mullah-
mohammed-omar). Chicago Tribune.
46. Newsday (2001). "Confidential UN report details mass killings of civilian villagers" (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20021118162327/http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/massacre.htm).
newsday.org. Archived from the original (http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/massacre.htm)
on November 18, 2002. Retrieved October 12, 2001.
47. "Archived copy" (https://archive.today/20120707181044/http://channel.nationalgeographic.c
om/episode/inside-the-taliban-3274). Archived from the original (http://channel.nationalgeogr
aphic.com/episode/inside-the-taliban-3274) on 2012-07-07. Retrieved 2010-12-06.
48. "He would have found Bin Laden" (http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/27/mass
oud.afghanistan/). CNN. May 27, 2009.
49. "History" (https://www.northernallianceaf.ha/history). Friends of the Northern Alliance.
Retrieved August 22, 2021.
50. "The Last Interview with Ahmad Shah Massoud" (https://web.archive.org/web/20060925043
421/http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/balcerowicz/texts/Ahmad_Shah_Masood_en.htm). Piotr
Balcerowicz. 2001. Archived from the original (http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/balcerowicz/texts/
Ahmad_Shah_Masood_en.htm) on 2006-09-25.
51. "The man who would have led Afghanistan" (http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/09/911/The_
man_who_would_hav.shtml). St. Petersburg Times. 2002.
52. "Proposal for Peace, promoted by Commander Massoud" (https://web.archive.org/web/2012
0310123118/http://www.peace-initiatives.com/frame.htm). peace-initiatives.com. 1998.
Archived from the original (http://www.peace-initiatives.com/frame.htm) on 2012-03-10.
53. Steve Coll. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (February 23, 2004 ed.). Penguin Press HC. p. 720.
54. "Massoud in the European Parliament 2001" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t78N6Q5V
D60). EU media. 2001.
55. "Inside the Taliban" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpQI6HKV-ZY). National
Geographic. 2007.
56. "Inside the Taliban" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080929130330/http://channel.nationalge
ographic.com/episode/inside-the-taliban-3274/Overview). National Geographic. 2007.
Archived from the original (http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/episode/inside-the-taliban
-3274/Overview) on September 29, 2008.
57. Marcela Grad. Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader (March 1,
2009 ed.). Webster University Press. p. 310.
58. "Defense Intelligence Agency (2001) report" (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAE
BB97/tal31.pdf) (PDF). Gwu.edu. Retrieved 2014-02-13.
59. Bearak, Barry (2001-09-17). "Rebel Chief Who Fought The Taliban Is Buried" (https://www.n
ytimes.com/2001/09/17/world/rebel-chief-who-fought-the-taliban-is-buried.html).
Nytimes.com. Pakistan; Afghanistan. Retrieved 2014-01-31.
60. "The Man Who Knew" (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/etc/script.htm
l). PBS. 2002.
61. Atul Aneja, "High Stakes for India" The Hindu, October 8th 2001.
62. "Afghanistan is a proxy war between India and Pakistan" (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8863073/Afghanistan-is-a-proxy-war-between-India-and-Pakist
an.html). Telegraph. Retrieved 2014-02-13.
63. "Musharraf: Afghanistan Is a Proxy War Between India and Pakistan – ABC News" (https://a
bcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/musharraf-afghanistan-is-a-proxy-war-between-india-
and-pakistan/). Abcnews.go.com. 2011-10-06. Retrieved 2014-02-13.
64. "There is more to peace than Taliban" (https://web.archive.org/web/20120112031913/http://a
times.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA12Df01.html). Asia Times. January 12, 2012. Archived
from the original on January 12, 2012.
65. "Afghan opposition says new parliament can check Karzai" (https://www.reuters.com/article/i
dUSTRE6AN2TM20101124). Reuters. November 24, 2010.
66. "2010 Afghan Parliamentary Election: Checks and Balances of Power" (http://www.khaama.
com/?p=1302). Khaama Press. December 9, 2010.
67. Rubin, Alissa J. (2011-05-05). "Thousands of Afghans Rally in Kabul" (https://www.nytimes.
com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06afghanistan.html). New York Times.
68. "Anti-Taliban rally" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/05/110504_l42_vid_afgh
an_opposition.shtml). BBC Persian. 2011-05-05.
69. "Govt Opposition Warn of Taking to Streets" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZMVeRD1
koY). Tolo TV. 2011-05-05.
70. "The Panjshir Valley: what is the main bastion of resistance against the Taliban advance in
Afghanistan" (https://marketresearchtelecast.com/the-panjshir-valley-what-is-the-main-bastio
n-of-resistance-against-the-taliban-advance-in-afghanistan/131364/). Market Research
Telecast. 17 August 2021.
71. "Leadership" (http://www.northernallianceaf.ga/leadership). Northern Alliance: Fighting for a
Free Afghanistan. Friends of the Northern Alliance. Retrieved 19 August 2021.
72. Marcela Grad. Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader (March 1,
2009 ed.). Webster University Press. p. 310.
73. "Massoud in the European Parliament 2001" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1iCsEnX
dIw). EU media. 2001.
74. "Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, October 2001" (https://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asi
a/afghan-bck1005.htm#uf). Human Rights Watch. 2001.
75. "Starved, hurt and buried alive in Afghanistan" (https://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http%
3A%2F%2Fwww.iol.co.za%2Findex.php%3Fset_id%3D1%26click_id%3D3%26art_id%3D
qw1020329461747B212&date=2009-08-07). Independent Online. 2002-05-02. Archived
from the original (http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3&art_id=qw102032946
1747B212) on 2009-08-07. Retrieved 2009-08-07.
76. Rashid, Abdul. "It Is Impossible Prisoners Were Abused" (http://www.rferl.org/content/It_Is_I
mpossible_Prisoners_Were_Abused/1779291.html). Rferl.org. Retrieved 2014-01-31.
77. "Afghan Warlord Denies Links to '01 Killings" (https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/world/as
ia/18dostum.htm.). The New York Times. Retrieved 2014-02-13.
78. Zarifi, Sam (2009-07-17). "A Response To General Dostum" (http://www.rferl.org/content/A_
Response_To_General_Dostum/1779264.html). Rferl.org. Retrieved 2014-01-31.

External links
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Northern_Alliance&oldid=1045459960"

This page was last edited on 20 September 2021, at 17:47 (UTC).

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. By using
this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia
Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.