Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies

Uber taxi cab-handling crisis communication

Nidhi Maheshwari,
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 Uber taxi cab-handling crisis
communication
Nidhi Maheshwari

Case synopsis Nidhi Maheshwari is

Associate Professor at
An extremely difficult situation arose for Uber Cab, a US-based company operating in India, the Asia Pacific Institute
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on December 8, 2014, when its taxi services were banned by the Delhi Government due to of Management,
growing anger over the suspected rape of a 27-year-old female executive by one of its New Delhi, India.
drivers. Uber Cab claims that it offers the “safest rides on the road”, but this episode proved
otherwise, as the accused was identified as a repeat offender.
Initial interrogation by the police highlighted the negligence of the company regarding
background checks and police verification while recruiting driver partners. The police further
revealed that the driver did not have a Delhi Transport Authority-issued license. Furthermore,
the company was not able to provide a call log to police, as such information was said to be
gathered at the company’s headquarters in New York. To handle this situation, Uber Cab
suspended its operations until the company could apply for a fresh registration and trade license.
What was the significance of this incident to a brand like Uber Cab? Could its effect on the
regulation of taxi services have been anticipated? How and when should the brand have
reacted? Looking forward, what contingency planning would be appropriate? Should brand
management, customer service management, or the human resource department have
been held accountable, or did the responsibility lie elsewhere in the organization?

Case study
Even after introducing a subway system in 2002, the public transport system in New Delhi,
India, did not satisfy customers in terms of efficiency and safety. Moreover, the demand for
the subway among those in the affluent segment of customers was falling because wealthy
Indians preferred to travel in well-maintained modern taxis. For them, paying a high price
for the comfort of air-conditioned taxis was a status symbol. However, the scarcity of
reliable taxi services, well-behaved drivers and a proper meter system for both local
residents and tourists represented some of the challenges that the radio taxi transportation
system had faced since the inception of the radio taxi concept in India (Dqi Bureau, 2014).
The public system had not shown satisfactory performance, giving private players the
opportunity to cash in on the high potential market for “radio cabs”; such private companies
captured the market quite effectively. Even the tedious task of calling a taxi to get to the
Disclaimer. This case is written
airport was converted into a one-click action through radio cabs’ booking websites or a solely for educational
simple call by dialing the number. purposes and is not intended
to represent successful or
unsuccessful managerial
The radio cab industry in India decision-making. The authors
may have disguised names;
financial and other
In the 1970s and 1980s, the taxi stand – a fleet of Ambassadors parked under a large tree, recognizable information to
with a landline phone number painted on the tree trunk – was a standard feature of almost protect confidentiality.

DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-12-2016-0228 VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017, pp. 1-17, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 1
 all of the neighbourhoods of Delhi. Typically, the taxi stand was run by an energetic and
jovial Sikh gentleman. Other cities had variations of this system, but in metro cities, cabs
were mostly used to go to airports and railway stations. The scenario changed in 2000 with
the arrival of radio cabs. In that year, efforts were made by the government to minimize the
unpredictable pricing, poor service levels and union challenges of the taxi industry through
introducing radio taxi services as a pilot project (Vasudevan, 2014). Specifically, in Delhi,
with its fleet of 300 radio taxis, the concepts of uniform tariffs, reliability and security were
realized by the government with a view to improving the satisfaction levels of customers.
However, the tedious three-year procedure required radio cab operators to obtain licenses,
and the financial implications of this process de-motivated operators, resulting in the
withdrawal of their services (Sinha, 2014).
The concept of radio cabs was reintroduced in 2007; the huge potential of the taxi market
motivated private players to revive it. In this year, many private operators started their
services in multiple cities (Exhibit 1).
In 2007, the taxi market in India was highly fragmented and unorganized, comprising
individual car owners and agencies. At the same time, however, the promising returns
tempted investors to invest regularly (Exhibit 2) (Moneycontrol, 2014). The result was that
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market had grown to US$160.54m by 2012[1]. In 2014, the total market size of the taxi
business was recorded as US$13bn, and the share of the organized sector was 5 per
cent[2]. In 2015, the industry recorded 35 per cent annual growth on the back of rising
demand for car rentals from the middle class and luxury cars for special occasions. Despite
growing tremendously over the past five years, radio cabs continue to represent a
minuscule portion of the overall private taxi business in cities (Exhibit 3) (Slideshare, 2014).

The taxi market in Delhi

The Transport Department, Government of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi in
2006 undertook a number of initiatives to provide safe and comfortable taxi services to local
commuters and tourists. At the same time, to ensure quality and safe service to
passengers, a number of measures were prescribed to taxi operators and taxi owners.
These included CNG Taxi, the fixation of fares, the installation of GPS units, the calibration
and checking of fare meters at the time of annual fitness, the installation of Pulsar/Procall
meters, etc. (Transport Department, 2006).
For regulating taxi services, the government introduced the Motor Vehicles Act. The Radio
Taxi Scheme of 2006 is the nodal regulation for the operation of taxi services in Delhi. The
scheme specifies that the licensee must be either a company under Companies Act, 1956
or a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The company/society must be
financially sound and have good experience in the transportation business and must
furnish a bank guarantee, in a format acceptable to the Transport Department, for an
amount of 72,944.35 USD (refer to Exhibit 4 for key requirements of registration for
licensing) (Slideshare, 2014). The available guideline was ambiguous regarding the tech-
or app-based solutions provided by companies like Uber, Ola Cabs and Taxi for Sure.

Uber cab service

Travis Kalanick, a college dropout from the University of California, founded Uber Cab in
San Francisco, USA, in 2009. This company was the third venture started by Kalanick, and
initially it was funded by former Google senior executive Chris Sacca and Amazon CEO Jeff
Bezos. Prior to Uber Cab, the two ventures initiated by Kalanick had gone bankrupt, which
motivated him to be extra cautious this time. In 2014, after an investment of US$1.2bn by
Fidelity, the company was valued at US$18.2bn, which was near WhatsApp’s last valuation.
Uber Cab, a company of India’s unicorn generation[3], entered in 2014 and swiftly
expanded to ten cities. It started its operations in Bangalore in a secret testing mode. Later,

PAGE 2 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017

 it showed its presence in Delhi, Hyderabad, Chennai, Mumbai, Pune, Ahmadabad,
Chandigarh, Jaipur and Kolkata (Business Today, 2015).
The business model of the company was completely different from those of Indian
competitors like Ola Cabs, Taxi for Sure, etc. Uber Cab had not hired any drivers on the
company’s payroll; rather, they created a driver–partner relationship with drivers. Drivers
were asked to register their mobile numbers on Uber’s website. Driver partners were not
restricted to work with them; rather, they were free to operate with other travel and tour
operators and pick up Uber Cab customers whenever they were free. Even the company’s
logo was not shared with driver partners. The physical office and employee investment was
the bare minimum. Uber Cab operated from a four-room office on the ground floor of
Signature Hotel, near IFFO Chowk, Gurgaon, with just three senior officials. When it
expanded its operation to ten Indian cities, the number of employees was raised to around
30 (Times of India, 2015).
The pricing strategy of the company was very different from that of Ola Cabs. The minimum
payout for a journey was kept to INR 200. Different ranges of services were introduced,
such as Uber Cab Black (the fleet of cars available under this range was Mercedes, BMW
and Audi) and UberX (the fleet of cars available under this range was Toyota Etios and
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Maruti Swift DZire). The base fare for Uber X was kept at INR 50, whereas the cost per
kilometer was INR 15, but the cost per minute remained the same. Ola Cabs charges INR
200 for the first 8 km and then INR 18 per km for its upscale service, Ola Sedan. While Uber
Black worked out to be much more expensive than competitors’ services like Ola Sedan,
UberX was cheaper and proved to be a strategic move for Uber Cab in India. To give
customers a luxury experience, advertisements were not pasted on the Uber Cab partner
cars. In fact, Uber Cab did not own any cars; it just acted as a middleman between people
needing chauffeur-driven cars and cabs that were available at that place and hour.
However, the Uber Cab driver partners must be commercially registered cab drivers.
Uber Cab’s payment system was portrayed as customer-friendly. When passengers got
charged on their credit card, the money got credited to a Holland-based Uber Cab account
near Amsterdam, from where it was further transferred to a US Wells Fargo account, and
then, after only seven days, 80 per cent of the paid money could be received in a driver’s
account in India.
This pricing strategy was objected to by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and radio taxi
owners’ associations from India filed a complaint against Uber Cab regarding bypassing
RBI’s e-payment laws and remitting the foreign exchange out of India. Uber Cab also faced
opposition in Canada, the UK, the USA, Australia, Germany and Poland on different
grounds, such as enrolling non-commercial cab drivers, charging rates lower than those
prescribed by local laws, forex violations and unsafe driving.
To enhance the efficiency of its business, Uber Cab provided free iPhones (latest models)
to all its driver partners. It proved useful for a driver partner to trace the location of the
customer and deliver on-time customer service. Voice calling and other usages were
locked by the company to avoid misuse by the driver partner (Business Today, 2015).

Recruitment of driver-partners by Uber Cab

Becoming a driver partner for Uber Cab was a simple process. It could be done by just
signing up on the company’s website and submitting personal details. After that, eligible
drivers would be contacted over the phone for a preliminary inquiry and then the approved
partner would be provided with a phone loaded with an app[4]. That is all that was
explained on Uber Cab’s site for background checks.
As tracking was done solely through the phone, turning the phone off or even something as
simple as deleting the app from the phone would remove the car from Uber Cab’s radar.

VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 3

 Uber Cab clarified that they are facilitators connecting passengers with private taxis and
not the owners of the cars in its fleet.
The competitors of Uber Cab in India, like Meru, had GPS systems in their cars, which were
used not only for tracking the cars but also for checking to ensure that the drivers were not
speeding. The competitors installed a panic button for customer use that could alert two
trusted numbers and show the user’s location on a map in an emergency.
Although the NCT stipulated that all taxi providers should carry out thorough background
checks on the drivers working for them, this was not religiously followed by taxi operators,
including Uber Cabs.

The incident
The incident that became a threat to Uber Cab’s presence in India took place on December
5, 2014. That day, the victim, who worked for a finance company in Gurgaon, was returning
from a restaurant after having dinner with her friends. One of her friends dropped her off at
Vasant Vihar, from where she hired the Uber cab and boarded at 9:30 p.m. The incident
took place in an isolated place between Sarai Rohilla and Inderlok. On the way, she dozed
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off in the back seat. When she felt that the car halted, she woke up. She found that the car
halted at a secluded spot. The car doors were locked. When she tried to raise an alarm, the
driver thrashed and sexually assaulted her. The victim clicked a photograph of the car’s
licence plate and then made a Police Control Room call to report the incident. The driver
(identified as Yadav) turned off his mobile phone[5]. Immediately after the complaint, when
the police inquired about Yadav’s permanent address, the company was not able to
produce Yadav’s permanent address, and his local address and mobile phone number
were unverified[6].
As per Uber Cab’s business functioning, whenever any Uber Cab driver was requested via
its app, the user was shown the photograph of the driver, along with his Uber Cab-issued
iPhone number[7]. However, in this case, the suspect’s iPhone was allegedly not registered
in his own name. Further, the driver switched off his mobile phone, which increased the
difficulty of tracing his location via GPS. Also, unlike its competitors, Uber Cab did not install
a panic button system, which could have prevented this tragedy from happening. But the
bigger question was why the suspect’s iPhone was not registered in his name. Similarly, it
was unexplained why Uber Cab’s software or manual processes did not flag a late-night
driver taking an altogether different route than the planned route.

The Uber cab’s (Delhi) response to the crisis

Immediately after the incident, Uber Cab flashed a message through social media that their
deepest sympathies were with the victim of this horrific crime. Uber Cab spokeswoman
Nairi Hourdajian said in a prepared statement, “We are cooperating fully with the authorities
to ensure the perpetrator is brought to justice[8]”.
Uber Cab CEO, Travis Kalanick, released the following statement to safeguard the brand
image of the company:“What happened over the weekend in New Delhi is horrific. Our
entire team’s hearts go out to the victim of this despicable crime. We will do everything, I
repeat, everything to help bring this perpetrator to justice and to support the victim and her
family in her recovery. We will work with the government to establish clear background
checks currently absent in their commercial transportation licensing programs. We will also
partner closely with the groups who are leading the way on women’s safety here in New
Delhi and around the country and invest in technology advances to help make New Delhi
a safer city for women[9]”. However, the widespread protest against the sexual violence did
not come to an end through the release of sympathy messages; rather, protestors
demanded a complete ban of Uber Cab in India and greater endeavours to ensure
women’s security.

PAGE 4 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017

 On Uber Cab’s website, a promise note focusing on rider safety along with a safety
record was posted on December 17, 2015 to defend the company. The message
mentioned that the company would not accept any commissions from its enrolled driver
partners in New Delhi until ambiguity over how it could work in New Delhi was cleared
up[10]. However, the protestors alleged that the company was not properly managed,
and even the company’s representatives were unable to provide information to the
police team for the crucial first few hours. The police party who was investigating
the case reached the Uber Cab office at 8 a.m. on Saturday, but no information about
the driver partner was given until 11 a.m.
Evelyn Tay, spokesperson for Uber Cab, said in an emailed statement to HuffPost India that
the company had fully cooperated with the police investigators. “Upon being notified of this
incident, our team immediately provided the local authorities with all relevant details”, she
said:
This included details of the driver such as name, photo, license details, and bank-verified
address. The information also included details of the cab, and data about the trip, including
pick-up and drop-off locations.
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The police investigator shared with media that the commercial driver’s badge, legally
required to drive a cab in the National Capital Region, was not available with the driver[11].
The company’s problems increased after the victimized passenger said that she had not
had a response from Uber Cab despite complaining about the driver in November. The
victim accused the company in a lawsuit filed in US court (in San Francisco, where the
company is based) of failing to properly examine the suspected assailant’s background.
Later, company security chief Philip Cardenas issued the following statement:
We are finding solutions in many places that range from polygraph exams that fill gaps in
available data to adding our own processes on top of existing screening for commercial
licenses. We are exploring new ways to screen drivers globally, using scientific analysis and
technology to find solutions[12].

Though the company tried to defend itself on the point of background checks, in the lawsuit
filed against Uber Cab, it was mentioned that the company could not claim background
checks of drivers as the best available way to ensure the safety of the customers because
criminal checks against a national criminal database were not done by the company while
screening drivers. In response, CEO Travis Kalanick said in a statement that the company
would work with the government “to establish clear background checks currently absent in
their commercial transportation licensing programs[13]”.
Again taking the alibi of driver partners’ livelihoods, Uber Cab posted on its blog that
the company needed to apply for a license that would require the ride-hailing company
to have a fleet of at least 200 radio taxis directly owned or owned through an agreement
with individual taxi permit holders. Further, the company mentioned that this time only
those driver partners who had undergone re-verification of their police clearance in the
past six weeks would be allowed to drive. The company urged the Delhi authorities to
treat Uber Cab as “on-demand transportation technology aggregators” and
“technology companies”, like the approach adopted by the eastern city of
Bidhannagar, Kolkata, where the commissioner of police passed an order regulating
“on-demand transportation technology aggregators” as “technology companies[14]”.
In the middle of January, 2016, the company decided to apply for a radio taxi license
to operate through its subsidiary, Resource Expert India Pvt Ltd., registered in
Bengaluru and with an office in Pitampura in Delhi. However, in late January, without
complying with its ban, the company applied for the license and restarted its
operations[15].

VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 5

 On the concerns of safety issues, Uber Cab answered that the company would introduce
two new safety features for riders in India – a panic button in its ride-hailing app that would
allow riders to notify the police in case of an emergency and a “safety net” feature to share
trip details and their location with as many as five other people. For daily management, they
even proposed creating a local team to respond to the notifications issued by riders
through pressing the panic button while riding. Further, the company said that physical
panic buttons would be only possible if the owner of the vehicle installed them and if the
button called the police directly[16].
After applying for a fresh license under the modified rules of the 2006 Radio Taxi Scheme,
Uber Cab sent emails to its customers in Delhi, claiming, “We’re back, to serve you and get
you moving once again”. It was mentioned in the passenger email that the company was
hopeful that the Delhi Government would follow the leadership shown by authorities in
Bidhannagar, Kolkata, who had developed a new progressive framework that embraces
innovation, supports consumer choice and ensures the safety of riders. A flat 25 per cent
discount was even offered to customers along with the promise to make each ride a
five-star-worthy experience.
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The copy of the email in which it was mentioned that the company was “relaunching”
operations in Delhi was sent to the rape victim along with other customers. This audacity of
Uber Cab was disturbing for the victim, who was struggling since the incident, relying on
the legal system. On the other end, the company was neglecting the directions of the
authorities. The 25-year-old woman’s American lawyer, Douglas Wigdor, who was assisting
her in an effort to file a suit against Uber Cab in a US court, shared with the media that the
victim and her family were very upset about this email from Uber Cab, and that the
company had come back to Delhi without engaging with them in a consultation
process[17].
On March 26, 2015, the ruling Aam Aadmi Party Government in Delhi asked the Central
Government to block Web-based apps of taxi operators (including Uber Cab), saying that,
despite a ban order imposed on them, they were continuing with their online services.
Transport Secretary and Commissioner Gitanjali Gupta wrote a letter to the Department of
Electronic & Information Technology (DEITY), stating that, despite the ban and undertaking
of Uber Cab, Ola Cabs and Taxi For Sure continued to book passengers through their
apps[18].
Keeping in mind all these aspects of misconduct and the gravity of the incident, the
government asked DEITY to block the operation of apps of M/s ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd
(Ola Cabs), Uber Cab India Systems Private Ltd. and Taxi For Sure, so that they could not
solicit passengers. Taking view of Section 12 of the IT Act, DEITY issued a direction on May
15, 2015, to all internet service providers to block the websites of these firms in Delhi and
report compliance. The notice mentioned that if the ISPs failed to block the sites, action
would be taken against them under Section 12 of the IT Act[19].
The Delhi High Court on Wednesday, July 8, 2015, revoked a government ban imposed on
online taxi firm Uber Cab Technologies, clearing the way for the US-based company to
operate in the capital city and reapply for a license. Welcoming the court’s decision, Uber
Cab Delhi general manager Gagan Bhatia said:
We always had immense faith in the country’s judiciary and welcome the order of the honourable
Delhi High Court invalidating the coercive actions against our driver partners, actions which
have affected thousands of drivers and their families in Delhi who are dependent on Uber Cab’s
technology for a better livelihood. We emphasise the need for sector-specific regulation for
Keywords: technology-based aggregators in the country. We are committed to working with the
Employee behaviour, government to develop a regulatory framework that encourages innovation, provides
Crisis management, consumers with more choice, drivers with more economic opportunity, while creating a safer
Event evaluation transportation environment for everyone[20].

PAGE 6 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017

 Notes
1. NOTE: US$1 ⫽ INR 68.52 as per the prevailing rate in 2016.
2. “Radio Cab Business Set to Zoom on the Fast Lane,” NDTV Report, http://profit.ndtv.com/news/
corporates/article-radio-cab-business-set-to-zoom-on-the-fast-lane-704947
3. In the venture capital industry, unicorn refers to any tech start-up company that reaches a US$1bn
market value as determined by private or public investment. The term was originally coined by
Aileen Lee, founder of Cowboy Ventures.
4. http://qz.com/307870/this-is-how-your-uber-driver-is-recruited-and-trained-in-new-delhi/ (accessed 15
September 2015).
5. http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/uber-cab-rape-case-victim-identifies-driver-in-
court/ (accessed 17 January 2015).
6. www.huffingtonpost.in/2014/12/07/_n_6283614.html (accessed 18 January 2015).
7. http://newsroom.uber.com/ahmedabad/2015/05/rider-pro-tips/ (accessed 31 May 2015).
8. www.indiawest.com/news/global_indian/indian-woman-who-reported-delhi-rape-sues-uber-in-san/
article_d167b04a-abda-11e4-88ab-c354e94c8010.html?mode⫽jqm (accessed 28 December 2014).
9. www.ndtv.com/india-news/what-uber-ceo-says-about-delhi-rape-710094 (accessed December
Downloaded by Emerald Staff, Mrs Neha Shukla At 21:36 26 December 2017 (PT)

2014).
10. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669100/india-woman-sues-uber-after-reporting-driver-raped-her (accessed 30
January 2015).
11. www.huffingtonpost.in/2014/12/07/_n_6283614.html (accessed 5 February).
12. https://newsroom.uber.com/2014/12/our-commitment-to-safety/ (accessed on 2014)
13. http://gadgets.ndtv.com/apps/news/we-will-work-with-government-to-establish-background-
checks-uber-ceo-631502 (accessed 15 December 2014).
14. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-15/news/58109056_1_radio-taxi-scheme-web-
based-taxi-aggregators-taxiforsure (accessed 18 January 2015).
15. www.business-standard.com/article/companies/uber-applies-for-a-license-in-delhi-expects-to-
start-operations-soon-115012300175_1.html (accessed 25 January 2015).
16. www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2943068/Uber-introduce-panic-button-safety-feature-India.
html (accessed 6 February 2015).
17. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/uber-emails-rape-victim-we-are-back-in-delhi/
18. www.financialexpress.com/article/companies/aam-aadmi-party-govt-seeks-blocking-apps-of-uber-
ola-taxi-for-sure/57601/ (accessed 27 March 2015).
19. www.dnaindia.com/money/report-dot-asks-isps-to-block-websites-of-uber-ola-taxiforsure-in-delhi-
2085802 (accessed 16 May 2015).
20. www.livelaw.in/delhi-high-court-revokes-governments-ban-on-uber/ (accessed 10 July 2015).

References
Business Today (2015), “Taxi Wars”, available at: www.businesstoday.in/magazine/cover-story/india-
taxi-market-war-heats-up-ola-cabs-uber-strategy-leaders/story/222542.html (accessed 30 August
2015).

Dqi Bureau (2014), “Radio taxi: way to go”, Dataquest, available at: www.dqindia.com/dataquest/
news/145953/radio-taxi-way-go (accessed 21 April 2014).

Moneycontrol (2014), “India’s taxi king transforms transport landscape”, CNBC Report, available at:
www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/indias-taxi-king-transforms-transport-landscape_1076175.
html (accessed 21 April 2014).

Slideshare (2014), “Radio-taxi market in India a case study of Delhi Report 2014”, Valoriser
Consultants, www.slideshare.net/valoriserconsultants/radio-taxi-market-in-india-a-case-study-of-delhi
(accessed 28 June 2014).

Sinha, A. (2014), “Revenue of radio cab market”, available at: www.nextbigwhat.com/report-on-radio-

cab-industry-297/ (accessed 21 April 2014).

VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 7

 Times of India (2015), “10 Little known facts about Uber”, available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/tech/slideshow/10-little-known-facts-about-uber/itslideshowviewall/41601794.cms (accessed 15
August 2015).

Transport Department (2006), “Transport department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi-radio taxi scheme 2006”,
available at: www.delhi.gov.in/DoIT/DoIT_Transport/trrs31.pdf (accessed June 2012).

Vasudevan, V. (2014), “Radio taxis: a long way to go”, Mint, available at: www.livemint.com/Opinion/
niYsPmc14VDWiDDjL7E6FN/Radio-taxis-a-long-way-to-go.html (accessed 21 May 2014).

Exhibit 1. The journey of radio taxis in India

Figure E1
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PAGE 8 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017

 Exhibit 2. Investment in the organized taxi market in India

Figure E2
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Exhibit 3. Organized taxi market in India (market size estimates, US$bn)

Figure E3

Exhibit 4: The key requirements for registration

1. The licensee must be either a company under the Companies Act, 1956 or a society
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
2. The licensee must be financially sound to run and manage the radio taxi operation in
Delhi.
3. The Licensee must have experience with and intimate knowledge of the transport
business, preferably in the running of motor cabs.
4. Spacious control room.
5. Radio communications.
6. Adequate parking spaces and maintenance for all taxies and office space (minimum
of 1,000 sq. ft.) for accommodating the control room with radio communication and
ten telephone lines.
7. Minimum fleet size would be 500 motor cabs, which must be achieved by the licensee
within one year of the commencement of the operation.

VOL. 7 NO. 4 2017 EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES PAGE 9

 8. It would be the responsibility of companies to ensure police verification of their
drivers.
9. Cabs should be brand-new (engine capacity of 999 CC or above) and run on clean
fuel. They should be fitted with electronic fare meters on the front panel (dashboard).
10. There should be an LCD board to display that the vehicle is a radio taxi.
11. Vehicles must be fitted with GPS/GPRS-based tracking devices that must be in
constant communication with central control.
12. Working hours of drivers are to be limited in accordance with the Motor Transport
Workers Act, 1961.
13. Drivers must have a driver’s licence of the appropriate category for at least five years
issued by an authority in the NCT of Delhi. They must have a valid public service
badge issued in Delhi (Source: www.delhi.gov.in/DoIT/DoIT_Transport/trrs31.pdf
accessed January 2015).

Corresponding author
Nidhi Maheshwari can be contacted at: nidhimaheshwari1999@yahoo.com
Downloaded by Emerald Staff, Mrs Neha Shukla At 21:36 26 December 2017 (PT)

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