Petitioner: en Banc

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI ,

petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT
THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondent.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B.
LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
NACHURA, J : p
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the
line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President's instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. 1 cCSDTI
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then

Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale
of Two Tapes", and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former
NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-
hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the
committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings,
the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare
committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the
resource persons. 3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any
other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings. 5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates
on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped. AECacS
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson

roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse that
Brought Darkness". In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the
public "the whole unvarnished truth — the what's, when's, where's, who's
and why's" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived
willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's speech was
referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired
by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7
In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate
ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible
transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body were to conduct a
legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered
view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a
Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R.
No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. 11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with
its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7, 12 17 13 and
October 1, 14 2007.
Intervening as respondents, 15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B.
Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their
Comment 16 on the petition on September 25, 2007. aAIcEH
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP
and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and
testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.

170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectives — the first is poised at preventing
the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the
committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of
the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.
I
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve
the issue on the parties' standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 20 we explained that "'[l]egal standing' or
locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act . . .," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions". 22 HTcDEa
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural

technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury
test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo 23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity
of laws, regulations and rulings". 24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales 25
even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of
the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission.
The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that
greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court's duty under the
1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them". 26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate
the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci"
tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees'
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their
standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use
the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the
legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the
ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the
laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional
processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of
legislation. 28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without
being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also
of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further
intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of
public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. 29 CAaSHI
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the

execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional
right to due process, 30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives, 31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada's and Agcaoili's and
intervenor Sagge's allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of
the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds. 32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably
invoked the vindication of their own rights — as taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar
and of the legal profession — which were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts. 33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and
should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal
attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of
Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and
Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge. cHATSI
II
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the
exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies. 35 By actual cases, we mean
existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will
amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend
to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case
in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its
purpose has become stale. 37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced. 38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the
same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that
the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members.
39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary
by the respondent committees. 40 Having been overtaken by these events,
the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic.
After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 41
III
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "
[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. 42 Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "
[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines." 44 EScaIT
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even
on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on
June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, 46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure". We quote the OSG's
explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a
different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization: CcSEIH
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a

continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four
members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of
six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three
years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into
the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935
Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum
to do business". Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno,
the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body
because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve
Senators. 47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution 48 (On
the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court
sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the
Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session
shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and

proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations,
of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated
upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status , but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will
typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status. HSCAIT
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution

and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected
in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate ( i.e. the Senate's main rules of
procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the
Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term
of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate
committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion
which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.
DCTSEA
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the
possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of
each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their
term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption
until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules . The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the
next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon
the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the
same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could
have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules
regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate's internet web
page. 49 HIESTA
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the clear and unambiguous language
of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and
does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient
under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation", precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person's liberty at
risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested
and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their
claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. 51
In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. 52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,
could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure". ECaSIT
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this
fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought
to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases
are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued
enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
"Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de
Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., pls. see dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., join
the dissent of Chief Justice Puno.
Corona, J., is on leave.
Reyes, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, C.J., dissenting:
The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing between what is

apparent and what is real, what is central and what is peripheral, to get to
the core of the issues that will decide the controversy at bar. SCcHIE
The facts pertaining to both G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No 17925 as
narrated in the ponencia are undisputed. Hence, I will go direct to the issues.
First, the issues in G.R. No. 179275. These were delineated in the Oral
Argument held on October 2, 2007 as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation have been published, in accordance with Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes"
violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic
Act No. 4200. 1
As I agree with the disquisition of the ponencia on the first issue, I shall
limit my discussion to the second and third issues. CDHSac

Publication of Senate Rules Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Let me hark back to the ruling of the Court on the publication of the
"Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation" (Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries) of the Senate in its March 25, 2008 Decision
2 (March 25 Neri Decision) and September 4, 2008 Resolution 3
(September 4 Neri Resolution). I respectfully submit that the ponencia is

not in accord with the ruling of the Court in these Neri cases (Neri Ruling).
The proper application of the Neri Ruling to the case at bar will yield the
conclusion that the subject Senate investigation should be allowed to
proceed even if the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries were not
published in the 14th Congress prior to the subject investigation. Still, I
maintain my dissent to the Neri Ruling and arrive at this same conclusion
through a different track.
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court ruled, viz.:
explanation: AECDHS
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the

procedurally infirm. 4
Subsequently, the Court clarified the above ruling in the September 4

Neri Resolution. I quote the ruling at length, viz.:
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to
respondent Committees' fourth argument. Respondent Committees
argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the
same was published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the
Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish the
Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended. SaTAED
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court

sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the
Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
(emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of
the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon
the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status , but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will
typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status. TCIEcH

procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the

Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin
their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to
the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion
which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.
(emphasis supplied)DSHTaC
RULE LII
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of

their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)

term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption
until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously
absent from the Rules . The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall
take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." (Section 24, Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation) The latter does not explicitly provide
for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the
next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be
stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted
pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those
that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for
the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans
such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective. 5 (emphasis supplied)
The ponencia quotes the foregoing ruling in the September 4 Neri
Resolution in holding, viz.:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines." EDISTc
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings

and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused
the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure".
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take
judicial notice of the fact, the recent publication does not cure the
infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. In so far as the consolidated cases are concerned,
the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because
no published rules govern it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution. 6 (emphasis supplied) cHTCaI
While the ponencia cites the Neri Ruling to support its conclusion that
the subject investigation cannot be conducted without published rules, I
submit that it fails to adhere to the Neri Ruling, as the latter emphasizes
that "not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans
such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective".
It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court
struck down not the entire proceedings of the Senate investigation
on the NBN-ZTE deal for want of published Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, but only the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and
directing his arrest and detention (January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in
the dispositive portion of the Decision. 7 A faithful adherence of the case at
bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion that the "Garci tapes"
investigation may be conducted even without the published Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that only those orders and proceedings
that result in the violation of the rights of the witnesses may be considered
null and void. The ponencia did not, however, show which orders or
proceedings resulted in this violation and, instead, made a blanket
prohibition of the conduct of the "Garci tapes" investigation for want of
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
In line with my position in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decision
and the September 4 Neri Resolution, it is my considered view that the
subject "Garci tapes" investigation is not constitutionally infirm for being
conducted without the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to said investigation. In addition to the
points raised in my two Dissents, I respectfully submit that the following
inconsistencies and erroneous assumptions in the March 25 Neri Decision
and September 4 Neri Resolution merit a review of the Neri Ruling and
a consequent conclusion that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,
sans amendment since its publication in two newspapers of general
circulation on August 24, 1995, need not be published by the Senate of
every Congress. HAICcD
1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure Governing

Inquiries but invalidity of the entire Rules
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court recognized the validity and
effectivity of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, even without
publication in the 14th Congress, by citing Section 18 of said rules and
holding that the January 30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner
Romulo Neri was invalid for failing to comply with the majority voting
requirement under Section 18. In the same breath, however, the Court held
that the subject investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal was procedurally infirm
for being conducted without valid Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, as
these were not published in the 14th Congress. The inconsistency is
apparent in the Court's explanation of the third and the fourth of the five
reasons for holding that the therein respondent Senate Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the January 30 Contempt
Order, viz.:
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees'
January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the
members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during
the deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its
members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who
disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to
testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of
its members." cTIESD
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members

of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually
participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order.
Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt
Order dated January 30, 2008. . .
xxx xxx xxx

explanation: DISHEA
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the

procedurally infirm. 8 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)
In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court reiterated its

recognition of the validity and effectivity of Section 18 of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, viz.:
In the present case, the Court's exercise of its power of judicial
review is warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of the
power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section
18 of the Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its

members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who
disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to
testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of
its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt

as to the validity of the contempt order because during the
deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7)
Senators were present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority
requirement needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations which has a membership of
seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on National
Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on Trade and
Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three
(3) members were present. These facts prompted us to quote in the
Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lack of
the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt order. 9
(emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted) HCSEcI
But in the same breath, it assailed the validity of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries and held that orders issued and proceedings conducted
pursuant to said rules, which result in the violation of rights of witnesses
were null and void, viz.:
amended or repealed to sufficiently put the public on notice.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed
that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are
considered valid and effective. 10 AHSaTI
In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September 4

Neri Resolution, the Court did not invalidate the entire Senate investigation
proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, which were not published in the 14th Congress. In fact, the Court
ruled on the issue of executive privilege raised in said proceedings. It struck
down only the January 30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner Neri for
failure to comply with Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, while at the same time holding these rules as constitutionally
infirm for want of publication.
Let us proceed to the second set of inconsistencies.
2. The continuing nature of the Senate as an institution and the
discontinuing nature of its business vis-a-vis the continuing
nature of the Rules of the Senate
In attempting to harmonize the above inconsistency in the March 25
Neri Decision, the Court, in its September 4 Neri Resolution, saw fit to
"issue a clarification . . . (o)n the nature of the Senate as a 'continuing body'"
and dichotomized this nature into the "continuity of the Senate as an
institution" and the "opposite nature of the conduct of its business". This
approach, however, spawned its own inconsistencies. DHcESI
In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the Rules of Procedure

Governing Inquiries could not be given continuing effect from one Congress
to the next unless expressly so provided in said rules, the Court interpreted
Section 136 on the "unfinished business" in conjunction with Section 137 on
the "date of taking effect" of the Rules of the Senate, viz.:
procedure) states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time.
RULE LII
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of

their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied) ACIDSc

term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that
its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language
is conspicuously absent from the Rules . The Rules simply
state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The
latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity
of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the
difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
11 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)
There is no quarrel — and my Dissent to the September 4 Neri

Resolution in fact acknowledges — that the Rules of the Senate (Senate
Rules) provide in Section 136 that all unfinished business or pending matters
and proceedings of the Senate terminate with the expiration of a Congress.
This provision, in conjunction with Section 137, does not, however, lend
support to the Court's ruling that absent a provision in the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries explicitly stating the "continued effectivity of
such rules until they are amended or repealed", it "cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress" for
the following reasons: AIDSTE
First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court interpreted

"pending matters" in Section 136 of the Senate Rules to include the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries that "may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if presented for the first time". This posture, however, comes
also with the interpretation that the Senate may choose not to take up
the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, thereby leaving it without
rules to conduct legislative inquiries as the effectivity of the rules had
terminated with the previous Congress. This is an absurd interpretation
considering that the Senate is fully aware that Article VI, Section 21 requires
legislative investigations to be conducted in accordance with duly published
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
The September 4 Neri Resolution recognizes that the Senate Rules
have continuing effect from one Congress to the next, because it provides in
Section 137 that the Senate Rules "shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed". The
Senate Rules unmistakably state that their effectivity can be interrupted only
by amendment or repeal as provided in Section 137 and not by termination
of one Congress as provided in Section 136. The Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries have the same character as the Senate Rules. Both are
not "pending matters and proceedings" that terminate with the
expiration of the Congress. Pending matters and proceedings include
investigations that have not been terminated or bills that have not
completed the legislative process in the Senate of one Congress. ADCEcI
The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from one

Congress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in its
September 4 Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as a
continuing body governed by its continuing Senate Rules. If the
Senate were not a continuing body, there would be no reason for the Senate
Rules to likewise have a continuing effect. In contradistinction, the effectivity
of the Rules of Proceedings of the House of Representatives (House Rules) —
which is admittedly not a continuing body, as the terms of all congressmen
end at the same time — terminates upon the expiration of one Congress.
Thus, Rule 1, Section 1 of the 14th Congress House Rules adopted on
November 20, 2007 reflects the practice of the House of Representatives of
adopting rules of proceedings on its first meeting and organization upon the
opening of a succeeding Congress, viz.:
RULE I
Convening and Organizing the House
xxx xxx xxx

After the oath-taking of the newly-elected Speaker, the body
shall proceed to the adoption of the rules of the immediately
preceding Congress to govern its proceedings until the approval
and adoption of the rules of the current Congress. (emphasis
supplied)
On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the 14th Congress,
pending the adoption of its own House Rules, adopted the House Rules of
the 13th Congress as its provisional rules. 12 The House of Representatives
of each Congress adopts its own rules. 13 HTcDEa
Second, the above-quoted Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate Rules,
adopted under the regime of the 1987 Constitution, do not depart from the
provisions of the Senate Rules adopted under the 1935 Constitution, viz.:
Chapter XLVI
Unfinished Business in the Senate

Sec. 108. Unfinished business at the end of one session shall
not be affected by the closing of same, but shall be taken up again at
the next session in the same status in which it was.
Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraph,
matters pending at the expiration of one Congress shall no longer be
acted on.
Chapter LIII
Sec. 122. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed. 14
Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution, as I have
consistently maintained in my Dissents), it was well-settled that the Senate
was a continuing body as held in Arnault v. Nazareno , citing the U.S. case
McGrain v. Daugherty . 15 The 1935 Constitution provided that two-thirds,
or a majority of the Senate, continued into the next Congress. 16 SIDTCa
Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer a continuing body

under the 1987 Constitution — as less than a majority continue into the
Senate of the succeeding Congress 17 — the termination of the unfinished
business of the Senate at the expiration of a Congress and the effectivity of
the Senate Rules until amended or repealed as provided in Sections 136 and
137 of the Senate Rules under the 1987 Constitution, do not lend support to
a departure from the Arnault ruling that the Senate is a continuing body.
Under both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions, the Senate Rules show that
a continuing Senate's unfinished business terminates at the expiration of one
Congress, and its rules remain in effect from one Congress to the next.
As expounded in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution,
the Philippine Senate is patterned after the U.S. Senate, which is a
continuing body as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain. The
continuing nature of the U.S. Senate is also reflected in the Standing Rules of
the Senate under Rule V (2), viz.:
Rule V
SUSPENSION AND AMENDMENT OF THE RULES
xxx xxx xxx
2. The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the
next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these
rules. 18 (emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Philippine Senate Rules under both the 1935 and the 1987
Constitutions and the Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, after which the
Philippine Senate was patterned, reflect the nature of the Senate as a
continuing body. That the Senate is a continuing body proceeds from its
nature as created by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and adopted by the
1935 and the 1987 Philippine Constitutions. The Senate Rules are not the
bases for the continuing nature of the Senate, but they embody and reflect
this nature.

Third, the recognition that the Senate is a continuing body as reflected
in the continuing effect of the Senate Rules from one Congress to the next is
not consistent with the holding of the ponencia that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries must explicitly provide for this continuing effectivity if
such were the intent of the Senate, viz.:
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The
latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in
the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed
that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. 19 (emphasis supplied) DHcTaE
I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri

Resolution that the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries on August 24, 1995 has satisfied the requirement under Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that inquiries in aid of legislation be
conducted in accordance with the Senate's "duly published rules of
procedure." Interpreting Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
states that "(l)aws shall take effect after fifteen days following completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .,"
the Court ruled in the landmark Tañada v. Tuvera, 20 viz.:
". . . all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature. . . Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation." 21
Publication must be made in the Official Gazette 22 or a newspaper of
general circulation. 23
As a general rule, one-time publication suffices to satisfy the due
process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern it and
affect its rights. It is not uncommon for laws and rules to provide that they
shall take effect upon a certain date following publication in a newspaper of
general circulation without having to state that they "shall remain in force
until they are amended or repealed" for them to have continuing effect.
These laws and rules are published only once, and yet they continue to be in
force. The Court itself employs this language in its rules as shown in the
recently promulgated Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data and Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, respectively, viz.:
Section 25. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on February
2, 2008 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 27. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on October
24, 2007 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general
circulation. HScaCT
The exception to the general rule that one-time publication suffices for
a law or rule to have continuing effect is when there are circumstances or
factors that interrupt this continuity. An example is the discontinuation of
the existence of the House of Representatives as a legislative body, which
terminates the effectivity of its published Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries and requires the publication of these rules in the succeeding
Congress for them to take effect. As discussed above and in my Dissents to
t h e March 25 Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution, the
Senate, unlike the House of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus,
contrary to the holding of the ponencia, the Senate's Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, need not be published by the Senate
of every Congress and need not also state that they shall "remain in force
until they are amended or repealed" for them to be effective from one
Congress to the next. Quite the opposite of the ponencia's ruling, in the
absence of language stating that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
shall not continue in effect from one Congress to the next, these rules shall
have continuing effect.
In sum, the above discussion shows that the March 25 Neri Decision
a n d September 4 Neri Resolution themselves provide bases for
concluding that the Senate is a continuing body and that one-time
publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment,
suffices to satisfy the publication requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of
the 1987 Constitution. I respectfully submit that the Court ought to so
conclude in order to uphold internal consistency in its ruling with respect to
the constitutional requirement of publication of the Senate's Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries. In line with my position in my Dissents to the
Neri Ruling, I submit that the publication of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to the conduct of the subject
"Garci tapes" investigation is not a requirement for conducting such
investigation. AIDTHC
Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement of

publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, let us now proceed
to the third issue.
The "Garci tapes" in relation to Article III,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 4200
Let me begin the disquisition on the issue of "whether the inquiry,
which is centered on the so-called 'Garci tapes' violates Section 3, Article III
of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200" by stating what the
disposition of the case at bar is not about and proceed forthwith to what the
disposition of this case is about. To avoid clutter, let us excise the fat to get
to the lean meat of the controversy before the Court.
While the 1987 Constitution affords paramount importance to the
policy of transparency, public accountability, and informed participation of
the citizenry in a democracy, the case at bar is not about balancing between
the right to privacy of communication under Article III, Section 3 24 of the
1987 Constitution and the right to information under Article III, Section 7
25of the charter. The petitioners in this case are not suing as citizens
demanding information from the government. aHTCIc
While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the indispensable

role of legislative investigations in crafting sound law and also gives prime
recognition to the right to privacy of communication, the case at bar is not
about balancing an asserted right to privacy of communication
against the Senate's exercise of its power of legislative
investigation. This case does not involve a situation in which a witness in a
legislative inquiry invokes the right to privacy of communication, but the
Senate compels him, under pain of contempt, to disclose the communication
on account of an overriding public interest.
The bone of contention in the case at bar is whether the
Senate can use, in its legislative investigation, in admissible
evidence of a surreptitiously and illegally recorded private
communication.
The law decisive of the case at bar is R.A. No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law enacted in 1965. Introduced by Senator Lorenzo Tañada,
the explanatory note of the bill provides the background and rationale for
the law, viz.:
The privacy of communication and correspondence is among
the fundamental rights of an individual secured and guaranteed by
our Constitution. Thus, section 1(5) of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution provides that, "The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court or when public safety and order require otherwise." aEHAIS
xxx xxx xxx

At present, the laws penalizing the violation of the privacy of
communication are inadequate to cope with modern developments.
As we are all aware of, technology today has so far advanced, and will
inexorably continue to advance, that there is now an ever-growing
array of devices or arrangements for eavesdropping . . . There
could, indeed, be no doubt that these modern devices or
arrangements, if availed of by any or officers of the government, to
spy on another, could be the most obnoxious instruments of
oppression or arbitrary power. Sooner or later we will have to deal
with the danger that these increasingly sensitive electronic ears,
which are as fantastic as they are alarming, may annihilate
completely the privacy of communication. An additional and potent
deterrent is obviously called for if we are to guard against what might
well be subversive of one of our cherished personal freedoms which
makes life worth living.
xxx xxx xxx

Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among
others on our high regard for the individual's rights and freedoms, the
proposed measure will be but in accord with the principles of law and
government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution which
are designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of every
individual as a human being against the incursions of
unwelcome intruders.
Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdropping or
unwelcome intrusions into private communications. Section 1 of the
law provides that these acts are unlawful: SECIcT
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being

authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the
use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who
shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared
to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the
provisions of the following section or of any order issued
thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than six months or more than six years and with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the
offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to
deportation proceedings. (emphases supplied)
A private communication is characterized as such based not on the
content of the communication, but on the context that it was said in
private and not for public consumption. That the content or nature of
the communication is immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals, 26 viz.:
. . . the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation
of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law,) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed." (emphasis
supplied)(footnote omitted) HIAESC
The Senate deliberations on R.A. No. 4200 evince the meaning of private,
as opposed to public, communication, viz.:
Senator DIOKNO.
Do I Understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would
be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but
the recording is done secretly.
Senator TAÑADA.
Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is
t h e communication between one person and another
person — not between a speaker and a public.
Senator DIOKNO.
The wording of the law is "communication or spoken word."
Senator TAÑADA.
Yes.
Senator DIOKNO.
The term "spoken word" would automatically include speeches,
including, Mr. Senator, what we are doing here this morning. HcACTE
Senator TAÑADA.
As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this bill is to prevent

the tape recording or interception of a communication between
one person and an another — not between a speaker and a
public. Because precisely, the speaker speaks so that the public
may know what he has in mind, what he wants to communicate
to the people, and there should be no objection to tape recording
that speech. . . . 27 (emphases supplied)
R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions when wiretapping is

allowed by written order of the court under Section 3, viz.:
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render
it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by
a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases
involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war
and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised
Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national
security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or
granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of
the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in
cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit
sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only
upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may
be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or
to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. (emphasis
supplied) CIaHDc
To further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200 makes
illegally wiretapped communications inadmissible in any proceeding, viz.:
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation. (emphasis supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at bar, the wiretapping of the
communication recorded in the "Garci tapes" may be held legal only if it was
recorded with consent of the parties to the conversation or upon written
court order. As the wiretapping was done in the course of duty by the
witness, Technical Sergeant Vidal Doble, he may be presumed to have been
acting regularly in the performance of his official duties. 28 Doble testified
that he presumed that the order of his superior to him to conduct a wiretap
was legal, viz.:
Sen. Cayetano (P). . . Ngayon itong — noong sinabi sa iyo ito,
anong pakiramdam mo? Nagulat ka ba o parang normal lang sa iyo
na, "Okay, bagong assignment", may naisip ka bang baka violation
ito ng isang batas? May naisip ka bang ganon?
Mr. Ooble. Ang nasa isip po kasi naming noon since na galing sa
military hierarchy ang order, we assume that is a legal order, Your
Honor. 29
The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed to proceed to
establish the circumstances surrounding the wiretapping and determine
whether or not the wiretap was legally done with the consent of the parties
or lawful court order. AHDcCT
Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the "Garci

tapes" were illegally wiretapped, the question that comes to the fore is
whether the "communication or spoken word (in the tapes), their existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained" may be used in the subject
Senate investigations.
In Ramirez, in which the Court found that petitioner Ramirez violated
R.A. No. 4200 for secretly recording her private conversation with therein
respondent Garcia, the Court published in its decision the transcript of the
illegally wiretapped conversation as part of the narration of the facts of the
case. A mechanical and literal reading of Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200
would yield the absurd conclusion that the Court violated these provisions
for "communicat(ing) the contents thereof (the illegally wiretapped
conversation), either verbally or in writing" and using the inadmissible
transcription in its judicial proceedings. It is clear to the eye that this was not
the intent of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 4200. "Legislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible (Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co.
vs. Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685, [1971]) or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. (12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). 30 (emphasis
supplied) There is thus a need to interpret Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200.
CITcSH
Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an

exception to the prohibition on the "use of such record (of wiretapped
conversation) or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3. . ." The offenses
under Section 3 which allows wiretapping upon written order of the court are
as follows: "treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,
piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other
offenses against national security."
The exception under Section 1 in t relation to Section 3 of R.A. No.
4200 does not include the use of illegally wiretapped communication for
purposes of prosecuting violations of R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did in
Ramirez. Not reading this exception into the law would impede the
prosecution of the acts it prohibits and contradict the very purpose for
adopting the law as clearly stated in its title, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication,
and for Other Purposes." Well-settled is the rule in statutory construction
that "where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. 31 Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. R.A. No.
4200 should be given a sensible construction, so as to give effect to its
rationale and intent and thus avoid an unjust or absurd interpretation. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the use of illegally wiretapped communication
must be allowed in a prosecution under R.A. 4200 precisely to deter the
commission of illegal wiretapping.

Corollary to this conclusion is that such evidence should be an
exception to inadmissible evidence under Section 4 of the law. Judges and
prosecutors who possess and use illegally wiretapped communications in
prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 4200 are thus not liable for violating
this law in the same manner that, by way of exception, they are not liable for
illegal possession of firearms where the firearm is presented in evidence in a
case involving the prosecution of a violation of R.A. No. 8294. 32 This is true
despite the absence of such an exception to illegal possession, in
contradistinction to the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which
explicitly provides the following exception to infringement of copyright under
Section 184 (l)(k): "Any use made of a work for the purpose of any judicial
proceedings or for the giving of professional advice by a legal practitioner."
TCacIE
For similar reasons, another exception that ought to be read into

Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No 4200 is the use and admissibility of illegally
wiretapped communication in legislative investigations whose
particular purpose is precisely to craft or improve laws that will address
the evil of illegal wiretapping. Without this exception, the absurd result
would be that legislators cannot at all investigate illegal wiretaps as they
happen on the ground and plug loopholes in the law, because Section 4 of
R.A. No. 4200 provides that even the fact of existence of an illegally
wiretapped communication is inadmissible in evidence. To be sure, this
could not have been the intent of the law.
Lest the herein recognized exceptions be misconstrued and open the
floodgates to violations of R.A. No. 4200, it must be emphasized that as a
general rule, illegally wiretapped material is inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding, including legislative investigations, in accordance with R.A.
No. 4200. 33 As a very narrow exception, however, the wiretapped material
may be used and is admitted in a judicial proceeding for prosecution of
violations of R.A. No. 4200 and, akin to this, in a legislative investigation in
aid of legislation whose purpose is precisely to address the problem of illegal
wiretap. IASEca
In the case at bar, the focus of the Senate investigation as shown by

the transcripts of its hearings 34 has been the illegal wiretapping of several
personalities including the Commander-in-Chief and President of the
Philippines, the possible involvement of telecommunication providers in the
illegal wiretap, the use of scarce intelligence resources for wiretapping in
connection with the conduct of the 2004 Presidential elections, and electoral
fraud. The purpose of the investigation may also be gleaned from two bills
previously filed in relation thereto by the Chairperson of the National
Defense and Security Committee, seeking to (1) control and regulate the
sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment; and (2) prohibit the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from performing electoral duties. 35
Prescinding from the very narrow contours of the exception in using
illegally wiretapped communications, the Senate may proceed with the use
of the "Garci tapes" in a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation whose
purpose is to craft or improve legislation on wiretapping. On the other hand,
the "Garci tapes" are not admissible in evidence in legislative investigations
for a different purpose such as the punishment of electoral fraud. While
electoral fraud is a serious anomaly that erodes the foundation of democracy
and should not go unpunished, evidence obtained not through illegal wiretap
should be presented in proceedings investigating this matter. Resort to
illegal wiretapping to catch perpetrators of electoral fraud will only further
erode our democracy. As Senator Tañada exhorted in the explanatory note
of Senate Bill No. 9, which became the Anti-Wiretapping Law: CAHTIS
Considering our democratic set-up which is founded,

among others on our high regard for the individual's rights
and freedoms, the proposed measure will be but in accord with the
principles of law and government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution which are designed to protect the feelings and
sensibilities of every individual as a human being against the
incursions of unwelcome intruders.
In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation for the purpose of
crafting or improving laws on wiretapping, the legislature ought to abide by
the constitutional command under Article VI, Section 21 that in conducting
such inquiries, "(t)he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." The legislature should thus use mechanisms
and procedures available to it, such as executive sessions, in avoiding any
further and unnecessary incursion into the right to privacy of
communication. THaAEC
With respect to the question of whether the use of the "Garci tapes"
violates Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights, the above disquisition on
R.A. No. 4200 sufficiently addresses this issue. Under this constitutional
provision, the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except (1) upon lawful order of the court, or (2) when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. There is ostensibly no
lawful order of the court under the first exception, and any argument
anchored on the second exception will lead to R.A. No. 4200, being the only
Philippine law on wiretapping.
Anent G.R. No. 170338, it is my considered view that the petition is
moot and academic. 36 The petition prays that the Court issue a Resolution:
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing
the House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,
Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
from making use of the sound recording of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in their Report for the inquiries conducted
relative thereto, or from otherwise making use of said recordings for
any other purpose. TAcSaC
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding

the Respondent Committees to strike off the record of the
proceedings any and all references to the illegally obtained
wiretapped recordings, and to desist from further using the sound
recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in any
of its proceedings. 37
The first prayer is moot and academic, as the "Garci tapes" were already
played in the session floor of the House of Representatives on July 5, 2005.
38 The second prayer is also moot and academic, as the subject records of
proceedings and reports belong to the House of Representatives of the
Thirteenth Congress, which has already been terminated. The House of
Representatives not being a continuous body, the current House of
Representatives of the Fourteenth Congress is different from the House of
Representatives of the Thirteenth Congress. Thus, petitioner Garcillano
ought to first seekk recourse to the current House of Representatives with
respect to his second prayer.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No. 179275.
REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it dismisses the petition in G.R.

No. 170338 but dissent insofar as it grants the petition in G.R. No. 179275.
I. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 should be dismissed for
being moot.
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Virgilio D. Garcillano, via a petition for
prohibition and injunction, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, implores the Court to issue a Resolution as
follows: TaHDAS
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing
the House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,
Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
from making use of the sound recording of the illegally obtained
wiretapped conversations in their Report for the inquiries relative
thereto, or from otherwise making use of said recordings for any
other purpose.
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding
the Respondent Committees to strike off the record of the
proceedings any and all references to the illegally obtained
wiretapped recordings, and to desist from further using the sound
recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in any
of its proceedings. 1
The Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner Garcillano because it
has been mooted. It is of public knowledge, a fit subject of judicial notice, 2
that the "Hello Garci" tapes were already played in the House of
Representatives and heard by its members. 3 Then, separate committee
reports on the "Hello Garci" tapes were submitted to then House Speaker
Jose de Venecia, Jr. 4
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is the presence of an
actual controversy. Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical,
conjectural or anticipatory questions despite their vast judicial power.
Otherwise, a decision rendered would amount to nothing but an advisory
opinion, which would not augur well with the function of courts as arbiters of
controversies. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, 5 the
Court held: TSIDaH
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to
hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. 6
While it is true that the Court is not absolutely precluded from resolving
issues that are otherwise moot, 7 no compelling circumstance is present
here that would warrant the exercise of judicial review.
Too, the function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the execution
of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy
for acts already accomplished. 8 The office of prohibition is to arrest
proceedings rather than to undo them. 9 A preventive remedy, as a rule,
does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. 10
II. The petition in G.R. No. 179275 should likewise be dismissed
because the Senate need not republish its Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
The issues in G.R. No. 179275 are as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
have been published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every
Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the
constitutional requirement?
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called

"Garci tapes" violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or
Republic Act No. 4200. 11
Anent the first issue, I agree with the ponencia and the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Reynato Puno that petitioners Santiago Javier
Ranada and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, plus intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge,
possess the requisite locus standi to bring the suit.
Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in
manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are tools crafted to facilitate, not to
frustrate, the attainment of justice. Thus, their strict and rigid application, if
they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be eschewed. Substantial rights must not be
prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of
expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of
the application of the rules is in order. 12 Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. 13 CSEHIa
There is no question that the issues raised by petitioners Ranada and

Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge are of paramount importance. Thus, any
procedural barrier to their suit should be put aside.
Now to the second issue — the meat of the second petition.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The ponencia holds that the Senate investigation on the "Hello Garci"
tapes is infirm because the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had not been duly published at the time of the legislative
inquiry in question.
I hold otherwise. On this score, I reiterate my separate opinion on the
motion for reconsideration in Senate v. Ermita, 14 thus:
True it is that, as the Constitution mandates, the Senate may
only conduct an investigation in aid of legislation pursuant to its duly
published rules of procedure. Without publication, the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is ineffective.
Thus, unless and until said publication is done, the Senate cannot
enforce its own rules of procedure, including its power to cite a
witness in contempt under Section 18.
But the Court can take judicial notice that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was published on
August 20 and 21, 1992 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine
Star during the 9th Congress.
The Senate again published its said rules on December 1, 2006
in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the 13th
Congress. That the Senate published its rules of procedure twice
more than complied with the Constitutional requirement. aCHDST
I submit that the Senate remains a continuing body under the

1987 Constitution. That the Senate is a continuing body is premised
on the staggered terms of its members, the idea being to ensure
stability of governmental policies. This is evident from the
deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, thus:
"MR. RODRIGO. . . .
I would like to state that in the United States Federal Congress,
the term of the members of the Lower House is only two years.
We have been used to a term of four years here but I think three
years is long enough. But they will be allowed to run for
reelection any number of times. In this way, we remedy the too
frequent elections every two years. We will have elections
every three years under the scheme and we will have a
continuing Senate. Every election, 12 of 24 Senators will
be elected, so that 12 Senators will remain in the Senate.
In other words, we will have a continuing Senate . 15
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE.
This is just a paragraph of that section that will follow what has
earlier been approved. It reads: "OF THE SENATORS ELECTED IN
THE ELECTION IN 1992, THE FIRST TWELVE OBTAINING THE
HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARS AND
THE REMAINING TWELVE FOR THREE YEARS."
This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform to the
idea of a continuing Senate.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo).
What does the Committee say?

MR. SUAREZ.
The Committee accepts the Davide proposal, Mr. Presiding
Officer. 16
The Senate does not cease to be a continuing body merely

because only half of its members continue to the next Congress. To
my mind, even a lesser number of Senators continuing into the next
Congress will still make the Senate a continuing body. The Senate
must be viewed as a collective body. It is an institution quite apart
from the Senators composing it. The Senate as an institution cannot
be equated to its present occupants. It is indivisible. It is not the sum
total of all sitting Senators at any given time. Senators come and go
but the very institution of the Senate remains. It is this indivisible
institution which should be viewed as continuing. HDTISa
The argument that the Senate is not a continuing body because

it lacks quorum to do business after every midterm or presidential
elections is flawed. It does not take into account that the term of
office of a Senator is fixed by the Constitution. There is no vacancy in
the office of outgoing Senators during midterm or presidential
elections. Article VI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election .
The term of a Senator starts at noon of June 30 next following
their election and shall end before noon of June 30 six years after. The
constitutional provision aims to prevent a vacuum in the office of an
outgoing Senator during elections, which is fixed under the
Constitution unless changed by law on the second Monday of May, 17
until June 30 when the Senators-elect assume their office. There is no
vacuum created because at the time an outgoing Senator's term
ends, the term of a Senator-elect begins.
The same principle holds true for the office of the President. A
president-elect does not assume office until noon of June 30 next
following a presidential election. An outgoing President does not
cease to perform the duties and responsibilities of a President merely
because the people had chosen his/her new successor. Until her term
expires, an outgoing President has the constitutional duty to
discharge the powers and functions of a President unless restricted 18
by the Constitution.
In fine, the Senate is a continuing body as it continues to have
a full or at least majority membership 19 even during elections until
the assumption of office of the Senators-elect. The Senate as an
institution does not cease to have a quorum to do business even
during elections. It is to be noted that the Senate is not in session
during an election until the opening of a new Congress for practical
reasons. This does not mean, however, that outgoing Senators cease
to perform their duties as Senators of the Republic during such
elections. When the President proclaims martial law or suspends the
writ of habeas corpus, for example, the Congress including the
outgoing Senators are required to convene if not in session within 24
hours in accordance with its rules without need of call. 20 aSTAcH
The Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senate

rules is contained in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
The above provision only requires a "duly published" rule of
procedure for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on
republication. There is nothing in the constitutional provision that
commands that every new Congress must publish its rules of
procedure. Implicitly, republication is necessary only when there is an
amendment or revision to the rules. This is required under the due
process clause of the Constitution.
The Senate in the 13th Congress caused the publication of the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. The
present Senate (14th Congress) adopted the same rules of procedure
in the NBN-ZTE investigation. It does not need to republish said rules
of procedure because it is not shown that a substantial amendment
or revision was made since its last publication that would affect the
rights of persons appearing before it.
On a more practical note, there is little to be gained in requiring
a new Congress to cause the republication of the rules of procedure
which has not been amended or revised. The exercise is simply a
waste of government funds. Worse, it unduly burdens and hinders the
Senate from discharging its constitutional duties. Publication takes
time and during the interregnum, it cannot be gainsaid that the
Senate is barred or restricted from conducting an investigation in aid
of legislation.
I agree with the Chief Justice that this Court must be wary of the
far-reaching consequences of a case law invalidating the Senate rules
of procedure for lack of republication. Our ruling in this petition will
not only affect the NBN-ZTE investigation, but all other Senate
investigations conducted under the 10th, 11th, 12th, and the present
14th Congress, for which no republication of the rules has been done.
These investigations have been the basis of several bills and laws
passed in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Putting a
doubt on the authority, effectivity and validity of these proceedings is
imprudent and unwise. This Court should really be cautious in making
a jurisprudential ruling that will unduly strangle the internal workings
of a co-equal branch and needlessly burden the discharge of its
constitutional duty. 21 SHADEC
In addition, let me point out the Philippine Constitution, past and

present, were largely influenced by the United States Constitution. In
McGrain v. Daugherty, 22 the United States Supreme Court explicitly ruled
that the American Senate is a continuing body. In Arnault v. Nazareno, 23 the
Philippine Supreme Court, relying on McGrain, held that the Philippine
Senate is a continuing body. There is no plausible reason why the rule
should be different today.
In view of the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to delve on the third
issue which the ponencia does not also address.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS both petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and
G.R. No. 179275.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Id. at 1-38.
5. Id. at 36-38.
6. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
7. Id. at 169. CIAHDT
8. An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
9. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
10. Id. at 3-17.
11. Id. at 7-13.
12. Id. at 24.

13. Id. at 44.
14. Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.

16. Id. at 71-90. DcICEa
17. Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the October
2, 2007 Oral Argument:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.

2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published,
in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily: ECDaAc
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes",

violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200.
(Id. at 66.)
18. Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26,
2007.
19. Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
20. 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
21. Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.

22. Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA
736, 755. SAcaDE
23. G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May
3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
24. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.
25. G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26. Id.
27. Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
28. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4. DTaAHS
29. Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
30. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.
31. 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.
33. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
34. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110,
139.
35. Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the
standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial
review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.
36. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890
(2004). AcTHCE
37. Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13,
46.
38. Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130,
138.
39. Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
40. See news article "Separate findings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac
published in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5
House committees in 'Garci' probe file report on Monday" published in The
Manila Bulletin on March 25, 2006. TASCDI
41. Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994,
229 SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.
679.
43. Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).

44. As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing
for the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of
General Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
45. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp.
9-10.
46. G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47. Id. at 297-298.

48. Dated September 4, 2008.
49. TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
50. Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commercial
and Non-Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful
Use Thereof and For Other Purposes", approved on June 14, 2000.
51. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633,
October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52. Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read: HEASaC
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages . — Information shall not be

denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in
the data message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is
merely referred to in that electronic data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents . — Electronic
documents shall have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other
document or legal writing, and —
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is
met by an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its
integrity and reliability, and can be authenticated so as to be usable for
subsequent reference, in that —
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart
from the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any
change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and
display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it
was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the
document not being presented or retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its
original form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if —
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from
the time when it was first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is
to be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary
any and all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the
execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional
equivalent of a written document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of
electronic data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating
to authentication and best evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents . — (1) Where the law requires information to
be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an
electronic data message or electronic document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated
in its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic document is
shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information is
capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of
an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the
information not being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has
remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the
purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
relevant circumstances.
PUNO, C.J., dissenting:

1. Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94. ESaITA
2. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,

Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180641, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA
77.
National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008. HTSIEa

77, 135-136.
National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 42-
25.
6. Ponencia .
77, 139. The dispositive portion reads, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate
Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.
SO ORDERED.
77, 132-136. ScHAIT

National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 40-
41.
10. Id. at 44-45.

11. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4,
2008, pp. 43-44.
12. 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, July 23, 2007.
13. See 13th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted October
27, 2004; 12th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted
October 22, 2002; 11th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
adopted August 31, 1999; 10th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, adopted July 24, 1995.
14. RULES OF THE SENATE approved on January 25, 1950, and revised as of 1966.
15. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
16. 1935 PHIL. CONST., Art. VIII, §3 provides, viz.:
Section 3. The term of office of Senators shall be six years and shall begin on
the thirtieth day of December next following their election. The first Senators
elected under this Constitution shall, in the manner provided by law, be
divided equally into three groups, the Senators of the first group to serve for
a term of six years; those of the second group, for four years; and those of
the third group, for two years.
17. 1987 PHIL. CONST., Art. VI, §4 in relation to Art. XVIII, §2 provides, viz.:
Art. VI, Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
Art, XVIII, Sec. 2. . . .
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve
for three years.
18. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, revised to September 14, 2007.
19. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4,
2008, p. 44.
20. 220 Phil. 422 (1985); Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration, 230 Phil. 528
(1986).
21. Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 533-535 (1986); See also The Veterans
Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006,
483 SCRA 526; Umali v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992, 209
SCRA 446. IDTcHa
22. Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

23. Executive OrderNo. 200, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.
24. Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
25. Article III, Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
26. G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA 590. SHAcID
27. III RECORDS OF THE SENATE, March 12, 1964, p. 625.

28. People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA
350, 381.
29. Transcript of Senate hearing held by the Joint Committees on National Defense
and Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, September 7, 2007, p. 95.
30. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA
590.
31. Lanot, et al. v, Comelec, G.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
32. An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, As Amended,
Enlitled "Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture,
Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives
or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunitions or
Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and
for Relevant Purposes."
33. Salcedo-Ortanez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994, 235
SCRA 111 and People of the Philippines v. Olivarez, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 77865
December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 635.
34. Transcripts of Senate hearings held by the Joint Committees on National
Defense and Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments,
Revision of Codes and Laws, September 7 and 17, 2007.
35. Rollo, pp. 216, 218; Comment of respondent Senate of the Philippines, p. 2.
36. Philippine Airlines v. Joselito Pascua, et al., G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003,
409 SCRA 195. STcaDI
37. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
38. Id. at 56.

REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
2. Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2. Judicial Notice, when discretionary. — A court
may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. aSCHIT
3. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, p. 9.

4. "Separate findings, no closure on 'Hello Garci' scandal" dated March 29, 2006 by
Michael Lim Ubac in
http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/hellogarci/view.php?db
=0&article=20060329-70909. The report partly states:
THE HOUSE of Representatives inquiry has resulted in two "Hello Garci"
reports, separate findings, no closure.
At dusk yesterday, the majority and minority blocs came up with separate
committee reports on the wiretapping scandal that nearly unseated
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo last year. ATICcS
It was the majority bloc represented by the chairs of the five House
committees that first handed its report to Speaker Jose de Venecia.
De Venecia congratulated the chairs led by North Cotabato Representative

Emmylou Taliño-Santos for "their wisdom and dedication to duty."
The minority report penned by Cavite Representative Gilbert Remulla
highlighted the futility of the search for truth behind an opposition allegation
that the recordings showed that Ms Arroyo phoned Election Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to boost her chances of winning the 2004 presidential race.
"It's likewise undeniable that the Arroyo government, in general, has shown
utter disregard, if not disrespect, towards the inquiry. Though members of
the administration appeared during the public hearings, nothing substantial
was presented to help ferret out the truth", said the minority report.
Lost opportunity
The report said that the 14 public hearings could have "finally be the
moment for Congress to address the lingering problem of election cheating,
but with the way the witnesses conducted themselves the opportunity was
lost."
The minority report would be "appended" to the main report, said Santos.
As expected, there was nothing new in the majority's findings and
recommendations.
The main report did not deviate from the revised draft report it routed to
committee members on March 13, which admitted the failure of the joint
congressional inquiry to unravel the mystery of the political controversy.
The report said that the hearings "only raised more issues and answered
none", thus Congress should "continue to seek the answers . . . and in
particular subpoena phone records to establish the likelihood or unlikelihood
that alleged wiretapping conversations could have taken place."
5. 465 Phil. 860 (2004).
6. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, id. at 889-890.
7. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a gave violation of
the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest involved demand; (3) the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485,
171483, 171400, 171489, & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160; Lacson v.
Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756; Province of Batangas
v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Albaña v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98, Acop
v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 277 SCRA 409. CAScIH
8. Heirs of Eugenia v. Roxas, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 67195,
78618 & 78619-20, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84
Phil. 515 (1949); Calbanero v. Torrens, 61 Phil. 522 (1935).
9. Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Remedies, p. 418.
10. Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 432.
11. Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94. AcSHCD
12. Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA
68.
13. Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, September 24, 1990, 190 SCRA
31, 38.
14. G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008.
15. Constitutional Commission Record (1986), p. 208.
16. Id. at 434.
17. CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 8.

18. Id., Secs. 14 and 15 provides:
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain
effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from
his assumption or reassumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
19. The Office of a Senator may be vacant for causes such as death or permanent
disability.
20. CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. VII, Sec. 18 provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report
in person or in writing to the congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call. cEAIHa
21. Senate v. Ermita, supra note 14, at 30-35.

22. 273 US 135 (1927).
23. Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil, 29 (1950). AIDTHC

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI ,

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panﬁlo Lacson

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution

The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing between what is

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(September 4 Neri Resolution). I respectfully submit that the ponencia is

The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the

Subsequently, the Court clariﬁed the above ruling in the September 4

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court

SEC. 123. Unﬁnished business at the end of the session

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take eﬀect on the date of

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings

xxx xxx xxx

1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure Governing

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members

Fourth, we ﬁnd merit in the argument of the OSG that

The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the

In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court reiterated its

"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt

In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September 4

In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the Rules of Procedure

SEC. 136. Unﬁnished business at the end of the session

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take eﬀect on the date of

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into

There is no quarrel — and my Dissent to the September 4 Neri

First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court interpreted

The continuing eﬀectivity of the Senate Rules from one

xxx xxx xxx

Unfinished Business in the Senate

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Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer a continuing body

xxx xxx xxx

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I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri

Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement of

While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the indispensable

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being

As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this bill is to prevent

R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions when wiretapping is

Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the "Garci

Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an

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For similar reasons, another exception that ought to be read into