Fabre vs. CA (Chua Girl edited by Loyola) and record of service.
and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires
July 26, 1996 | Mendoza, J. | Negligent
PETITIONER: Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre and Porfirio Cabil
RESPONDENTS: Court Of Appeals, The Word For The World Christian
Fellowship, Inc., Amyline Antonio, John Richards, Gonzalo Gonzales, Vicente
V. Que, Jr., Icli Cordova, Arlene Gojocco, Alberto Roxas Cordero, Richard
Bautista, Jocelyn Garcia, Yolanda Cordova, Noel Roque, Edward Tan, Ernesto
Narciso, Enriqueta Locsin, Francis Norman O. Lopes, Julius Caesar, Garcia,
Rosario Ma. V. Ortiz, Marietta C. Clavo, Elvie Seniel, Rosario Mara-Mara,
Teresita Regala, Melinda Torres, Marella Mijares, Josefa Cabatingan, Mara
Nadoc, Diane Mayo, Tess Plata, Mayette Jocson, Arlene Y. Mortiz, Liza Mayo,
Carlos Ranario, Rosamaria T. Radoc And Bernadette Ferrer,
SUMMARY: The Fabre’s were owners of a 1982 Mazda minibus which they
used for a bus service for school children. The couple hired a driver (Cabil)
after trying him out for 2 weeks and whose job was to take children to St.
Scholastica’s college. WWCF arranged with the Fabre’s for the
transportation of 33 of its Young Ministry from Manila to La Union. The
group was scheduled to leave at 5PM but they left at 8PM because some of the
members were late. The usual route to La Union was through Carmen however
the bridge was under repair so Cabil was forced to take a detour through the
town of Ba-ay in Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a
sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction. The road was
slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed
of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. One of the passengers
injured was Amyline Antonio who was thrown on the floor of the bus and
pinned down by a wooden seat. Cabil’s defense was that he did not see the curve
until it was too late and that he slowed down (30kph) but it was too late. A
criminal complaint was filed against the driver and Amyline Antonio filed a civil
case as well. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia
and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. RTC ruled that the Fabre’s
were negligent. CA sustained RTC’s finding that Cabil failed to exercise due
care and precaution and that the Fabre’s were themselves presumptively
negligent. The issue is whether Fabre’s and Cabil were negligent and if they
are liable for the injuries suffered by Amyline Antonio. The SC said yes to
both. The SC ruled that it was unnecessary to decide whethere the petitioners are
liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of
quasi delict or culpa aquiliana as for although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature," nevertheless "the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort.". Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise
presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the
selection and supervision of their employee. Due diligence in selection
constitutes the examination of the applicant for for his qualifications, experience
the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring
of consistent compliance with the rules. In the case, the Fabres did not consider
the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only from their homes to
the school and hired him only after 2 weeks of apprenticeship. As common
carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for the
safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. Owners and driver of
the bus may be made to respond jointly and severally. In this case, Amyline
Antonio did not stake out her claim against carrier and driver exclusively on one
theory (on breach of contract aline). It was permitted for them to allege
alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such
causes of action. So long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not
recover twice for the same injury. There was intent to recover from both the
carrier and driver thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were
jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to
produce the same injury.
DOCTRINE: This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee
Article 1759 of the Code provides Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
FACTS:
1. The Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982
model Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a
bus service for school children which they operated in Manila.
2. The couple hired a driver named Porfiro J. Cabil (Cabil)
a. Hired after trying him out for 2 weeks
b. Job was to take school children to and from St. Scholastica’s
3. College in Malate
4. Respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF)
arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young
Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of
which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
a. Group was scheduled to leave Nov. 1984 at 5PM.
b. However, several members of the party were late so the bus left
8PM instead
5. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan.
However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil,
 who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was
forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan
6. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the
highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as "siete."
a. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus,
which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid
to the left road shoulder.
b. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and
rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and
landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of
impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it
had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
7. One of the passengers injured was private respondent Amyline Antonio who
was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat
8. Driver Cabil’s defense
a. He did not see the curve until it was too late.
b. He said he was not familiar with the area and he could not have
seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because
it was dark and there was no sign on the road.
c. He said that he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30
meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour,
but it was too late.
9. The Lingayen police investigated the incident and filed a criminal
complaint against the driver
10. Amyline Antonio brought this case in the RTC of Makati
a. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia
and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down
b. She described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence
regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy
11. RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT—Fabre’s were negligent because no
convincing evidence shown that:
a. Minibus was properly checked for travel a long distance trip
b. Driver was properly screened and tested before being admitted for
employment
12. RULING OF THE CA –sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner
Cabil failed to exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his
vehicle considering the time and the place of the accident and that the
Fabre’s were themselves presumptively negligent
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN petitioners (Fabre’s and Cabil) were negligent – YES
2. WoN petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by Amyline Antonio –
YES
3. WoN damages can be awarded and to what extent – YES
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to award of damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY
jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline Antonio the following amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees; and
6) costs of suit.
RATIO:
First Issue
1. First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this
case on the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of
carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held,
a. for although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature," nevertheless "the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort.".
b. In either case, the question is whether the bus driver, petitioner
Porfirio Cabil, was negligent.
2. The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the
Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is
fully supported by the evidence on record.
a. The fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was
dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on
a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and
that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent
and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private
respondent Amyline Antonio.
3. Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise
to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves
negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.
4. Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the
applicant possessed a professional driver's license.
a. The employer should also examine the applicant for his
qualifications, experience and record of service
5. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with the rules
6. In the case, the Fabres did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving
for school children only from their homes to the school and hired him only
after 2 weeks of apprenticeship
 a. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could
remember the names of the children he would be taking to school,
which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long
distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union was
his first.
7. Fabre’s argues they are not liable because
a. An earlier departure (made impossible by the congregation's
delayed meeting) could have averted the mishap
b. Under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the
conduct of the trip.
8. The SC said that neither of the two arguments of the Fabre’s hold water
a. The hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the
delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident
b. [A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver
directions as to the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but
exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from
recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the
automobile and a train, caused by the negligence either of the
locomotive engineer or the automobile driver.
9. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. the
Fabres,did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation
for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them.
a. Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
b. The above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity
(in local idiom, as "a sideline")
10. As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise "extraordinary
diligence" for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination.
a. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employee
b. Article 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
11. The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial
court and of the appellate court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176
and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify finding them guilty of breach of
contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.
Second Issue:
1. Owners and driver of the bus may be made to respond jointly and severally
2. Jurisrudence cited by the court
a. Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
i. driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to
let off passengers when a fellow passenger ran amuck, as
a result of which the passengers jumped out of the
speeding bus and suffered injuries, was held also jointly
and severally liable with the bus company to the injured
passengers.
b. Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
,
i. The bus company, its driver, the operator of the other
vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's
heirs.
3. BASIS (as explained in Viluan v CA): Nor should it make any difference
that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while
that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from
quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez,
that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the
drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally
liable for damages.
4. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc v CA – court exonerated the jeepney
driver from liability to injured passengers white holding owners of the
jeepney solidarily liable
a. This was because case was expressly tried and decided
exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual.
b. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the
carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The contract of
carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the
event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his driver
5. In this case, Amyline Antonio did not stake out her claim against carrier and
driver exclusively on one theory (on breach of contract aline)
a. It was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action
and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action
b. So long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover
twice for the same injury
 6. There was intent to recover from both the carrier and driver thus justifying
the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable
because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same
injury.

Third Issue
1. We sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However,
we think the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the amount of
compensatory damages because private respondents did not question this
award as inadequate.
2. To the contrary, the award of P500,000.00 for compensatory damages
which the Regional Trial Court made is reasonable considering the
contingent nature of her income as a casual employee of a company and as
distributor of beauty products and the fact that the possibility that she might
be able to work again has not been foreclosed.
3. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely within the
purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in
cases of quasi delict.
4. On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage,
the award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2220, since Cabil's gross negligence amounted to bad faith.
 MARIANO v. CALLEJAS (Lim)
July 31, 2009 | Puno, C.J. | Disputable Presumption of Negligence
PETITIONER: HERMINIO MARIANO, JR
RESPONDENTS: ILDEFONSO C. CALLEJAS and EDGAR DE BORJA
SUMMARY: Mariano, the surviving spouse of a passenger of a Celyrosa Express
bus bound for Tagaytay who died, filed a case against the common carrier and its
driver, Callejas. The Celyrosa Express bus, carrying Dr. Mariano as its passenger,
collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer bearing plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH
531. The passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay while the trailer truck came from
the opposite direction, bound for Manila. The RTC held dolidarily liable both the
driver and the passenger bus. However, CA reversed saying that they exercised
extraordinary diligence and was able to rebut the presumption of negligence. Issue
is W/N liable? NO. The totality of evidence shows that the death of petitioner's
spouse was caused by the reckless negligence of the driver of the Isuzu trailer
truck which lost its brakes and bumped the Celyrosa Express bus, owned and
operated by respondents. Respondent driver De Borja had every right to expect
that the trailer truck coming from the opposite direction would stay on its
proper lane. He was not expected to know that the trailer truck had lost its brakes.
The swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was running on a fast speed as
it was found 500 meters away from the point of collision. Secondly, any doubt as
to the culpability of the driver of the trailer truck ought to vanish when he pleaded
guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple slight
physical injuries and damage to property in Criminal Case No. 2223-92,
involving the same incident.
DOCTRINE: Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault
or negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured,
merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten
the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof
that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law
in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the
passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Herminio Mariano, Jr. is the surviving spouse of Dr. Frelinda
Mariano who was a passenger of a Celyrosa Express bus bound for Tagaytay
when she met her death.
2. Respondent Ildefonso C. Callejas is the registered owner of Celyrosa Express
3. Respondent Edgar de Borja was the driver of the bus on which the deceased
was a passenger.
4. At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12, 1991, along Aguinaldo Highway, San
Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite, the Celyrosa Express bus, carrying Dr. Mariano
as its passenger, collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer bearing plate
numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531. The passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay
while the trailer truck came from the opposite direction, bound for Manila.
The trailer truck bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion.
Due to the impact, the passenger bus fell on its right side on the right shoulder
of the highway and caused the death of Dr. Mariano and physical injuries to
four other passengers. Dr. Mariano was 36 years old at the time of her death.
She left behind three minor children, aged four, three and two years.
5. Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages
against respondents for their failure to transport his wife and mother of his
three minor children safely to her destination.
a. Respondents claimed that the proximate cause of the accident was
the recklessness of the driver of the trailer truck which bumped
their bus while allegedly at a halt on the shoulder of the road in its
rightful lane. Thus, respondent Callejas filed a third-party
complaint against Liong Chio Chang, doing business under the
name and style of La Perla Sugar Supply, the owner of the trailer
truck, for indemnity.
6. A criminal case was also filed against truck driver Arcilla in the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. On May 3, 1994, the said court convicted truck driver Arcadio Arcilla
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, multiple slight
physical injuries and damage to property.
7. In the case at bar, the trial court, in its Decision dated September 13, 1999,
found respondents Ildefonso Callejas and Edgar de Borja, together with
Liong Chio Chang, jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner damages and
costs of suit.
8. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
9. WoN Respondents are liable under the Contract of Carriage? NO, it was able
to prove that it exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE.
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May
21, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 7, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66891 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
First Issue
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
10. The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting her to her
destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To
overcome the presumption, respondents have to show that they observed
extraordinary diligence in the discharge of their duty, or that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event
11. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers
in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of
negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of
the absolute safety of its passengers.
a. Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary
care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can
provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged
with due regard to all the circumstances.
12. Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured,
merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to
fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is
rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary
diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation,
or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous
event.
13. The intention of the Code Commission and Congress is to curb the
recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of
their business.
14. it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for
personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its
failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.
15. The totality of evidence shows that the death of petitioner's spouse was
caused by the reckless negligence of the driver of the Isuzu trailer truck which
lost its brakes and bumped the Celyrosa Express bus, owned and operated by
respondents.
a. The sketch of PO3 Magno S. de Villa, who investigated the
accident, shows the passenger bus facing the direction of Tagaytay
City and lying on its right side on the shoulder of the road, about
five meters away from the point of impact. On the other hand, the
trailer truck was on the opposite direction, about 500 meters away
from the point of impact. PO3 De Villa stated that he interviewed
De Borja, respondent driver of the passenger bus, who said that he
was about to unload some passengers when his bus was bumped by
the driver of the trailer truck that lost its brakes. PO3 De Villa
checked out the trailer truck and found that its brakes really failed.
b. Said vehicle 1 [passenger bus] was running from Manila toward
south direction when, in the course of its travel, it was hit and
bumped by vehicle 2 [truck with trailer] then running fast from
opposite direction, causing said vehicle 1 to fall on its side on the
road shoulder, causing the death of one and injuries of some
passengers thereof, and its damage, after collission (sic), vehicle 2
continiously (sic) ran and stopped at approximately 500 meters
away from the piont (sic) of impact.
c. The evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was
cruising on its rightful lane along the Aguinaldo Highway when the
trailer truck coming from the opposite direction, on full speed,
suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane, and bumped the
passenger bus on its left middle portion.
i. Respondent driver De Borja had every right to expect
that the trailer truck coming from the opposite
direction would stay on its proper lane. He was not
expected to know that the trailer truck had lost its brakes.
The swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was
running on a fast speed as it was found 500 meters away
from the point of collision.
ii. Secondly, any doubt as to the culpability of the driver of
the trailer truck ought to vanish when he pleaded guilty to
the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
slight physical injuries and damage to property in
Criminal Case No. 2223-92, involving the same incident.