Human Rights Movement

THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE 21st CENTURY
A LIVING DOCUMENT
IN A CHANGING WORLD
A report by the
Global Citizenship Commission
CHAIRED BY GORDON BROWN
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 21st CENTURY
The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in the 21st Century:
A Living Document in a
Changing World
A report by the
Global Citizenship Commission
Edited by Gordon Brown

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Contents
Glossary ix
Introduction by Gordon Brown 1
Preface by Paul Boghossian 7
Acknowledgments 9
Executive Summary 13
Preamble 25
1. The Long and Influential Life of the Universal Declaration 29
of Human Rights
1.1 History of the UDHR 29
1.2 Affirming and protecting the UDHR 31
1.3 The changing context 32
1.4 The enduring relevance of the UDHR 32
1.5 Legal status 34
1.6 Foundational principles 35
1.7 Universality 36
1.8 Interconnectivity of rights 38
2. The Evolving Understanding of Rights 39

2.1 Rights of members of specific groups 40
a. The rights of women 40
b. The rights of children 41
c. The rights of the disabled, including the profoundly 43
disabled
d. Rights related to sexual orientation 44
e. The rights of prisoners 45
2.2 Rights of groups as such 46
a. The right to national self-determination, including 46
regional autonomy and subsidiarity
b. The rights of indigenous peoples 47
c. Ethnic cleansing 47
d. The rights of peoples prejudiced at the national or 47
communal level by climate change
2.3 Rights related to other issues involving vital interests 48
a. Migration 48
b. Statelessness 50
c. Administrative justice 51
d. Corruption 51
e. Privacy from state or corporate electronic surveillance 52
f. Access to the Internet and electronic communication on a 53
global scale
g. Extreme poverty and deep economic inequality 53
h. Healthcare 54
i. A safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment 55
2.4 An open task 56
3. Limitations and Derogations 57

3.1 Adequacy of Article 29 account of limitations 57
3.2 Derogation of rights in national or international emergencies 59
3.3 Regulation of the use of force 60
4. Social and Economic Rights 63

4.1 The importance of social and economic rights 63
4.2 Relation to availability of resources 65
4.3 Responsibilities for social and economic rights 66
4.4 Poverty reduction and other human rights 69
5. Responsibility for Human Rights 71

5.1 The special role of states 72
5.2 Other entities 73
a. Sub-national governments 74
b. International institutions 74
c. Corporations 74
d. Private persons 76
5.3 Responsibilities of rights-bearers 77
5.4 No closed model of responsibility 79
6. Implementation of Human Rights 81
6.1 Introduction 81
6.2 State of play on representative rights 82
a. Anti-slavery (Article 4) 83
b. Anti-torture (Article 5) 84
c. Free expression (Article 19) and free association (Article 20) 86
d. Education (Article 26) 88
e. Summary 90
6.3 Suggestions on implementation 91
a. Recommendations for strengthening the UN system on 91
human rights implementation
i. Implement the recommendations of UN human 91
rights mechanisms
ii. Enhance the OHCHR’s field presence 92
iii. Raise human rights concerns for consideration by the 93
UN Security Council
iv. Limit the UN Security Council veto in the case of 94
mass atrocities
v. Harness technology to enhance human rights 94
accountability
b. National and regional legal systems 95
c. NGOs 97
d. Human rights education 97
i. The UDHR and human rights education for all 97
ii. The UDHR and human rights education since 1948 98
iii. Transformative human rights education 99
iv. Advancing transformative human rights education 99
6.4 Sovereignty 100
a. General (human rights as limits on sovereignty) 100
b. Sanctions, denunciations, and other measures 101
c. Responsibility to Protect 102
7. Human Rights and a Global Ethic 105
Appendices 109
A The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 109
B Members of the Commission 117
C Members of the Philosophers' Committee 131
Online Appendices
D Human Rights Education
E Human Rights Implementation
Glossary
CAT Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CEDAW The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSOs Civil Society Organizations
GCC Global Citizenship Commission
EFA Education for All
GIAS Global Institute for Advanced Study
HRE Human Rights Education
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights
ILO International Labour Organization

MDGs Millennium Development Goals
OHCHR Office of the High Commission for Human Rights
OPCAT Optional Protocol to CAT
x The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 21st Century
The P5 Permanent Members of the Security Council
RtoP Responsibility to Protect

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPR Universal Periodic Review

Introduction
by Gordon Brown
When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted

in 1948,1 the world was a very different place. Years of war had left the
better part of two continents in disarray. A geopolitical reordering saw
an Iron Curtain fall across a continent and a Cold War rise across the
globe. And the world was waking up to the unconscionable horrors of
the Holocaust. From the ruins of the Second World War came a call to
enshrine fundamental human rights.
Facilitating this moment of global introspection was a Philosophers’
Committee under the direction of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The Committee
enlisted leading thinkers  –  from Mahatma Gandhi to Aldous Huxley  –  to
contribute their insights about a proposed Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The work of the Philosophers’ Committee was then
passed to the UN Human Rights Commission, chaired by Eleanor
Roosevelt, a tireless fighter whose supreme and lasting achievement
was shaping a human rights consensus among the then 58 UN Member
States.
The framers of the Declaration envisaged three parts to the postwar
human rights enterprise: a set of general principles, the codification
of those principles into law, and a practical means of implementation.
Because of the divisions and hostilities of the Cold War, countries could
neither agree on the basis of human rights, nor on how specific rights
should be upheld. So it was that Eleanor Roosevelt could only complete
1 An annotated version of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is set out in
Appendix A.
© NYU GIAS, CC BY http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0091.01
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 21st Century
the first task. But owing in large part to her vision and leadership, the
nations of the world did issue a historic declaration of human rights – a
pantheon that for the first time encompassed civil, political, social, and
economic rights. It is a Universal Declaration that has withstood the test
of time.
As the Declaration’s seventieth anniversary nears, we are reminded
that its age has hastened an evolution, bequeathing to us something
both inspirational and demanding. Today, the UDHR provides a
“common conscience” for humanity. It is a beacon of hope. It is also a
call for action, setting a high standard by which we judge the width of
our generosity, the depth of our compassion, and the breadth of our
humanity. It sends forth a message that injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere, and that no evil can last forever.
And everywhere we look we are reminded that the Declaration has
stirred civil rights movements and hastened the march of progress. The
words of protestors speaking out against colonialism and apartheid
have been laced with the spirit, and at times the letter, of the Declaration.
Those seeking to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender,
and sexual orientation have confronted a wall – and a tall one at that – in
the Declaration. Conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and squalor have all
been challenged under the banner of the Declaration. And for those
like Nelson Mandela, inspired by the sentiments of the Declaration,
no intimidation, no show trial, no prison cell – not even the threat of
execution – could ever extinguish their desire to stand for freedom.
This is not to turn a blind eye to injustices that endure; for every
step we take there are two that have yet to be made. Nonetheless, the
Declaration is a proven force for good – both weapon and symbol for
those seeking to give strength to the weak, courage to the fainthearted,
power to the powerless, and voice to the silent. The very existence of
a universal declaration rebukes long-standing, but intellectually feeble
presumptions, that a sovereign state’s treatment of its citizens is the
business of that state and that state alone. Time and again the arc of
recent history has been altered by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The Global Citizenship Commission (GCC), designed to reflect on
that progress and the demands of the future, was born in the classroom.
With the guidance of John Sexton, President of New York University
Introduction 3
(NYU) from 2002 to 2015, the Commission’s members met in a series of

seminars to discuss the UDHR’s continuing relevance and contribution
to the development of a global ethic.2 We understood we were asking
questions about a new world – a sphere far more interconnected,
integrated, and interdependent than when the Declaration was signed.
More than ever before, the lives of each of us are affected by the lives
of all of us. This is the lens through which realities were viewed and
questions shaped. Principally, we focused on how the Declaration is
understood for those born after 1948, and thus into a world where these
rights are known. In parallel, discussions with UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon stressed the centrality of individual citizens’ rights and the
need for a strong educational foundation. This dual emphasis, reflected
throughout our report, accords with Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement that
ideals “carry no weight unless the people know them, unless the people
understand them, unless the people demand that they be lived.”
Drawing on the Declaration’s own history, the Commission borrowed
a page from the UDHR and convened a Philosophers’ Committee.3
Its work informed the deliberations of a global working group of
scholars, led by the highly-respected Professor Jeremy Waldron. The
Philosophers’ Committee’s analysis provided the academic foundation
for a meaningful examination of the UDHR, and I join the Commission
in thanking these scholars for their pioneering work.
In light of the Philosophers’ Committee’s analysis, the Commission’s
report first considers how our understanding of human rights has
evolved. We then move on to identify specific rights requiring
more emphasis than they received in the Declaration, if they were
acknowledged at all. As one might expect, the rights of women, children,
the disabled, and the LGBT community require further attention and a
deepened global commitment. What is more, in a world where 60 million
individuals are displaced from their homes and 20 million are refugees,
the rights of migrants and stateless persons have become once again – as
was true in the upheavals following the Second World War – a matter of
vital importance. The report also examines what justification there can
ever be for derogations of rights, how we combine civil and political
2 The members of the Commission are set out in Appendix B.

3 The members of the Philosophers’ Committee are set out in Appendix C.
rights with social and economic rights, and who must ultimately take
responsibility for upholding the UDHR as a global ethic – as a covenant.
These questions were flanked by a recognition of reality – the hard
data proving there is much work to be done. Discussions with the
Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid
Ra’ad Al Hussein, and my own experiences as UN Special Envoy for
Global Education convinced me that a balanced Commission report
should address failures of implementation. This is, in a real sense, the
unfinished work of Eleanor Roosevelt’s commission. Even after almost
seventy years, the question of how we protect enshrined rights has
never been answered comprehensively.
The Commission’s report is a reminder of what is at stake.
Accordingly, we advance recommendations that highlight the urgent
need to strengthen human rights in the twenty-first century. Some
recommendations call for upholding specific rights in new ways, such
as our proposal urging the international community to adopt a more
far-reaching convention on refugees and migrants and our call for an
International Children’s Court. Other recommendations call attention
to deeper, structural issues, including our conclusion that countries
may not hide behind the thin veil of national sovereignty as a pretext
for insulating themselves from external human rights pressures. We
advocate enhancing the UN’s system for upholding and advancing
human rights with a proposal that Security Council members voluntarily
suspend veto rights in situations involving mass atrocities.
I am honored to have chaired the Global Citizenship Commission.
I am profoundly grateful to each Commissioner for making this
report, and its proposals, possible. Over two years, the Commission
met in Edinburgh, Bonn, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and New York – all while
holding global consultations drawing on counsel and expertise from
China, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. During the life of the
Commission, we endeavored – through public dialogues and external
consultation – to include a broad range of perspectives. All of this has
been made possible by the generous support of New York University,
the Carnegie UK Trust, the University of Edinburgh, the University
of Bonn, and the NYU Global Institute for Advanced Study (GIAS),
chaired by Paul Boghossian who has been an ever-present influence for
good. We are grateful to the Director of Research and Secretary to the
Introduction 5
Commission, Andrew Hilland, and our Staff Directors Melissa Friesen

and Michael Patullo, all of whom carried the burden of servicing our
work for two years. And we owe a special debt of gratitude to Executive
Director Diane Yu who managed this process, and Robert Shrum for his
guidance in drafting the Commission’s report. I want to thank all those
who helped make this report possible, including the individuals and
institutions mentioned in the Acknowledgments.
Voices at the margins must come alive. For this reason, I believe this
report can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates. We
write of course from a comfortable vantage point – from a promontory.
Wherever we direct our gaze, we are bound to find broken refugees,
oppressed children, and enslaved women. We see them and, in turn,
hope they see us and demand action. I do not expect our report to
be, like the Declaration itself, timeless. But I do hope it will be timely,
holding high once again the challenge posed to each successive
generation – to do better and achieve more. The Commission is insistent
that rights imply responsibilities. In securing certain rights, and seeking
to enshrine others, we are constantly reminded of both how far the
world has come and how much farther we must go. For we must never
forget that the global condition of human rights – civil, political, social,
and economic – is the yardstick with which we measure humanity’s
progress.
Gordon Brown
Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
UN Special Envoy for Global Education
Preface
by Paul Boghossian
This report by the Global Citizenship Commission is the first of the

Global Institute for Advanced Study’s major initiatives to be brought
to fruition. It gives me great pride that the Institute’s inaugural
achievement is represented by such an important document.
The GIAS is a nascent initiative at New York University that helps
support innovative and (typically) interdisciplinary scholarly work
requiring collaboration on an international scale and with a sustained,
multi-year focus. Conceived in conversations between (then) Vice-
Chancellor Richard Foley and me, and with the crucial support of
President John Sexton and Provost David McLaughlin, it was launched
in 2011. All three of these leaders of NYU deserve thanks for their
willingness to invest significant resources in encouraging unusual,
risky, but potentially transformative work.
When Gordon Brown approached me in 2012 with his idea to
convene a commission that would study the continuing relevance to our
time of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its contribution
to the development of a global ethic, it struck me both as an enormously
important idea and as a perfect fit for the mission of the Global Institute.
After some discussion, Gordon and I agreed that it would be best if
the project were to proceed in two phases. In the first, a distinguished
committee of academics  – 
philosophers, political theorists, and
human rights lawyers – would lay the intellectual groundwork for the
commission’s report by providing a detailed analytical commentary on
the UDHR. In the second phase, a blue ribbon commission, chaired by
Gordon, would use the findings of this “Philosophers’ Committee” to
develop a report that would be presented, at his request, to Ban Ki-moon,

the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and distributed widely.
The road to the successful completion of this report has been a long
one, involving three meetings of the Philosophers’ Committee, six
meetings of the Global Citizenship Commission, and countless meetings
of the Commission’s Steering Committee, which I chaired. I am grateful
to Professors Michael Forster and Markus Gabriel for hosting our
meetings in Bonn, Germany. I want especially to thank the members
of the Steering Committee, Anthony Appiah, Emma Rothschild, Robert
Shrum, Jeremy Waldron, and Diane Yu, for their hard work between
meetings of the full Commission that made progress at those meetings
possible. Andrew Hilland and Melissa Friesen provided indispensable
support.
I am very grateful to Professor Jeremy Waldron of NYU’s Law
School for accepting our invitation to lead the Philosophers’ Committee.
Jeremy assembled a superb panel of scholars, and worked tirelessly in
all its different phases to bring this report into existence.
I am also immensely grateful to Gordon Brown for entrusting this
important project to the GIAS, for his unflagging enthusiasm and
energy for it, and, in general, for his unwavering dedication to making
the world a better place.
Paul Boghossian,
Director, GIAS
Julius Silver Professor of Philosophy
NYU
Acknowledgments
The Global Institute for Advanced Study at New York University and
the NYU Office of the President were pleased to provide academic,
financial, and administrative support for the work of the Global
Citizenship Commission, from the first meeting of the Philosophers’
Committee in the fall of 2012 to the present day. The vision of Gordon
Brown in undertaking this vital work for submission to UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon has inspired all of us, and we hope that The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the 21st Century will make a
profound and lasting impact.
As Executive Director of the Commission, I wish to acknowledge
a number of individuals and institutions that helped make this
report possible. I am grateful to the members of the Philosophers’
Committee – and its Chair, Jeremy Waldron – whose brilliant analysis
provided the academic underpinning of the report. I want to thank the
GCC Steering Committee, in which I had the pleasure of participating
alongside the Committee Chair, Paul Boghossian, and members
Anthony Appiah, Emma Rothschild, Robert Shrum, and Jeremy
Waldron. Melissa Friesen (2014–2016) and Michael Patullo (2013–2014)
served as Staff Directors to the Commission, providing outstanding
administrative and logistical support to Commission Chair Gordon
Brown and the Commissioners. Andrew Hilland, Director of Research
and Secretary to the Commission, was invaluable in helping to produce
the final version of the report. In addition, this report would not have
been possible without the support of John Sexton and Andrew Hamilton,
the immediate past and current Presidents of NYU, respectively.
I am grateful for the assistance and support of the following people

in hosting meetings and public-facing events of the GCC: Timothy
O’Shea (Principal, University of Edinburgh), Charlie Jeffery (Vice
Principal for Public Policy and Impact, University of Edinburgh),
and Martyn Evans (Chief Executive, Carnegie Trust UK) for the
Commission’s meeting in Edinburgh in October 2013; Jürgen Fohrmann
(former Rector, University of Bonn), Michael Forster (Alexander von
Humboldt Professor, Chair for Theoretical Philosophy, and Co-Director
of the International Center for Philosophy, University of Bonn), Markus
Gabriel (Chair for Epistemology and Co-Director of the International
Center for Philosophy, University of Bonn), Dieter Sturma (Chair for
Philosophy of Ethics and the Biosciences and Director of the Institute
for Science and Politics, University of Bonn), and Stefan Zimmermann
(International Center for Philosophy, University of Bonn) for the
Commission’s meeting in Bonn in May 2014; and Klaus Schwab
(Founder and Executive Chairman, World Economic Forum), Alfred
Bloom (Vice Chancellor, NYU Abu Dhabi), Fabio Piano (Provost, NYU
Abu Dhabi), Reindert Falkenburg, Gila Bessarat Waels, Antoine El
Khayat, Nora Yousef, Nils Lewis, and Danielle Cherubin (of the NYU
Abu Dhabi Institute) for the Commission’s meetings in Abu Dhabi
and Dubai in November 2014. The assistance of NYU administrators
John Beckman, Regina Drew, and Gregory Albanis from the Office of
University Relations and Public Affairs in mounting the public forum
in New York in April 2016 was also much appreciated.
I want to thank the Center on Global Justice (University of California,
San Diego), of which Commissioner Fonna Forman is Founding
Co-Director, for undertaking comprehensive research and analysis on
human rights implementation and human rights education. In particular,
I am grateful to the implementation research team, which was supervised
by Sean Morgan and also included John Gotti, Vanessa Lodermeier,
Mike Nicholson, and John Porten. I am also grateful to Monisha Bajaj,
Ben Cislaghi, and Gerry Mackie, who authored the Online Appendix
D to this report,1 Advancing Transformative Human Rights Education, and
to Commissioner Andrew Forrest and the Minderoo Foundation for
providing material support for their work.
1 Online Appendix D, on Human Rights Education, is available at https://www.

openbookpublishers.com/isbn/9781783742189#resources
Acknowledgments 11
We have benefitted immensely from the input and advice of UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, and an
array of lawyers from his office, including Gianni Magazzeni (Chief of
the Americas, Europe and Central Asia Branch, Field Operations and
Technical Cooperation Division) and Mona Rishmawi (Rule of Law and
Democracy Section). Zainab Hawa Bangura, United Nations Under-
Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on Sexual Violence in Conflict, participated in the deliberations of the
Commission. Aung San Suu Kyi was a member of the Commission
but due to events in Myanmar was unable to contribute to our final
deliberations. Finally, we have been fortunate to be able to draw on
the expertise of Philip Alston (NYU Law School), Itai Madamombe
(Assistant to the UN Secretary-General), Dimitrina Petrova (Founding
Executive Director, Equal Rights Trust), Michael Posner (Co-Director,
NYU Stern’s Center for Business and Human Rights), and Michael
Sandel (Harvard University, Department of Government).
Diane C. Yu
GCC Executive Director
Counselor to Leadership and Executive Director
Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Community Programs at NYU Abu Dhabi
Executive Summary
The Long and Influential Life of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a monumental
embodiment for our time of the ancient idea that we all belong to a
single global community, and that each human being has moral ties and
responsibilities to all others.
From the start, endorsed and adopted in 1948 by most Member States
of the UN, the Declaration has been a beacon and a standard, its influence
both wide and deep. The UDHR has been and is an unprecedented
educational and cultural force, making people conversant with the
idea of human rights, providing a widely accepted text enumerating
those rights, delivering an articulate focus for what might otherwise
be timid and inarticulate concerns, and sending out a message that an
injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. Today, the UDHR,
translated into 350 languages, is the best-known and most often cited
human rights document on Earth. By setting out, for the first time,
fundamental rights to be universally protected, it is a milestone in the
history of human interactions and the cause of human rights.
The Global Citizenship Commission both affirms the continuing
relevance and inspirational force of the UDHR and seeks further
recognition and respect for human rights for all citizens of the world, in
light of developments in the twenty-first century. The social, political,
and legal environment has been transformed since 1948, and our global
interconnectedness and dependence have diminished our moral distance.

Yet as a living document, the UDHR demands renewed attention and
speaks urgently to the issues of today. In this report, we assess the life to
date of the UDHR: its foundational principles, its profound impact, and
its legacy. We consider the evolving understanding of human rights
and identify certain rights that were not addressed specifically in the
1948 document but that arguably reflect our understanding of rights
today. We examine the issues of limitations and derogations, social and
economic rights, where the responsibility for upholding human rights
lies, and – critically – implementation.
The cornerstone of the Declaration is the concept of human dignity:
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world.” Sadly, for millions of people, the recognition of
their inherent dignity is far from a reality. To us, this speaks not of the
failure of the UDHR but of the need to keep re-examining the relevance
of these standards, and to continue to challenge ourselves to find better
ways to achieve our shared goal of a common human dignity.
The Evolving Understanding of Rights

Globalization has changed the terms of interaction in global life, and it
has created space both for implicit extensions of and explicit additions to
the content of human rights doctrine. Since 1948 there have been many
important human rights conventions that have addressed some of the
issues we identify. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognize a number
of rights that we think have come into clearer focus after seventy years
and need more emphasis than they received in the Declaration. These
fall into three broad categories.
First, the rights of members of specific groups, comprising the rights
of women; the rights of children; the rights of the disabled, including
the profoundly disabled; rights related to sexual orientation; and the
rights of prisoners.
Second, the rights of groups as such, comprising the right to national
self-determination, including regional autonomy and subsidiarity; the
rights of indigenous peoples; the prohibition against ethnic cleansing;
and the rights of peoples prejudiced at the national or communal level

by climate change.
Third, rights related to other issues affecting vital interests,
comprising migration; statelessness; administrative justice; corruption;
privacy from state or corporate electronic surveillance; access to the
Internet and electronic communication on a global scale; extreme
poverty and deep inequality; healthcare; and a safe, clean, healthy, and
sustainable environment.
Each of these issues demands the international community’s
attention, some because of the need for a clear articulation and
recognition of rights and all because of the need to take concrete steps
to ensure their implementation. For example, on the issue of migration,
the Commission recommends that the international community
urgently:
Implement Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.7, which

calls for states to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible
migration and mobility of people, including through the
implementation of planned and well-managed migration
policies.”
Strengthen the international refugee protection system.
onsider adopting a new international convention on refugees

C
and migrants.
And to ensure the protection of the rights of children, we recommend

that:
he international community support the creation of a Children’s

T
Court, with the power to receive and adjudicate petitions from
children and their representatives on violations of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, to issue legally binding judgments, and
to investigate areas of concern such as child labor, child slavery,
and child marriage.
he International Criminal Court investigates and prosecutes

T
crimes against children within its remit to the full extent of the
law.
he UN Security Council convenes a “Children’s Council” – an

T
annual review on children’s rights, building on its existing debate
of the plight of children in armed conflict.
t the national level, all states create accessible complaint

A
mechanisms for the resolution of violations of the rights of
children, and consider establishing a Youth Parliament, Children’s
Commissioner, and dedicated budget for Children.
Limitations and Derogations

Article 29(2) of the UDHR sets out the circumstances in which limitations
on individual rights are permissible. The Declaration as a whole should
be read as the assertion of a strong presumption in favor of human
rights and Article 29(2) should be read as placing the burden of proof
on anyone who seeks to limit them.
Unlike the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) makes separate and extensive provision for
the derogation of rights in national and/or international emergencies.
However, the increasing reliance in the modern world on long-term,
continuous states of emergency as justifications for human rights
derogations is not dealt with adequately by the ICCPR’s formulations,
as they envisage relatively short-term, clearly demarcated emergencies.
The international community should develop standards governing
long-term derogations of human rights in national or international
emergencies, to ensure that this process is not abused.
In recent years, there have been military interventions that
contravene the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. And states
have responded to the rise and persistence of international terrorism by
employing tactics of surveillance, detention of suspects, and targeted
killing. The Commission emphasizes that each of these developments
raises human rights issues, and calls on the international community
to develop standards governing the use of force and the response to
international terrorism that are derived from current conceptions and
enduring foundations of human rights.
Lastly, it is critical to take a comprehensive approach to terrorism
that encompasses not only essential security-based counter-terrorism
measures, but also systematic preventative measures that address the

root causes of violent extremism. These include lack of socioeconomic
opportunities; marginalization and discrimination; poor governance;
violations of human rights and the rule of law; prolonged and
unresolved conflicts; and radicalization in prisons. The creation of open,
equitable, inclusive, and pluralist societies, founded on the full respect
of human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the
most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism and the
most promising strategy for undermining its appeal.
Social and Economic Rights

Social and economic rights are vital. They reflect genuine human needs
that every state has an obligation to attend to, within existing resources,
in the interest of all those committed to their care. We think it is fitting
and valuable that the UDHR enshrined social and economic rights in
the same document as civil and political rights, and thus to perceive
human rights as a whole in the context of a single declaration.
The social and economic provisions of the UDHR should be
interpreted to mean that everyone is entitled to certain minimum
standards of health, education, and social security. The concept of
dignity – while abstract – provides a yardstick against which to set
minimum measures. The extent of available resources in each society is
one determinative factor, though the UDHR also imposes constraints on
the allocation of such resources as there are. The Commission believes
that the UDHR (and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) should be read as endorsing an ongoing
global conversation about what the minimum provision should be
and a rule of progress to the effect that the human rights framework
calls for steps to improve the position of everyone, including the least
advantaged in society.
States have front-line responsibility for the social and economic
well-being of their citizens. Fair economic growth has a critical role to
play in this, and the Commission believes it is crucial to see a stronger
connection between economic policy and the instruments of human
rights. It is evident, however, that the challenges faced by many states
cannot be resolved entirely by actions in those states alone. There is

an overwhelming moral case for interpreting the social and economic
rights provisions of the Declaration as placing obligations on the
international community to alleviate world poverty. International
aid and transfers, aimed at strengthening the capacity of recipient
states to secure the social and economic rights of their citizens, thus
have an indispensable role to play. Responsibilities among the
international community to uphold social and economic rights are in
the Commission’s view held not only by states, but also above the
level of states by international organizations and below the level of
states by corporations and individuals.
It is sometimes said that, although the rights in the Declaration are
presented as an interconnected body of principles, complementary
and mutually supportive, there are in fact serious conflicts among
them. It is sometimes argued, for example, that the rights to freedom
of speech or assembly may conflict with the right of people not to live
in poverty, that the only way to lift large numbers of people out of
poverty may involve authoritarian rule. In certain very specific real-
world settings, our ability to fully implement one right may conflict
with our ability to fully implement another, at least temporarily.
However, any such claim would be very hard to establish and must
always be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny. Furthermore, it is
always a serious question whether any particular proposed trade-off
is morally justifiable.
Responsibility for Human Rights

The UDHR does not specify who carries the responsibilities
corresponding to the rights it enumerates. Yet the role of states remains
essential. Given the realities of our world – this was even more the case
in 1948 – states must be regarded as the main guarantors of the rights of
their own citizens. The laws and national constitutions of states, in most
instances, will be the first recourse to address any violations of human
rights, and should be regarded as the ordinary mode of implementation.
In a globalized world, it is also the duty of each state to concern itself
to a certain extent with the human rights of persons outside its borders.
While states have the primary responsibility for ensuring the human
rights of their citizens, there are numerous examples of situations where
governments no longer control substantial tracts of territory, no longer
control the military or have a monopoly on force, lack legitimacy, and
are unable or unwilling to provide public services. In these situations,
who is responsible for the human rights of the population? This issue
needs to be urgently addressed by the international community.
The fact that one entity – like a state – has responsibility for a
given right is quite compatible with other entities also having their
own obligations. Rights generate waves of responsibility, and those
responsibilities may fall on an array of duty-bearers. Though national
state responsibility is primary, sub-national governments, international
institutions, corporations, and private persons each and all have
a common duty to ensure recognition of human rights and accept
responsibility to secure them. Rights-bearers themselves also have
responsibilities with respect to their own rights and responsibilities as
rights-bearers to the rights system as a whole and to society generally.
It would be a mistake to develop a rigid or closed model of
responsibility for rights, or to conclude that rights are of no value until
responsibilities are actually specified. The advantage of specifying
rights first is that this provides a basis for thinking about the duties of
the state and other entities. The Commission has judged that it is both
sensible and essential to retain an open and developing sense of where
responsibilities lie, since the environment in which rights have to be
satisfied is constantly changing.
Implementation of Human Rights
State of play on representative rights

In our examination of the implementation of select rights in the
Declaration – the anti-slavery provision; the anti-torture provision;
the free expression provision and the free association provision; and
the education provision – a number of themes emerged. First, the
UDHR represents the founding document in a process of progressive
elaboration of human rights. Second, historic progress has been made

in the promotion and protection of rights since 1948, including the
development of a body of human rights law and implementation
mechanisms that simply could not have been envisioned in the
1920s and 1930s. Third, despite the gains, we must recognize and
respond to the reality that human rights continue to be violated on an
alarming scale across the globe. Fourth, the fullness of human rights
will only be achieved through multiple overlapping and coordinated
mechanisms – that operate at both the international and national
levels, and which engage both governmental and non-governmental
institutions.
Suggestions on implementation
The Commission analyzes and advances recommendations in respect
of four areas.
UN system of human rights implementation
The Commission supports a number of existing proposals for improving

the UN system for the protection of human rights. We call on the UN
to establish a commission to consider these and other proposals for
realizing Article 28 of the Declaration.
he UN should seek to ensure that the problems and priorities

T
identified through UN human rights mechanisms command
sufficient attention and action from the international community
and the UN as a whole, including its security and development
endeavors.
he UN should expand the Office of the UN High Commissioner

T
for Human Rights’ regional and country field presence and
significantly raise financial support for priority human rights
activities.
he UN Secretary-General should exercise his or her power

T
under Article 99 of the UN Charter to raise human rights issues
for consideration by the Security Council whenever advised to
do so by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, or the heads of the
human rights components of UN peace missions.
he permanent members of the UN Security Council should

T
voluntarily suspend their veto rights in situations involving mass
atrocities.
he UN should consider ways in which new forms of technology

T
can amplify human rights accountability.
National and regional legal systems
The judiciary has a pivotal role to play in upholding human rights. Only
an independent judiciary can render justice impartially on the basis
of law, thereby assuring the rights and fundamental freedoms of the
individual. On this basis:
he international community must redouble its resolve to

T
safeguard and enhance the independence and effectiveness
of judiciaries worldwide, in line with existing international
principles of the rule of law.
he international community should aim to bolster the role of

T
existing regional human rights courts and also encourage the
development of new regional human rights courts by the League
of Arab States and in Asia and the Pacific. All UN Member States
should agree to submit themselves to the authority of international
tribunals whose jurisdiction can appropriately – geographically
or otherwise – be extended to them.
t the global level, the UN should consider the creation of a

A
World Human Rights Court, consistent with the principle of
complementarity.
Non-governmental organizations
Non-governmental organizations play a frontline role in highlighting

the importance of the rights protected in the UDHR, in drawing
attention to shortcomings in their implementation, and in naming
and shaming governments that are guilty of violations or of failing
to protect their citizens from human rights abuses. In light of this, it
is especially important that states make reasonable accommodation
for NGOs aiming to promote, protect, and investigate violations of
human rights.
Human rights education
Human rights education also has an indispensable role to play.

Fostering a universal culture of human rights among all individuals
and institutions through transformative human rights education
“from the bottom-up” can add important impetus to the adoption and
enforcement of legal standards by governments “from the top-down.”
The Commission calls on all governments, international organizations,
and NGOs to encourage and support transformative human rights
education.
Sovereignty
The era of human rights that was initiated by the UDHR has disposed
of any notion of state sovereignty that purports to insulate states from
external criticism of internal rights violations. One principle the UDHR
represents, and rightly so, is that human rights in every country are the
world’s business. The Commission wishes to affirm: first, that countries
may not misuse their national sovereignty as an excuse for insulating
themselves from external pressure on human rights; and second, that
it is legitimate for states to raise human rights issues in conducting
foreign relations.
The international community needs a toolkit of governmental
and multilateral responses to rights violations that is more legitimate
and more sophisticated than we have today, and which relies on

mechanisms other than the use of force. There are many instruments of
change used: some widely acknowledged, like trade sanctions; some far
less recognized, such as human rights “name and shame” mechanisms;
and others perhaps less clearly articulated, such as providing shelter to
migrants fleeing from neighboring countries in times of great distress.
We recommend that a study be undertaken of what governments do
when they genuinely want to seek to change another government’s
behavior, and what governments are susceptible to in terms of real
world pressures on human rights.
The Commission supports the concept of the Responsibility to Protect
(RtoP) governing the process of humanitarian intervention. However,
intervention under the auspices of RtoP will be far from regular and will
be appropriate only in the case of egregious and widespread human
rights violations. The violation of rights, the erosion of rights, or the
failure to fulfill rights are matters of concern, even when they are not
widespread. Any time a violation occurs – which may affect one person
or one thousand – we must take notice. Underpinning this imperative
is the principle that the violation of the rights of anyone is the concern
of everyone.
Human Rights and a Global Ethic

The promulgation of the UDHR in 1948 made a difference in how
people saw their place in the world and their relations with their state
and with each other. This is in itself a valuable contribution, quite apart
from the securing of the rights actually listed in the document. Over
the decades since 1948, the UDHR has provided the rudiments of a
“common conscience” for humanity. In the words of Immanuel Kant, a
violation of rights in any place is now felt all around the world. The
international community is continuing to build on this, and the UDHR
should be regarded as one of the pillars of an emerging global ethic for
our increasingly interdependent world.
Preamble
Across the ages, people of different religions, civilizations, and political

orders have advanced the ideal that each human being has moral ties
and responsibilities to all others. And for three quarters of a century and
more, in a world increasingly and globally interconnected, the human
family has witnessed new and path-breaking initiatives to articulate and
expand the summons of this ideal. Among the most vital and powerful
of these endeavors is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
From the start, endorsed and adopted by most Member States of the
United Nations, the Declaration has been a beacon and a standard, its
influence both wide and deep. It is a living document that demands
renewed recognition and speaks urgently to the issues of today – even
though states and others may repeatedly flout or fall short of the rights
and norms it expresses.
We, the members of the Global Citizenship Commission, undertook
our exploration of the Declaration, its legacy, and its promise with open
minds. We were determined to learn from one another, with our distinct
beliefs and our disparate places of origin, and ready to account for the
weaknesses as well as the strengths of the Declaration and the modern
human rights system for which it is a life force. We have discovered
in our multinational collaboration that working together to reflect on
the UDHR and its writ, its reach, and its impact has reaffirmed our
faith in its stirring invocation of “the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as “the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world […]” There is
much more to be done to fully secure the rights and more effectively
carry out the responsibilities that are essential to the work of making
real the ideals of the UDHR. Hideous and systemic human rights
abuses continue to be perpetrated at an alarming rate across the world.
Sadly, too many people, so many of them in authority, are hostile to
human rights or indifferent to their claims – or willing to devalue them
as secondary issues. This makes it all the more imperative to reassert
our firm belief in the call of the UDHR as a central mission for all the
world.
Most of this report involves a detailed discussion of the UDHR and
its enduring relevance for today. But we begin by elaborating the sense
of global community and global ethics in which both the Declaration
and our discussions are grounded.
The idea that every human being is part of a seamless human fabric,
a single global community, bound by moral ties to every other human
being, is as ancient as recorded history. Confucius, born in the sixth
century BCE in Lu State, China, conceived of “all under heaven” as the
widest span of moral concern; two centuries later, Diogenes of Sinope,
a Greek settlement on the southern coast of the Black Sea, declared
that he was a citizen of the cosmos, of the entire earth. The Abrahamic
faiths – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – are all rooted in the concept
that every human being is the creation of a loving God who cares for
us and commands us to care for one another. Buddhism and Hinduism
enshrine the interconnectedness of all creatures, the view of a shared
humanity is voiced in the Southern African notion of Ubuntu, and the
same fundamental insight is found in the traditions of peoples on every
continent. There is, in short, a global understanding that, in the truest
sense, we are a single human family.
None of these separate traditions, however, proposed a commitment
to a global community resting on the creation of a single world
government. And neither do we. Historically, each held that moral
duties were strongest toward those to whom we were closest. As concern
moved out from friends and families, moral obligations were attenuated.
There were special obligations to those with whom we shared a state,
but there were still real and significant obligations to others with whom
we did not. This duty to care is the basis for citizenship – local or global.
The idea of global citizenship does not, then, exclude citizenship
in a nation or state, or membership in a family or a local community.
Preamble 27
Indeed, it presupposes that we have significant moral connections at

all three levels. As a Commission on Global Citizenship, our charge has
been to reflect on what it is for each of us to be members of a global
community and, in particular, what each of us owes to all others
everywhere. But recognizing that we are all members of a single human
community – citizens, as Diogenes put it, of the entire earth – is not
just a matter of articulating rights and duties. It involves approaching
each other with an attitude of respect and concern, treating each human
being as someone who seeks and deserves to live a life of dignity, a
life imbued with significance. For global citizenship to have practical
meaning, we believe it is indispensable for us to come to a common
appreciation of these basic ideas.
The need for a shared comprehension of our moral connections
has become more and more pressing in the past century as the world
has become more and more interdependent. Goods, money, diseases,
pollutants, and ideas: all move across the globe more swiftly and
sweepingly than ever, whether by ship or by plane, whether in the
currents of the oceans and the atmosphere or electronically through
the revolutionary media of our time, including, of course, the World
Wide Web. Our ecological interconnections – through climate change
and global epidemics, for example – require us each to join together to
overcome challenges that have an impact on us all, and on the prospects
of generations yet unborn. Global economic realities, and especially
the persistence of extreme poverty, confront us with problems that
are practical as well as moral challenges, which we can only meet and
master in common cause.
In the decades since the Second World War, the UDHR stands as a
monumental embodiment of that ancient idea that we all belong to a
single global community and that all of us must do our part to ensure
that every human being can live a life of dignity. With the endorsement
of the nations of the world, the Declaration expressed the idea of the
human family as a globally shared ideal. Article 1 speaks to the first
principle that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.” Article 2 holds that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration” without exception.
The notion of global citizenship can be empowering to every
individual in the world, particularly when those suffering learn of its
attachment to a set of basic human rights that are far more than they
could have imagined. For this reason, we decided that exploring the
continuing role and relevance of the UDHR was the best starting point
for developing a common contemporary understanding of the meaning
of global citizenship. That ambition is the guiding purpose of this report.
1. The Long and Influential Life
of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
1.1 History of the UDHR

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged from the ashes of
the Second World War. With the end of the conflict, and the creation of
the United Nations, the international community vowed never again to
abide the unspeakable atrocities the world had just witnessed. So the
leaders of the world decided to amplify the UN Charter by enshrining
and encouraging guarantees for the rights of human beings everywhere.
In 1946, as part of the preliminary work of drafting the Declaration,
under the auspices of UNESCO, Jacques Maritain assembled a
Philosophers’ Committee to identify key theoretical issues in framing
a charter of rights for all peoples and all nations. The work of the
Philosophers’ Committee then moved to the UN Commission on
Human Rights. At its first session in January 1947, the Commission
authorized its members to formulate what it termed “a preliminary
draft international bill of human rights.” Later the work was taken
over by a formal drafting committee, consisting of members of the
Commission from eight states. The Commission on Human Rights
comprised 18 members from various political, cultural, and religious
backgrounds. Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, chaired the Commission. It also included René Cassin of

France, who composed the first draft of the declaration; Commission
Rapporteur Charles Malik of Lebanon; Vice-Chairman Peng Chung
Chang of China; and John Humphrey of Canada, Director of the UN’s
Human Rights Division, who prepared the Declaration’s blueprint.
The Commission had to resolve issues of fundamental importance.
First, it concluded that the right mission was to develop a declaration,
rather than a treaty. The Commission’s view was that the declaration
should be relatively short, inspirational, energizing, and broadly
accessible to peoples everywhere: the defining document of an
international bill of human rights. It also decided that the declaration
should encompass both civil and political rights, on the one hand, and
social and economic rights, on the other.
Cassin handed his draft of the declaration to a meeting of the
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Thus this version, which
was sent to all UN Member States for comment, became known as the
“Geneva draft.” The Commission revised the Geneva draft to reflect
the replies it had received from Member States, before submitting it to
the General Assembly. The General Assembly in turn scrutinized the
document between September and December of 1948, with over 50
Member States voting a total of 1,400 times on practically every clause
and virtually every word of the text. By its resolution 217 A (III) of 10
December 1948, the General Assembly, meeting in Paris, voted to adopt
the UDHR with eight nations abstaining but none dissenting.1 It was
an historic moment, and the General Assembly called upon all Member
States to publicize the text of the Declaration and “to cause it to be
disseminated, displayed, read, and expounded principally in schools
1
The following 48 countries voted in favor of the Declaration: Afghanistan,
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Siam, Sweden, Syria,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The following
eight countries abstained: the Soviet Union, Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR,
People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, People’s Republic of Poland, Union of
South Africa, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Honduras and
Yemen – both members of the UN at the time – failed to vote or abstain.
1. The Long and Influential Life of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights 31
and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the

political status of countries or territories.”
The UDHR formed the basis for two covenants which were adopted
by the General Assembly in 1966: the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. These Covenants have binding status in
international law. The Declaration and the Covenants are collectively
known as the “International Bill of Human Rights.”
Today, the Universal Declaration, translated into 350 languages, is
the best-known and most often cited human rights document on Earth.
By setting out, for the first time, fundamental rights to be universally
protected, it is a milestone in the history of human interactions and the
cause of human rights.
1.2 Affirming and protecting the UDHR

Given that the UDHR is best understood as a living enterprise that
challenges each new generation to new actions to fulfill and extend its
writ, the aim of the Commission has been to assess what needs to be
understood and undertaken in the twenty-first century to realize the
high ideals of the UDHR, and to reinforce its status as a foundational
document of global citizenship. Therefore, the Commission not only
celebrates the framers of the Declaration – together with all those who
have worked so hard over the years to sustain it – but, in that spirit, we
also set forth issues on which we believe the international community
should focus in renewing the 1948 enterprise for our day and generation.
So the Commission both affirms the UDHR and seeks to further
recognition and respect for human rights for all citizens of the world, in
the life and light of the twenty-first century. The intention of our report
is not to rewrite or revise the UDHR. Rather, what we have learned and
share here should be regarded as an analytical commentary that reflects
changed circumstances and progress in our moral thought since the first
days of the Declaration. The report further observes that individuals,
states, and other entities each and all have a common duty to ensure
recognition of human rights and accept responsibility to secure them.
1.3 The changing context

The social, political, and legal environment has been transformed since
1948. It is impossible to list all the changes, but many are of sweeping
and particular importance. Decolonization, the breakup of old empires,
and the emergence of new states mean that there are 193 UN Member
States today, compared to the 58 of 1948. Some would say that states
have risen and then declined in importance since 1948. Certainly in
recent years the growth in the number of states has been matched by
the growth of new centers of authority, and by an increase in the power
of non-state actors.
Our global interdependence now plays a central and often contentious
role: globalization is a major phenomenon in economics and trade as
well as politics, culture, communications, and technology. International
institutions have far greater sway in world affairs than they did in 1948,
both those associated with the United Nations itself and those that hold
an independent status. There is more and more awareness too of global
challenges such as climate change. New patterns of life and economic
development have emerged, as have new patterns of migration and
inequality.
In 1948, the memory of the Second World War was fresh in
everyone’s minds. Since then new forms of conflict have emerged: the
Cold War dominated the period between the 1950s and 1980s; today
armed conflict frequently involves non-state actors; and there is the
prolonged struggle against terrorism. Along with such new forms of
conflict have come new formulations of international responsibilities
such as the Responsibility to Protect.
We have been able to reconsider the UDHR after 70 years not only
in light of these changed circumstances, but also in the context of the
undeniable truth that global interconnectedness and dependence have
diminished our moral distance from each other.
1.4 The enduring relevance of the UDHR

One of the tasks of the Commission is to apply the abstract language of
the Declaration to the reality of the twenty-first century. The question
we should ask is not what the framers of the UDHR would have thought
about a particular issue in 1948. Instead, the question is what we should

think now, in the world of today, animated by the same principles that
animated the framers then.
The UDHR purports to offer a shared basis for comprehending both
the idea of human rights itself and the array of human rights that the
idea implies. Specifically, the Declaration presents what the Preamble
calls a “common understanding” of human rights and represents what
the Proclamation Clause calls “a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations.” We believe that the assertion of a
“common understanding” of human rights and “a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations” was a vital step in 1948 and
we believe it remains equally vital in the twenty-first century.
Part of that vitality is that the clauses of the UDHR provide a tangible
focus of orientation; so that when people debate human rights there
is less chance of talking in circles or at cross-purposes. Even if people
disagree with the UDHR’s formulations, the formulations nevertheless
help to structure their disagreements and arguments. More than that,
however, the Declaration embodies a set of common expectations for
the dealings of nations and peoples with one another, so far as the
proper treatment of individuals is concerned. It makes apparent that
this is a subject on which firm, explicit, and reasonably clear standards
have been publicly laid down. Having this common point of reference
has been of immeasurable political importance in both large-scale and
small-scale campaigns to protect peoples and individuals from abuses.
Here we have in mind large-scale campaigns like the articulation of
human rights in the Helsinki movement from 1975, as well as small-
scale, even village-level, campaigns in various parts of the world.
Most of all, the UDHR gives substance to the idea that there actually
is such a thing as a “common conscience” for mankind. One of the
most fundamental things that human rights declarations and human
rights law can do is to establish certain taboos around serious abuses
and violations. Quite apart from enforcement, this is a matter of culture
and positive morality. It is essential that those who abuse individuals
should recognize that there is something called “human rights” that
they are violating, and that both those who suffer abuses and those
who observe them should have a common and publicly recognized
vocabulary in which to express denunciation of this conduct and to
organize resistance against it.
So we believe the UDHR has been and is an unprecedented

educational and cultural force, making people conversant with the idea
of human rights, providing a widely accepted text enumerating those
rights, and delivering an articulate focus for what might otherwise be
timid and inarticulate concerns. The UDHR in 1948 laid the foundation
for our modern culture of human rights. Now, as distinct from 1948, the
document functions in a world that by and large takes human rights
seriously, a world in which the idea and culture of human rights are
pervasive though implementation falls far short of the ideals, a world
in which the idea of human rights can no longer be dismissed as simply
aspirational and unworldly. In short, the UDHR has had a shaping
influence on the world in which it now operates.
1.5 Legal status

The UDHR was originally formulated as “soft law;” it was aspirational,
not legally binding. Since its adoption, however, the UDHR has been
complemented by the two covenants that are legally binding on the
nations that have signed and ratified them: the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which came into force in 1976 and has
been ratified by 168 nations; and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which also came into force in
1976 and has been ratified by 164 nations. Further, many provisions of
the UDHR are also now part of customary international law. There are
additional conventions on particular human rights concerns, such as
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
The International Bill of Human Rights is matched in many cases
by the rights provisions of national constitutions, charters, and bills of
rights. Some of these, like the U.S. Bill of Rights, predate the UDHR
by decades or centuries. Others, including the constitutions of some of
the newest countries in the world, have been cast in the image of the
International Bill of Human Rights, directly or indirectly adopting ideas

and formulations from these international instruments. In this way
the UDHR provides a template for national law-making, and forges
a continuum between the international protection of human rights
and their protection under public law in particular countries. Such
international and national instruments are complemented by regional
treaties – principally the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the European
Convention on Human Rights.
In reality, most of the legal work to secure human rights and
vindicate them in the face of violations is conducted under the auspices
of national and regional law and practice. This will continue to be the
ordinary mode of implementation in the twenty-first century, and one of
the roles of international declarations like the UDHR and the Covenants
should be to serve as a model for structuring local constitutional and
legislative arrangements.
1.6 Foundational principles

The Declaration does not clearly indicate the reasons for enumerating
the particular rights it mentions, nor does it articulate the philosophical
ideas upon which these rights are predicated. However, the Commission
believes that the UDHR’s emphasis on the principle of human dignity is
the keystone. The Preamble enunciates the principle: “recognition of the
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world.” The United Nations clause says that the Member States
have “reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person.” And Article 1 reaffirms the ideal that
“all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”
In the Covenants, dignity is also cited as a way of determining what
a particular right entails. For example, Article 10(1) of the ICCPR says:
“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with […] respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person,” and Article 13(1) of the
ICESCR recognizes a right to education and provides that “education
shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and
the sense of its dignity.” There is a reference of this kind in the UDHR’s
conditions of work provision, Article 23, which asserts, among other
things, that “everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity.”
Dignity is not defined in the UDHR or in any of the human rights
documents that repeatedly invoke it. But it is clear that human dignity
is a special status that accrues to all people on account of the inherent
features of their human being, their human potential, and their
human qualities and capacities. As a status dignity implies a number
of important rights and responsibilities; it generates a basis on which
people can exact respect for themselves from others; it is an equal status;
and it inheres in people by virtue of their humanity as such, irrespective
of merit or demerit.
Human dignity is often cited as a value or principle associated
integrally and perhaps foundationally with human rights. The Preamble
to the ICCPR announces this specifically, “recognizing that these rights
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” A number of
national constitutions also make human dignity the centerpiece of their
bills or charters of fundamental rights. These include the South African
Constitution (Articles 1, 7, and 10), the Chinese Constitution (Article 38),
the Basic Law of Germany (Article 1.1), and many others.
1.7 Universality
Our report makes a number of claims about what ought to count as a
human right: for example, that it is every human being’s right not to be
enslaved, and that it is every human being’s right to marry and found a
family. How are such claims to be understood? Specifically, are they put
forward as principles that everyone ought to accept regardless of his or
her religion or cultural tradition, or are they meant merely to reflect the
values of a particular segment of the human population?
To say that freedom from enslavement is a human right is not merely
to express a preference for living in a world in which no one is enslaved.
It is also not merely to say that freedom from slavery is an ideal to
which we happen to subscribe but that others are free to reject in favor
of a competing ideal. It is to say that enslaving people deprives them
of a condition of life to which they are entitled inalienably as a result

of being human. There is no way to understand this claim as simply
the expression of a mere preference; it is put forward and urged on
everybody as a matter of principle.
But how is such a principled commitment to avoid coming across
as disrespectful towards the potentially vast number of human beings
who may disagree with a particular human rights claim? The claim
about slavery may no longer be controversial in our time; but the claim
about marriage, for example, is an occasion for much controversy with
different interpretations both advanced and rejected by large numbers
of people around the globe. If we adopt a particular view, are we not in
danger of just imposing our own values on others, without consideration
of their opposing points of view?
We do not think so. First, when a claim, any claim, is put forward as
true, that is not the same thing as saying that it is put forward as certain,
or infallible, or not open to rational discussion. The claim needs to be backed
up with reasons and arguments, and any reasons and arguments on the
other side need to be listened to, considered, and answered. We have
sought to arrive at the moral conclusions about human rights that seem
to us most justified by what we judge to be the best moral thinking
of our time. However, we remain entirely sensitive to the possibility
that we have fallen short and invite anyone who disagrees with our
conclusions to assert and argue the countervailing considerations.
Second, many expressions of human rights – including those of the
UDHR – allow for a certain amount of contextual variation. For example,
the UDHR is emphatic in Articles 10 and 11 that people have the right to
due process when they are accused of any crime, but the legal systems
of the world vary in their procedural arrangements and, within broad
limits, the UDHR respects such variations.
Finally, the formulations of human rights declarations are often
vague and abstract, and they leave certain issues unsettled and open
to interpretation. These are often matters of good-faith disagreement
within particular countries and between particular countries. So, for
example, some countries may regard corporal punishment as consistent
in principle with Article 5 (the anti-torture provision) while other
countries emphatically reject this. Similarly, some countries may see the
disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners as consistent with Article 21
(the democracy provision) while others will disagree. This openness of
the UDHR is one of its great virtues. It does not preclude the emergence
of a checkerboard of interpretations around the world of its various
provisions, reflecting what European human rights lawyers call a
“margin of appreciation” for discrete national practices and sensibilities.
The room for interpretation is not unlimited, but the provisions of the
Declaration were not intended to settle every last detail.
1.8 Interconnectivity of rights

It was no doubt important to divide the binding human rights
instruments into two separate covenants – the ICCPR and ICESCR – if
only to secure ratification of at least one of these (e.g., the ICCPR by
the United States or the ICESCR by China) in circumstances where the
ratification of the other was not possible. But the unity of the UDHR in
this respect – the fact that it combines civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural rights in a single declaration with a single preamble – is
critical.
The UDHR does not explicitly commit itself to any thesis of the
indivisibility of human rights. But implicitly it conveys the impression
that the values that underpin, for example, the free expression provision,
the anti-torture provision, and the democracy provision are grounded
in the same way and stand upon the same foundation as the values that
underpin the social security provision, the conditions of work provision,
and the standard of living provision. Not everyone is convinced of this,
of course, but we think it was an appropriate stance to take in drafting
the UDHR.
Although the rights set out in the UDHR are presented as a list – line
item by line item – it is imperative to acknowledge the interconnectivity
of these rights. We should understand the Declaration as an implicit
expression of the interconnections, overlaps, and mutual reinforcement
between rights. By way of illustration, both Article 4 (the anti-slavery
provision) and Article 16 (the marriage and family provision) are
relevant to child marriage.
2. The Evolving
Understanding of Rights
Globalization has changed the terms of interaction in global life, and it

has created space both for implicit extensions of and explicit additions
to the content of human rights doctrine. We recall that since 1948 there
have been many other substantive human rights conventions that have
addressed some of the issues we identify  –  including the rights of women,
the rights of children, and the rights of the disabled. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize a number of rights that we think have come into
clearer focus after 70 years and need more emphasis than they received
in the Declaration. Some of these rights are mentioned in the UDHR,
such as the rights of women, but we want to suggest that the language
could have been more vivid in light of what we now know. Other rights,
such as those related to sexual orientation, are not expressly addressed
at all in the document, and involve a change in consciousness and
concern since the UDHR was adopted. But it is arguable that even these
can be understood as an elaboration of rights to personal freedom or
autonomy that are in fact clearly affirmed in the Declaration.
The suggestions below are preliminary and non-exhaustive, and
many of them are controversial. We view our role as initiating a
conversation on the challenges raised by particular issues, rather than
trying to legislate definitively on the content of particular rights. Our
aim is not to rewrite the Declaration or suggest amendments to it.
Instead the Commission wishes to pay tribute to the enduring power of
the original document, and draw attention to new issues that reflect our
understanding of human rights today.
2.1 Rights of members of specific groups
a. The rights of women

A large part of the world condones the systemic violation of the human
rights of women on a daily basis – whether directly in the form of
domestic violence, female genital cutting, forced marriage, and other
forms of oppression, or indirectly in the way women have to bear the
consequences of extreme poverty and a lack of access to healthcare
and to safe water and sanitation. These indirect impacts on the rights
of women also include, for example, traditional systems of land
ownership and inheritance, economies that fail to ensure women can
have enough income to support a decent standard of life from birth to
old age, systems of family law that make it impossible for women to
leave situations of violence, and attitudes with respect to employment
that result in women being paid less for the same work and working
disproportionately in informal and insecure sectors.
The Commission wishes to highlight that the framers of the Declaration
recognized in 1948 that gender equality was essential. Article 2 of the
UDHR expressly held that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as […] sex.” In light of the widespread human rights violations
perpetrated against women around the Earth in the subsequent 70 years,
it is important to reaffirm without qualification that the grounding of
the UDHR in human dignity requires that all people – including all
women – enjoy the rights set out in the UDHR, including the right to
education, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,
the right to equal employment opportunities, the right to marry only
with free and full consent, and the right to be free from torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.1 Women’s rights, including
all rights recognized in the ICCPR and CEDAW, must be recognized
as real and women must be respected by governments everywhere in
1 The use of gender-specific language and assumptions in the UDHR – such as the

language of “human brotherhood” in Article 1 and the implication in Article 23(3)
that it is men who work and provide subsistence for a family – is a function of the
time and should not be read as discriminatory.
the world as equal to men – irrespective of religions and cultures. Our

point is that formal equality is not sufficient: as recognized by Goal
5 of the Sustainable Development Goals, there is a need to actually
achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. It is crucial
to give attention to the gender impacts of systems and attitudes that
are apparently “gender-blind.” The UDHR must be read in a way that
highlights the specific impact upon women of certain abuses, certain
attitudes, and certain forms of neglect.
b. The rights of children

The UDHR does not expressly recognize the rights of children. In fact,
it was not until the adoption of the CRC in 1989 that the rights of the
world’s youngest were explicitly acknowledged by an international
treaty. The CRC articulated, for the first time, that children possess
innate rights equal to those of adults: rights to health, to education, to
protection, and to equal opportunity.
Nonetheless, a number of provisions in the UDHR are relevant to the
rights of children. Article 25, the standard of living provision, recognizes
that children are “entitled to special care and assistance.” Article 26 of
the Declaration sets out the right to education. In fact, the education
section is one of the most detailed provisions of the UDHR. And Article
16(1) of the UDHR, the marriage and family provision, reads: “Men and
women of full age, without limitation due to race, nationality or religion,
have the right to marry and to found a family.” It is clear that the right
of parents to found and raise a family is not only a right – it is also a
responsibility. Consequently, the rights of children are not just rights in
relation to governments: they are, in the first instance, rights in relation
to their parents.
There are different kinds of incentives for upholding the rights of
children in different parts of the world. In some cases, both the child’s
parents and the government keep their eyes closed to violations. Thus,
in addition to recognizing the obligations of parents and governments,
we should also acknowledge the responsibilities of the community at
large, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
No account of the rights of children would be complete without
highlighting slavery. Children make up a substantial portion of the 35.8
million people that Walk Free estimates are enslaved around the world.
While measuring this hidden crime is difficult, based on World Bank
age distribution data and the Global Slavery Index, there are currently
an estimated 8.7 million children in slavery. Slavery is expressly
prohibited by Article 4 of the Declaration: “No one shall be held in
slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in
all their forms.”2
The Commission also considered the issue of child marriage
specifically. Article 16(2) of the Declaration says: “Marriage shall be
entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”
However, in certain parts of the world, “free and full consent” is often
assumed based on custom, culture, or tradition. And the assertion is
frequently made that this is an instance of competing rights: the right of
a child to marry freely, against the right to freedom of culture or freedom
of religion. Indeed, there is a strong linkage between the existence of
dual or parallel legal systems within a country and the prevalence of
child, early, and forced marriages. While most national laws prohibit
child, early, and forced marriages, in those countries where customary,
tribal, or religious laws are a powerful civil force, they are sometimes
abused to compromise or undermine national laws regulating marriage.
These laws expose children to child marriage, and potentially condemn
them to a life of poverty and violence.
Custom, culture, and tradition may not legitimately dispense with
the requirement of explicit individual consent. We insist that the rights
of children (like those of women) can never properly be denied in the
name of particular beliefs or cultures. A simple, positive statement
should be made to young people that “you do not have to get married
unless you want to.” On this view, the greatest hope for fulfilment
of the Declaration is that the people, families, and communities most
2 It is worth noting that Article 1(d) of the UN Supplementary Convention on

the Abolition of Slavery states that “any institution or practice whereby a child
or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his
natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not,
with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour” is an
institution or practice similar to slavery.
susceptible to human rights abuses begin to understand the Declaration,

grasp it, and use it as their shield.
The Commission wishes to advance a number of proposals that
would strengthen the protection of children’s rights in the twenty-
first century. At the international level, we propose the creation of a
Children’s Court, with the power to receive and adjudicate petitions
from children and their representatives on violations of the CRC, issue
legally binding judgments, and investigate areas of concern including
child labor, child slavery, and child marriage.3 The Commission also
calls for the International Criminal Court to investigate and prosecute
crimes against children within its remit to the full extent of the law.
Further, we recommend that the UN Security Council convene a
“Children’s Council” – an annual debate on children’s rights, building
on its existing review of the issue of children in armed conflict. At
the national level, the Commission urges states to create accessible
complaint mechanisms for the resolution of violations of the rights of
children, and to consider establishing a Youth Parliament, Children’s
Commissioner, and dedicated Children’s Budget. We believe that
these measures can play a vital role in realizing the rights articulated
in the CRC.
c. The rights of the disabled, including the

profoundly disabled
The right to equality, enshrined in the UDHR, is as relevant to people
with disabilities as it is to any other members of society. The UDHR
makes no mention of human disability, apart from an oblique mention
in Article 25, which cites a person’s inability to secure subsistence “in
3 Children from countries that have ratified the Third Optional Protocol to the CRC
can submit a complaint to the Committee on the Rights of the Child if their rights
under the Convention, or its two earlier Optional Protocols, have been violated by
the state and when all domestic remedies have been exhausted. To date, however,
only 24 states have ratified the Third Optional Protocol, and many of those states
have failed to adequately educate the public as to its existence. Further, this form
of redress is political, rather than legal, and decisions made by the Committee are
non-binding.
circumstances beyond his control.” However, in 2006, the UN adopted

the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which
represents a paradigm shift in the global movement from viewing
persons with disabilities as “objects” of charity, medical treatment, and
social protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as “subjects”
with rights, who are capable of claiming those rights and making
decisions for their lives based on their free and informed consent.
Speaking philosophically, disability may pose particular issues
when humans lack the characteristics or capacities on which human
dignity is usually grounded. And speaking practically, disability may
require particular and if need be costly attention to the way in which
rights are fulfilled. We believe it is vital to reaffirm the possession of
human rights by all humans, including those suffering from disabilities.
Disability covers a wide range of human situations, with loss of part
of one’s capacities at one end (e.g., deafness, blindness, loss of limbs)
ranging all the way through to a profound loss of cognitive capacity at
the other. The Commission emphasizes the rights of people suffering
from disabilities at each point on the spectrum, and the importance of
taking reasonable measures to facilitate the exercise and fulfilment of
such rights. Even when the disability is profound, we must respect the
human lives and human needs of those who cannot participate with
others on equal terms.
d. Rights related to sexual orientation

It is important to highlight two particular omissions of the UDHR
with respect to sexual orientation: first, that sexual orientation and
transgender status is not mentioned in Article 2 – the universality
provision – as a category that cannot justify a restriction of rights; and
second, that Article 16 – the marriage and family provision – does not
explicitly establish rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) people to marry and to found a family. The omissions are
understandable, as a new normative context around sexual orientation
and transgender status has only emerged in the past 20 years.
Nevertheless, the Commission wishes to address these omissions by
affirming that: first, everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
enumerated in the UDHR without distinction based on sexual orientation

or transgender status; second, Article 7, the non-discrimination
provision, should be understood to prohibit discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation or transgender status; and third, Article
16 protects the rights of LGBT people to marry and to found a family.
There is no getting round the fact that the controversy around same-sex
marriage is a human rights issue. There is a need to acknowledge it as
such and debate it as such.
e. The rights of prisoners

Article 10 of the ICCPR establishes certain rights of prisoners that have
developed as guiding norms of international human rights law. Some
of these are specific, such as the segregation of juvenile from adult
prisoners. Some are quite general, including the requirement that all
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
The rights of prisoners have become a particularly acute issue in
recent years with the emergence of new forms of detention as part of
the response to international terrorism. The Commission believes that
Article 10 of the ICCPR was right to make explicit these principles, which
are essential to a just penitentiary system and a necessary complement
to Article 5 of the UDHR, which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.
From a human rights point of view, the scale of incarceration may be
an issue, as well as the conditions that people face when incarcerated.
Indeed, many of the concerns about the role played by factors such as
race and drugs in sustaining disproportionately high levels of prison
populations in certain countries are human rights concerns.
Prisoners retain the bulk of their fundamental rights, with the
exception of those rights directly affected by restrictions implicit in
their incarceration. It remains debated whether rights such as the right
to vote should be maintained by prisoners when they are incarcerated.
The Commissioners accept that disagreement on this question
may, depending on the content of the view, constitute reasonable
disagreement. However, the right to vote should never be denied to
people who have finished a custodial sentence on the basis of their

having been convicted of an offense. The penalty for the crime is the
custodial sentence itself. Beyond that, to deprive people of one of the
fundamental democratic rights denies them the full citizenship to which
all are entitled, and undermines the process of their social reintegration.
2.2 Rights of groups as such

Human rights are in the first instance rights of individuals. However,
human communities, human peoples, and human families are also
possessed of human rights, and recent developments in human rights
law have made this plain.
Group rights are a difficult and controversial idea, but there is no
doubt that some human communities are entitled to rights, whether
conceived as the aggregate of members’ individual rights or the rights
of the group as a whole.
a. The right to national self-determination,

including regional autonomy and subsidiarity
The UDHR makes no mention of national self-determination or the
self-determination of peoples as a right. On the contrary, the UDHR
still uses the language of colonialism, with Member States pledging to
promote respect for human rights “among the peoples of territories
under their jurisdiction.” However, both the ICCPR and the ICESCR
recognize the right of “all peoples” to self-determination by virtue of
which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.
The omission of the right to self-determination from the UDHR is
understandable, as the decolonization movement largely occurred
after 1948 (and before the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR in 1966).
Nonetheless, international recognition of this right emerged swiftly,
and the Commission believes that the wording in the first Article of
each of the Covenants was an essential addition to the International
Bill of Human Rights. Admittedly, the definition of “peoples” remains
controversial in many circumstances, but the formulations of the
Covenants point us to the fact that these controversies need to be

worked out as human rights issues.
b. The rights of indigenous peoples

Particular attention needs to be paid to the situation of indigenous
peoples: those who were the original inhabitants of lands impacted
by imperial expansion and colonialism. More and more efforts are
underway nationally and internationally to take the rights of indigenous
peoples into account. The UDHR’s emphasis on equality makes cultural
protection a legitimate interest, and thereby provides a justification for
such efforts.
c. Ethnic cleansing
Ethnic cleansing was of intense importance in 1948, and is a matter of
grave concern today, as recognized by its inclusion in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court. It would be good for human rights
declarations to embrace a clear and explicit understanding of ethnic
cleansing as a grievous human rights abuse. It is important that human
rights be understood not just for what they are, but also in the different
modes in which they may be abused and violated, of which ethnic
cleansing is one.
d. The rights of peoples prejudiced at the national

or communal level by climate change
Climate change is a genuinely new issue, which has emerged in the last
20 to 25 years. There is no way it could have been envisaged in 1948.
It is, however, urgent for the international community to address it in
2016. Climate change may well turn out to be the most consequential
global challenge of the twenty-first century. It will reshape the concept
of global citizenship in a number of regards, but the implications for
human rights will be severe and should command the closest attention
and thought among human rights advocates.
There are already, and there will be in future, massive implications

for local and global economies, for human subsistence, and for migration.
The impacts will not be felt evenly. For example, environmental migrants
are often drawn from the most marginalized members of society, groups
dependent on agriculture, populations in the least developed countries,
in low-lying areas and coastal areas, and of course those impacted by
national disasters. Increases in extreme weather events, the inundation
of low-lying areas, and changes in patterns of weather affecting food
production will all have a direct and also an indirect impact on people’s
rights as they are understood in the UDHR.
2.3 Rights related to other issues

involving vital interests
a. Migration
The movement of people and peoples was an issue in 1948 and it is once
again a pressing concern. The UDHR offers some resources for thinking
about migration. Article 14, the asylum provision, provides that
“everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.” And Article 15 states that everyone has the right to
a nationality and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.
Migration has become salient in new ways in our time. First, its
scale has multiplied since 1948, with the wave of international migrants
anticipated to surpass 250 million in 2015. Remittances from migrant
workers play a significant role in economic development, with more
than 400 billion USD a year flowing in this way to developing countries.
Well-managed migration has been recognized as playing a decidedly
positive role in economic development.
In 2015, conflict-related migration was at an all-time high, with
worldwide displacement at the highest levels since records began. Much
of this is the result of human rights violations in migrants’ countries
of origin. In 2015, the number of displaced people was expected to
exceed 60 million, compared to 37.5 million a decade earlier. Over 5
million newly displaced people were reported in the first half of 2015,
comparable to the 5.5 million newly displaced for the same period in
2014. Every day in 2014, 42,500 people became refugees, asylum seekers,
or internally displaced.
Conflict-driven migration has high human and social costs. In 2015,
over one million people arrived by sea in Europe, and more than 27,000
made crossings by sea in South-East Asia in the first half of the year,
reflecting an explosion in the criminal trade of moving people from
conflict zones for profit. We know this can have tragic consequences for
some of the world’s most vulnerable people: more than 46,000 migrants
have died along migratory routes since 2000, and more than 3,770 died
crossing the Mediterranean in 2015 alone. Worldwide, the total number
of deaths across migratory routes in 2015 was 5,400.
Migration has enormous implications for the realization of human
rights. While the UDHR applies to all persons irrespective of nationality
or citizenship, in reality human rights are often inaccessible or denied
to migrants. For example, refugees may be admitted to a country to
seek safety but then denied the right to work. Migrant workers may be
admitted to a country to work but legally prohibited from starting or
joining trade unions. It must be recognized that those who move across
state boundaries: retain their universal human rights and should be
treated accordingly; have continuing rights in relation to their country
of origin; have a right to security in transit, including freedom from
forced or coerced movement; have a right to a fair and responsible
process at borders and in all legal dealings with an actual or potential
host country; and have a right to good reason for a refusal to allow
entrance or settlement – refusal should not be based on ethnic, racial,
religious, or other illegitimate discrimination.
While there are large-scale and varied international movements of
people in the contemporary world, states often seek to restrict migration
on economic, cultural, security, or other grounds. There is no consensus
on the balance between rights to movement and the power of states to
restrict it. However, given the current situation, there is an urgent need
for the international community to strengthen the international refugee
protection system. Perhaps we should be looking for a new international
convention on refugees and migration. In any case, we endorse SDG
target 10.7, which calls for states to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and
responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the

implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.”
b. Statelessness
“Statelessness” arises when a person is deprived of a state and its legal
system, which provides access to rights and remedies for their violation.
Inasmuch as states have front-line responsibility for upholding the
human rights of their citizens, stateless persons are deprived of the
benefit of this responsibility. A person’s legal right and ability to access
human rights protections often depends on whether or not they are a
national or citizen of the country they are in. This is about both lack of
certainty in law and also prevailing social attitudes.
Statelessness is not a new issue. Article 15 of the UDHR upholds the
right of every human being to a nationality. Nonetheless, there are still
10 million stateless people in the world today, over a third of whom
are children. And during the past five years, 20 percent of all refugees
resettled by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) have also been stateless.4
Stateless people are deprived of rights that the majority of the global
population takes for granted. Often they are excluded from cradle to
grave – being denied a legal identity when they are born, access to
education, health care, marriage, and job opportunities during their
lifetime, and even the dignity of an official burial and death certificate
when they die.
In the last three years there has been a positive trend toward resolving
statelessness, as 26 states have acceded to the 1954 Convention relating
4 There are a number of causes of statelessness. Some countries do not recognize

people from certain communities as citizens of that country. For instance, there
are more than 800,000 Rohingya in Myanmar that have been refused nationality
under the 1982 citizenship law, and many of the Bedouins of Kuwait are effectively
stateless. Statelessness is also caused by the breakup of countries. More than two
decades after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, over 600,000 people remain
stateless. In addition, there are 27 countries in the world where women do not
have the same rights as men to confer nationality on their children. So if you are
a single mother of a child whose father is not known, you are unable to pass your
nationality to your child. Finally, there are circumstances where bureaucratic
difficulties in obtaining documentation such as birth certificates preclude people
from accessing rights associated with nationality.
to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the

Reduction of Statelessness. Still, only 82 countries in all have acceded
to the 1954 Convention and only 60 countries have acceded to the
1961 Convention. In November 2014 the UNHCR launched a 10-Year
Campaign to End Statelessness, and the Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner’s Programme approved a budget of 68 million
USD for 2015. There is much more to be done to deal with statelessness,
ensure that every birth is registered, and prevent gender and other
forms of discrimination in nationality laws.
c. Administrative justice
The UDHR contains legality rights in Articles 8 to 11 but these mainly
focus on criminal law. Given that administrative regulation is now
pervasive, it is arguable that there should be a duty on bodies exercising
governmental functions to act fairly, reasonably, and lawfully in
decisions that materially affect an individual’s rights and interests, and
to ensure that individuals whose interests and livelihoods are affected by
administrative decisions have a right to be heard prior to the decisions
being made and a right to challenge them where appropriate.
d. Corruption
Corruption in the performance of state functions has been a problem
since human governance began. Over the last 30 years there has been
a rising awareness of the relevance of anti-corruption measures to the
rule of law, state-building, and economic growth. The World Bank
estimates that each year 20 billion USD to 40 billion USD, corresponding
to 20 percent to 40 percent of official development assistance, is stolen
through high level corruption from public budgets in developing
countries and hidden overseas.5 The flow on effects for access to rights
are enormous.
The UN Convention Against Corruption, adopted in 2003, obliges
State Parties to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption
5
http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf
measures affecting their laws, institutions, and practices. These

measures aim to promote the prevention, detection, and punishment
of corruption, including domestic and foreign bribery, embezzlement,
trading in influence, and money laundering, as well as the cooperation
between State Parties on these matters.
Corruption is inextricably linked to the violation of an array of
human rights, including the anti-slavery provision, the freedom of
movement provision, and the legality provisions of Articles 8 to 11;
moreover, people are wronged when they are denied equal access to
governmental services as a result of corruption. This illustrates yet again
the interconnectivity of rights and rights violations, described in section
1.8. There is a need and a duty for individuals, states, and other entities
to recognize and respond to the human rights impact of governmental
corruption, and to work to bring it to an end.
e. Privacy from state or corporate

electronic surveillance
Article 12, the privacy and reputation provision, states that no one shall
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy.
In recent years there has been an exponential surge in the span and
capacity of electronic communications, with concomitant opportunities
for surveillance that can violate individuals’ privacy rights. State
surveillance can be an important law enforcement and national security
intelligence-gathering tool when governed by strong rule of law
requirements. But surveillance also poses risks, not only to privacy, but
also to the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, which
increasingly are facilitated online and on mobile devices. Journalists,
activists, government critics, and minority groups are especially
vulnerable to abuse of states’ surveillance powers. In addition, there
are mounting concerns about threats to individual privacy from
surveillance and commercially driven data collection by corporations.
These trends suggest to us that human rights documents need to
cite new principles or new elaborations of old principles to balance
the inevitable trade-offs that result from state or corporate electronic
surveillance.
f. Access to the Internet and electronic

communication on a global scale
A case can be made that access to the Internet and electronic
communication is a human right. Some would object that a document
like the UDHR aims to state core principles grounded in human dignity,
and that the Internet is too recent and contingent a development to be
recognized as the proper subject of a human right. Still, the provisions of
the Declaration vary in the level of detail that they encompass – see, for
example, the thorough language of Article 26, the education provision.
It is certainly important to understand that the specific rights set out
in the Declaration extend to new technologies, including the Internet.
This follows from our understanding of the UDHR as a living document.
By way of illustration, the abstract language of Article 19 – read in
the context of today – implies that the right to freedom of expression
encompasses communication via the Internet. That article states that
“everyone has the right to […] impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.”
Electronic communication, particularly through the Internet, enables
the exercise of a range of other human rights. For example, social
media provide a platform for people to exercise their Article 20 rights
to peaceful assembly and association in circumstances where they
otherwise could not do so.
g. Extreme poverty and deep economic inequality

The UDHR already enumerates a range of social and economic rights.
It tends to state them in the affirmative: for example, the right to social
security in Article 22 or the right to work in Article 23. Ever since 1948,
however, there has been a contention that we should also maintain a
focus on the conditions that continue to make social provision necessary.
Two such conditions now merit particular attention: extreme poverty
and deep economic inequality.
Economic inequality is defined by the gap between rich and poor,
both nationally (within countries) and globally (between countries).
Deep economic inequality refers to disparities that involve poverty on
the one hand, and great riches on the other.6 In general terms, poverty
can be defined as an individual’s or family’s inability to meet basic needs
such as food, shelter, clothing, water, sanitation, education, healthcare,
nutrition, and access to communication. Extreme poverty refers to
earning that lies below the international poverty line of 1.90 USD a day,
as set by the World Bank.7 The UDHR is not explicit about extreme
poverty, but the recent SDG target to “by 2030, eradicate extreme
poverty for all people everywhere” should be read as a continuation of
the concerns stated in Article 25, the standard of living provision.
Extreme poverty clearly has direct implications for people’s enjoyment
and exercise of the rights they possess. And while deep inequality is not a
violation of human rights per se, it is often associated with such violations,
inasmuch as it has an impact upon access to political power and also
makes discrimination more difficult to resist. Moreover, it is hard to
maintain a sense of global citizenship in circumstances of such deep
inequality that rich and poor cannot comprehend each other’s lives, both
within states and globally. Without such understanding, it is difficult for
the rich to sympathize with the needs and predicaments of the poor, and
difficult for them to see human dignity in the lives of the poor.
h. Healthcare
The UDHR makes a brief but powerful reference to healthcare in Article
25, which states that everyone has the right to a standard of living
6 Income inequality is on the rise, with the richest 10 percent earning up to 40 percent
of total global income, while the poorest 10 percent earn only between 2 and 7
percent of total global income. In developing countries, inequality has increased by
11 percent if we take into account the growth of population. A significant majority of
households in developing countries – more than 75 percent of the population – are
living today in societies where income is more unequally distributed than it was
in the 1990s. Evidence shows that, beyond a certain threshold, inequality harms
growth and poverty reduction, the quality of relations in the public and political
spheres, and individuals’ sense of fulfillment and self-worth. SDG 10 is to “reduce
inequality within and among countries.”
7 According to the most recent estimates, in 2012, 896 million people lived on less
than $1.90 a day. Just over 77.8 percent of the extremely poor lived in South Asia
(309 million) and Sub-Saharan Africa (388.7 million). In addition, 147 million lived
in East Asia and Pacific.
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing, and medical care.
Access to health care, both in the form of public health provision in
urban and rural areas, and in terms of disease and epidemic control,
along with the availability of personal health care resources – these are
all essential to health and life itself and must be recognized explicitly as
rights. Article 12(1) of the ICESCR speaks of “the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health,” and focuses particularly on the health of children. This should
be read as an elaboration of the concerns embodied in Article 25.
i. A safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment

For obvious reasons, the international community is far more acutely
aware of environmental threats today than it was in 1948. The
international community has not yet recognized a human right to a
decent and liveable environment per se. However, we believe that our
understanding of human rights should embrace the right to a safe,
clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, with a right of access for
everyone to such elementary resources as clean air, clean water, and
clean, safe, and sustainable energy.
We endorse the recent formulation of the Special Rapporteur8 on
human rights and the environment that “[a]ll human rights depend on
the environment in which we live. A safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment is integral to the full enjoyment of a wide range of human
rights, including the rights to life, health, food, water and sanitation.
Without a healthy environment, we are unable to fulfill our aspirations
8 A Special Rapporteur is an individual working on behalf of the UN within the

scope of the Special Procedures mechanisms, who bears a specific country or
thematic mandate from the UN Human Rights Council. Special Rapporteurs
undertake country visits; act on individual cases and concerns of a broader,
structural nature by sending communications to states and others in which they
bring alleged violations or abuses to their attention; conduct thematic studies
and convene expert consultations; contribute to the development of international
human rights standards, engage in advocacy, raise public awareness, and provide
advice for technical cooperation.
or even live at a level commensurate with minimum standards of human

dignity. At the same time, protecting human rights helps to protect the
environment. When people are able to learn about, and participate
in, the decisions that affect them, they can help to ensure that those
decisions respect their need for a sustainable environment.” The very
existence of the Special Rapporteur reflects the ability of the human
rights system that has emerged since 1948 to respond to new challenges.
Concerns about a decent environment remind us that many
rights need to be conceived of inter-generationally, and that our
responsibilities must embrace the needs and predicaments of our
children and grandchildren.
2.4 An open task

The UDHR left some vital questions unanswered and we have sought
to point out some of the ways in which its lacunae have been or could
be filled. But the task of identifying the rights we will need to guarantee
in our progressively more interdependent world will remain open. The
world is changing and humanity changes with it. As we confront the
new realities produced by climate change, we may need to identify new
rights necessary to protect fundamental human needs and interests;
as new technologies develop in the life and information sciences, we
may face challenges posed by the reshaping of our minds and bodies,
through artificial intelligence or biotechnology. Perhaps, as science
fiction writers and philosophers have suggested, we will one day have to
consider the rights of beings we have created ourselves. But we believe
that as the human community moves forward together to address such
challenges, it will be able to build upon the firm foundations laid out in
the UDHR.
3. Limitations and Derogations
3.1 Adequacy of Article 29 account

of limitations
The second clause of Article 29 – “In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society” – assumes almost as a matter of course that
some limitations on individual rights will be desirable or necessary.
It was probably not the function of the UDHR to explain why this
is the case. Its purpose has been much more to establish the rights
that it proclaims than to vindicate any basis for their limitation. The
Declaration as a whole should be read as the assertion of a strong
presumption in favor of human rights, and Article 29(2) should be
read as placing the burden of proof on anyone who seeks to limit them.
It is critical to recognize the force of Article 29(2)’s insistence that
limitations cannot be particularistic or ad hoc but must be determined
as a matter of law. In modern terms this would be associated with
the idea of proportionality, a principle that has only been clearly
articulated in more recent human rights law.1 Similarly, the suggestion
1 The most common formulation of proportionality is as a three-part test, which

asks: (1) Is the measure suitable to achieve a legitimate aim? (2) Is the measure
necessary to achieve that aim or are less restrictive means available? (3) Does the
measure nonetheless impose an excessive burden on the individual affected?
that rights may be limited “for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others” seems entirely
sensible. Perhaps the number and breadth of the rights recognized
in the UDHR mean that some conflict among them is inevitable. In
articulating the basis on which such conflicts are justly resolved, it is
important that all the right-holders in question be treated as equals.
Further, limiting a right for the sake of other considerations should
not be seen as disparaging that right or the underlying interest or
liberty from which it flows in any particular case.
Nonetheless, the idea that the limitation of rights can be justified
based on “morality, public order and the general welfare” strikes
us as problematic. It is far too general. If “morality” is seen as the
customs and mores of a particular society, then the UDHR will fail
in its central purpose of creating a common understanding of human
rights and the circumstances in which it is appropriate to limit these
rights. (If “morality” means the principles of a correct universal moral
code, by contrast, there is little hope of agreement as to its content.)
And the reference to “the general welfare” as a ground of limitation
seems to undercut the modern idea of rights as trumping utilitarian
considerations. After all, the mere fact that the denial of a right would
marginally increase national income provides no basis for such a
denial. We realize that there are serious difficulties in defining clearly
what bases for limiting a right, beyond a conflict with other rights,
are permissible. The better way forward would be to develop shared
understandings as to what reasons are not sufficient justifications for
such limitations.
Article 29(2) does not mention resource limitations as a basis for
limiting rights, especially social and economic rights. The only time
such limitations are referred to in the UDHR is implicitly in Article
22, the general social security provision: “Everyone, as a member of
society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization,
through national effort and international cooperation and in
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality [emphasis added].”
3.2 Derogation of rights in national or

international emergencies
The question of rights in an emergency is distinct from the question of
the balance between rights and the considerations mentioned in Article
29(2). The ICCPR recognizes this in the separate and extensive provision
it makes for emergencies in its Article 4.2 Here the ICCPR sets out the
rules for derogations in times of emergency; it lays constraints on such
derogations; and it identifies certain rights which may not be derogated
even in times of emergency. The UDHR does none of this.
It is true that the UDHR initiated our thinking about human rights,
and the issue of derogations (as set out in Article 4 of the ICCPR) is
a product of a later phase in such thinking that we can now take
advantage of. But the UDHR remains in and of itself something of
crucial educational importance and a vital foundation of the global ethic
of human rights. It is therefore a pity that it did not introduce the world
to the idea of emergency derogations – and even more, to the idea that
there are certain rights from which derogations may not be made, like
the rights not to be tortured or enslaved. Such anti-derogation provisions
establish the rights in question as more or less absolute.
The Commission also considered the increasing reliance in the
modern world on long-term, continuous states of emergency as
justifications for human rights derogations. One example is the U.S.-led
2 Article 4 of the ICCPR states:

(1) In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.
(2) No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made
under this provision.
(3) Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation
shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which
it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall
be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
“War on Terror,” which has now lasted for 14 years and has been invoked
to justify such practices as drone strikes in Pakistan and the indefinite
detention of inmates at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. This challenge is not
dealt with adequately by the formulations in Article 4 of the ICCPR, as
they envisage relatively short-term, clearly demarcated emergencies. If
there are to be long-term derogations of human rights, the international
community must develop mechanisms to ensure that this process is
not abused. In the Commission’s view, the following standards should
apply: first, derogations ought to be publicly announced and publicly
justified, whenever possible, and organized in the context of a legislative
framework that provides for independent supervision and oversight;
second, the justification should substantiate that the derogations in
question are the minimum required to achieve the stated objectives; third,
suitable arrangements should be in place for the supervision of detention,
including procedural safeguards; and fourth, derogations should be for a
fixed period, with renewal subject to the same conditions.
The issue of long-term derogations of human rights should be
the focus of discussion in relevant world bodies, such as the UN
Human Rights Council, as well as across international civil society.
The possibility of reaching international agreements on the relevant
standards governing long-term derogations ought to be explored.
3.3 Regulation of the use of force

The UDHR was intended to operate in conjunction with the UN
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.
Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that all UN Member States “shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.” It allowed only two exceptions to the prohibition on the use
of force in international law: self-defence under Article 51, and military
measures authorized by the UN Security Council in response to “any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”
Yet in recent years there have been military interventions that have
been neither in self-defence nor authorized by the UN Security Council.
If the standards governing the use of force in the UN Charter are no

longer effective, then the international community needs to create a new
and more workable regime. Certainly we should understand that the
UDHR and the UN Charter must operate together: a world in which
war or the threat of war is endemic cannot be a world in which human
rights are respected. The human rights community therefore has an
interest in the workability of the UN Security Council’s role being
revisited. Any revision should maintain the fundamental restrictions
on the use of force.
The rise and persistence of international terrorism have shown
us that armed conflict is not confined to state organizations, and in
many respects is not amenable in principle to the sort of rules and
restrictions laid down in the UN Charter, which mainly envisage
inter-state conflict. Much of the rethinking that is required affects the
international law of armed conflict, and that is not our subject here.
But the problem of international terrorism does raise a number of
human rights issues – about surveillance, about detention of suspects,
and about targeted killing. Since there appears to be no chance that
these issues will abate soon, we need to address them on the basis
that the circumstances giving rise to them have to be accepted for
the time being as “the new normal.” This does not mean that current
tactics of surveillance, detention, and targeted killing should not be
questioned. But in doing so human rights principles need to be given
due consideration: these practices, and the necessities on which some
would base them, must be addressed as permanent features of our
human rights environment. Hard work needs to be done to create an
architecture of values and principles, derived from current conceptions
and the enduring foundations of human rights, that can deal coherently
with these new features.
The Commission wishes to emphasize two further points. First,
violations of human rights committed in the name of state security can
actually facilitate international terrorism by marginalizing individuals
and alienating key constituencies, thus generating community support
for and complicity in the actions of violent extremists. To be effective
and sustainable, therefore, all policies and practices adopted to prevent
terrorism must be firmly grounded in respect for human rights and
the rule of law. Second, it is vital to take a comprehensive approach
to terrorism which encompasses not only essential security-based

counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventative measures
which address the root causes of violent extremism. These include lack
of socio-economic opportunities; marginalization and discrimination;
poor governance; violations of human rights and the rule of law;
prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalization in prisons. The
creation of open, equitable, inclusive, and pluralist societies, based on
the full respect of human rights and with economic opportunities for
all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent
extremism and the most promising strategy for undermining its appeal.3
3 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Report of the Secretary General,

A/70/674 (available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
A/70/674).
4. Social and Economic Rights
In addition to civil and political rights, the UDHR contains a list of

social and economic rights. These are set out in Articles 22 to 26, which
include provisions relating to social security, conditions of work, rest
and leisure, standard of living, and education.
The inclusion of these rights occasioned some concern in the decades
following the adoption of the UDHR and their inclusion continues to be
controversial for some who resist the idea that these rights are as central
as civil and political rights. Others argue that they are more central.
And some think of them as social and economic aspirations but doubt
whether the language of rights makes sense.
Much of the success of the human rights movement over nearly
seven decades is attributable to the creation of a set of standards that
can be upheld without changing the structures of international affairs
and the international economy. While social and economic rights
were included in the UDHR, they differ from this paradigm in that
their realization might be thought to require some restructuring of the
international order. This challenges us to consider the extent to which
social and economic objectives should be pursued through a human
rights framework.
4.1 The importance of social and

economic rights
The Commission believes that social and economic rights are vital. They
reflect genuine human needs that every state has an obligation to attend
to, within existing resources, in the interest of all those committed to
their care.
Social and economic rights are conceptually linked to civil and

political rights because respect for human dignity requires that both
be upheld. There is also a causal connection in that civil and political
rights can be used to secure social and economic rights, and social
and economic rights make possible the meaningful exercise of civil
and political rights. Indeed, the failure of social and economic rights
makes individuals more vulnerable to other human rights abuses, such
as forced labor. Dire poverty and the other ills and vulnerabilities that
come with it are a standard threat to rights of all kinds. So we think it
is fitting and valuable to have social and economic rights enshrined in
the same declaration as civil and political rights, and thus to perceive
human rights as a whole in the context of a single declaration.
It is right for the world to indicate to governments that attention to
matters of social security, conditions of work, rest and leisure, standard
of living, health, and education are now regarded as elementary and
fundamental tasks of government, laid down as compelling priorities
in relation to whatever resources are available. The rights here are not
optional and they are not just wistful longings. A lack of resources does
not turn such rights into a mere wish list. Countries have a categorical
obligation to do all that they reasonably can to fulfil these rights.
Moreover, other states and all international organizations have an
obligation to assist particular countries in this regard.
We add two further points. First, the social and economic part of the
UDHR is not intended as a comprehensive theory of good government,
nor is it intended as a theory of social justice. It is supposed to capture
no more than the essence of certain elementary obligations that societies
owe to their members in the social and economic sphere. Second, the
Declaration does not commit societies to economic equality, but requires
that specified areas of concern be attended to. In wealthier nations,
much more generous provisions can and should be made for health,
education, and social security than in developing nations. Nevertheless,
the mandate is that every society, within its resources, should pay due
attention to the health, education, and social security of its members.
The value and relevance of Articles 22 to 26 are not just in the
immediate requirements they impose. Like other articles of the UDHR,
these provisions lay down a foundation for a subsequent and wider
comprehension of human rights. In the case of social and economic
rights, the articles of the UDHR prefigured and prepared the way for
the ICESCR; the development of international agencies devoted to
securing these rights, directly and indirectly; the inclusion of social and
economic rights in modern national constitutions (and their elaboration
by courts in the context of national constitutional law); and the evolution
of doctrines for benchmarks and core provision of these rights.
4.2 Relation to availability of resources

Social and economic rights are dependent on the availability and
distribution of resources in a way that civil and political rights are not.
It is true that civil and political rights do have their costs and, in some
circumstances, social and economic rights require forbearance rather
than costly action. But in general, the level of provision needed for
social and economic rights is high. So paying attention to the capacity
of the actors responsible for delivering these rights is both natural and
unavoidable. It is a matter of debate – among all commentators on
the UDHR – whether Articles 22 to 26 should be read as stipulating a
common core of minimum provision or whether the provision that is
expected should vary with the social and economic circumstances and
expectations of each society.
One view is that it would be dangerous to attempt to stipulate a
common core of provision at some fixed level. First, the standards might
be so minimal that while some countries would deem it an achievement
to meet them, a number of other countries would lose ground. Second,
if certain developing countries knew that they were unable to meet the
minimum standards, they would be less likely to ratify human rights
instruments.
However, the more persuasive view is that we should be
uncompromising on social and economic rights as they are formulated,
but recognize some degree of relativity in capacities and context.
Specifically, we should keep faith with the Declaration’s explicit
universality, both as to actual provision and as to the expectations that
people are entitled to. The social and economic provisions of the UDHR
should be interpreted to mean that everyone is entitled to certain
minimum standards of health, education, and social security. The
concept of dignity – while abstract – provides a yardstick against which

to set minimum measures. The extent of available resources is one
determinative factor, though the UDHR also imposes constraints on the
allocation of such resources as there are: the UDHR mandates that the
actors responsible for social and economic rights give priority to health,
education, and social security based on resources that can reasonably
be made available given economic and fiscal circumstances, rather
than on the resources that actually are made available. It is possible
that these rights may permit a reasonable level of cultural relativity:
to take Article 23, what counts as “an existence worthy of human
dignity” may vary from one set of social and cultural circumstances to
another. However, the Commission does not accept the idea that there
are cultural differences that can affect who should benefit from social
and economic rights or can justify maldistribution in this regard. So, for
example, we do not believe that people should ever be denied equal
social and economic rights because they are women or ethnic minorities.
While we must face up to the task of setting reasonably clear
common standards for minimum provision, it is equally imperative to
acknowledge the phenomenon of extreme poverty, where there is no
question that people are living well below the most minimum levels that
human dignity would demand. In short, we will often be in a position
to conclude that there has been a violation of social and economic rights,
without having to specify a standard at the upper level.
The Commission believes that the UDHR (and the ICESCR) should
be read as endorsing an ongoing global conversation about what the
minimum provision should be and a rule of progress to the effect that
the human rights framework calls for steps to improve the position of
everyone, including the least advantaged in society.
4.3 Responsibilities for social and

economic rights
To a certain extent, a poor state can act on the internal distribution of
its resources but it cannot directly act to secure an equitable global
distribution of resources that would enable it to end the poverty of its
citizens. Social and economic rights therefore raise questions about the
allocation of responsibilities, and particularly whether and to what

extent wealthy states have an obligation to help citizens of poor states.
It is arguable that we should be sensitive to the relationship between
the responsibilities that certain rights impose and the capacities that the
responsible actors have to fulfill them, a balance which is particularly
relevant in the context of social and economic rights. Certainly, it might
be thought that any adequate approach to human rights needs to take
a realistic view of the capacities of the responsible actors, and of the
resources they can control and dispense. A realistic view of the actual
powers and resources of state and non-state agents must take proper
account of the effects of globalization and the ways in which power has
been reconfigured. At the same time, lack of resources does not entitle
any government to ignore its own obligations. The social and economic
rights set out in the UDHR require governments to do everything
reasonable within their power to implement these provisions, including
redressing priorities in the allocation of resources.
This raises a broader point: is it true that you can only articulate rights
after you have identified the responsible authority – a duty-bearer – and
determined that their violation is actionable? The Commission’s
conclusion is that we are often in a position to identify a right before we
are in a position to identify the duty-bearers charged with fulfilling that
right. Each right gives us a reason to seek duty-bearers, but where we
look will depend on the circumstances. And there may be many duties
and many duty-bearers corresponding to a given right. Thus we should
think of duty-bearers of social and economic rights – and indeed rights
generally – as standing not in a static but in a dynamic relation to a
given right. This accords with the way philosophers analyze the relation
between rights and duties.
We have to recognize that we are not always dealing with
straightforward, concrete rights violations, but instead with a plethora
of ways in which there can be failures of responsibility. There are those
who are able to act to bring about progress on social and economic
rights, but who may not have full agency with regard to a violation
per se. Responsibilities will therefore be both direct and indirect. More
broadly, systems that sustain long-term global poverty are matters
of deep concern, and the international community must question
arrangements that do not further the attainment of social and economic
rights. This puts the issue of poverty onto the agenda for citizens, states,
corporations, and international institutions – which is one of the most
powerful ways in which social and economic rights operate.
The Commission believes that states have front-line responsibility
for the social and economic well-being of their citizens. Fair economic
growth has a critical role to play in this, and the Commission believes it
is crucial to see a stronger connection between economic policy and the
instruments of human rights. The support of the international community
should to some extent be conditioned on whether the governments of
particular countries are discharging their own responsibilities. The
UDHR leaves open the question of placing social and economic rights
in a constitution and the question of their justiciability in the courts.
We judge that the most likely vehicle for implementation of these
rights is social legislation rather than the constitution of each country.
And another issue – an open one – is whether it is wise to allocate
enforcement here to courts.
It is evident, however, that the challenges faced by many states cannot
be resolved entirely by actions in those states alone. The Commission
believes that there is an overwhelming moral case for interpreting the
social and economic rights provisions of the Declaration as placing
obligations on the international community to alleviate world poverty.
International aid and transfers, aimed at strengthening the capacity of
recipient states to secure the social and economic rights of their citizens,
thus have an indispensable role to play.
Three more specific points are worth mentioning. First, it is clear
that many low-income and middle-income countries cannot afford to
tackle the poverty of their citizens entirely by themselves. Analysis by
the World Bank shows that even if those countries were to tax their
middle class to the limit, it would not generate enough resources to
eradicate their endemic poverty.1 Second, there are approximately 700
million people in the world who currently live on less than 1.90 USD a
day. However, the amount of money needed to bring these people out
of such extreme poverty is small in relation to the world’s resources.
Third, in 1970, the UN General Assembly agreed that all “economically
advanced countries” should dedicate 0.7 percent of their gross national
1
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/should-we-care-equally-about-poor-
people-wherever-they-may-live
income to official development assistance. Nonetheless, in 2013 only

Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates,
and the United Kingdom spent more than 0.7 percent on aid. Social and
economic rights are an international and not just a national responsibility.
Responsibilities among the international community to uphold social
and economic rights are in the Commission’s view held not only by
states, but also above the level of states by international organizations
and below the level of states by corporations and individuals. Issues of
world poverty cannot be dealt with exclusively by nations or by a transfer
of resources between nations. Global businesses have a substantial
and at times decisive impact on the social and economic rights of
millions of people worldwide. Their role can be positive or negative.
Over the last third of a century, the expansion of the global economy,
led by the private sector, has been the driving force in lifting almost
two billion people out of extreme poverty. But in too many instances
businesses have also frustrated government efforts to protect the social
and economic welfare of their people, and have been implicated in
violations of social and economic rights. Redefining the legal obligations
of corporations is of course a difficult and complicated matter. There is,
however, an emerging demand for companies to recognize and act on
responsibilities arising out of human rights in their global operations,
including the right to just conditions of work. Drawing on the inspiration
of the UDHR, companies and other stakeholders are beginning to shape
industry-specific human rights standards and metrics.
4.4 Poverty reduction and other human rights

It is sometimes said that, although the rights in the Declaration are
presented as an interconnected body of principles, complementary and
mutually supportive, there are in fact serious conflicts among them. It
is sometimes argued, for example, that the right to freedom of speech
or assembly may conflict with the right of people not to live in poverty,
that the only way to lift large numbers of people out of poverty may
involve authoritarian rule. Or, to take another example, it is sometimes
argued that the right to life and security may conflict with the right to
privacy, that ensuring that innocent civilians are not subject to violent
attacks may involve curbing their rights not to be surveilled.
It is important to appreciate that, to the extent to which there is a

“trade-off” among various rights, it is not a conflict among the rights
themselves. The principles of the UDHR are entirely consistent with one
another and may all derive from a single foundation.
What is true is that, in certain very specific real-world settings, our
ability to fully implement one right may conflict with our ability to fully
implement another, at least temporarily. This is not a logical conflict
among the rights themselves, but rather a reflection of the way in
which real-world conditions can put pressure on the simultaneous
implementation of several rights.
However, no claim that there exists, in a specific real-world setting,
a tension between the implementation of one right and that of another
is ever self-evident. Any such claim would be very hard to establish and
must always be subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny.
Furthermore, it is always a serious question whether any particular
proposed trade-off is morally justifiable. Even if it were true that, under
the pressure of certain sorts of threat, a greater emphasis on preserving
the right to life might require curbing the right to privacy, it is not
obvious what this should entail. We must be able to choose whether we
prefer to live in a surveillance society or whether we prefer to live in a
freer society that runs a somewhat greater risk of unpredictable attacks
on its citizens.
The implementation of human rights is a historical process, in which
fulfillment is often and in varying degrees incomplete and uneven. It is
a complex process too, involving not just the avoidance of violations but
the setting up and maintaining of social, political, and legal systems and
institutions. This is necessarily a protracted and asymmetrical process.
So, in all of this, progress, not perfection, should be the measure.
5. Responsibility for
Human Rights
These issues of social and economic rights have put the subject of
responsibility firmly on the table, but we thought it appropriate to
address it at a more general level as well.
Responsibility for rights has a number of aspects. In this section
we are concerned with two of them: first, responsibilities for securing
the subject matter of each right; and second, responsibilities of rights-
bearers themselves. A third set of responsibilities – for monitoring,
investigating, and remedying rights violations – is discussed in
section 6.
The UDHR enumerates rights, but it does not specify who carries
the corresponding duties. The Declaration seems to assume that states
are the primary bearers of responsibility. There is also a suggestion
in the document that responsibility for upholding human rights may
fall on individuals and entities below the level of the state, and on
organizations above the level of the state. Indeed, the proclamation
clause of the preamble states that “every individual and every organ
of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms
and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance.” Moreover, Article
28 provides that “everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realized.”
For some rights – such as the due process provisions in Articles 9 to

11 – it is obvious that states are the principal targets of the constraints.
For the rest, the explanation for the UDHR’s openness on the question
of responsibilities probably has more to do with the political resistance
that would have met any attempt at explicit specification in 1947 and
1948. This would have been especially true of any attempt to specify
international or nation-to-nation obligations in regard to social and
economic rights. It might also have been true of social and economic
rights generally, inasmuch as debate about the specification of duty-
bearers would have opened up intense ideological disagreement about
political economy.
While acknowledging the obstacles that would have faced any effort
at specification in 1948, our task now is to expand on the reference to
“every individual and every organ of society” in the preamble and on
the reference to everyone as “entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realized” in Article 28. The rights in the Declaration should be
understood as generating duties for states, international institutions,
corporations, private persons, and even rights-bearing individuals
themselves.
5.1 The special role of states

The role of states remains essential. Given the realities of our world – this
was even more the case in 1948 – states must be regarded as the main
guarantors of the rights of their own citizens. States still control the
basic structure of each nation’s polity and legal system, and the overall
structure of governance in each society. This is true whether we are
talking about civil and political rights or social and economic rights.
States are duty-bound to the human rights of their citizens in several
ways. First, states have inherent responsibility for certain institutions,
like the legal system, which human rights directly constrain. Second,
states also have a degree of control over other institutions and structures
on which human rights impose limitations. Third, states have a greater
power of enforcement against rights-violators than any other entity in
society. Fourth, and conversely, states can become a major threat to
human rights. Fifth, and fortunately, states also can furnish – through
the division of their powers – the major safeguard against state-based

threats.
The special position of states is not just a matter of effectiveness and
control. States claim a form of legitimacy that distinguishes them from
other entities and agencies operating, whether lawfully or unlawfully,
in a society. The UDHR and the covenants aim to impose human rights-
based conditions on this legitimacy.
The laws and national constitutions of states, in most instances, will be
the first recourse to address any violations of human rights, and should
be regarded as the ordinary mode of human rights implementation.
Indeed, the human rights regime initiated by the UDHR was intended
as a foundation not only for the subsequent covenants and international
agreements, but also for the laws and national constitutions of individual
countries.
In a globalized world, it is also the duty of each state to concern
itself to a certain extent with the human rights of persons outside its
borders, taking into account the following four forms of influence: first,
the effect of the state’s own policies and actions on other countries;
second, the impact on other countries of the way in which it participates
in international institutions; third, the provision and efficacy of
development aid; and fourth, the response to rights abuses in other
countries, either by way of criticism and public denunciation or, in the
last resort, by intervention and support for intervention.
While states have the primary responsibility for ensuring the human
rights of their citizens, there are numerous examples of situations where
governments no longer control substantial tracts of territory, no longer
control the military or have a monopoly on force, lack legitimacy, and
are unable or unwilling to provide public services. In these situations,
who is responsible for the human rights of the population? This issue
needs to be urgently addressed by the international community.
5.2 Other entities

The fact that one entity – like a state – has responsibility for a given right
is quite compatible with other entities also having their own obligations.
Rights generate waves of responsibility, and those responsibilities may
fall on an array of duty-bearers.
a. Sub-national governments
Though national state responsibility is primary, the position of
sub-national governments also needs to be addressed. Often the
governments of local, devolved, provincial, and state entities have
considerable autonomy, and they may not be entirely under the control
of the national government so far as upholding rights is concerned.
b. International institutions
Global and regional institutions, including those associated with the
UN (like the Security Council), the IMF, and the World Bank, should
regard themselves as bound by human rights. Even if they do not have
an affirmative responsibility to provide what is necessary for rights, they
have a responsibility not to undermine human rights or make them more
difficult to secure. Even when an organization believes itself to have
a legal immunity, it is appropriate for that immunity to be waived in
cases of egregious violations of human rights. The Commission believes
that these responsibilities should be made explicit. The Commission
also calls for international institutions to sign and ratify international
human rights agreements.
c. Corporations
Since 1948, the power concentrated in global companies has reached
unprecedented levels. When country gross domestic product (GDP) is
compared to annual company revenues, half of the 100 largest economies
in the world today are private corporations. States have a responsibility
to exercise appropriate oversight over corporations operating in their
jurisdictions, to ensure their compliance with human rights standards.
In practice, however, many states have been unable or unwilling to
act. Companies often operate in weak states where there is a profound
governance gap. They have also flexed their political and economic
influence to undermine state oversight, by demanding deregulation and
by lobbying for business-friendly regulations that diminish the capacity
of governments to promote environmental and social protection.
In light of this expansion in corporate power and the governance

gap in many states, there should be a firm expectation that companies
will respect human rights. Stakeholders, shareholders, employees,
and constituencies including civil society, responsible investors, trade
unions, and consumers are increasingly demanding that corporations
attend seriously to policies and practices addressing human rights.
Generational shifts in attitudes to consumption and broader access to
information on company operations through new media sources are
also exerting pressure on companies to comply with the human rights
standards applicable to their industries. In 2011, the UN adopted the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which establishes
a “protect, respect and remedy framework” that requires businesses
to adhere to policies and practices that respect human rights in their
day-to-day business operations. Over time, companies have also agreed
to be bound by various international obligations, for example through
their participation in the framework of the International Labour
Organization (ILO), which is committed to dialogue and cooperation
among governments, employers, and workers, and to the development
of standards addressing conditions of work.
Given that the bulk of the world’s employment is in the private
sector, the Commission considers that certain provisions of the UDHR,
such as Article 23 on the conditions of work, should be interpreted as
imposing duties on corporations. Of course, national governments
have the primary responsibility for establishing and enforcing the
legal frameworks within which businesses operate. But in the many
situations where national governments are failing to protect their own
people, it is incumbent on global corporations and their investors and
financiers to develop and abide by human rights standards that extend
beyond the jurisdiction of any one state.
We must also accept that the role and importance of business
organizations reaches beyond conditions of work. Corporations have
become important actors alongside states, and perform governance
functions that transcend their roles as employers and workplace
proprietors. They also play a prominent part in the communities in
which they operate, and have a major impact on issues of migration,
food security, the empowerment of women, and environmental
sustainability. Consequently, companies have obligations in these areas,
not only to respect but also to advance human rights in the states where
they do business.
There are reasons to believe that the influence of large global
companies will continue to multiply. This points to the need for new
mechanisms to strengthen corporate compliance with human rights.
Engaged citizens, stakeholders, and civil society groups have an
indispensable role to play in working with corporations to develop
practical and effective ways to secure human rights. Such efforts should
be undertaken in collaboration with national governments, taking into
account the willingness and capacity of states to protect their own
people. When states fail to act, corporations and other stakeholders
need to develop alternative measures to ensure that basic rights are
being respected.
Thus companies need to work with key stakeholders to develop
industry minimum standards on human rights, and metrics to
monitor and assess compliance. Multi-stakeholder initiatives that hold
businesses accountable to agreed standards through reporting and
monitoring can help drive a race to the top and give consumers and
investors the information they need and are now demanding to guide
their purchasing and investment decisions.
Home states, which directly benefit from the economic activity
generated by global companies, must take steps to ensure that companies
under their jurisdiction respect human rights in their operations abroad.
d. Private persons
The Commission is attracted to the idea that individuals – ordinary men
and women – should be thought of as the ultimate bearers of the duties
that correspond to human rights. In the final analysis it is everyone’s
responsibility to respect and look out for each other’s rights. (This does
not replace the primary responsibility of states, since states are the main
mechanism through which people carry out their duties in regard to
human rights and the mechanism by which their duties are coordinated
and made effective.)
With respect to rights that rely on fiscal resources – social and
economic rights in particular  – individuals have clear duties as
taxpayers. More generally, citizens have negative duties not to oppose
or agitate against human rights. They may also have positive duties
to form social movements and NGOs that actively support and lobby
for human rights. They have duties to play their part in maintaining a
culture of rights in society and in the world at large. And individuals
have the responsibilities of global citizenship in relation to the specific
demands of human rights.
Article 29(1) of the UDHR is germane in this context. It asserts that
“everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.” From the perspective of
global citizenship, “community” means not just the national community
but also the world community, whose structures increasingly protect or
deny human rights at every level: local, national, and global.
5.3 Responsibilities of rights-bearers

Finally, we emphasize again that rights-bearers themselves have
responsibilities with respect to their own rights and responsibilities as
rights-bearers to the rights system as a whole and to society generally.
The responsibility of rights-bearers requires us to recognize that:
rights may at times be legitimately limited; there is a duty to listen to
and consider any reasons given for the limitation of rights; and that the
fulfilment of some rights is costly and that this may render rights not
immediately achievable. In a sense, these responsibilities recognize the
need for us to have a democratic dialogue about the fulfilment of rights,
and a dialogue requires a commitment to both listening and engaging.
We believe that if the value of dialogue on rights is recognized, the
protection and fulfilment of human rights is likely to be advanced.
Some commentators argue that rights-bearers often act irresponsibly
in claiming human rights protections by being over-zealous in pursuing
rights campaigns or by adopting the posture of victim. In our view, such
commentary risks downplaying or soft-pedalling human rights abuses
or blocking serious and important interpretive debates. Human rights
are designed, among other things, to protect people from the worst evils
that can be inflicted on them. They are designed to facilitate a clamoring
for attention for victims of abuse, even when this is uncomfortable for
other members of society. We must never lose sight of this.
Sometimes the complaint is that rights are being claimed by

individuals who have already shown that they are socially irresponsible
or who are accused of crimes or suspected of terrorism. We believe that
not the slightest concession should be made to this critique of human
rights. Just as Articles 18 and 19 of the UDHR are intended, among other
purposes, to protect those who hold dissident views or who believe
in an unpopular creed, so certain human rights must be understood
as operating for the benefit of those who have come under public
suspicion of crime or other anti-social activity. We view with horror the
suggestion that these protections should be diminished on the grounds
of “responsibility.”
Of course, a culture of human rights should not foster a purely passive
sense of entitlement. This may be even truer when we think about social
and economic rights that specify and privilege certain material interests
that all people have – interests in social security, in an income sufficient
for “an existence worthy of human dignity,” in rest and leisure, in a
certain standard of living and of health, and so on. That these rights are
expressed as such in a document that – whatever else it does – imposes
duties upon states should not be read as meaning that the state has the
sole responsibility here. Instead, and this must be acknowledged and
emphasized, the UDHR assumes that primary provision for most of
these rights will be made by individuals themselves through gainful
work and employment. That is the heart of Article 23. It affirms that,
wherever possible, individuals have a duty to provide for themselves
and for those who are dependent upon them. And in recognizing that
the economy must be such as to satisfy certain conditions – adequate
remuneration, justice in the conditions of work, worker organization,
and holidays with pay, amongst others  – the UDHR by no means retreats
from the position that in this context individuals too are responsible for
themselves.
Nor is any such retreat envisioned in the Declaration’s call to make
provision, socially and collectively if necessary, for the well-being
of the most vulnerable. Again, that does not detract from the central
principle in these articles that individuals, broadly speaking, have a
responsibility as well as a right to work for a living. The Commission
is adamantly opposed to any critique of social and economic rights that
ignores this or that contends or implies that social and economic rights
foster a culture of idle entitlement.
5.4 No closed model of responsibility

It would be a mistake to develop a rigid or closed model of responsibility
for rights, or to conclude that rights are of no value until responsibilities
are actually specified. The advantage of specifying rights first is that
this provides a basis for thinking about the duties of the state and other
entities.
The Commission has judged that it is both sensible and essential
to retain an open and developing sense of where responsibilities lie,
since the environment in which rights have to be satisfied is constantly
changing.
6. Implementation of
Human Rights
6.1 Introduction
The framers of the UDHR, led by Eleanor Roosevelt, envisaged three
parts to the postwar human rights enterprise: a set of general principles;
the codification of those principles into law; and practical means of
implementation.1
Today implementation takes many forms, ranging from top-
down monitoring by human rights treaty bodies and adjudication by
international courts and tribunals, to capacity building in civil society
organizations and human rights education at the grass-roots level.
We should recognize that effective implementation includes not only
retrospective complaint mechanisms, but also forward-looking efforts
to cultivate respect for human rights. This is reflected in the mandate of
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which is both
to promote and protect human rights.
1 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (London: Random House, 2001), Chapter 6. At its
second meeting – in Geneva in December 1947 – the Human Rights Commission
pressed forward in three working groups. The first group, chaired by Eleanor
Roosevelt, worked on the draft Declaration. The second group, chaired by Lord
Dukeston of the United Kingdom, sought to prepare a draft Convention. The third
group, chaired by Hansa Mehta of India, investigated methods of implementation
that might or might not later be incorporated into a Covenant.
The Commission’s starting point in considering human rights

implementation is Article 28 of the UDHR, which provides that
“everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”
This statement invites us to focus on the disparity between the world as
it is, and the world we should hope to live in. More specifically, it raises
the question of why the human rights embedded in the UDHR are
far from realized today, and what more the international community
can – and must – do to make real the ideal of human rights for all. This
section of the report deals with that challenge.
In sections 6.2 and 6.3, we look at particular areas of rights, to give an
indication of how the implementation of human rights is faring, and we
develop a number of specific suggestions. In 6.4, we take on some more
general issues about sovereignty and state responsibility, identifying
the obstacles to and the opportunities for the greater vindication of
human rights.
6.2 State of play on representative rights

The Commission has considered the implementation of the following
representative provisions of the UDHR: the anti-slavery provision
(Article 4); the anti-torture provision (Article 5); the free expression
provision (Article 19) and the free association provision (Article 20);
and the education provision (Article 26). We singled out these articles
because they represent some of the most pressing human rights concerns
of the early twenty-first century.
We set out below short summaries of the Commission’s conclusions
with respect to each of these rights. The full case studies, on which these
findings are based, are set out in Online Appendix E.2
2
Appendix E, on Human Rights Implementation, is available at https://www.
openbookpublishers.com/isbn/9781783742189#resources. The case studies on
the anti-slavery provision, the anti-torture provision, the free expression and
free association provisions, and the education provision were prepared for the
Commission by the Center on Global Justice (University of California, San Diego).
The case study on the equality and non-discrimination provision – which the
Commission also considered in its analysis of human rights implementation – was
prepared by Dr. Dimitrina Petrova, the founding Executive Director of the Equal
Rights Trust.
a. Anti-slavery (Article 4)
Slavery constitutes a profound human rights violation and an affront to
any sense of human dignity. While definitions vary, at its core slavery
involves one person taking away another person’s freedom – their
freedom to leave their workplace or employer/slavemaster at their own
choosing, to control their body, to choose their work – so that they can
be exploited. This is achieved not through lawful means (as is the case
with military service or imprisonment) but through threats, violence, or
coercion.
The concept of slavery and slavery-like practices can cover a range
of practices, including forced labor (e.g., debt bondage, serfdom, and
forced sex work), exploitative child labor (e.g., child soldiers), descent-
based slavery, forced or servile marriage (e.g., exchanging a woman for
payment), and human trafficking. They all have in common an inability
for the individual to leave a workplace or employer/slavemaster at their
own free will.
Article 4 of the UDHR asserts that “No one shall be held in slavery
or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all
their forms.” This prohibition has been reaffirmed in a range of treaty
provisions: Article 8 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 6 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, Article 10 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights,
Article 13 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights
Declaration, and Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court criminalizes, as
crimes against humanity, enslavement, sexual slavery, and enforced
prostitution. As war crimes, it criminalizes sexual slavery and enforced
prostitution. In addition, there are a number of conventions that aim
to eradicate slavery, most notably the 1926 Slavery Convention, as
amended by the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition
of Slavery; the 2000 International Labour Organization Convention
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour; and the 2000 Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children. In 2007, the Human Rights Council established a Special
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and
consequences.
Despite this extensive array of treaty provisions embodying the

spirit of Article 4 of the UDHR, slavery persists across the world, even
in countries that have ratified anti-slavery treaties. According to ILO
estimates, almost 21 million individuals across the globe were forced
laborers in 2012; 11.4 million of them were female and 9.5 million were
male. Walk Free estimates of modern slavery – which include forced
marriage – place the number of people living in servitude far higher
at 35.8 million. Children are particularly vulnerable, especially as child
soldiers, domestic servants, and sex slaves. Against this reality, the
U.S. Department of State estimates that there are only around 10,000
prosecutions annually for human trafficking offences.
Clearly, the task of preventing slavery is not as straightforward as
simply declaring it to be illegal. Slavery has different root causes, and
many factors that sustain both vulnerability to enslavement and the
impunity of offenders. Conflict, corruption, poverty, and discrimination
are key drivers of vulnerability, as are historical relationships of
power, colonialism, and exploitation – relationships that have become
embedded in local culture and social norms. Weak rule of law, the failure
of legal systems to operate effectively across international borders,
failure of social safety nets, and even the normalization of some forms
of exploitation facilitate the continued existence of slavery.
Ending slavery is deeply connected with the mission of the UDHR.
This will require a deep focus on discrimination and inequality, and
the systems that allow these to persist. It will require governments,
corporations, and private citizens to focus serious attention (and
resources) on practical realization of the social and economic rights
that allow people to protect themselves from slavery, whether this is
through social insurance in times of shocks, food and shelter in times of
crisis, or their ability to access decent work. It will require governments
to address the corruption that perpetuates the impunity of offenders.
b. Anti-torture (Article 5)
Torture has enduring effects on the physical, mental, and emotional
well-being of its survivors, crippling or destroying their abilities to
pursue fulfillment and happiness. In many nations, torture is used to
extract confessions from alleged criminals or political prisoners. Torture
is utterly inconsistent with basic human rights.
Article 5 of the UDHR states: “No one shall be subjected to torture

or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” Since
torture has devastating consequences for its victims, the international
prohibition against it is absolute. Article 7 of the ICCPR reaffirms the
UDHR’s proscription of torture, and expressly bans non-consensual
medical or scientific experimentation. Most importantly, the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment obliges every country to take
effective legislative, administrative, and judicial measures to prevent
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction (Article 2.1), and forbids
states from sending a person to another state where they would be in
danger of being tortured (Article 3). The 158 state parties to CAT are
required to ban the use of evidence obtained through torture in their
courts (Article 15). In addition, CAT provides that all state parties must
ensure “education and information regarding the prohibition against
torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel,”
or any other persons who are involved in interrogations of those
arrested, detained, or imprisoned (Article 10.1).
The repudiation of torture is supposed to be realized in international
law through three primary mechanisms. First, CAT establishes a
Committee against Torture that reviews reports submitted by state
parties on the measures they have taken to fulfill their obligations under
the convention. The Committee also initiates inquiries concerning
allegations of systematic torture by a state party. Second, the Optional
Protocol to CAT (OPCAT) establishes an international inspection system
for places of detention with the objective of preventing torture, modeled
on the system that has existed in Europe since 1987 (the Committee
for the Prevention of Torture). Third, in 1985 the UN Commission on
Human Rights established the Special Rapporteur on torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The Special
Rapporteur examines relevant questions in all countries, regardless of
whether a state has ratified CAT or OPCAT.
Nevertheless, torture remains a shamefully common practice.
Amnesty International reported that torture occurred in 144
countries – scattered across all continents – between January 2009 and
May 2013. Torture takes many forms. In 2013 to 2014 alone, Amnesty
International documented over 27 variants worldwide, the most
common of which were beatings, electric shocks, stress positions,
extended isolation, and whipping.
Why is torture so persistent and pervasive? First, many countries

have not adopted domestic laws criminalizing it. Second, even where
there are laws against torture, real steps to bar it are often not taken.
Third, victims frequently come from the ranks of the marginal and the
vulnerable such as minority groups, the poor, and opposition political
parties and movements. They have little or no power to demand and
obtain redress. Fourth, international efforts to combat torture are
limited by a lack of data identifying where violations occur most and
who suffers them most. Finally, anti-torture efforts are undermined by
the widespread misconception that torture is an efficient and reliable
shortcut to establish guilt and secure justice. A survey conducted in
2013–2014 by Amnesty International across 21 countries and 21,000
respondents found that over a third of them agreed that torture is
sometimes “necessary and acceptable.”
c. Free expression (Article 19) and

free association (Article 20)
Although enumerated in separate articles of the UDHR (Articles 19
and 20), freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, and association
(collectively, expression rights) are inextricably linked. Expression rights
are both essential for good government and central to the affirmation of
the dignity of every individual. They are accordingly the hallmark of a
free and open society.
Article 19 affirms: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 20 is similarly
emphatic: “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association,” and “(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an
association.”
Articles 19, 21, and 22 of the ICCPR collectively declare wide-ranging
rights in the domains of opinion, expression, assembly, and association.
Article 19 guarantees the right to “hold opinions without interference,” as
well as the ability to “seek and impart information and ideas of all kinds
[...] through any other media regardless of frontiers.” Article 21 upholds
the right to peaceful assembly, while Article 22 insists on the right to free
association, including, notably, “the right to form and join trade unions.”
Article 8 of the ICESCR extends the right to trade unions to national and
international confederations, and clearly enshrines the right to strike as
a bargaining tool. The ICCPR and ICESCR establish a set of exceptions
to expression, assembly, and association rights, for the protection of
national security, public order and safety, and public health and morals.
A number of other international treaties have widened the writ of the
ICCPR and the ICESCR, setting out distinct prohibitions against specific
types of dissent-suppression. Most prominently, the Convention
for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly declare that
expression rights are women’s rights and children’s rights too. Regional
treaties – including the European Convention on Human Rights, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration – have
likewise broadened the recognition of expression rights in the post-
war period. Generally, regional treaties have followed the template
of the ICCPR, protecting conscience, expression, association, and
assembly – with exceptions for public health and morals, national
security, public order, and harm to others’ rights and reputations.
Although there has been a degree of progress in securing expression
rights, they are not observed today in many parts of the world. The
Commission notes that three actors bear particular responsibility for
advancing expression rights: states, international organizations, and
corporations.
States are obviously of key importance here. Although many national
constitutions affirm rights to freedom of opinion, expression, assembly,
and association, they are impermissibly circumscribed by states.
Restrictions on expression rights must be proportionate, necessary,
and lawful in order to be justified. However, many countries routinely
suppress expression, particularly political dissent. State interference
in four areas is of pressing concern: first, Internet censorship and
surveillance; second, the blocking of funds to civil society organizations
(CSOs); third, burdensome restraints on assembly; and fourth, the
detention of and violence directed at journalists.
International organizations must also defend and extend expression

rights. Currently a number of international organizations erect barriers
to CSO participation and engagement with their work. They should
reduce barriers to participation in their decision-making and foster
active stakeholder engagement. Corporations too have an obligation to
observe expression rights, including the right to unionize and to protest
near places of business.
d. Education (Article 26)

The right to education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable
means of realizing other human rights. Education empowers individuals
to raise themselves out of poverty and advance their socio-economic
status. Politically and socially, education offers people the necessary
skills to identify common goals, assume a full and active place in
community life, recognize manipulative media practices, and resist
oppression. Despite its vital importance in securing human rights and
advancing socio-economic development, education commands too little
media attention. There is a stubborn and unacceptable gap between
education needs and available resources. Indeed, total global financial
support for education has actually fallen in recent years.
The right to education is articulated in Article 26 of the UDHR,
which emphasizes universality, equal access, and the role of education
in promoting respect for human rights and tolerance among nations
and social groups. The right to education is likewise reaffirmed
in Article 13 of the ICESCR and Articles 28 and 29 of the CRC. The
major regional human rights instruments similarly recognize a
universal right to education, including the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Article 17(1)), the European Convention on
Human Rights (Article 2 of the First Protocol), and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations’ Human Rights Declaration (Article 31).
One exception is the American Convention on Human Rights, which
lacks a specific provision on education. The Commission on Human
Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on Education in 1998. In 2000,
the Special Rapporteur developed the Right to Education Project,
supported by prominent international NGOs, including ActionAid

International, Amnesty International, Save the Children, and Human
Rights Watch. Again and again the international community has set
higher goals for progress in education. Quantitative targets have been
set in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Education for
All (EFA) movement, and the SDGs.
Unfortunately, although gains were made on these goals in the early
2000s – reducing the number of out of school children from 120 million
to less than 60 million – further progress has stalled. For example, in
recent years, the number of out of school children has increased from
58 to 59 million. In order to reverse this trend, the 4-A framework
for education must be fulfilled. The 4-A framework emphasizes
availability of educational institutions and programs, the physical
and economic accessibility of educational institutions and programs
to everyone without discrimination, the acceptability of curricula and
teaching methods (e.g., culturally appropriate and good quality), and
the adaptability of education to diverse social and cultural settings, as
well as to students’ special requirements.
There are four primary barriers to achieving the right to education:
first, lack of investment and finance; second, economic barriers to
access for both children and adults; third, discrimination, particularly
gender-based discrimination; and fourth, challenges in large-scale
emergency situations. According to a 2015 UNESCO report, an
annual financing gap of 39 billion USD will have to be met from
2015–2030, totaling 585 billion USD over the fifteen-year period, if the
international community is to achieve universal pre-primary, primary,
and secondary education of decent quality in low and lower-middle
income countries.
Delivering the right to education has far-reaching benefits. The
Global Partnership for Education estimates that the increase in
women’s education, for instance, has prevented over four million
child deaths. Similarly, if all children were to acquire basic reading
skills, the Partnership estimates that 171 million people would be lifted
from poverty, a reduction in global poverty rates of 12 percent. Over
40 years, a mere 0.1 percent improvement in a country’s educational
equality can increase per capita GDP by 23 percent.
e. Summary
In our examination of the implementation of select rights in the
Declaration – which looked beyond the representative rights we have
listed here – a number of themes emerged.
First, the UDHR represents the founding document in a process
of progressive elaboration of human rights. As we approach the 70th
anniversary of the Declaration, this achievement should be celebrated.
Second, historic progress has been made in the promotion and
protection of rights since 1948, including the development of a body of
human rights law and implementation mechanisms that simply could
not have been envisioned in the 1920s and 1930s. It is vital to account
for, understand, and take this development seriously as a platform for
further progress.
Third, despite the gains, we must recognize and respond to the reality
that human rights continue to be violated on an alarming scale across
the globe, even by nations that have signed the relevant human rights
treaties. Our case studies demonstrate that it is the poorest people and
countries, and the most vulnerable members of society – particularly
women and children, ethnic and religious minorities, migrants and
refugees, and persons with disabilities – who are most susceptible
to human rights violations. They also remind us that violations are
conducted and perpetuated not only by states, but also by international
organizations, corporations, and private persons.
Fourth, the fullness of human rights will only be achieved
through multiple overlapping and coordinated mechanisms. We
need mechanisms that operate at both the international and national
levels, and which engage both governmental and non-governmental
institutions. Human rights education also has an indispensable role to
play.
The Commission hopes that the brief case studies appended illustrate
the great challenges that remain in achieving the widespread and
regular application and enforcement of human rights standards. It is
beyond the scope of the Commission’s work to examine the full range of
mechanisms that promote and protect rights. Instead we have identified
four areas for particular analysis: first, the UN system of human rights
implementation; second, national and regional legal systems; third,
non-governmental organizations; and fourth, human rights education.

In singling out these four areas, the Commission does not suggest that
other mechanisms are not important. They are. The project of human
rights implementation will require ongoing analysis, review, and hard
work in the decades ahead.
6.3 Suggestions on implementation
a. Recommendations for strengthening the UN system

on human rights implementation
Much action is still needed to ensure that the rights so eloquently
espoused in the UDHR, and codified by the later covenants and
conventions, are made realities in life as well as law. In this section, the
Commission supports a number of existing proposals for improving
the UN system for the protection of human rights. We call on the UN
to establish a commission to consider these and other proposals for
realizing Article 28 of the Declaration.
i. Implement the recommendations of

UN human rights mechanisms
There are different human rights monitoring mechanisms in the United

Nations system, based either on the UN Charter or on UN treaties. The
most prominent Charter-based bodies are the Human Rights Council
and its regime of Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review
(UPR). Of the ten current human rights treaty bodies, nine monitor
implementation of the core international human rights treaties while the
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture monitors places of detention in
states that are party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against
Torture.
The UN human rights mechanisms produce a rich array of findings,
decisions, and recommendations, many on a country-by-country
basis, including recommendations adopted by treaty bodies after
examining the implementation of a human rights treaty by a state
party; recommendations issued by Special Procedures of the Human

Rights Council in reports on country visits, thematic reports, and
communications on individual cases; recommendations stemming from
the UPR; and recommendations of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding
missions, and other ad hoc human rights investigations initiated by the
Human Rights Council, the Security Council, the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, or the UN Secretary-General.
But the problems and priorities identified through UN human rights
mechanisms do not command sufficient attention and action from the
international community and the UN as a whole, including its security
and development endeavors. The UN should enhance its system-wide
support and follow-up aimed at ensuring the findings, decisions, and
recommendations made – country by country – by the UN’s human
rights mechanisms are enforced through a better alignment between
human rights and development. For instance, the OECD Development
Assistance Committee should recognize that, in order to be effective,
official development assistance must increasingly address the good
governance, rule of law, and human rights gaps revealed by the human
rights mechanisms, especially when recipient countries accept and
agree with stipulated changes.
ii. Enhance the OHCHR’s field presence
Away from its headquarters in Geneva, the operations of the Office of

the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR) can be strategic
entry points for pursuing human rights at country level, integrating
a human rights perspective into the work of United Nations country
teams and peace missions, and strengthening national institutions and
civil society. OHCHR’s field operations already scrutinize the human
rights situations in specific countries, while also building the capacity of
Member States and other duty-bearers to address shortfalls and abuses.
Over the years, the OHCHR has gradually widened its presence
in the field; however, its operations are not yet fully fit for purpose.
First, OHCHR is underrepresented: it has 65 field presences but only
13 country offices – compared to the World Bank or United Nations
Development Programme, for example, which maintain permanent
offices in well over 100 member countries. Moreover, the OHCHR’s
regional offices provide no coverage in North-East Asia, South Asia,
and North America. Second, its field operations are underfunded.

Indeed human rights account for less than 3 percent of the UN’s regular
budget, which inhibits the ability of the OHCHR to effectively monitor
and champion human rights on the ground.
The UN should expand the OHCHR’s regional and country field
presence and significantly raise its financial support for priority human
rights activities in line with countries’ legal obligations and political
commitments made in the UPR. This is crucial to strengthening national
human rights protection systems through development cooperation as
well as peace-keeping and peace-building budgets. It will enhance the
prevention of violations and the success and sustainability of peace and
development efforts.
Of course, none of this is of any consequence unless states cooperate
with, allow access for, and do not inhibit or intimidate UN personnel
seeking to promote and protect rights and to investigate alleged abuses.
iii. Raise human rights concerns for

consideration by the UN Security Council
There is no formal procedure permitting UN human rights bodies to

take the initiative in raising an issue for consideration by the Security
Council. In recent years, it has become increasingly common for the
OHCHR and the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council to
brief the Security Council through an informal procedure known as the
“Arria-formula.” However, such sessions can be convened only at the
initiative of a member or members of the Security Council and then the
extent to which such sessions are convened depends on the Presidency
of the Council.
Human rights concerns are root causes of conflict, and early action
by the UN system and the international community can prove critical in
averting violence. The Secretary-General already has the power under
Article 99 of the UN Charter to bring to the Security Council any matter
that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
We urge the Secretary-General to exercise this power whenever advised
to do so by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Special
Procedures of the Human Rights Council, or the heads of the human
rights components of UN peace missions.
iv. Limit the UN Security Council veto in

the case of mass atrocities
Again and again, vetoes or threats of vetoes by permanent members

(the P5) have blocked Security Council action to maintain international
peace and security in a range of crises. The Council’s inability to act on
behalf of civilians in Syria and elsewhere has not only had a massive
cost in human life, but has dangerously eroded the credibility of the UN
system. Inaction has given the green light to perpetrators to engage in
ever more flagrant human rights abuses.
To address this, France has proposed that the P5 voluntarily suspend
veto rights in situations involving mass atrocities. In the wake of the
events in Syria, France has argued that such a step would enhance the
legitimacy of the Security Council, strengthen its integrity, restore the
power of discussion and constructive negotiation, and convey the will
of the international community to make the protection of human life a
true priority. The logic here is clear: when the misuse of the veto blocks
action to stem atrocities, it contravenes the principles of the UN. All
Member States should support the French initiative for restraining the
veto in the case of mass atrocities.
More generally, the P5 should accept an affirmative obligation to
offer a reasoned justification for any exercise of the veto, and to propose
an alternative plan in accordance with international law to achieve the
same objectives.
v. Harness technology to enhance human rights accountability
Advances in technology since 1948, and particularly the creation of

the Internet, present an unprecedented opportunity to amplify human
rights accountability. The UN should encourage and enable the
development at the country level – by national human rights institutions
and (currently only a few) Parliaments’ Human Rights Committees – of
online platforms through which citizens can rate their governments’
performance on human rights issues. This can empower citizens to
exert pressure on governments responsible for violations.
In addition, we recommend a direct mechanism supported by
the UN, which could take two forms. First, an online “complaint
clearinghouse” would let citizens register complaints about human

rights abuses directly with the UN. The clearinghouse would help
overcome existing data shortcomings on human rights and enable the
OHCHR and other human rights mechanisms to target their activities
more accurately. Second, a global human rights wiki, accessible to and
editable by recognized human rights organizations, would equip the
relevant actors to readily combine and share data regarding ongoing
crises, improving both the speed and effectiveness of global responses.
The UN should consider these measures and others to harness new
forms of technology that can widen the writ and reach of human rights
for all in the twenty-first century.
As such mechanisms are put in place, we should meet the inevitable
need to provide protection and security for those who take the risk of
identifying and complaining about human rights violations. Encryption
of the relevant technology can have the effect of encouraging people to
submit testimony and evidence that might then be put to good use by
the international community.
b. National and regional legal systems

Many of the suggestions we have made have to do with global
institutions and NGOs. However, we should never forget a point
we have stressed a number of times in this document, that the front-
line work of upholding human rights is always conducted under the
auspices of national constitutions and bills of rights. They are intended
to provide primary protections, through national legal systems. And
any account of implementation must look to them, in the first instance,
because at too many times and in too many places, between the intention
and the reality falls a dark shadow.
This implies that, as we scrutinize the human rights records
of particular countries, we should pay attention not only to their
constitutional arrangements, but also to the work that is being done by
lawyers and rights-related NGOs in those countries. So, for example,
no account of human rights implementation in the United States can
be complete without a full account of the way in which state and
national bills of rights operate, nor without an account of the way in
which bar associations and groups like the American Civil Liberties
Union advocate for the protection of rights domestically. The point is

perhaps obvious in the case of the United States. It may be less obvious
in developing nations and emerging democracies, where there is a
temptation to think that all the work has to be done by outside agencies
assisting with development and nation-building.
The judiciary has a pivotal role to play in upholding human rights.
Only an independent judiciary can render justice impartially on the
basis of law, thereby assuring the rights and fundamental freedoms
of the individual. The basic principle is laid down in Article 10 of
the UDHR: “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination
of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”
In this era, however, in country after country, there has been a rising
wave of attacks on the independence of judges, lawyers, prosecutors,
and court officials, particularly in the form of threats, intimidation,
and interference in the discharge of their professional functions. The
international community must redouble its resolve to safeguard and
enhance the independence and effectiveness of judiciaries worldwide,
in line with existing international principles of the rule of law.
Consistent with this imperative, the international community
should pay attention to the impact of statutes of limitation governing
human rights claims. California became the first American jurisdiction,
through recently enacted legislation, to offer survivors of abuse a longer
period of time to bring their claims to court. This legislation – California
Assembly Bill 15 – extended the period from two years to 10 years for
serious transgressions such as torture, war crimes, extrajudicial killing,
crimes against humanity, and human trafficking. This reform should
provoke a wide-ranging discussion of the procedural obstacles to the
effective implementation of human rights.
Regional human rights courts are and can be powerful instruments
for the vindication of human rights. This is the purpose of the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The international
community should aim to bolster the role of these institutions, ensuring
that they have both sufficient resources and competent personnel. The
international community should also encourage the development of
new regional human rights courts by the League of Arab States and
in Asia and the Pacific. These courts should hear complaints not only
from state parties, but also from individuals. All UN Member States
should agree to submit themselves to the authority of international
tribunals whose jurisdiction can appropriately – geographically or
otherwise – be extended to them. Given that compliance has not always
been automatic, we reiterate that state parties have a binding obligation
under the treaties creating these courts to give effect to their rulings.
At the global level, the UN should consider the creation of a World
Human Rights Court, consistent with the principle of complementarity.
While this is presently an aspiration, considered and considerable
thought should be given to whether a World Human Rights Court
could reinforce the maintenance of human rights across the globe.
c. NGOs
The implementation of human rights does not depend just on official
institutions. It presupposes and is enriched by a vigilant civil society at
national, regional, and international levels. The Human Rights Council
already accredits a number of NGOs specifically dedicated to human
rights. Such organizations play a frontline role in highlighting the
importance of the rights protected in the UDHR, in drawing attention
to shortcomings in their implementation, and in naming and shaming
governments that are guilty of violations or of failing to protect their
citizens from human rights abuses. In light of this, it is especially
important that states make reasonable accommodation for NGOs
aiming to promote, protect, and investigate violations of human rights.
d. Human rights education
i. The UDHR and human rights education for all
The preamble of the UDHR states that “every individual and every
organ of society shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms.”
ii. The UDHR and human rights education since 1948
Since 1948, the ideals of the UDHR and later instruments have gained
greater acceptance and achieved greater realization, and human rights
education (HRE) has advanced alongside this. In the first few decades
after the UDHR, HRE consisted mostly of legal training focused on
the formal standards codified by the UN and other intergovernmental
organizations, or else popular education carried out by NGOs in
the global south. In the 1970s, UNESCO promoted HRE, and social
movements adopted human rights discourse to support legal campaigns
for the effectuation of human rights at the national and international
levels. Meanwhile, as national educational systems were expanding in
scope and competence across the world, newer and older democracies
alike started and continued to incorporate HRE into formal education,
although mostly in the legal rather than the popular sphere.
UNESCO’s third congress on HRE in Montreal in 1993 proposed
a world plan of action on education for human rights and democracy,
endorsed that same year by the World Conference on Human Rights
in Vienna, which proposed a Decade for Human Rights Education. The
next year, with the support of HRE NGOs, the UN General Assembly
proclaimed that decade would run from 1995 to 2004. The General
Assembly created a World Programme for HRE in 2005, and in 2012
adopted the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education
and Training, which outlined the obligations of states and other
duty-bearers to implement HRE universally. It mandated educational
training, information, awareness-raising, and learning activities aimed
at promoting universal respect for and observance of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms. The aim was to prevent violations and
abuses by providing people with knowledge, skills, and understanding
to shape their own attitudes and behaviors – thus empowering them as
active agents in the building and strengthening of a universal culture of
human rights.
The leading international network of HRE actors is HRE2020: The
Global Coalition for Human Rights Education. This alliance was formed
by NGOs in 2014 to encourage and enhance the HRE compliance of
states by raising awareness and urging progress, by integrating HRE
into UN mechanisms, and by monitoring the implementation of HRE
commitments. The coalition has set the year 2020 as a benchmark for
assessing the performance of governments, international institutions,

and civil society in providing access to quality human rights education.
iii. Transformative human rights education
HRE is necessarily diverse in goals, content, and delivery. Some

educational reforms that followed from the UN’s Decade for Human
Rights Education involved little more than incorporating human rights
language into the educational standards or textbooks of Member States.
The integration of HRE into formal school curricula can be the most
effective way to broadly execute HRE; but a simultaneous community-
based approach to HRE can help ensure that school children educated
in HRE do not encounter resistance outside the classroom door.
“Transformative HRE” is a community-based approach to HRE,
intended for children, youth, and adults in formal or non-formal settings,
and including cognitive, affective, and action-oriented elements.
Contextualized and relevant studies are paired with interactive
learning to bring human rights to life and to foster in students and
citizens an awareness of global citizenship and a respect for human
rights. Transformative HRE exposes gaps between rights and realities,
and provokes group dialogue on the specific steps essential to closing
the gaps. Learners engage in critical reflection, open discussion, and
individual and collective action to move the cause of human rights
forward locally, nationally, and globally. Transformative HRE can yield
remarkable results for individuals and groups.
iv. Advancing transformative human rights education
Fostering a universal culture of human rights among all individuals and

institutions through transformative HRE “from the bottom up” can add
important impetus to the adoption and enforcement of legal standards
by governments “from the top down.”
Yet many states lack a national HRE plan for formal education; many
with a plan do not implement it well; and many who implement HRE
focus on its basic legal literacy rather than advancing its transformative
potential. NGOs and other civil society organizations have been the
most active promoters and implementers of HRE, campaigning for the

incorporation of HRE into formal education. The Commission calls on
all governments, international organizations, and NGOs to encourage
and support transformative human rights education.
We see our work as part of a process of public education about
human rights, not as an ending, but as a beginning that must be carried
forward. Further details of ongoing HRE initiatives are found in Online
Appendix D.3
6.4 Sovereignty
In addition to the suggestions in the previous section, we must also
consider deeper structural issues that make the implementation of
human rights more or less successful. The most prominent is the issue
of national sovereignty. Although, as we stressed in section 6.3(b), much
implementation can be achieved within the legal system of particular
countries, the pressure for progress must sometimes come from the
outside. If domestic policy fails or if human rights are systemically
flouted within a particular society, external pressure may have to come
to the assistance of those whose rights are threatened.
Accordingly, no account of implementation can dispense with the
general issue of sovereignty and the way in which it has come to be
viewed in the new era of global human rights consciousness.
a. General (human rights as limits on sovereignty)

The era of human rights that was initiated by the UDHR has certainly
disposed of any notion of state sovereignty that purports to insulate
states from external criticism of internal rights violations. Occasionally
we hear countries invoke that insular and outdated notion of sovereignty,
but such claims are increasingly half-hearted and no longer treated as
3 Appendix D, on Human Rights Education, is available at https://www.openbook

publishers.com/isbn/9781783742189#resources. This Appendix was prepared
for the Commission by a working group on human rights education under the
auspices of the Center on Global Justice (University of California, San Diego).
credible by the international community. Countries change in their

willingness to accept and listen to criticism from beyond their borders.
In any case, such criticism – including public official comment – is
not to be equated with intervention. Nor is it to be rebutted with the
rationalization that violations are internal matters and “none of the
outside state’s business.” One principle the UDHR represents, and
rightly so, is that human rights in every country are the world’s business.
To that extent, the rights culture inculcated by the UDHR has to a real
degree transformed the world of sovereign states.
The intermediate case is where nations or members of the international
community sponsor NGOs or perhaps opposition parties within
another state – sponsorship that can be characterized as an attempt to
influence the political process of the target state. This is a question on
which there is considerable disagreement. It is not a matter on which
the UDHR takes sides, except perhaps implicitly in the proclamation
clause’s insistence that “every organ of society [...] shall strive [...] to
promote respect for these rights.”
We should not regard it as a failure of the UDHR that it does not
resolve questions like this. They are worked out more effectively in
the terms of the Covenants. But the Commission wishes to affirm: first,
that countries may not misuse their national sovereignty as an excuse
for insulating themselves from external pressure on human rights; and
second, that it is legitimate for states to raise human rights issues in
conducting foreign relations.
b. Sanctions, denunciations, and other measures

The international community needs a toolkit of governmental and
multilateral responses to rights violations that is more legitimate
and more sophisticated than we have today, and which relies on
mechanisms other than the use of force. There are many instruments of
change used: some widely acknowledged, like trade sanctions; some far
less recognized, such as human rights “name and shame” mechanisms;
and others perhaps less clearly articulated, such as providing shelter to
migrants fleeing from neighboring countries in times of great distress.
Armed force is seldom the best option. We recommend that a study be
undertaken of what governments do when they genuinely want to seek

to change another government’s behavior, and what governments are
susceptible to in terms of real world pressures on human rights.
c. Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect – known as RtoP – refers to the obligation
of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of
genocide and other mass atrocities.
Though the international community – as part of the doctrine of
RtoP – has reserved the right to intervene militarily in countries where
grave and widespread violations are underway, that has been and is
likely to remain an exceptional occurrence. We can say that in such cases,
human rights do represent a limit on state sovereignty. But since the
most flagrant cases will be rare, and since individual rights violations
on a smaller scale will remain quite frequent, there are questions about
state sovereignty and human rights that have to be resolved in the
case of less dramatic violations. Thus, in our view it is wrong to ignore
the wider challenge and rivet attention exclusively on RtoP and the
instances where it may be invoked.
RtoP stipulates three pillars of responsibility: first, every state has the
Responsibility to Protect its people from four grave crimes – genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing; second, the
wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and
assist individual states in meeting that obligation; and third, if a state
is manifestly failing to protect its people, the international community
must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and
decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.
These principles originated in a 2001 report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and were endorsed
by the United Nations General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document. In January of 2009, the UN Secretary-General
released a report on implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
followed in July by the first General Assembly debate on the issue.
During the debate, UN Member States overwhelmingly reaffirmed
the 2005 commitment and the General Assembly passed a consensus
resolution (A/RES/63/308) taking note of the Secretary-General’s report.
Since then, the Responsibility to Protect has featured prominently in

a number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council, including
those in relation to Libya (2011), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Yemen (2011),
Mali (2012), Syria (2014), South Sudan (2014), and the Central African
Republic (2015).
The Commission supports the concept of RtoP governing the
process of humanitarian intervention. However, intervention under
the auspices of RtoP will be far from regular and will be appropriate
only in the case of egregious and widespread human rights violations.
Such intervention is certainly justified. But it is no substitute for routine
responsibility for the rights of individuals and it cannot be the main
focus of our analysis of responsibility for rights. Instead we should look,
wherever possible, to the regular institutional arrangements in each
society, not just to a few dramatic cases.
We have to emphasize that in the final analysis rights are an
individual matter. Every person has rights. And the violation of rights,
the erosion of rights, or the failure to fulfill rights are matters of concern,
even when they are not widespread. For example, when a particular
woman or man is tortured or detained without trial, there may be no
prospect of any international military mobilization: but a human right
has been trampled on. Too much concentration on RtoP can lead us to
assume that human rights violations only become serious when they are
en masse and egregious. In a general sense, out of our common humanity,
we all have a responsibility with regard to any violation – even if it is
only sporadic or individual.
The specter of mass atrocity must never lead us to overlook the wrong
that is done when any human right is violated at a lesser level. Any time
a violation occurs – which may affect one person or one thousand – we
must take notice. Underpinning this imperative is the principle that the
violation of the rights of anyone is the concern of everyone. Of course, in
the first instance it is the province of every national legal system to deal
with human rights violations within that country. The international
human rights community becomes involved either when this national
responsibility falters, or when the rights violations reach a certain level
of frequency or severity. We know that there is a challenge of setting
priorities here. Not all of us can be on duty all the time. But nobody
is entitled to say of any human rights violation that it is, in principle,
“none of my business.”
When an international response is appropriate, it should be chosen

from a range of options, depending on circumstances. The selected
response should be consistent with the protection of other rights. It
should be proportionate to the violation; you cannot deploy armed
force over an issue of educational reform. The question must be: “Is this
response producing a net gain for human rights or not?” For the danger
is not just failing to act, but doing more harm than good. On the range of
possible actions, military intervention for the Rwanda genocide would be
at the far end; but the range also spans diplomatic démarches, sanctions,
formal findings by state departments, informal protests, and raising
issues at a ministerial level. One of the advantages of this approach is
that the need for coordination mounts at the far end of the range, but
does not necessarily accrue at the near end. If there is any question of
armed intervention, that is an issue for the Security Council. If there is
a question of sanctions, that is a matter for the international community.
If denunciation is the right option, it is not clear that we need Security
Council clearance. And countries have unilaterally taken up the task of
naming and shaming rights violators. Therefore, we should confine a
requirement for some authoritative multilateral declaration to the far
end of the spectrum: military intervention, and perhaps sanctions too.
7. Human Rights and
a Global Ethic
The promulgation of the UDHR in 1948 made a difference in how

people saw their place in the world and their relations with their state
and with each other. This is in itself a valuable contribution, quite apart
from the securing of the rights actually listed in the document. Over
the decades since 1948, the UDHR has provided the rudiments of a
“common conscience” for humanity. To borrow the words of Immanuel
Kant, a violation of rights in any place is now felt all around the world.
The international community is continuing to build on this, and the
UDHR should be regarded as one of the pillars of a modern global ethic.
Understandings of a “global ethic” will vary. But the idea seems to
comprise at least the following two elements: first, a set of fundamental
ethical ideas (such as human dignity) that are globally accepted as
establishing a basis on which people deal with one another in the world;
and second, a set of principles that arise out of the development of a new
kind of interdependent global civil society, with common opportunities
and common dangers. The Commission believes that a globalizing
world needs an ethic of global citizenship, even if we cannot agree on a
moral universalist basis for it.
Of course, although human rights are important for a global ethic,
they are only a part of it. Other pillars of a global ethic include:
• G
ood governance and the rule of law, at both national and global
levels.
• R
esponsibility for planet and climate, and our obligations to
future generations.
• B
asic humanitarian responsibility for one another, even when
human rights are not directly involved.
• The eradication of extreme poverty.
• O
utlawing aggressive war and upholding international security
through the United Nations system as a basis for the resolution
of global conflict.
• T
he elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction.
•
A broad commitment to strengthening institutions such as
the United Nations and its agencies, which have paramount
responsibility for the well-being of the international system.
• T
he maintenance of the cosmopolitan frameworks that enable
people to relate to one another scientifically, productively,
economically, and culturally all around the world.
These pillars are related to one another and they form an integrated
system. Each of them has pivotal human rights dimensions but each
of them also takes us beyond the field of human rights and opens
up broader vistas of global obligation and participation. One way
of thinking about human rights requirements is that they secure the
foundation on which people can exercise and construct their citizenship
responsibilities, whether in their own countries or in the world at large.
Without the protections and liberty that human rights are supposed to
secure, it would be difficult for people to lift their gaze beyond their
immediate fears and deprivations.
We think it is imperative, therefore, to reaffirm that human rights
in general and the UDHR in particular contribute immensely to the
emergence of a global ethic. A global ethic is not the same as international
law. It is something like the shared moral impulse that underlies and
sustains international law. Many things need to be comprised in a
global ethic cannot be laid down in precise legal terms. At the same
time, the reality of human rights institutions and the evolution of
international human rights law – along with national and regional
declarations of rights, and their accompanying courts – demonstrate
that it is possible to build real-world institutions and practices upon
these ethical foundations.
7. Human Rights and a Global Ethic 107
The stated foundations of the UDHR – particularly the principles

of dignity and human solidarity and the rejection of the barbarism
that was experienced in the middle of the twentieth century – are the
centerpiece of an emerging global ethic. The UDHR illustrates this
not just by stating foundational values in its preamble but by showing
how various human rights flow from these deeper commitments. In
this regard, the very idea of rights is key. The distinctiveness of the
contribution made by human rights to the global ethic is that they
represent the responsibilities that are owed to every individual man,
woman, and child on the planet. While some rights are group rights, in
the final analysis the idea of human rights conveys a commitment to the
liberty and well-being of individuals. It represents a commitment to the
principle that no person, however lowly, is to be sacrificed simply for
the well-being of others.
The adoption of the UDHR also demonstrates the prospects and
challenges for ethical consensus in a diverse world. We acknowledge
that, in a sense, its formulations are quite abstract in relation to the rich
global array of cultures, ethics, and religions. But the fact of its adoption
and its longevity indicate that it is possible to identify common
commitments and common respect for humanity.
As part of a global ethic, the UDHR has great educational force and
great importance in building and sustaining morale among people who
are vulnerable to various forms of oppression. It provides a common
point of reference for them and a conviction that they are not alone in
resisting abuses. The Declaration legitimizes their struggles.
Equally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its progeny
have been indispensable in de-legitimizing human rights abuses. The
conviction is now abroad in the world that violating human rights is
something that no person, state, or entity is entitled to do and for which
they may properly be held accountable by the world community at
every level.
Appendix A:
The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights
Note: the below text has been annotated with labels for each of the clauses and
provisions (in bold). The Commission refers to these labels throughout the
report.
PREAMBLE
a) [ the inherent dignity clause] Whereas recognition of the inherent

dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world,
b) [the barbarism and aspiration clause] Whereas disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people,
c) [the rebellion clause] Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by
the rule of law,
d) [the friendly relations clause] Whereas it is essential to promote
the development of friendly relations between nations,
e) [the United Nations clause] Whereas the peoples of the United

Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and
in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,
f) [the pledge of respect clause] Whereas Member States have
pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
g)
[the common understanding clause] Whereas a common
understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest
importance for the full realization of this pledge,
h)
[the proclamation clause] Now, Therefore THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves
and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1. [the free and equal provision] All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2. [the universality provision] Everyone is entitled to all the

rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing
or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Appendix A: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 111
Article 3. [the right to life provision] Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of person.
Article 4. [the anti-slavery provision] No one shall be held in slavery

or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their
forms.
Article 5. [the anti-torture provision] No one shall be subjected to

torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6. [the legal personality provision] Everyone has the right to

recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article 7. [the non-discrimination provision] All are equal before the

law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of
the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination
in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination.
Article 8. [the remedies provision] Everyone has the right to an effective

remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9. [the arbitrary arrest provision] No one shall be subjected to

arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10. [the right to a hearing provision] Everyone is entitled in full

equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.
Article 11. [the due process provision] (1) Everyone charged with a
penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees
necessary for his defence. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
Article 12. [the privacy and reputation provision] No one shall be

subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.
Article 13. [the freedom of movement provision] (1) Everyone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
Article 14. [the asylum provision] (1) Everyone has the right to seek and
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may
not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
Article 15. [the nationality provision] (1) Everyone has the right to a
nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16. [the marriage and family provision] (1) Men and women
of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion,
have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to
equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2)
Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 17. [the property provision] (1) Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18. [the thought and worship provision] Everyone has the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article 19. [the free expression provision] Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20. [the free association provision] (1) Everyone has the right
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be
compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21. [the democracy provision] (1) Everyone has the right to take
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public
service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22. [the general social security provision] Everyone, as a

member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and
in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality.
Article 23. [the conditions of work provision] (1) Everyone has the
right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2)
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for
equal work. (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy
of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.
Article 24. [the rest and leisure provision] Everyone has the right to
rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and
periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25. [the standard of living provision] (1) Everyone has the right
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood
and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children,
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26. [the education provision] (1) Everyone has the right to
education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available
and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of
merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance
and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall
be given to their children.
Article 27. [the cultural life provision] (1) Everyone has the right freely
to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and
to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28. [the international order provision] Everyone is entitled to a

social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Declaration can be fully realized.
Article 29. [the duties and limitation provision] (1) Everyone has duties
to the community in which alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms,
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to

the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30. [the no-abuse provision] Nothing in this Declaration may

be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
Appendix B:
Members of the Commission
K. Anthony Appiah
Kwame Anthony Appiah is Professor of

Philosophy and Law at New York University.
He was born in London, grew up in Ghana, and
studied philosophy at Cambridge University. He
has taught philosophy in Ghana, France, Britain,
and the United States. Among his books are In My
Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture
(1992) and Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World
of Strangers (2006). Professor Appiah has been
President of the PEN American Center and of the Modern Language
Association and Chair of the Board of the American Philosophical
Association and the American Council of Learned Societies.
Laurel Bellows
Laurel Bellows, founding principal of the Bellows

Law Group, P.C. is past president of the American
Bar Association, the Chicago Bar Association, and
International Women’s Forum Chicago. Laurel
is currently serving on the Executive Committee
of the InterAmerican Bar Association. She is an
internationally recognized business lawyer. Her
law firm offers strategic business counseling
and litigation to businesses of all sizes, counseling senior executives

and corporations on executive employment, severance agreements,
workplace disputes, anti-trafficking risk assessment, supply chain and
recruiting policies, and cybersecurity. Laurel is licensed to practice in
Illinois, Florida, and California. She is an arbitrator and certified mediator.
Nicolas Berggruen
Nicolas Berggruen is Chairman of the Berggruen

Institute. The Institute develops and implements
systemic political governance projects and
thinking. Through its Philosophy and Culture
Center, it fosters fresh ideas and understanding
between the East and the West. Committed to
leaving a legacy of art and architecture, he sits
on the boards of the Museum Berggruen, Berlin
and the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. He
has worked with some of the world’s leading architects on projects from
India to Turkey and the USA.
Paul Boghossian
Paul Boghossian is Julius Silver Professor of

Philosophy at New York University and Director
of its Global Institute for Advanced Study.
Elected to the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences in 2012, he has written on a wide range
of topics including knowledge, meaning, rules,
moral relativism, aesthetics, and the concept of
genocide. He is the author of Fear of Knowledge:
Against Relativism and Constructivism (2006) and
Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers (2008); and editor, with
Christopher Peacocke, of New Essays on the A Priori (2000). A volume
collecting a series of his exchanges with Timothy Williamson on
the topics of a priori and analytic truth is forthcoming from Oxford
University Press.
Appendix B: Members of the Commission 119
Gordon Brown
Gordon Brown served as Prime Minister of the

United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010, Chancellor
of the Exchequer from 1997 to 2007, and as a
Member of Parliament in his home county of Fife,
Scotland, from 1983 to 2015. He is the United
Nations Special Envoy for Global Education and
a passionate advocate for the rights of children.
He believes every girl and boy deserves the
opportunity of a future through schooling. Mr.
Brown has also been appointed Chair of the new Global Commission
on Financing Global Education and serves as New York University’s
inaugural Distinguished Global Leader in Residence.
Craig Calhoun
Craig Calhoun is Director of the London School

of Economics and calls it “the dream job for
anyone who cares about social science, global
issues, and bringing better knowledge to public
debates.” In the USA, he was President of the
Social Science Research Council, and taught at
the University of North Carolina, Columbia, and
NYU, where he was most recently University
Professor of Social Sciences and Director of the
Institute for Public Knowledge.
Calhoun’s many publications bring together theory and empirical
research across several disciplines. Among his books on politics and
social movements are Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the
Struggle for Democracy in China (1994) and The Roots of Radicalism (2012).
He has also published extensively on nationalism and globalization;
secularism, religion, and the public sphere; economic and technological
change; critical social theory; and the history of social science.
Wang Chenguang
Wang Chenguang holds a B.A. (1980), Master

of Law (1983), and Ph.D. in Law (1999) from
Peking University, as well as an LL.M. (1986)
from Harvard Law School. He has taught as
Teaching Assistant (1983), Lecturer (1985), and
Associate Professor (1991) at Peking University;
as University Senior Lecturer (1994) at City
University of Hong Kong; and as Associate
Professor (2000) and Professor (2000) at Tsinghua
University. He has served as Dean (2002–2008) at Tsinghua University
Law School, and he is currently Vice-Chair of the China Association of
Legal Theory, Deputy-Chair of the China Association of Legal Education,
Deputy-Chair of the China Association of Health Law, Executive Chief-
Editor of the China Journal of Legal Science (English), and Legal Advisor
to the China Food and Drug Administration. His fields of teaching
and research are legal theory, comparative law, health law, legal clinic,
legislative and judicial systems.
Mohamed ElBaradei
Mohamed ElBaradei was Director General of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
is currently Director General Emeritus. He was
born in Egypt and holds degrees in Law from the
University of Cairo and the New York University
School of Law. He was an Egyptian diplomat
before joining the IAEA in 1984. In 2005, he was
jointly awarded with the IAEA the Nobel Peace
Prize. He has received numerous other awards
and Honoris Causae for his work as a public servant and advocate of
tolerance, humanity, and freedom. He played a leading role in the Arab
Spring of 2011.
Fonna Forman
Fonna Forman is a professor of Political Theory

and Founding Director of the Center on Global
Justice at the University of California, San Diego.
She is best known for her revisionist scholarship
on Adam Smith, recuperating the ethical, social,
spatial, and public dimensions of his thought.
Her current work focuses on human rights at the
urban scale, climate justice in cities, and equitable
urban development in the Global South. She
presently serves as Vice-Chair of the University of California Climate
Solutions Group. She is a principal in Estudio Teddy Cruz + Forman, a
research-based political and architectural practice based in San Diego/
Tijuana.
Andrew Forrest
Andrew Forrest is a leading philanthropist and

businessman who joined the Giving Pledge
campaign, contributing wealth generated from
founding two of Australia’s major resource
companies and employers.
Internationally, the five global initiatives of
Andrew’s Walk Free Foundation are helping to
bring an end to modern slavery. The Foundation
facilitated the historical signing of a declaration
by the major world faiths to reject slavery and publishes the Global
Slavery Index: achievements without precedent. At home, Andrew
works to end the disparity between indigenous and non-indigenous
Australians through GenerationOne’s education, training, and
employment efforts. His businesses have allocated $2bn to indigenous
contractors, and recently he chaired the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s
national Indigenous Review, “Creating Parity.”
Ronald M. George
Ronald M. George is a 1961 graduate of Princeton

University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, and a 1964 graduate of
Stanford Law School. From 1965 to 1972, he served
as a Deputy Attorney General in the California
Department of Justice, where he represented the
State of California in six oral arguments before the
United States Supreme Court. He was appointed
to the Los Angeles Municipal Court by Governor
Reagan, to the Superior Court by Governor Brown, Jr., to the Court of
Appeal by Governor Deukmejian, to the California Supreme Court by
Governor Wilson as an Associate Justice, and, in 1996, as the 27th Chief
Justice of California (confirmed in 1998 by the voters for a 12-year term.)
As Chief Justice he chaired the Judicial Council of California and the
Commission on Judicial Appointments. He was inducted as a Fellow
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2009 and served as
President of the Conference of Chief Justices, Chair of the Board of
Directors of the National Center for State Courts, and as a member of
the steering committee of the Sandra Day O’Connor Project on the State
of the Judiciary.
Asma Jahangir
Twice Chairperson of the Human Rights

Commission of Pakistan, Asma Jahangir was
elected President of the Supreme Court Bar
Association of Pakistan in 2011. Asma is also a
Director of the AGHS Legal Aid Cell, which
provides free legal assistance to the needy and
was instrumental in the formation of the Punjab
Women Lawyers Association in 1980 and the
Women Action Forum in 1985.
In 1998, Asma was appointed United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution as part of the
Commission on Human Rights, and in 2004 she was appointed United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief for the
Council of Human Rights.
John Agyekum Kufuor
John Kufuor is the Former President of Ghana

(2001–2009). He was called to the Bar, Lincoln’s
Inn, London (1959–1961); BA Honours (PPE) and
MA Economics, Oxford (1964).
In December 2013, he was appointed UN
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Climate
Change. In 2012, he founded the John A Kufuor
Foundation for Leadership, Governance, and
Development. In 2011, he was named joint-
winner of the World Food Prize with former Brazilian President Lula
da Silva. As Ghanaian president, he was Chairperson of the African
Union (2007–2008) and Chairman of the Economic Community of West
African States (2003–2005).
Other appointments held include Co-Chairman of the Global Panel
on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition (2013); Chairman of
the Governing Council, Interpeace (2010–2015); Global Envoy for the
Neglected Tropical Diseases Alliance (2011–2015); Chairman of the
Sanitation and Water for All Partnership (2011–2015); Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1969–1972); and Member of Parliament (1969–1972
and 1979–1981).
Graça Machel
Graça Machel is a renowned international

advocate for women’s and children’s rights and
has been a social and political activist over many
decades. She is a former freedom fighter and was
the first Education Minister of Mozambique. Her
contributions to the Africa Progress Panel, the
United Nations Secretary-General’s Millennium
Development Goals Advocacy Group and the
High-Level Panel on Post 2015 Development
Agenda, have been widely appreciated. She is a member of The Elders,
Girls Not Brides, Board Chair of the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn
& Child Health, African Ambassador for A Promised Renewed,
President of SOAS, University of London, Chancellor of the University
of Cape Town, Board Chair of the African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes, President of the Foundation for Community

Development, and founder of the Zizile Institute for Child Development.
As Founder of the newly established Graça Machel Trust, she has
focused more recently on advocating for women’s economic and
financial empowerment, education for all, an end to child marriage, food
security and nutrition, and promoting democracy and good governance.
Catherine O’Regan
Kate O’Regan served as a judge of the

Constitutional Court of South Africa from
1994–2009 and has been serving as an ad
hoc judge of the Supreme Court of Namibia
since 2010. From 2008–2012, she served as the
inaugural chairperson of the United Nations
Internal Justice Council, a body established to
ensure independence, professionalism, and
accountability in the internal system of justice in
the UN. She is Visiting Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University
of Oxford and also serves on the boards of many NGOs working in the
fields of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and equality.
Ricken Patel
Ricken Patel is the founding President and

Executive Director of Avaaz.org, a global civic
movement for social change which has rapidly
grown since 2007 into the largest online activist
community in the world, with over 40 million
members in all 193 countries represented at the
United Nations. Ricken was voted “Ultimate
Gamechanger in Politics” by the Huffington
Post and named a Young Global Leader by the
Davos World Economic Forum. He was also among Foreign Policy’s 100
Top Global Thinkers in 2012. He has lived and worked in Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Afghanistan, and Sudan, working on conflict resolution for
various organizations including the International Crisis Group and the
International Center for Transitional Justice. Ricken holds a Master’s

degree in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University, and a Bachelor’s in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics from Balliol College, Oxford University.
Emma Rothschild
Emma Rothschild is Director of the Joint Center

for History and Economics, and Jeremy and
Jane Knowles Professor of History at Harvard
University. She is a Fellow of Magdalene College,
Cambridge. She was Chairman of the United
Nations Research Fund for Social Development
from 1999–2005 and a member of the United
Nations Foundation Board from 1998–2015. She
has written extensively on economic history
and the history of economic thought. Her
publications include The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century
History (2011) and Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the
Enlightenment (2001).
Robert E. Rubin
Robert Rubin served as the 70th Secretary of

the U.S. Treasury from 1995 to 1999. He joined
the Clinton Administration in 1993 as the first
director of the National Economic Council.
Mr. Rubin began his career in finance at
Goldman Sachs, rising to Vice-Chairman and
Co-Chief Operating Officer (1987–1990) and
Co-Senior Partner and Co-Chairman (1990–1992).
He was a member of the board at Citigroup
and a senior advisor to the company (1999–2009). In 2010, he joined
Centerview Partners as a senior counselor.
Mr. Rubin is Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations; is
on the Board of the Mount Sinai Health System; and is Chairman of the
Board of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation.
Jonathan Sacks
A global religious leader, philosopher, bestselling

author, and moral voice for our time, Rabbi Lord
Jonathan Sacks was recently named the winner
of the 2016 Templeton Prize. Rabbi Sacks is
currently the Ingeborg and Ira Rennert Global
Distinguished Professor of Judaic Thought at
New York University and the Kressel and Ephrat
Family University Professor of Jewish Thought at
Yeshiva University. He is Emeritus Professor of
Law, Ethics and the Bible at King’s College London. Previously, Rabbi
Sacks served as Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the
Commonwealth between September 1991 and September 2013, only the
sixth incumbent since the role was formalized in 1845.
Kailash Satyarthi
Mr Satyarthi has been a tireless advocate of

children’s rights for over three decades. He
and the grassroots movement founded by him,
Bachpan Bachao Andolan (Save the Childhood
Movement), have liberated more than 84,000
children from exploitation and developed
a successful model for their education and
rehabilitation. Mr Satyarthi has been the architect
of the single largest civil society network for
the most exploited children, the Global March Against Child Labour,
whose mobilization of unions, civil society and most importantly,
children, led to the adoption of ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms
of child labour in 1999. He is also the founding president of the Global
Campaign for Education, an exemplar civil society movement working
to end the global education crisis, and GoodWeave International which
raises consumer awareness in the carpet industry. In 2014, he was jointly
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “struggle against the suppression of
children and young people and for the right of all children to education.”
Klaus Schwab
Klaus Schwab is the founder and Executive

Chairman of the World Economic Forum, the
International Organization for Public-Private
Cooperation, based in Geneva, Switzerland.
Schwab studied at the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich, at the University of
Fribourg, and at Harvard University. His degrees
include doctorates in Mechanical Engineering
and Economics (summa cum laude). From 1972–
2003, he was Professor of Business Policy, University of Geneva. In
1998, Schwab co-founded, with his wife Hilde, the Schwab Foundation
for Social Entrepreneurship, supporting social innovation around the
world; in 2004, he founded the Forum of Young Global Leaders; and
in 2011, he founded the Global Shapers Community. He has received
numerous honorary doctorates and honorary professorships, as well as
the highest international and national honors for initiatives undertaken
in the spirit of entrepreneurship in the global public interest and for
peace and reconciliation.
Amartya Sen
Amartya Sen is Thomas W. Lamont University

Professor and Professor of Economics and
Philosophy at Harvard University. Until 2004 he
was Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. He has
served as President of the American Economic
Association, the Indian Economic Association,
the International Economic Association, and
the Econometric Society. His awards include
Bharat Ratna (India); Commandeur de la Légion
d’Honneur (France); the National Humanities Medal (USA); Honorary
Companion of Honour (UK); Ordem do Merito Cientifico (Brazil); the
Aztec Eagle (Mexico), and the Nobel Prize in Economics. Sen’s books,
on economics, philosophy, decision theory, and social inequalities have

been translated into more than thirty languages.
John Sexton
John Sexton served as President of New York

University from 2002 through 2015. He is NYU’s
Benjamin Butler Professor of Law and Dean
Emeritus of the Law School. Milestones of his
tenure include the growth of NYU’s global
network, encompassing campuses in Abu
Dhabi and Shanghai; a merger with Polytechnic
University, now the NYU Tandon School of
Engineering; and the largest increase in the Arts
and Science Faculty in the University’s history.
A Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, President
Emeritus Sexton also serves on the board of the Institute of International
Education and is past Chair of the American Council on Education.
Photo Credit ©NYU Photo Bureau: Gallo
Robert M. Shrum
Robert M. Shrum holds the Carmen H. and

Louis Warschaw Chair in Practical Politics and is
Professor of the Practice of Political Science at the
University of Southern California. For decades,
he was a political strategist and consultant,
serving as senior advisor to Kerry 2004 and Gore
2000 campaigns. He was also senior advisor to
the campaign of Prime Minister Ehud Barak of
Israel and to the British Labour Party. Mr. Shrum
has written for New York Magazine, The Los Angeles Times, The New York
Times, and Newsweek, among other publications. His book, No Excuses:
Concessions of a Serial Campaigner (2007), was a national bestseller.
Jeremy Waldron
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor and

Professor of Law at New York University.
Professor Waldron was educated in New Zealand
and at Oxford, and his career has included
appointments at Edinburgh, Berkeley, Columbia,
and Oxford. He is well-known for his work
on constitutionalism, human dignity, historic
injustice, national security issues, and the rule
of law. His books include Law and Disagreement
(1999) and Torture, Terror and Trade-offs: Philosophy for the White House
(2010). His new book Political Theory is being published by Harvard
University Press in March 2016. Professor Waldron was elected to the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998 and has been a Fellow
of the British Academy since 2011.
Joseph Weiler
J.H.H. Weiler is President of the European

University Institute (EUI), and University
Professor at NYU Law School. Previously
he served as Manley Hudson Professor of
International Law at Harvard Law School and
subsequently as Director of the Jean Monnet
Center at NYU School of Law. He also served
for many years as Member of the Committee
of Jurists of the Institutional Affairs Committee
of the European Parliament. Prof. Weiler is Editor-in-Chief of the
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) and the International Journal
of Constitutional Law (ICON). He is also an Honorary Professor at
University College London and the University of Copenhagen, and
Co-Director of the Academy of International Trade Law in Macao,
China. He holds a PhD in European Law from the EUI, Florence and
honorary degrees from various European and American universities.
He is the author of several books and articles in the field of European
integration, international and comparative constitutional law, and
human rights law.
Rowan Williams
Rowan Williams took up the mastership of

Magdalene College, Cambridge on January 1,
2013. He took his degrees at Christ’s College,
Cambridge and at Christ Church and Wadham
College, Oxford. His career began as a lecturer
at Mirfield (1975–1977), and he later returned to
Cambridge as Tutor and Director of Studies at
Westcott House. After ordination in Ely Cathedral,
and serving as Honorary Assistant Priest at St
George’s Chesterton, he was appointed to a University Lectureship in
Divinity. In 1984, he was elected a Fellow and Dean of Clare College.
Then, still only 36, it was back to Oxford as Lady Margaret Professor of
Divinity for six years, before becoming Bishop of Monmouth and, from
2000, Archbishop of Wales. In 2002, Dr. Williams was confirmed as the
104th Archbishop of Canterbury.
Diane C. Yu
Diane C. Yu is serving as Counselor to Leadership

and Executive Director of the Sheikh Mohamed
bin Zayed Community Programs at New York
University Abu Dhabi, one of the three New
York University campuses. From 2012-2015 she
was NYU’s Deputy President, a member of the
President’s cabinet, and presidential advisor
regarding dealings with NYU Trustees, deans,
faculty, administrators, and students; prior to
that she served for 10 years as the Chief of Staff and Deputy to the
NYU President. Before coming to NYU, she was Managing Counsel at
a Fortune 250 company, General Counsel for the State Bar of California
(for whom she won a case in the U.S. Supreme Court), White House
Fellow, and California Superior Court Commissioner. She has a B.A.
from Oberlin College and a J.D. from U.C. Berkeley.
Appendix C:
Members of the
Philosophers’ Committee
Philip Alston New York University Law School

Anthony Appiah New York University Law School and Department
of Philosophy
Charles Beitz Princeton University, Department of Politics
Seyla Benhabib Yale University, Departments of Political Science
and Philosophy
Simon Caney Oxford University, Department of Politics and
International Relations
Fonna Forman University of California, San Diego, Department
of Political Science
Avishai Margalit Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of
Philosophy
Pratap Mehta Center for Policy Research, New Delhi
Samuel Moyn Harvard University Law School and Department
of History
Onora O’Neill Cambridge University, Department of Philosophy
Michael Rosen Harvard University, Department of Government
Michael Sandel Harvard University, Department of Government
Amartya Sen Harvard University, Department of Economics
John Tasioulas King’s College London Law School
Jeremy Waldron New York University Law School
Wang Chenguang Tsinghua University Law School
Joseph Weiler European University Institute
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The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in the 21st Century
A Living Document in a Changing World
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world . . .
—The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
The Global Citizenship Commission was convened, under the leadership of former British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the auspices of NYU’s Global Institute for Advanced Study,
to re-examine the spirit and stirring words of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The result – this volume – offers a 21st-century commentary on the original document,
furthering the work of human rights and illuminating the ideal of global citizenship. What
does it mean for each of us to be members of a global community?
Since 1948, the Declaration has stood as a beacon and a standard for a better world. Yet
the work of making its ideals real is far from over. Hideous and systemic human rights
abuses continue to be perpetrated at an alarming rate around the world. Too many people,
particularly those in power, are hostile to human rights or indifferent to their claims.
Meanwhile, our global interdependence deepens.
Bringing together world leaders and thinkers in the fields of philosophy, law, ethics, politics,
and philanthropy, the Commission set out to develop a common understanding of the
meaning of global citizenship – one that arises from basic human rights and empowers
every individual in the world. This landmark report affirms the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and seeks to renew the 1948 enterprise, and the very ideal of the human
family, for our day and generation.
K. Anthony Appiah Mohamed ElBaradei Catherine O’Regan Amartya Sen

Laurel Bellows Fonna Forman Ricken Patel John Sexton
Nicolas Berggruen Andrew Forrest Emma Rothschild Robert Shrum
Paul Boghossian Ronald M. George Robert Rubin Jeremy Waldron
Gordon Brown (Chair) Asma Jahangir Jonathan Sacks Joseph Weiler
Craig Calhoun John Kufuor Kailash Satyarthi Rowan Williams
Wang Chenguang Graça Machel Klaus Schwab Diane C. Yu (Executive Director)
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HUMAN RIGHTS
UNDER SIEGE1
Philip Alston
• How to respond to the populist •

threat facing human rights
ABSTRACT
There is little debate that the human rights movement is experiencing unprecedented challenges.
Here Philip Alston addresses how the movement needs to respond in order to survive. Firstly,
he notes the importance of maintaining perspective, reminding us that the defence of human
rights has never been easy. He also argues that we must recognise that this is a long-term effort
and will not disappear after Trump leaves office and that, crucially, the movement needs to
develop introspection and openness in order to adapt. He then sets out the five key issues that
he believes the movement must address in the coming years: the populist threat to democracy;
the role of civil society; inequality and exclusion; the undermining of international law and the
fragility of international institutions. Finally, Alston suggests a number of strategies that human
rights organisations need to adopt in order to respond to this new reality. He ends by saying all
this must be done with a sense of great urgency. The time to act is now.
KEYWORDS
Populism | Human rights movement | Strategies | Trump
• SUR 25 - v.14 n.25 • 267 - 272 | 2017 267

HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE
The human rights movement, as we know it, is no longer.
The challenges that the human rights movement now faces are fundamentally different
from much of what has gone before. This does not mean, “the endtimes of human
rights”.2 But it does mean that human rights proponents need to urgently rethink
many of their assumptions, re-evaluate their strategies, and broaden their outreach,
while not giving up on the basic principles.
These challenges are seen nowhere clearer than in the election of Donald Trump who
has consistently advocated measures that would abrogate civil liberties for American
citizens and non-citizens alike. Almost every senior appointment he has made has been
a person from the far right of the political spectrum with a total lack of expertise for
the relevant portfolio. And while the finer details of President Trump’s human rights
policies remain to be worked out, there is an essential antipathy and even hostility
to the subject. Beyond Trump, an increasingly diverse array of governments have all
expressed a desire to pushback against key pillars of the international human rights
regime. And while there have always been coalitions of would-be wreckers, in the past
they have been met with at least some pushback from the United States of America
(US) and other leading Western and Latin American governments. The prospect of
effective pushback in the future is now evaporating before our eyes.
To respond to this, we need to remember three key points. First, we need to maintain
perspective, despite the magnitude of the challenges. Defending human rights has never
been a consensus project and has almost always been the product of struggle. Second, this is
the start of a long-term effort; it won’t be over in four years. And finally, the human rights
movement needs to develop a spirit of introspection and openness. Historically, it has not
responded well to criticism.
Looking forward, there are a great many issues that will demand our attention in the years
ahead, but five will be key. The first is the populist threat to democracy. Much of the
problem is linked to post-9/11 era security concerns, which has translated into an actual or
constructed fear and hatred of foreigners or minorities. These concerns have been exploited
by governments of many different stripes to justify huge trade-offs, for example that security
can only be achieved by restricting freedom of movement, privacy, non-discrimination
norms, or even personal integrity guarantees.
The second major issue is the role of civil society and how, rather than “shrinking civil space”
the reality is that the space has already closed in a great many countries. In my capacity as
United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights I have seen
this first hand in my country visits to Mauritania and to China, while other countries are
excellent students in this domain. Egypt recently passed a law limiting the activity of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to social and development work, and banning all NGOs
from cooperating in any way with any international body without governmental approval.
268 Sur - International Journal on Human Rights

PHILIP ALSTON VOICES
The third issue is the linkage between inequality and exclusion. Populism is driven in
part by fear and resentment. To the extent that economic policies are thus critical, it
is noteworthy that mainstream human rights advocacy addresses economic and social
rights issues in a tokenistic manner at best, and the issue of inequality almost not at
all.3 Similarly, the focus of most human rights advocacy is on marginal and oppressed
individuals and minority groups. However, the majority in society feel that they have
no stake in this kind of human rights movement, and that human rights groups really
are just working for “asylum seekers”, “felons”, and “terrorists”. A renewed focus on
social rights and on diminishing inequality must be part of a new human rights agenda.
Taking into account the concerns, indeed the human rights, of those who feel badly
done by as a result of what we loosely call globalisation-driven economic change is key
to ensuring the movement’s success.
The fourth issue is the undermining of the international rule of law, specifically,
the systematic undermining of the rules governing the international use of force by
Western countries. The US and its ever-supportive, never-questioning allies such as
the United Kingdom and Australia and their assiduous efforts to rationalise targeted
killings and other dubious acts are now reaping the rewards that they so richly deserve.
These countries are no longer in a position to turn around and say that some of the
tactics used by other countries are in violation of international rules. There has also
been a shocking breakdown in respect for the principles of international humanitarian
law. Systematic targeted attacks on medical facilities, on operations by Médecins Sans
Frontières and other humanitarian groups are commonplace and barely remarked upon.
In a 2016 opinion poll undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross, a
mere 30 per cent of American respondents considered it to be unacceptable to torture
a captured enemy combatant “to obtain important military information”. In the same
poll, taken in 1999, the figure had been 65 per cent. In Nigeria, 70 per cent supported
such torture and in Israel 50 per cent did.4
The fifth and final issue concerns the fragility of international institutions. The
International Criminal Court is under sustained attack with various African states
announcing their planned withdrawals. And the announcement by the Office of the
Prosecutor that she is actively investigating the activities of the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and other forces in Afghanistan and related countries will hardly endear
the court to the Trump Administration. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council has been
operating in a way that is surprisingly balanced in the last few years. However, the new
populism is certain to change this dynamic and China and Russia have both made it clear
that they stand ready to introduce or to re-introduce major “reforms” of the Council, a
prospect which is hardly grounds for cheer. Similarly, the United Kingdom and many
other states have waning affection for the European Court of Human Rights, while
Russia and Turkey are virtually unresponsive members. Across the Atlantic, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights announced, in mid-2016, that it was going to
have to lay off 40 per cent of its staff, a fate that was narrowly headed off at the very last
• SUR 25 - v.14 n.25 • 267 - 272 | 2017 269

moment by new contributions. But there is no certainty that this rescue operation will
be sustainable in the future and it is noteworthy that the US has traditionally played an
outsized role in funding the Commission’s work. And finally in institutional terms, the
slashing of developmental assistance budgets, which is an ongoing process, is likely to be
accelerated in the years ahead threatening these institutions even further.
So, what sort of strategies does the human rights community need to start considering
in response to the fundamentally new circumstances that we are now confronting?
1 • Local/international synergies. We need to reflect on how better to ensure

effective synergies between international and local human rights movements. The
large NGOs have still not achieved the right balance. The activities of international
NGOs must have less of an extractive character (extracting information and
leaving) and instead focus more on building or complementing national capacity.
There will be times when only international groups can function effectively; but
there will also be situations in which exclusively international advocacy will be
ineffective and perhaps counter-productive.
2 • The economics of rights. Economic and social rights must be an important and
authentic part of the overall agenda. A surprisingly small proportion of self-described
human rights NGOs do anything much on economic and social rights.5 It is argued
that if people enjoy political freedoms they can stand up for their social rights. But
the enjoyment of civil rights does not always bring social rights. We need to start
insisting that the catalogue of human rights includes – equally – both categories of
rights. Human rights groups should reflect on ways in which they can constructively
contribute to both sides of the agenda. They remain fundamentally misunderstood
by the great majority of governments and even by most human rights activists.
The rights are conflated or confused with development, or poverty alleviation.
But economic and social rights proponents should not be focusing their attention
initially on, for example, ensuring that everyone actually enjoys immediate access
to all types of health care. Instead, we need to start by constructing an appropriate
human rights framework. This involves the same three elements as does a campaign
against torture: recognition, institution building, and accountability.6
3 • Broadening the base. The human rights community must start expanding its
horizons in terms of thinking about which other actors it can work with. We need to
begin more of a big-picture conversation with the larger corporations about whether
an authoritarian, anti-rights, and anti-welfare future is really in their interests. They,
but also we, need to start thinking about where, how and when they can legitimately
and constructively stand up to policies that cross certain lines and how they can
use their influence and power to make the case for more human rights friendly
approaches. And it is not just corporations. We need to start thinking more creatively
about other potential allies with whom the human rights movement can cooperate.

PHILIP ALSTON VOICES
4 • Persuasion. We need to acknowledge the need to devote more time and

effort to being persuasive and convincing, rather than simply annunciating our
principles as though they were self-evidently correct and applicable. We need to
take a step back from the absolutism that sometimes manifests itself. We pride
ourselves, sometimes rightly and unavoidably, on being uncompromising and fear
that if we make any concessions along the way we are selling out on the basics of
human rights. However, in the words of Jose Zalaquett we must have “the courage
to forgo easy righteousness, to learn how to live with real-life restrictions, but to
seek nevertheless to advance one’s most cherished values day by day to the extent
possible. Relentlessly. Responsibly.”7
5 • The role of scholars. What role do scholars have in all of this? As teachers, as
researchers, as publicists, we have obligations to our students and to our readers.
It has become fashionable, especially at elite universities in the West, to disparage
human rights by accentuating the undoubted shortcomings of international human
rights norms and institutions. At a range of law schools that I have visited I have
encountered students who have become deeply disillusioned or cynical because they
have been taught that the human rights enterprise is largely an illusion, that it is
not something that they really should be putting their time into and that it has no
future. It is our responsibility to suggest alternative strategies, not simply to ensure
that students are aware that there are shortcomings.
6 • What each of us can do? A crucial element in responding to the populists

and autocrats is for each one of us to reflect carefully on what contributions we
can make. All of us can stand up for human rights, but each in our own way.
The simple point is that each one of us is in a position to make a difference if we
want to do so. Despondency or defeat is not the answer, because there is always
something we can do. It might be a rather minor gesture in the overall scheme
of things, but it makes a difference. It might be merely a financial contribution.
Now is the time to be contributing to human rights groups and advocates in ways
that we have not done in the past. It is absolutely essential for us to strengthen
the frontline organisations that are going to be best placed to stand up and defend
human rights against the threats posed by the new populism.
We cannot wait, we need to start acting; we need to do whatever we can to strengthen

respect for international human rights. We need to commit to the principles in our
own lives, in our own areas. We are going to need to operate in a much more creative
fashion both internationally and locally. There is going to be a complex relationship
between these two levels but there are always places where we can make a difference.
These are extraordinarily dangerous times, unprecedentedly so in my lifetime. Even
during most of the Cold War there was a degree of certainty but today we have lost
much of that and almost anything seems possible. The response is really up to us.
• SUR 25 - v.14 n.25 • 267 - 272 | 2017 271

NOTES
1 • This is an edited version of an article that first International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
appeared in The Journal of Human Rights Practice, 2016, accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.icrc.org/
which in turn was based on a public lecture en/document/people-on-war.
given at the London School of Economics on 8 5 • United Nations, Report of the Special
December 2016. Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,
2 • Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights Philip Alston, on the Marginality of Economic and
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). Social Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/31 (28 April
3 • For a report on the relationship between 2016), available from http://www.ohchr.org/
extreme poverty and extreme inequality, see EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/
United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Documents/A_HRC_32_31_AEV.docx.
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, 6 • This framework is developed in some detail in ibid.
UN Doc. A/HRC/29/31 (26 May 2015), available 7 • José Zalaquett, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives
from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New
RegularSessions/Session29/Documents/A_ Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights
HRC_29_31_en.doc. Violations,” (The Mathew O. Tobriner Memorial
4 • “People on War: Perspectives from 16 Countries,” Lecture), Hastings Law Journal 43, no. 6 (1992): 1425.
PHILIP ALSTON – USA

Philip Alston teaches international law, international criminal law, and a
range of human rights subjects at New York University. He has degrees
in law and economics from the University of Melbourne and a JSD from
Berkeley. He previously taught at the European University Institute, the
Australian National University, Harvard Law School, and the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy. He was one of the founders of both the European
and the Australian and New Zealand societies of international law and was
editor-in-chief of the European Journal of International Law from 1996 until
2007. He holds a variety of international positions. Most recently he was
appointed by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council as its Special
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. From 2004 to 2010, he
was UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions. He is a member of
the advisory board of the Sur International Journal on Human Rights.
email: philip.alston@nyu.edu
Received in March 2017.
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Contents
Foreword from the Australian Human Rights Commissioner .......................................................... 4
Major project partners and Expert Reference Group ........................................................................ 6
1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 7
2 Background....................................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 The Australian Human Rights Commission and the Project .................................................... 9
2.2 Other government and parliamentary processes ..................................................................... 9
3 Human rights and technology....................................................................................................... 11
3.1 What are human rights? ......................................................................................................... 11
3.2 What are governments’ obligations to protect human rights?................................................ 14
3.3 How are human rights protected in Australia? ....................................................................... 14
3.4 Which human rights are affected by new technologies? ....................................................... 15
(a) The right to privacy .......................................................................................................... 15
(b) Security, safety and the right to life ................................................................................. 16
(c) The right to non-discrimination and equal treatment ....................................................... 16
3.5 A human rights approach ....................................................................................................... 17
4 Threats and opportunities arising from new technology ........................................................... 18
4.1 The convergence of human rights and new technologies ..................................................... 18
4.2 The impact of technology on specific population groups ....................................................... 20
5 Reinventing regulation and oversight for new technologies .................................................... 22
5.1 The role of legislation ............................................................................................................. 23
5.2 Other regulatory approaches ................................................................................................. 24
6 Artificial Intelligence, big data and decisions that affect human rights ................................... 26
6.1 Understanding the core concepts .......................................................................................... 26
(a) Artificial Intelligence ......................................................................................................... 26
(b) Machine learning, algorithms and big data ...................................................................... 27
(c) AI-informed decision making ........................................................................................... 28
6.2 AI-informed decision making and human rights ..................................................................... 28
(a) Human dignity and human life ......................................................................................... 28
(b) Fairness and non-discrimination ...................................................................................... 28
(c) Data, privacy and personal autonomy ............................................................................. 30
(d) Related issues ................................................................................................................. 30
6.3 How should Australia protect human rights in this context? .................................................. 31
(a) What is the role of ordinary legislation? ........................................................................... 32
(b) How are other jurisdictions approaching this challenge? ................................................ 32
(c) Self-regulation, co-regulation and regulation by design .................................................. 33
(d) The role of public and private institutions ........................................................................ 34
7 Accessible technology .................................................................................................................. 36
7.1 How people with disability experience technology ................................................................. 37
7.2 Current framework governing equal access to new technologies for people with disability .. 38
(a) International human rights law ......................................................................................... 38
(b) Australian law .................................................................................................................. 39
(c) Government policy and coordination ............................................................................... 39
(d) Guidelines and standards ................................................................................................ 40
7.3 Models of accessible and inclusive technology ..................................................................... 40
(a) Regulatory and compliance frameworks ......................................................................... 41
(b) Accessible design and development of new technology ................................................. 42
8 Consultation questions ................................................................................................................. 44
9 Making a submission ..................................................................................................................... 46
10 Glossary .......................................................................................................................................... 47
11 Appendix: Government innovation and data initiatives ............................................................. 49
Foreword from the Australian Human Rights Commissioner
This Issues Paper marks the formal launch of the Australian Human Rights Commission’s
major project on human rights and technology (the Project).
New technology is changing us. It is changing how we relate; how we work; how we make
decisions, big and small.
Facial recognition technology, Artificial Intelligence that predicts the future, neural network
computing… these are no longer science fiction. These developments promise enormous
economic and social benefits. But the scope and pace of change also pose profound
challenges.
Technology should exist to serve humanity. Whether it does will depend on how it is
deployed, by whom and to what end.
As new technology reshapes our world, we must seize the opportunities this presents to
advance human rights by making Australia fairer and more inclusive. However, we must
also be alive to, and guard against, the threat that new technology could worsen inequality
and disadvantage.
In her 2017 Boyer lectures, Professor Genevieve Bell reflected on what it means to be
human today. Too often we focus on single, technology-related issues – such as the
increased use of facial-recognition technology – without reflecting on the broader context.
She said:
[W]hat we have not seen is a broader debate about what they point to collectively. This
absence presents an opportunity and an obligation. 1
Similarly, the Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, Professor
Klaus Schwab, was the first to describe the rapid and pervasive growth in new
technologies as a new industrial revolution. He said:
The world lacks a consistent, positive and common narrative that outlines the opportunities
and challenges of the fourth industrial revolution, a narrative that is essential if we are to
empower a diverse set of individuals and communities and avoid a popular backlash
against the fundamental changes underway. 2
This Project will explore the rapid rise of new technology and what it means for our human
rights. The Project will:
1. identify the practical issues at stake
2. undertake research and public consultation on how best to respond to the human
rights challenges and opportunities presented by new technology
3. develop a practical and innovative roadmap for reform.
4
The matters at the heart of this Project are complex. While the Commission remains solely
responsible for the content produced in this Project, including this Issues Paper, the only
way we can develop effective solutions is by working collaboratively with a broad range of
stakeholders.
The Commission is particularly grateful to be working with our major partners in this
Project: Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Herbert Smith Freehills;
LexisNexis; and the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS). In addition, the Commission
appreciates the support of other significant partners, especially the Digital Transformation
Agency, Data61 and the World Economic Forum. The Commission also acknowledges the
generosity of the members of the Project’s Expert Reference Group, who provide strategic
guidance and technical expertise.
This Issues Paper aims to assist all parts of the Australian community to engage with this
Project. As Human Rights Commissioner, I warmly encourage you to participate in this
consultation process.
Edward Santow
Human Rights Commissioner
July 2018
Human Rights and Technology Issues Paper • July 2018 • 5

Major project partners and Expert Reference Group
The Australian Human Rights Commission is taking a collaborative approach in this
Project. In addition to inviting input from the public and key stakeholders, the Commission
is working cooperatively with a number of organisations. While the Commission is solely
responsible for all material produced in this Project, this cooperation is invaluable.
The Commission has engaged four major project partner organisations. They are
contributing expertise and some resources for this work. The Commission’s major project
partners are:
• The Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
• Herbert Smith Freehills
• LexisNexis
• The University of Technology, Sydney (UTS).
In addition, the Commission has established an Expert Reference Group for this Project.
The members of that group are generously providing their expertise pro bono. The
members of the Expert Reference Group for this Project are:
• Amanda Alford, Director Policy and Advocacy, National Association of Community
Legal Centres
• The Honourable Justice Margaret Beazley AO, President of the NSW Court of Appeal
• Professor Genevieve Bell, Distinguished Professor, Australian National University,
Director of the 3A Institute, and Senior Fellow, Intel
• Dr Tobias Feakin, Australian Ambassador for Cyber Affairs
• Dr Alan Finkel AO, Chief Scientist of Australia
• Verity Firth, Executive Director, Social Justice, The University of Technology, Sydney
(UTS)
• Peter Leonard, Principal, Data Synergies
• Brooke Massender, Head of Pro Bono, Herbert Smith Freehills and Peter Dunne,
Partner, Herbert Smith Freehills
• Sean Murphy, Accessibility Software Engineer, Cisco
• Professor Toby Walsh, Scientia Professor of Artificial Intelligence, University of New
South Wales, and Data61
• Myfanwy Wallwork, Executive Director, Emerging Markets, LexisNexis.
6
1 Introduction
Like any tool, technology can be used for good or ill. However, modern technology carries
unprecedented potential on an individual and global scale. New technologies are already
radically disrupting our social, governmental and economic systems.
Often the same, or similar, technologies can be used to help and to harm. For example:
• Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being used to treat previously terminal illness. 3 Yet it can
also entrench or exacerbate inequality when used as a tool of ‘predictive policing’. 4
• New 3-D printing technology could soon enable an amputated limb to be replaced
quickly and cheaply, by a highly-effective ‘printed’ prosthesis. 5 Yet the same technology
also can be used to ‘print’ a gun. 6
• Blood can be transported by drone to the scene of an accident in time to save a life. 7
Yet drones can also fire weapons8 and breach individual privacy. 9
Led by the Australian Human Rights Commissioner, Edward Santow, the Human Rights &
Technology Project (the Project) will analyse the social impact of technology, especially
new and emerging technology, using a human rights framework. The Commission will
facilitate, lead and guide the public conversation on how to protect and promote human
rights in an era of unprecedented technological change.
This Issues Paper:
• sets out background information about human rights and new technology, asking which
issues the Commission should concentrate on
• asks how Australia should regulate new technology, and what other measures should
be taken to promote responsible innovation
• considers how AI is increasingly used in decision making, and asks how we can protect
human rights in this context
• considers how we can promote more accessible technology, ensuring that people with
disability experience the benefits of new technology
• asks how new technology affects specific groups, such as children, women and
older people.

The Issues Paper will guide the first phase of the Commission’s in-depth and inclusive
consultation. It can be used by the Australian community – including experts and decision-
makers across industry, government, academia and civil society – to engage with the
Project.
The Issues Paper starts a public consultation that will inform the Commission’s work. As
the potential for new technology to help or harm is almost limitless, the first phase of
consultation will assist in determining the central issues the Project will focus on.
Stakeholders are invited to express their views on any or all of the questions posed in this
Issues Paper. A written submission may be made by 2 October 2018, and the Commission
will also organise roundtable meetings and other consultation opportunities in the second
half of 2018.
Following this consultation process, the Commission will develop innovative and practical
recommendations to prioritise human rights in the design and regulation of new
technologies.
The Commission will publish a Discussion Paper in early 2019, and this will include the
Commission’s preliminary proposals for change. The Commission will then undertake a
second phase of consultation to seek feedback on the proposals made in the Discussion
Paper. A Final Report will be published by early 2020.
July 2018 Early 2019 2019-2020

Issues Paper: Discussion Paper: Final Report:
Background and questions Proposed roadmap for Conclusions and final
responsible innovation recommendations
Phase 1 consultation with
key stakeholders Phase 2 consultation with Implementation of proposed
key stakeholders approach
Throughout the Project, the Commission will also contribute to related inquiry and reform
processes in Australia and internationally. Updates about the Project will be available at
tech.humanrights.gov.au.
8
2 Background
2.1 The Australian Human Rights Commission and the Project
The Commission is established by the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986
(Cth). It is Australia’s national human rights institution. The Commission is independent
and impartial. It has a number of functions which are, broadly speaking, directed towards
the promotion and protection of human rights.
Since its establishment in 1986, the Commission has inquired into and reported on
important human rights issues. The Commission frequently brings together diverse
stakeholders from government, industry and civil society. As with other similar projects, the
Commission aims to provide practical recommendations that can be implemented to help
protect and promote human rights for everyone in Australia.
The Project will consider how law, policy, incentives and other measures can be used to
promote human rights in a new era of technological development. 10 An international
conference on human rights and technology on 24 July 2018 in Sydney marks the formal
launch of the Project and this accompanying Issues Paper.
The Issues Paper explores the rapid rise of new technology and how it affects the human
rights of everyone in Australia. As noted above, this Project will focus on a limited number
of issues so that the recommendations ultimately made by the Commission are practical
and informed by in-depth research. However, this Project will likely identify a range of
issues that warrant further investigation.
2.2 Other government and parliamentary processes

Like many jurisdictions overseas, Australia’s federal, state and territory governments have
rightly begun to grapple with specific aspects of what is frequently referred to as the Fourth
Industrial Revolution. 11
Details of a number of concurrent government processes are outlined in the Appendix.
Examples include:
• The Digital Economy Strategy, due to be launched by the Department of Innovation
and Science in 2018. The Strategy will set out a roadmap for government, community
and the private sector to make the most of the economic potential of the growing
digital economy. 12

• The Australian Government’s commitment of almost $30 million in the May 2018
budget to develop a ‘Technology Roadmap, Standards Framework and a national AI
Ethics Framework to identify global opportunities and guide future investments’. 13
• An investigation by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
into digital platforms and their impact on Australian journalism. 14
As an independent statutory organisation, the Commission will engage with government,
public and private stakeholders in order to provide an independent process and view on
the opportunities and challenges for human rights protection and promotion. This will
include contributing to, and building on, concurrent government initiatives detailed in the
Appendix. The Commission is working closely with government and industry to ensure that
the Project operates in a complementary way, avoiding duplication.
10
3 Human rights and technology
It has been suggested that new technology is changing what it means to be human. 15 The
late Stephen Hawking posited that AI could, in future, outperform and replace humans
altogether. 16 There are numerous examples of the convergence of technology with human
beings, ranging from the extraordinary to the mundane. Whether it be deep-brain
stimulation aiming to treat degenerative brain conditions, 17 or robots that behave like us, 18 it
is increasingly difficult to draw a bright line between the physical and digital worlds.
The international human rights framework exists to ensure that, as the world around us
changes, the fundamental dignity of individuals remains central.
Since the advent of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 70 years ago, the modern
human rights framework has proven adaptable to changing external events. And so our
task is not to develop new human rights standards, but rather to apply the existing
standards to address the technological challenges that confront us.
In this section, we briefly explain what human rights are; identify Australia’s obligations to
protect human rights; explore how human rights intersect with technology; and discuss
what a human rights-based approach to technology might look like.
3.1 What are human rights?

Human rights reflect the idea that all humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
We are all entitled to enjoy our human rights for one simple reason – that we are human.
We possess rights regardless of our background, age, gender, sexual orientation, political
opinion, religious belief or other status. Human rights are centred on the inherent dignity
and value of each person, and they recognise humans’ ability to make free choices about
how to live.
While the roots of the human rights movement can be traced to ancient philosophical
writings on natural law, the modern human rights framework has its origins in the formation
of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. As Nation States came together to define a minimum
set of norms and standards about the relationship between governments and citizens,
human rights formed the cornerstone of their shared vision of international peace and
security. 19

The ‘international bill of human rights’ sets out a broad spectrum of rights. This comprises
three key instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); 20 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 21 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 22
The human rights set out in these instruments are supplemented by a range of other
international treaties that elaborate how these standards apply in particular circumstances
and to particular groups of people. This includes treaties relating to discrimination against
women, racial discrimination, the rights of people with disability and the rights of children,
among other issues.
These international human rights treaties rarely refer expressly to the protection of human
rights through technology. Instead, new technology provides a setting in which human
rights are applied.
Table 1 below provides examples of how human rights and new technology can intersect.
These examples show that new technology can advance or restrict human rights, and
sometimes offers both possibilities at once.
Table 1: Examples of technology advancing and restricting human rights
Right to equality and non-discrimination

Articles 2 and 26, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 2, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and related
provisions
• New technologies, particularly relating to health, education and related fields, can improve
access to services and improve outcomes on a range of socio-economic indicators.
• The ability to collect and disaggregate data more easily, through the use of new technologies,
can improve the targeting of programs and services and ensure equality of access for
vulnerable groups.
• Unequal access to new technologies can exacerbate inequalities, especially where access is
affected by factors such as socio-economic status, disability, age or geographical location.
Freedom of expression
Article 19, ICCPR
• New technologies can significantly aid freedom of expression by opening up communication
options.
• New technologies can assist vulnerable groups by enabling new ways of documenting and
communicating human rights abuses.
• Hate speech can be more readily disseminated.
Right to benefit from scientific progress

Article 15(1)(b), ICESCR
• New technologies can improve enjoyment of human rights such as access to food, health and
education.
• Ensuring accessibility across all sectors of the community can be difficult.
Freedom from violence

Article 19, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 23
Article 2, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) 24
• Access to new technologies can provide greater protections from violence and abuse, and
ability to document abuse, while also providing new settings for abuse to occur. Greater
access to information and support through technology can make support for survivors of
violence and abuse more affordable and accessible.
12
Accessibility
Article 4, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 25
• New technologies can increase accessibility to services for people with disability.
• Reduced cost of services through affordability of new technology can promote equality for
people with disability by ensuring progressive realisation is achieved faster and reasonable
adjustments are more affordable.
• New technologies can increase barriers for people with disability if technology is not
accessibly designed.
National security / counter-terrorism

Articles 6 and 20, ICCPR
• New technologies can increase government’s capability to identify threats to national security.
• Use of such technologies for surveillance purposes can be overly broad and, without
appropriate safeguards, can impinge unreasonably on the privacy and reputation of innocent
people.
Right to privacy
Article 17, ICCPR
• The ease and power of distribution of information through new technologies can significantly
impact the ability to protect one’s privacy.
• Flow of data internationally, and from private and state actors, can make regulation of privacy
more challenging (particularly in terms of providing effective remedies).
• It can be difficult to ‘correct’ or remove personal information once disseminated.
• The ease of disseminating and distorting information can lead to new forms of reputational
damage and related harms.
Right to education
Article 13, ICESCR
• New technologies can assist in meeting the obligation to provide universal, free primary
school education.
• Lack of access to technology can exacerbate inequality, based on factors such as age,
disability, Indigenous status, and rural or remote location.
Access to information and safety for children

Articles 17 and 19, CRC
• Online environments create opportunities for greater access to information for children while
also creating challenges to protect their wellbeing.
• New technologies provide different settings for harassment and bullying that are sometimes
challenging to moderate.
Right to a fair trial and procedural fairness

Article 14, ICCPR
Article 5(a), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) 26
• Use of AI to aid decision making can reduce bias or conversely re-affirm
pre-existing bias in decision making, potentially impacting on procedural fairness and the right
to a fair hearing.
• Of particular concern is the potential for racial bias to be reinforced through AI decision
making tools (inconsistent with the right to equal treatment in the administration of justice).

3.2 What are governments’ obligations to protect human rights?
International human rights law requires Nation States to respect, protect and fulfil
human rights:
• The obligation to respect means that states must refrain from interfering with or
curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. In other words, governments themselves
must not breach human rights.
• The obligation to protect requires states to protect individuals and groups against
human rights abuses. In other words, laws and other processes must provide
protection against breaches of human rights by others.
• The obligation to fulfil means that states must take positive action to facilitate the
enjoyment of basic human rights.
As set out in section 3.3 below, Australia has sought to fulfil its international human rights
obligations through a combination of legislation, policy and institutional arrangements. This
creates a set of domestic legal rights, obligations and accountability mechanisms, which
apply to individuals as well as public and private organisations in Australia.
While international human rights law applies directly to Nation States, there is increasing
acceptance that non-government actors also have a responsibility to protect human rights
through their own actions.
For example, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights require
businesses to uphold international human rights law. 27 Principle 15 states:
In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business enterprises should
have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and circumstances, including:
(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights;
(b) A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how
they address their impact on human rights;
(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause
or to which they contribute.
3.3 How are human rights protected in Australia?

Human rights are protected in Australia in a number of ways.
• First, while Australia has no federal bill or charter of rights, a small number of rights are
protected directly or indirectly in the Australian Constitution – most particularly, the right
to freedom of political communication. 28
• Second, Australia has incorporated some of its human rights obligations into domestic
legislation. In particular, federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and some other grounds. 29 This
legislation incorporates a number of Australia’s human rights treaty obligations.
Similarly, some elements of the right to privacy are protected by the Privacy Act 1988
(Cth) (Privacy Act). There are also parallel state and territory laws that deal, in
particular, with discrimination and privacy. Two jurisdictions, Victoria and the Australian
Capital Territory, have statutory bills of rights. 30
• Third, the common law – sometimes known as judge-made law – protects a range of
rights, including the principle of legality (which is central to the rule of law) and due
process or procedural fairness, which aims to ensure people receive a fair hearing. 31
14
• Fourth, some executive bodies are responsible for promoting adherence to human
rights. The Commission has special responsibility for protecting human rights in
Australia, including through a conciliation function (in respect of alleged breaches of
federal human rights and anti-discrimination law), education and policy development. 32
There are also specialist bodies that have regulatory and broader functions in respect
of specific rights. These include the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,
which is responsible for privacy and freedom of information, and the Office of the
eSafety Commissioner. 33
• Fifth, a number of parliamentary processes aim to protect human rights. In particular,
when a new law is drafted, the relevant body (usually a government Minister) will be
responsible for producing a statement of compatibility, which considers the draft law’s
impact on human rights. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights
scrutinises draft laws in order to advise the Australian Parliament on whether they are
consistent with international human rights law. 34
• Sixth, the Australian Government participates in UN review processes that report on
Australia’s compliance with its human rights obligations. Some international bodies can
hear complaints from a person in Australia that the Australian Government is in breach
of its obligations under one of its treaty commitments. In addition, the UN appoints
special rapporteurs and other mandate holders to report on human rights conditions in
countries including Australia. These international processes generally make
recommendations or findings that are not enforceable.
• Finally, all affected people and organisations in Australia – and especially civil society
organisations – can and do engage with these mechanisms to protect human rights.
For instance, through advocacy, civil society organisations can play an important role in
policy and law formation; they can enforce legally-protected rights in the justice system;
and they can participate in international processes.
3.4 Which human rights are affected by new technologies?

Technology has the potential to impact on a wide range of human rights – as set out in the
examples in Table 1 above. In sections 6 and 7, this Issues Paper analyses the specific
human rights implicated by, respectively, AI-informed decision making and disability
accessibility. The remainder of this section provides a more general summary of some key
human rights that are frequently engaged in respect of new technologies.
(a) The right to privacy

New technologies have spawned products and services that adapt to the particular
preferences and other characteristics of the individuals they interact with. But this is only
possible if the product or service ‘understands’ the individual it is relating with – something
that requires the collection, storage, use and transfer of personal information.
This has created unprecedented demand for personal information – with unprecedented
implications for the right to privacy. Where personal information is misused, the
consequences can be grave. For example, individuals can be influenced or manipulated
by targeted information on digital platforms.
Some research suggests that Australians are increasingly concerned about their online
privacy, do not feel in control of their information online, are concerned about violations of
privacy by corporations and government, want to know what social media companies do
with their personal data, and disagree with targeting content for political purposes. 35
This includes large data breaches, such as those based on AI methodology where data
collection influences search engine results, as well as direct advertising. It also includes
the possibility of mass surveillance by government and/or the private sector. 36

(b) Security, safety and the right to life
New technology can enhance or threaten the human rights associated with our personal
safety and security.
For example:
• Drones can be used to identify threats to a group of people, yet can also be deployed
as weapons. 37
• The personal safety of individuals may be enhanced through the Internet of Things
(IoT). 38 For instance, a person with diabetes can wear a patch that automatically
monitors their blood glucose fluctuations and administers insulin when required.
However, the IoT also presents platforms for cybercrime – abuse, exploitation,
extremist manifestations, bullying, intimidation and threatening conduct.
• Blockchain technology can increase transparency and reliability of commercial and
other transactions. But it also enables cryptocurrency, which can be a useful tool for
criminal enterprises. 39
Some issues related to technology have a particular effect on certain groups. For example,
while digital platforms, services and applications might specify a minimum age for their
users, they generally cannot verify accurately whether their end-user is an adult or a child.
As a result, most children are treated as adults when they use such technology and this
can have potentially negative consequences for them.
(c) The right to non-discrimination and equal treatment

Technological innovations can affect societal inequality. 40 Equality may be considered
across several domains, including: access to technology; processes embedded in
technology; outcomes for individuals arising from technology; and the social, economic
and physical distribution of beneficial and detrimental outcomes for communities resulting
from technological advances.
Economic inequalities may emerge in the application of technology (for example,
displacement of the labour force through robotics), and through market effects of
technology (for example, displacement of small competitors, power concentration, price
discrimination, value chain control). 41 Economic inequality has consequences for individual
and communal participation in social, cultural and political life.
Conversely, new technologies can reduce inequality and enable participation for those
who have been traditionally excluded. For example, sustainable energy technologies can
dramatically improve the lives of citizens in developing countries and ameliorate the
impacts of climate change.
It is important also to consider equality of access to innovations – including availability,
affordability and capacity-building. How can economically, socially and physically
marginalised groups access innovations as they emerge? While different population
groups are impacted by technology in a variety of ways, section 7 of this Issues Paper
explores these issues in respect of one particular group – people with disability.
16
3.5 A human rights approach
This Issues Paper sets out a human rights approach to new technology. This is similar to,
but in some ways different from, an ethical approach.
The ethical implications of new technology are increasingly being considered, including in
the US, UK and Europe. 42 While there are examples of ethical frameworks for specific
technologies, such as the ethical standards developed by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (IEEE), 43 New York University’s AI Now Institute has noted:
[T]he tools that have been available to developers to contend with social and ethical
questions have been relatively limited. …[W]e have not yet developed ways to link the
adherence to ethical guidelines to the ultimate impact of an AI system in the world. 44
The UK House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence ‘commended’ the
increasing consideration given by private and public bodies to ethical matters in the
context of AI, but it also emphasised the role for government to promote awareness and a
consistent approach to these issues. 45
A technology ethicist generally would identify standards, values and responsibilities that
support individuals to make ‘good’ decisions. However, the UK’s Human Rights, Big Data
and Technology Project has explained that while an ethical framework can incorporate
some human rights, generally it will not involve ‘a systematic approach from prevention to
remedy or focus on the duty bearers and rights-holders’. 46
By contrast, a human rights approach provides ‘a more substantive mechanism by which
to identify, prevent and mitigate risk’. 47 It does this by turning concepts of rights and
freedoms into effective policies, practices and practical realities. International human rights
principles embody these fundamental values, and the human rights approach gives
mechanisms and tools to realise them through implementation and accountabilities.
A common way of applying a human rights approach is via the ‘PANEL principles’:
• Participation. People should be involved in decisions that affect their rights.
• Accountability. There should be monitoring of how people’s rights are being affected,
as well as remedies when things go wrong.
• Non-discrimination and equality. All forms of discrimination must be prohibited,
prevented and eliminated. People who face the biggest barriers to realising their rights
should be prioritised.
• Empowerment. Everyone should understand their rights, and be fully supported to
take part in developing policy and practices which affect their lives.
• Legality. Approaches should be grounded in the legal rights that are set out in
domestic and international laws. 48

4 Threats and opportunities arising from new technology
We need to set priorities for our response, and so it is critical to understand which forms of
technology most urgently engage human rights.
The World Economic Forum highlighted 12 types of technology that merit close attention.
As technologies continuously develop and expand, these 12 technology types generate
new categories, processes, products and services; as well as new value chains and
organisational structures. 49 They are:
• New computing technologies • Biotechnologies

• Blockchain and distributed ledger • Neurotechnologies
technologies
• Virtual reality and augmented reality
• The Internet of Things (IoT)
• Energy capture, storage and
• AI and robotics transmission
• Advanced materials • Geoengineering
• Additive manufacturing and • Space technologies.
multidimensional printing
4.1 The convergence of human rights and new technologies

New technologies are causing us to rethink our understanding of particular human rights.
For example, there has been increasing attention to the implications of the internet, and its
role in modern life, for freedom of expression. The former UN Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression said:
By vastly expanding the capacity of individuals to enjoy their right to freedom of opinion
and expression, which is an ‘enabler’ of other human rights, the Internet boosts economic,
social and political development, and contributes to the progress of humankind as
a whole. 50
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This leads some to claim that the right to freedom of expression includes a right of access
to the internet. 51
Similarly, the right to benefit from scientific progress in the ICESCR requires states to take
steps to ensure the right of everyone ‘to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications’. 52 The key components of the right include ‘access by everyone without
discrimination to the benefits of science and its application’ and ‘participation of individuals
and communities in decision making and the related right to information’. 53
The Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights has noted that, given the ‘enormous
impact that scientific advances and technologies have on the daily lives of individuals’, the
right must be read in conjunction with numerous other civil, political, economic and social
rights, including freedom of expression and the right to participate in public affairs. 54 The
right to enjoy the benefits of science may also be considered a prerequisite to the
realisation of a number of other social, cultural and economic rights such as the right to
food, health, water, housing, education and the emerging right to a clean and healthy
environment. 55
While human rights treaties do not prescribe detailed rules in respect of technology, the
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has acknowledged this
is a growing area of importance. For example, the OHCHR published a set of human rights
principles to guide data collection. They require consent and consultation with data
holders, transparent and open collection practices and data disaggregation to ensure it
can be used to identify and measure inequalities among population groups. 56
Some regional groupings are starting to address specific intersections between technology
and human rights. For example, in 1997, the Council of Europe adopted the Oviedo
Convention, which is the first such treaty to deal with ‘accelerating developments in biology
and medicine’. 57 Article 1 sets out the Convention’s aim to:
protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with
regard to the application of biology and medicine.
In addition, public discourse about the social impact of technology often rests, explicitly or
implicitly, on human rights concerns. When we discuss the manipulation of social media
platforms to infiltrate and influence democratic elections, 58 or the use of an algorithm in a
recruitment process that screens out people with mental illness, 59 these are human rights
problems – raising issues of discrimination, fairness, due process and equality before
the law.
New technologies do not inevitably threaten human rights, but the problem of dual
affordances, or multiple uses, is particularly acute with new technologies. Many such tools
can be used to protect and violate human rights. Virtual, augmented and mixed realities
present countless positive educational and health opportunities, and yet may be used to
manipulate people and propagate extremist messages. 60
There are unquestionably opportunities to advance human rights protections. Some NGOs
are increasingly using new technologies to push for accountability for human rights
violations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for example, has developed the
Mobile Justice app that allows users to record incidents of police misconduct and routine
stops and searches, upload a report to the ACLU and seek advice on the legality of
the conduct. 61

Other organisations are using new technologies to remotely access data to record possible
human rights violations in previously inaccessible areas. The Satellite Sentinel Project, for
example, used DigitalGlobe’s sub-one metre resolution imagery to corroborate anecdotal
eyewitness accounts from the conflict zone in South Sudan, resulting in a number of
reports documenting violence perpetrated against the civilian population by the
Government of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. 62
Conversely, some governments have been accused of using such technologies to violate
human rights. Earlier this year, a UN team investigating possible genocide of the Rohingya
accused the Myanmar Government of using social media to disseminate misinformation
regarding this persecuted Muslim minority. 63
Below we ask how to harness the potential of new technologies for human rights
protection, while addressing the risk of misuse and ensuring accountability for use of these
technologies.
4.2 The impact of technology on specific population groups

The impact of new technology is not experienced equally by all parts of the Australian
community. Specific groups will feel both the positive and negative impacts of new
technologies differently to other Australians.
In section 7, this Issues Paper considers the implications for people with disability. Other
groups will also be particularly affected.
For example, new technology and online platforms present enormous opportunities to
advance gender equality and are a powerful tool for women to increase their access to
education and information, social connectedness and improve their economic security.
However, women are also disproportionately the target of personal, sexual and gender-
based cyber abuse.
A 2016 study found that 76% of women under 30 years of age, have reported experiencing
online harassment, and almost half (47%) of all women had been targets. 64 Similarly, one
in four lesbian, bisexual and transgender women report targeted sexual orientation
harassment. 65 More recent research on the experiences of women in Australia found that,
of those that had experienced online abuse and harassment, 42% of women said it was
misogynistic or sexist in nature, and 20% said it had included threats of physical or sexual
violence. 66
The social and economic consequences of widespread automation are also likely to be
different for women than men, with significant implications for socio-economic equality and
the global gender gap. 67 The disparity in global access to technology and the internet may
also have detrimental consequences for women, particularly for future economic
opportunities. 68
New technologies also bring particular opportunities and challenges for children. Children
and young people are often the first to adapt to new technologies and their technological
skills frequently surpass those of their parents or carers. However, there can be tension
between the commercial imperatives that typically drive technological innovation and the
human rights and wellbeing of children. In any event, children and young people in
Australia commonly now spend a significant proportion of their daily lives online. This
brings new risks for children and young people, including exploitation, 69 abuse, cyber-
bullying 70 and breaches of privacy. While being alive to these risks, attention should also
be directed towards realising the digital environment’s potential to enhance a child’s right
to participation, education and information.
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Some groups may be unable to benefit from the social advances being made by new
technologies because they encounter barriers in accessing technology. People in low-
income households experience the lowest rates of digital inclusion for all Australians, and
people with no paid employment are also below the national average. 71 Australians living in
regional or rural areas experience lower digital inclusion rates than their counterparts living
in the city, 72 while Australians aged over 65 years are the least digitally-included age
group. 73 As government services move increasingly online, this can pose especially acute
problems for those Australians with limited internet access.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples also experience low rates of digital inclusion 74
and can have very specific concerns about particular dimensions of new technologies. For
example, Facebook has a practice of ‘memorialising’ a user’s Facebook page after the
company learns of the user’s death. Memorialisation often involves a carousel of the
deceased person’s images being available, more or less publicly depending on the user’s
privacy settings. To the extent that these images include photographs of the deceased
person, this can raise particular problems, because under the laws and customs of some
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples it can be forbidden to share the image of a
deceased person. 75
Control over the use and disclosure of big data is another example where new technology
has specific implications for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The concept of
‘data sovereignty’ over the data collected from and in relation to Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples has been recognised as central to the realisation of the right to self-
determination. 76
Consultation questions
1. What types of technology raise particular human rights concerns? Which human rights
are particularly implicated?
2. Noting that particular groups within the Australian community can experience new
technology differently, what are the key issues regarding new technologies for these
groups of people (such as children and young people; older people; women and girls;
LGBTI people; people of culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds; Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander peoples)?

5 Reinventing regulation and oversight for new
technologies
The term ‘regulation’ refers to processes that aim to moderate individual and
organisational behaviour better to achieve identified objectives. In the simplest terms,
regulation helps organise society, setting out the rules that everyone must abide by.
Irrespective of one’s view about the place of regulation generally in Australia, we need to
consider how regulation can foster a form of technological innovation that is consistent
with the values of our liberal democracy.
It should first be acknowledged that regulating technology is difficult, for reasons that
include:
• the extraordinary pace of change in this area
• new technology is primarily developed by the private sector, and so efficiency and profit
imperatives are influential in driving research and development
• technology can exclude, or be radically inclusive of, particular groups.
The public debate is moving from whether regulation is needed per se, to what form of
regulation is most appropriate. For example, the CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg,
recently said:
Our position is not that regulation is bad. I think the internet is so important in people’s lives,
and it’s getting more important. The expectations on technology companies and internet
companies are growing. I think the real question is, what is the right framework for this – not
should there be one. 77
Similarly, Salesforce Chairman and CEO Marc Benioff called for urgent and proactive
regulation of the technology industry, drawing analogies with the failure to regulate the
banking and tobacco industries to prevent harm. He said, ‘The government needs to come
in and point “True North”’. 78
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In a recent report, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression identified the need
to act urgently to put in place governance for platforms that rely on user-generated
content. He said:
Despite taking steps to illuminate their rules and government interactions, the companies
remain enigmatic regulators, establishing a kind of ‘platform law’ in which clarity,
consistency, accountability and remedy are elusive. 79
In this section, we seek stakeholder views on the role of regulation and other measures to
ensure that new technology protects and promotes human rights in Australia.
5.1 The role of legislation

The most obvious form of regulation is law. This form of regulation includes primary
legislation, as well as subordinate or delegated legislation. Regulation can also refer to
other instruments – such as rules, guidelines and principles – only some of which have
legal force. 80
In addition to setting out rules, the law can also incentivise an activity, such as providing
tax concessions to support the growth of small business.
There are numerous ways to regulate through law. For example, the Australian Law
Reform Commission summarised Professor Julia Black’s influential taxonomy in its report,
For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice:
• a ‘bright line rule’ contains a ‘single criterion of applicability’ which is a simple and clear
approach but can fail to achieve a desired objective by being too rigid or too narrow;
• a ‘principle-based approach’ articulates ‘substantive objectives’ that are also simple to
apply and give flexibility over time, but can be problematic if there is a dispute as to
what each principle means and what it requires;
• and a ‘complex or detailed rule’ provides further detail, such as setting out conditions to
be satisfied prior to any action taking place. This gives certainty but is complex and is
likely to lead to gaps that may result ‘in scope for manipulation nor creative
compliance’. 81
Some see a strength of principles-based regulation as being its adaptability to changing
circumstances. 82 Given how rapidly technology is developing, principles-based regulation
may be one regulatory response considered in this area.
An example of principles-based legislation is the Australian Privacy Principles. Contained
in Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act, the Principles set out high-level rules on the handling,
use and management of personal information. The Principles are intended to adapt to the
particular circumstances of the variety of bodies that must comply with them, and to the
changing technological environment. 83
In recommending a new form of regulatory oversight for data governance in the UK, the
British Academy and The Royal Society called for
a renewed governance framework…to ensure trustworthiness and trust in the management
and use of data as a whole. This need can be met through a set of high-level principles that
would cut across any data governance attempt, helping to ensure confidence in the whole
system. As effective data governance strongly resists a one-size-fits-all approach,
grounding efforts in underlying principles will provide a source of clarity and of trust across
application areas. These are not principles to fix definitively in law, but to visibly sit behind
all attempts at data governance across sectors, from regulation to voluntary standards. 84

An approach relying on human rights principles could, for example, lead to steps to
remove discriminatory bias in AI-informed decision making. These steps could require
technology to be designed in order to be accessible for people with disability. It could also
require a method of algorithm accountability to be made available to a person who has
been adversely impacted by its operation.
Whichever forms of legislation are adopted, it is important to be particularly alive to the risk
of unintended consequences in this area. For example, the Australian Government
recently announced that it will compel technology companies, such as Google and
Facebook, to provide Australian security agencies access to encrypted data for national
security purposes. 85 If legislation is adopted, great care will need to be taken given the
significant implications this proposal has for individuals’ use of technology and the
operation of private entities, as well as the impact on a number of human rights, including
the right to privacy and freedom of expression and association.
5.2 Other regulatory approaches

Beyond conventional legislation, there is also scope for self- and co-regulatory approaches
in this area. This can include accreditation systems, professional codes of ethics or, as
outlined in section 7, standards for human rights compliant design.
The eSafety Commissioner, for example, is currently developing a safety by design
framework to provide practical guidance to technology companies to ensure user safety is
embedded from the earliest stages of product development. The principles will be
embedded in children’s rights and ensure that industry adopts ‘tools to help children and
young people navigate the online world in a safe way’. 86 Another example is Australia’s
National Statistical Service accreditation scheme that accredits agencies to act as
‘Integrating Authorities’ tasked with aggregating data sets. 87
Box 1 below provides an example of a ‘trust mark’ approach that has been proposed in
respect of AI. While the relative merits of this sort of approach have been debated in other
contexts, 88 it is a useful example of how a self-regulatory scheme could operate in
this area.
Box 1: The Turing Stamp

The Chief Scientist of Australia, Dr Alan Finkel, has argued for a new type of regulatory
approach to ensure public trust in the use of AI.
Dr Finkel has noted that the current legislative framework is limited in protecting against
misuse of certain new technologies. The application of AI in the context of social media, for
example, has exposed the limitations of current laws and highlighted the public interest in
being protected from misuse.
One way to regulate AI would be to give consumers the ability to ‘recognise and reward
ethical conduct’, 89 similar to the ‘Fair Trade’ mark or ‘Australian Made’ symbol.
Put simply, the ‘Turing Stamp, named after the pioneering computer scientist of the 1940s,
Alan Turing, would be the symbol that marks a vendor and product as bearers of the
Turing Certificate, meaning they are worthy of trust’. 90
As currently proposed, the Stamp would be a voluntary measure, rewarding companies
that act in accordance with their human rights obligations, for example: ‘Done right, the
costs of securing certification should be covered by increased sales, from customers
willing to pay a premium’. 91
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The concept of regulation also encompasses oversight and monitoring bodies. There are a
number of regulatory bodies that exist in all Australian jurisdictions. The functions and
objectives of regulatory bodies vary widely, from advisory functions to the receipt of
complaints, own-motion investigations and enforcement activities.
There is an increasing variety of approaches to regulating new technology in other
jurisdictions. For example:
• The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) imposes new data protection
requirements, applying to all individuals and businesses operating in the EU and the
European Economic Area. The GDPR harmonises data protection laws across the EU
– for instance, requiring business to put in place measures to ensure compliance with
privacy principles and mandating privacy impact assessments. 92
• In Japan, the Government’s ‘Robot Strategy’ sets out a program of reform to establish
a new legal system to effectively use robots and promote the development of different
robotic systems, as well as deregulating to promote the development of the robotics
industry. 93
• In Germany, legislation ‘requires large social media companies to remove content
inconsistent with specified local laws, with substantial penalties for non-compliance
within very short timeframes’. 94
• In Estonia, laws are being prepared to give robots legal status; one proposal being
considered would create a new legal term, ‘robot-agent’, that would be between the
concept of a separate legal personality and an object that belongs to an individual. 95
In addition, other jurisdictions are starting to establish new bodies to lead, regulate or both.
The UK Government, for example, is in the process of establishing a new Centre for Data
Ethics and Innovation. 96
The idea of an Australian organisation to lead responsible innovation in one or more areas
of new technology will be explored in a White Paper co-authored by the Australian Human
Rights Commission and the World Economic Forum, due for release by early 2019. 97 This
White Paper will be used as part of the Commission’s consultation process in this Project.
3. How should Australian law protect human rights in the development, use and
application of new technologies? In particular:
(a) What gaps, if any, are there in this area of Australian law?
(b) What can we learn about the need for regulating new technologies, and the
options for doing so, from international human rights law and the experiences of
other countries?
(c) What principles should guide regulation in this area?
4. In addition to legislation, how should the Australian Government, the private sector
and others protect and promote human rights in the development of new technology?

6 Artificial Intelligence, big data and decisions that affect
human rights
This section considers how Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being used in a broad
spectrum of decision making that engages people’s human rights. AI can be used to
provide an input that a human decision maker can weigh up among other considerations –
with the human ultimately deciding what weight (if any) to give to the AI-generated input.
At the other end of the decision making spectrum, there is little or no human involvement
in the decision, beyond acting on the AI-generated input.
In this Issues Paper, the term ‘AI-informed decision making’ refers to all decision making
on this spectrum. Except as stated otherwise, AI-informed decision making refers to
decisions that engage human rights. This section asks how we should protect human
rights amid the rise of AI-informed decision making.
6.1 Understanding the core concepts

The Issues Paper contains a glossary of key terms, but some key terms are discussed in
detail below.
(a) Artificial Intelligence

There is no universally accepted definition of AI. 98 Instead, AI is a convenient expression
that refers to a computerised form of processing information that more closely resembles
human thought than previous computers were ever capable of. That is, AI describes ‘the
range of technologies exhibiting some characteristics of human intelligence’. 99
Historically, Alan Turing first considered intellectual competition between humans and
machines in 1950. 100 Rapid developments in computing power and processes in recent
decades have moved the idea of AI from science fiction to a dawning reality. 101
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There are two basic types of AI:
• ‘Narrow AI’ refers to today’s AI systems, which are capable of specific, relatively simple
tasks – such as searching the internet or navigating a vehicle.
• ‘Artificial general intelligence’ is largely theoretical today. It would involve a form of AI
that can accomplish sophisticated cognitive tasks on a breadth and variety similar to
humans. It is difficult to determine when, if ever, artificial general intelligence will exist,
but predictions tend to be between 2030-2100. 102
AI applications available today are examples of narrow AI, and this is the form of AI that
this section refers to.
Narrow AI is being integrated into daily life. ‘Chatbots’ can help with simple banking
tasks. 103 AI can use natural language processing to book a restaurant or haircut. 104 It is
being developed to debate with us, using a machine learning algorithm and deep neural
networks to present arguments and better inform public debate. 105 If properly implemented,
such applications may provide significant benefits.
Yet AI can also threaten our political, judicial and social systems, with significant
consequences for our rights and freedoms. Allegations that AI was used to manipulate
voting in the recent US election are currently being considered by the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106 while concerns about the use of AI in autonomous
weapons have prompted calls to ban ‘killer robots’. 107
In addition, AI’s latent potential remains enormous and it is thought to be still in its infancy.
The recent surge in the global use of AI is driven by the combined factors of improved
machine learning and algorithms, advances in computing power and its capacity to
analyse big data. 108
(b) Machine learning, algorithms and big data

Sometimes seen as an example of AI, machine learning may be understood as a
computing system ‘used to make predictions and conclusions on the basis of data’. 109
Machine learning can be used to modify an algorithm so that its task is performed better
over time. 110
An algorithm is a set of instructions programmed into a computing system. Algorithms are
critical in autonomous computational systems, whether used in the real-time system
activity itself, or in the learning and training of the system.
‘Big data’ refers to diverse sets of information, produced in very large volumes, and which
can only be processed at high speeds by computers. The data collected can be analysed
to understand trends and make critical predictions.
The ability to use big data effectively enables increasing:
• volumes of data to be managed
• variety of data sources
• velocity in making assessments
• veracity – in the sense that it enables more powerful capabilities to make predictions
and other assessments
• value, where the capabilities of big data can be monetised. 111

(c) AI-informed decision making
AI-informed decision making is made possible where AI, including through machine
learning, applies (and in some cases adjusts) algorithms to big datasets. It can be used in
areas as diverse as assessing risk in policing, 112 to optimising hospital operations. 113 This
section of the Issues Paper focuses on the risks in this area, but it should be emphasised
that AI-informed decision making offers the prospect of extraordinary improvements in
humans’ data analysis and, especially, in our predictive capabilities.
That said, today’s AI-informed decision making is most reliable when applied to relatively
simple rule-based calculations. It is far more difficult to use narrow AI to perform what is
considered quintessentially human or subjective judgment, such as assessing whether a
painting is beautiful or a joke is humorous.
6.2 AI-informed decision making and human rights

This part considers how AI-informed decision making engages human rights.
(a) Human dignity and human life

The growing integration of AI-informed decision making systems in everyday life is
unprecedented. It raises ethical, moral and legal questions – for example, how we ensure
accountability and balance competing interests.
A recent example is the death of a woman who was hit by an autonomous car at night
after it failed to detect her walking across the road with her bicycle. 114 International human
rights law requires states to take steps to protect the right to life, such as through imposing
criminal penalties for causing the death of another person. In this case, the human ‘safety
driver’ did not appear to be following requisite procedure, but the incident raises important
questions about how to apportion responsibility, and specifically legal liability, in such
circumstances.
Conversely, some AI-informed decision making has an obvious social benefit. For
example, the use of AI in medical diagnosis is significantly improving the accuracy of
diagnosis and treatment of disease. 115 Genome sequencing software and machine learning
from genetic data sets, when integrated with clinical information, present a new frontier in
how we approach public health. 116 They also serve to protect and promote the right to the
highest attainable standard of health and the right to life. 117
(b) Fairness and non-discrimination

The challenge of balancing the convenience of AI-informed decision making and machine-
learning technologies with various risks – such as entrenching gender bias118 and
stereotyping 119 – has only recently been identified. When considering bias, it is not only the
operation of the algorithm that needs to be considered. Rather, choices made at every
stage of development – for example, by software developers in designing and modelling
their technology – will be embedded in any AI-informed decision making system. 120
Without humans to detect or correct these problems in autonomous systems, the impacts
may go unnoticed and unaddressed, and result in harm. 121 This can entrench social
injustice in AI-informed decision making systems 122 This injustice can reflect unintended or
unconscious bias derived from the actions or values of people creating the technology,
and in the limitations of the data used to train it. Box 2 below sets out a case study.
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Box 2: AI in the United States criminal justice system
In 2016, ProPublica investigated the use of an algorithm, ‘COMPAS’, that assesses the
risk of individuals committing a future crime. ProPublica claimed that COMPAS was biased
against African Americans. 123
COMPAS was used by some United States judges when deciding:
(a) whether a person charged with an offence should be released on bail pending their
court hearing; and
(b) how long a person convicted of an offence should be imprisoned.
COMPAS works by assigning defendants a score from 1 to 10 to indicate their likelihood of
reoffending, based on more than 100 factors such as age, sex and criminal history.
Notably, race is not a variable factor. The algorithm provided a prediction of reoffending by
comparing information about an individual with a similar group of people based on a large
data set within the criminal justice system. 124
ProPublica analysed approximately 5000 defendants who had been assigned a COMPAS
score in a Florida County. It found that, of individuals who ultimately did not reoffend,
African Americans were more than twice as likely as white defendants to be classified as
medium or high risk.
Northpointe, the private company that developed the risk assessment tool, refused to
disclose the details of its proprietary algorithm, but claimed the assessment was fair. 125
In July 2016, a defendant challenged the use of COMPAS in sentencing on the basis that
it violates a defendant’s right to due process because the proprietary nature of the tool
means its scientific validity cannot be challenged. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld
the use of the tool as the sentencing judge had relied on other independent factors and the
COMPAS risk assessment was not determinative. However, the Court cautioned judges
using the tool to observe its limitations, including that the risk score works by identifying
groups of high-risk offenders rather than a particular high-risk individual. 126
This example raises a number of questions of how we continue to protect human rights in
the criminal justice system. Fairness is not a value that is easily incorporated into decision
making that is informed or influenced by such algorithms. Some argue that an algorithm
can never incorporate fairness into its operation. 127 The increasing use of predictive
algorithms, along with the reliance on private companies in government decision making,
has serious implications for individuals who are already likely to be marginalised and
vulnerable.
Other examples of potentially unjust consequences from AI-informed decision making

include:
• the use of algorithms to target advertising of job opportunities on the basis of age,
gender or some other characteristic such that, for example, people over a certain age
never become aware of the employment opportunity; 128
• a situation where AI-informed decision making resulted in some primary school
teachers in a US school district losing their jobs based on a simplistic and ultimately
inaccurate assessment of their performance; 129
• job-screening algorithms that exclude applicants with mental illness; 130
• risk-assessment algorithms that result in the police disproportionately targeting certain
groups, such as young people and people from particular racial, ethnic or minority
groups; 131 and

• predictive policing tools that direct police to lower socio-economic areas, entrenching or
even exacerbating the cycle of imprisonment and recidivism. 132
Ultimately, we may need to answer some difficult questions. For example, what sorts of
mistakes are we willing to tolerate in an AI-informed decision making system? And how
much more accurate, and less susceptible to prejudice, does such a system need to be –
in comparison with a decision making system that relies only on humans – before we
deem it to be suitable for use?
(c) Data, privacy and personal autonomy

The data individuals provide in return for services has led to the concentration of large
data holdings. Some of those concentrations are in Australian companies; some are in a
small number of large technology corporations operating principally overseas; and some
are in governments here and overseas.
Government held data is sometimes said to be a ‘national resource’ – a term that
recognises such data as a valuable asset that should be protected and shared, as
appropriate, to stimulate innovation, improve service delivery and boost economies. 133
Australia’s Open Government Partnership, 134 together with other reforms such as those to
the national data system, 135 aim to optimise the use of data as a national resource, improve
transparency and drive innovation while maintaining trust through appropriate safeguards.
Alongside this, there is a growing recognition that Australia needs to improve the
population’s collective data literacy. 136 This has prompted the establishment of data
literacy, 137 and digital capability, 138 programs to help upskill the public sector, noting that
these challenges are not limited to the public service. 139 Data scientists continue to be in
short supply. 140
In this context, we need to consider issues such as:
• the choice an individual has about their personal data and who may access it, noting
that millions of people exercise little control over their data 141
• the connection of disparate data sets and the re-identification of previously anonymised
data, 142 as recently seen with Medicare data in Australia 143
• the past and partial characteristics of data along with the combination of data sets
creating new, unregulated ones 144
• data custody and control, as distinct from data ownership, 145 and
• the adequacy of existing privacy and data protections in the age of big data. 146
(d) Related issues

These technologies can be applied outside of a decision making context in ways that
engage human rights. There are other processes, beyond this Project, considering such
issues.
Examples include:
• AI can be used to influence social media newsfeeds. It was alleged that some social
media newsfeeds were manipulated during recent electoral processes in the UK and
US. This engages a number of human rights. For example, because freedom of
expression includes the free exchange of ideas and information, and therefore the right
to seek out and receive information, the alleged manipulation and distortion of what
electors receive as news could significantly affect their enjoyment of this right. More
broadly, if such alleged activity were to happen at scale, it has the potential to
undermine Western liberal-democratic systems. 147
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• AI can be used to influence advertising and search engine results, as highlighted by the
European Union Commissioner for Competition’s fine against Google for favouring its
own services over those offered by other providers. 148
• There has been growing public concern about the relationship between social media
and news. In response, the ACCC is conducting an inquiry into the impact of digital
search engines, social media platforms and other digital content platforms on the state
of competition in media and advertising, in particular regarding the supply of news and
journalistic content. The inquiry will investigate the implications for consumers,
advertisers and media content creators and is due to report in mid-2019. 149
6.3 How should Australia protect human rights in this context?

AI-informed decision making can avoid many of the conventional forms of regulation for
science and technology. 150
It is common for an algorithm to be opaque, in the sense that its operation is not usually
apparent to anyone beyond the person or organisation responsible for deploying it. The
dataset in respect of which the algorithm is deployed is often also not readily accessible.
Even where the algorithm is made available, it would usually require specialised, technical
expertise to understand how it works. Sometimes, even the person or organisation
responsible for creating or using the algorithm will not fully understand how it arrives at a
result – especially where machine-learning techniques are used.
As a result, it can be difficult or even impossible to ensure accountability for anyone who is
affected by an AI-informed decision. For example, if a decision appears on its face to be
discriminatory, because it appears to have a disproportionate negative effect on a
particular ethnic group, it is necessary to assess the decision making process to determine
whether in fact there was unlawful discrimination. However, if that decision making
process is itself opaque – that is, if we cannot understand how an algorithm operates with
respect to the relevant dataset – it may be impossible to determine whether an individual
suffered unlawful discrimination.
This problem can manifest in two ways. First, a person who suspects discrimination may
be unable to establish that fact even where it has occurred. Secondly, the lack of
transparency of the decision making process may mean that discrimination affecting many
people goes undetected.
Australia has started to grapple with these issues. For example, the Australian Technology
and Science Growth Plan is funded to develop a national AI Ethical Framework, 151 along
with a Technology Roadmap and Standards Framework, to support business innovation in
a range of sectors by identifying global opportunities and guiding future investments.
As explored in section 5 above, in Australia, human rights are protected by a combination
of law, policy, public institutions and convention. Self- and co-regulation by organisations
outside the public sector can promote adherence to human rights standards that go
beyond the narrow confines of the law.
In determining how to ensure human rights are protected in AI-informed decision making,
all of these avenues should be considered, including their inter-relationship.

(a) What is the role of ordinary legislation?
Primary legislation (ie, acts of parliament) is the main way of creating legal rules, penalties
for wrong-doing and remedies for anyone who has suffered detriment. The democratic
process means it is also the most transparent and consultative way of doing so.
However, primary legislation can be slow to adapt where the subject of regulation is
changing fast. Central to the claim that we are living in the time of a new industrial
revolution is the fact that the pace and scope of technological change are unprecedented.
This presents a particular challenge for legislation in this area because:
• legislation must be general and it can be difficult to frame laws to address very specific,
technical issues
• legislation is subject to democratic and political processes that can be time consuming
and are not well suited for frequent revision
• our understanding of this new technology is growing faster than we have generally
been able to legislate.
In addressing such problems, some have suggested principles-based legislation because
it can provide the opportunity for a less rigid application of standards that also allows for
greater flexibility over time. 152
Later in this section, various options are posited for self- and co-regulation. While these
should be assessed on their own merits, it is important also to consider how such options
might operate most effectively within the broader regulatory environment.
(b) How are other jurisdictions approaching this challenge?

While some initiatives establishing ethics codes have been instigated by industry
partnering with non-profit organisations and academics, such as Open AI 153 and the
Partnership on AI, 154 there are few nationally coordinated approaches. Examples of
jurisdiction level initiatives to improve regulation in this area include:
• The European Commission’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies has noted the urgent moral questions raised by the opaque nature of AI
and speed of development. 155 It has called for a common, international ethical and legal
framework for the design, production, use and governance of AI, robotics and
autonomous systems. 156
• In December 2017, New York City established an ‘Automated Decision Making Task
Force’ that will examine the use of AI through the lens of equity, fairness and
accountability. 157 The Task Force will make recommendations regarding ‘how
information on agency automated decision systems may be shared with the public and
how agencies may address instances where people are harmed by agency automated
decision systems.’ 158
• The UK’s House of Lords Select Committee proposed an ‘AI Code’ in April 2018, to be
developed across the public and private sectors, including the Centre for Data Ethics
and Innovation, the AI Council and the Alan Turing Institute. 159 The Select Committee
noted that such a code could provide the basis for statutory regulation, if and when that
is deemed necessary. In the meantime, the Select Committee recommended that it
include the requirement to have established ethical advisory boards in entities that are
developing or using AI.
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Coordination is necessary to ensure consistent rather than patchwork solutions that would
heighten risk and undermine integrity. It is also important to consider how AI-informed
decision making will impact society as a whole, including vulnerable and marginalised
groups. The G7 is promoting inclusivity of social groups representing diverse, traditionally
underrepresented populations in the development of more useful AI-informed decision
making systems that will be more relevant to society as a whole. 160
Some jurisdictions are starting to regulate AI. For example, on 25 May 2018, the European
Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect. The GDPR
harmonises EU data protection and privacy law, and includes provisions relating to the
transfer or export of personal data outside the EU – something that will influence how AI
can be used on transnational datasets. 161 Also relevant to AI-informed decision making is
the GDPR’s restriction on how decisions based on automated processes can be made,
where they have significant effects on an individual.
There are also civil society led efforts to determine how best to regulate in this area. For
example, in May 2018, a number of international NGOs, led by Amnesty International and
Access Now, launched the Toronto Declaration: Protecting the rights to equality and non-
discrimination in machine learning systems. 162 The Declaration aims to apply existing
international human rights requirements to the context of machine-learning, with a focus
on equality, discrimination, inclusion, diversity and equity. The Future of Life Institute’s
2017 conference attendees developed a set of 23 AI principles which have been signed by
over 1200 AI/robotics researchers and over 2500 other stakeholders. 163 The principles
cover AI issues ranging from research strategies and data rights, through to future issues
including potential super-intelligence.
(c) Self-regulation, co-regulation and regulation by design

As noted above, system level biases in AI-informed decision making can result in racial,
gender and other forms of discrimination. A biased result might not be apparent until a
large number of AI-informed decisions are analysed and suggest a tendency to
disadvantage a particular racial, gender or other group.
However, by the time a possible problem is diagnosed, the decision making system might
already have caused considerable harm to any affected groups by, for example,
systematically denying them home loans or insurance. Virginia Eubanks coined the term
‘digital poorhouse’ to refer to the risk of already vulnerable people being further
disadvantaged by wholly or partially automated decision making processes, where there is
very limited scope for benign human intervention. 164
Discovering bias, in a decision that has already been made, is often difficult. It involves
careful analysis of an individual against a comparator group, ideally with a body of similar
decisions for context.
However, once a biased or discriminatory decision has been made, many of its negative
effects may never be fully rectified – even where the problem has been accurately and
promptly found. Therefore, it is crucial that decision making systems are carefully
scrutinised to mitigate, if not eliminate, the risk of bias before a decision is made in the
real world.
To give an analogy: imagine a human judge, Justice X, who is prejudiced against young
people and consistently gives harsher sentences to young people than to adults in
equivalent circumstances. Our justice system should be able to identify every instance in
which Justice X discriminates against a young person and it should take steps to address
the problem. But it would be better if the system identified that Justice X was prone to
making such discriminatory decisions and removed this judge from the courtroom. It would
be better still if only people who did not act in such a discriminatory way were appointed
judges.

While accountability mechanisms can try to address problems that arise from biased or
discriminatory decisions, it is frequently the case that a person whose human rights have
been violated cannot be fully restored to the position they were in before the violation
occurred. Lasting negative consequences are common.
In a similar way, filtering out bias, and ensuring other human rights are protected, is
important in designing and building AI-informed decision making systems. 165 As those
systems become more common, this task assumes added urgency. 166
But how? Some have suggested ways of using self-regulation, co-regulation and design
principles to achieve this aim. Examples include:
• As discussed in section 5 above, the Chief Scientist of Australia has suggested the
creation of a voluntary trustmark for ethically compliant AI design. Akin to the ‘Fairtrade’
approach, a ‘Turing Stamp’ could be a means of assuring that an AI-powered product,
service or application was developed according to standards that protect the basic
human rights of affected people. This could help build trust for AI-powered tools that
are safe, and discourage the adoption of unsafe tools. 167
• Algorithmic accountability mechanisms could analyse and remedy algorithmic
distortions of competition, such as an ‘Algorithm Review Board’ as proposed by
Newscorp in its Issues Paper for the ACCC’s inquiry into Digital Platforms. 168
• An ‘Algorithmic Impact Assessment’, which would involve public agencies being
responsible for conducting a self-assessment of automated decision systems,
evaluating the impacts on people and communities. It would involve meaningful
external researcher review processes, disclosure to the public on decision systems and
due process mechanisms for individuals or communities to challenge agency
assessments. 169
As outlined in section 3 above, a human rights approach could practically and usefully
provide the underpinning for such initiatives.
(d) The role of public and private institutions

The extraordinary potential to commercialise AI means that the private sector is
establishing multi-disciplinary centres to explore these opportunities.
Earlier this year, for example, Google set up an AI research centre in France, with a team
focusing on issues such as health, science, art and the environment. The research team
‘will publish their research and open-source the code they produce, so that everyone can
use these insights to solve their own problems, in their own way.’ 170 Similarly, Samsung
has opened AI research centres in the UK, Russia and Canada. 171
Individual jurisdictions have also begun to establish domestic focused agencies. The UK
Government, for example, announced in late 2017 that it would establish a new Centre for
Data Ethics to promote the ‘safe, ethical and ground-breaking innovation in AI and data
driven technologies’. The Centre will ‘work with government, regulators and industry to lay
the foundations for AI adoption’. 172 The UK will also join the World Economic Forum’s
global council, a body that focuses on the global implications of the widespread use
of AI. 173
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As noted above, the Commission and the World Economic Forum are working together to
consider whether Australia needs an organisation to take a central role in promoting
responsible innovation in AI and related technologies and, if so, how that organisation
should operate.
5. How well are human rights protected and promoted in AI-informed decision making? In
particular, what are some practical examples of how AI-informed decision making can
protect or threaten human rights?
6. How should Australian law protect human rights in respect of AI-informed decision
making? In particular:
(a) What should be the overarching objectives of regulation in this area?
(b) What principles should be applied to achieve these objectives?
(c) Are there any gaps in how Australian law deals with this area? If so, what are
they?
(d) What can we learn from how other countries are seeking to protect human rights in
this area?
7. In addition to legislation, how should Australia protect human rights in AI-informed
decision making? What role, if any, is there for:
(a) An organisation that takes a central role in promoting responsible innovation in AI-
informed decision making?
(b) Self-regulatory or co-regulatory approaches?
(c) A ‘regulation by design’ approach?

7 Accessible technology
New technology is becoming integrated into almost every aspect of life. Technology is now
central to our experience of daily activities including shopping, transport and accessing
government services. Technology is also increasingly a part of activities that are central to
our enjoyment of human rights.
It is crucial, therefore, that the whole community is able to access and use such
technology. This principle is often referred to as ‘accessibility’. Just as everyone should be
able to access our education system, public transport and buildings, technology also
should be accessible to all. If technology is increasingly the main gateway to participate in
the core elements of individual and community life, this gateway must accommodate all
members of the Australian community, regardless of their disability, race, religion, gender
or other characteristic.
Accessibility focuses on the user experience of both inputting and consuming information,
with the goal of removing barriers to technology services or goods. An example is where a
person with a vision impairment uses voice recognition, a mouse, touch screen or
keyboard to input information. To consume information, they may use text-to-speech
(TTS), magnification or Braille.
As briefly outlined in section 4 above, the human rights impact of technology differs for
different groups in the Australian community. Older Australians, for example, are more
likely to experience barriers in accessing government services delivered online, 174 or will be
subject to higher levels of monitoring of their health data, thereby increasing the risk of
breach of privacy. Children and young people face fewer difficulties using technology, but
will often be particularly vulnerable to the potential harm of new technology, such as a
breach of privacy, or exploitation, made possible by the entrenched use of social
platforms. In order to ensure that access to technology is universal, specific tools and
approaches will need to be developed to address the issues new technologies raise for
specific groups.
This section considers the specific barriers in accessing technology faced by people with
disability. The central question of this section is: how do we ensure the technology that
enables us to enjoy our basic human rights is itself available and accessible?
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7.1 How people with disability experience technology
The prevalence of disability in Australia is almost 1 in 5 (18.3%). 175 Digital inclusion is one
facet to understanding technology accessibility. It measures the degree of access and
capacity to use the internet and digital platforms. 176 Australians with disability experience
lower digital inclusion rates compared with those who do not have a disability. 177
The general problem was described in a 2017 parliamentary committee report:
While improvements have been made in the availability, affordability and accessibility of
communications products and services for people with disability, there are concerns that
there is ‘still a long way to go before all Australians with disability have the essential
connectivity to benefit from our digitally connected society’. 178
The Committee recorded concerns regarding barriers to access communications and
digital information, including:
• lack of access to appropriate equipment and devices
• lack of awareness of mainstream or disability-specific options
• lack of internet connection generally and connection that supports high-bandwidth
accessibility solutions
• affordability
• gaps in service delivery from the National Relay Service
• lack of accessible services arising from the procurement process
• touchscreen technology for persons who are blind or have a vision impairment
• exemptions from and reductions of captioning under the Broadcasting Services Act
1992 (Cth) (BSA)
• lack of standards and voluntary implementation of audio description. 179
Other technological advances, while providing some benefits to people with disability, also
may present access barriers, including:
• automated household goods and services, and shopping
• business software and AI tools across project management, finance, human resources
and ICT – impacting education and employment pathways for people with disability
• autonomous modes of transport and processes to access transport, eg driverless
carsand automated passport processes at airports.
In addition, the Commission has previously reported on how inaccessible information and
communications technologies can be a ‘a major form of employment discrimination’,
because they impede workforce participation. 180
While there are significant challenges, the rapid development of new technologies has the
potential to transform the lives of people with disability. As noted in Box 3 below, new
technologies have the potential to enable people with disability to overcome historic
barriers to inclusivity and fully enjoy their human rights.

Box 3: Accessible and assistive technologies for people with disability
Developers are creating technologies that improve participation and independence of
people with disability. These developments ensure that people with disability have full
enjoyment of their human rights as protected by the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. Accessible technology underpins the CRPD’s guiding principles that
support the achievement of individual rights, such as the right to work. These principles
include:
• respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s
own choices, and independence of persons;
• non-discrimination;
• full and effective participation and inclusion in society;
• accessibility; and
• equality of opportunity.
Innovations, for example, that protect and promote the human rights of people with
disability include:
• An intelligent home assistant can assist people with a variety of disabilities by operating
household and daily tasks through speech and content recognition. 181
• An app that allows a person to hold their smartphone camera to everyday objects,
which are then described audibly. Designed for people who are blind or who have low
vision, the app recognises people and describes their emotions, and identifies products
in, for example, a supermarket. 182
• The engineering of a prosthetic limb that links the limb and the brain to alert the
sensory cortex when pressure is applied – that is, a prosthetic limb that can feel. 183
• Mind-controlled wheelchairs to give independent movement to people with
quadriplegia. 184
7.2 Current framework governing equal access to new technologies

for people with disability
The rights of people with disability receive specific protection in the CRPD. A number of
those rights, including accessibility in a range of contexts, are also incorporated in
Australian law.
(a) International human rights law

The CRPD imposes general and specific obligations, including: accessibility; equality of
opportunity; independence; and full and effective participation and inclusion in society for
people with disability. The CRPD requires states parties to take appropriate measures to
ensure persons with disabilities have
access, on an equal basis with others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to
information and communications, including information and communications technologies
and systems, and to other facilities and services open or provided to the public, both in
urban and in rural areas. 185
The CRPD also states that the right to freedom of expression includes ‘provision of
information to the public in accessible formats and technologies; facilitating the use of
accessible modes of communication; and urging private entities and mass media to
provide accessible information and services, including the internet.’ 186
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(b) Australian law
There are several Australian laws that aim to combat discrimination, and promote equality,
for people with disability.
The most significant is the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, education, accommodation and in
the provision of goods, services or facilities. The DDA also requires reasonable
adjustments to be made to enable a person with disability to access goods, services or
facilities, unless this would cause ‘unjustifiable hardship’. 187 In addition, the DDA enables
the Minister to make Disability Standards that set out more detailed requirements about
accessibility in a range of areas, such as education, buildings and public transport. State
and territory laws also prohibit disability discrimination. 188
Some Australian laws deal more specifically with disability and technology. For example,
the BSA regulates Australia’s television broadcasters and authorises the Australian
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) to monitor and regulate the broadcasting,
datacasting, internet and related industries. 189 The BSA outlines relevant industry codes
and standards, including minimum requirements for broadcasters to caption television
programs for people who are deaf or hearing impaired.
The Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) authorises ACMA to make standards to regulate
features in telecommunications that may be required by people with disability, including
voluntary standards. 190 For example, one standard prescribes requirements for telephone
headsets or keypads, and recommends design features that remove barriers to access for
people with disability. 191
Standards Australia (SA) is the nation’s peak non-government standards organisation
which develops and adopts internationally-aligned standards in Australia and represents
the nation at the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). 192 Australian
Standards are voluntary and SA does not enforce or regulate standards. However federal,
state and territory governments often incorporate them into legislation (for instance, they
are incorporated in the Disability Standards referred to above).
(c) Government policy and coordination

The National Disability Strategy 2010−2020 (Disability Strategy) is a Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) agreement to establish a plan for improving life for Australians with
a disability and incorporate principles from the CRPD into national policy and practice. 193
Consistent with the stated principles underlying the National Disability Insurance Scheme
(NDIS), 194 the first ‘outcome’ of the Disability Strategy is that people with disability live in
accessible and well-designed communities with opportunity for full inclusion in social,
economic, sporting and cultural life.
Policy directions for this outcome include increased participation in, and accessibility of,
communication and information systems for the social, cultural, religious, recreational and
sporting life of the community. The strategy has associated implementation plans and
disability access and inclusion plans for federal, state and territory governments.
The Digital Transformation Agency (DTA) administers the Digital Service Standard, which
ensures federal government digital services are simple, clear and fast. 195 Criterion Nine of
the Standard provides that services are to be accessible to all users, regardless of their
ability and environment. Government services are required to evidence usability testing of
their digital platforms, including users with low-level digital skills, people with a disability,
and people from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. The Australian Government’s
design content guide outlines digital accessibility and inclusivity considerations for a range
of population groups. 196

The Australian Government incorporated a new Australian Standard (adopted directly from
a European Standard) in 2016 into its Commonwealth Procurement Rules. 197 The rule
requires that all ICT goods and services procured by the Australian Government for
government workplaces and employees, must be consistent with the Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0 and accessible by employees with various
disabilities.
(d) Guidelines and standards

There is a growing body of guidelines and standards that can promote access to
technology. Some of this is known as ‘soft law’.
To date, particular attention has been given to access to the internet. For example, the
WCAG aim to provide a single shared standard for web content accessibility for people
with disability. 198 WCAG 2.1 was released in June 2018 and is an extension of the 2.0
version. It provides guidance on the design of website content that is accessible to a wider
range of people with disability including: blindness and low vision; deafness and hearing
loss; learning disabilities; cognitive limitations; limited movement; speech disabilities; and
photosensitivity. 199
The Australian Government officially endorsed the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines in 2010, with the
aim of ensuring all government website content conforms to accessibility standards for
people with disability. 200
Other international guidelines and standards include the following:
• The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a United Nations body, develops
technical standards to improve ICT access for underserved communities.
• The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) creates standards that provide
requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics that help ensure materials,
products, processes and services are fit for their purpose. 201 In addition to standards
that directly cover accessible products (eg, PDF specifications that allow for greater
accessibility), the ISO produces guides for addressing accessibility in standards.
• The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) produces international standards
for ‘electrotechnology’ products, systems and services. 202
7.3 Models of accessible and inclusive technology

An important way of making technology accessible to all is to consider how technology is
designed.
‘Universal design’ refers to an accessible and inclusive approach to designing products
and services, focusing especially on ensuring that people with disability, as well as others
with specialised needs, are able to use those products and services. Applying universal
design to technology means designing products, environments, programmes and services,
so they can be used by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for
specialised or adapted features. 203 ‘Inclusive design’ is a closely-related concept which is
‘design that considers the full range of human diversity with respect to ability, language,
gender, age and other forms of human difference’. 204 This section covers both the
accessible and inclusive design concepts but does not attempt to distinguish between
them.
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Accessible and inclusive technology differs from ‘assistive technology’. Assistive
technology is the overarching term for technology that is specifically designed to support a
person with a disability perform a task. An example of an assistive technology is a screen
reader, which can assist a person who is blind, or who has a vision impairment, to read the
content of a website. Correctly implemented universal design supports assistance
technology when required.
(a) Regulatory and compliance frameworks

The goal of accessible and inclusive technology is unlikely to be achieved by the law
alone. For example, the US legal framework for promoting online access for people with
disability has been described as the most robust and comprehensive in the world, and yet
the law is insufficiently enforced to create online equality. 205 An even stronger set of laws
and clearer guidelines, if not widely enforced or implemented, also may not result in
increased accessibility. 206
A more holistic approach would incorporate, but not rely solely on, conventional legal
protections. It could involve considering measures such as the following.
• Voluntary industry measures to promote accessibility. Such measures have
advantages such as being led by industry participants that have a strong understanding
of their own operating environments. They can also influence the behaviour of
manufacturers through the procurement process. Voluntary measures may be
supported by regulations which, for example, prescribe voluntary or mandatory codes,
have reserve power to make a code mandatory, or can enforce compliance. 207
• Government standards and guidelines. Article 9(2)(a) of the CRPD requires states to
‘develop, promulgate and monitor the implementation of minimum standards and
guidelines for the accessibility of facilities and services open or provided to the public’.
Such standards could apply the principles of universal design and pay particular
attention to the needs of vulnerable groups such as older persons, children and
persons with disabilities. 208
• Education and awareness raising. Programs can be developed to educate and raise
awareness within government and industry on the need for effective measures to
enable the use of technology by people who encounter barriers to access. 209 This could
promote a comprehensive framework that addresses all aspects of accessibility and
technological advances. 210
• Procurement. Procurement policies can set minimum accessible and inclusive
technological features. Such policies can be either mandatory or aspirational, and tend
to be a lever for change in large organisations and government. 211
• Oversight, monitoring and enforcement. Careful consideration needs to be given to
the institutional architecture that promotes accessible and inclusive technology. The
public body or bodies responsible for implementing, monitoring and enforcing these
aims and legal requirements need to be appropriately equipped to do so. In addition,
the Commission and the World Economic Forum are co-authoring a separate
consultation paper due for release by early 2019 that asks whether Australia needs an
organisation to take a central role in promoting responsible innovation in AI and related
technologies and, if so, how that organisation should operate. 212

Box 4: Principles for a regulatory framework
ITU and 3Gict proposed a set of guiding principles and steps for countries to set up an
institutional framework for ICT accessibility for people with disability. 213 The principles may
be applied to create a “light touch” regulatory framework that includes industry self-
regulation and co-regulation, through to more traditional regulatory approaches that
require the promulgation of regulations. 214 The steps involve:
1. revising existing policies/legislation/regulations to promote accessibility
2. consulting with relevant persons who encounter barriers to access on the development
of revised regulations and establishing a committee on accessibility
3. making persons who face accessibility barriers aware of revised regulations
4. adopting accessibility technical and quality of service standards
5. adding and revising key legislation definitions to promote accessibility
6. amending the universal access/service legal and regulatory framework to include
accessibility as an explicit goal of universal access/service and the universal
access/service fund
7. ensuring that quality of service requirements take into account the specific needs of
persons who encounter accessibility barriers and set quality of service standards for
accessible services
8. revising legal frameworks for emergency communications to ensure emergency
services are accessible for relevant persons
9. establishing clear targets and reporting annually on their implementation
10. amending legislation to refer to accessibility.
(b) Accessible design and development of new technology

The technology industry has approached accessibility and inclusivity in divergent ways.
Some technology companies have been pioneers, making such objectives central to the
design and development of services and products. Others have paid little or no attention to
these aims. Even where accessibility is considered, the relevant features are often added
after an initial non-accessible release of new technology, and are sometimes only
available at an additional cost, causing delay and inequalities in access. 215
Unquestionably, there are significant challenges. For example, the pace of technological
change means that an accessible product or service can quickly become obsolete as the
surrounding technological environment advances.
In addressing such challenges, consideration could be given to:
• Inclusion of people with disability, and others who face accessibility barriers, in the
design of technology, and in developing relevant technology standards.
• Working with those who develop relevant standards to help them understand the
importance of accessibility.
• Using international forums, through the United Nations and elsewhere, to promote a
common approach internationally to accessibility in technology.
• Training and equipping community and civil society organisations to take advantage of
opportunities to use technology in an accessible, inclusive way.
• Examining university and other vocational curricula relating to technology, to ensure
that accessibility principles are included. 216
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• Leveraging existing industry bodies to promote, educate, develop certifications and
encourage the adoption of universal and inclusive design.
• Industry including the requirement of accessibility skills for positions in design,
development, testing, marketing and similar type jobs.
8. What opportunities and challenges currently exist for people with disability accessing
technology?
9. What should be the Australian Government’s strategy in promoting accessible and
innovative technology for people with disability? In particular:
(a) What, if any, changes to Australian law are needed to ensure new technology is
accessible?
(b) What, if any, policy and other changes are needed in Australia to promote
accessibility for new technology?
10. How can the private sector be encouraged or incentivised to develop and use
accessible and inclusive technology, for example, through the use of universal design?

8 Consultation questions
For ease of reference, the questions posed in this Issues Paper are
listed below.
1. What types of technology raise particular human rights concerns? Which human
rights are particularly implicated?
2. Noting that particular groups within the Australian community can experience new
technology differently, what are the key issues regarding new technologies for these
groups of people (such as children and young people; older people; women and girls;
LGBTI people; people of culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds; Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander peoples)?
3. How should Australian law protect human rights in the development, use and
application of new technologies? In particular:
a) What gaps, if any, are there in this area of Australian law?
b) What can we learn about the need for regulating new technologies, and the
options for doing so, from international human rights law and the experiences of
other countries?
c) What principles should guide regulation in this area?
4. In addition to legislation, how should the Australian Government, the private sector
and others protect and promote human rights in the development of new technology?
5. How well are human rights protected and promoted in AI-informed decision making?
In particular, what are some practical examples of how AI-informed decision making
can protect or threaten human rights?
6. How should Australian law protect human rights in respect of AI-informed decision
making? In particular:
a) What should be the overarching objectives of regulation in this area?
b) What principles should be applied to achieve these objectives?
c) Are there any gaps in how Australian law deals with this area? If so, what are
they?
d) What can we learn from how other countries are seeking to protect human
rights in this area?
44
7. In addition to legislation, how should Australia protect human rights in AI-informed
decision making? What role, if any, is there for:
a) An organisation that takes a central role in promoting responsible innovation in
AI-informed decision making?
b) Self-regulatory or co-regulatory approaches?
c) A ‘regulation by design’ approach?
8. What opportunities and challenges currently exist for people with disability accessing
technology?
9. What should be the Australian Government’s strategy in promoting accessible
technology for people with disability? In particular:
a) What, if any, changes to Australian law are needed to ensure new technology is
accessible?
b) What, if any, policy and other changes are needed in Australia to promote
accessibility for new technology?
10. How can the private sector be encouraged or incentivised to develop and use
accessible and inclusive technology, for example, through the use of universal
design?

9 Making a submission
The Commission would like to hear your views on the questions posed in this
Issues Paper.
Written submissions may be formal or informal, and can address some or all of the
consultation questions.
Written submissions must be received by 2 October 2018. Submissions can be emailed to
tech@humanrights.gov.au. The submission form and details on the submission process,
as well as further information about the Human Rights and Technology Project, can be
found at: https://tech.humanrights.gov.au/.
Please note that when making a submission, you are indicating that you have read and
understood the Commission’s Submission Policy available at
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/submission-policy.
The information collected through the consultation process may be drawn upon, quoted or
referred to in any Project documentation. The Commission also intends to publish
submissions on the Project website, unless you state you do not wish the Commission to
do so. If you would like your submission to be confidential and anonymous, please clearly
state this when you make your submission.
To contact the Human Rights and Technology Project Team phone (02) 9284 9600 or
email tech@humanrights.gov.au.
46
10 Glossary
Algorithm An algorithm is a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem. It is used for
calculation, data processing and automated reasoning. An algorithm can tell a
computer what the author wants it to do, the computer then implements it,
following each step, to accomplish the goal. 217
Artificial Artificial Intelligence is the theory and development of computer systems that can
Intelligence do tasks that normally require human intelligence. This includes decision making,
(AI) visual perception, speech recognition, learning and problem solving. 218 Current AI
systems are capable of specific tasks such as internet searches, translating text or
driving a car.
Artificial Artificial General Intelligence is an emerging area of AI research and refers to the
General development of AI systems that would have cognitive function similar to humans in
Intelligence their ability to learn and think. This means they would be able to accomplish more
(AGI) sophisticated cognitive tasks than current AI systems. 219
Assistive Assistive technology, is the overarching term for technology that is specifically
technology designed to support a person with a disability perform a task. An example of an
assistive technology is a screen reader, which can assist a person who is blind, or
who has a vision impairment, to read the content of a website. Correctly
implemented universal design supports assistive technology when required. 220
Big Data Big data refers to the diverse sets of information produced in large volumes and
processed at high speeds using AI. Data collected is analysed to understand
trends and make predictions. AI can automatically process and analyse millions of
data-sets quickly and efficiently and give it meaning. 221
Bitcoin Bitcoin is a system of open source peer-to-peer software for the creation and
exchange of a type of a digital currency that can be encrypted. This is known as a
cryptocurrency. Bitcoin is the first such system to be fully functional. Bitcoin
operates through a distributed ledger such as Blockchain. 222
Blockchain Blockchain is the foundation of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Blockchain is an ever-
growing set of data or information blocks that is shared and can continuously be
updated simultaneously. These blocks can be stored across the internet, cannot
be controlled by a single entity and have no sole point of failure. 223

Chatbot A Chatbot is a computer program that simulates human conversation through
voice commands or text or both. For example, in banking, a limited bot may be
used to ask the caller questions to understand their needs. However, the Chatbot
cannot understand a request if the customer responds with a different answer. 224
Data Data sovereignty is the concept that information which has been converted and
sovereignty stored is subject to the laws of the country in which it is located. Within the context
of Indigenous rights, data sovereignty recognises the rights of Indigenous peoples
to govern the collection, ownership and application of their data. 225
Digital Digital economy refers to economic and social activities that are supported by
economy information and communications technologies. This includes purchasing goods
and services, banking and accessing education or entertainment using the internet
and connected devices like smart phones. The digital economy impacts all
industries and business types and influences the way we interact with each other
every day. 226
Fourth The fourth industrial revolution refers to the fusion of technologies that blur the
Industrial lines between physical, digital and biological spheres. This includes emerging
Revolution technologies such as robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain, nanotechnology,
The Internet of Things, and autonomous vehicles. Earlier phases of the industrial
revolution are; phase one mechanised production with water and steam; phase
two mass production with electricity; and phase three automated production with
electronics and information technology. 227
Machine Machine learning is an application of AI that enables computers to automatically
learning learn and improve from experience without being explicitly programmed by a
person. This is done by the computer collecting and using data to learn for
themselves. For example, an email spam filter collecting data on known spam
terminology and unknown email addresses, merging that information and making a
prediction to identify and filter sources of spam. 228
The The Internet of Things refers to the ability of any device with an on and off switch
Internet of to be connected to the internet and send and receive data. For example, on a
Things personal level a coffee could brew when an alarm goes off, on a larger scale
(IoT) ‘smart cities’ could use devices to collect and analyse data to reduce waste and
congestion. 229
Universal Universal design’ refers to an accessible and inclusive approach to designing
design products and services, focusing on ensuring that people with disability, as well as
others with specialised needs, are able to use those products and services.
Applying universal design to technology means designing products, environments,
programmes and services so they can be used by all people, to the greatest extent
possible, without the need for specialised or adapted features. 230 Correctly
implemented universal design supports assistive technology when required.
48
11 Appendix: Government innovation and data initiatives
Initiative Agency Indicative More information
timeline
1. https://industry.gov.au/innovatio
Digital Economy Strategy Department of To be launched in
n/Digital-
The Strategy will set out a roadmap for government, community and Industry, Innovation 2018 Economy/Pages/default.aspx
the private sector to make the most of the economic potential of the and Science
growing digital economy. Developing the Strategy included public
consultations and opportunities to contribute via submissions and
discussions.
Evolving over time, the Strategy will cover how together the
government, the private sector and the community can:
• drive productivity within existing industries
• take advantage of the changes in our economy
• open new sources of growth for the future
• develop world-leading digital business capability for globally
engaged, innovative, high-growth businesses of all sizes
• drive a culture and mindset that supports lifelong learning, a global
outlook, and help us respond to change
• address Australia’s varying digital skills and confidence levels to
help everyone succeed in the digital economy.
2. https://industry.gov.au/innovatio
Australian Technology and Science Growth Plan — building Department of Four years from
n/InnovationPolicy/Documents/G
Australia’s Artificial Intelligence capability to support business Industry, Innovation 2018-19 overnment-Response-ISA-2030-
The Government will provide $29.9 million over four years from 2018- and Science Plan.pdf
19 to strengthen Australia’s capability in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Commonwealth
https://www.budget.gov.au/2018
Machine Learning (ML), supporting economic growth and the Scientific and -
productivity of Australian businesses. Industrial Research 19/content/bp2/download/bp2_c
This measure supports business innovation in sectors such as digital Organisation ombined.pdf
health, digital agriculture, energy, mining and cybersecurity, through: Department of
• the provision of additional funding to the Cooperative Research Education and
Centres Program to support projects from AI and ML capabilities Training
• funding for AI and ML-focused PhD scholarships and school-
related learning to address skill gaps

timeline
• the development of a Technology Roadmap, Standards
Framework and a national AI Ethics Framework to identify global
opportunities and guide future investments.
3. http://dataavailability.pmc.gov.au
Strengthening the national data system Department of the Four years from
/sites/default/files/govt-
The Government will invest $65 million to reform the Australian data Prime Minister and 2018-19 response-pc-dau-inquiry.pdf
system and introduce a range of reform measures in response to the Cabinet
Productivity Commission Data Availability and Use Inquiry.
Three key features underpin the reforms:
• A new Consumer Data Right will give citizens greater
transparency and control over their own data.
• A National Data Commissioner will implement and oversee a
simpler, more efficient data sharing and release framework. The
National Data Commissioner will be the trusted overseer of the
public data system.
• New legislative and governance arrangements will enable better
use of data across the economy while ensuring appropriate
safeguards are in place to protect sensitive information.
4. https://www.pmc.gov.au/public-
Platforms for open data Department of the Round 4
data/open-data/platforms-open-
As part of the National Innovation and Science Agenda, Data61 is Prime Minister and commences 1 data
working with Commonwealth entities to improve the Australian Cabinet July 2018
Government’s use, re-use and release of government held data. Data61
5. https://beta.dta.gov.au/help-and-
Data fellowships Digital Transformation Second round of
advice/learning-and-
The Data Fellowship is a competitive program to provide advanced Agency fellowships development/data-fellowship-
data training to high performing Australian Public Service data Data61 announced 8 program
specialists. June 2018
6. https://acola.org.au/wp/acola-
Deployment of Artificial Intelligence and what it presents for Australian Council of One year 2018- receives-arc-funding-to-
Australia Learned Academies 19 undertake-two-new-horizon-
The Australian Research Council’s Linkage Program, Linkage scanning-projects-on-ai-and-iot/
Learned Academies Special Projects, awarded a project grant to the
Australian Council of Learned Academies (ACOLA) to explore how
digital technologies benefit Australia. This study is part of ACOLA’s
Horizon Scanning Program supporting Commonwealth Science
50
timeline
Council priorities.
AI is an identified priority for the Council. This study will explore the
opportunities, risks and consequences of broad uptake and collate
evidence on the economics, social perspectives, research capabilities
and environmental impacts. The study’s overarching key findings will
be presented to inform government decisions and policy making over
coming decades.
7. https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-
Digital platforms inquiry Australian Competition Inquiry 2018
areas/inquiries/digital-platforms-
The Treasurer, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, directed the ACCC in and Consumer Final report 2019 inquiry
December 2017 to conduct an inquiry into digital platforms. The Commission
inquiry is examining the effect that digital search engines, social
media platforms and other digital content aggregation platforms have
on competition in media and advertising services markets.
The inquiry includes public consultations and opportunities to
contribute via submissions.
The inquiry will look at the impact of digital platforms on the supply of
news and journalistic content and the implications of this for media
content creators, advertisers and consumers.
8. https://cybersecuritystrategy.pm
Cyber security strategy Department of the 2017 - 2020
c.gov.au/index.html
The Cyber Security Strategy sets out the Government’s philosophy Prime Minister and
and program for meeting the dual challenges of the digital age - Cabinet
advancing and protecting Australia’s interests online. The strategy
establishes five themes of action for Australia’s cyber security:
• A national cyber partnership
• Strong cyber defences
• Global responsibility and influence
• Growth and innovation
• A cyber smart nation

1
Genevieve Bell ‘Fast, Smart and Connected: What is it to be Human, and Australian, in a Digital World’, 2017 ABC
Radio National Boyer Lectures (3 October 2017). At
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/boyerlectures/series/2017-boyer-lectures/8869370 (viewed 18 June
2018).
2
Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Portfolio Penguin, 2017), 13.
3
Ian Tucker ‘AI cancer detectors’ The Guardian (online) 10 June 2018. At
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/10/artificial-intelligence-cancer-detectors-the-five (viewed 6 July
2018).
4
Mike Rowe, ‘AI profiling: the social and moral hazards of ‘predictive’ policing’, The Conversation (online), 7 March 2018.
At https://theconversation.com/ai-profiling-the-social-and-moral-hazards-of-predictive-policing-92960 (viewed 18 June
2018).
5
Ability Mate, Clinical trial of digitally fabricated (3D Printed) ankle foot orthoses – frequently asked questions for health
care providers (16 June 2018) Ability Mate. At http://www.abilitymate.com/ (viewed 16 June 2018);
6
Richard Matthews, ‘The legal mindfield of 3D printed guns’ The Conversation (online), 3 February 2017). At
https://theconversation.com/the-legal-minefield-of-3d-printed-guns-71878 (viewed 6 July 2018).
7
Meredith Cohn, ‘Drones could soon get crucial medical supplies to patients in need’, The Baltimore Sun (online), 1
January 2017. At http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/maryland-health/bs-hs-drones-for-blood-20161223-story.html
(viewed 16 June 2018).
8
Benjamin Haas, ‘’Killer robots’: AI experts call for boycott over lab at South Korea University’ The Guardian (online), 5
April 2018. At https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/05/killer-robots-south-korea-university-boycott-artifical-
intelligence-hanwha (viewed 6 July 2018).
9
Commonwealth House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, ‘Chapter 4: Drones
and privacy’ Eyes in the Sky, Inquiry into drones and the regulation of air safety and privacy (July 2014), 33. At
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Social_Policy_and_Legal_Affairs/Drones/Report
(viewed 6 July 2018).
10
Up to date information on the Project can be found at: Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Human Rights and
Technology Project’. At https://tech.humanrights.gov.au/ (viewed 18 June 2018).
11
The ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ follows the first industrial revolution, spanning from 1760 to 1840, involving the
th
development of mechanical production; the second industrial revolution, that commenced in the late 19 century through
th
to the early 20 century, that saw mass production enabled by electricity and the assembly line; and the third revolution,
often referred to as the computer or digital revolution, that took place in the 1960s through to the 1990s. See Klaus
Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, (Portfolio Penguin, 2017), 6 to 7.
12
Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, The Digital Economy: Opening up the Conversation, Consultation
paper on the Digital Economy Strategy (September 2017). At https://industry.gov.au/innovation/Digital-
Economy/Pages/default.aspx (viewed 10 June 2018).
13
Australian Government, Budget Measures 2018-19, Budget Paper No. 2 (8 May 2018) 151. At
https://www.budget.gov.au/2018-19/content/bp2/download/bp2_combined.pdf (viewed 22 June 2018).
14
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital platforms inquiry (4 December 2017). At
https://www.accc.gov.au/about-us/inquiries/digital-platforms-inquiry (viewed 16 June 2018).
15
Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Portfolio Penguin, 2017), 7. At
https://luminariaz.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-2016-21.pdf (viewed 28 June 2018).
16
Dom Galeon, Stephen Hawking warns AI could replace humanity (8 November 2017) World Economic Forum. At
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/why-stephen-hawking-thinks-ai-might-replace-humans (viewed 18 June 2018).
17
D Scharre et al, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation of Frontal Lobe Networks to Treat Alzheimer’s Disease’, (2018) 62 (2) Journal
of Alzheimer's Disease, 621-633. At https://newatlas.com/brain-pacemaker-electrical-stimulation-alzheimers/53192/
18
Janice Williams, ‘Sophia the Robot Wants Women's Rights for Saudi Arabia’, Newsweek (online), 12 May 2017. At
http://www.newsweek.com/sophia-robot-saudi-arabia-women-735503 (viewed 18 June 2018).
19
Charter of the United Nations Preamble, art 1.
20
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (10 December 1948). At http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/ (viewed 6 July 2018).
21
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, (entered
into force 23 March 1976).
22
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS
3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
23
United Nations Convention the Rights of the Child UN GA Res 44/25 (20 November 1989). At
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/crc.pdf (viewed 6 July 2018).
24
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 December
1979, 189 UNTS 1249 (entered into force 3 September 1981).
25
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 3 May 2008).
26
International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December
1965, 660 UNTS 195( Entry into force 4 January 1969).
52
27
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(2011), endorsed by the Human Rights Council on 16 June 2011 in resolution 17/4. At
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/2 (viewed 13 May 2018).
28
The High Court of Australia has said the freedom of political communication is implied from the system of
representative and responsible government set up by the terms and structure of the Australian Constitution. See, eg,
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34; (2015)
89 ALJR 857; and, most recently, Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43.
29
See, especially Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Australian Human Rights
Commission Act 1986 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), Age Discrimination Act, 2004 (Cth); Fair Work Act
2009 (Cth).
30
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)
31
Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms-Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws
(ALRC Report 129, 2 March 2018), Chapter 2, Rights and Freedoms in Context, Common Law Foundations. At
https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/common-law-foundations (viewed 25 June 2018).
32
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s 11.
33
See Australian Government, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. At https://www.oaic.gov.au/ (viewed 6
July 2018); Australian Government, Office of the eSafety Commissioner. At https://www.esafety.gov.au/ (viewed 6 July
2018).
34
See Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny Act 2011 (Cth).
35
Gerard Goggin, ‘Digital Rights in Australia’, University of Sydney (2017), 1-2. At
http://digitalrightsusyd.net/research/digital-rights-in-australia-report/ (viewed 18 June 2018).
36
See, for example, the Identity-Matching Services Bill 2018 (Cth) and the Australian Passports Amendment (Identity-
matching Services) Bill 2018 (Cth). If passed, these Bills would enable government and some non-government entities to
collect, use and disclose identification information in order to operate new biometric face-matching services.
37
Wayne Lonstein, ‘Drone technology: The good, the bad and the horrible’, Forbes (online), 22 January 2018. At
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/01/22/drone-technology-the-good-the-bad-and-the-
horrible/2/#2ab8516d8fa4 (viewed 18 June 2018).
38
See Jacob Morgan, ‘A Simple Explanation of the ‘The Internet of Things’ Forbes (online), 21 May 2014. At
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-
understand/#7eb0f5391d09 (viewed 22 June 2018); Andrew Meola, ‘How smart cities and IoT will change our
communities’, Business Insider (online) (20 December 2016). At http://www. businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-
smart-cities-2016-10/?r=AU&IR=T (viewed 26 June 2018).
39
Kate Allman, ‘The dark side of Bitcoin’ (2018) 42 Law Society Journal of NSW, 28. At
https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=436097450333633;res=IELHSS (viewed 18 June 2018).
40
See for example Cathy O’Neill, Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens
st
democracy (Crown Publishing Group, 1 ed, 2016).
41
Klaus Schwab, with Nicholas Davis, Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution: A Handbook for Citizens, Policy Makers,
Business Leaders and Social Influencers (Portfolio Penguin, 2018) 48.
42
See, for example, the proposed approaches to artificial intelligence in C Corinne et al, ‘Artificial Intelligence and the
'Good Society': The US, EU, and UK Approach’ (December 23, 2016) SSRN. At
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906249 (viewed 10 June 2018).
43
IEEE Standards Association, IEEE Global Initiative for Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
Autonomous Systems (AS) Drives, together with IEEE Societies, New Standards Projects; Releases New Report on
Prioritizing Human Well-Being (21 June 2018). At http://standards.ieee.org/ news/2017/ieee_p7004.html (viewed 21
June 2018).
44
A Campolo, M Sanfilippo, M Whitttaker, K Crawford, AI Now 2017 Report, AI Now Institute (2017), 32. At
https://ainowinstitute.org/reports.html (viewed 15 June 2018).
45
UK House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: ready, willing and able? (HL Paper 100,
AIC0196), (18 April 2018) [419]. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf (viewed 29 June
2018).
46
The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project, Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial
Intelligence (AIC0196) (6 September 2017), [12]. At https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Artificial-
Intelligence/AI-Written-Evidence-Volume.pdf (viewed 29 June 2018).
47
The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project, Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial
Intelligence (AIC0196) (6 September 2017), [15]. At https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Artificial-
Intelligence/AI-Written-Evidence-Volume.pdf (viewed 29 June 2018).
48
See for example Australian Human Rights Commission, Human rights based approaches (not dated). At
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-based-approaches (viewed 19 June 2018); Scottish Human Rights
Commission, A human rights based approach: an introduction, (not dated). At
http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/rights-in-practice/human-rights-based-approach/ (viewed 13 May 2018).
49
Klaus Schwab, with Nicholas Davis, Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution: A Handbook for Citizens, Policy Makers,
Business Leaders and Social Influencers (Portfolio Penguin, 2018), 44.
50
Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, UN Doc A/HRC/17/2 (16 May 2011), [67]. At http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf (viewed 19 June 2018).

51
Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Chapter 8, A right to access the internet.’ Background Paper Human Rights in
Cyberspace (2013). At https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/background-paper-human-rights-cyberspace/3-
freedom-expression-and-internet (viewed 9 July 2018).
52
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS
3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) art 15.
53
Farida Shaheed, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: The right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012) 1. At https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/134/91/PDF/G1213491.pdf?OpenElement (viewed 16 June 2018).
54
scientific progress and its applications, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012), [21].
55
scientific progress and its applications, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012), [23].
56
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, A human rights-based approach to data (2015). At
http://hrbaportal.org/resources/a-human-rights-based-approach-to-data-leaving-no-one-behind-in-the-2030-development-
agenda (viewed 13 May 2018).
57
Known as the Oviedo Convention. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, opened for signature
4 April 1997, ETS No 164 (entered into force 1 December 1999), art 1. At https://rm.coe.int/168007cf98 (viewed 18 June
2018).
58
Sarah Bannerman, ‘Preventing social media from interfering in Canadian elections’, The Conversation (online), 21
March 2018. At https://theconversation.com/preventing-social-media-from-interfering-in-canadian-elections-93565
59
Cathy O’Neill, Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy (Crown
st
Publishing Group, 1 ed, 2016).
60
Klaus Schwab, with Nicholas Davis, Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution: A Handbook for Citizens, Policy
Makers, Business Leaders and Social Influencers (Portfolio Penguin, 2018), 103.
61
American Civil Liberties Union of California et al, Mobile Justice Ca App (16 June 2018). At
https://www.mobilejusticeca.org/ (viewed 19 June 2018).
62
Steven Livingston, ‘Digital Affordances and Human Rights Advocacy’, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No 69
(March 2016). At http://www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen/sfb-700-working_papers/wp69/SFB-Governance-Working-
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63
ABC, ‘Facebook: UN blames social media giant for spreading hatred of Rohingya in Myanmar’ ABC (online), 13 March
2018. At http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-13/facebook-played-a-determining-role-in-myanmar-crisis-un/9542464
64
Norton Symantec, ‘Norton study shows online harassment nears epidemic proportions for young Australian women.’
(Media Release 8 March 2016). At https://www.symantec.com/en/au/about/ newsroom/press-
releases/2016/symantec_0309_01(viewed 10 June 2018).
65
Norton Symantec, ‘Norton study shows online harassment nears epidemic proportions for young Australian women.’
(Media Release 8 March 2016). At https://www.symantec.com/en/au/about /newsroom/press-
releases/2016/symantec_0309_01 (viewed 10 June 2018).
66
Amnesty International, Australia: Poll reveals alarming impact of online abuse against women (7 February 2018)
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67
Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Portfolio Penguin, 2017), 46. At
https://luminariaz.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-2016-21.pdf (viewed 28 June 2018).
68
United Nations Women, Making Innovation and technology Work for Women, (September 2017), 4. At:
http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/7/making-innovation-and-technology-work-for-women
(viewed 5 July 2018). For example, the report notes that the global internet user gender gap has grown from 11% in
2013 to 12% in 2016. Over 1.7 billion women don’t own mobile phones. Women are on average 14% less likely to own a
mobile phone than men, which translates into 200 million fewer women than men owning mobile phones. When women
do own mobile phones, they use phones less frequently and intensively than men, especially mobile internet.
69
Andy Greenberg, ‘Over 80 percent of dark-web visits relate to paedophilia, study finds’, Wired (online), 30 December
2014. At https://www.wired.com/2014/12/80-percent-dark-web-visits-relate-pedophilia-study-finds/ (viewed 15 June
2018).
70
Ilan Katz et al, Research on youth exposure to, and management of, cyberbullying incidents in Australia, Synthesise
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J Thomas, J Barraket, C Wilson, C Ewing, T MacDonald, J Tucker, E Rennie, Measuring Australia’s Digital Divide:
The Australian Digital Inclusion Index 2017, (RMIT University, Melbourne, for Telstra) 6. At
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19 June 2018).
72
J Thomas, J Barraket, C Wilson, C Ewing, T MacDonald, J Tucker, E Rennie, Measuring Australia’s Digital Divide: The
Australian Digital Inclusion Index 2017, (RMIT University, Melbourne, for Telstra) 6. At
19 June 2018).
73
54
19 June 2018).
74
19 June 2018).
75
Carlson, B ‘Indigenous Australia’s diverse memorialisation of the dead’ The Conversation, 18 November 2014. At
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E Rennie, T Yunkaporta, I Holcombe-James, Cyber Safety in Remote Aboriginal Communities: Final Report.
Melbourne: Digital Ethnography Research Centre (2018 RMIT University). At http://apo.org.au/node/172076 (viewed 20
June 2018); J Glanville, Submission to Productivity Commission, Data Availability and Use Inquiry, 29 July 2016, 2-4.
At https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/203234/sub060-data-access.pdf (viewed 25 June 2018).
77
Testimony of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook to the US Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transport, Facebook, ‘Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data’. Washington
D.C, 10 April 2018, 112. At https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/9d8e069d-2670-4530-bcdc-
d3a63a8831c4/7C8DE61421D13E86FC6855CC2EA7AEA7.senate-commerce-committee-combined-qfrs-06.11.2018.pdf
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189
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), s 5(1).
190
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), s 376, ss 380-381.
191
Australian Communications and Media Authority, Telecommunications Disability Standard (Requirements for
Customer Equipment for use with the Standard Telephone Service — Features for special needs of persons with
disabilities, AS/ACIF S040) 2015, 17 February 2015. At https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2015L00191 (viewed 21
June 2018).
192
Standards Australia, About us (20 June 2018). At https://www.standards.org.au/ (viewed 20 June 2018).
193
Commonwealth of Australia, National Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (2011). At
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/national_disability_strategy_2010_2020.pdf (viewed 19
June 2018).
194
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 4(2).
195
Digital Transformation Agency, Digital Service Standard (10 May 2017) Australian Government. At
https://www.dta.gov.au/standard/ (viewed 16 May 2018).
196
Digital Transformation Agency, Gov.au content guide (10 May 2018) Australian Government. At
https://guides.service.gov.au/content-guide/accessibility-inclusivity/ (viewed 10 May 2018).
197
Department of Finance, Accessibility ICT Procurement Standard (9 September 2016) Australian Government. At
https://www.finance.gov.au/blog/2016/09/09/Accessibility-ICT-Procurement-Standard/ (viewed 20 June 2018).
198
W3C Web Accessibility Initiative, Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Overview (15 June 2018). At
https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/wcag/ (viewed 15 June 2018).

199
W3C Web Accessibility Initiative, Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1. I (15 June 2018). At
http://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/ (15 June 2018).
200
Peter Alexander, Australian Government releases the Web Accessibility National Transition Strategy (30 June 2010)
Department of Finance. At https://www.finance.gov.au/blog/2010/06/30/ australian-government-releases-web-
accessibility-national-transition-strategy/ (viewed 15 June 2018). See the Commission advisory note on the Guidelines:
Australian Human Rights Commission World Wide Web Access: Disability Discrimination Act Advisory Notes ver 4.1
(2014). At https://www.humanrights.gov.au/world-wide-web-access-disability-discrimination-act-advisory-notes-ver-41-
2014 (viewed 5 July 2018).
201
International Organization for Standardization. Standards (20 June 2018). At https://www.iso.org /standards.html (15
June 2018).
202
International Electrotechnical Commission, International standards and conformity assessment for all electrical,
electronic and related technologies (10 June 2018). At http://www.iec.ch/index.htm (viewed 10 June 2018).
203
204
Inclusive design research centre, What is inclusive design, OCAD University. At https://idrc.ocadu.ca/about-the-
idrc/49-resources/online-resources/articles-and-papers/443-whatisinclusivedesign (viewed 25 June 2018).
205
Paul T Jaeger, ‘Disability, human rights, and social justice: The ongoing struggle for online accessibility and equality’
(2015) 20 (9), First Monday. At http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view/6164/4898 (viewed 15 June 2018).
206
Paul T Jaeger, ’Disability, human rights, and social justice: The ongoing struggle for online accessibility and equality’
(2015) 20 (9), First Monday. At http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view/6164/4898 (viewed 15 June 2018).
207
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Global Initiative for Inclusive ICTs (G3ict), Model ICT accessibility
policy report (2014) 3. At https://www.itu.int/pub/D-PHCB-SIS_A.01 (viewed 10 June 2018).
208
International Electrotechnical Commission, International Organisation for Standardisation, International
Telecommunications Union, IEC/ISO/ITU Policy on Standardization and accessibility (10 June 2018). At
http://www.iec.ch/newslog/2014/pdf/IEC_ISO_ITU_Joint_Policy_Statement_on
_Standardization_and_Accessibility_Final_version.pdf (viewed 10 June 2018).
209
UNESCO, G3ict, IDA, ITU, Microsoft, Telecentre.org Foundation, The ICT opportunity for a disability-inclusive
development framework (September 2013) Synthesis report of the ICT Consultation in support of the High-Level
Meeting on Disability and Development of the sixty eight session of the UN General Assembly p 37. At
https://www.itu.int/en/action/accessibility/
Documents/The%20ICT%20Opportunity%20for%20a%20Disability_Inclusive%20Development%20Framework.pdf;
210
G Goggin, S Hollier, W Hawkins, ‘Internet accessibility and disability policy lessons for digital inclusion and equality
from Australia’ (2017) 6 (1) Journal on internet regulation 7.
211
G Goggin, S Hollier, W Hawkins, ‘Internet accessibility and disability policy lessons for digital inclusion and equality
from Australia’ (2017) 6 (1) Journal on internet regulation 9.
212
Updated information on the White Paper, co-authored by the Australian Human Rights Commission and the World
Economic Forum, will be available on the Project website: https://tech.humanrights.gov.au/.
213
214
215
UNESCO, G3ict, IDA, ITU, Microsoft, Telecentre.org Foundation, The ICT opportunity for a disability-inclusive
development framework (September 2013) Synthesis report of the ICT Consultation in support of the High-Level
Meeting on Disability and Development of the sixty eight session of the UN General Assembly p 36.
216
Many of these suggestions have been raised in: UNESCO, G3ict, IDA, ITU, Microsoft, Telecentre.org Foundation,
The ICT opportunity for a disability-inclusive development framework (September 2013). Synthesis report of the ICT
Consultation in support of the High-Level Meeting on Disability and Development of the sixty eight session of the UN
General Assembly p 44; IEC/SIO/ITU Policy on Standardization and accessibility, International Electrotechnical
Commission, International Organisation for Standardisation, International Telecommunications Union, IEC/ISO/ITU
Policy on Standardization and accessibility (10 June 2018). At http://www.iec.ch/newslog/2014/pdf/
IEC_ISO_ITU_Joint_Policy_Statement_on _Standardization_and_Accessibility_Final_version.pdf (viewed 10 June
2018).
217
See for example; Technopedia, Algorithm, At https://www.techopedia.com/definition/3739/algorithm 9viewed 22 June
2018); S Deangelis, Artificial Intelligence: How algorithms make systems smart. At
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/artificial-intelligence-algorithms-2/ (22 June 2018).
218
Oxford Dictionary, Definition of artificial intelligence in English (22 June 2018). At
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial_intelligence (viewed 22 June 2018).
219
For more information see Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT 6.S099: Artificial General Intelligence, (January
2018 online course). At https://agi.mit.edu/ viewed 24 June 2018). B Lake, T Ullman, J Tenenbaum, s Gershman,
‘Building machines that learn and think like people’,(2017) 40, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 253. At
http://web.stanford.edu/class/psych209/Readings/LakeEtAlBBS.pdf (viewed 25 Jun e2018).
220
See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, A/RES/61/106
(entered into force 3 May 2008) art 2; World Health Organisation, Assistive devices and technologies (26 June 2018)
World Health Organisation. At http://www.who.int/disabilities/technology/en/ (viewed 26 June 2018).
221
Editorial Team, The Intersection of AI and Big Data (25 October 2017) Inside Big Data. At
https://insidebigdata.com/2017/10/25/intersection-ai-big-data/ (viewed 28 June 2018).
60
222
For more information see Justin Jaffe, What is bitcoin? Here’s everything you need to know (12 February 2018)
CNET. At https://www.cnet.com/how-to/what-is-bitcoin/ (viewed 26 June 2018).
223
For more information see Blockgeeks, What is blockchain technology? A step by step guide for beginners (2016). At
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (viewed 23 June 2018); R Hackett, Wait, what is
blockchain? (23 May 2016) Fortune. At http://fortune.com/2016/05/23 /blockchain-definition/ (22 June 2018).
224
Investopedia, Chatbot (24 June 2018) At https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chatbot.asp (viewed 22 June 2018).
225
Tahu, Kukutai, John Taylor, ‘Data sovereignty for Indigenous peoples: current practice and future needs’. In Tahu,
Kukutai, John Taylor (eds), Indigenous Data Sovereignty, Toward and Agenda, in Australian National University Press
(2016)2.
226
Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, The Digital Economy: Opening up the Conversation, Consultation
paper on the Digital Economy Strategy (September 2017) 9. At https://industry.gov.au/innovation/Digital-
Economy/Pages/default.aspx (viewed 10 June 2018).
227
See Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Portfolio Penguin, 2017).
228
For further information see Google Developers, Machine Learning Glossary (22 June 2018). At
https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/glossary/ (viewed 25 June 2018).
229
Jacob Morgan, ‘A Simple Explanation of the ‘The Internet of Things’, 21 May 2014, Forbes (online). At
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-
understand/#7eb0f5391d09 (viewed 22 June 2018); Andrew Meola, ‘How smart cities and IoT will change our
communities’, Business Insider (online), 20 December 2016). At http://www. businessinsider.com/internet-of-things-
smart-cities-2016-10/?r=AU&IR=T (viewed 26 June 2018).
230

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Ethics & Global Politics
ISSN: 1654-4951 (Print) 1654-6369 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zegp20
The power of rights and the rights of power: what

future for human rights?
Richard Falk
To cite this article: Richard Falk (2008) The power of rights and the rights of power: what future for
human rights?, Ethics & Global Politics, 1:1-2, 81-96, DOI: 10.3402/egp.v1i1.1815
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v1i1.1815
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Ethics & Global Politics
Vol. 1, No. 12, 2008, pp. 8196
CRITICAL DEBATE
The power of rights and the rights of

power: what future for human rights?
Richard Falk*
Abstract
This article explores the tensions between geopolitics and human rights under present conditions
of world politics. It takes notes of the rise of human rights as a discourse in international law, and
draws attention to the use of this discourse by powerful states, especially the United States, to
validate non-defensive uses of force. It also notes the role of the media in facilitating the geopolitical
agenda associated with exerting pressure on some conditions (Darfur, China, Cuba) but exempting
other situations as serious or more so (Gaza, Saudi Arabia). This article also discusses the reliance
on the human rights discourse by oppressed groups and by countries in the South, and the
emergence of a counter-hegemonic tradition in human rights that challenges geopolitical projects
in a variety of settings. The main conclusion is that neither an uncritical endorsement nor a cynical
dismissal of human rights is appropriate at this time.
Keywords: human rights; geopolitics; hegemony; counter-hegemony; international law
Ever since the end of World War II human rights have been a controversial and
complex topic. Realists have been disappointed because of their central conviction
that foreign policy should be governed exclusively by the pursuit of material interests.
Liberal internationalists, believers in soft power, have been disappointed because
political leaders often failed to take seriously human rights concerns in their dealings
overseas. These opposing outlooks are further confused by the extent to which there
exist multiple roles for a human rights diplomacy. Even the most cynical realist
appreciates a selective emphasis on the failures to respect human rights that can be
attributed to hostile states. And most liberal internationalists are deferential to
strategic relationships, and tend to overlook the violations of aligned states.
This article explores this tension between rights and power under the headings of
the power of rights and the rights of power. The main argument of the paper is that
rights of power prevail over the power of rights almost always when strategic interests
*Correspondence to: Richard Falk, Professor emeritus of International Law, Princeton University.
Email: falk@global.ucsb.edu
#2008 R Falk. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permiting
all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited. Citation: Ethics & Global Politics 2008. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v1i1.1815
82 R. Falk
of major state actors are at stake, and this is true whether the orientation toward
world politics reflects a realist or a liberal internationalist persuasion. There is a
second line of argument that insists that a critical perspective is adopted toward the
relationship between the advocacy of human rights (rights talk) and the dynamics of
implementation (rights work). A major contention here is that the United States has
in recent years been particularly manipulative in these respects, championing rights
talk as a key tenet of the neoconservative worldview while actively obstructing rights
work whenever it conflicts with grand strategy, and worse, officially pursuing policies
that involve flagrant rights abuse, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
In concluding that the power of rights, although a much more potent reality than
would have seemed likely a century ago, is still no match for the rights of power in a
variety of settings. Part of this mismatch arises from the militarist forms of global
hegemony that continue to be practiced by dominant sovereign states despite some
contradictory developments in international law and in defiance of the Charter of the
United Nations. A more Gramscian turn in global hegemony could create incentives
for the more powerful political actors to enhance their legitimacy by encouraging
respect for human rights as the foundation of effective leadership on the world stage.
There are no indications that such a turn is likely, but all is not lost.
Another set of possibilities will be explored. These are associated with a counter-
hegemonic approach to human rights based on mounting challenges to the rights of
power at the grassroots and in the development of post-colonial diplomacy. The anti-
globalization movement, as supported by governments in the South and by an array
of civil society actors, is illustrative of efforts to augment the power of rights with
respect to polices bearing on economic and social justice. This counter-hegemonic
option is both establishing an appropriate discourse (rights talk on behalf of global
justice goals) and a supportive practice (rights work by way of resistance and
demonstrations, politics from below, as well as through coalitions between anti-
geopolitical governments and transnational civil society movements). The global
process that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court is
illustrative of counter-hegemonic diplomacy. This project as a juridical undertaking
seemed unattainable from a realist perspective given the opposition of leading states,
and yet it happened, but happening is only a symbolic victory for counter-hegemonic
forces. A substantive victory would require that rights of power give way to the claims
of international criminal accountability, and this seems unlikely in the foreseeable
future, that is, so long as the structures of global authority sustain existing
geopolitical hierarchies, politics from above. It should be observed that the concept
of hegemony that has been adopted by the advocates of ‘counter-hegemonic’ politics
and law assumes an established order of inequality and exploitation managed
through coercion and manipulation, and reinforced by a highly corporatized media.
This is not the ‘benevolent hegemony’ or ‘empire lite’ so beloved by neoconservatives
and liberal hawks, but rather a violent geopolitics that continues even in this post-
colonial era to victimize most of humanity.
It follows that human rights is conceived of as a terrain of struggle in an ongoing
battle between disciplinary use of norms and rights to stabilize existing oppressive,
The power of rights and the rights of power 83
exploitative, and humiliating power structures as distinguished from their emanci-

patory role when used by social forces aligned with the oppressed, the poor and
weak, the forgotten, and the victimized margins of various societal and governmental
arrangements.1 That is, the rights of power include the appropriation of rights and
norms to promote current geopolitical objectives, while the power of rights confers a
normative edge with a still underutilized potential for moral and legal mobilization in
the struggle to achieve global justice and a humane global political order.
The first main section of the article looks at top-down modalities that concentrate
on the complex ways in which dominant political actors manipulate language, and
use their geopolitical muscle, so as impose their will. The role of rights is especially
important in this era as a way of legitimating, or at least rationalizing, the use of
naked force in world politics in ways that violate international law and the United
Nations Charter. The second principal section looks at a bottom up antidotes to the
rights of power, exploring the capacity of grassroots forces in global civil society and
their governmental allies to work toward global justice in a variety of settings. In these
contexts the language and pursuit of rights provides a moral motivation for initiatives
that aim both to resist oppressive moves emanating from the established order and to
transform the status quo in accord with goals associated with equity, equality, and
human solidarity.
THE RIGHTS OF POWER

There are many past and present human ordeals that could be chosen to illustrate the
multifaceted connections between ‘rights talk’ and ‘rights work,’ as well as to clarify
the closely linked appropriation of the ‘the power of rights’ by ‘the rights of power.’
My overall intention is to work toward the construction of a normative language and
praxis for human rights as discourse and behavior that is more consistently
responsive to individuals and groups, including entire people, entrapped in highly
oppressive, exploitative, and humiliating circumstances.
To select the Palestinian situation to illustrate the essential character of the rights
of power is deliberatively provocative as it challenges Israel’s main pattern of
justification based on its defensive right to uphold the security of its territory and
protect its population. To insist that these Israeli policies are unlawful is controversial
in many liberal democracies, as is the contention that the Palestinian plight is both
concealed and distorted in most mainstream formats of public communication,
especially in the United States. From the perspective of normative expectations
derived from international humanitarian law, objectively assessed, the Palestinians
are victims of multiple abuses associated with prolonged Israeli occupation and harsh
security tactics that defy the rules of conduct contained in the Geneva Conventions.
The scale and severity of abuse approaches, if not attains genocidal proportions as a
consequence of the unremitting siege imposed by Israel on the people of Gaza in
recent months. This siege has raised well-documented risks of imminent massive
famine and disease, as well as causing many daily forms of psychological and material
84 R. Falk
forms of suffering.2 It qualifies, politically and morally, as a continuing Crime

Against Humanity, and by its deliberateness in the face of information as to its
impacts on the civilian population of Gaza, also as genocide.3
Yet that part of the world that stakes its claim to the post-colonial moral high
ground on its adherence to the norms of liberal democracy and its advocacy of
human rights seems hypocritical, considering the pronounced selectivity of what it
fails to see and what it sees.4 The main claimants to this high ground are the
countries of Europe and North America.5 As could be expected given this analysis,
the zealously self-righteous leadership of the United States refuses to treat the
unfolding Gazan catastrophe as a human rights challenge. On the contrary, official
Washington actively supports the Israeli policies that seem directly responsible for
the massive suffering that is befalling the 1.5 million people of Gaza.6
By their silence, and beyond this, by their diplomatic and material support of these
repressive policies, these states that talk so much about human rights, and lecture
the non-Western world about their duty to uphold these norms, never even reach the
stage of admitting that there exists a challenge of rights work in relation to the
Palestinians. These rights talkers, reinforced by the rights of power, intensified their
punishment of the Palestinian people after the outcome of internationally monitored
free elections brought Hamas to power in January 2006. For daring to vote as they
did for Hamas candidates, the entire citizenry of Gaza have been severely punished
by imposing a comprehensive siege and through withholding international economic
assistance from a people that had already been mired in deep poverty, widespread
unemployment, and the multiple dangers and hardships of a long and violent
occupation, as well as enduring a series of lethal insecurities arising from frequent
Israeli military incursions using advanced weapons technology and adopting
menacing, humiliating, and arbitrary forms of border control.
On the level of rights talk, the Palestinian case is more deeply revealing of the
extent to which the supposed global promise of human rights is broken whenever it
seriously collides with geopolitical priorities, what I am calling with deliberate irony,
‘the rights of power.’ If the underlying conflict between Israel and Palestine were to be
assigned to an independent third-party mechanism to assess from the perspective of
law and morality the respective claims of the two sides, there is little doubt that the
outcome would favor the Palestinians on every key disputed issue7: that is, ending
the occupation by requiring an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian
territory; by resolving territorial claims and reestablishing borders that existed before
the 1967 War; by determining the legal status of Israeli settlements in accordance
with the Fourth Geneva Convention8; by carrying out the mandate of the World
Court in its Advisory Opinion relating to the legality of Israel’s security fence
constructed on occupied Palestinian territory9; by restoring the demographics and
boundaries of Jerusalem, and by invalidating the assignment of sovereign rights over
the city to Israel; by upholding the legal entitlements of Palestinian refugees claiming
a right of return; and by determining the use rights of access to ground water aquifers
located beneath Palestinian territory. A central aspect of the rights of power has been
Israel’s capacity, reinforced by the United States, to exclude such assessments of the
legal merits and moral force of the respective claims of the two sides from the
actuality of any unfolding so-called ‘peace process.’10 Instead of rights talk, which is
excluded, what is offered up for discussion by Israel are ‘facts on the ground,’ the
security concerns of the Israeli people, and the allegedly dysfunctional refusal of
Palestinian leaders to accept whatever one-sided solution to the conflict an Israeli
government puts forward at a particular time.11
Conceptually, what is exhibited is the displacement of rights talk, even talk, by the
rhetoric and exercise of power, and in the process it should be noticed that rights
work is erased altogether from the active political agenda. Resisting this erasure,
often derided as irresponsible, meant opposing conventional wisdom at the time.
This lonely work of resistance explained why Edward Said, and other principled and
stalwart Palestinians, were so distressed by the Oslo Peace Process of the 1990s and
by the grandstanding attempt of the Clinton presidency at Camp David II.12 These
diplomatic initiatives were at the time widely hailed as constructive breakthroughs for
peace by the self-appointed moral guardians of the geopolitical order, and their
structural bias against Palestinians was mostly overlooked at the time. The most
telling indication of this bias was reliance on the United States as the ‘honest broker’
of this peace process despite its consistently self-proclaimed identity as the
unconditional ally of Israel. This should have been discrediting enough to invalidate
the whole undertaking. There were other signs as well that the framework established
for the peace process was itself too reflective of the unequal power relations to have
any realistic hope of producing a fair outcome that should have been acceptable to
the two sides, given their respective rights under international law and their
reasonable expectations. In the Oslo framework agreement that initiated the
negotiations there was an absence of any reference to a Palestinian right of self-
determination or sovereign status, nor any indication that the imbalances in power
and diplomatic leverage would be mediated by way of deference to the determination
of rights via international law.
It is arguable that the weaker side deserves an intermediary biased in its favor to
offset its bargaining disadvantages, but it would be unprecedented for the stronger
side to agree to such an arrangement. The most, but also the least, that the weaker
side could hope for is a neutral diplomatic setting, with an intermediary that was a
credible interlocutor, bringing as much balance, reasonableness, and fairness to the
negotiations as possible. As suggested, an intermediary biased toward the stronger
side merely underscores the absence of any leverage on the weaker side, and with
such weakness has almost no prospect of receiving any satisfaction for its contested
claims and goals even if willing to engage in compromise and eager for a
reconciliation. It was not surprising that the United States made little existential
attempt to be an ‘honest broker’ at Camp David, but rather crudely played the part
of ‘power broker’ and Israeli advocate, adding its formidable support to the proposals
of Israel and blaming the Palestinians for their refusal to accept what Israel has
offered with a display of gratitude.13 It is disturbing that the mainstream media
uncritically reported Washington’s one-sided version of why the negotiations failed.
86 R. Falk
Such an erasure of the rights of the weak as a proper concern of inter-

governmental negotiations has the unintended effect of relegating genuine ‘rights
talk’ and ‘rights work’ to civil society militants, moderate governments, and the
margins of world public opinion. This relegation process is uneven, being far worse
in the United States with respect to the Palestinians than elsewhere in the world,
including even Europe. The attention of almost all ‘reasonable’ people in the West is
thereby shifted by a manipulative mind game to the prudent exercise of the ‘rights of
power.’ This becomes the inevitable result of an unequal bargaining relationship in
which the rights of the weak side are disregarded altogether by being deliberately
placed outside the domain of diplomacy. Adding to public confusion, the main-
stream media, especially in the United States, disarmingly claiming objectivity,
portrayed the proposals of Ehud Barak at Camp David II as ‘generous’ and
‘courageous.’ Yasir Arafat, as representing the Palestinians, was cast in the role of
‘spoiler’ whose opposition to the Israeli proposals was treated as convincing evidence
that he had never been truly interested in achieving ‘peace,’ was intent on resolving
the conflict through violence, and came to Camp David lacking the good faith
needed to negotiate a peace agreement. This false rendering of the failed diplomacy
later was relied upon by Israel to vindicate its use of excessive force to subdue the
Second Intifada. This angry challenge to the status quo emerged in late September
2000 directly from Palestinian frustrations and Israeli provocations (especially Ariel
Sharon’s notorious 28 September 2000 visit to the al Aqsa mosque on the Temple
Mount/Harim-al Sharif).
Against this background it was hardly surprising, yet inflammatory and inaccurate,
for President Clinton and other notables to declare in public that Arafat was
responsible for the breakdown of the peace negotiations. This background set the
stage for positing the unilateralist claims of Ariel Sharon to the effect that since the
Israelis had no ‘partner’ in their search for peace, they were entitled to proceed
unilaterally, imposing their own solution to the conflict and calling that ‘peace.’ As
argued, the geopolitically compliant media played a decisive part in producing such a
distorted view of these realities, inverting the equities in a manner that would make
even George Orwell blush: the strong side while being insistent on retaining most of
its unlawful advantages resulting from military and diplomatic dominance, as well as
its successful reliance as occupier on state terror and political violence, is applauded
for its peace initiatives and its reasonableness, whereas the weak side is scorned for its
imprudent and defiant rejectionism and its supposedly addictive reliance on
terrorism.
In this manner the rights of power consistently overwhelmed the power of rights in
public space. At the same time existential conditions of acute injustice are almost
totally exempt from mainstream scrutiny and criticism. Of course, this perception
and discourse relating to Israel/Palestine is largely inverted, with comparable
imbalance, throughout the Middle East and South Asia. This pro-Palestinian rights
talk has little impact on the dynamics of the frozen conflict: the problem-solving
matrix for this conflict, despite its geographic location, remains as firmly anchored in
the Eurocentric West as was the case during the colonial era.
This argument can be generalized far beyond the particular tragedies of the
Palestinian narrative, which is admittedly an unusual situation due to the degree and
unconditionality of American support for Israel that partly reflects domestic political
pressures that is arguably often at odds with United States national interests.14 Rights
talk is excluded from public consciousness, or artfully manipulated, whenever it gets
seriously in the way of the rights of power. For this reason the very possibility of
rights work is occluded from consciousness. This structure sustaining oppression and
obscuring various forms of cruelty was explicit in the relations between Europe and
the Middle East and South Asia during the colonial period, but it persists in many,
but not all, post-colonial settings, although in often disguised and inconsistent forms.
The root causes of different contexts of human suffering as it appears in many
political spaces continues to exist because the rights of power usually have the will
and capacity to prevent even a critical awareness from emerging.
This pattern is definitely descriptive of many inter-governmental and inter-
regional realities, but also in more complicated ways it affects a variety of intra-
governmental settings. For instance, the issue of Indian untouchability, dalits, and
caste subordination is almost as occluded from international rights talk as is the
ordeal of the Gazans, not because of any self-conscious strategy by outside political
actors, but because the plight of culturally and politically victimized Indians is not
nearly so geopolitically resonant as is the plight of Tibetans or Chechans. Whatever
the governmental context, by achieving this subordination, the question of rights
work never even gets on official political agendas. Arguably, and in a range of
circumstances, oppressive economic, political, and cultural structures within
sovereign states are responsible for the most persistent and severe denials of
fundamental rights in the world that affect by far the greatest number of lives.
These human wrongs are mainly indigenous, and can often be only indirectly, if at
all, linked to the colonial legacy. This fundamental distribution of authority to shape
human behavior continues almost exclusively under the control of leaders situated
behind the high, and virtually unbreachable, walls of sovereign states. This deference
to sovereignty is reinforced by continuing to accord legitimacy to a world order
composed of sovereign states.15 These states have long served as sanctuaries of
impunity in which the commission of ‘human wrongs’ often goes unnoticed, and
almost always go unpunished.16
A spectacular exception occurred in 1998 when the former Chilean dictator,
Augusto Pinochet, was detained in Britain in response to an extradition request to
face charges in Spain for crimes against humanity and other abuses of power during
his tenure as president of Chile. The drama surrounding the detention of Chile’s
former dictator suggested that it might be possible in certain rare circumstances to
overcome impunity. After a long litigating process in Britain Pinochet was sent home
to Chile because he was found unfit to stand trial by the British Foreign Secretary in
what many observers felt to be a political decision dictated by a concern about the
treatment of political leaders by foreign legal systems. Pinochet died some years later
in Chile before any punitive initiatives were consummated in his home country.
German courts in the last few years have, for thinly disguised presumably similar
88 R. Falk
political reasons, been unwilling to exercise the jurisdictional authority contained in

their criminal laws to hold Donald Rumsfeld accountable for torture at Abu Ghraib,
despite the submission to the prosecutor of a strong dossier of incriminating
evidence. The promise of ‘universal jurisdiction’ has titillated the imagination of
liberal legalists, but it currently lacks the capacity to overcome the insulation of
international crimes of state from procedures of legal accountability except in some
rare special instances.17
This dynamic is actually given explicit recognition in some conceptualizations of
international law that accord hegemonic status power within the law, creating a
tension between the political/juridical myth that international relations and world
order are based on norms of ‘sovereign equality’ and assertions that inequalities of
status and power deserve to be acknowledged as having a ‘desirable’ lawmaking
effect.18 The most symbolically significant example of such an acknowledgement of
hegemonic international law is written into the Charter of the United Nations, which
makes the five states that prevailed in World War II (and were the first five to acquire
nuclear weapons) permanent members of the Security Council and alone entitled to
exercise a veto over its decisions. This two-tier UN hierarchy is actually less overtly
deferential to geopolitical claims in some respects than was the League of Nations
Covenant’s juridically inexplicable statement of deference to the Monroe Doctrine.
The UN approach to power and law has far more operational significance given the
centrality of the Security Council on matters of peace and security, and considering
the use of the veto, and its threatened use, by permanent members whenever
controversial decisions are being made, thereby often gridlocking the UN at times of
greatest urgency. In effect, this veto power institutionalizes ‘hegemonic international
law’ by formalizing sovereign inequality as a basic ordering principle of pervasive
operational significance.
It was also reinforced in judicial settings at the outset of the UN’s existence by the
reservation attached to the US acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
World Court, which allowed the US Government to prevent the submission of any
legal dispute within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by
the United States Government. When the World Court established its legal
competence over vigorous objections from Washington to decide the Nicaragua
case back in the 1980s, a dispute involving various hostile actions of the US directed
at undermining the legitimate Sandinista Government in Managua, the US
Government rescinded its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction altogether, typifying
its unwillingness to risk an impartial application of law and rights reaching an adverse
outcome.19 The rights of power also control the interminable yet frustrating
discourse on UN reform, with most attention by governments being devoted to
the rather superficial challenge of taking account of shifts in the geopolitical
landscape that have taken place since the UN was established in 1945. In effect, at
issue is whether India, Japan, Brazil, and others should be elevated to this status of
permanent members, with or without a veto power, but without any more general
consideration of whether a right of veto can ever be reconciled with the supposed
commitment of the UN to a law governed world.20
The docility of the United Nations with respect to its central mandate of war
prevention is a further demonstration of the rights of power overwhelming the power
of rights. The UN was widely heralded when the UN Security Council resisted in
2003 US geopolitical pressures to authorize the initiation of an aggressive war against
Iraq, but this was an extremely modest gesture of resistance. If more dispassionately
considered, the UN role would itself confirm the distortion of rights that is achieved
by the claims of power. From the perspective of legal rights, Iraq should have been
protected by UN collective security mechanisms against unlawful threats and uses of
force that had been made and carried out for many years prior to 2003 by the United
States and Great Britain, as well as from sanctions that were a form of collective
punishment victimizing the civilian population of Iraq.21 It is widely remembered
that when Madeleine Albright, the American Secretary of State during Clinton’s
second term, was asked by a TV newscaster in 1996 whether she thought the several
hundred thousand civilian casualties attributable to sanctions were worth this price
in lives, she replied chillingly: ‘Yes, we think the price is worth it.’22 In relations to the
imposition of sanctions, the UN was so effectively manipulated that it had endorsed a
geopolitical stance of the US Government that was completely oblivious to the rights
of the people of Iraq, and again, expectations were so low, that it was considered a
victory for ‘compassionate liberalism’ to soften the cruelty being experienced by the
Iraqi people during the 1990s to allow some food to be sent to Iraq in exchange for a
portion of Iraqi oil revenues. The point here is that if we look at the manner with
which rights and power are configured internationally, it becomes clear that even
rights talk at the UN and in other arenas where the participants are governments, is
often reduced to formalistic verbal communications that lack any pretension of
substantive seriousness in the sense of seeking behavioral results.
Or another example, the US Government after proclaiming in many ways,
especially since 9/11, that it will never be constrained by international law in the
pursuit of its security interests, in mid-February 2008 indignantly invoked interna-
tional law to protest the failure of the Serbian government to protect its embassy in
Belgrade after Kosovo’s controversial secessionist declaration of political indepen-
dence.23 What this illustrates, then, is the opportunistic use of international law, a
variant of ‘rights talk,’ by an hegemonic actor such as the United States whenever the
political leadership finds it convenient to do so. Because of the rights of power, such
opportunism rarely attracts adverse comment. The American claim is evaluated by
the UN membership as if the United States is itself a model adherent of international
law rather than being one of the worst offenders.
The dark side of this schizophrenic relationship to international law and human
rights is vividly disclosed by the approach taken to crimes of state committed by
political leaders. The extension of the Nuremberg Principles to the circumstances of
the 1990s helped create the profoundly misleading appearance that ‘a golden age of
human rights’ was emerging out of the leftover debris of the Cold War. More
accurate perceptions might have discerned the dawn of a new dark age for
international law and human rights: First came the legally dubious Kosovo War of
1999 under NATO auspices with its plausible human rights rationale, then came the
90 R. Falk
American response to 9/11 that included an array of encroachments on individual

rights, and then came the Iraq War with its flagrant disregard for international law
and the authority of the United Nations. On the glossy surface of world politics this
darkness was effectively ignored. With a variety of maneuvers behind the scenes, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, was induced to indict
Slobodan Milosevic while the NATO bombs were reigning down on Serbia in a non-
defensive war never endorsed by the UN Security Council.24 Worse still, despite
launching an aggressive war against Iraq, the captured leader, Saddam Hussein, was
subjected to political trial managed behind the scenes by the aggressor state and
summarily executed in a disgracefully discrediting manner. In both instances, the
enthusiasm for criminalizing the behavior of political leaders was undertaken to
provide an aura of legitimacy for the lawlessness of the hegemonic instigators, an
almost perfect instance of ‘empire’s law’ as there was a virtual guaranty of an absence
of symmetry in this revival of the Nuremberg ethos of accountability. Of course, at
Nuremberg itself this guaranty of impunity was formally part of the structure of
judicial assessment, which was somewhat later derided as victors’ justice.25
Despite such contradictions of usage, the geopolitical status of the United States,
makes power of rights appear formidable on those occasions when such a hegemonic
actor manifests the political will to implement rights claims. The rather dispiriting
point here is that the ‘rights of power’ are indispensable for achieving the ‘power of
rights’ in many specific situations given the way the world continues to be organized.
This pattern strengthens the impression that the most vulnerable are either erased
from view altogether (as had been the case until rather recently for indigenous
peoples, or currently, the people of Gaza) or their grievances are entirely ignored as
any corrective response is generally perceived as existing in a realm beyond the reach
of practical politics (as is the case for many abused minorities in larger states). Such
an assessment would be even more depressing from a humanistic perspective if it
were not the case that power itself is undergoing a variety of transformations that
enhance the leverage of the dispossessed and vulnerable.
THE POWER OF RIGHTS

No recent voice has been clearer than that of Balakrishnan Rajagopal in exposing the
hegemonic orientation of the liberal human rights movement, including that
associated with such leading human rights NGOs as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. By hegemonic orientation Rajagopal has in mind the
selectivity in the way rights talk and rights work are both implemented, highlighting
some instances, ignoring others. This critical task is necessary to undercut,
especially, arguments favoring ‘humanitarian intervention’ so as to circumvent the
prohibitions of law and morality associated with recourse to non-defensive force that
do not elicit approval from the UN Security Council. In the period of strategic
unipolarity since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the
predominant hegemon, and has consistently fused controversial claims to use force
with various humanitarian rationales. This practice has been particularly pronounced
during the Bush II presidency, and especially so since 9/11. And it has encouraged
the perception that rights talk obfuscates both the rights of power and lawlessness.26
Rajagopal is equally insightful in contemplating a counter-hegemonic potential for
a reoriented human rights movement. His words are worth quoting at some length
because they identify so clearly the uncertain fault line that separates hegemony from
emancipation when it comes to human rights:
Current human rights discourse and practice has a choice, a fork in the road. . .it
can either insinuate itself within hegemonic international law or it can serve as an
important tool in developing and strengthening a counter-hegemonic international
law. By ignoring the history of imperialism, by endorsing wars while opposing their
consequences, and by failing to link itself with social movements of resistance, the
main protagonists of the Western human rights discourse are undermining the
future of human rights itself.27
It is crucial for those world citizens with a progressive agenda not to bow down
before this hegemonic appropriation of human rights discourse, and limit a negative
response to exposé and criticism, however deserved.28 There exists an important
corpus of counter-hegemonic practice and discourse that can take political advantage
of the inter-governmental normative architecture of international human rights law.
This structure incorporates norms that are ethically helpful in challenging prevailing
forms of oppression and exploitation. This corpus of norms provides tools for
struggle and resistance, as well as critique, and offers a conception of engagement
that re-situates human rights on the emancipatory side of the geopolitical ledger of
accounts.
In this spirit of sincere dedication to the values that give rise to the norms,
progressive activists should pay close attention to Upendra Baxi’s broad injunction
made several decades ago ‘to take human suffering seriously,’ or as he more recently
formulated his outlook, to bridge ‘the immeasurable distance between what we call
‘‘human rights’’ and the right of all to be human; and that this distance can be begin
to be traversed only if we claim the audacity to look at the human rights models from
the standpoint of the historically oppressed groups.’ as the foundational imperative of
a counter-hegemonic human rights movement.29 To similar effect, with an eye
toward not confining popular struggles to the formal arenas of law and international
institutions, Smitu Kothari and Harsh Sheth write of the importance of evolving ‘a
social praxis, rooted in the need of the most oppressed communities, that seeks to
create norms of civilized existence, In any final instance, it is only this*a shared
vision of how we want to live as a collectivity*that can provide us the moral basis for
evolving our own conduct.’30 From these perspectives, the power of rights has had
several instructive historic successes within the broad framing of world order issues,
including the discrediting of colonial claims and the upgrading of the right of self-
determination; the affirmation of national sovereignty over natural resources; the
anti-apartheid, anti-racism struggle; the liberation of Eastern Europe by nonviolent
means; the pursuit of ‘another globalization’ oriented toward human well-being
rather than the efficiency of capital; and the continued elaboration of a human rights
92 R. Falk
architecture (norms and procedures) that provides legitimation for a variety of

emancipatory struggles (while admittedly also simultaneously providing tools to
validate an array of hegemonic projects). Reverting to Rajagopal’s reference to the
fork in the road confronting the human rights movement, reminds us of the closing
lines of Robert Frost’s familiar poem ‘The Road Not Taken’:
‘Two roads diverged in a wood, and I*
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.’
I think that there exists a better way to contemplate the contextual realities of the
counter-hegemonic approach to rights than to contemplate what to do at a fork in the
road. It is to recognize that the choice has actually been made quite a long time ago
by both sides: the mainstream human rights movement in the North generally, yet
not invariably, has chosen to work within the frame of hegemonic international law.
This is in line with the precepts of liberal internationalism (the ‘empire lite’ of
Michael Ignatieff) and moves along on the well-traveled road with positive results
achieved in those sectors of international life where the strategic motivations of the
hegemonic actor are either minimal or absent.
The other less traveled road has been best articulated by post-colonial thought,
made manifest through civil society initiatives, and given a loose institutional identity
by World Social Forum. It links perceptions and activities directly to the plight of the
vulnerable, the marginal, the oppressed, exploited, and abused. This emancipatory
undertaking finds itself moving in spurts and stops on this less traveled road,
sometimes effectively and at other times futilely, but its steadfastness and courage is
what in Frost’s words, makes ‘all the difference.’ The historic moment is
characterized, thus, not by a choice between alternatives but by two opposed sets
of priorities, one guided by grand strategy, the other by compassion and human
solidarity that only rarely converge in thought or action. One instance of convergence
occurred during the latter stages of the anti-apartheid campaign when dominant
governments were induced to empower claims for racial justice in South Africa,
achieving dramatic results.
This less traveled road as it pertains to human rights is synonymous with the
imperatives of counter-hegemonic discourse. Its heritage is most easily traced to the
efforts of Latin American jurists early in the twentieth century to use international
law with some success as a defensive strategy to mitigate, and eventually invalidate,
US interventionary diplomacy, and the accompanying unequal economic arrange-
ments that had been forcibly imposed and maintained. More globally, and in the
setting of the Middle East and Asia, the anti-colonial movement based on a creative
extension of the highly constrained self-determination ethos as disseminated by
Woodrow Wilson at the close of World War I, as well as the more faithful borrowing
by nationalist figures in Asia and Africa from a comparable endorsement of self-
determination made after World War I by Lenin.
What rights work has been done in recent years on the less traveled road of
counter-hegemonic creativity has been mainly due to the efforts of civil society actors
with a transnational agenda. There are many examples, but among the most
poignant, was ‘the tribunal movement’ prompted by the Iraq War (and a natural
sequel to the pre-war global demonstrations on 15 February 2003) and by the
silences of governments and the United Nations. This movement consisted of trials
in some 20 countries around the world. It was financed and organized by
representatives of civil society to assess the legality of the invasion and occupation
of Iraq and the criminal accountability of those leaders (and supportive actors,
including corporate officers, journalists). These efforts culminated in an elaborate
proceeding, enjoying wide coverage on the Internet and alternate media, in Istanbul
in 2005 that examined all facets of the legal and ethical case against the US/UK
policies in Iraq.31 This kind of initiative is the mirror image of the hegemonic
prosecutions of Milosevic and Saddam Hussein referred to above, but lacking the
backing of the power of rights, and resting its claims on the authority of the rights of
power. This counter-tradition associated with international legality and criminality
was organized during the Vietnam War acting on the initiative of Bertrand Russell
who was able to enlist the participation of leading intellectuals of the day, including
Jean-Paul Sartre, and was followed by the establishment in Rome of the Permanent
Peoples Tribunal dedicated to the same goals of exposure and truth-telling. From the
perspective of my understanding, a significant development over the years is reflected
in the shift of tribunal sites, that is, by the geographic move away from Europe to
Istanbul, which can claim a location that is at least as much Asian and Middle
Eastern as it is European.
A TRAJECTORY FOR THE POWER OF RIGHTS

The rights of power are well financed and motivated by the material sensibilities that
control almost every modern society. The power of rights needs to motivate its varied
constituencies by both the urgencies of its cause and the genuine, although not
assured, possibilities of producing improvements in the human conditions. Without
motivation there will be no struggle, and without struggle there will be no progress. A
few lines from a poem by the German poet, Günter Eich, express the promise and
responsibility associated with the power of rights:
No, don’t sleep while the arrangers of the world are busy!
Be suspicious of the power they claim
To have to acquire on your behalf!
Stay awake to be sure that your hearts are not empty, when
others calculate on the emptiness of your hearts!
Do what is unhelpful, sing songs from out of your mouths
that go against expectation!
Be ornery, be as sand, not oil in the thirsty machinery
of the world!
94 R. Falk
NOTES
1. This dual potentiality of human rights as used for purposes of mystification by dominant
political actors and for emancipatory goals by and on behalf of subjugated peoples contrasts
with the trenchant critique of human rights discourse and diplomacy as exclusively
instrumental and regressive. For this view see Anthony Carty’s (2007) important book,
The philosophy of international law, esp. 194195. Edinburgh, Scotland, Edinburgh University
Press.
2. The word ‘genocide’ is used here to describe a set of moral and political assessments, but
does not imply a legal conclusion that depends, according to the International Court of
Justice, on a level of documentary evidence that is unlikely to be available in the context of
Israel’s occupation policy directed at Palestine. For case see Bosnia and Herzogovina vs.
Serbia and Montenegro, ICJ Reports, 26 Feb. 2007; for comment see Jillayne Seymour (2007)
Jurisdiction and responsibility by necessary implication: genocide in Bosnia, Cambridge Law
Journal, 66(2), 249253; for a non-legal determination that Israel’s policies toward Gaza
have a genocidal quality see Ilan Pappe (2007) ‘Palestine 2007: genocide in Gaza, ethnic
cleansing in the West Bank,’ The Electronic Intifada. Available online at: http://electro-
nicintifada.net/v2/printer6374.shtml (accessed 11 January 2007); Pappe (2008) The mega
prison of Palestine, The Electronic Intifada. Available online at: http://electronicintifada.net/
v2/article9370.shtml (accessed 5 March 2008) Israel’s Deputy Defense Minister, Matan
Vilnai, warned Gaza of a ‘shoah’ if rockets from Gaza continue to imperil the security of
Israeli border towns and cities; later spokespersons insisted that Mr. Vilnai was using shoah
in the Hebrew sense of ‘disaster,’ not in its historical sense of denoting the Holocaust
experienced by the Jews due to the policies of Nazi Germany, but the association of the two
meanings of shoah was unavoidable, especially given the fact that Gaza was already a
disaster, and being described as genocide ever since Hamas took over political control of the
territory.
3. Whether this pattern of behavior is also genocide in a legal sense depends on a presently
unsatisfied condition: a determination by a duly constituted tribunal that hears allegations
and defenses. Note that such condition has not inhibited the label genocide from being
affixed to the Holocaust, the massacres carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or
numerous other instances. Most of the extensive literature on genocide draws its conclusion
on the basis of the facts of deliberate and systematic action taken against a particular ethnic
group, although it usually involves mass killing as its core characteristic, it could satisfy most
definitions if an intent to destroy the group in whole or in part is considered evidence of a
genocidal intent. Perhaps, the Israeli approach to Gaza is best expressed by the
conceptualization of ‘slow genocide.’ See Martha, L., Cottam, J. Huseby, & Lutze, F. E.
(2006) ’Slow genocide,’ paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society
of Political Psychology in Barcelona.
4. For instance, such a selective outlook sees with unremitting clarity violations of human rights
by Communist governments in Cuba or China, while not seeing much grander violations
committed by Israel or the United States.
5. For devastating critiques along these lines see Carty, Note 1, and Anne Orford (2003)
Reading humanitarian intervention: human rights and the use of force in international law.
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
6. See the notoriously one-sided text condemning Hamas responsibility for rocket attacks on
Israel that have caused 12 civilian deaths in Israel, while Israeli use of force in Gaza has
caused over 2,600 Palestinian civilian deaths in the same period. US House of
Representatives, H. RES. 951, 5 March 2008 passed by an incredible vote of 404-1. Any
deliberate targeting of civilians is illegal and immoral, but such condemnations should be
balanced by reference to the realities of harm being caused.
7. For general assessment along these lines see Richard Falk (2005) International law and the
peace process, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 28(3), 331348.
8. See Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War.
9. Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, ICJ Reports, 9 July 2004; the legal conclusions of the International Court of
Justice, the highest judicial arm of the UN System, was supported by a vote of 14-1,
including several European judges with an approach to international law respectful of
sovereign rights. The General Assembly urged by a vote of 150-6 (Israel, USA, Australia,
Micronesia, Palau, Marshall Islands), with 10 abstentions Israel to implement the findings of
law. General Assembly doc: GA/10248, 9 March 2004.
10. This refusal to resolve disputes by reference to respective legal rights as fairly determined is a
challenge to the whole idea central to the United Nations Charter that states should
renounce force in their resolution of force.
11. Dennis Ross, the chief diplomatic advisor to President Bill Clinton during 2000 Camp
David II negotiating sessions, influentially and exhaustively reports on his pervasive effort to
avoid any proposals that Israeli public opinion would be unwilling to swallow for the sake of
conflict resolution without paying the slightest attention to comparable concerns on the
Palestinian side, specifically, what it was reasonable to expect the Palestinians to accept. This
kind of approach to the search for a diplomatic solution was particularly outrageous given
the fact that the Palestinians were mainly seeking to exercise their right of self-determination
over only 22% of the original Palestine mandate, thereby conceding prior to negotiations
that pre-1967 Israel could expect to be secure within its 78% of the territory in dispute if an
agreement on Israeli withdrawal from the 22% could be achieved in the process of
establishing the state of Palestine. For Ross’s presentation of Camp David II see his massive
account: Dennis Ross (2004) The missing peace: the inside story of the fight for Middle East
peace. New York, Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
12. For Said’s (2000) views see his The end of the peace process: Oslo and after. New York,
Pantheon.
13. This tale of Israeli forthcomingness and generosity is disarmingly told in Ross, note 9; even
Israeli sources are more candid in distributing the blame for the failure of negotiations and
acknowledge that it is not clear that the Israeli proposals would have been accepted by
Knesset or Israeli public opinion. For a surprisingly objective account see Yoram Meital
(2006) Peace in tatters: Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner.
14. This issue is explored in depth by two international relations experts who had been
previously regarded as members of the American foreign policy establishment, but with this
criticism of the Israeli influence on American policy formation they have been themselves
somewhat marginalized. John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt (2007) The Israel lobby and
US foreign policy. New York, Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
15. This deference is disguised to some extent by the term ‘nation-state’ as if the nation is
genuinely synonymous with the state. For many minorities the state operates as a hostile trap
rather than as a security blanket. Governments do have the exclusive authority to confer
nationality for international purposes, including the issuance of passports, but this only
confuses the issue of whether nationalities within a particular state are adequately
represented and fairly treated. The image of ‘captive nations’ points to the reality where
minorities (and occasionally majorities, as in apartheid South Africa) are denied equality of
treatment, and may be targets of exploitation and abuse.
16. This indictment of Westphalian world order on these grounds has been most persuasively
achieved by Ken Booth (1995) Human wrongs in international relations, Journal of
International Affairs, 71, 103126; for further exploration see Tim Dunne & Nicholas J.
Wheeler (Eds) (1999) Human rights in global politics ; also, from a different perspective based
96 R. Falk
on the structure of world order, not on the coercive power of the individual sovereign state
see Chandra Muzaffar (Ed.) (1996) Human wrongs: reflections on western global dominance and
its impact upon human rights. Penang, Malaysia, Just World Trust.
17. For a comprehensive presentations of liberal legalist hopes associated with universal
jurisdiction see Stephen Macedo (Ed.) (2004) Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the
prosecution of serious crimes under international law. Philadelphia, PA, University of
Pennsylvania Press.
18. For examples of such formal rationalizations of hegemony as inhering within international
law see Detlev Vagts (2001) Hegemonic international law, American Journal of International
Law, 95(4), 843848 and José E. Alvarez (2003) Hegemonic international law revisited,
American Journal of International Law, 97(4), 873888. See also Nico Krisch (2005)
International law in times of hegemony: unequal power and the shaping of the international
legal order, The European Journal of International Law, 16(3), 369408.
19. For decision see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V.
USA), International Court of Justice Reports, 27 June 1986.
20. For a critique of the official dialogue on global reform from these perspectives see Richard
Falk (2008) Illusions of reform: needs, desires, and realities, in: Kevin P. Clements & Nadia
Mizner (Eds), The center holds: un reform for 21st century challenges, 1930. New Brunswick,
NJ, Transaction Publishers.
21. See Richard Falk (2008) The costs of war: international law, the UN, and World order after Iraq,
3751. New York, Routledge.
22. This statement was made on the TV program 60 Minutes, and followed upon a statement by
the newsperson, Leslie Stahl: We have heard that a half million children have died . . .I mean,
that’s more children than died in Hiroshima. And. . .and you know, is the price worth it? For
full text see http://www.uwire.com/content/topops0214001001.html.
23. See Jeremy Scahill (2008) The real story behind Kosovo’s independence, Truthout. Available
online at: http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/022408Y.shtml (accessed 23 February 2008).
24. For an overly devastating critique see John Laughland (2007) Travesty: the trial of Slobodan
Milosevic and the corruption of international justice. London, UK, Pluto.
25. Most completely depicted in the context of the Tokyo war crimes trials in Richard H. Minear
(1971) Victors’ justice: the Tokyo war crimes tribunal. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press.
26. This critique is well developed in Philippe Sands (2005) Lawless world. New York, Viking and
Marjorie Cohn (2007) Cowboy republic: six ways the bush gang has defied the law. Sausalito,
CA, PoliPoint Press.
27. Balakrishnan Rajagopal (2006) Counter-hegemonic international law: rethinking human
rights and development as a Third World strategy, Third World Quarterly, 27(5), 767783, at
775.
28. Several recent publications are relevant and encouraging. See Anne Orfeld, Note 5; Carty,
Note 1; Amy Bartholomew (Ed.) (2006) Empire’s law: the American imperial project and the
‘war to remake the world’. London, UK, Pluto; Ikechi Mgbeoji (2003) Collective insecurity: the
liberian crisis, unilateralism, & global order. Vancouver, Canada, UBC Press; Susan Marks
(2003) ‘Empire’s Law,’ Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10, 449466.
29. See Baxi (1989) From human rights to the right to be human: some heresies, in: Smitu
Kothari & Harsh Sheth (Eds), Rethinking human rights, 181166. Delhi, India, Lokayan, at
166; more recently, extending his analysis to the emerging circumstance of possibly being
‘posthuman.’ Baxi (2007) Human rights in a posthuman world. Delhi, India, Oxford.
30. Kothari & Sheth, Note 25, On Categories and Interventions, 117, at 9.
31. For proceedings see Müge Gürsöy Sökman (Ed.) (2008) World tribunal on Iraq. North-
ampton, MA, Olive Branch Press.
PANTONE 144 PANTONE 144
Protection of human rights defenders: Best practices and lessons learnt

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arising from the content of this work is that of the authors. Neither the persons who have written
this work nor the publishers can guarantee that the information in it is complete and free of error,
and they therefore cannot be held responsible for any harm associated with its use. No part of this
work may be taken as a standard or guarantee of any nature, and it shall not be used without the
necessary means to evaluate the risks and problems of protection facing defenders of human rights.
PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS:
BEST PRACTICES
AND LESSONS LEARNT
Protection of



PANTONE 144
Contents
Introduction VII
Part I: Legislation, national policies and defeders’units 1
Chapter 1: Description and analysis of legislation and institutions

for the protection of defenders at international and regional level. 3
Chapter 2: Description of national legislation and institutions
for the protection of human rights defenders. 13
Chapter 3: Analysis of national laws and authorities protecting
human rights defenders. 27
Chapter 4: State structures and mechanisms for the protection
of human rights defenders. 37
Part II: Operational aspects of defenders’ protection 63

Chapter 1: Overview of the Protection Response. 65
Chapter 2: Inclusion in Protection Programmes. 75
Chapter 3: Risk Analysis in Programmes for the Protection of
Human Rights Defenders. 89
Chapter 4: Protection Measures provided by the Programmes:
Characteristics and Duration. 99
Chapter 5: Catalogue of Available Protection Measures and Analysis. 107
Chapter 6: The Overall Protection Response. 119
Appendices 125
Appendix 1: Table of supra-national protection systems. 126
Appendix 2: National protection systems in Latin America
and the Caribbean. 130
Appendix 3: Example of a table of protection measures for defenders
(extract from the Colombian Protection Programme). 135
Annexes 139
Annex 1: Assesing risk: threats, vulnerabilities and capacities. 140
Annex 2: Brazil – Bill on protection of defenders (2009) 148
Annex 3: Brazil: Procedural Manual for Programmes for the
Protection of Human Rights Defenders (extract). 154
Annex 4: Colombia: Decree 4065 (2011), Creation of the National
Protection Unit – objective and structure established. 168
Annex 5: Colombia: Decree 2788 (2003), Committee for regulation
and risk assessment of the protection programmes. 178
Annex 6: Guatemala: National prevention and protection policy
for human rights defenders and other vulnerable groups (2009). 181
Annex 7: Guatemala: Agreement on creating the analysis body (2008). 195
Annex 8: Guatemala: Catalogue of measures for the prevention of
human rights abuses and protection of human rights defenders and
other particularly vulnerable groups (Guatemala, February 2008). 197
Annex 9: Nepal: Draft bill 2066 on human rights defenders (2009). 216
Annex 10: Democratic Republic of Congo: Draft bill on protection
of defenders (2008). 221
Annex 11: United Nations: Declaration on the rights and obligations of
individuals, groups and institutions to protect universally recognised
human rights and fundamental freedoms (1998). 225
Annex 12: United Nations: Complementary resolution to the declaration
on defenders – see previous annex – (2009). 230
Acknowledgements 233
Protection of human rights defenders: best practices and lessons learnt
Introduction
In recent years several governments have developed specific national mechanisms to protect
defenders, all of them in countries seriously lacking in protection for human rights defenders.
These mechanisms (laws, action policies, offices) have been established under pressure from
(and with the cooperation of) national and international human rights organisations, with
essential legal support from the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.
At Protection International, this development has led us to study these national initiatives:
what are they and what do they consist of? How did they come about, how do they work
and what is their impact on the protection of defenders? We set up a study group (made up
of protection lawyers and experts) and carried out a large number of interviews with men
and women defenders as well as government officials in 16 countries on three continents.1
We also embarked on a process of compiling and analysing legal enforcement instruments
at the national level (while examining existing universal and regional ones). During the
study we only found national non-governmental initiatives of this type in Brazil, Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru (Central and South America), in Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (Africa) and Nepal (Asia). While there may be several organizations
working on protection-related matters and making important contributions, only
Guatemala (UDEFUGUA2), Uganda (EHAHRDP 3) and Colombia (Somos Defensores
Programme4) have three defender units specifically set up by civil society. They are
pioneers in the field and together with the Protection Desks established by PI5 and
supporting organizations (such as Peace Brigades International), are among those civil
society groups whose sole mission is the protection of defenders on the ground.
Given the vast and complex nature of the results of the survey we decided to compile them
in two parts under the general title, “Protection of human rights defenders: best practices
and lessons learnt”. Part I is subtitled, “Legislation, national policies and defenders’ units”,
and in it we analyse the legislative and structural aspects of these protection initiatives.
Part II, “Protection Programmes for Defenders”, analyses the practical aspects of protection
programmes: the measures they include, how they are structured, and their results. Part II
focuses on the three countries whose protection programmes were examined, namely
Brazil, Guatemala and Colombia.6
1 Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo), Central and South America (Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru), Asia (Indonesia, Nepal, Thailand) and Europe (Belgium, France,
United Kingdom, Switzerland). These interviews were done by PI’s Protection Desk network in cooperation
with national counterparts, and by a team researching the subject.
2 Unidad de Defensores y Defensoras de Guatemala http://www.udefegua.org/
3 East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project http://www.defenddefenders.org
4 Somos Defensores programme http://www.somosdefensores.org
5 The Protection desks already established or in the pipeline are: Colombia (counterpart: Pensamiento y
Acción Social), Guatemala (counterpart: UDEFEGUA), Nepal, Thailand, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Uganda (counterpart: EHAHRDP), Turkey.
6 In Colombia, the recent Decree 1740 of 2010 defines the parameters of two programmes: the Human
Rights Protection Programme of the Ministry of the Interior and Justie, nas the National Police Protection
Programme. This book concentrates principally on the Ministry’s programme becasue the Police
programme concentrates principally on public figures and high ranking state and government officals.
VII
As you will see in Part I, Defenders’ Units (whether governmental or non-governmental)

work in different ways to provide protection for defenders, employing different perspectives
and objectives and with different budgetary availability; the units operate, also, in very
varied organisational frameworks or coordinations. However, they all have in common that
their work is carried out under the aegis of article 18 of the UN Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which indicates that:
1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to
strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at
the national and international levels.
2. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an
important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting
human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and
advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes.
3. [By analogy] Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations
also have an important role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the
promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
human rights instruments can be fully realized.
Although the Defenders’ Units are all different, Part II uses a focus that maintains a broad
overview that may be applied to any of the varieties of Unit that exist, organising the analysis
around their principal objective, that of providing protection. Having examined the work of the
different Units we believe that this mixed approach makes it easier to focus on the question of
protection. We also highlight, whenever necessary, the differences that may be observed between
them. In order to simplify the text we refer always to “protection programmes” or simply
“programmes”. More detail is available in the annexes where the relevant texts are reproduced.
Clarification
The background to this debate needs to be addressed first. The issue that was repeatedly
raised in the interviews we conducted in all these countries, as well as in documentation
from international organisations,7 was whether it is necessary for the state to create
mechanisms (laws, policies, offices) specifically for the protection of defenders or if it is
better to ensure the institutions (the legal system and security forces) fulfil their obligation
to guarantee protection for this group.
It is an important debate because the ad hoc mechanisms at the disposal of human rights
defenders generally have few enforcement powers both legally speaking – secondary legislation
– and practically, since these bodies lack the necessary resources and can neither launch an
investigation nor wield any political power to ensure adequate protection for defenders.
Firstly, it is a fact that existing national instruments were only created in the wake of strong
pressure by national (and occasionally international) defenders’ organizations – which implies
that there is a will to do so by large groups of defenders. However, the detractors opposed to
7 For example, ‘For more effective protection in favour of human rights defenders in Africa – Strategy Note’ - by
the International Observatory for the Protection of Defenders (2009).
VIII
ad hoc instruments claim they are merely a formal response to this national and international
pressure and are mainly used to ease it by displaying responses with no real impact while
those attacking human rights defenders continue to act with equal or even increasing impunity.
The other problem is that at times these instruments generate new bureaucratic barriers that
make it more difficult for NGOs to carry out investigations or prosecute those acting against
human rights defenders. It has also been suggested that the funding they get could have been
used to improve the response by state institutions (e.g. the police and the judiciary).
On the other hand, those in favour of these bodies acknowledge the serious problems involved
but feel they can open the door to enhancing protection - either by facilitating access to places
that are traditionally off-limits such as inside the security forces, or by providing immediate
support (such as relocation funds, means of communication or escorts) which can address
serious protection gaps, at least in the short run. They claim that conscious use can be made of
what these bodies have to offer while bearing in mind that it is the entire state apparatus (and
not just one office) that is responsible for protection. The onus is above all on the Executive and
the Judiciary to take the necessary steps to ensure proper protection for human rights defenders.
In the few countries with existing protection mechanisms of this nature the protection status
of human rights defenders is nonetheless precarious within a national context characterized by
extreme violations of human rights. We did not find any formal, far-reaching assessment
suggesting the existence of instruments and ad hoc offices for the protection of human rights
defenders has had any impact on the lack of security experienced by defenders. Although it is
certainly very difficult to make any such assessment, the defenders interviewed tended to use
this kind of ad hoc support in full knowledge of its limitations and problems.
Our job as an international NGO is to serve human rights defenders and we adopt a critical
approach to state instruments and offices intended to offer protection to human rights
defenders, without losing sight of the shared responsibility and duty of all its institutions,
starting with the government. This is the reason for this study. In our view there is a need to
better understand all the initiatives that have been taken in the world to this end and to show
what the defenders think constitutes good practice and what we can learn. In our opinion this
is a task for the medium term and we have therefore set up Focus, a global observatory for
national policies and structures to protect human rights defenders. See http://focus.
protectionline.org/-Focus- for regular updates on its progress. We are confident that in making
these proposals to the international community of defenders we are taking a step in the right
direction. New improved practices will give people, who on a daily basis are determined to
defend human rights despite tremendous obstacles, the protection they need and deserve.
Additional notes: quotes, gender and defenders.
Save for a few exceptions, we have generally disassociated the content from the persons
interviewed. We decided to do so from the start in order to allow for the frank exchange of
ideas in the interviews. The latter are in the safekeeping of PI and form the basis of this report.
In this book the authors refer throughout to Defenders; this term should be taken to include
women and men. In the Spanish version of the text the authors used the terms defensora and
defensor interchangeably in specific response, as they put it, to the fact that “the adequate use
of grammatical gender to reflect the participation of women is a question that remains
unresolved in Spanish” and in the hope that “this tactic will make the work of women Human
Rights defenders visible”...
IX
Protection of

Chapter 1: Description and analysis of

legislation and institutions for the protection
of defenders at international and regional level
There are various laws and regulations regarding the protection of human rights defenders.
In some cases these laws were adopted as a result of the work done by civil society and in
others due to work by state or international structures.
In this first chapter we address international legislation and instruments of a universal
nature as well as regional instruments1 (national laws and instruments in individual
countries will be covered in the next chapter).
1. Universal instruments and institutions

The United Nations has created several instruments that are essential for the work of
human rights defenders. Among these is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of
which articles 19, 20 and 28 refer to freedom of opinion and speech, the right of peaceful
assembly and association and the right to an established social and international order in
which these rights and freedoms are fully effective. The International Pact on Civil and
Political Rights in articles 19, 21 and 22 recognizes and guarantees freedom of opinion and
speech as well as the right to peaceful assembly and association.
Subsequently, and after a long discussion process strongly encouraged by non-governmental
organizations, the UN also took into account the important work of human rights defenders
and the need to guarantee their security. As a result on 9 December 1998 under Resolution
53/144, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the right
and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect
universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms2,81 known as the
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (hereafter ‘the declaration’). Two years later the
United Nations Human Rights Commission asked the Secretary General to appoint a
Special Representative on human rights defenders to monitor and support the
implementation of the declaration. On 26 April 2000 Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2000/6182 led
to the creation of the post of Special Representative for Human Rights Defenders.83 In
2008 Resolution 7/884 led to a renewal of the mandate on the special procedure for the
1 There is an interesting summary on the subject (universal and regional instruments) from October 2009
by the International Human Rights Federation.
http://www.fidh.org/-International-and-regional-protection-of-human
2 Resolution 53/144 adopted by the General Assembly.
81 http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.53.144.Sp?OpenDocument
82 http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.RES.2000.61.Sp?Opendocument
83 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/
84 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/
3
situation of human rights defenders but this time appointing a Special Rapporteur3 rather
than a Special Representative of the Secretary General.4
The mandate of the Special Representative consists in:
“seeking, receiving, examining

and responding to information on the situation
and rights of those who acting individually
or in association with others seek to promote
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
establishing cooperation and conducting a dialogue
with governments and other interested stakeholders
on the promotion and effective implementation
of the declaration; recommending effective strategies
to better protect human rights defenders and
following up on these recommendations.” 5
The Rapporteur’s activities involve inter alia: 6

• Receiving information provided by human rights defenders including complaints
regarding violations of their rights, and using this information to determine the issues
and questions to be raised with the countries concerned. When presenting a report the
representative may submit:
- Letters of ‘urgent measures’ used to provide information about a violation already
occurring or about to, so that the state may take action in time
- Letters of complaint, used to inform the state about violations already committed or
which have had an effect on the defender which can no longer be reversed.
• Maintaining periodic contact with the states in United Nations bodies and establishing
more specific bilateral contacts in meetings or in writing. These means shall be used by
the Special Representative to raise specific issues with the counties which are a matter
of concern, and to ask them to take action
3 Human Rights Council. Resolution 7/8 on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights defenders http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/mandate.htm
4 The United Nations Human Rights Commission gives several titles to the experts such as Special
Rapporteur, independent expert, representative of the Secretary General or Representative of the
Commission. These titles do not suggest an order of seniority and are not indicative of any powers
conferred on the experts. They are simply the result of political negotiations. The key issue is the
mandate of the expert as stipulated in the resolutions of the Human Rights Commission. The mandate
can focus on complaints of violations, the analysis of a problem, contributions to technical assistance or
a combination of several of these. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner. Recommendations
on extra-conventional mechanisms for Guatemala. Introduction. Special United Nations Rapporteurs
h t t p : / / w w w . o a c n u d h . o r g. g t / d o c u m e n t o s / p u b l i c a c i o n e s / K I T % 2 0 I N S T R U M E N T O S % 2 0
INTERNACIONALES/ 9%20MECANISMOS%20ESPECIALES/ 9.3%20Introduccion.%20%20Los%20
relatores%20especiales%20de%20las%20NU.pdf
5 See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/mandate.htm
6 See Fact sheet Nº 29. Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the right to defend human rights.
4
• Making official visits to the countries (on invitation by the government) during which
the functions and situation of their human right defenders are examined, addressing
the main concerns and making recommendations on an appropriate course of action
• Meeting other stakeholders relevant to the mandate and its activities such as parliaments,
regional intergovernmental organisations and groups of states committed to improving
the situation of human rights defenders
• Annual reports to be presented to the Human Rights Commission and the UN General
Assembly. The reports describe the general trends and concerns observed during the
year and make recommendations on how to address them. Some examine major
concerns such as the implications of legislation on security matters for human right
defenders and their work.
Given the difficulties and doubts regarding the concept of defender in the declaration, the
representative published Fact Sheet No. 29 -Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the
Right to Defend Human Rights85 which provides a better definition of who human rights
defenders are and the role played in their protection by the Special Representative and
subsequently Special Rapporteur.
Similarly, the General Assembly has adopted several resolutions on defenders as well as
more practical documents such as the Guidelines for submitting complaints to the Special
Representative regarding violations under the declaration on human rights defenders86.
It is also important to mention that the United Nations has adopted other documents
which, though not directly aimed at the protection of human rights defenders, do have a
bearing on this study such as the Paris Principles.787 These create bases for the regulation
and implementation of the recommended rules for the national human rights institutions88
which usually house the offices responsible for the protection of human rights defenders.
2. Regional instruments and bodies

As with the universal instruments, the regional instruments recognize and protect the
right of association and freedom of thought, opinion and speech; at the same time in some
regions of the world specific instruments have been adopted to protect human rights
defenders as explained below.
85 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet29en.pdf
86 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/complaints.htm
7 Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights
- adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 December 1993.
87 http://www.nhri.net/pdf/ParisPrinciples.english.pdf
88 http://www.nhri.net/
5
2.1. Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean the Organization of American States (OAS) has paid
special attention to violence against human rights defenders since 1999 by adopting annual
resolutions on this subject.8
In 2001, in Resolution AG/RES. 1818,89 the General Assembly of the OAS asked one of the
main bodies in its human rights protection system - the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) - to continue to monitor the situation of human rights defenders
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The same resolution led to the creation of the IAHCR
Human Rights Defenders Unit,810 which focuses on receiving information on the situation
of human rights defenders in the region, maintaining contacts with non-governmental and
governmental organizations and coordinating the work of the IACHR Executive Secretariat
on human rights defenders in Latin America. In 2006 the Unit published a comprehensive
report on the situation of human rights defenders in Latin America and the Caribbean9.
Since 1979, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights811 - the judicial body of the inter-
American system - has tried states for human rights violations including violations
perpetrated against human rights defenders. The case of Eliodoro Portugal vs Panama or that
of Myrna Mack vs Guatemala are among the most representative. In both cases the liability
of the state was established and they admitted responsibility for the murder of the
anthropologist and abduction of the trade unionist. The same thing happened in the case
of the murder of the human rights activist Jesús María Valle Jaramillo in Colombia; the
court duly recognised the importance of the work done by human rights defenders and
that the state has a duty to protect them.
8 Resolution by the Organisation of American States (OAS) concerning human rights defenders.
AG/RES. 2412 (XXXVIII-O/08) http://www.oas.org/DIL/AGRES_2412.doc
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders. AG/RES. 2280 (XXXVII-O/07) http://www.civil-society.oas.
org/General%20Assembly%20Resolutions/Panama/AG%20RES%202280%20ENG.doc
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders. AG/RES. 2177 (XXXVI-O/06) http://www.civil-society.oas.org/
General%20Assembly%20Resolutions/Sto%20Domingo/Eng/AG%20RES%202177%20english.doc
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders. AG/RES. 2067 (XXXVO-O/05) http://www.civil-society.oas.
org/General%20Assembly%20Resolutions/Fort%20Lauderdale/Eng/G-RES.%202067-XXXV-O-05%20ENG.doc
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders. AG/RES. 2036 (XXXIV-O/04) http://www.summit-americas.
org/OAS%20General%20Assembly/XXXIV_GA-Quito/AGRES_2036_(XXXIV-O-04).doc
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders AG/RES. 1920 (XXXIII-O/03)
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1920.htm
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders AG/RES. 1842 (XXXII-O/02)
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga02/agres_1842.htm
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders AG/RES. 1818 (XXXI-O/01)
http://www.oas.org/Assembly2001/documentsE/Decl-Resol.aprv/ag-RES1818XXXI-O-01.htm
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders AG/RES. 1711 (XXX-O/00)
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres_1711_xxxo00.htm
OAS Resolution on human rights defenders AG/RES. 1671 (XXIX-O/99)
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res99/eres1671.htm
89 http://www.oas.org/Assembly2001/documentsE/Decl-Resol.aprv/ag-RES1818XXXI-O-01.htm
810 http://www.cidh.org/defenders/defensores.htm
9 See report: http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Defensores/defensoresindice.htm
811 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?&CFID=391064&CFTOKEN=18465782
6
In several cases,10 including that of Gilson Nogueira de Carvalho11 (the Brazilian lawyer
murdered in 1996) the Court has pointed out that:
“[…] in a democratic society, the duty of states

to create the necessary conditions
to effectively respect and guarantee
the human rights of everyone under their jurisdiction
is intrinsically linked to a recognition of the role
played by human rights defenders
and their protection.[...]
The Organization of American States has recognized
inter alia the need to “support the national
and regional action of human rights defenders,
recognise their valuable contribution
to the promotion, respect and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while condemning acts that directly
or indirectly impede their work
in Latin America and the Caribbean.”
The commitment to protect human rights defenders
has been emphasized in other international instruments.
The Court considers that threats and attacks
against the integrity and lives
of human rights defenders and the impunity
of the perpetrators are all the more serious
since the impact is not only individual but collective.
This is because society is prevented
from knowing the truth about whether
people’s rights in a given state
are being respected or violated.”
10 See ‘Servellón García and others’, supra note 11 para. 108; ‘Ximenes Lopes’ supra note 11 para. 85; Pueblo
Bello massacre - sentence delivered 31 January 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 113; Mapiripán massacre
- sentence delivered 15 September 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 111; and Legal status and rights of
undocumented immigrants. Advisory Opinion - 18/03 of 17 September 2003. Series A No.18, para. 140.
11 Inter-American Human Rights Court. Nogueira de Carvalho and others vs Brazil. Ruling of 28 November
2006 - preliminary waivers - para. 74 onwards.
7
In handing down the sentence, the court12 repeated earlier rulings adding that:
It is the duty of the state

to enable human rights defenders
to engage freely in their activities,
protect them when under threat
from attempts to kill or injure them,
refrain from creating obstacles to their work,
thoroughly investigate violations of their rights
and fight against impunity.”
The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights has also set up a series
of protection mechanisms for persons at risk which have often been used by human
rights defenders.
The rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commission13 (article 2514) enable it to award
precautionary measures on its own initiative or at another party’s behest to prevent
irreparable harm to persons in extremely serious and urgent situations. Article 19c of its
statutes15 also allows it to, “request that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights take any
provisional measures it considers appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have not yet been
submitted to it for consideration […]”.
12 See case of prisoners at the Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira penitentiary in Araraquara – interim measures,
supra nota 52, twenty-fourth recital; the Monagas remand prisoner case (“La Pica”) interim measures.
Resolution of the Inter-American Human Rights Court of 9 February 2006, recital fourteen; the Mery
Naranjo and others case - interim measures, supra note 52, recital eight; and the Guatemalan Forensic
Anthropology Foundation case - interim measures. Resolution of the Inter-American Court on Human
rights, 9th February 2006, recital twelve.
13 Rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights approved by the Commission at
its 109th special session held 4-8 December 2000, amended at its 116th regular session period 7-25 October
2002, at its 118th regular session period 6-24 October 2003, at its 126th regular session period 16-27 October
2006 and at its 132nd regular session period 17- 25 July 2008.
14 Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
1. In cases of gravity and urgency, in the light of available information and when necessary to avoid
irreparable damage to persons, the Commission may, at the request of a party or independently,
request that the state in question adopt precautionary measures.
2. If the Commission is not in session the chairman, or failing that one of the vice-chairmen, shall
consult the other members through the executive secretariat regarding the application of the above
provisions. Should this consultation be impossible within a reasonable period of time in relation to the
circumstances of the case, the chairman shall take the decision on behalf of the Commission and shall
notify its members.
3. The Commission may request information from the parties concerned regarding any issue relevant to
the adoption and enforcement of the precautionary measures.
4. The granting of these measures and their adoption by the state shall not pre-empt any decision on the
substance of the matter.
15 Statutes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - approved by resolution 447 of the OAS
General Assembly at its 9th regular session, La Paz Bolivia, October 1979.
8
Similarly, in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, article 25 of the rules of procedure of
the Inter-American Human Rights Court16 enables it to order provisional measures in
extremely serious and urgent situations, to avoid irreparable damage to persons.
In the 9 July 2004 Resolution On Interim Measures requested by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights with respect to Venezuela in the ‘Nieto and others’ case, the Inter-American
Court said, “States should provide effective and adequate guarantees to human rights defenders to enable
them to act freely. Particular attention should be paid to anything that might limit or prevent their work”.
Statements of this nature and the necessary response to requests for precautionary and
provisional measures have encouraged states to set up protection programmes similar to the
ones featured in this survey. This has also led to an increased number of protected persons in
these programmes and an example is the inclusion in the Colombian state protection
programme of members of the Patriotic Union and the Colombian Communist Party.
At the Inter-American level protecting human rights within the regional system cannot be
dissociated from the NGO Centre for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) 812 which has
proved to be a strong, permanent link between national organizations and the Inter-
American system, with resources and capacities that have provided an important
complement to the work of national organizations in the system. It has also reported cases
of violations of the human rights of defenders to the Commission and the IACHR.
2.2. Africa
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights813 (which does not mention defenders
since it pre-dates 1998) authorizes individuals and NGOs to make complaints about human
rights violations. Article 56 of the Charter establishes the conditions for doing so, such as
avoiding disparaging language against the state involved or against the AU, ensuring
complaints are only submitted after national procedures have been exhausted (or illegally
delayed) and within a reasonable period of time afterwards, and on condition that these
complaints do not involve cases already settled under the principles of the African Charter.
The African Commission on Human Rights814 (set up by the Organization of African Unity
which is now the African Union – AU) confirmed in the Grand Bay Declaration815 (1999) the
16 Art 25 of the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:

1. At any stage in the procedures, on condition that the case is one of extreme seriousness and urgency
and whenever necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court, in an official capacity or on
behalf of a party, may order any provisional measures it considers relevant under the terms of article
63.2 of the Convention.
2. If the issues have not yet been brought to its attention, it may act at the request of the Commission.
3. The request may be submitted to the president, to any of the judges or to the secretariat, using any method
of communication. In any event whoever receives the request will immediately inform the president.
4. If the court is not in session the chairman in consultation with the standing commission and if possible
with the other judges shall demand that the respective government take any urgent steps necessary to
ensure the effectiveness of the provisional measures which the Court may subsequently adopt in its
next period of sessions.
5. The Court shall include in its annual report to the General Assembly an account of the provisional
measures it ordered during the reporting period and if these measures have not been implemented,
shall make any recommendations it deems relevant.
812 http://cejil.org/en
813 http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html
814 http://www.achpr.org/
815 http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_grand_bay_en.html
9
importance of the declaration on human rights defenders approved the previous year by the
UN, and called upon African states to implement the declaration in Africa. In 2003, the
Commission issued the Kigali Declaration816 in which it wholeheartedly supported the role
of human rights defenders and the need for their protection. By 2004, the African Commission
had adopted its first Resolution on the Protection of African Human Rights Defenders817
which introduced the post of a Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Defenders in
Africa,818 answerable to the Commission. In addition to these resolutions, since 2001 the
African Commission has adopted several others which refer specifically to human rights
defenders.17 All in all progress regarding human rights defenders in Africa has been brought
about through pressure and support from African and international NGOs.
The mandate of the Rapporteur covers several aspects: receiving urgent petitions from
human rights defenders that are then referred to the government involved, on-site visits to
countries, submitting activity reports, raising questions on the protection of human rights
defenders during the sessions of the African Commission18 and maintaining contact with
other stakeholders dealing with the situation of human rights activists in the region.19
In May 2009, following the Pan-African Conference on Human Rights Defenders in
Kampala, the Kampala Plan of Action (KAPA) for the protection of human rights defenders
was launched. As well as several African and international NGOs and the diplomatic
corps, four African Union commissioners attended (Reine Alapini-Gansou, special
rapporteur for human rights defenders, Soyata Maiga, special rapporteur for women’s
rights, Catherine Atoki, chairperson of the working party on the Robben Island Guidelines,
and Mumba Malila, special rapporteur for prisons and conditions of detention). Hassan
Shire Sheikh, chairman of the East and Horn of Africa human rights defenders network
and head of the secretariat of the Pan-African defenders’ network, introduced the main
objectives of KAPA, which include greater cooperation between African networks of
human rights defenders, improving training in the use of African and international
protection mechanisms, security, lobbying, fundraising, gender and sexual orientation
issues and encouraging states, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs to respond to
the needs of human rights defenders for protection.
816 http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_kigali_en.html
817 http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/hrd_res_appoin_3.html
818 http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/index_hrd_en.html
17 Another resolution on the situation of human Rights defenders in Africa: ACHPR /Res.119 (XXXXII)07
http://www.achpr.org/english/resolutions/resolution119_en.htm
Resolution on the situation of human rights defenders in Tunisia: ACHPR/Res.56(XXIX)01
http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../resolutions/resolution61_en.html
Resolution on the situation of human rights defenders in Gambia: ACHPR /Res.134(XXXXIIII)08
http://www.achpr.org/english/resolutions/resolution134_en.htm
Resolution on the situation of human rights defenders in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
ACHPR/Res.139(XXXXIIII)08 http://www.achpr.org/english/resolutions/resolution139_en.htm
18 For a sample of its reports see: http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/hrd_intersess._40.html (2006),
http://www.achpr.org/english/Commissioner%27s%20Activity/44th%20OS/Special%20Rapporteurs/
Human%20Rights%20Defenders.pdf (2008).
19 For further information on the work of the rapporteur and the challenges faced see the excellent report
from the Observatory for the Protection of Defenders: “For more effective protection of human rights defenders
in Africa - Strategy Note” (April 2009).
10
A breakthrough may be made as a result of this plan of action, since it may lead to the
creation of national protection mechanisms and the consolidation and strengthening of
regional mechanisms.
2.3. Europe
The European continent has also emphasized the protection of human rights defenders as
is clear from the various initiatives taken by the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The European Union and the protection of human rights defenders
Europe addresses the protection of human rights defenders within the wider mandate of
the European Commissioner on Human Rights.819 The 2008 Council of Europe
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders,820 in which the Council of Europe strengthened
the Commissioner’s dedication to human rights defenders, reviewed the main impediments
to their work including protection issues and recommended a series of measures to the
member states. Some of these measures are particularly relevant to our study, including
granting powers to independent commissions, ombudsmen or national human rights
institutions to receive complaints or make recommendations on the violation of the rights
of defenders (measure 10), ensuring that national legislation complies with international
human rights standards (measure 11) and encouraging governments to consult civil society
on human rights issues (measure 17). It also recommends building relationships with
“other regional mechanisms, such as those within the African Commission and the Inter-
American Commission” (measure 26).
In 2004 the EU Council published the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights
Defenders20, which can be studied and analysed in several guides and manuals.21 Under
these guidelines European Union embassies have potentially become important protection
bodies, affected by current developments and impact assessments. In 2006 the first review
of the implementation of the EU guidelines on human rights defenders821 was published.
The analysis and recommendations are based on information provided by several partners
in response to a questionnaire submitted by EU Heads of Mission in 79 countries and with
practical examples of good practice. The responses were based on the useful lessons learnt
from the freedom of speech campaign in the second half of 2005, including greater
awareness, visibility and the best form of action. They cover local experiences of NGOs as
well as of the human rights defenders themselves and reflect the recommendations of a
seminar on human rights defenders that took place at the EU Seventh Annual NGO Forum
on Human Rights (London December 2005) as well as incorporating contributions from
international NGOs and local human rights defenders. Finally, the review takes into
819 http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/activities/themes/hrd_en.asp
820 https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1245887&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFB
B55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75
20 The 2008 revised version is at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16332-re02.en08.pdf
21 “Front Line handbook for human rights defenders: What protection can diplomatic missions offer? or European
guidelines” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/docs/Frontlinehandbook.pdf;
and Amnesty International, Working document: ”Towards the full and effective implementation of the
European Union Guidelines on Human rights defenders - lessons learnt”.
http://www.protectionline.org/IMG/doc/051207_AI_Discussion_Paper_for_EU_Forum_FINAL.doc
821 http://www.protectionline.org/First-review-of-the-implementation,570.html
11
account the recommendations in the reports of the special representative on human rights
defenders. The review led to the Council conclusions on the EU guidelines on human
rights defenders822 and these in turn were revised in 2006 at the same time as a further
review following new contributions in 2008. As in other cases encouragement, support and
pressure from NGOs has been and continues to be crucial to the implementation of an
instrument that would otherwise be useless.
The OSCE and the protection of human rights defenders
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has addressed the protection
of human rights defenders by setting up an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR).823 This office has issued several reports on the situation of human rights
defenders in the OSCE22 region, and in 2007 established a focal point824 for human rights
defenders and national institutions. The focal point was set up after consultations with inter alia
the UN Secretary’s special representative on human rights defenders at the time, and its main
task is to monitor the situation of human rights defenders in the region, to identify their
concerns, promote and protect their interests and provide training. At the time of writing there
were no detailed activity reports available. Our interviews and other publicly available
information suggest there is much room for improvement in providing this protection
infrastructure for human rights defenders.
2.4. Asia
At the regional level there is the Asian Human Rights Charter825 the Asian Human Rights
Commission826 and the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN827) which recently
in October 2009 set up an Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. However, Asia
is generally lagging behind other regions in terms of regional human rights mechanisms
and as a result, in mechanisms for the protection of human rights defenders. The protection
of human rights defenders is therefore exclusively dependent on governments and on
national human rights institutions and therefore lacks the impetus provided in this field by
international bodies in other regions.
822 http://www.protectionline.org/Council-Conclusions-on-EU,527.html
823 http://www.osce.org/odihr
22 2007 report: Human rights defenders in the OSCE region: our collective conscience http://www.protectionline.org/
IMG/pdf/28760_1004_en.pdf; 2008 report: The situation of human rights defenders in the OSCE region: challenges
and good practices http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_11_35711.html.
824 http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/28244_en.pdf.html
825 http://material.ahrchk.net/charter/mainfile.php/eng_charter/
826 http://www.ahrchk.net/index.php
827 http://www.asean.org
12
Chapter 2: Description of national legislation

and institutions for the protection of human
rights defenders
Under article 12 of the UN declaration on human rights defenders,
states must guarantee their protection:
& A
rticle 12 of the declaration on human
rights defenders
1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with
others, to participate in peaceful activities against violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The state shall take all necessary measures to ensure the
protection by the competent authorities of everyone, individually
and in association with others, against any violence, threats,
retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or
any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate
exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration.
3. In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and in
association with others, to be protected effectively under national
law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful means,
activities and acts, including those by omission, attributable to
States that result in violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or
individuals that affect the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Despite the fact that the declaration on human rights defenders is not legally binding and
does not impose any obligation on states in the strict sense of the word, it is nonetheless the
result of a consensus of the United Nations General Assembly and entails a strong
commitment by states to enforce it.
It is therefore politically binding and as such includes a series of principles and rights
based on existing human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments
which are legally binding such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In response to this and encouraged by national civil society and the international community,
states have developed internally applicable laws. These include legislation aimed at bringing
national law into line with their obligations, and others which create national protection
mechanisms or implement the measures they propose. Some states have established
programmes or offices to protect human rights defenders and others have even considered
the possibility of adopting the declaration itself as a binding piece of national legislation.1
1 See fact sheet Nº 29. Human rights defenders: Protecting the right to defend human rights. UN Secretary General’s
representative for human rights defenders, page 28.
13
We can now turn to case studies that best reflect the mechanisms used by states to improve
the protection of human rights defenders.2
Colombia
Colombia was one of the first countries in the world (along with Mexico) to come up with
a specific programme to address the protection of human rights defenders. In 1997 article
81 of Law 418 which creates instruments intended to promote coexistence and the
efficiency of the judiciary as well as other provisions81 ordered the Ministry of Home
Affairs to introduce a protection programme for persons at risk from political or ideological
violence or from internal armed conflict.
The law subsequently underwent several amendments3 and this gave rise to the current
General Protection Programme of the Directorate of Human Rights in the Colombian
Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice.82 It is intended to support the government “in
safeguarding the lives, integrity, freedom and security of the target population” – i.e. anyone
exposed to imminent and exceptional risk as a direct consequence of political, public, social
or humanitarian activities. Human rights defenders are within this target group.
Decree 2816 of 2006 4 83 forms the basis for the drafting and management of the Programme
for the Protection of Human Rights at the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice. The work
was coordinated by the Committees for Regulation and Risk Assessment, governed by
Decree 2788 of 2003. 5 84
One of the institutions responsible for providing security to human rights defenders, the
Ministry of Defence, set out its obligations towards them in its Directive 09 of 2003
entitled, “Policies of the ministry of defence regarding the protection of the human
rights of trade unionists and human rights defenders.”85
Subsequently, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice through Resolution 2138 adopted
a manual of definitions, usage and procedures for the Human Rights Protection Programme,
thereby regulating the measures to be adopted by the programme and determining the
appropriate mechanisms.
2 Part I constitutes a legal analysis of the protection programmes; Part II of this work will be an operational
analysis of protection methods and outcomes.
81 http://www.disaster-info.net/desplazados/legislacion/LEY418de1997.pdf
3 Law 418 Act of 1997 was extended, modified and reinforced by laws 548 of 1999, 782 of 2002 and 1106 of 2006.
82 http://www.mij.gov.co/eContent/CategoryDetail.asp?idcategory=142&IDCompany=2&Name=Derechos+Humanos
&idmenucategory=142
4 See annexes.
83 http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/decretoslinea/2006/agosto/22/dec2816220806.pdf
5 See annexes.
84 http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/decretoslinea/2003/octubre/02/dec2788021003.pdf
85 http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/comunicados/2003/cp0318.pdf
14
An assessment of the programme

The Colombian government’s protection programme is one of the oldest and most extensive
compared to others (it had a budget of 40 million dollars in 2009 and covers hundreds of
human rights defenders). This programme has several positive aspects; for example, it has
facilitated dialogue at the very highest levels with public institutions and has made it
possible for representatives of the target population to participate in decision making within
the programme and in the implementation of measures. Similarly, the actions and attitudes
of the civil servants at the Ministry of Home Affairs have been positively assessed by those
they regularly work with. However, it is to be noted that the continuing conflict between the
government and civil society has led some to adopt different conclusions.
Serious shortcomings have also been observed. Some of these are due to delays in risk
assessment (which in turn delays implementation) and to the way risk assessments are
done. In many cases, civil society and some public institutions take a different view to the
security forces regarding risk assessment. This could be due to a lack of training among
civil servants with regard to human rights and the situation of the defenders as well as the
contexts they work in. Obstacles like this prevent measures from being taken or lead to
measures which fail to take account of the vulnerable situation of the defender.
The fact that it is the ‘Administrative Security Department’ that does risk analysis and
orders protection measures has generated a good deal of mistrust, especially since it
transpired that this institution was carrying out intelligence activities and a dirty war
against groups of human rights defenders.86 For this reason those requesting protection
often refuse to provide the necessary information for this institution to carry out a risk
assessment, or they reject any measures involving escorts from this department.
Faced with this situation and without consulting the target group, the Ministry of Home
Affairs and Justice proposed the privatization of the protection schemes. This alternative
involves private security agencies being entrusted with the protection schemes and ignores
the conclusions of the 2002 assessment of the Protection Programme6, which proposed the
establishment of a Special Directorate for Security and Protection, to operate under the vice-
ministry for Home Affairs or under the directorate general of the national police (i.e. part of
the Civic Public Police). The alternative proposal was for a Department of Security and
Protection at the Directorate of Human Rights at the vice-ministry for Home Affairs.7
There are several arguments against privatizing protection schemes. Among them is the
fact that some of the elements in these firms come from paramilitary groups or state security
agencies with a record of human rights violations or which maintain a confrontational
stance against human rights defenders, or even have records of previous attacks and
intimidation against the very groups they are supposed to protect.8 Another argument
against privatization is the fact that it is incumbent upon the state to provide protection and
86 http://www.elespectador.com/node/177212/print
6 Sponsored by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia and the International
Labour Organisation.
7 See Luis Alfonso Novoa Díaz. Opinion on the establishment of a state-run Special Directorate on Protection
and Security. Bogota DC, September 2009.
8 Ibid.
15
that it should not delegate its functions and duties to private institutions that do not offer
the necessary guarantees and are subject to legal limitations when performing these tasks.
This situation also implies less responsibility for those protecting the target groups in the
programme (as they are not civil servants) and waters down the responsibility of the state.9
Shortcomings have also been observed in the prevention of attacks and this can be
addressed through an inter-institutional approach for effective preventive action.
In September 2009, member organizations of the international campaign for the right to
defend human rights recalled in writing and for the umpteenth time the existence of
chronic problems in protecting human rights defenders in a country where activists are
still under serious threat, in spite of the size of this programme. They highlighted the
importance of addressing strategic threats to the work of human rights defenders, for
example attacks against defenders with complete impunity (proposals include the
centralization of investigations of these cases and the separation of civil from military
justice in other cases), using the intelligence services and even the escorts themselves
against human rights defenders, systematic accusations including from the President’s
Office stigmatizing their work, malicious prosecutions etc.
Additionally the organizations propose measures intended to revise some aspects of the
protection programme itself in consultation with the defenders such as:
- the creation by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice of a special unit to coordinate
protection schemes in cooperation with human rights defenders
- a mechanism to ensure that escorts or drivers have no links present or past with illegal
armed groups and that they do not carry out intelligence work against their charges
- ensuring risk studies and the implementation of the programme take into account the
leadership profiles, functions or support work carried out by the persons under threat as
well as the reports drawn up by bodies such as the ombudsman’s Early Warning System,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, social organizations and others
- provision by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice of temporary and immediate
protection (within 48 hours of receiving the request) to the persons/organizations who
request it while their risk situation is assessed
- protection to persons at risk not being provided by private security firms
- ensuring that, once adjusted and reviewed, the Protection Programme of the Ministry of
Home Affairs is provided with the requisite funding to ensure the effective implementation
of the measures assigned to it for the protection of human rights defenders.
At the end of 2009, following her visit to Colombia, the Special Rapporteur, Margaret
Sekaggya, made a number of statements and recommendations for the improvement of the
Protection Programme which echoed the sentiments expressed by the human rights
defenders themselves. Sekaggya stated that she: “...welcomed the notable increase in funds
earmarked for the National Protection Programme for human rights defenders (from 13 million
dollars in 2002 to 40 million dollars in 2009). She added, I support the work of the national and
regional ombudsmen, in particular the early warning system, and I believe that their reports should
9 Ibidem.
16
be made public and taken into account more frequently by the Inter-institutional Committee on
Early Warnings”. She emphasized the specific needs of certain groups of defenders: “As for
the safety of human rights defenders, I have been informed that the government is in the process of
reforming the Protection Programme for human rights defenders under the Ministry of Home
Affairs and Justice. The reform should accommodate the special needs of women, indigenous peoples
and Afro-descendants. I strongly suggest that state officials defending human rights (magistrates,
national and regional ombudsmen) be included”. She went on to emphasize the need for the
“process for requesting protection to be simplified and made more efficient. The issue of spying on
human rights defenders by the escorts assigned to protect them should be resolved. Furthermore, the
scope of the programme’s preventive measures should be widened. Finally, human rights defenders
have expressed concern about the privatization of the programme and this matter should be jointly
debated and resolved”.
Guatemala
Owing to the political violence generated by internal armed conflict, the issue of human
rights defenders was included in the Peace Agreements. As such Commitment 7 of the
Comprehensive Agreement on Human rights (CAHR),10 87 signed on 29th March 1994
between the government of Guatemala and the National Revolutionary Unit of Guatemala
(URNG), acknowledged the importance of the work done by human rights activists and
the need to protect them and their work. This document is important not only because it is
the first protection instrument for human rights defenders in the country but also because
it preceded the declaration on human rights defenders.
As a result of this and in the wake of considerable local and foreign pressure, in 2004 the
government of Guatemala approved Internal Agreement II of the Presidential Commission
for Human Rights in Guatemala (COPREDEH),11 which led to the setting up of the
Coordination Unit for the protection of human rights defenders, law enforcement officers
and administrators, journalists and other media personnel. This unit is authorized to
coordinate (with government institutions providing protection to the beneficiaries) the
protection measures granted by the Inter-American system or by the United Nations.
In order to provide a more complete response, a Protection Programme for Human Rights
Defenders and other vulnerable groups was proposed. On 2nd November 2004, the
government tabled a Proposal for Public Policy governing Prevention and the Protection of
Human Rights Defenders, Accused Persons and Witnesses, Journalists and Media
Personnel, plus a National Plan of Action for Protection and a list of protection measures.12
10 VII. Guarantees and protection for persons and entities working in the field of the protection of human rights.
1. The Parties agree that all such acts as are likely to affect guarantees to those individuals and entities
working in the promotion and protection of human rights are to be condemned.
2. To this end the government of the Republic of Guatemala shall adopt special protection measures
for the benefit of those persons or entities working in the field of human rights. Similarly, it shall
thoroughly investigate any complaint concerning acts or threats to them.
3. The government of the Republic of Guatemala reiterates its commitment to effectively guarantee and
protect the work of those individuals and entities defending human rights.
87 http://www.congreso.gob.gt/Docs/PAZ/ACUERDO GLOBAL SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS.pdf
11 COPREDEH: http://www.minex.gob.gt/index.php?Itemid=39&id=1225&option=com_content&task=view
12 These documents together with others of interest can be found in Focus (PI’s observatory for national
legislation on the protection of human rights defenders) at http://focus.protectionline.org/-Focus-. Excerpts
of the most relevant portions of these documents can be found in the annexes to this work.
17
These documents were debated and agreed upon by several state organizations and with
various human rights organizations and although in 2007 the Presidential Commission on
Human Rights (COPREDEH) tried to activate the process through a governmental
agreement, this failed and the programme has been postponed without any decision
having being made in 2009.13
On 10th January 2008, a further step was taken with the Ministerial Agreement no.103-
2008,14 88 by which Guatemala established a unit to analyse attacks against human rights
defenders in Guatemala with the intention of studying patterns of violence against activists.
Perhaps the outstanding feature of this body is the participation of various investigative
bodies (the Directorate General for Civil Intelligence, the Public Prosecutor’s office and the
National Civil Police) with the participation (by invitation) of representatives of national and
international human rights NGOs. This has led to a certain degree of coordination in
investigative activities and more practical steps in protecting human rights defenders at risk.

The opinions of human rights defenders suggest that the defenders’ unit COPREDEH is
endeavouring to reconcile the official response to protection with precautionary and
provisional measures and urgent appeals from international bodies; however, although
there are some proposals we cannot conclude that there is an actual protection policy or
programme in place.
Similarly, the inability to influence decisions taken by the Ministry for Internal Affairs
constitutes a serious limitation since most of the protective measures are provided by the
National Civil Police and the Ministry decides on all aspects of their application.
On the other hand, it is important to point out that the representatives of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs in the Department of Analysis on Attacks Against Human Rights
Defenders in Guatemala have no institutional support and this has placed serious
restrictions on what the department can do.
Mexico
Human rights defenders and the Offices of the Ombudsmen
In 1997, through its Council, the Mexican Ombudsman’s National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) 15 began to coordinate the Programme of the National Human
Rights Commission on offences against journalists and civilian human rights
defenders.89 The directorate general of the programme on offences against journalists and
civilian human rights defenders16 was set up in 2005 under the programme with the
13 See: En el nudo de la impunidad (In the knot of impunity): A report on the situation of human rights defenders,
January to December 2008. Protection Unit for Human Rights Defenders (UDEFEGUA).
14 See annex for the text.
88 http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/acuerdos/2008/gtamx103-2008.pdf
15 The Ombudsman system in Mexico is made up of 32 State Commissions on Human Rights and the
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC).
89 http://www.cndh.org.mx/progate/agvperio/presenta.htm
16 The National Directorate on the Programme on Offences was set up within what is known as the Fifth
General Inspectorate: http://www.derechoshumanos.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?pagina=def-organismos-nac
18
objective of addressing the complaints relating to human rights violations committed

against both groups.
Mexico did not only deal with this through its national institutions. In 2007, the Federal
District Human Rights Commission (HRCFD) 17 set up the Rapporteur’s Office for
Freedom of Speech and the Protection of Human Rights Defenders.810 This body was
formally established on 30 May 2007 with the publication of the HRCFD Council’s
agreement, and on 16th June 2007 began work with the objective of collecting information
in Mexico City on matters relating to free speech and human rights defenders, as well as
organising training and raising awareness about prevention.18 However the rest of the
State Commissions have no specific department to deal with the protection of human
rights defenders nor do they make any distinction between them and other categories
when they receive complaints.
Government bodies and human rights defenders

For its part, the government established the Programme for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders through an internal regulation from the secretariat of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, which was housed under its Unit for the Promotion and Defence of Human
Rights (UPDHR).19 The unit has little information to offer, though its website features a
“register of human rights defenders”20 seeking protection, hardly an appropriate way to
present this kind of information.
On the other hand, in strategy 1.421 of the decree introducing the National Human Rights
Plan 2008-2012, there is a list of defenders’ protection needs and the organisations
responsible for meeting them. The bodies shall:
• “...Define the assumptions and modalities in accordance with which special protection
can be granted to human rights defenders. (The Public Security Office, the Prosecutor-
General of the Republic – PGR, the Ministry of Home Affairs)
• Develop a specific protocol to enable the investigation of illegal acts committed against
human rights defenders (PGR)
• Train civil society organizations in human rights (the Federal Public Administration – FPA)
• Seek support from various sources to enable civil society organizations to undertake
projects for the promotion and defence of human rights (FPA)...”
17 This Commission acts as the Office of the Ombudsman for the Federal Capital.
810 http://www.cdhdf.org.mx/index.php?id=bol10907
18 Human Rights Commission, Federal District Press Bulletin 109/2007: http://www.cdhdf.org.mx/index.
php?id=bol10907. The HRCFD announced the opening of the Rapporteur’s Office for freedom of speech
and protection of human rights defenders - 2 June 2007.
19 http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?pagina=upddh Established in 2002 “to design and
implement state human rights policies”.
20 See: http://www.derechoshumanos.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?nIdHeader=1&nIdPanel=61&nIdLateral=2&nIdF
ooter=3
21 See http://www.sre.gob.mx/derechoshumanos/images/docs/pndh20082012.pdf
19
Some figures
The information we have, albeit limited, includes the 2009 end-of-year report on Mexican
human rights defenders,22 in which the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
highlights the low number of complaints lodged with the Ombudsman’s office relating to
allegations of violations of the human rights of defenders. Over the last four years and
taking all 12 public human rights bodies which responded to the questionnaire from the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, only 11 complaints of this nature were
registered. The HRCFD in particular received 6 complaints during 2007-2008 alleging
violations of their human rights. The NHRC received a total of 65 complaints from January
2006 to May 2009. Similarly there were few recommendations made addressing specific
violations committed against human rights defenders. Out of all 12 state ombudsmen
offices which responded to the questionnaire, only 2 recommendations have been issued
over the past four years and the National Human Rights Commission issued a total of five
from 1998 up to May 2009.

The above mentioned UNOHCHR report notes that among the defenders there is a
“generally negative opinion of the work done by the public bodies responsible for human
rights and a feeling of mistrust. Sometimes the underlying reasons are the institutional
and budgetary limitations of these bodies, although their inefficiency can also arise from
a lack of sensitivity and interest on the part of the management or a lack of autonomy.
There have even been cases where the leaders of these public bodies have adopted hostile
attitudes towards certain human rights defenders critical of their management”.
The report acknowledges “the efforts made by the Mexican state to guarantee the right to
defend human rights and in particular its commitment to the National Human Rights
Programme” but goes on to note “the unbalanced state response to human rights
defenders”. There is a need for it to “adopt the issue as a priority and for a strong,
comprehensive policy in this field” and the report recommends among other measures,
“the consolidation and/or establishment of specialized programmes within public human
rights bodies”, “the creation of a national protection mechanism” and the “adoption of
special protocols to investigate attacks”. In general this fully reflects the outcome of the
interviews conducted for this survey. The same is true of problems regarding protection
measures which are due to “the slow response by the authorities, reluctance in
acknowledging the gravity of the situation and the fact that in most cases measures
basically involve giving people phones and other means of communication or assigning
escorts to ‘look after the defenders.’ Occasionally the institutions they fear are the very
same ones entrusted with their protection.” There is no mechanism for risk assessment in
the unit based at the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor a protocol defining the procedure to be
followed or setting clear criteria on whether the measures are to be maintained or lifted;
there are no clear rules for coordination between the federal and local levels either, nor is
there a budget to shoulder the costs of the protection measures.
22 “Defending human rights: between commitment and risk”: http://www.hchr.org.mx/documentos%5Cinforme

s%5Cinformepdf.pdf
20
Brazil
Following sustained pressure from national human rights NGOs and after several working
group meetings (for over a year), the National Programme for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders (PPDDH in Portuguese) was finally officially launched by the government
on 26th October 2004 in Brasilia during a public hearing of the Human Rights Commission
of the Chamber of Deputies. This programme is run by the Special Secretariat for Human
Rights (SEDH811 - part of the Office of the President of the Republic812). Decree Nº 6.044,
of 12 February 200723 813 led to the approval of the National Policy for the Protection of
Human Rights Defenders. Its objective is to establish protection principles and guidelines
as well as assistance to natural and legal persons, groups, institutions, organizations and
social movements that promote, protect and defend human rights and which in exercising
these functions find themselves exposed to risk or in a vulnerable position.
Originally a chapter on the protection of defenders was to be included in a law on victim
and witness protection,24 in order to create a legal protection framework for human rights
defenders. This project did not materialize and instead a debate took place on elevating the
National Protection Programme to the category of a law. The issue is still under discussion
at the time of writing and will be dealt with later in this text.25
The PPDDH has initiated a decentralization process with pilot programmes in the states of
Pernambuco, Pará y Espirito Santo (and the State coordination office is based in Brasilia). In
each state a coordination unit and a programme office have been set up with representatives
of various sectors such as the Civil, Federal and Military Police, the Ombudsman’s Office
(which handles programme coordination in the state of Pará, for example), the Public
Prosecutor’s Office as well as civil society representatives (NGOs, trade unions, etc).
While the programme was being developed national coordination meetings were held in
rotation in the various states included in the programme, with the participation of all of
the sectors involved.
The programme budget was initially 500,000 Reales in 2004, rising to 2.5 million Reales
(almost one million euros) in 2008, during which time the Special Secretariat had 45
defenders under its protection.26
811 http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/sedh/
812 http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/sedh/protecao/defensores/
23 Decree Nº 6.044, dated 12 February 2007. Approval of the National Policy for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders - PNPDDH, defines the stages in the elaboration of the National Plan for the Protection
of Human rights defenders and presents further steps.
813 http://legislacao.planalto.gov.br/legisla/legislacao.nsf/Viw_Identificacao/DEC 6.044-2007?OpenDocument
24 Bill No 3.616/2004 presented before the Chamber of Deputies – the intention was to include a chapter on
the protection of human rights defenders under threat in law 9.807/99 (Act pertaining to the programme
on victims and witness protection).
25 See full text of the bill in the annex.
26 See accompanying note to this bill in Focus (PI’s observatory on national protection policies for human
rights defenders at: http://focus.protectionline.org/-Focus-).
21

At the end of 2009, during a series of debates on the aforementioned Human Rights
Defenders Bill, the Brazilian Committee for Human Rights Defenders sent an open letter
to the Brazilian government with an assessment of the programme plus a set of
recommendations.27 Among other things, the Brazilian defenders pointed out structural
problems leading to attacks on defenders (such as the struggle for land and an economic
development model based on mega-projects). They also pointed out that chronic problems
have dogged the programme since its inception that can be categorized as follows:
• At the institutional and structural level: lack of coordination and demarcation of
responsibilities between the central and state levels and excessive bureaucracy
• Extension of networks: a need for legal advice, psychological support and effective
protection of defenders, prioritising local protection for defenders and strengthening of
the ombudsman’s offices (inter alia)
• The legal framework: the need to make the programme state policy
• The need for a national analysis
• Programme management: civil society/state participation and good staff retention
since 2007 are recognized as strengths. The letter mentions the need for clearer work
plans, coordinated visits at local level and a better definition of methodology. It
highlights structural weaknesses and lack of resources.
It is worth mentioning that the bill proposed by the Brazilian government is the only one
of its kind in the world given that all the other protection programmes are based on decrees
or policy measures without attaining this level of institutionalization.
The current bill on protecting human rights defenders

According to the SEDH, the current bill is intended to institutionalize the protection of
human rights defenders and overcome contradictions and gaps affecting the programme
(constitutional matters, and conflict of powers between various state and federal bodies).
Likewise its intended legal status, its cross-cutting nature (covering different state bodies
dealing with human rights issues) and decentralized structure must be underlined. State
protection offices are to have a wider scope (currently only in states of Pernambuco, Pará,
and Espirito Santo with 45 defenders on the programme) and an analysis of the national
situation of human right defenders will be completed. The bill seeks greater international
cooperation regarding the protection of defenders and the sharing of experience at that
level (see below for an assessment of the contents of the bill).
27 This document and other relevant will be available in Focus: http://focus.protectionline.org/-Focus-
22
Peru
On 22 February 2007, the Ministry of Justice by official notice requested that the chairman
of the Commission on Justice and Human Rights of the Congress of the Republic adopt bill
175/2006 on the “Benefits of effective co-operation and a system for the protection of
informers, wronged persons, witnesses and experts.”28 The objective of this initiative was
to modify Law 27378 relating to the benefits of effective collaboration in the field of
organized crime,814 adding informers, victims, witnesses and experts who may be
involved in investigations or legal action against human rights violations, close family,
parents/grandparents, descendants, siblings or other related persons such as lawyers or
human rights defenders to the list of people protected by the law.
However at the time of writing the project had not yet been adopted.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Despite there being no law in force, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a pioneer in this
field on the African continent. In 2007, civil society drew up a draft bill on the Protection of
Human Rights Defenders. It was debated but never passed.
Due to the fact that the text29 incorporates essential elements of the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders, its adoption and entry into force presupposes the transposition and full
application of the declaration at national level, thus invoking the direct obligation of the
state to protect defenders. However, in contrast to legislation in other countries, this bill
does not have a special protection mechanism and there are gaps in the defenders’ rights.
This process has also been addressed at provincial level in the Democratic Republic of
Congo: in 2007 human rights organisations in South Kivu submitted draft regional
legislation to the provincial legislative assembly. Unfortunately on the 14th February 2009
it was rejected by the assembly without debate.30 As the South Kivu organizations prepare
to resubmit it a similar initiative is being prepared in North Kivu for the provincial
legislative assembly.
28 This document and other relevant ones are available in Focus (observatory on national policies for the
protection of human rights defenders) at: http://focus.protectionline.org/-Focus-
814 http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache:rSFtAHwBu4QJ:www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic2_per_ley_27378_sp
.pdf+Ley+N%BC+27378,+que+establece+beneficios+por+colaboraci%97n+eficaz+en+el+%87mbito+de+la+crim
inalidad+organizada&hl=es&ct=clnk&cd=2
29 See this document in annex.
30 Initiative Congolaise pour la Justice et la Paix (ICJP) - Congolese initiative for justice and peace - Press
statement 17 February 2009.
23
Other African countries

Although the majority of African countries have no laws or institutions dealing specifically
with the protection of human rights defenders, in some like Kenya there is legislation covering
the protection of certain individuals including certain types of human rights defenders. The
purpose of the law is primarily witness protection but it can also cover the protection of
whistleblowers on corruption, human rights violations and other crimes.31 The mandate of the
ombudsman in both Kenya and Uganda includes the protection of human rights defenders,
although this has only actually been practiced in a few cases.32
Nepal
In Nepal, an organization known as the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) 815
presented a draft decree33 on human rights defenders for discussion by the Nepali
authorities in the second half of 2009.
• The draft includes an express reference to the UN Declaration on human rights
defenders and includes a definition of the defender and his/her rights and responsibilities
which complies with the declaration
• It advocates the establishment by the government of a Commission on Human Rights
Defenders (sic) as an “autonomous” institution that would be made up of a government
representative (Ministry of Home Affairs), another from the Judiciary (but appointed
by the government), a legal expert from the Bar,34 a journalist appointed by the
Federation of Nepali Journalists and four defenders (with at least one woman) appointed
by the government (on recommendation by the National Human Rights Commission).
Apart from the government’s substantial participation in decisions regarding the
composition of the Commission, the representatives must also meet certain requirements
such as holding university degree and being between 25 and 70 years old. Nevertheless,
this Commission does not include any representative from the security forces, which
deprives it from the opportunity of communicating with them directly, building trust
and proposing action regarding human rights defenders at risk. There is also no
representative from the National Human Rights Commission
• As regards resources, several possible sources of funding are acknowledged, ranging
from government funds to NGOs including questionable sources such as “fees” from
the defenders themselves or funds from “any other source”. The staff is to be provided
by the government who will also pay their salaries
31 Information from interviews.

32 Information from interviews.
815 http://www.insec.org.np
33 Human Rights Defenders Bill 2066, First Draft (see annex).
34 Nepal Bar Association.
24
• The responsibilities of this Commission entail taking action or making others take
action to provide defenders with the protection they need, drawing up a “code of
conduct” for the defenders, developing protection policies and assisting the National
Human Rights Commission and the government to enforce the Defenders’ Declaration,
etc. However, it does not specify mechanisms for coordination or action, or the source
of authority for all this. There are no details on the scope or use of the code of conduct
in defining the work of defenders (for example the non use of violence) or in excluding
certain groups of defenders
• The draft includes a chapter on safety measures for defenders which highlights the
responsibilities incumbent upon all government, administrative and security bodies in
supporting the work of defenders, such as the fact they cannot be detained or prosecuted
while carrying out their duties (unless they commit a crime). They cannot be made to testify
or make a statement based on information they have as a result of their role as defenders.
Both measures are important in order to safeguard defenders from being criminalised.
The analysis of this draft is interesting in that it is the most recent attempt to establish a
legal instrument for the protection of a country’s human right defenders. Though drafted
in the spirit of the UN Declaration, it reproduces many of the mistakes and gaps highlighted
by human rights organizations and the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights defenders covered here. However, the inclusion of the rights of defenders
in the course of their work is an innovation.
Initiatives by European Union countries

The legislation and initiatives of the European Union usually provide guarantees regarding
the rights of those defending human rights. Several states have taken initiatives regarding the
situation of defenders beyond their respective borders. The German Bundestag (Parliament)
drafted a motion on the protection of human rights defenders under threat; 816 the Spanish
Congress of Deputies issued a non-legislative motion on the protection of human rights
defenders817 and in Belgium the Senate issued a resolution on the protection of human
rights defenders818 while the House of Representatives adopted a resolution on defenders.819
As always civil society initiatives have been fundamental in achieving this progress.
816 http://www.protectionline.org/Motion-on-the-protection-of-human,220.html
817 http://www.protectionline.org/Non-legislative-motion-about-the,3920.html
818 http://www.protectionline.org/Resolution-on-the-protection-of,217.html
819 http://www.protectionline.org/Resolution-on-Human-Rights,188.html
25
Chapter 3: Analysis of national laws and

authorities protecting human rights defenders
There are two types of legislation governing the protection of human rights defenders:
1. Laws leading to transposition of the declaration into national law, and which define
human rights defenders and the state’s obligations towards them.
2. Laws which lead to national protection mechanisms and stipulate their tasks and roles.
Ideally states should have both types and use the transposition of the declaration to
develop mechanisms to meet its obligations. Unfortunately this usually does not happen,
although the laws have in general at least accommodated the declaration with an express
recognition of its binding nature.
We shall now examine the legislation.
Human rights defenders as protected subjects

One of the most important aspects of this study of legislation is without a doubt the people
it is designed to protect. We will use the instruments adopted by the United Nations as a
reference and more specifically the declaration on human rights defenders.
Definition of human rights defenders

From 1998 onwards, terms such as human rights ‘activist, professional, observer or agent’
fell out of usage because with the express recognition of the “right and duty to promote the
respect and knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms at national and
international levels” the term human rights defenders became increasingly common.1
Fifty years after the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and twenty years after
negotiations began on the draft “Declaration on Human Rights Defenders”, the United
Nations finally recognized the reality of the thousands of persons promoting and protecting
human rights in the world. February 1998 saw the birth of the “Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Institutions to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.
As already mentioned, article 12.1 of this Declaration recognizes the right of all persons to
participate, individually and collectively, in peaceful activities against violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.2 This statement led to a sufficiently broad definition of
the term defender for the needs of the situation and recognized the range of persons
involved in human rights promotion and protection.
Before taking an in-depth look at the definition of the term ‘human rights defender’, for the
purposes of illustration we will give a brief definition of human rights.
1 See Fact sheet Nº 29. Human Rights defenders: Protecting the right to defend human rights. The United
Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for human rights defenders. Footnote on page 2.
2 Art 12.1. “Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful activities
against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.
27
International human rights law recognizes the individual’s rights and freedoms before states.
States are obliged to refrain from violating these rights and to guarantee the law is upheld.3
Thus human rights “can be defined as the privileges which all individuals have, in accordance with
international law, before the authorities to preserve their dignity as human beings. Their function is
to exclude state interference in specific areas of the individual’s life or to guarantee the provision of
certain services by the state to meet basic needs and which reflect the fundamental demands a human
being can make on the society they live in.”4
So the work of human rights defenders is to take action when the state violates human
rights or fails to guarantee them. They also intervene when the state fails in its obligations
to transpose international law into national legislation.5
The United Nations document entitled “Human
ssential requirements
E rights defenders: protecting the right to defend
& for human rights human rights” 681 defines the term ‘human rights
defenders defenders’ as applicable to persons who individually
• Defend, promote, protect or with others promote and protect human rights
human rights through non-violent acts. So a human rights
defender can be anyone irrespective of gender, age
• Act in a non-violent manner
or origin. There are no requirements for professional
• Accept the universal nature qualifications nor must defending rights be part of
of human rights their job. A defender can work alone or within an
NGO, international institutions, the state machinery,
the government or the private sector. However, the human rights defender must meet three
essential requirements: defend, promote or protect human rights, do so in a non-violent manner
and accept the universal nature of human rights (that is, no human right may be rejected).
Before ending this section, it must be pointed out that in spite of the above and the many
efforts to spread this concept within society and even among defenders, traditional positions
which consider human rights defenders as people working in the civil and political rights
sector or as individuals paid to defend them are still commonplace. Some people only
consider defenders to be those working for social organizations, and some further restrict
the definition by applying it solely to lawyers involved in human rights cases. Nevertheless,
as we have already explained, both the United Nations and regional legislation adopt a
broad definition of term ‘defender’ as has been described above.
3 Cf. Art.30 Universal Declaration on Human Rights; Art 1 (Obligation to respect human rights) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – part 1: duties
and obligations, Chapter I Article 1 (Human and Peoples’ Rights) of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (BANJUL CHARTER) art 1, para.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
4 Inter-American Institute for Human Rights. The inter-American system for the protection of human
rights: institutional and procedural aspects, Héctor Ledesma Faúndez. 4th ed., 2004 pp. 5 and 6.
5 Some instruments have made the need to transpose these obligations into national law one of the
obligations to guarantee human rights, repealing or amending such legislation as may be in violation of
them or legislating to ensure they are complied with. Cf. art. 1 African Charter for human and peoples’
rights and art. 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
6 Fact sheet Nº 29. Human rights defenders: Protecting the right to defend human rights. The United
Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for human rights defenders.
28
The actions of the human rights defenders

An important factor in the definition of the term human rights defender is the type of
action they are involved in. The difficulty in arriving at a clear and precise definition led
the above mentioned United Nations document7 to note that human rights defenders are
above all identified by what they do and it is through a description of their actions and of
some of the contexts in which they operate that the term can be best understood. To specify
further who qualifies to be a human rights defender, the same document describes the
nature of defence and lists some typical actions (see box).
& Features of defence work

• Must promote or defend any human right (civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights) or fundamental freedoms
• May be carried out individually or collectively
• May use any platform (including state institutions, government or private firms)
• Should be non-violent or peaceful
• May focus on the rights of specific sections of the population
• May be paid or unpaid (through employment or voluntary work)
• May be carried out on a permanent or occasional basis
• May be carried out in any part of the world
• May be carried out at local, national, regional and international levels
& Action may include:

• Investigation of human rights violations or gathering and disseminating the information
• Victim support
• Ensuring accountability and ending impunity
• Supporting more effective public management and governance
• Contributing to the implementation of human rights treaties
• Education and training in human rights
7 Fact sheet Nº 29. Human rights defenders: Protecting the right to defend human rights. The United Nations
Secretary General’s Special Representative for human rights defenders.
29
To many, requiring action to be legal is a

rt. 3 of the Declaration on
A debatable issue. Although international
& human rights defenders
instruments stipulate non-violence on the
part of the human rights defenders, they
“Domestic law consistent with the Charter of the
do not actually say their action must be
United Nations and other international obligations
legal. Some of the experts we interviewed
of the State in the field of human rights and
for this survey felt action by defenders
fundamental freedoms is the juridical framework
should not constitute a criminal offence;
within which human rights and fundamental
however, restricting the actions of human
freedoms should be implemented and enjoyed and
rights defenders to legal acts alone,
within which all activities referred to in the present
especially in a context of conflict,
Declaration for the promotion, protection and
repression or states of emergency8 can
effective realization of those rights and freedoms
lead to unjust exclusion. A response to this
should be conducted”.
question is found in article 3 of the
declaration on human rights defenders,
which affirms that domestic law is the framework within which the defence of human rights
should be exercised and enjoyed, but only as long as this does not contravene the aforementioned
instruments. As such, if a human rights defender were to carry out action deemed illegal under
domestic law, the same action can be construed to be legitimate if the infringed legislation
proved to be contrary to international human rights instruments.
However, one can go further and point out that states which often “criminalise” the actions of
human rights defenders do so in two ways. First, the states in question define as criminal all
resistance or defence of human rights, for example restrictions on the right of assembly and
demonstration, excessive application of the offences of conspiracy and terrorism etc.9 Secondly
ambiguous laws may be applied in an arbitrary way to accuse a defender, i.e. when laws are
8 States of emergency, alert and siege are situations in which the states have the authority to restrict or
limit guarantees. Authoritarian governments have traditionally made use of these methods to curb the
activities of their opponents.
- This is an important point to emphasize as both the European and American Conventions include
provisions that empower states to abolish some of the guarantees established by these instruments in
exceptional cases. The European Convention stipulates that, “in times of war or other public emergencies
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”. However, this provision does permit any
derogation from the right to life nor from that prohibiting torture and slavery.
- In a wider sense but with more precision article 27 of the American Convention authorizes states in
exceptional cases like war, public danger or any other emergency threatening state security or its
independence to adopt measures that would limit certain guarantees, but solely for “the period of time
strictly required by the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, gender, language, religion,
or social origin”. Like the European Convention, the American Convention excludes from possible
suspension the guarantees that protect the right to life, personal integrity as well as those that prohibit
slavery but adds other rights not mentioned in the European Convention (10) where the obligation
stipulated under article 15 must be deduced from the words “such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law”.
- So clearly in exceptional situations the legality of the actions of the defenders may not be curtailed
by the states in the case of the defence of rights or guarantees which cannot be suspended under
international law and conventions. Furthermore regarding actions to defend rights in states of
emergency, both the European and American Conventions require that states inform the respective
secretaries general on the reasons underlying the suspension of rights and guarantees and the date of
expiry of these measures.
9 Manual to address, monitor and verify cases of violations against human rights defenders. Claudia
Samayoa. Protection unit for human rights defenders in Guatemala. (UDEFEGUA).
30
applied without the proper guarantees (recognized by international instruments). Under

these ambiguous laws the assumptions are so broad as to be imprecise, lending themselves to
various interpretations and the prosecution of a broad range of actions. So a precise
classification of offences is needed, especially those which human right defenders could be
accused of in the course of their work. The draft Nepali decree contains a good example of
preventive measures under which human rights defenders cannot be detained or prosecuted
in the course of their duties (unless they commit a crime), neither can they be forced to testify
or to make statements based on information they have acquired as a result of their work as
defenders. Both measures are important to avoid the criminalisation of defenders.10
Furthermore in some countries the right to resistance is recognized by law11 and this would
imply that many of the actions referred to here are not even deemed illegal.
Is the definition of human rights defenders in national legislation the

same as in international instruments?
National legislation on the protection of human rights defenders should clearly determine the
target group. Almost all laws include the term human rights defenders but some actually lack a
definition of defender (perhaps largely due to the fact the laws adopt the definition in the
Declaration).
In Guatemala the proposed Public Protection Policy for Human Rights Defenders and
Other Vulnerable Groups includes some of the elements of Fact Sheet Nº 29, However it
does so in a section entitled “Background” and when referring to the target group states that
protection policy “should be directed at certain categories or sectors in society such as:
a) Leaders and activists in political groups, especially opposition groups
b) Leaders and activists in social, civic, community, trade union, farmers and ethnic groups
c) Leaders and activists from human rights organisations
d) Victims of crime, abuse of power and/or witnesses in cases of human rights violations and
offences against international humanitarian law, whether or not criminal, disciplinary and
administrative proceedings have been initiated
e) Journalists and media personnel dealing with the dissemination, defence, safeguard and
restoration of human rights and the application of International Humanitarian Law or who
exercise freedom of speech
f) Mayors, councillors and trade unionists whose duties place them at risk”.
Although this Public Policy includes important elements for the definition of human rights
defenders, it simply lists various groups without mentioning them specifically. Although
the list is not exhaustive, it could be misleading and exclude certain people, which is not
advisable given the matter’s importance.
10 Human Rights Defenders Bill 2066, First Draft (this document along with other relevant one can be found
in Focus (http://focus.protectionline.org/-Focus-).
11 For example, article 45 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala stipulates that ”action
to prosecute human rights offenders is public and can be exercised through a simple complaint without bail or any
formality. The people shall legitimately exercise resistance in order to protect and defend the human rights and
guarantees enshrined in the Constitution”.
31
For its part, the General Protection Programme of the Directorate of Human Rights in
the Colombian Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice82 covers several target groups,
although the members of the groups are not always defined as defenders under law.12
The programme13 is intended for:
1. Leaders or activists of political or opposition groups, social, civic and community
organisations, trade unions, farmers and ethnic groups, human rights NGOs and
members of Mision Medica
2. Witnesses in cases of violation of human rights and international humanitarian law
3. Leaders and members of the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union-UP) 14 and the Colombian
Communist party
4. Journalists and media personnel
5. Mayors, councillors, members of parliament and proxies15
6. Leaders of organisations representing displaced populations
7. Civil servants and former civil servants responsible for designing, coordinating and
implementing the government’s human rights and peace policy.
The draft bill under discussion in Brazil and the draft decree in Nepal accept and include
the definition in the declaration. But there are other important contributions to the
definition of the term human rights defender such as the bill in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, which in article 6 includes a list of action typically taken by defenders:
“[…] human rights defenders shall:
- provide proof of acts of violence
- provide legal, medical, psychological or any other form of assistance, such that victims may
assert their rights before the law
- combat the culture of impunity that has been used to hide systematic and repeated violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms”
The civil servants attached to protection programmes are familiar with this concept and
usually endorse the definition in the international instruments.16 However, the laws
governing these programmes are sometimes confused and although the objective is to
82 http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/
12 According to Jorge Cubides, Interinstitutional Coordinator of the Government Programme for Human
Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Colombia, this was in order to avoid excluding anyone.
13 Decree 2816/06 of 22 August 2006: “Drafting and managing the Human Rights Protection Programme of
the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice and adopting other provisions”.
14 Colombian political party.
15 These proxies are agents of the Solicitor-General of the Nation. In addition, article 277 of the Political Constitution
of Colombia authorizes them to – inter alia - protect human rights and ensure they remain effective, to defend
the interests of society as well as the collective interest, ensure administrative tasks are done efficiently and
supervise the official conduct of those exercising public functions.
16 Interview with Hugo Enrique Martínez Juárez, director of the coordination committee for the protection
of human rights defenders, administrators and officers of the law, journalists and media personnel of the
COPREDHE, Guatemala.
32
protect human rights defenders, there is no clear reference to them and the term is even
avoided. For example the Mexican ombudsman’s programme is intended for ‘civilian
defenders’ of human rights, which is an unclear, misleading term for such an important
issue as the definition of a protected group.
In conclusion, it cannot be said that the different national laws are at variance with
international instruments. In fact most of the protection programmes apply a broad
definition of the term defender in their daily practice similar to that of international
instruments. However, the lack of a written definition may lead to the exclusion of some
defenders when certain institutions do not wish to include them or where civil servants do
not have the right training.
National protection legislation

should include a definition of defender
based on international instruments.
Does national legislation only apply to the protection of human rights

defenders or does it also provide protection to other sectors?
Protection legislation does not usually apply solely to human rights defenders, as the
measures can also cover journalists, witnesses and other groups often at risk (and who in
some cases can also be considered as human rights defenders).
In Mexico the rules of the ministry of state are intended to prevent human rights violations
including those against human rights defenders, although they are not expressly
mentioned. However the Programme of the Mexican National Human Rights Commission
only deals with journalists and civilian defenders of human rights.
In Guatemala and Colombia the Proposal for Public Policy and the Protection Programme
apply to a wide-ranging group of persons as we have seen. The fact that these provisions
cover the protection of different, diverse groups may make it difficult to cater for each
group individually. Ignoring this may affect how efficient these measures turn out to be.
In Brazil protection extends to family members who live with the defender as well as their
assets should they also be threatened.
Laws governing protection measures should therefore take into account the different
needs stipulated by each group (or else different laws should govern different groups).
The specific protection needs of defenders

should be taken into account when legislation
applies to several groups
33
Are witnesses included?

Although there is no indication that Colombia and Guatemala’s protection programmes
apply directly to witnesses, generally speaking both programmes include protecting
witnesses as well as other groups from violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.17
In the case of Peru, where there is no government or state protection for defenders, an
attempt was made to include defenders in a witness protection programme set up to
protect those involved in court cases following the Truth Commission. To some, this was a
good proposal as it endeavoured to guarantee the protection of human right defenders by
making use of existing structures. However, for others this was not an appropriate
alternative, as a witness programme does not necessarily reflect the specific nature of
protection required for defenders and this could have a bearing on the effectiveness of the
measures taken.
Where both programmes coexist, one for the protection of defenders under the ministry of
state or home affairs for example and another for witness protection under the attorney-
general’s office or the ministry of justice, there are often problems of overlap when the
witness is also a human rights defender. This conflict of interest is usually to the detriment
of the defenders’ protection because it can considerably delay the granting of measures.
Where two programmes coexist

criteria on who is covered by each one
must be drawn up to avoid delays
owing to conflicts of responsibility
In Colombia Decree 28/16 includes witnesses to human rights violations. The Protection
Programme nonetheless coordinates with the Office of the Public Prosecutor.18 Cases are
referred to this office if they meet the criteria for the witness protection programme since
some of the measures in its remit, such as change of identity and isolation, are considered
more effective for their circumstances. The same may apply to elected holders of public office
in Colombia, such as mayors, who while not human rights defenders are still covered by the
programmes (protection measures are only granted in these cases when the state security
forces or the public bodies to which they belong do not have the resources to protect them).
It would therefore be advisable in such cases for legislation to lay down clear criteria
allowing to rapidly determine which programme should cover the defender or the witness
and by applying measures to each case in line with its specific protection needs.
17 In Colombia, the target group of decree 2816/06 is ”victims of crime, abuse of power, and/or witnesses in cases
of human rights violations and infringement of international humanitarian law, irrespective of whether criminal,
disciplinary or administrative proceedings have been initiated”. In Guatemala, the Proposal for Public Policy
includes both witnesses and accused persons in the protection scheme.
18 Interview with Jorge Cubides, Interinstitutional Coordinator of the Colombian Presidential Programme
for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.
34
Are any defenders excluded?

Even the most exhaustive list of persons such as the one in the Colombian programme (see
above) may leave certain defenders out of the programme, despite the fact the definitions
in international instruments include them. For example, human rights defenders involved
in teaching human rights in educational centres (or anywhere else other than social
organizations) could fall outside the programme even though this is a sector that has
traditionally been a victim of political violence. A further example is the Colombian
programme which limits one of its target groups to affiliates of two political parties19 which
could put other current or future political parties involved in human rights work in a
vulnerable position and leave them without protection.
In the Peruvian bill even though reference is made to human rights defenders, this only
applies to persons participating in trials and as such, human rights defenders whose
activities do not involve court cases are not covered by the legislation.
The term “civil defender” used by the Mexican National Human Rights Commission
apparently excludes all those who do not belong to human rights NGOs. This implies that
non-organised human rights defenders or those working in national or international
institutions will not be protected; furthermore the identity of the aggressor can also
exclude people because the Commission does not protect human rights defenders who
have not been attacked by state agents. This creates an additional problem since in many
cases it is not possible to identify who is behind an attack.20
Another example of possible restrictions is to be found in the Nepali draft bill which
alludes to a code of conduct: depending on how this is defined, several groups of defenders
might be excluded.
As previously explained, defenders involved in violent action are disqualified and therefore
excluded from protective measures. However, some civil servants appear to confuse “non-
violence” with the requirement that the action of a human rights defender should be legal.
Mistakes like this can also exclude them from protection.
Obligations for states arising from legislation on human rights defenders

When national protection guidelines apply to wider groups and not solely to defenders,
states base their legislation on the obligation to guarantee the security of persons on their
territory, arising from their recognition of different rights and freedoms in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights21 and other universal and regional instruments. When
legislation applies specifically to human rights defenders as a group, in addition to the
general obligation to protect, it normally draws on the obligations under the declaration on
19 Members of the Unión Patriótica and the Communist Party of Colombia are included for historical reasons
(systematic repression of members of both parties) and possibly because regional bodies such as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights are aware of this.
20 The main objective of the National Human Rights Commission is to closely examine cases in which a
media worker or member of any non-governmental organization dealing with the defence of human
rights is wronged by any authority in the exercise of their respective duties.
21 Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration”.
35
human rights defenders. Protecting this group does not only mean protecting the right to
life and to one’s physical integrity but also the right to defend human rights.
When addressing violence against human rights defenders from this perspective a broader
approach can be adopted so that the legislation and mechanisms created to meet these
obligations can also fully meet the needs in question.
Therefore, when the declaration on human rights defenders acknowledges “the important
role of international cooperation and the valuable work of individuals, groups and institutions in
contributing to the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms”
and recognizes in the same text the right to defend human rights, it places an obligation on
states under article 12 to protect these rights in accordance with the terms above.
The content of national legislation on human rights defenders

In conclusion, we can say that substantive legislation on the protection of human rights
defenders should at least cover the following points:
• Protected persons:
- They should be precisely defined as human rights defenders and the text should
include a broad and clear definition of human rights defenders in accordance with
international instruments
- Any list of persons should not be considered closed since the broad interpretation of
the term ‘human rights defender’ makes it almost impossible to draw up detailed
lists that do not lead to exclusions
- Protection of human rights defenders should be addressed separately from other
protected groups so that legislation can include their specific needs
- Should other groups be included, it is important that the human rights defenders be
dealt with in a separate paragraph which should cater for the specific nature of
protection required by defenders. In this way their needs will not be glossed over in
an attempt to legislate for the protection of several groups at once.
• State obligations:
- Obligations arise from a recognition of the work done by human rights defenders.
Recognition implies an obligation to protect
- Obligations incumbent on the state should include a general obligation to guarantee
human rights, but this should not be dealt with separately from the duty to protect
the right to defend human rights.
36
Chapter 4: State structures and mechanisms

for the protection of human rights defenders
An important statement to start with: much as the existence of protection within the state
machinery might reflect real political will, and in some cases has led to substantial progress in
this field, it in no way guarantees any improvement in the situation of human rights defenders.
Several countries in this survey have sophisticated protection legislation, yet human rights
defenders continue to suffer attacks that go unpunished. In the final analysis it is clear that
protection depends on political will and action as well as effective cooperation between the
authorities involved, especially the government, the security forces and the judiciary.
On a more technical level problems such as the allocation of insufficient resources or the
deployment of poorly trained civil servants may lead to an ineffectual state protection office.
The Peruvian ombudsman has stated that “any attempt to improve the system of protection requires
sufficient economic and specialised human resources to enable it to efficiently implement and adopt the
right protection measures.” 1 Human rights organisations have made similar criticisms of the
federal programme in Brazil. Obstacles such as these (problems with training and resources)
have led to many considering these initiatives as window dressing by the state for the benefit
of the international community. The detractors of these institutions feel that in the absence of
the will to deal with the problem, the role of these offices is simply to improve the country’s
image and that they contribute little if anything to protection. In many cases it has even been
claimed they have made things worse by rendering international pressure less effective.
The mistrust some defenders feel towards the state also hinders many from joining these
programmes. One of the main reasons is that the information the police obtain from
human rights defenders may end up being used to attack them instead. The increasing
flow of information on the dirty war waged by the Administrative Department of Security
(DAS) in Colombia against large sectors of defenders (among other social groups) is
striking, especially when it was the DAS that was supposed to be protecting them.
In spite of this, responsibility for protection must lie first and foremost with the state and
as we shall see in some cases, a state programme may provide adequate protection simply
owing to the economic, human and logistical resources available to it.
We shall therefore analyse the processes involved in establishing state protection offices
and the best practices for an effective response.
Background to state protection offices

Some of the bodies providing protection to human rights defenders were set up with this
objective in mind, as is the case with Colombia, Brazil or the proposal in Nepal, while others
have been created within structures already in existence. Creating something from scratch
means it can be designed to match the protection needs of the human right defenders and
can do its job without the inertia and red tape of an existing body. However, it then has to
find its place on the global scene and get enough funding, etc. On the other hand, the use of
already established state structures can be a good opportunity for state institutions doing
1 Office of the Ombudsman of Peru. Ombudsman’s report Nº 112. December 2006.
37
similar work to do something for human rights defenders. The specific nature of protection
for human rights defenders must of course be catered for. In certain political circumstances
there may be less resistance to the setting up of an office for the protection of human rights
defenders under an existing structure. As we have seen, in the case of Peru, human rights
defenders at risk were handled through witness protection legislation during the court
cases from the Truth Commission. In the case of the Mexican National Human Rights
Commission their protection emerged from a programme for journalists.
In all the cases studied the state protection offices were set up due to political pressure from
human rights organisations, generally over several years. In fact some of these offices such as
those in Guatemala and Colombia were set up to mirror the setting up of protection bodies by the
human rights defenders themselves (the Defenders Unit in Guatemala and the Non-Governmental
Protection Programme for Human Rights Defenders - see Part II of this study).
Another important point as far as the background to the setting up of these offices is
concerned is the political moment at which this takes place. For example in Mexico a change
of government, national and international demands for an explanation of the murder of the
human rights defender Digna Ochoa and subsequent threats against known defenders
turned the safety of human rights defenders into an important item on the political agenda.
Human rights organisations seized upon this and, using the tools provided by the First
Latin American Conference of Human Rights Defenders, demanded the establishment of a
protection office. The presidency’s human rights unit was subsequently set up.
It is important for civil society

and other relevant experts to participate
in the setting up of the office
As well as the importance of national participation, international experts should be involved

in the creation of these offices. In Brazil national civil society organisations and international
experts contributed to drafting the legislation for the programme. This type of participation
can set useful standards for programme development, especially when sharing experiences
and best practices to be applied in countries which have not tackled this problem yet.
Objectives of the protection offices
In general, the main objective of all the protection offices studied was protecting a relatively
large group of human rights defenders. The biggest differences lay in the mechanisms they use
or in the scope of their work. The other common factor is that in all the countries studied many
critics of defenders felt the offices were set up in a bid to ease international pressure brought to
bear on the states in response to violence against human rights defenders.
The objective of the Human Rights Protection Programme of the Ministry for Home Affairs
and Justice in Colombia is to:
“[…] support the National Government in safeguarding the lives, integrity, freedom and security of
the programme target population which faces certain, imminent and exceptional risks as a direct
consequence of their political, public, social or humanitarian work.”2
2 Decree No. 2816 2006. 22 August 2006 “through which the Human Rights Protection Programme of the Ministry of
Home Affairs and Justice is drafted and regulated, and other provisions adopted”.
38
The Public Policy Proposal in Guatemala makes a similar suggestion in its second objective3;
however this proposal is much more ambitious in that it has a wider overall objective:
“To ensure a favourable environment in which human rights defenders, trade unionists, officers of
the law, persons appearing in court, victims of crime, journalists, media personnel and other
vulnerable groups may perform their tasks.”4
The specific objectives suggested by this proposal are therefore the fight against impunity
and the promotion of a human rights culture, as well as the design and implementation of
a national plan of action for protection, the establishment of an early warning system,
without forgetting the improvement and strengthening of human rights protection
mechanisms and programmes.
The bill of the Democratic Republic of Congo contains a magnificent example of how to
transpose the declaration on human rights defenders into national law:
“The State has the responsibility and the duty to protect, promote and render effective all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular by adopting measures to create the right conditions
and legal guarantees, so that everyone under its jurisdiction, including human rights defenders, may
individually and collectively put these rights and freedoms into practice.”5
This is an ideal framework for a protection programme; the obligations in it are likely to
lead to a programme that meets the protection objectives of the declaration. The protection
office then introduces measures to ensure that the appropriate authorities protect the
defenders,6 investigate specific cases,7 fight impunity8 and prevent the expulsion of human
rights defenders fleeing persecution in other countries.
Where are the protection offices housed?

Traditionally, state protection activities emanated from several sources: human rights
commissions, the Ombudsman, the Attorney General’s office and human rights bodies
linked to the Executive usually under the Ministry of the Presidency or Home Affairs (or
its equivalent). In almost all the cases studied the protection office was set up by the
government and housed within government structures. There are also cases such as
Mexico and Brazil however where ad hoc bodies for human rights defenders are housed at
the ombudsman’s office.
3 Objective 2 of the Public Policy Proposal for the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights Defenders
and other vulnerable groups in Guatemala. “To develop prevention mechanisms for the improvement and
strengthening of the existing mechanisms and programmes for human rights defenders, those appearing in court,
media personnel and other vulnerable groups under threat or in situations of imminent risk to their lives, physical
integrity, safety and other universal freedoms, intended to protect them from violence, that is to say ordinary violence,
organised crime, illegal, clandestine and parallel security groups“.
4 Overall objective of the Public Policy Proposal for the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights
Defenders and other vulnerable groups in Guatemala.
5 See annex.
6 Art. 26: the state shall take all necessary measures to ensure the competent authorities protect human
rights defenders, individually or in association with others, from violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or
de jure discrimination or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by national and international human rights instruments.
7 Art. 25: The state shall conduct a prompt and impartial investigation when a complaint about violence has
been made or when it has grounds to believe that a violation of the rights of a defender has occurred.
8 Art. 29: Emphasize the need to combat the problem of impunity by carrying out in-depth independent
investigations and bringing to an end the violence perpetrated against human rights defenders.
39
When analyzing the pros and cons of where to place protection offices we can distinguish
between a government structure (a ministry for example) or an independent body (such as
the ombudsman’s office).
There are several reasons in favour of an ombudsman’s office having a department for the
protection of human rights defenders. The independence it enjoys makes it, at least in
theory, an ideal place for this work. Independence is a key element in protection work and
for gaining the trust of human rights defenders, who in many cases refuse contact with
government offices. Although the office’s resolutions might not entail sanctions, they may
force state institutions to respond. There is also the advantage of stability over time. These
are the positive points of basing protection offices in an institution of this type.
On the other hand, a government office does not only spell disadvantage compared to the
ombudsman, since it can also make important contributions to protection work e.g. access to
government structures and chains of command (such as the Ministry of Home Affairs and
the security forces for example), contacts with the Executive with the prospect of political
agreements and even the possibility of doing comprehensive work involving different
ministries, secretariats and local authorities. The government also has economic and human
resources as well as the possibility of amending legislation.
Finally, it is possible to create a mixed programme that includes contributions from the
government and the ombudsman. For example, in the State of Pará (Brazil) the department
responsible for the government’s programme for the protection of human rights defenders is
housed and coordinated by the ombudsman’s office and civil society participates fully.
Initiatives like this one that lead to a collective response imply combined effort and diverse
contributions that can substantially enrich the approach to protecting human rights defenders.
Who participates in the management of the protection programme?

The legislative obligations arising from international instruments are aimed at countries as
a whole and not solely at governments, so in seeking to meet their commitments they should
involve the different state authorities and institutions. With that in mind and from an
operational point of view, the work of an office for the protection of human rights defenders
requires solid cooperation with other institutions – government and state as well as non-state
institutions. Working relations are often established with ministries, offices attached to the
presidency or the Home Office as well as other high ranking positions in the security forces
and the public prosecutor’s office, etc. It is thus important that the laws governing protection
offices take the need for this network of institutional relationships into account.
Although in some instances this type of coordination has not been formally established,
there have been cases where these institutions and others participate directly in the
programme’s decision-making processes. Thus in Colombia, the CRER (Comité de Evaluación
de Riesgos – risk assessment committee) is chaired by the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs
or his representative9 and composed of the director of human rights at the Ministry of Home
Affairs and Justice, the director of the Presidential Programme for the Promotion of Human
Rights and the Application of International Humanitarian Law, the director general of the
DAS or his representative from the Protection Directorate, the director of the National Police,
9 All the CRER posts may be deputised by alternates and this may dilute its executive powers at certain times.
40
the director of the Social Solidarity Network, a representative from the Attorney-General’s
office, a representative of the ombudsman and a treasury representative. The Guatemalan
Public Policy Proposal for Prevention and the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and
Other Vulnerable Groups also provides a Committee for Risk Assessment and Protection
Measures and proposes a similar structure, adapted to the state’s institutions, with the
addition of a delegate from the public prosecutor’s office.
The participation of organisations supporting human rights defenders in these structures is
crucial. Among the various laws analysed, of special interest are those in Colombia, Brazil
and Guatemala’s Public Policy Proposal, because they cater for civil society participation. Four
representatives of the target population sit on Colombia’s Committee for Regulation and Risk
Assessment.10 They recommend the adoption of appropriate measures for each case.
In Guatemala, the public policy proposal allowed delegates from civil society organisations
and others from the journalism and media sector to join the Committee for Risk Assessment
and Protection – who then participated in the assessment of risk levels, formulating
recommendations and adopting protective measures.
In Brazil, the draft bill presented to the presidency on 30 October 2008 provides for civil
society participation within the highest authority in the programme - the National
Deliberation Council. Participation is therefore possible in the deliberations on setting up
a National Protection Policy and on which cases the programme should cover. Civil society
organisations decide on appeals against decisions by local councils or other decision-
making bodies in the programme. They support the implementation of the programme in
the various states and participate in other matters according to the new powers given to
the Council by its regulations.
However, in the Nepali proposal the four defenders on the National Commission are there
in an individual capacity, appointed by the government following a proposal from another
body (the National Human Rights Commission). They must be between 25 and 70 years
old and have a university degree, which excludes many defenders.
The intervention of defenders’ organisations not only enables them to participate in discussions
and decisions on cases brought before the programme, but also in planning and procedures.
In the Colombian programme, protection polices were initially agreed with the target
population, but in the years since the programme began one of the main recommendations
following criticism on how it could be improved has been the need for better coordination on
protection measures. As well as offering criticism, civil society organisations that join the
programme may bring it closer to its members, and this can win the defenders’ trust.
Although strictly speaking only the above-mentioned programmes permit the participation
of civil society, others allow a form of cooperation which is not so clearly defined but which
10 Trade union leaders: A representative each for CUT, CGT and CTC. Human rights leaders: A representative
from MINGA. Mayors, councillors, proxies and MPs: A representative each from the Colombian Local
Government Federation, the Colombian Local Councillors Federation, the National Association of Legal
Proxies and from the National MPs Association. Journalists: A representative each from the Foundation for
the Freedom of the Press-FLIP, ANDIARIOS, ASOMEDIOS and Media for Peace. UP-PCC: A representative
of REINICIAR, two from the PCC and one from the UP. Displaced Persons: A representative each from
ASODESAMUBA, the Foundation for Women and Labour and the National Coordination Committee for
Displaced Persons. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders: A representative of the indigenous and
Afro-Colombian communities respectively.
41
functions as a channel for information exchange and a focal point for reaching out to
human rights defenders. It would obviously be preferable for civil society participation to
be explicitly provided for, since otherwise they have no decision-making powers, and
changes in the programme’s staff coupled with the political atmosphere can close down
these channels of communication.
The participation of international institutions can also be very useful. In the Colombian
programme, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCHR) sits on the Risk Assessment Committee and although it has no voting powers
it has made several technical contributions and brought cases to the programme’s attention.
The office monitors the country, records cases and receives complaints. In Guatemala, even
though the UNHCHR is not yet established as an assessment body for the government
programme, it has participated in some successful initiatives. For example the UNHCHR
organised a defenders’ workshop on views of protection mechanisms where proposals
from the government’s presidential commission for human rights were submitted so that
new legislation could take experience into account. Along the same lines, a representative
of an international body sits on the recently created Agency for the Analysis of Attacks
against Human Rights Defenders.
It is to be noted that the attendance of the UNHCHR (or other institutions) can provide an
external perspective that can act as a kind of informal monitoring and when necessary, a
meeting point for state institutions and non-governmental organisations.
The draft legislation in Brazil, Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo does not include
international participation in the monitoring or management of protection programmes.
The participation of international

human rights organisations
and civil society in the programmes
can be beneficial
& The following bodies should participate in the programme

• The security forces and Ministry • The prosecution service and other
of Home Affairs investigation and intelligence bodies
• Specialist protection forces (and bodies specialising in
investigating these cases)
• Civil society
• Ministry of Social Security, Welfare
• Delegates from the protected sectors
or the equivalent
• International institutions
• Judicial bodies
• Representatives of protected groups
• Ministry of Health
• Representatives of the Executive’s
• For monitoring purposes
human rights office
- Ombudsman’s Office
• Ministry of Justice
- Public Prosecutor’s Office
- Treasury
42
Protection programmes and relations with other institutions participating

in the protection of defenders
All these institutions are not working alone in this field, because as has been previously
explained, protection work requires coordination between different state institutions and
this should feature in their guidelines for action. As such several institutions have worked
together. Here are some examples of coordination with the security forces or the judiciary.11
Coordination with the security forces

In all the programmes we studied organisations of human rights defenders constantly
underlined the need for coordination with the security forces and getting them to prevent
and respond to attacks against human right defenders.
Police escorts for human rights defenders at risk have become the main form of security
provided by the state. Not all human rights defenders agree with this measure, irrespective
of whether they use it or not. For some defenders the use of weapons even by the state is at
variance with their ethics. In other cases this type of protection has been described as
ineffective or counterproductive. Indeed, there are many cases in which a human rights
defender has declined this type of security on the grounds that contact with other defenders
or grass roots organisations becomes difficult with a police escort, or because the escort
itself becomes a source of information on his or her activities which could be used for a
direct attack (there are many documented cases) or for campaigns and other activities
against them.12 Note that defenders emphasize that declining a police escort should not be
construed as freeing the state from its responsibility to protect the defender concerned.
One of the negative experiences observed with the use of police escorts is the lack of proper
preparation for the police officers, much to the discontent of the users of the service. On other
occasions the service is provided by specialist bodies which provide more effective protection,
with the result that the defender feels much less vulnerable. This is the case of the Brazilian
programme where organisations are calling for a police force trained by the National Public
Security Agency to provide specialised protection to human rights defenders.
In Guatemala the DIPROSE - Division for Protection and Security - handles these cases as well
as the DPP - the Directorate for VIP Protection - bodies which were formed to protect persons
at risk. However a new proposal (opposed by the Interior Ministry) involves the creation of an
Elite Body for Security and Protection known as CESP to provide escorts both for personal
security as well as at home and at work. Members are to be selected from personnel already
serving in state security forces, not involved in intelligence and counterintelligence activities,
and they must have the right training, including in human rights and international state
responsibility. Furthermore, they must devote themselves exclusively to this task and
representatives of the target population are to participate in their selection.13
11 Part II of this study includes an in-depth analysis of the operational protection programmes.
12 For example, the Special Rapporteur Margaret Sekaggya raised this issue in the preliminary report on her visit
to Colombia in September 2009: “The issue of spying on human rights defenders by escorts detailed for their protection
must be resolved...” http://www.protectionline.org/IMG/pdf/A-HRC-13-22-Add3_advance_edited_version_.pdf
13 See: Schedule of preventive and protective measures for human rights defenders and other vulnerable
groups - Hugo Enrique Martínez Juárez. Coordination Committee for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders, Administrators, Legal Officers, Journalists and Social Communicators, COPREDHE, Guatemala.
43
The Guatemalan proposal also allows for the possibility that escorts may not meet the protection
needs of certain clients and for this reason – as long as there is a justification for it – people
trusted by the human rights defender can be hired and trained by the state (this experiment
was applied in Colombia where rehabilitated ex-guerrillas were trained by the Administrative
Security Department prior to deployment as escorts. This is no longer the case).
Similarly, in Peru a proposal was made to set up a specialised police protection unit, separate
from the National Police. However the Peruvian People’s Ombudsman stated that the
application of protection measures for victims, witnesses and family members of victims of
human rights violations should be handled by a mixed entity, with the participation of both
the state and civil society organisations.14 In addition, the ombudsman’s office also pointed
out that the effectiveness of any protection measures will depend among other things on the
fear in both victims and their families of members of the police and army.15
However, police intervention should not only be limited to these measures. In Guatemala, the
emergency hotline 110 for use by all citizens led to a specialised service for human rights defenders
being set up. It offered for example to respond to cases of observation and persecution (which it
normally would not have responded to) as well as immediately informing specialised police
units in the event of offences against human rights defenders, such as murder and robbery.16
Likewise, the Guatemalan police, through its human rights unit at the Criminal Investigations
Division (CID), set up a unit to respond to offences perpetrated against human rights
defenders in order to assist investigations. The unit responds to requests from the Prosecutor’s
Office or from the human rights defender at risk, then offers assistance to the prosecutor in
charge of the investigation. This means that the unit, like all other institutions of this type,
not only requires training and resources but also prior coordination with the prosecutor’s
office, with clearly defined powers and technical investigation requirements.17
Another innovation is the Committee for the Analysis of Attacks against Human Rights
Defenders in Guatemala which includes the interior ministry, the Directorate General for
Civil Intelligence, the Criminal Investigations Division (DINC) - PNC, national and
international human rights organisations, the Office of the Prosecutor and lately the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights. The function of the committee is
to “analyse patterns of attack, where they occur, using a scientific methodology defined, approved and
agreed on by the committee members,”18 in order to develop prevention policies and possibly
support investigation efforts undertaken by the relevant institutions19 (N.B. this Committee
for Analysis does the same analytical work on attacks against human rights defenders which
the non-governmental Guatemalan Defenders Unit has been doing for years).
14 Office of the Ombudsman for the People of Peru. Ombudsman’s report Nº 112. December 2006.
15 Office of the Ombudsman for the People of Peru. Ombudsman’s report Nº 112. December 2006.
16 Unidad de Protección de Defensoras y Defensores de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala (Unit for the
Protection of Human Rights Defenders of Guatemala - UDEFEGUA). Venciendo barreras (Overcoming
barriers) - Report on the situation of human rights defenders. January to December 2007.
Protection of Human Rights Defenders of Guatemala - UDEFEGUA). Venciendo barreras (Overcoming
18 Ministerial order No.103-2008. Guatemala, 10th January 2008.
Protection of Human Rights Defenders of Guatemala- UDEFEGUA). Venciendo barreras (Overcoming
44
A source of alarm for Colombian organisations of human rights defenders is the possibility
that the state might contract private security firms to protect defenders instead of the
national security forces.20
Coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor

The Office of the Prosecutor as the body responsible for investigations is also an important
element in this field - not only in terms of ending impunity but also as an essential element in
avoiding the criminalisation of social protest, since it has the power to initiate criminal law
reform. The importance of the Office of the Prosecutor can be seen in Guatemala, where they
have a unit dealing solely with attacks against human rights defenders – the Unit for the
Prosecution of Attacks against Human Rights Activists - that answers to the department for
human rights. Although the work of these units has not been considered successful in view of
the results, the very existence of the department staffed with qualified personnel and resources
can be essential in fighting impunity. Analysing patterns of attack and placing all cases under
one unit at the prosecutors’ office can improve its ability to investigate these cases.
Coordination with the judiciary

Cooperation between protection offices and the judiciary can be of great relevance in protection
work and not only as a means of bringing the perpetrators of attacks against human rights defenders
to justice. A good example of this is the ruling by the Colombian Constitutional Court of 20th
October 1998,21 which establishes the duty of the state to protect human rights defenders. The Court
held that the activities of human rights defenders in Colombia are fraught with numerous dangers,
making them a vulnerable social group, and that the State was therefore obliged to prioritise their
protection.22 It further stated that, “the lack of protection for human rights defenders by the State led to an
unconstitutional state of affairs.”23 Case law stipulated that an unconstitutional state of affairs occurs
when “(1) the fundamental rights of many persons are repeatedly violated - persons who might subsequently
resort to legal action to fight for their rights, thus congesting the law offices and (2) when these violations are
not caused solely by the authority in question but also by structural factors.”24
In the above-mentioned appeal for legal protection the Court decided to appeal to all the
country’s authorities to end this situation and called upon the Prosecutor General of the
Nation and the Ombudsman to act. They then prioritised the protection of the lives of
defenders, since under the Constitution it is their duty to safeguard, protect and promote
human rights. The Court likewise called on all persons resident in Colombia to comply
with article 95 of the Constitution, which obliges them to defend and disseminate human
rights as the foundation of peaceful coexistence.25
20 These and other operational matters are to feature in an in-depth analysis in Part II of this study.
21 Ruling on case T-590 by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, 20th October 1998.
22 Ruling on case T-590 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia. Summary of the ruling of the Inter-American
Court on human rights in the case of Valle Jaramillo and others vs Colombia, 27thNovember 2008.
23 Ruling on case T-590 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia. Summary of the ruling of the Inter-American
Court on human rights in the case of Valle Jaramillo and other vs Colombia, 27th November 2008.
24 See ruling SU-250 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, 26th May 1998. Summary of the ruling of
the Inter-American Court on human rights in the case of Valle Jaramillo and other vs Colombia,
27th November 2008. Note 41.
25 Ruling T-590 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, supra nota 39 (f. 1409). Summary of the ruling
of the Inter-American Court on human rights in the case of Valle Jaramillo and other vs Colombia,
27th November 2008. Para 84.
45
Coordination with other bodies

As regards cooperation in the area of, for example, medical care for human rights defenders,
methods such as those of the Mexican Human Rights Commission should be taken into
account. They refer human rights defenders to public health institutions for treatment for
physical and psychological wounds following attacks.
Finally, it is important to note that even though up until now we have only referred to
institutions that are specifically involved in the protection of human rights defenders,
there are other bodies which protect human rights defenders in some way or other as part
of their work. Indeed some ombudsman offices and government human rights programmes
may not have special defender departments but have nonetheless been known to intervene
in cases of violations of defenders’ rights.
The efficiency of the work done by the protection offices

The Paris Principles81 cover a broad international consensus on the features which
national human rights institutions should possess. These principles set out the steps
necessary for increased efficiency, quoted in a document entitled Assessing the effectiveness
of national human rights institutions.26 When applying the document to national protection
offices two things must be born in mind:
First of all that the Paris Principles apply
actors contributing to the
F to national human rights institutions
& efficiency of protection offices
and this survey only analyses one type
• Public legitimacy - the protection offices - and secondly,
• Accessibility the Principles only apply to independent
• Open form of organisation institutions and therefore do not include
government bodies. (Note that Part II of
• Consultations with civil society
this study includes a more operational
• Ensuring the integrity, quality and diversity analysis of the performance of protection
of staff programmes and offices).
• Broad mandate
So both the Paris Principles and the
• Effective international links
above-mentioned assessment document
• Speedy and effective handling of complaints
make useful contributions to analysing
• Powers covering all sectors the work of protection offices, be they
• Power to monitor compliance with their part of an independent institution, the
recommendations government or even non-governmental
• Systematic handling of human rights agencies. According to these documents,
• Adequate budgetary resources, accountability. in order for protection offices to be
effective they must display the
following features:
26 International Council on Human Rights Policy and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights: Assessing the effectiveness of human rights institutions. 2005.
46
Public legitimacy
The first criterion is whether the protection office enjoys public or popular legitimacy. To a
large extent this will depend on the institution within which it is based, whether it has
legal or official status, is perceived as a body that protects the rights of the defenceless
against more powerful interests and whether it acts in a just manner when addressing
issues within its remit.27
Accessibility
Protection offices need to disclose what
he accessibility of the offices
T they do and be open to the public as
& depends on:
well as to official bodies and non-
• Publicity regarding its work governmental organisations. As such,
• Easy contact their offices should be easily accessible
and the most disadvantaged groups
• Proximity to the most vulnerable
should be encouraged to visit them.28
• Decentralising work through its own offices or
through coordination with other institutions.
Decentralisation
Broadly speaking, access to the office will depend on its capacity to decentralise its
operations. Locating offices and staff in various regions of the country will provide access
to people who do not work in the capital city or who live in rural areas.
Local government authorities are consequently of key importance for human rights work,
as pointed out in the document entitled, “Local government and human rights: doing good
service.”29 They provide citizens with access to their own rights. Public human rights bodies
at local level with special provision for the protection of defenders are therefore to be
highly recommended.
Decentralisation of protection work is not only important in facilitating access to the
programmes. When the work is decentralised any measures taken tend to be more efficient,
since proximity to the users makes for better knowledge of their circumstances, which in
turn allows their needs to be met more effectively. The Peruvian Ombudsman states that,
“the effectiveness of the protection measures in each case will depend on the specific social and
cultural background of the subject; […] there are special circumstances that should be considered
when assessing possible protection measures, such as the remoteness of where they live.”30
However experience shows that, on the contrary, the work of protection offices tends to be
centralised, with offices only in the capital or in large cities and staff only occasionally
travelling to other areas.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 International Council on Human Rights Policy. “Local Government and Human Rights: Doing Good Service
2006. “In this sense human rights and local governance are both essentially concerned with the provision of certain
entitlements, including participation in local political processes and access to essential services.”
30 Ombudsman of the People of Peru. Ombudsman’s report Nº 112 December 2006.
47
This type of work is done more easily in federal states, since their structure generates the
decentralisation of public offices. In Brazil for instance the national programme for the
protection of human rights defenders has three offices with staff in three priority states
(Pará, Espírito Santo and Pernambuco). However, when assessing the programme human
rights defenders point out gaps in responsibility and conflicts of powers, caused by
inadequately planned decentralisation.
Similarly, the work of the Mexican
& Decentralisation can be: ombudsman is not only done through
• Direct: the National Human Rights Commission,
- Through the different protection offices but also through the ombudsman offices
of the federal states. However, despite
• Indirect:
the fact that the state commissions may
- Through the headquarters of institutions provide the means of replicating this
in which they are located system, only the Federal District
- Through civil society: Commission has a Rapporteur on Freedom
Protection organisations working with of Speech and Human Rights Defenders.
provincial human rights defenders In both Colombia and Guatemala,
Rural based organisations. although the protection offices are
located in the capital cities, other
mechanisms have been developed to extend protection work to the countryside. Even in
the absence of qualified personnel, Colombia has 16 people entrusted with the 16
departments handling the prevention of human rights violations, while Guatemala
depends on offices of the government–run Presidential Commission on Human Rights
(Comisión Presidencial de Derechos Humanos - COPREDEH) to verify cases relating to
defenders or to monitor measures adopted in the region.
Decentralisation is also possible through participation in the programme for civil society
organisations. In the case of Guatemala, the governmental protection office has highlighted the
fact that the work of civil society has given them greater access to defenders in rural areas.31
Clearly, of all the proposed alternatives the best is a protection office with branches in
various areas of the country, capable of dealing directly with the defenders in its care.
Open form of organisation

For institutions of this nature to be effective and able to respond adequately to the needs of
the target population and identify shortcomings in their own practices, there is a need for
constant communication with existing and potential clients. It is therefore important for
clients and their respective organisations to feel welcome in the protection offices and
confident of being taken seriously.
A major factor in improving the effectiveness

of the office is its accessibility to civil society
and the target population
31 Interview with Hugo Enrique Martínez Juárez. Director of the Coordination Committee for the Protection
of Human Rights Defenders, Administrators, Law Enforcement Officers, Journalists and Media personnel,
COPREDHE, Guatemala.
48
However the mistrust of many human rights defenders towards government or state
institutions, the existence of tightly closed institutions and of bodies unwilling to cooperate
or to exercise self-criticism has meant there have been very few cases of constant
communication, analytical thinking and constructive criticism.32
Consultations with civil society
In our area of interest, consultations with civil society and the target population of male
and female human rights defenders is of special relevance in ensuring effective links
between national institutions and the defenders, especially the most vulnerable. These
consultations can also influence programme design and implementation in such a way
that the measures are more efficient and meet the protection needs of the defenders.
Ensuring the integrity, quality and diversity of staff
The quality and efficiency of the work of these offices depends largely on the staff. As such,
steps should be taken to adopt procedures to guarantee staff are selected on merit and that
independent professionals are appointed.
In the interests of openness and accessibility, the office staff should reflect the social, ethnic
and linguistic composition of the society it serves as well as guaranteeing gender balance.33
Broad mandate
Article 2 of the Paris Principles34 stipulates that national institutions for the protection and
promotion of human rights should have as broad a mandate as possible. As we have seen,
this also applies to the offices for the protection of human rights defenders. It is therefore
especially important for their mandate to include not only protection but also preventive
action (see paragraph below on preventive vs. reactive action). The definition of a human
rights defender is also of great importance, as this will substantially influence the office’s
scope of action (see discussion on the definition of human rights defender above).
The effective application of the office’s mandate may be restricted by budgetary or human
resource issues. However, the lack of resources could be a purely cyclical matter that
should not have a bearing on the definition of its mandate, as this can open up future areas
of activity for a later stage.
Powers covering all sectors
It is important for the institution to have powers to include all sectors in its work, since the
credibility of human rights institutions can be jeopardised if certain authorities with a
potentially major impact on human rights (such as the security forces) are excluded from its
remit.35 For example, the Mexican National Human Rights Commission does not exclude any
32 See the International Council for the study of human rights policy and the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights: Assessing the effectiveness of human rights institutions. 2005.
33 International Council for the study of human rights policy and the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human rights: Assessing the effectiveness of Human rights institutions. 2005.
34 United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Paris Principles: principles relating to the status and
functions of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights. March 1992. Art 2 “A national
institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or
legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence.”
35 See: International Council on Human Rights Policy and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human rights: Assessing the effectiveness of human rights institutions. 2005.
49
type of civil servant, but as already mentioned it only deals with those defenders whose
rights have been violated by agents of the state, a fact that is not always easy to establish.
Furthermore, attacks on defenders are perpetrated by a vast array of groups, which as with
organised crime do not necessarily have formal links with the state. However, should the
perpetrator be a private individual, the National Human Rights Commission cannot
intervene immediately following the attack. It only does so subsequently if the state fails in
fulfilling its obligations to investigate the circumstances or to protect the victim.
The approach adopted by this institution has however proved limited in the face of
systematic violence against human rights defenders. As the Colombian Constitutional
Court states in the above-mentioned ruling,36 the violence is not committed by any particular
authority as such but is rooted in structural factors37 for which the state is indeed responsible.
Develop international links
The protection office can become an interface between the national system and the
international and regional mechanisms protecting defenders and can even function as a
coordinating and supervisory body for measures adopted at international level. However
conflicts of powers may occur as this is usually a task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On the other hand, the coordination or supervisory role of the protection office should not
serve as a pretext to absolve other parts of the state, such as the security forces, from
responsibility and from being held accountable.
Preventive vs. reactive action
One of the main complaints from civil society is that the mandate of the protection offices
does not cover preventive action and even if it does, this action is not taken. In some cases
such as Colombia the idea was contained in the initial programme but was promptly
discarded and emphasis placed on reactive action, meaning the state could only intervene
after attack had been perpetrated.
Although some legislation allows preventive action, this usually focuses on self-defence
training intended merely to avoid future attacks on those who have already been victims.
Budgetary constraints also mean priority is given to providing direct support and physical
protection for human rights defenders who have already been attacked (and this includes
threats and intimidation as well as physical violence).
Some elements of prevention which civil society considers important have been overlooked.
For example, protective action following serious threats prior to any attack, campaigns to
legitimise the defence of human rights and to forestall and penalise campaigns by civil
servants to discredit defenders as well as training in protection and self defence for those
at risk but who have not actually been attacked.
Human rights defenders feel that the best way to prevent violence against them is to punish
the perpetrators of previous attacks, i.e. combat the impunity they enjoy. This however
barely features in these programmes and where it does it has proved largely ineffectual.
36 Ruling on case T-590 by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, 20th October 1998.
37 See ruling SU-250 of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, 26th May 1998. Summary of the ruling of the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights in the case of Valle Jaramillo and others vs Colombia, 27th November
2008. Note 41.
50
In response to this, with prevention in mind, a mechanism has been set up in Guatemala
- the Committee for the Analysis of Attacks against Human Rights Defenders (see above).
Its task is to develop preventive policies and provide support to ongoing investigations.38
The Early Warning System (EWS) is also sign of progress and is up and running in
Colombia, with attempts to set it up in Guatemala in connection with the above-mentioned
committee. The objective of the EWS is to identify risks and threats to protected subjects in
given regions, in the light of the social, political and cultural context.39
Preventive action leads to

more effective protection and
indicates greater commitment by the state
towards human rights defenders
However it cannot be said that the outcome of these attempts has led to major progress in
preventive action.
Summing up, responding to attacks through protection is a first step but should not be the
only one. It is therefore necessary to prevent the attacks while addressing their causes and
the reasons they continue.
Speedy and effective handling of complaints

For a protection office to be effective, the work it does should be simple, accessible, economic
(preferably free of charge) and speedy. The office itself should be efficiently run.
When human rights defenders approach national institutions, they expect the latter to be
vested with the authority to address the organisations responsible for their protection –
otherwise the effectiveness of the office is limited. Similarly, it is vital for the office to
ensure its recommendations are implemented. For example, it should have the power to
refer the outcome of its investigations to the specialist courts judging its cases, in the event
that its good offices produce no results. An example of ineffectiveness raised by
UDEGEGUA40 is the case of the human rights prosecution service. Although it has
supported defenders in specific cases, they only rarely get any feedback on how their
complaints have been handled and say that the prosecution service is just another formality
which provides neither answers nor results. Defenders’ organisations in Colombia also
feel that it is crucial to reduce the response time in a protection case and even ensure
protection is immediately available while the defender’s file is being drawn up. Similar
criticism has been expressed by human rights defenders in Brazil and Mexico.
Protection of Guatemalan Human Rights Defenders - UDEFEGUA). Venciendo barreras (Overcoming
39 See list of preventive and protective measures for human rights defenders and other vulnerable groups,
Hugo Enrique Martínez Juárez. Coordination Committee for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders,
Administrators, Law Enforcement Officers, Journalists and Media Personnel, COPREDHE, Guatemala.
40 See In the Knot of Impunity – report on the situation of human rights defenders, Jan-Dec 2008. Protection
Unit for Human Rights Defenders (UDEFEGUA).
51
Power to monitor compliance with their recommendations

Closely linked to the above is the need for protection offices to monitor the degree to which the
relevant authorities follow their advice and recommendations. Without monitoring compliance
in this way there is little point having an office. Monitoring should also be a permanent exercise.
Systematic handling of human rights

As already stated, office efficiency depends largely on its host institution and the work that
institution does. Protection departments should therefore be placed in institutions working
with human rights which identify and address issues of general concern. They should also
use appropriate methodology, such as investigations and reports on public policies.
Adequate budgetary resources

Protection offices can be ineffective due to lack of resources. State institutions should therefore
ensure that they receive an adequate budget. At the same time control over the budget should
be independent of the government in power to ensure the office retains its independence.
International donors often fund these offices and this can become controversial. Exactly
this happened in Colombia. According to Jorge Cubides (inter-institutional coordinator of
the government protection programme) the figures for 2007 show that over 75% of the
budget for the human rights protection programme at the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Justice came from the state budget and only a small percentage from donors.41 However
human rights organisations claim that the bulk of the above programme’s budget (which
reached 40 million dollars in 2009) comes from international cooperation, especially from
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Both versions are
possible since international funds end up in various sections of the state budget.
For the office to earn its legitimacy, steps must be taken to ensure that the resources at its
disposal – be they generous or inadequate – are used sensibly and that there is accountability.
This should include the source of the funds, which may depend to a large extent on the
institution’s degree of independence. For this reason as well as the above controversy it
would be unwise to allow the possibility that Nepal’s draft decree proposes of accepting
dubious sources of finance such as ‘fees’ from the defenders themselves or funds from ‘any
other source’ (sic).
The specific functions of a protection office

The functions to be carried out by the office will largely depend on its mandate (see above).
However the functions of a protection office should not only be analysed in the light of the
Paris Principles, which spell out the powers and the working methods of national
institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. The declaration on human
rights defenders should also be taken into consideration, given that its articles 2, 9, 12, 14
and 15 place obligations on states which logically speaking should in part be the
responsibility of protection offices.
41 Information from our personal interviews.
52
Since the declaration includes the obligation to protect, promote and render effective all
human rights and to guarantee their application through legislative, administrative or any
other measures that may be necessary,42 some of these steps should be taken by the
protection offices based within national human rights institutions. Under the Paris
Principles, this may entail:
• Preparing reports on the national situation of defenders
• Submitting opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on matters concerning
the protection of defenders to the government, parliament and any other competent
body for advisory purposes, which may be made public
• Promoting and ensuring national legislation, regulations and practices are implemented
and that they comply with the international instruments relating to defenders to which
the state is a party. The ratification of these international instruments or compliance
with the texts and their subsequent application should also be encouraged.
The declaration also indicates that states should provide adequate resources to persons
who have reported human rights violations against them and investigate the complaints in
a prompt and impartial manner.43 Likewise section C of the Paris Principles states that the
institution should:
• Freely consider any issues falling within its competence, whether they are submitted by
the government or whether it acts on its own authority following a proposal from its
members or any petitioner
• Collect evidence and obtain any information and documents necessary to assess
situations falling within its remit.
The Paris Principles state that should there be no response from the state, the institution
shall resort to international protection mechanisms which, in the case of defenders, implies
that the institution should also:
• Contribute to the reports which states are required to submit to United Nations bodies
and committees or to regional defender institutions and, where necessary, submit an
opinion on the subject
• Cooperate with the United Nations and other international organisations, regional
institutions and institutions in other countries responsible for the right to defend
human rights.
The declaration on human rights defenders calls for steps to guarantee the protection of
anyone facing violence, threats, reprisals, adverse discrimination, pressure or any other
arbitrary action arising from the legitimate exercise of their rights.44 Under the Paris
Principles state institutions protecting defenders shall therefore:
42 Article 2 of the UN Declaration on human rights defenders.

43 Article 9.5 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
44 Article 12.2 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
53
• Ensure the safety of defenders, drawing the government’s attention to situations in any part
of the country where the right to defend human rights is being violated. They shall propose
measures to resolve them and publish opinions on the government’s position and reaction.
The declaration includes an obligation to promote public understanding of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights, and promote and facilitate the teaching of human
rights at all levels of education and official professional training.45 Under the Paris Principles
the protection office should therefore:
• Publicise the work of human rights defenders by raising public awareness of the
importance and legitimacy of their work.
Experience shows that these principles have not been applied in this way because in most
cases the role of these offices is severely limited and basically revolves around practical
action to try to guarantee the defenders’ physical safety including:
• Receiving and handling requests and information on violations of the right to protect
human rights
• Analysing and verifying relevant documentation and requesting further information
to investigate the particular situation of the petitioner. This may involve an interview
with them to collect additional information on their personal circumstances
• Coordinating enforcement of prevention and protection measures with the relevant
authorities once approved
• Transmitting requests or information for which the programme is not responsible to
the relevant authorities
• Providing information required by government inspection bodies and other relevant
authorities
• In other cases the offices may also:
- Ensure appropriate use and storage of devices provided for personal protection
- Monitor the implementation of current and pending protection measures
- When programmes involve risk assessments of defenders, as is the case in Colombia,
carry out the following tasks:
- Ask the National Police or an equivalent institution for studies on risk levels and
degrees of threat for those seeking protection under the programme
- Submit requests for protection with supporting documents to the Committee on
Regulation and Risk Assessment so that relevant recommendations can be made
- Act as technical secretariat to the committee
- Notify beneficiaries of the committee’s recommendations
- Implement the protection measures recommended by the committee.
45 Article 15 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society
to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
54
Some protection offices have gone beyond risk assessment and coordinating protection
measures and have for example contributed to introducing and drafting public policies on
human rights defenders.
& Functions of protection offices

• Freely consider any issues falling • Contribute to the reports which states
within its competence, whether they are required to submit to United
are submitted by the government or Nations bodies and committees or to
whether it acts on its own authority regional defender institutions and,
following a proposal from its members where necessary, submit an opinion on
or any petitioner the subject
• Collect evidence and obtain any • Cooperate with the United Nations
information and documents necessary and other international organisations,
to assess situations falling within its regional institutions and institutions
powers in other countries responsible for the
• Prepare reports on the national right to defend human rights
situation of defenders • Ensure the safety of defenders, drawing
• Submit opinions, recommendations, the government’s attention to situations
proposals and reports on matters in any part of the country where the
concerning the protection of defenders right to defend human rights is being
to the government, parliament and any violated. Propose measures to resolve
other competent body for advisory them and publish opinions on the
purposes, which may be made public government’s position and reaction
• Promote and ensure national legislation, • Publicise the work of human rights
regulations and practices are defenders by raising public awareness
implemented and that they comply with of the importance and legitimacy of
the international instruments relating to their work.
defenders to which the state is a party.
The ratification of these international
instruments or compliance with the
texts and their subsequent application
should also be encouraged
Commitments by the beneficiaries

In most cases, clients not only benefit from the advantages of the protection programmes
but also need to make several commitments. Although many programmes have no actual
rules, the Colombian programme has worked out in minute detail the duties expected of
its beneficiaries:
1. Inform the state security or inspection forces of the circumstances causing them to fear
for their lives, integrity, freedom and safety
2. Comply with the recommendations of the state security forces and the human rights
protection programmes of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice
55
3. Not request or accept registration in any other state protection programme

4. Keep all items provided in good condition
5. Use all items provided exclusively for personal protection
6. Adhere to established procedure regarding the items provided
7. Cooperate with the state investigation, inspection and security forces when clarifying
the facts behind the threats
8. Refrain from any conduct that could jeopardise their safety
9. Attend self-defence and personal safety courses
10. Give prior notification of any travel that might require inter-institutional coordination
11. Report immediately any loss, theft or damage to any item provided by the programme
12. Pay the insurance value of any item provided by the programme in the event of the
need to replace it due to loss, theft or damage
13. Return all items provided for protection in good condition
14. Cooperate with the state security forces when carrying out studies on risk assessment
and degree of threat
15. Safeguard personal details
16. Sign the document of commitment
17. Abide by any other commitment arising from his/her status as programme beneficiary
and any recommendations from the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment.
In the Guatemalan programme the only written justification for withdrawing the measures
is using them for means other than those originally intended.
The Nepali project requires defenders to “take due care when compiling and disseminating
information linked to national security, sovereignty, indivisibility, social and religious
harmony and unity” – which seems to entail commitments on the part of the human rights
defender which go beyond protecting human rights.
Normally the obligations are restricted to the signing of a commitment by both parties
when the measures are enforced or escorts made available. However the document does
not always detail what obligations the beneficiary has taken on and as such they should be
included in legislation governing protection programmes.46
46 Part II of this study contains a more detailed analysis of all the operational issues on protection programmes
for human rights defenders.
56
Prototype legislation for protection offices

In conclusion and as a summary to this section, legislation that governs the establishment
and work of protection offices should include the following elements:
• Source of legislation
- The programmes may emanate from amendments to laws governing action taken by
the state to protect other groups, or new laws may be drafted. In the first case it is
important for the amendment to include specific mention of the protection of defenders
- It is important for the laws governing the functioning and structure of the protection
offices to include the participation of civil society and experts in the field (national
and international)
- Certain circumstances and periods may be useful for promoting state approval of
these laws and programmes. The role of civil society is crucial for generating the
necessary political will during the process.
• Objectives of the protection offices
- The protection laws and mechanisms the offices set in motion need to address wider
objectives beyond the physical protection of defenders. These objectives should
include the quest for an environment conducive to human rights defence work
which will involve:
- The elaboration of a national plan of action for protection to address the issue
from all angles and which includes different state institutions
- The setting up of a preventive system (early warning, training, etc.)
- The fight against impunity
- The promotion of a human rights culture and the legitimisation of the work of
human rights defenders.
• Location of the protection offices
- Protection work may require bodies set up exclusively for the protection of human
rights defenders
- The offices are usually housed in institutions specialising in human rights. Offices
of the ombudsman or human rights directorates attached to the Executive are the
most common but there is always the possibility of mixed offices, which pool the
efforts of various bodies including those from civil society.
• Programme participants
- Protection work requires that a large number of institutions each with different
capacities join forces. To this end, legislation should create areas where different
state institutions converge. These may include:
- The security forces and the Ministry of State
- Security agencies specialising in protection
57
- Civil society
- The protected groups
- International human rights institutions
- The human rights office of the Executive
- The Ministry of Home Affairs or Justice
- The Director of Public Prosecutions (or bodies specialising in the investigation of
cases of this nature, where they exist)
- The Ministry for Social Security, Social Solidarity or the equivalent
- The judiciary
- The Ministry of Health
- Inspection/audit bodies
t Office of the Ombudsman
t Office of the Prosecutor General
t Treasury.
• Other institutions involved in protection
- Legislation should include coordination with other institutions also involved in
protection without necessarily being part of the structure such as:
- Other security forces linked to protection work
- Services providing rapid response to high-risk situations
- Other investigative bodies such as the intelligence services
- Medical care services
- The judiciary.
• Ensuring effective work
- To function effectively, legislation should ensure the offices display the following
features:
- Public legitimacy
- Accessibility
- Open form of organisation
- Consultations with civil society
- Ensuring the integrity, quality and diversity of staff
- Broad mandate
- Effective international links
58
- Speedy and effective handling of complaints

- Powers covering all sectors
- Power to monitor compliance with their recommendations
- Systematic handling of human rights
- Adequate budgetary resources, accountability.
• Functions
- Legislation should stipulate the following functions:
- Freely consider any issues falling within its competence, whether they are
submitted by the government or whether it acts on its own authority following a
proposal from its members or any petitioner
- Collect evidence and obtain any information and documents necessary to assess
situations falling within its powers
- Prepare reports on the national situation of defenders
- Submit opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on matters concerning
the protection of defenders to the government, parliament and any other
competent body for advisory purposes, which may be made public
- Promote and ensure national legislation, regulations and practices are
implemented and that they comply with the international instruments relating
to defenders to which the state is a party. The ratification of these international
instruments or compliance with the texts and their subsequent application
should also be encouraged
- Contribute to the reports which states are required to submit to United Nations
bodies and committees or to regional defender institutions and, where necessary,
submit an opinion on the subject
- Cooperate with the United Nations and other international organisations,
regional institutions and institutions in other countries responsible for the right
to defend human rights
- Ensure the safety of defenders, drawing the government’s attention to situations
in any part of the country where the right to defend human rights is being
violated. Propose measures to resolve them and publish opinions on the
government’s position and reaction
- Publicise the work of human rights defenders by raising public awareness of the
importance and legitimacy of their work.
• The commitments of the beneficiaries
- Legislation should include a clear statement of the commitments that beneficiaries
enter into on accepting the protection measures
- Commitments that go beyond those directly relevant to the protection of the rights
of human rights defenders should be avoided.
59
Some final reflections on Part I

Finally at the end of Part I we offer some thoughts we hope will encourage an open dialogue
in Focus,47 the observatory on national policies, or in direct correspondence with interested
P Although the UN declaration on human rights defenders was adopted in 1998, there is
little experience of the introduction of national laws and authorities for the protection
of human rights defenders. The overwhelming majority of defenders are to be found in
Latin America. If we were to venture an explanation, we would probably say that this
is due to the pressure exerted by a powerful civil society with high expectations of
human rights as well as the existence of a structured regional human rights system.
Perhaps this combination has enabled national governments to generate the necessary
political will for this to be the case.
P In all the cases studied there is much room for improvement in the protection
programmes. Some have already accumulated valuable experience and we hope that
this study contributes towards that.
P It is probably fair to say that none of the cases studied have moved from a tactical level
of protection (provision of protective measures alone) to a more strategic level of
protection (prevention of attacks instead of reactive measures, investigation and trial of
the perpetrators of attacks against defenders, institutionalisation of a democratic
human rights culture, etc) despite the fact defenders’ organisations are constantly
calling for this and are willing to cooperate in achieving it.
P As we said in the introduction to this part, the challenge is still what it has always been:
how do we recognise and make more effective the responsibility of the state for
providing human rights defenders with protection and for the fight against impunity?
With this in mind, beyond assessing the immediate results of the national protection
programmes, we should assess civil society’s ability to trigger an appropriate response
from the state. Of course the creation of a protection programme is part of the answer,
but probably not all of it.
P The increasing flow of information on the involvement of Colombia’s Administrative
Security Department in a “dirty war” against human rights defenders is a direct attack
on the Colombian protection programme. At the time of writing we do not know what
the final consequences of this will be, given that this is the largest programme with the
most resources of all our case studies.
P The devil may lie in the detail, but nonetheless the next part of this study will include
an in-depth analysis of the operational aspects of the protection services provided to
human rights defenders, i.e. the day-to-day work of the programmes.
47 See: http://www.protectionline.org/
60
Protection of
Part II: Operational aspects

of defenders’ protection
Chapter 1: Overview of the protection

response
1. The programmes examined in this part
Various experiences have been examined in the preparation of this book, and considerable
effort has been exerted to be as concrete as possible, and present the information succinctly.
The principal (but not the only) experiences analysed have been the following, all developed
at national level:
• Brazil:
- The National Policy for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (by the Presidency
of the Republic’s Special Secretariat for Human Rights).
- The Monitoring Group on the National Programme for the Protection of Human
Rights Defenders (by civil society: Justicia Global, Terra de Direitos and others).
• Colombia:
- Decree 740 of 2010.
- The Non-governmental Programme for the Protection of Defenders and Somos
Defensores (both non- governmental).
• Guatemala:
- The Catalogue of Measures for the Prevention of Human Rights Abuses and
Protection of Human Rights Defenders and other Particularly Vulnerable Groups (of
the Presidential Coordinating Commission of Executive Branch Policies on Human
Rights, COPREDEH).
- The Guatemalan Human Rights Defenders’ Unit (UDEFEGUA, non-governmental).
The analysis of these programmes has made it possible to draw certain conclusions, which
are indicated in the text using the following symbols:

“Good Practice”

“Bad Practice”

“Warning, or Point of Concern”
& “Lesson Learnt”
2. The objectives and strategies of programmes for the protection

of defenders
As has been stated elsewhere in the two parts of this book the protection offered to human
rights defenders should be integral, that is, it should adhere to a series of principles, the
principal aspects of which are presented in the (open) list presented below:
• There should be an adequate framework of laws and policies covering Human Rights
and Defenders;
65
• Criminal investigation and trial for those who attack defenders in any way;
• Awareness of the social usefulness and legitimacy of work to defend Human Rights, and
• If necessary, specific protection programmes for defenders, including preventive and
reactive measures.
However, in the three governmental protection programmes (or proposals) analysed here
(from Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala), protection is, above all, reduced to the last point
– that of protection measures – offering a fragmentary and reactive response.
In two of the three countries (Colombia and Guatemala) non-governmental organisations
have developed solid and stable activities for protection, which have in fact acted as
antecedents and models for the governmental programmes that have mirrored them. An
overview of the protection activities of the non-governmental sector as a whole shows that
it comes close to providing the integral protection model refered to earlier. Of course,
NGOs do not pass legislation or decide on public policy, but their proposals and
contributions have meant that it would have been possible to design much stronger laws
and policies if only governments had taken their contributions more into account. NGOs
are not judges either, but the contributions they make to investigations and the monitoring
of legal processes have been fundamental in achieving the few convictions that have been
achieved against individuals who attack defenders. Furthermore, NGOs have organised
the broadest campaigns for the social legitimation of defenders, and have initiated
protection mechanisms that are comparable to governmental ones, despite the chasm
between the resources available to governments and to NGOs.

The pioneering impulse and support, accompaniment, critiques and pressure provided by
defenders’ organisations have been fundamental to the construction of the informed viewpoint
we have today concerning the model that should be adopted by an integral programme for the
protection of defenders.
Different national-level institutions have contributed over the years to the evolution and
design of protection programmes. Looking at the national level, it is instructive to highlight
the role of the Colombian Constitutional Court and the recognition it makes of the obligation
of states in relation to the risks that citizens should not be obliged to withstand:1 “...the
authorities have the primary right to protect the fundamental rights to life and personal
security enjoyed by all residents of the country”. The Colombian Constitutional Court also
recognised the right to personal security as the “right to receive state protection against
extraordinary risks that individuals do not have the constitutional duty to withstand”, and
to advance the duty of the state to adopt protection measures appropriate to each concrete
case, which “should be evaluated as a whole, employing an integral perspective, in order to
establish the nature, reach, intensity and continuity of attacks affecting each individual”.
This is why it is important to to determine whether these are “specific, individualisable,
concrete, current, important, serious, clear, discernible, exceptional and disproportionate
for the subject”. The Court also specified that, faced with these kinds of risk, the constitutional
authorities are obliged to preserve the right to personal security of the people exposed to
them. This obligation includes the following aspects:
1 Sentence T-719 of 2003.
66
“ 1. The obligation to identify the extraordinary risk affecting a person, a family or a group
of persons as well as to inform those affected in a clear and opportune manner. It is
therefore not always the case that protection is requested by the person directly affected:
2. The obligation to assess, on the basis of careful study of each individual case, the
existence, characteristics. (…) and origin or source of the risk that has been identified;
3. The obligation to define in a timely manner the specific protection measures, and the
means necessary, to ensure that the extraordinary risk identified does not occur;
4. The obligation to assign such means and adopt said measures (…) such that the
protection offered is effective;
5. The obligation to monitor periodically the evolution of the extraordinary risk and to
take the corresponding decisions to respond to that evolution;
6. The obligation to provide an effective response to indications that the extraordinary
risk may become concrete or be realised, and to adopt the specific actions necessary to
mitigate it or reduce its effects;
7. The prohibition according to which the administration is prohibited from adopting
measures that create an extraordinary risk for persons as a result of their circumstances,
and their consequent duty to protect those affected”.
In response to this sentence the Colombian programme has had to adapt its contents;
furthermore the Constitutional Court has promulgated several resolutions that have obliged
the programme to take or to reinstitute protection measures for leaders of the displaced
population, such as Decision 107/08 (which order the Committee for the Evaluation of Risks
“to apply the protection programme because of the constitutional assumption of the risk
faced by women leaders, and by the displaced population”), or Sentence T-134 of 2010 which
ordered the Ministry of Justice and the Interior to make a new determination of the level of
risk faced by defenders, in order to take adequate protection measures.
This jurisprudence is very important in Colombia and internationally but, in practice, its
results are incorporated into the Colombian protection programme, with all its successes
and failures, as will be seen later in this book.
3. The principles behind the framework of protection measures

Protection measures are granted according to a series of principles that may be summarised
in the following list, which has been elaborated according to information drawn from
the programmes:
• Voluntary principle
The decision of the beneficiary to enter into the programmes or to accept its measures
will be free and voluntary. Beneficiaries will provide informed written consent.
• Exclusivity
The measures will be destined exclusively to beneficiaries of the programme. This does
not imply that they refer only to the defender who has been threatened or attacked, as
other persons, such as family members or partners, may also face risks and, therefore,
qualify as beneficiaries.
67
• Prevention
The institutions responsible for providing protection shall adopt effective strategies to
prevent attacks, intimidation or acts committed against defenders and other members
of the target population.
• The tutelary principle
With the exception of requirements demanded as a result of ordinary jurisdictional
procedures, protection measures will not prejudge situations but shall adopt measures
immediately in order to guarantee the free exercise of Human Rights and universal
freedoms, according to the pro persona principle; 2 as this refers to precautionary measures
they are not to be ruled by the same requirements of rigorousness as other prevention
and protection measures contemplated in national legislative frameworks.
Likewise, the measures necessary to implement legal protection measures at national
level should be taken.
• The principle of agreement and consultation
It is indispensable that state bodies, beneficiaries and civil society should develop stable
channels of consultation and dialogue in order to communicate needs and evaluate the
performance of the programme.
• Causality
Protection measures will be based on the factors of risk and threat and on the activity
or role developed by the beneficiary.
• Proportionality
The measures that are granted will correspond to the manner, time and place of the
particular threat affecting each beneficiary of the programme.
• Effectiveness
The measures should provide effective protection to the users of the programme.
• Sustainability of the measures
The measures should be sustainable for the programme and for defenders.
• Reversibility of the measures
If the measures do not work, or the situation of risk changes, it should be possible to
return to the prior situation of the defenders (as a minimum, if possible, an overall
improvement in their security situation).
• Confidentiality
Because of its nature, all information connected with the protection of persons should
be strictly confidential.
2 The term pro persona refers to the pro homine principle, which in international law means that when
applying domestic legislation passed in reference to international law, the norm is to adhere to the the
interpretation that most advances the respect for rights.
68
• Temporary
The protection measures shall be temporary, lasting as long as the situation of risk
persists; and they shall be subject to periodic revision.
• Responsibility and collaboration
The programme’s entire target population should respect and support the authorities and
collaborate actively in its implementation and in their own self-protection (including
providing information during the life of the programme that might affect the level of risk).
• Equal treatment, non-discrimination and special treatment
In offering its services, the programme should guarantee the principles of equal
treatment and nondiscrimination on the grounds of gender, ethnic origin, social or
economic circumstances, sexual preference or orientation, language, nationality,
religion, political opinion or any other form of discrimination. However, it should adopt
a gender perspective and, when necessary, practice positive discrimination as well as
special treatment for defenders who may require such treatment because of the greater
risk and vulnerability they face.
• Timely
The measures will be offered in a timely manner (when they are needed).
• Complementarity
The protection measures will be complementary to the measures adopted by other
entities (specifically, the various state, departmental and local structures (entidades
territoriales) vis a vis the regional authorities in a country).
4. General aspects of the relationship with protected defenders

The relationship between the protection programmes, defenders, and associated
organisations is not always an easy one. This is not surprising, given the difficulties and
tensions affecting the situations of risk that affect defenders, and the number of players – at
times with opposing interests – who are variously involved in a protection programme.
Thus, there are a series of good practices, as well as challenges, and actions that should be
avoided, which are present in the relations between protection programmes and defenders
that, as a result of the research carried out, it is important to highlight.

Defenders collaborate in the construction of protection responses, and participate in
decisionmaking concerning every case.
It is important that defenders at risk who enter a programme, or those who collaborate
generally with it, should participate actively in the construction of the protection response.
As in any programme, this participation will improve the levels of co-responsibility
affecting the defenders and the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the response.
It is clear that participation will not always be uniform. At times a programme may
promote participation, but the principle might be ignored by one of the bodies involved
(the police for example). A participatory culture needs to be allowed to develop naturally
within the overall framework of the programme, and by its parts.
69

The programme offers responses adapted to the varied protection needs and different circumstances
of defenders.
Different kinds of defenders, who face varied risks, have different protection needs to
which the programmes need to adapt their protection responses. To pick two examples at
random, a lawyer living in a major city who receives a death threat does not have the same
needs as a community leader who is being pressured by local landowners.
& It is important to to take into account at least

the following categories of defenders:
• Women3
• Isolated rural defenders
• Groups with distinct characteristics: e.g. indigenous groups
• Groups of defenders that might suffer particular discrimination: sex workers,
defenders of sexual and reproductive rights,4 etc.

Specific support (positive discrimination) should be offered to groups of defenders who are
susceptible to habitual discrimination; they should be offered protection measures appropriate to
their particular circumstances.

Rurally-based defenders should be fully taken into account in the activities of programmes: they
need to cover rural areas, consider establishing antennae : local contact points or offices to
facilitate access to their services (which might include dedicated offices, or be shared with other
institutions or individuals, either through formal agreements or informally); they should also
consider communications campaigns aimed at the rural sector, etc.

Programmes should not limit themselves to one rigid response that is incapable of responding
adequately to the varied protection needs of defenders: “we have lots of other cases – this is all we
can offer”, “take it or leave it”...
& During the research process a relationship was detected between the protection
responses imposed on defenders, and that were not fully accepted or adhered to,
and dissatisfaction with the protection programme, alongside a possibility
that the protection measures would be improperly used
& The defender has a right to protection; it is not a service provided

by the state, rather the state has a duty to provide it
3 On the risks faced by Women Defenders, see section 1.9 of the New Protection Manual for Human Rights
Defenders (Protection International, 2009).
4 On the risks faced by Defenders of Sexuality Righs, see the New Protection Manual for Human Rights
Defenders (Protection International, 2009).
70

Occasions when defenders or organisations refuse to collaborate with the programme.
On occasion defenders or organisations may refuse to collaborate with a programme,
either following the first contact made, or when the protection response begins. This
possibility should be contemplated in the protection agreement signed at the point the
terms are agreed. There may be many reasons why organisations or defenders may
refuse to collaborate; the next section deals with some of the most important of these
and attempts to propose answers.
• A defender rejects the assignation of an armed bodyguard provided by the state.
There have been cases when defenders have rejected the assignation of an armed
bodyguard, for example for ethical reasons such as a rejection of the use of violence,
or for practical ones, such as when they realise that the bodyguard is carrying out
intelligence activities against them. In other cases defenders argue that the presence
of police bodyguards leads to mistrust among the people or communities they work
with, or might even place them at risk – in the case of victims or witnesses of cases
of police violence, for example.
• A group of defenders rejects a set of protection measures in protest because they
consider them insufficient or useless.
There have been several cases in which groups of defenders have rejected a set of
protection measures in protest because they consider them insufficient or useless
(some refer to placebo measures). For example, in Colombia a group of defenders
returned their bullet proof vests, cellular phones and even bullet proof cars because
attacks continued to be committed against defenders and the state was not acting
duly in response, failing to investigate, arrest or try those responsible.

In these cases, a basic consideration is that the state should not be absolved of its responsibility to
protect defenders, and should carry out all the appropriate measures necessary both socially and
politically to re-establish the protection agreements (for example, coming to alternative agreements
if a bodyguard has been rejected, or renegotiating them if the measures have been rejected because
of state inaction).

Avoid the re-victimisation of defenders.
When defenders have suffered attacks it is fundamentally important to ensure that
during the protection response they are not re-victimised, that is, forced repeatedly to
experience the traumas suffered, to recount their experiences to different bodies or to
explain their situations to the authorities more than once.
71
& Situations involving the risk of re-victimisation resulting from an obligation

to repeat their testimony or respond to repeated interviews:

In order to enter the protection programme;

During the risk assessment (with other bodies such as the police);

To other institutions (such as other state bodies, the legal authorities, international bodies, etc.);

Norms designed to reduce the risk of re-victimisation:
• Develop protocols to minimise the number of interviews required, whether within the
programme or with other habitual collaborators;
• Reach agreements with the programme and other bodies;
• Training of staff in how to deal with victims;
• Accompany defenders during their acceptance in the programme and the evaluation of
their case;
• Assign a single official to accompany the defender during the whole process, including
during negotiations with other institutions;
• If necessary, ensure continuous contact with the same designated official;
• Include specialist psycho-social support from the start;
• Anticipate and deal with linguistic and cultural obstacles.
5. Written agreements
The implementation or delivery of protection measures is generally formalised with the
signing of a written agreement by the beneficiaries, detailing the security measures agreed
(for example bullet proof vests) and the condition in which they were handed over, the
expected benefits and commitments, the duration of the measures, and the consequences
of their improper use.
An example of this kind of agreement is provided in the annexes, which reproduce the
agreement signed by the beneficiaries of the Brazilian programme. Below, a list of
commitments expected of beneficiaries of the Colombian programme is presented. This
list of commitments has evolved over time as a result of the experiences accrued during its
implementation. It reflects a considerable number of the prohibited , anomalous or difficult
circumstances that emerge when protection measures are implemented. Consequently,
several of these norms are analysed in Chapter 5, which deals with protection measures.
72
Examples from the Colombian programme: commitments of beneficiaries

It should be borne in mind that the majority of cases subject to protection measures do not
merely involve benefits agreed on entry into a programme, but, if the measures are to be
effective, a series of commitments should be entered into. The Colombian programme
is the only one that has regularised these commitments in detail:
Decree 1740 of 2010, Article 34. Commitments of the Beneficiaries.

Beneficiaries are required to commit to the following:
1. Accept the recommendations formulated by the state security bodies and the protection programme.
2. Neither seek nor accept entry into a different state protection programme during the lifetime of the measures.
3. If included in more than one state protection programme, withdraw from one of them.
4. Maintain the elements handed over in good condition and maintain them in good order.
5. Use the elements or assistance offered exclusively for the purpose of protection.
6. Collaborate with state investigatory, supervisory and security bodies in order to clarify the events that
led to the threats, respecting the Constitutional Exception that obliges them to testify.
7. Attend the self-protection sessions suggested by the officials responsible for each of the programmes,
which will be realised in the place determined by the institution responsible for the measures.
8. Inform with a minimum of 24 hours notice any travel arrangements that require coordination between
official bodies in different parts of the country.
9. Avoid maintaining contacts that might endanger their security.
10. Respond to any requirements that may be made by the respective Committee, the Human Rights
Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, the National Police and/or the authority that has
assigned the measures concerning the improper use of the protection measures, in order to explain or
clarify the information or evidence concerning the implementation of said protection measures.
11. Report immediately any loss, theft or damage of any element provided by the protection programme.
12. Collaborate with the authority that has assigned the protection measure in order to confirm their correct use.
13. Collaborate with the National Police in the realisation of the risk assessment. If such collaboration to
prepare the risk assessment is not offered or is refused, a written minute will be prepared to that effect
and the situation will be passed to the respective Committee for its consideration.
14. Maintain confidentiality concerning information related to their situation.
15. Sign an agreement of principle that details the elements supplied, and their condition, the benefits and
commitments agreed, the duration of the measures and the consequences of their improper use.
16. Return the elements supplied for the protection of the beneficiary once they cease to be connected with
the protection programme.
17. Inform the state security or supervisory bodies of the facts that cause them to fear for their lives, integrity,
liberty and security.
18. Pay the deductible amount due under the terms of insurance covering any element provided by the
programme, in the event that it has to be replaced as a result of loss, theft or damage, in cases where the
responsibility of the protected party is proven.
19. Any other commitments inherent to the quality of the individual as a beneficiary of the protection
service, and such as may be recommended by the relevant Committee.
73
Chapter 2: Inclusion in protection

programmes
1. Contact between defenders and programmes (how cases are received)
• The defender makes direct contact with the programme.
• An intermediary body (such as an organisation, a church, etc.) puts the defender in
contact with the programme, with the defender’s consent.
• The programme contacts the defender or an intermediary organisation if it is made
aware of a situation.1
Contacts such as these occur every day, and in practice it is difficult to know what factors
may make the contacts easier or harder to make. Based on research and existing
documentation we have produced the following two lists that present the obstacles and the
aspects that may facilitate this first contact.
& Barriers to establishing contact between defenders

and protection programmes:
• Lack of information or publicity about the programme.

• A perception that the programme is biased or that it only acepts certain groups
or persons.
• Lack of confidence in the programme or its results, especially in cases where a strong
confrontation exists between government and defenders (in the case of governmental
programmes).
• The physical isolation of defenders who work in rural areas with poor communications
or in large countries.
• Many defenders do not identify themselves as such and therefore do not consider
themselves among the target population of programmes, making it difficult for them
to enter.
• Linguistic, cultural and economic barriers.
1 The Colombian Constitutional Court has ruled that the authorities are obliged “to identify the
extraordinary risk affecting a person, a family or a group of persons as well as to inform those affected in
a clear and opportune manner. It is therefore not always the case that protection is requested by the person
directly affected” (Sentence T-719, 2003). Nevertheless, Decree 1740 of 2010, which governs the Colombian
programme, does not include this requirement to enter into contact with threatened individuals among
the functions of the programme.
75
& Factors that facilitate contacts with

the programmes: 2
• Legitimacy: that the programme is felt to be legitimate by the public. This will depend
on whether it is has a sound legal or institutional basis or its acceptance by the
community of defenders, if it is viewed as an institution that is serious about the
protection and welfare of the people it covers, etc.
• Decentralisation: this depends on the presence of offices across the country (or their
antennae, or contact points) and on whether the programme’s employees travel
outside the major cities where most of the work carried out by defenders occurs.
Decentralisation is important, not only as it facilitates access, but also in order to
guarantee effective measures are taken, because proximity to the target population
makes it easier to understand the realities they face.
• An open organisational culture and a broad mandate: defenders should feel welcome in
the protection offices they visit, and secure that they are going to be listened to seriously.
• Integrity, quality and diversity of the staff group: to a large degree the quality of the
work of these offices depends on the people who work in them. Therefore procedures
should be developed that guarantee that employees are selected on their merits in
order to ensure that the offices are staffed by independent professionals. Furthermore,
if the offices are to be open and accessible, staff should represent the social, ethnic,
and linguistic and gender balance of society.
• Rapid, efficient and respectful procedures: if the office is to provide effective protection
its procedures should be simple, accessible and free of charge (or very reasonably
priced), and rapid. But the office should also be effective; when defenders attend the
national-level offices they are entitled to expect them to have the authority to require
answers of the bodies responsible for their protection. It is also of vital importance
that the offices, whether governmental or non-governmental, should be able to
monitor whether the recommendations have been fulfilled. It is of overall importance,
too, to minimise the time defenders are forced to wait before protection measures
begin, or even to guarantee an immediate protective response.
2. Opening and establishing a case

Once a defender has made contact with the protection programme, a decision needs to be
made concerning whether they will enter the programme or not. Ideally, this decision will
be made according to a flexible, clear, pre-established set of criteria.
Admissions criteria
The criteria used by the Colombian protection programme to evaluate requests for
protection are very general, specifying that the applicant should be a member of the
programme’s target population, that the threat is related to activities intended to defend
Human Rights, and that too much time has not elapsed since the threat (the request must
be made within the three months following the events in question).
2 For a more detailed discussion of access to protection programmes see chapter 4 of Part I.
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The Guatemalan proposal includes the following criteria: that the applicant should be a
member of the programme’s target population and their application be supported by their
peers, there should be a clear relationship between the case and the activities of the
defender, a complaint should have been lodged with the legal authorities, the “local or
regional” authorities should have been informed, and the case should not present
“insurmountable obstacles to the security or protection scheme run by the Interior
Ministry” (assuming, that is, that the security needs of defender go beyond the programme’s
capacity to protect).
The criteria used in the Brazilian programme are very general; they gauge whether the
applicant is or is not a Human Rights Defender and if there is a causal connection between
their activities and the threat. It should be noted that if the request is rejected the applicant
has the right to appeal to the Programme’s National Council. The other programmes do
not provide a right of appeal.3
3 In response to complaints from applicants who were rejected by the programme the Colombian
Constitutional Court has produced decisions and sentences that support the revision of such cases.
77
Summary of acceptance criteria for the different programmes
Criteria included in at least two of the three programmes analysed
Subject Criteria
The defender should belong to the target population.

• Colombia: the defenders should belong to legally recognised
Target organisations, ranging from NGOs to community organisations.4
population
• Guatemala: if a defender belongs to an organisation, it should
support their application, or their leadership role should be
demonstrated and confirmed by local organisations or bodies.
Motivation The threat or aggression must be a direct consequence of the activities

for, or origin of the defender.
of, the threat
or aggression
Criteria included in just one of the three programmes analysed.
Colombia: the request must be made within three months of the

Timescale
occurrence of the events.
Guatemala:
Action before • The applicant must provide a copy of the complaint lodged before
other the authorities (police or a judge).
institutions
• The local or regional authorities should be aware of the situation of
risk faced by the applicant.
Place Colombia: the zone of risk has to form a part of the national territory.
4 Criteria for acceptance in the Colombian programme (2010):

1. Leaders or activists of social, civic, community, trade union and peasant organisations or of interest or
ethnic groups.
2. Leaders or activists of human rights organisations or members of the medical mission.
3. Witnesses in cases of Human Rights violations and abuses of International Humanitarian Law,
irrespective of whether the corresponding disciplinary, criminal or administrative cases have been
initiated, in fulfilment of current guidelines.
4. Journalists and communications professionals.
5. Leaders and representatives of organisations of the displaced population or displaced people in
situations of extraordinary or extreme risk.
6. Officials responsible for the design, coordination, or implementation of the National Government’s
Human Rights or Peace Policies.
7. Employees who have in the past been responsible the design, coordination, or implementation of the
National Government’s Human Rights or Peace Policies.
8. Leaders of the [demobilised guerrilla organisations] the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), the Corriente
de Renovación Socialista (CRS), the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), the Partido Revolucionario de
los Trabajadores (PRT), the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL), the Frente Francisco Garnica of
the Coordinadora Guerrillera, the Movimiento Independiente Revolucionario Comandos Armados (MIR
– COAR) and the Milicias Populares del Pueblo y para el Pueblo, Milicias Independientes del Valle de
Aburrá and Milicias Metropolitanas de la ciudad de Medellín, who signed peace agreements with the
National Government in 1994 and 1998, were reincorporated into civilian society and who, as a result of
their political, social, journalistic, humanitarian or professional activities face extraordinary or extreme
levels of risk.
78
The objective Guatemala: the protection request should have no other motivation
of the than preserving and protecting the life, integrity, security or freedom
request for of the individual.
protection
Guatemala: the protection requested should not be responsibility of

Competence
another state body; if it is, the application should be made to this body.
Guatemala: acceptance of a candidate for protection should not imply

Programme
“insurmountable obstacles to the security or protection scheme run by
capacity
the Interior Ministry”.
& The main criteria for acceptance in a protection programme are the
demonstrable membership of the individual in the programme’s target population
and that the threat or attack were a consequence of the defender’s activities

It has proved useful to ensure the participation during the design period of defenders in
discussions concerning the inclusion criteria for the programmes and in subsequent revisions
aimed at incorporating lessons learnt.
It should be borne in mind that the Colombian protection programme covers other
population sin addition to defenders and that, apart from the programme run by the
National Police (dedicated to the protection of ranking government and state officials), the
Programme of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, which is the programme dealt with
in this chapter, includes former guerrilla combatants, witnesses, journalists, and others
(see footnote on the previous page). This this has caused concern among Human Rights
organisations because it is difficult, given the limited resources available, for a programme
intended to cover such disparate target groups to respond adequately to the specific needs
of human rights defenders.
It may be observed that the acceptance criteria exert a clear influence on the decision to
accept requests for inclusion, as follows:
Few, ill-defined or ambiguous Clearly defined /

admission criteria restrictive criteria
More laxity in decision-making Clear criteria: transparency
Flexibility Legitimacy of decisions, greater
support available if there are problems
Risk of errors Less risk of errors
Risk of arbitrariness Reduced flexibility to differing cases
and discrimination and realities of defenders
Risk of low levels prioritisation
79
Criteria for excluding applicants from programmes

The only programme that contemplates excluding applicants is the proposed programme
in Guatemala, when they are shown to: “[c]arry out, or have carried out, illegal acts or
[who] are subject to legal proceedings in the national justice system. This applies to
individuals covered both by national and supranational protection”. A clarification is
provided that “[the programme] does not cover people who have been deprived of liberty
in circumstances that constitute a threat to the right to life”.

This clause has the potential to negatively affect protection for defenders, because if there are laws
on the statute book that discriminate against or criminalise defenders protection programmes
will not favour them, with the result of facilitating legal attacks against defenders.
Other unwritten criteria that have been taken into account by the various evaluation
committees have included the question of whether the defender has resorted to violence,
and the “sustained bad name” they may acquire (the ambiguity and the adaptability of
this concept should be remembered).
The collective nature of the decision to accept an application
The fact that a considerable number of people have positions of responsibility in the
programmes and are involved in deciding whether people should or should not be offered
protection brings with it advantages and disadvantages, as will be shown later. Joint
decision-making is the norm in all the programmes examined.
In the Colombian programme the Comité de Reglamentación y Evaluación de Riesgos
(Committee for the Regulation and Assessment of Risks - CRER) was created as the
programme’s “advisory body”; it is defined as a “participatory, democratic and pluralist
[space] in which representatives of the state, in collaboration with representatives of the
target population, evaluate each case individually, taking into account the nature, time,
place and degree of threat and the level of risk faced by the applicants, and recommending
the protection measures that should be adopted”.
In the Guatemalan proposal the Comité de Evaluación de Riesgo (Committee for the
Assessment of Risks), also collective, determines its membership and the responsibilities
each should assume. The Brazilian programme does not enter into much detail on the
matter, though it does establish that decisions concerning who should be admitted to the
programme are the responsibility of the state coordination body or “depending on the
circumstances” (which are not specified), by the National Coordination. The guidelines
also recommend that the interview with the defender to determine whether they should be
included in the programme should be conducted “by more than one member of the
technical team, preferably in the presence of a lawyer”.
80
3. Composition of the bodies responsible for the various protection

programmes
Programa/
Colombia5 Guatemala6 Brazil7
Entity
• Committee for the • Committee for the • State and

Name of
Regulation and Assessment of Risks National

Body
Evaluation of Risks, and Protection Deliberative

CRER (advisory Measures (CERPM) Councils
body)
• Minister of the • Presidential • Representatives

Interior and Justice Coordinating of the
(may delegate the Commission of Government
Deputy Minister); Executive Branch (not specified,
chairs Policies on Human other than the
the CRER Rights –COPREDEH- National
Government
• Director of the (who functions as chair) Executive

Presidential Agency • Delegate of the Office Coordinator
for Social Action and for the Analysis of the
International of Attacks against Programme)
Cooperation defenders, attached
to the Vice-Ministry
for Security in
the Ministry
of the Interior
• Director of the • Director or delegate

Presidential Human of the Directorate of
Rights Programme8 Civilian Intelligence.
Participating Bodies
• Director of the • Representative of the

Human Rights International Relations
Programme of the Unit of the Ministry of
Ministry of the Labour and Social
Interior and Justice Security
• Representative of the
prosecuting authorities
(special invitation)
5 According to Decree 1740 of 2010.

6 See the proposal “Catalogue of Measures for the Prevention of Human Rights Abuses and Protection of
Human Rights Defenders and other Vulnerable Groups” (February 2008).
7 The information that appears in this table has been drawn from the Draft Law which was awaiting
approval by Brazilian Congress during the preparation of the current text (December 2010).
8 The full name is: the Presidential Programme for the Promotion, Respect and Guarantee of Human Rights
and the Application of International Humanitarian Law.
81
• Representatives (voice • Delegate Human • Representatives

not vote) of the office Rights Ombudsmans of “the
of the Solicitor General Authorities”
Bodies
• Delegate of the
State
(Procuraduría General (not specified)

Solicitor General
de la Nación) and the
Human Rights
Ombudsmane
• Director of Protection • Representative of • Representatives

and Special Services, the Division for the of “the
National Police Protection of Public Authorities”
Security Forces
Figures and/or Division (not specified)

• Coordinator of the
for the Protection of
Human Rights Group,
Public Safety and/or
National Police
the Human Right Office
of the National Civilian
Police, on a case by
case basis
• Representative of • Representative of
System
the office of the Public the Judicial Bodies

Justice
Prosecutor (voice or a delegate of the

not vote) Security Unit
• Four Representatives •T
wo national-level • Representatives
of each of the representatives of civil of civil society
Programme’s target society organisation organisations
Defenders’ Organisations
population groups (Human Rights (not specified,

special invitation organisations, trade except that
– only attend sessions unions, interest groups they will
examining the target and administrators and participate
group in question) other servants of the “on equal
justice system) terms” with
representatives
•T
wo national-level
of “the
representatives of
Authorities”)
journalists and the
communications
profession
• Representative of
the Office of
International
organisms
the UN High
Commissioner
for Human Rights
(special invitation)
82
It is clear from the table that judicial authorities participate only in the Colombian and
Guatemalan programmes, and that the Colombian programme is the only one with
participation by an international body.
In general, it is true that there are advantages and disadvantages associated with collective
decisionmaking processes according to the numbers involved:
Decision taken by a very Collective decision taken by

small number of people a larger number of people
Flexibility, dynamism,
Slower decision making
immediate response
Risk of arbitrariness Less risk of arbitrariness
and discrimination and discrimination
Risk of mistakes Less risk of mistakes

It is both useful and important that the members of these bodies should have decision making
capacity concerning overall decisions on the adoption and implementation of security measures
(because if they have to consult their superiors information is lost in transmission, timescales are
stretched, and the decision itself is taken at a remove from the defenders).9
Procedures and timescales for deciding admission to the programmes
The ordinary procedures followed at the start of the programmes generally follow the
following stages:
- Reception of a written request directly from the defender or a third party.
- Analysis and verification that the applicant is a member of the target population, as well
as the existence of a causal relation between the threat and their activities, the ongoing
nature of the threat, the location of the defender, etc. If necessary, a personal interview
will be conducted with the applicant in order to expand on relevant information.
- Completion of an assessment of the level of risk, to be carried out by the corresponding
body (police or other).
- Once the level of risk has been determined, the specific case is presented to the body
responsible for the programme, which determines the level of risk and assesses the
situation before recommending the pertinent security measures.
- Discussion of the recommendations and measures with the beneficiaries, and
preparation of a written agreement setting out their terms.
- Implementation of the agreed security measures.
When it comes to defining timescales it is important to take into account the frequency
with which the decision-making bodies meet:
• CRER (Colombia): monthly (with extraordinary meetings of the committee “when the
protection needs require it”).
9 Decree 1740, covering the Colombian programme specifies that if one of the members has been delegated
to participate they should be employees with decision-making capacity, and that the delegation should be
in writing (article 7).
83
• CERMP (Guatemala): fortnightly (and “extraordinarily when necessary, and according

to the extreme gravity and the circumstances of the case”).
• National Deliberative Council (Brazil): not specified.
In the Colombian and Guatemalan cases the timescales for admission to the programmes
under ordinary circumstances are set at several weeks long. Deadlines are not always
clear; nor are they necessarily respected.
Colombia Guatemala (following Brazil (the Brazilian

(following application and application, evaluation programme does not
the assignment of an of application by the establish timescales):
employee of the programme Protection Unit,
to the applicant): and transfer to the
Evaluation Committee):
Interview with the Report evaluated by Interview

defender the Committee for
the Evaluation of Risks
and Protective
Measures (2 weeks)
Preparation of report by Decision on the Proposal

employee (presented implementation
within 10 days) of measures
Technical risk assessment Approval

(completed within
2 weeks)
Decision on the Definition of the

implementation of level of risk
measures
Protection request
Incorporation into
programme
Implementation
84

In some cases weeks or even months may pass between the acceptance of the defender in the
programme and the implementation of protection measures, especially when the measures are to
be the responsibility of institutions that do not form a part of the programme, such as the local
police, for example.
& In such cases it may be useful to establish cooperation agreements (with a

commitment from the higher echelons of the organisation) so that that
the obligatory nature of the measures and the duty of the
implementing body to fulfil them are made clear
Procedures and timescales for urgent cases
None of the programmes defines what it means by “urgent cases”, though they do specify
procedures that should be followed in such cases. The Brazilian programme establishes
the need in these cases to take a decision immediately after the application has been made
(though once again no timescales are set). The proposal to establish the Guatemalan
programme states that measures in these cases will have the duration of two months after
which they will be subjected to the same assessment as an ordinary case. The Colombian
programme mentions the transfer or relocation of the defender as an initial measure, after
which they should present themselves to the “competent authority” for the procedures to
be initiated.
Emergency procedures provide protection measures in situations of high or very high risk,
in accordance with the decision made on the case by the person or body responsible for
such decisions. In these cases a programme may adopt or request measures without any
requirement to carry out an initial assessment of threat or risk levels, or to make initial
recommendations. Subsequently, the risk evaluation committee should be informed with
a view to proceeding, as soon as possible, with the ordinary procedures and the adoption
of definitive measures. In any case, as with ordinary procedures, it is important that an
agreement (or document) should set out the emergency measures agreed with the defender
or the organisation advising them. This agreement may take the form of a written
document, a fax or email or, even, a recording of a telephone call providing this procedure
has been agreed upon verbally during the phone call.
Precisely because of the lack of time available to assess risks and actions during the
emergency procedures it is easy to make mistakes that might affect the programme or the
defender in question. To reduce these risks it may be useful to do the following:
- Use pre-established protocols of action designed to prioritise the “reducing the
exposure” of the defender to the threat.
- Ensure that the protection measures granted should be conservative; that is, that they
prioritise the safety of the defender according to the assumption that the threat is real.
In this way doubts will not get in the way of rapid and effective protection.
It should be clear that an emergency protection response should not necessarily condition
subsequent actions, since once the risk has been analysed it should be possible to take more
informed decisions. That is, it may become apparent in a given case that the evacuation of
85
the defender was not in fact necessary; or the opposite may be the case: that in the
emergency situation the measures adopted were not sufficient.
& If there is well-founded fear that the life of a defender is in danger, the quickest,
most effective and, in principle, least damaging measure is immediate transfer
to a safe place. It is perfectly feasible to prepare a protocol covering this
eventuality in advance in order to ensure maximum safety levels for defenders
and their families should it be necessary to implement the measure

A security measure may be necessary, but bring with it levels of risk for defenders. All programmes
should, therefore, prepare protocols covering their emergency measures; these should be well
defined and include on-going monitoring, and prompt evaluation.
Documentation necessary to open a case
All the programmes require a written application requesting inclusion. This is the only
aspect they have in common. (And is the only initial documentary requirement of the
Brazilian programme). The Guatemalan programme requests in addition the presentation
of a copy of the complaint that was lodged detailing the facts of the case, while the Colombian
programme provides, additionally, a list of six documents, ranging from the criminal record
to a certificate of employment covering the previous three years. The programme specifies
a deadline of between five and ten days to provide the required documentation).
& Documentary support is required in order to justify the decisions on a given case,
but it should not become a barrier to the initiation of protection measures, especially in
cases where the risk levels are high or when the defender has had to be evacuated from
their habitual residence. Only documents specifically related to the case should be
requested, and reasonable timescales should be established for their presentation
4. Verification of cases
Once a case has been received by a programme it is fundamental to verify the information
that has been provided, both in order to understand the circumstances properly and to
confirm that the attack is a result of the applicant’s activities as a Human Rights Defender
as well as to be able to assess the risks and to take adequate protection measures. The
programmes follow different criteria (some of which are regulated and others not) in order
to confirm the information related to a case.
Some of the regulated verification procedures have already been mentioned, for instance
those governing acceptance by the programme: membership of an organisation, an
expression of support for the application from their organisation, knowledge of the case by
the local authorities, or that a formal complaint has been lodged with the authorities. This
last requirement is rooted in the fact that the presentation of a false complaint may have
profound legal consequences, and the requirement reduces considerably the possibility of
baseless applications being made.10
10 As will be seen later, this requirement also seeks to establish legal mechanisms aimed at reducing
impunity and preventing the programme from becoming a mechanism of refuge without the participation
of the legal institutions.
86
Other verification procedures require greater investigation in order to understand the

case. Such a study may be carried out by employees of the programme, as is habitually
done by the nongovernmental programme UDEFEGUA in Guatemala, or by a trusted
organisation in the zone where the defender has been threatened or attacked. If it is not
possible to carry out the study in situ the programmes do so at a distance, using a variety
of means to contact a range of sources. It will be apparent that the latter kind of assessment
is likely to be less trustworthy than the former, and may contain errors.

Defenders should provide written confirmation that they are willing for the information to be
used by the programme. Opportunities could be designed into the programmes to ensure
consultation with the defender over which information may be used and which should not.

When an institution belonging to committee requests information on a case, a confidentiality
agreement should be signed to protect the information in question.11
& When additional investigation is required, the safe handling of information

becomes even more important. Communications with third parties may break
confidentiality and the consent of the defender must be obtained (especially if
this is their first contact with the programme). It is of fundamental importance
to know what it is possible to ask each person interviewed and to
determine exactly what information is sought

Programmes should establish a mechanism to filter the information contained in the case files
which may contain confidential information - and to provide information to third parties (during
the verification stage, the risk assessment or the implementation period). One difficulty here is to
provide justification for a protection measure if it is not possible to cite confidential information.
In general, defenders are honest and appropriate in the use they make of protection
programmes. However there have been cases when defenders have asked to be included in
a programme because they are anxious for recognition or because they wish to travel to
another part of the country. On other occasions fear leads a defender to misinterpret events
or to manipulate them in order to access a programme. The few proven cases when
fraudulent access has been gained become notorious within programmes and may lead to
the erroneous perception that it occurs more frequently than is actually the case.
11 Article 50, Decree 1740 of 2010, Colombia.
87
Chapter 3: Risk analysis in programmes for

the protection of human rights defenders
As a general rule, the risk analyses available to the authors in preparing this research were
neither clear nor concrete; 1 in a sense, rather than efficient systems useful when analysing
the risks faced by human rights defenders they present little more than a “list of needs”,
and classifications of the types of risk faced. As they may be consulted in the annexes to
this book they are not presented in detail here. Instead, this chapter deals with a range of
key questions related to the analysis of risks.
Risk analyses should respond to reality and to the needs of human rights defenders. If the
systems used by the police do not fulfil this function, then protection programmes should
contain their own system of risk analysis either in an attempt to reach agreement concerning
adjustments to the schemes the police use, or to apply them directly, working in conjunction
with the human rights defenders. Differences between the analyses might lead to conflicts
of interpretation, but in any case it will be easier to adapt the programmes to varied
circumstances.
It is also important to try and define risk, though this is not an easy task because the truth
is that there is no single agreed definition of what risk means. The Colombian programme
defines risk as the “objective probability that some danger faced by an individual or a
group of individuals will be materialised in acts of damage or aggression“.2 Similarly, in
the New Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders3 we say that “risk” refers to
“possible events, however uncertain, that cause damage”. The level of risk depends on the
threats received but also on the degree of vulnerability of the defender to these threats and
the capacity they have to confront them. For example, faced with a generalised threat
against “everybody who works in Human Rights” in a city, organisations with greater
capacity (a security plan, protection measures in the office, support networks etc.) will not
face the same risks as much more vulnerable organisations (with no awareness of the
importance of security, no protection for their office or for computer equipment, etc.). Thus,
the management of risk focuses on acting in response to threats, vulnerabilities and
capacities. For an in-depth treatment of this topic, see annexes).4
Risks are circumstantial (because they depend on context and circumstances), changeable
(because they change when significant events occur) and subjective (because each individual
in an organisation may perceive them differently). In other words, risk cannot be
“measured” and it is therefore necessary to reach agreement about the level it has reached.

1 That is, the analyses that appear in the Guatemalan and Brazilian programmes; we have not had access to
the Colombian programme, nor to the protocols used by the different police forces to evaluate risk.
2 Decree 1740 of 2010, article 3.
3 See the manual in question, which may be consulted at:
http://protectionline.org/-Protection-International,318-.html
4 Adapted from Chapter 1.2 of the New Manual for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (see bibliography).
89
Some protection programmes use a numerical system to determine the level of risk.5 Others
just draw approximate conclusions based on the views of the person who carries out the
analysis. This chapter presents a process that may be used to determine the level of existing
risk by consensus.6 It involves two steps: first the determination of the level of risk; second,
how to manage the risk according to the level that has been determined.
& Before continuing, it is important to differentiate between and separate

the analysis of threats from the analysis of risk
An analysis of threats is carried out to study a threat and to try to determine the
possibility that it may be made effective in an attack against a defender. For example, if
a defender has received a death threat by telephone it is useful to analyse if it is likely to
be carried out in the form of direct physical aggression. But this is not an analysis of
risk; risk analysis is a more complex process that takes more factors into account.
We therefore recommend carrying out the analysis of threats first and the risk
analysis subsequently.
I. Determining the level of risk

Determining the level of risk is not a question of seeking to “measure” it objectively, but to
interpret it; that is, agree on how it should be understood according to a perspective of
providing protection to the defender. The Colombian programme defines the “study of the
level of risk” as the “result of the technical security analysis concerning the gravity and
imminence of the situation of risk and threat faced by the individual, family or group of
persons, as well as the specific conditions of vulnerability that affect them“.7
Although there are different ways to determine the level of risk, in general the process
involves determining if the level is “high, medium, or low”, in reflection of the probability
that something will occur and of the impact it would have if it did.
The probability of an aggression occurring: what is the probability that an aggression will be
committed (against individuals or an organisation).
The following table may be used to characterise this probability: 8
5 This is the case with the (non-governmental) case of UDEFEGUA (Guatemalan Defenders Unit).
6 The process is based on the results of the current research and previous experience in the field.
7 Decree 1740 of 2020, article 3.
8 Adapted from the New Manual for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (see bibliography).
90
Table characterising the possibilities that a given aggression will occur in the following … (days or months)
Influencing Factors
Previous Threats and Ability to Skills and Political, Economic Previous Attitudes or Ability of the Our levels
direct actions operate in the resources of military or motives. aggressions intentions. security forces of political
Reflections / carried out up zone analysed. the AP. hegemonic (against the to prevent influence in
Probability
in summary to now by the motivation in same or aggressions order to
form Aggressive the zone. different neutralise
Party (AP). defenders). the AP.
It is very likely that The Clear and AP controls It has them. The Defender The AP Clear cases Aggressiveness Inexistent, Limited
Aggression it will occur, almost conjunction explicit threats, the zone, or clearly desperately of previous – clear current there is no (depending on
certain in fact; of threats and direct actions operates at damages needs equipment aggressions. threats. capacity or circumstances)
very effectively action is clear, such as other ease in it. their ability or resources in will (the or inexistent.
probable we have to treat and there is an threats or to achieve cash form. armed forces
it as a fact. intention to surveillance objectives, collaborate
attack. operations. benefits their with , ore,
It is expected to opponents, the AP)
Aggression occur; it is more etc.
likely to happen
probable
than not.
It might happen; it There are Clear and AP acts in It has some, Partial – the The AP is There have Not overly Low. Medium
would not be threats and explicit threats. nearby zones or could Defender is interested in been a few interested. to Low.
strange if it did. minor actions, Minor actions and could start acquire an obstacle to equipment, cash cases. Occasional
but apparently (low level or operations in them. their political resources or other threats;
Aggression
no desire to sporadic this one. or hegemonic income (eg from frequent
possible carry out direct surveillance). objectives. kidnapping). warnings.
acts of
aggression.
It might happen, The threats Veiled, Low capacity It has None – the AP does not need No cases or They claim to Existent. Good.
though it would be do not refer non-explicit to act in the few or no Defender our equipment or exceptionally. be close or to
somewhat to direct or anonymous zone. resources to does not money. identify with
surprising if it did; aggression. threats. There carry out an constitute us, or are
Aggression but the likelihood is no history aggression an obstacle indifferent.
improbable cannot be rejected. of actions. such as that to their
analysed. objectives.
It would be very
strange if it
Aggression happened; it has
very never happened
improbable before – there are
no antecedents.
91
An example of the probability of direct acts of aggression: the potential aggressor

controls the zones where the defender operates but has no economic motivation for
carrying out an attack. The work of the defender only limits the potential aggressor’s
political and military objectives partially and there are no precedents for similar aggressions
in the zone. The attitude of the potential aggressor is indifferent and it is clear that it is
not in their interests to attract the national or international-level attention or pressure
that would result from an attack on the defender. However, the potential aggressor does,
through third parties, issue veiled threats against the work of the defender.
Conclusion: The probability of direct aggressions against the defender
is in this case considered to be low or medium.
It will be apparent that we use terms such as “given aggression” or refer to the execution of a
specific threat that has been received. It is important to refer to concrete aggressions or threats.
It is also important to establish a deadline or timescale (two weeks, two months, six months
etc.) to govern the probability analysis. For example, what is the probability of an aggression
such as this occurring during the next six months? Or: is it likely to be repeated during the
next two weeks?.
The Impact of an Aggression: how great would the impact of this aggression be on the defender
or the organisation (taking different factors into account).
The following table may be used to characterise the potential impact of a given aggression:
How to determine the impact of an aggression
On individuals On property, On reputation On the

(in cases resources, and image (in continuity of
analysed or on information cases analysed work (in cases
other associated (in cases or in relation analysed or in
Impact
individuals) analysed or in to associated relation to
relation to third parties) associated
associated third parties)
third parties)
Lives clearly Losses or Overwhelming Impossible to

at risk, there irremediable effects continue
Very High might already damage
have been
other deaths
92
Lives at risk, Losses or Serious effects Serious

or physical serious difficulties, it
integrity at risk damage is not clear
High (serious attacks), whether it will
prolonged be possible to
imprisonment, continue
etc.
Non-serious Moderate Partially Work will

attacks, brief losses affected continue, with
Medium imprisonment difficulties
still to
overcome
Insults or Light losses Very little Scarcely

Low
similar affected affected
Very Low No No Not affected Not affected
To determine the level of risk, it is necessary to combine the probability that something
will occur with its impact. In this way it will be possible to classify the risk as Very High
(VH), High (H), Medium (M), Low (L), or Very Low (VL), using the following table:
Determination of the level of risk
Impact
Very Low
Low Medium High Very High
or None
Probability
Very Probable L M H VH VH
Probable L M H H VH
Possible VL L M H H
Unlikely VL L L M M
Very Unlikely VL VL VL L L
It is apparent that “Very High” levels of risk correspond to a “Very Probable” attack that
“endangers the life of the defender (for example, a murder attempt). “Very Low” risks
correspond to a “Very Unlikely” action that produces “pressures” or “verbal harassment “.
 In order to determine the level of risk using this table it is necessary to enter into debate and draw
conclusions; it is not always easy to reach agreement. If it is not possible to agree between two levels
of risk it is best to choose the higher, to ensure that the benefit of the doubt always favours security.
93
The constitutional presumption of risk, extraordinary risk,

and the Colombian programme
The Colombian Constitutional Court has referred to the concept of the “constitutional
presumption of risk” which it links to the “duty to pay particular attention to the
population displaced by the authorities” when the “conditions that activate the
presumption of risk” are fulfilled. These conditions are:
a. the presentation of a request for protection to the authorities by the displaced
individual,
b. that the request was duly registered by the competent authority,
c. the request contains information that demonstrates, prima facie, that the individual
has been displaced as a result of violence, sufficient evidence being the registration
papers presented to the Unique Register of the Displaced Population, and
d. the information presented refers specifically to an identifiable threat to the life and
integrity of the petitioner or their family or to an act of violence committed against
them, related to concrete events that indicate they were the object of threats or attacks.
This presumption of risk should be applied by the authorities until its substance is
determined by a “specific, technically conducted, security analysis”. The current
decree covering the Colombian programme has, for the first time, incorporated the
presumption of risk in the case of displaced persons.9
The new regulation covering the Colombian programme10 describes “ordinary” risk
as “that to which all persons are subject, equally, as a consequence of their
membership of a given society and which generates an obligation on the part of the
state to adopt general security measures by providing an effective police service”.
Following on from this, “extraordinary” risk is defined as “that which persons are not
legally obliged to assume and which brings with it the right to receive from the state
special protection provided by its authorities”. This legal distinction is very
important, because it specifies a right to protection that was not present in previous
versions of the programme. It is based on several sources, including the Colombian
Constitutional Court’s Sentence T-719 of 2003 and Decision 200 of 2007. The
Colombian programme utilizes the Constitutional Court’s characterisation of
extraordinary risk:11
a. That it should be specific and individualizable.
b. That it should be concrete, based on particular and manifest actions or facts and not
on abstract suppositions.
c. That it should be current and not remote or presumed.
d. That it should be important, that is, that it threatens to damage goods or legal
interests, or the physical, psychological or sexual integrity that is valuable to the
victim or witness.
9 Decree 1740 of 2010 (Section III).

10 See Decree 1740 of 2010 (article 3), in annex.
11 Decree 1740 of 2010 (article 3).
94
e. That it should be serious, and likely to be carried out given the circumstances of
the case.
f. That it should be clear and discernible.
g. That it should be exceptional to the degree that it should not be borne by individuals
in general.
h. That it should be disproportionate when compared to the benefits derived by the
person from the situation that generates the risk.
It also adopts the definition of “extreme risk” as “that which threatens the rights to
life and integrity, liberty and personal security and occurs when all the
characteristics indicated for cases of extraordinary risk are present. Additionally, this
type of risk should be grave and imminent and directed against life or integrity,
liberty and personal security, with the evident intention of violating these rights “.
In its definition of risk the Brazilian programme incorporates the same characteristics
assigned by the Colombian programme to extraordinary risk.
Once the level of risk faced by the defender or the organisation has been determined it is
possible to pass onto the next stage, risk management.
II. Managing risk: decisions and processes to put into practice

Before taking decisions on managing risk, it is useful to examine first what can be done
with it, as set out in the following table:
What can be done with risk? Strategic decisions (first of all)
Level of Risk What can be done How to do it
Continue with habitual activities, without

Very Low or
Accept the risk forgetting to monitor the context and the risk,
Low Risk
in case there are changes.
This involves acting on the risk in order to

reduce it. This can involve applying the risk
equation (reduce risks, reduce vulnerabilities
Low, Medium and increase capabilities: see annexes).
Reduce the risk
or High Risk
Another alternative is to share the risk: by
acting jointly with allies the risk of aggression
is shared and may be reduced.
95
When the risk is high or very high it is

difficult to reduce it in the short term and
it is necessary to initiate measures
High or immediately to avoid it. These measures
Very High Avoid the risk generally interrupt work or habitual
Risk activities and generate drastic changes
during an indeterminate period of time.
Simultaneously, measures should be put in
place to reduce the risk in the medium term.
It is important to remember that when the risk is high or very high it is difficult to continue
with day to day activities in the same way as before, because drastic measures are generally
required to reduce the risk, including: changes in routines, the implementation of security
measures, the dedication of time and resources to avoiding and reducing risk (acting to
reduce the threats and vulnerabilities). These options are indicted in the following table:
How to influence the level of risk affecting a defender and/or organisation
Situation Description of Continuation Security Time to be

the general of normal plan and dedicated to
situation activities security security
Risk measures
Very dangerous No Absolute All that is
Very High and priority necessary
unpredictable
Dangerous and No, save Priority All that is
High unpredictable exceptions necessary
Dangerous but Yes, with Important: Part of the time

predictable or changes to the integrated (reducing the
Medium manageable activities most into amount of time
associated with activities usually dedicated to
the risk normal activities)
Little danger, Yes, in general Normal Normal
Low and
manageable
Very Low Manageable Yes Normal Normal
Risk analysis focused on risk management: taking decisions on security

The next step involves analysing the risk from the point of view of its components, so as to
be able to establish a protection and security plan. At the beginning of the chapter risk was
defined as “possible events, however uncertain, that cause damage”. Risk was said to
96
depend on threats that have been issued but also on how vulnerable the target is to these
threats and what capacity they have to face them; consequently, the management of risk
means acting on threats, vulnerabilities and capacities. This topic is dealt with in greater
detail in annexes.12
Summary: the process of analysing and managing risk
The following table summarises the process of analysing and managing risk; it draws on
the tables and tools presented previously in the chapter.
Table
page 90
Threat/Aggression
Context Analysis
I. Determining the level of risk
Table Table
page 91
Probability Impact page 92
Table
Level of risk page 93
VL L M H VH
II. Management of risk
Table Accept Reduce Avoid

page 95
Share
Security and protection plan
Implementation Monitoring
12 Adapted from the New Manual for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (see bibliography).
97
Finally, it should be remembered that:

• When defining the level of risk the idea is not to “measure” it objectively but to interpret
it. That is, agree, from the point of view of the defender, how it should be understood.
• It is important to separate the analysis of risk (determining the level of risk) from decisions
about how to manage it (the protection and security plan).
• Frequently, when it comes to analysing a situation there is a tendency to confuse the
analysis of risk with the analysis of how it should be managed. Nevertheless, it is important
to separate the two and to carry out first the analysis of risk (to determine its level) and
subsequently decide how it should be managed (the protection and security plan).
For example, a “medium” risk might be managed by implementing a simple protection plan.
98
Chapter 4: Protection measures provided

by the programmes: characteristics
and duration
1. Ensuring the appropriateness of protection measures
Protection measures should be appropriate to individual defenders and to the risks they
run. It is instructive to refer to Decision 200/07 of the Colombian Constitutional Court,
which states that in order for protection measures to be effective they should be:
“ (i) Factually appropriate to the circumstances of the applicant, which should be subjected
to careful study and whose preparation should not, however, delay the adoption of effective
measures designed to deal with the risk;
(ii) Effective in protecting the life, security and personal integrity of the individual and
their family – an effectiveness that includes both the timeliness of the measure and its
suitability, in achieving the objective of protection, and
(iii) Temporally appropriate, that is, that they continue to be applied while the extraordinary
risk they are designed to confront persists. (…) At the moment a protection measure is
defined in response to a presumed risk, the competent authority should justify them
expressly to the beneficiary, explaining how they fulfil the requirements of factual
adequacy, effectiveness and temporal adequacy“.
It is important to highlight, in reference to paragraph (iii), above, that the explanation the
authorities are required to provide of the appropriateness of a given measure offers a
fundamental key to understanding: there should be agreement on the measures between the
defender (and their organisation) and the protection programme. The work of human rights
defenders has specific characteristics and this negotiation process will make it more likely
there will be agreement on the appropriate protection measures that will allow the work of
the defender to continue working if the situation of risk allows it. This topic of risk assessment
is further explored in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 5 where specific measures are analysed.
2. The duration of protection measures
All the programmes specify that protection measures are temporary, but simultaneously
establish fixed timescales during which defenders may benefit from the measures: up to 12
months in Colombia and six months in Guatemala (extendable in both cases at the decision
of the programme committee). The measures may be suspended before the en of the
period, but they should always be maintained while the risk subsists.
3. Periodic revision of protection measures
When measures are offered for a finite period of time a further assessment of risk should
be carried out before the measures expire, in order to decide whether they should be
maintained. Consequently, some of the programmes include provision for periodical
evaluations of the cases (for example, every three to six months in the Colombian case,
depending on whether the risk is ordinary or extraordinary).
99
In order to review the risk and the implementation of the measures the programmes carry
out activities such as:
• Regular interviews with defenders and their organisations (if relevant).
• Reports compiled by programme officials or bodyguards (when these are employed).
• Inquiries into the progress of police or criminal investigations related to the case.
• Information on emerging incidents that are connected to the case or may affect the risks
faced by defenders.
Overall, it may be affirmed that the programmes have little capacity to monitor protection
measures or to review the levels of risk faced by defenders. In many cases the measures are
maintained formally for long periods, years even, without the levels of existing risk or the
due implementation of the measures in place to combat it being reviewed.
& In all cases regular reviews of risk and of the appropriateness of the measures
conceded should be carried out during the period covered by the protection
measures, and in all cases before they expire. Furthermore, whenever new
incidents occur against a protected defender an extraordinary
re-assessment of risk should be carried out

The absence of monitoring is in many cases justified by the scarce human resources that are
assigned in relation to the volume of work facing the programmes.
& The contribution and accompaniment provided by defenders’ organisations is

fundamental to the monitoring, implementation and effectiveness of protection
measures. This can and should be formally integrated into the monitoring provided
by the programme (both by the affected defender and by the mechanisms for
monitoring involving the defenders’ organisations that support the programme:
in the three countries in question defenders actively contribute to the processes
established to monitor and accompany the institutional protection programmes,
combining, as a result, a critical focus with necessary levels of support)

The Brazilian programme organises, as a minimum, one annual national level meeting to treat
topics related to the protection of defenders; a wide range of defenders, technical staff and
politicians, and at times outside invitees, participate.
It should be noted that there are frequent delays in the initiation of protection measures and
that they may be suspended for a range of reasons, the most common including the following:
• The refusal of the responsible body to implement; the police may, for instance, argue
that they do not have available agents at a given time or that they have other priorities,
or local or regional authorities may not share the priorities of central government or
may be engaged in power struggles with them.
• Liquidity and funding problems.
• Delays in bureaucratic procedures.
100

A reality affecting all the programmes examined is the lack of funds, liquidity problems,
bureaucratic difficulties, frequent delays in initiating measures, or their suspension.
4. Modification and termination of protection measures
Protection measures may be formally terminated for the following reasons:
• Fulfilment of allotted timescales (if the risk is no longer present).
• The risk faced by the beneficiary no longer exists.
The risk may diminish for a variety of reasons:1
- Because the threat is no longer present (for example because the actions of the
threatening party have been reduced by effective police or judicial action).
- Because of changes in the activities of the beneficiary (for example, if the defender
no longer works in defence of Human Rights or takes on other activities that imply
lower levels of risk).
- Changes in the place of residence of the beneficiary (moving to another place where
the risks are absent).
• At the request of the defender. In this case it is usual for a written request to be required.
• Improper use of the measures. (see the final section of this chapter).
• Leave of absence (except maternity leave) (Colombia).
• Imprisonment or house arrest (Colombia); or if a defender “carry out or have carried
out illegal acts or are subject to legal proceedings in the national justice system”
(Guatemalan proposal).
As has been mentioned in other sections of this book, if defenders suffer discrimination
or are criminalised by ad hoc laws they may lose the protection of the programmes that
have been established to provide necessary protection, resulting in the closing of a
circle of attacks against Human Rights activities.
• The Colombian programme adduces a further reason for the suspension of protection
measures, namely a “reasoned and unanimous recommendation of the CRER”. A
similar ambiguity of criteria is present in the Guatemalan proposal which provides an
additional motive: “any other reason defined by the CERPM”. Given the complex
relations involved in matters of protection, it is perhaps understandable that a
programme may wish to provide a “blank cheque” to decision makers but it is in any
case important that such decisions are properly transparent (that the motives are
clearly explained, at least to the bodies involved in monitoring the measures). These
ad hoc decisions may also be incorporated into the programme in the form of criteria
or lessons learnt (in this sense it is instructive to examine the list of improper uses
made of the protection measures offered by the Colombian programme: see the final
part of this chapter).
1 See Chapter 3, on the assessment of risk.
101
Protection measures may be modified (increased or reduced) in response to changes in the

level of risk faced by the defender:
Reduced Measures: Protection measures may be reduced when the level of risk wanes;
this may occur for the reasons presented in the previous paragraph (because the level
of threat has declined or because the defender has changed their activities or place
of residence).
Increased Measures: Similarly, protection measures should be increased when the
risks faced by a defender increase. This is the case, for example, when fresh incidents
occur (new threats, attacks on associates or on the defender, etc.)
Various factors may complicate the decision-making process concerning the withdrawal of
protection measures:
- All the programmes share a profound concern at the consequences and costs that may
occur when a defender whose protection measures have ended suffers a direct attack.
In an interview conducted during the research for this book, an official with a
governmental protection programme argued that “it is better to invest in security than
to leave someone unprotected”.
- Some defenders may face more than one source of threat that can lead to different levels
of threat that are not easily reconciled; for example, a defender might also lead an
opposition party and face threats that result from their work as a defender or because
of their political activity.
- When defenders themselves participate in programme decisions there may be conflicts
of interest when they are required to decide on the withdrawal of protection measures
either for themselves or their colleagues, especially if the programme is financed
externally, as defenders may not be aware of the limits to the resources available.
- In some cases certain defenders may be interested in retaining measures that provide
them with direct benefits, such as , for example, when they are provided with a bullet-
proof car and a driver, or when the fact of “having bodyguards” is associated with the
idea that the individual is “important” or “politically significant”.

If protection measures are continued indefinitely without clear justification it is likely that programme
resources will be squandered and it will be hard for other defenders to gain access to its benefits.
102
& In order to facilitate decision making on the withdrawal of protection

measures a programme should have in place:
• A system capable of guaranteeing the adequate assessment of risks.

• Clear, agreed, pre-established criteria governing decision making (based on the
risk assessment).
Pre-established criteria reduce differences of treatment and arbitrariness, enable prior
agreement to be reached between parties, and speed up decisionmaking.
• Clear support on the part of the community of defenders and the relevant institutions
for the decisions taken.
• An ad hoc system for monitoring risk in the period following the withdrawal of
measures (lasting several months).
In this way it is possible to guarantee a special monitoring process that will make it
possible to detect increases in the level of risk and to act in a timely manner. This
monitoring process may be the responsibility of the body responsible for coordinating
the programme, but in order to optimise available resources the system might also be
implemented by the defender’s organisation or by members of their immediate circle.
• A flexible system enabling protection measures to be re-initiated when necessary.
& As a practical minimum, a decision to establish timescales for the protection

measures that are established might help to guarantee that they do not continue
indefinitely when the programme has limited capacity to re-assess risks that
have fallen to medium or low levels. In any case, it should never be forgotten
that priority should always be given t protecting the defender at risk for
as long as necessary should the situation of risk continue.
5. The improper use of protection measures
The programmes generally compile a list of reasons for the withdrawal of measures,
related to their improper use. This is a controversial topic which shows, on the one hand,
how difficult it is to reconcile the needs of defenders with the schemes developed by
protection programmes, and on the other, the need of the programmes to ensure that their
resources are put to proper use.
The outline of the proposed Guatemalan programme, and the Colombian programme
present lists detailing the improper use of protection measures, while in the Brazilian
programme these are gathered together under one heading. As the programmes are
available to be consulted in the annexes included with these two parts, the focus here is on
enumerating and analysing the most important ones, in the light of the practical experience
of the authors and the research that has gone into producing these texts.
103
Improper use of protection measures by beneficiaries is generally held to have occurred

when they:
• Go to places that constitute a risk to their security and ignore the observations or
recommendations on self-protection and security that have been formulated by the
security details assigned them or by state security personnel.
As has been stated at various points in this book there is a need to reconcile the continuing
work of defenders with the restrictions that may be imposed if they are working under
conditions of elevated risk. Additionally, perceptions, and even the reality, of risk may vary
between individuals and institutions. Those “places that constitute a risk to their security”
may be the areas where defenders habitually work and they may reasonably feel that they
should continue to do so. In order to find the correct balance, defenders should participate
in risk assessments (it might be easier for a defender to persuade a colleague of the risks
they run), and the protection programmes should endeavour to identify with the work of
defenders so that they end up doing everything possible to ensure – whenever possible –
that security measures do not constitute a barrier to their work.
• Abandon or evade the protection scheme, travelling to [dangerous] zones without the
accompaniment of their assigned security personnel.
• Impede the attempts of the protection detail to provide accompaniment in closed or
public places, thereby placing their lives in danger. Or, if a protected person has decided
to end a protection scheme, they leave the place where they were, or return to the zone
of risk without informing the relevant authorities.
In addition to the comments concerning the previous point it is important to take into
account the fact that defenders sometimes work in socially deprived social sectors among
a population that is suspicious of the police. A defender will not be able to carry on their
normal activities if the interviews conducted with witnesses are accompanied by the
police. Furthermore, in some countries such as Colombia there are serious antecedents of
the security forces using bodyguard duties to gather information on the activities of
defenders. This definition, then, should not qualify as an improper use of protection
measures, especially if the responsibility for the actions is assumed by the defender.
• Authorises the use of the measures by other than those determined by the authorities,
or seeks to gain commercially from the protection measures assigned them.
• Orders drivers, bodyguards or others to develop activities that have nothing to do with
the development of their security activities.
• Attacks the personnel assigned to their protection detail either physically or verbally.
• Behaves in a manner that puts at risk their personal safety or that of their security
detail, such as:
- Drive vehicles under the effects of intoxicating liquor or hallucinogenic substances.
- Fail to respect the rod safety norms (or pressure the security detail to do so).
- Carry arms without authorisation.
104
• Authorise leave or rest periods for the security detail without the knowledge of the
body responsible for the protection scheme.
• Commit punishable or disciplinary acts or misdemeanours making use of the physical and
human resources made available for their protection.
• Cause intentional damage to the physical and human resources assigned by the programme.
105
Chapter 5: Catalogue of available protection

measures and analysis
The programmes analysed in this book bring together, in greater or lesser detail, the
different protection measures that are examined, but, first it is useful to make some general
comments about them.
There are major budgetary differences between the programmes and while it is true that
the Colombian programme is the most generously funded, the programme of the Ministry
of the Interior and Justice also covers groups other than defenders, such as journalists,
witnesses, demobilised guerrilla fighters, etc.). These budgetary differences mean that the
programmes are able to offer different kinds of measures (transport costs, bullet proof
vehicles, etc.). The catalogue of measures offered by the Colombian programme is more
extensive than is contained in the Guatemalan and Brazilian proposals which, above all,
offer police protection. Evidently, there is a theoretical advantage if a greater range of
measures is available as they are more likely to meet a range of needs; but it should be
borne in mind that, in practice, many of the measures are only offered on paper.1

Frequently, due to structural and budgetary limitations, more measures are listed than are
actually available in practice. This is not good practice as it may provide an inflated image of the
programme that is not reflected in reality.
The programmes classify the measures they provide in different ways. Some refer to
“preventive” and “protective” (or “protection”) measures. Others classify the measures
offered as “soft” or “hard” (according to whether they use armed bodyguards or not). Some
provide detailed descriptions of operational arrangements or protection “schemes”, while
others open the door to less technical and more political approaches, such as Human Rights
training for the security forces, etc. In order to be able to carry out a thorough analysis of the
measures, they have been grouped according to a logic derived from risk assessment (see
annexes): risk is proportional to the vulnerabilities of the defenders, and inversely
proportional to their security capacities. It is therefore fundamentally important that
measures should confront threats, reduce vulnerabilities and increase the capacities of
defenders. First, it is important to understand that the vast majority of protection measures
are intended to reduce vulnerability (means of communication, bullet proof vests, payment
of transport costs to leave the zone of risk, etc.), and that practically the only measure
intended to confront threats directly is the provision of armed bodyguards. Taken together
these factors imply that the overall set of measures available does not deal with threat in a
balanced way, but tends towards the technical and to approaches based on armed protection.
There have been cases where the funding for protection programmes has been diversified,
with the result that defenders have been passed from one programme to another for a
variety of reasons (for example, because they are internally displaced, or indigenous, or
because of the kind of protection offered – for example if they have to leave their region or
the country, etc.).
1 The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders, M. Sekaggya, has also
expressed her concern at this:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=111&LangID=E
107

It is important to avoid the practice of “one defender for each funding source”, because it creates
problems in coordination, delays in providing protection, and poor resource management.
& Although different funds exist for defenders, it is possible to integrate them
effectively by adopting common criteria concerning admission to
programmes and the implementation of protection measures
1. Measures to reduce vulnerability
Measures to reduce the exposure of defenders

• Evacuation, removing a defender and their family from a zone. This usually involves
(as an emergency measure, or with more planning) the payment of transport (terrestrial
or air depending on the characteristics of the zone).
• Temporary Relocation in a different, risk free, zone (this may be outside the country,
but is usually to another location within national territory).
- Financial support (usually limited: for example the Colombian programme specifies
that it will provide a “maximum of the equivalent of the minimum wage for three
months, renewable”; the Brazilian programme stipulates that the support will be for
a “fixed period”).
- Financial support to help with moving costs.
A frequent problem has been the timely availability of funds to carry out an evacuation or a
temporary relocation. In general it is necessary to increase the responsiveness of the programmes
in these cases. More than once a non-governmental defenders’ programme or organisation has
had to advance money and wait for it to be returned by the governmental programme.
• Internships (national or international): sometimes the relocation may involve an
internship or a period of paid or unpaid collaboration with another Human Rights
institution; these arangements allow better use to be made of the period of relocation,
reduce psycho-social effects and facilitate the exchange of experiences.
• Protection of daily movements:
- Provision of a vehicle to facilitate mobility (with or without a driver or bodyguard
according to the level of risk; risk is also taken into account when determining
whether the vehicle should be bullet proof or not).
- The use of secure transport means (private cars, or payment for taxis in order to
avoid the use of public transport which might increase levels of vulnerability if the
defender is obliged to wait at bus stops, use pre-established routes or walk to
between bus stops and their place of residence or work, etc.).
Measures to improve communications capacity
Communications equipment for use in emergencies:
• Cellular telephones (or payment of pre-paid services for use in emergencies)
108
• Radios or radio telephones

• Satellite phones
Measures to protect defenders’ offices, headquarters and homes
• Security doors and windows
• Video entry phones, closed circuit television
• Metal detectors
• Bullet proof vests
Measures to increase the capacity of defenders to protect themselves
The governmental programmes all mention a measure known as “Training in protection
and self-protection”, although training processes are most frequently organised by non-
governmental organisations.2
2. Measures to confront direct threats
These measures are designed to deal with direct threats; that is, to reduce the possibility
that a potential perpetrator will attack a defender directly. Most of these measures are
based on the continuous or periodic presence of armed personnel, though the unarmed
international accompaniment provided by NGOs such as Peace Brigades International
should also be mentioned.3 A protective presence may also be offered by national NGOs,
United Nations staff, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other bodies
including some state institutions such as Human Rights Ombudsman’s offices.
Bodyguards or armed protection
Bodyguards or armed protection details who provide a continuous or periodic presence of
armed personnel; they may be offered to an organisation (for example to protect a place of
work) or to threatened defenders (individual bodyguards). For defenders, armed protection
is important in a number of ways, analysed below.
Who provides the service?
There are different ways in which Bodyguards may operate:
• Bodyguards provided by members of one of the security forces such as the police.
This is the most frequent mechanism because it has a broad reach (in theory it can be
provided anywhere in the country). It has advantages but also disadvantages which
have caused a great deal of concern among defenders (see the table below). As is detailed
in the next point, several proposals have been put forward, as a result of these concerns,
to create a specialised security body specialising in armed protection for defenders. In
any case, as minimum defenders insist that mechanisms should be created to ensure
that the bodyguards or drivers have “clean records”, with no connections with armed
2 Among the few organisations that specialise in this field are Protection International and the Protection
Desks that it has created in conjunction with national defenders’ organisations in several countries around
the world. For more information see www.protectioninternational.org
3 For more information see www.peacebrigades.org, or “Unarmed bodyguards: International Accompaniment
for the Protection of Human Rights”, by Liam Mahony and Luis Enrique Eguren, Kumarian Press, West
Hartford, Connecticut, 2007.
109
groups or other security bodies that have participated in repressive actions. defenders
insist, too, that bodyguards should have received training in, and be sensitive to,
Human Rights, and have finished their training recently. These demands are all made
to avoid cases where bodyguards form a part of criminal networks that oppose the
work carried out by defenders or where they might be co-opted and used to attack or
gather information on those they are supposed to protect.
• Bodyguards provided by specialised bodies.
The Guatemalan proposal includes a suggestion for the creation of an Elite Security and
Protection Corps – CESP for its Spanish initials), within a state security body, but
specialised in the protection of persons. The Colombian defenders’ organisations have
made similar proposals, specifically for the creation of a special unit to coordinate
existing security schemes, whose design “should be agreed with the beneficiaries”.
There have been similar discussions in Brazil. These proposals are not only based on
the hope that the bodyguards will be adequately trained to perform their role, but that
the members of the units will also receive special recognition, developing an esprit de
corps, and reducing the risk they will “sell their services”.
• Bodyguards provided by “trusted” personnel.
That is, individuals in whom the defender has confidence, trained in weapons use (in
Colombia and Guatemala these people are frequently demobilised guerrilla fighters).
At times these bodyguards work on private contracts and frequently (for the purposes
solely of providing this specific service) join some state security body; in Colombia for
example several joined the state security agency, or DAS, after receiving additional
training as bodyguards. This model is provided for in the Guatemalan proposal in
cases in which “the beneficiaries [decide] for valid reasons not to accept protection from
[official bodyguards]”: the state would, in these cases, contract and train the bodyguard
and provide their weaponry; they might be placed under the authority of the official
body in charge of protection or, if contracted privately, under the CESP; 4 in this latter
case they would, in the words of the proposal, “respond to the beneficiaries”.
• Bodyguards provided by private security companies.
Currently, the Colombian programme offers bodyguards and armed protection
contracted from a private security company. This has been widely criticised by
defenders’ organisations and by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human
Rights Defenders, Margaret Sekaggya81 (see following table), who propose that the
model should be abolished.
4 Elite Prevention and Protection Unit (a police body to be created to provide protection), see the proposed
Guatemalan programme, Section 3.4.
81 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=111&LangID=E
110
Comparative table of the different models

of armed protection
Potential advantages Objections
Present everywhere in Lack of experience and commitment
the country. (availability depends on other police
Bodyguards provided by permanent members
priorities) or resources (at times the defender

Probably cheaper.
is obliged to pay for the bodyguard’s food).
Possible access to police
Lack of awareness: it is common for the
intelligence information on
bodyguards to be prejudiced against human
possible aggressions against
rights defenders (who are viewed as
of a security body
defenders (if such information

“Defenders of Guerrillas” or of “Criminals”,
exists and is transmitted to
or as people who present obstacles to the
the protection programme).
work of the security forces).
There might be more people
Possible direct or indirect links repressive
available in a given operation
structures within the security forces.
and greater fire power
(weaponry). Risk that they will carry out surveillance or
leak information on or against the defenders
or their contacts and their work (cases have
been documented).
Need to coordinate with the protection
programme (they are separate institutions).
Better training and more Probably more costly to create.
dedicated.
Bureaucratic delays might create delays in its
Less risk of structural establishment.
Bodyguards provided by a specialised bodies
relationships with repressive

sectors, less risk of surveillance
or leaking of information.
Potentially, improved
coordination with the
protection programme.
Possible access to police
intelligence information
concerning possible
aggressions against defenders
(if such information exists
and is transmitted to the
protection programme).
There might be more people
available in a given operation
and greater fire power.
111
Greater social and political Less access to police intelligence information

commitment with the work on possible aggressions against defenders
of defenders. (if such information exists).
Absence of the risk of Might lead to conflicts with the security
Bodyguards provided by
“trusted” personnel
structural connections forces (if these are hostile to defenders),

with repressive sectors, such as arrests if they act in confused
of surveillance or of circumstances, etc.
leaking information.
Generally limited firepower (because of the
number of bodyguards and weapons).
The relationship of confidence between the
bodyguards and the defenders may create
conflicts of interest or the bodyguard may
not act with due professionalism.
Dilution of state responsibility.
The state is responsible for providing
protection, and a private company is not a
state body; it is therefore very difficult for
the state to delegate its authority and
Bodyguards provided by private
responsibility (given that state agents owe

high degrees of accountability, whereas this is
security companies
much more diffuse for a private bodyguard).

Companies tend to be created by former
members of security bodies and may be
infiltrated by sectors that repress defenders
(cases have been documented in Colombia).
In contrast to the situation with state officials
there is no due control of the employees of
private companies.
The bodyguards do not have the basic
training provided to state agents and many
fewer have received Human Rights training.
This table setting out potential advantages and objections should be read bearing in mind
risk and the needs of defenders. For example, if there is a high risk of surveillance and
espionage being carried out against a defender’s contacts, armed police bodyguards may
not be a viable option for the defender. But sometimes it is not possible to choose, and the
defender is left feeling that they have to decide between a bodyguard and nothing. At other
times defenders might opt for a form of protection other than a Bodyguard, such as
international accompaniment (see the comments on this in chapter 1), or – in situations of
risk – accompaniment by a member of the defenders’ or another organisation.
112
In this connection the proposed programme in Guatemala envisions support in developing

“accompaniment by national and international organisations (…) to respond to situations of
imminent risk” (including, for example, by facilitating visas for international accompaniers).5
A possible alternative is to use unarmed guards, a mechanism which is frequently used,
for example, to guard business premises. Sight should not be lost of the fact that these
different models of accompaniment and the employment of bodyguards should always be
analysed in the light of existing risks, because frequently, in particular circumstances, one
or other alternative may not provide viable protection.
How are bodyguards deployed?
Bodyguards or armed protection details are usually provided on a continuing basis or for
long periods of time, day and/or night. They consist of an operation (or “scheme”)
employing one or more bodyguards, with or without a vehicle, who accompany a protected
person according to set security protocols. On leaving a building they exit before the
protected individual, check out the enclosed or semi-enclosed places the protected person
will enter, plan transport routes and in general apply technical criteria that have been
designed taking into account the daily routines of the person they are protecting. These
actions are necessary because the bodyguards cannot be “in two places at one time”. The
effectiveness of bodyguards is based on their ability to dissuade potential aggressors from
attacking (they share this with national and international accompaniers), if an attack is
planned, they should detect or, if eventually necessary, repel it without injury to the
protected person or to themselves.

A bodyguard who is not committed, or is passive, will not be able to repel an attack, nor react
appropriately if it occurs.
Discontinuous armed presence
This mechanism involves organising patrols around an office or place of residence. Its
principal objective is not usually to act in response to aggressions at the moment they
occur but to prevent them happening in the first place. If patrols are to be effective they
should be irregular but sufficiently frequent that a potential aggressor cannot predict
when the next one will be. They should be carried out several times a day especially at
moments of high risk (such as when a defender enters or leaves the office, at dusk, etc.;
frequency can also vary according to changes in the overall level of risk). Patrols should
consist of more than “just passing by” requiring an active attitude including counter
surveillance activities (to detect if others have the premises being protected under
surveillance) and when possible carrying out enquiries locally (that is, to carry out
intelligence on the protected area), in order to be able take note of danger signals and to act
on them. It is also important, as the Guatemalan proposal notes, to take into account levels
of illumination in the zone, parking areas, traffic flow and the layout of entrances, stairways,
doors, lifts and the like.

Bad practices that have been detected in police patrols include the low frequency with which they
are carried out, and their routine nature (the car “just drives by” and “always at the same time”.
5 See Guatemalan proposal, Section 4.
113
& In order to ensure that visits are carried out at greater frequency, or at least gather
evidence of which agents are not fulfilling their duties, some organisations who
have counted with these measures have agreed with the police that they would
maintain a register of the dates and times of visits made to their offices along
with the badge numbers, names and signatures of the officers involved
The practice of discontinuous armed presence can also include provision of direct telephone
lines to guarantee a rapid police response if a security incident occurs. For a period in
Colombia a networked communications system was established, using radio telephones to
link defenders and a specially assigned unit in the National Police, which defenders could
use to communicate immediately with the police and arrange for a patrol to be sent to the
scene of events. In Guatemala there was a similar experience using the standard emergency
telephone number (110) available to the whole population but which was adapted to include
a special service for defenders. It is not entirely clear, on balance, how effective these
measures were since positive reports on their functioning were matched by negative ones.
The process of assigning bodyguards

First, the protection programme and the defenders themselves (both organisations that
support the programmes and beneficiary organisations and individuals) should monitor
accurately the ways in which the measures work. The following section highlights some of
the most frequent problems encountered and suggests ways of overcoming them.
• Substantial or formal disagreement concerning the level of risk faced by the defender
or of the kind of security detail they should be offered.
If the body carrying out the risk assessment is not the same as the one providing the
armed protection there might be disagreements about the level of protection required
by the defender. In a similar vein, the limited resources available to pay for bodyguards
and the even lower social status of defenders mean that the police are likely to see
defenders as a low priority for protection.
On other occasions the disagreements may have political or ideological roots as occurs
for example when high ranking police officers oppose Human Rights activities, when
the attacks on defenders come from the security forces themselves or when a police
chief identifies with a local government that does not share the government line and is
prepared to act against it.
There are several ways to deal with these situations. At the technical level it can be
useful for the entity that provides the bodyguards to participate in some way in the risk
assessment, so that they can contribute their perspectives and it may be possible to win
their commitment. Similarly, it may be useful if the personnel who work as bodyguards
are not linked operationally to the core bodies of the police. But if the underlying
problem is a lack of political will, the solution has to be to create that will: to increase
perceptions of the social significance and value of defenders, and to ensure that orders
handed down from above are respected. During the research we have learnt of a range
ofresponses to these difficulties and there are no clear conclusions as to which is most
effective, because each depends on the particular context. But the general conclusion is
that it has not proved possible to generate the political will needed to overcome the
114
obstacles to implementing protection measures (let alone the broader measures that are
discussed in the next chapter).
• Coordination between the Programme and the Body that Provides the Bodyguards.
A recurrent problem is the lack of coordination between programmes and the armed body
that provides the bodyguards, whether initially or during deployment. This obstacle also
occurs when different security bodies are involved. The lack of coordination has budgetary
implications too, a question that at first appears minor but that is in fact sensitive: who
pays the costs of the bodyguards (food, petrol, journeys outside the city, etc.)? It is all too
frequent that the defender ends up paying for food and other related costs.
The programmes propose different ways of dealing with these coordination difficulties.
The Colombian programme defines a “protection route”, a strategy intended to articulate
and coordinate the actions of authorities at national, departmental and municipal level.
This “route” defines the responsibilities of each level in some detail.6 The programme
also establishes a unique data base to record the details of beneficiaries. Guatemala saw
the creation of the Human Rights Unit of the Criminal Investigation Division of the
National Civilian Police (subsequently renamed the Special Criminal Investigations
Division, or DIEC for its Spanish initials), whose function is to respond to crimes
committed against defenders and contribute to their investigation in coordination with
the prosecutors who are responsible for them. For a period, despite having only a small
team that required help with training and resource problems, this Unit demonstrated
considerable capacity to operate and to attend cases throughout the country to the
extent that initial results promised that it might be possible to end impunity. Regrettably
poor coordination with the prosecuting authorities and obstructive attitudes meant
that many of these cases were never brought to a final conclusion.
In relation to bodyguards’ expenses, the Colombian programme stipulates only that a
circular will be sent the regional and local authorities requesting them to include the
costs associated with the protection programmes in their budgets. The Brazilian
programme establishes that “the necessary collaboration and support”, including
economic assistance, will be offered to police forces.7
& The supervision of bodyguards should not be the sole responsibility of the
programmes, but should also involve defenders’ organisations. To enable this,
organisations themselves need to develop their own policies covering their
interactions with armed protection; they should do this in cooperation with
other organisations and without obliging individual defenders to manage
the difficulties associated with accepting protection from bodyguards
• Distrust for the police felt by defenders or the populations they work with.
In the three programmes analysed, defenders maintain high levels of distrust towards
the police forces that provide their bodyguards. There have been numerous cases of
espionage carried out against defenders, as well as direct actions against them
6 Decree 1740 of 2010, Section IV.

7 Procedural Manual, p.31.
115
committed by the security forces. Among the most resonant of these cases has been that
of the illegal interceptions of communications involving defenders and other social and
political groups in Colombia by the army and the state intelligence agency, the DAS.8
Bodyguards are also able to facilitate the processes that criminalise defenders: cases are
on record where they have provided evidence against them. The same risk exists with
the officials who undertake risk assessments, as these agents are able to obtain abundant
information on defenders and their work.
Some of the ways in which attempts have been made to address these activities include
– in addition to the necessary investigations and legal proceedings – the proposals that
have already been discussed to create special independent police units, and the
importance of establishing an accessible contact point within the police with whom it is
possible to develop a relationship of trust and who can take measures and even carry
out internal investigations when the circumstances so dictate.
It is common for the population groups with which defenders work to resist collaboration
with a person who has armed accompaniment, whether these are members of the state
security forces or not. In these cases there is usually an understanding of the risk
involved, a factor that explains why defenders tend to describe openly the risks they
face. It is common practice, too, for the bodyguard to be a person who does not have
contact with the local population or know the localities where they live (for example in
cases where witnesses or the leaders of movements have chosen to operate with a low
public profile). This also generates multiple conflicts in the programmes because at
times defenders may go to a place without informing their bodyguards, ask them to
remain at a distance while they carry out their work, or “dismiss” them at a certain time
and then carry on with their activities. However, this latter alternative is not always
possible because such cases have been defined by the Colombian programme as
“improper use” of the protection measures and may lead to their suspension.
& If the levels of risk allow it, protection measures should be compatible with the work
carried out by defenders. Both the Colombian Constitutional Court and the
Inter American Court of Human Rights have stipulated that protection measures
should be appropriate to the needs of defenders and consulted with them. The
Brazilian draft law for the protection of defenders puts it in the following way:
“Measures that lead to the interruption of the human rights defender’s work
in his/her area of activity will only be implemented if strictly necessary
for his/her security or that of his/her collaborators”9
• Bodyguards who generate risks

In certain circumstances police bodyguards may generate risks for defenders. For
example, defenders who work in the Brazilian favelas state that their levels of risk
increases when they enter localities accompanied by uniformed police (and the police
say the same). We are not aware of simple solutions to cases such as these in which
8 Protests at these acts of espionage and other actions against defenders have been widely expressed,
including by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders, M. Sekaggya:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=111&LangID=E
9 Article 10 (see annexes).
116
different kinds of risk are combined, namely those that defenders face and those faced
by their bodyguards. On many occasions this situation has led to interruptions in the
provision of armed protection in zones of risk, a factor which seriously limits their
capacity to protect.
3. Other protection measures
It is clear that the majority of the measures proposed by the programmes are reduced to the
physical protection of threatened defenders. However, all defenders agree that the best form
of protection would be to end impunity: if cases are investigated, if perpetrators are arrested
and then tried and sentenced the result would be a major advance in protection. Another
significant advance would be the creation of a social environment in which the work of
defenders is positively valued. In this, as so often, defenders’ organisations themselves have
been pioneers developing wide-ranging, prolonged, campaigns. For its part, the proposed
Guatemalan programme includes a series of measures that go beyond physical protection
and, similarly, the Colombian programme has also included certain – though much more
limited – aspects of this kind. The next chapter focuses on other protection measures, of
broader scope, that go beyond the physical measures analysed here.
117
Chapter 6: The overall protection response

1. The protection response
As was argued in the previous chapter, protection programmes should widen the focus of
their protection response beyond the mere physical measures analysed up to now. The
objectives of integral protection should include ending the impunity enjoyed by the
abusers, and granting defenders the respect and social recognition they deserve. As the
Brazilian draft legislation states, it is of fundamental importance to “adopt measures
intended to overcome the causes that led to [the defenders’] inclusion in the Programme.”1
For this to occur, governmental programmes, which focus primarily on physical and
reactive measures, must adopt the mechanism and tactics developed by certain non-
governmental programmes, as will be seen below.
2. Criminal investigation of aggressions against defenders

All defenders coincide in confirming that the aggressions they suffer would diminish if
impunity were ended. This is why it is possible to state the following:
& The criminal investigation, trial and sentencing of the perpetrators of attacks
against defenders is one of the principal sources of their protection.
Programmes should be conceived bearing in mind that they cannot be “bubbles” that
isolate defenders from the contexts in which they work or from the police or judicial
investigations of the threats or attacks they have suffered.

Protection programmes are structured to include as members the police and judicial bodies
responsible for investigating attacks against defenders.
At the same time it is fundamentally important to prevent potential leaks of information about
the situation of defenders. For example, the proposed Brazilian legislation includes provisions
to guarantee “confidentiality of identity, appearance and personal data” of defenders and
stipulates that the “Measures and provisions […] will be carried out and maintained in secret
by the human rights defenders and the agents involved in carrying them out.”2

Programmes should maintain due confidentiality and prevent possible leaks of information
about the circumstances related to the protection of defenders (which, if they are detected,
should be investigated). It is more likely for leaks to occur when the perpetrators are members
of the security forces who may have connections with officials who are close to the programme
(bodyguards for example).
3. The protection of defenders as state policy
If the protection of defenders is to be state policy it should be regulated by law and not
merely by guidelines or ad hoc decrees. At the time this book was being prepared Brazil
1 Article 10 of the Law cited (see text in annexes).

2 Article 10 of the Law cited (see text in annexes).
119
was the only country in the world that was close to approving a law for the protection of
defenders.3 In all other cases mechanism are contained in ad hoc policies (Colombia) or
proposals (Guatemala, and more recently, Mexico).
4. The need for inter-sectoral coordination between government and
state bodies
An integral protection response requires coordination between the different governmental
and state bodies responsible for protection. The Brazilian draft legislation establishes that
“the Special Secretariat for Human Rights may create a national-level inter-sectoral
commission to coordinate state and federal bodies with faculties related to the policies
and programmes for the protection of Human Rights”, but it does not provide a concrete
mechanism. The situation in Guatemala is similar. Nevertheless, the new decree regulating
the Colombian programme creates a high level Inter-Sectoral Protection Commission4
(see table).
Colombia: Inter-sectoral protection commission
Members The Minister of the Interior and Justice, who chairs the Commission.
The Minister of Defence.
The Public Prosecutor (Fiscal General de la Nación).
The Solicitor General (Procurador General de la Nación).
The Director of the Presidential Programme for Human Rights and IHL.
The Human Rights Ombudsman.
The Contralor General de la República (responsible for overseeing the
rectitude of the public accounts).
(participation in this Commission may not be delegated).
Functions Guide the strategies of state protection policy.

Coordinate the implementation and finalisation of protection measures in
exceptional cases resulting from situations of extreme risk and requested
by the Minister of the Interior and Justice or the National Police.
Periodically review the monitoring reports emitted by the different
protection programmes, and produce recommendations.
Evaluate the process of transition of each of the target populations covered
by the programmes.
Invite participation from persons considered necessary to the work of the
Commission.
3 For more information see Part I.

4 Decree 1740 of 2010.
120
Sessions The Commission will establish its own regulations governing its functions
and will determine the how frequently nit will meet in session.
The recommendations and decisions of the Commission will be recorded
in a minute which will be signed by the President of the Republic and the
Presidential Secretary.
5. Measures imposed by international bodies

Certain regional bodies such as the Inter American Court and the Inter American
Commission of Human Rights have the legal capacity to impose precautionary or
provisional measures on a member state when a defender is at grave risk. In certain cases
these measures are immediately implemented in the country in question under the theory
that the criteria of necessity adhered to by the international body makes them immediately
applicable. In other cases the protection programme or a security body will carry out an
assessment of risk which will form the basis of the decision on the kinds of measures to be
adopted. This has led to situations where precautionary measures have been requested
because of the high levels of risk faced by a defender but the risk assessment has categorised
the level of risk as “low”, leading as a consequence to a conflict between institutions.
The implementation of protection measures based on precautionary or provisional
measures requires a certain level of coordination between the corresponding protection
programme and the Foreign Ministry (in fulfilment of its role in maintain relations with
international bodies), the security forces and defenders. Usually, the implementation of
these protection measures is marked by the same difficulties as those already analysed in
the implementation of measures in other programmes.
6. Other protection measures
Other protection measures exist on paper, such as the Guatemalan proposal or the Brazilian
draft law that, along with the actions carried out by defenders’ organisations, suggest a
much broader panorama of possible actions to protect defenders. This section presents a
brief summary of some of these measures.
Legal support and approaches to the authorities
• Accompaniment provided to state bodies.
• Monitoring of the evolution of the case and pressure to ensure trial.
• Vigilance to ensure due process in cases of judicialisation or criminalisation of defenders
(as a minimum, provide information critical of the legislation or policies that criminalise
defenders).
• Awareness-raising of the judicial sector and police concerning the importance of
protecting defenders.

Example: in 2010 the state programme in Pernambuco (Brazil) took the initiative of inviting the the
judicial sector and police to an event to analyse and exchange ideas on the protection of defenders.
121
• The right to information: the proposal to establish a programme in Guatemala states

that “state institutions should provide information concerning Human Rights to
prosecutors and judges whenever requested by HRDs in order to expedite legal
investigations and trials.”5
• The Brazilian draft law envisages that “[i]f the protected party is a public servant or
member of the armed forces” their work activities should be temporarily suspended
“without prejudice to their salary or benefits.”6
Medical and psycho-social support
Medical and psycho-social support for defenders who have been attacked is a very
important part of the protection process. An initial assessment should be carried out to
detect cases where specialised support is required, which may be offered by the protection
programme (for example, the Brazilian programme and the Guatemalan non-governmental
programmes UDEFEGUA7 employ psychologists in their teams), or might be contracted
from another institution as necessary.
Public statements in favour of defenders by government and state bodies
When defenders are the victims of public attacks in the communications media, whether
these come from pressure groups, public servants or other sources, it is important that
government and state bodies pronounce in their favour, denouncing the attacks. There
have been numerous examples of of such situations. Public statements may be public
declarations, but can also take the form of Presidential decrees, circular letters to the
security forces, administrative guidelines, parliamentary resolutions, etc.
Similarly, state organs charged with overseeing the conduct of state employees, such as the
Solicitor General’s office or, in their absence, the prosecuting authorities, can initiate
disciplinary procedures against the officials on the grounds whose statements, actions or
omissions promote or permit acts of aggression against defenders.
The protective response of national or international networks
An important component of any protection response is the development of national-level
or international networks. The proposal for the Guatemalan programme specifically
incorporates this point8 and suggests seeking the support of networks and creating
directories of governmental and non-governmental contacts, etc. In any case, the creation
of networks is an effective strategy employed by defenders’ organisations.
Public and sectoral campaigns: human rights education
Public campaigns on the role of defenders are important. There have been very interesting
experiences developed by defenders’ organisations, such as the “International Campaign
for the the Right to Defend Human Rights” in Colombia, or the campaigns organised by
UDEFEGUA in Guatemala, though little is known about their impact. Similarly, information
is scarce concerning the impact of education campaigns aimed at the security forces.
5 See the Guatemalan proposal in the annexes (point 4).

6 Article 10 (see text in annexes).
7 The non-governmental organisation Unidad de Defensores y Defensoras de Guatemala (Guatemalan
Defenders’ Unit).
8 Chapter 4 of the Guatemalan proposal.
122
Intelligence archives relating to defenders

Defenders’ organisations call for the declassification of military and police intelligence
files that contain illegal information on defenders, for access to the information contained
in them and their subsequent closure, as well as an end to espionage by intelligence bodies.
The proposed Guatemalan programme picks up on this point, saying that “the state is
made vulnerable by those who abuse Human Rights and not by those who denounce their
abuse”, and proposing a series of measures on intelligence archives.9
Actions to combat baseless judicialisation and legislation that restricts the
right of defenders to promote human rights
The judicialisation of defenders is a growing phenomenon used to reduce the political
costs that might result from an aggression directed against them, while being at he same
time an effective way to halt their work. At times judicialisation is carried out under the
aegis of ad hoc legislation that restricts the the right of defenders to promote Human
Rights. Judicialisation and repressive legislation are two very important aspects to bear in
mind if due protection is to be offered to defenders.
Managing information concerning aggressions against defenders
Aggressions against defenders follow tendencies and patterns that in turn respond to the
needs and strategies of those who attack them. The documentation and analysis of these
aggressions provides information that is important to the design of more effective policies
and measures aimed at providing protection. Again, in this respect, the non-governmental
programmes are well ahead of those run by governments. The regular reports produced
by UDEFEGUA cast light on the trends that characterise aggressions against defenders,
broken down by geographic location, kind of victim, etc.10 They are unique in the world,
and a good example of what can be achieved if information is dealt with properly.11
9 Chapter 4 of the Guatemalan proposal.

10 See www.udefegua.org
11 In collaboration with its partners (Protection Desks), and inspired by UDEFEGUA, Protection International
is beginnng to establish data bases in various countries.
123
Protection of
Appendices
Appendix 1: Table of supranational protection systems
Instruments Institutional structures Protection mechanisms
• Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of • United Nations High • Individual complaints
Individuals, Groups and Institutions to Promote and Commissioner for • Presentation of complaints on
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Human Rights85 the question of human rights
Fundamental Freedoms81 • Special Rapporteur for defenders to the Rapporteur
• Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to UN defenders86 • On-site visits to countries
Defend Human Rights Fact Sheet no. 2982
• Periodic reports to the UN
• Principles relating to the statute on national institutions.
Paris Principles83
Universal scope
• Guidelines for presenting complaints about violations of
the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders to the
Special Representative84
81 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/declaration.htm
84 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/complaints.htm
85 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx
86 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/index.htm
Appendix 1: Table of supranational protection systems (continued)
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 2412 (XXXVIII-O/08)87 • Organization of • Complaints before

88 American States817 the IACHR819
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 2280 (XXXVII-O/07)
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 2177 (XXXVI-O/06)89 • IACHR Human Rights • Protective Measures of
810 Defenders Unit818 the Protective Measures
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 2067 (XXXV-O/05)
IACHR820
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 2036 (XXXIV-O/04)811
• Cases before the
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 1920 (XXXIII-O/03)812 IACHR821
America
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 1842 (XXXII-O/02)813 • Provisional Measures
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 1818 (XXXI-O/01)814 of the Provisional
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 1711 (XXX-O/00)815 Measures IACHR822
• OAS resolution on defenders. AG/RES. 1671 (XXIX-O/99)816
87 http://www.oas.org/DIL/AGRES_2412.doc 814 h t t p : / / w w w. o a s . o rg / A s s e m bly2 0 0 1 / d o c um e ntsE / D e c l - R e s o l . a p r v / ag -

88 http://www.civil-society.oas.org/General%20Assembly%20Resolutions/Panama/ RES1818XXXI-O-01.htm
AG%20RES%202280%20ENG.doc 815 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres_1711_xxxo00.htm
89 http://www.civil-society.oas.org/General%20Assembly%20Resolutions/Sto%20 816 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga-res99/eres1671.htm
Domingo/Eng/AG%20RES%202177%20english.doc 817 http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp
810 http://www.civil-society.oas.org/General%20Assembly%20Resolutions/Fort%20 818 http://www.cidh.org/defenders/defensores.htm
Lauderdale/Eng/G-RES.%202067-XXXV-O-05%20ENG.doc
819 http://www.cidh.org/DefaultE.htm
811 http://www.summit-americas.org/OAS%20General%20Assembly/XXXIV_GA-
Quito/AGRES_2036_(XXXIV-O-04).doc 820 http://www.cidh.org/medidas.eng.htm
812 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1920.htm 821 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/denuncias_consultas.cfm
813 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga02/agres_1842.htm 822 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/medidas.cfm
• First review of the application of EU guidelines on • Council of Europe and • On-site visits to countries
human rights defenders.823 its Commissioner for • Reports to bodies
• Council Conclusions on EU Guidelines on human rights Human Rights826
defenders824 • European Commissioner on
825 Human Rights: Defenders827
• Declaration of the Council of Europe on defenders
• Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human
Europe
Rights of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE/ODIHR)828
• OSCE: Focal Point for
defenders and national
human rights institutions829
823 http://www.protectionline.org/IMG/pdf/AnnexII_EU_Guidelines_evaluation. 826 http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/default_en.asp

en06.pdf 827 http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/activities/themes/hrd_en.asp
824 htt p : / / w w w.p rote cti o nlin e . org / I MG / pdf / EU _ c o nclu si o n s _ g ui d elin e s _ 828 http://www.osce.org/odihr/
HRD_120606.pdf
829 http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/28244_en.pdf.html
825 http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2008)5&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=ad
d&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackCol
orLogged=FFAC75
Declarations on Defenders: • Special Rapporteur on Human • Presentation of complaints to

830 Rights Defenders in Africa833 the Special Rapporteur on
• Grand Bay Declaration (1999)
Human Rights Defenders of
• Kigali Declaration (2003)831
the African Commission on
• Resolution on the protection of African defenders (2004)832 Human Rights
• Missions to countries
• Reports to the African Union
Africa/African Union
830 http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_grand_bay_en.html
831 http://www.achpr.org/english/declarations/declaration_kigali_en.html
832 http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/hrd_res_appoin_3.html
833 http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/index_hrd_en.html
Appendix 2: National protection systems in the Americas
Legislation and Non-governmental
State and institutional
Declarations, legislation and policies on defenders policies on witnesses frameworks for
frameworks
and victims defenders
Country
• There is no legislation for protecting defenders • Law No. 27378, • Witness protection • Risk Assessment
• On 22 February 2007 the Minister of Justice made which establishes programme Committee of the
an official request to the President of the privileges for National Human
Commission on Justice and Human Rights of the effective Rights Commission
Congress of the Republic to include within Bill collaboration in the
No. 175/2006, on “Procedures Relating to the sphere of organised
Granting of Privileges for Effective Collaboration crime83
and on the System of Protection for Collaborators, • Bill No. 175/200684
Peru
Injured Parties, Witnesses and Experts”, specific
measures to offer protection to human rights
defenders. However nothing has been
implemented to date 81
• Report of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman’s
Report No. 112), which recommended including
defenders in Bill No. 175/200682
81 http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/nuevos/2005/septiembre/29/defensorial97_recomendaciones.pdf
82 http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/descarga.php?pb=917
83 http://190.41.250.173/rij/ - see “el caso peruano” within “anticorrupción” section.
84 http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/nuevos/2005/septiembre/29/defensorial97_recomendaciones.pdf
Appendix 2: National protection systems in the Americas (continued)
Legislation and State and Non-governmental
Declarations, legislation and policies on defenders policies on witnesses institutional frameworks for
and victims frameworks defenders
Country
• Law No. 418 of 1997, under which instruments for seeking • Public • General • Non-
coexistence and effectiveness of justice are set out and other Prosecutor’s Protection Governmental
provisions issued, and which orders the Ministry of the Interior Witness Programme of Protection
to put into operation a programme of protection for people who Protection the Human Programme for
find themselves in a situation of risk against their lives, physical Programme89 Rights Defenders of
well-being, safety or freedom, for reasons related to political or Department of Human Rights
ideological violence or to internal armed conflict 85 the Colombian in Colombia.
• Mindefensa Directive 09 of 2003. Policies of the National Interior and (PNGPDDH):
Ministry of Defence relating to the protection of the human Justice “Somos
rights of Trades Unionists and Human Rights Defenders 86 Ministry810 Defensores”
• Decree No. 2788 of 2003, under which the Regulations and Risk (We are
Assessment Committee of the Protection Programme of the Defenders) 811
Colombia
Human Rights Department of the Interior and Justice Ministry
are unified and regulated 87
• Decree No. 2816 of 2006, “under which the Human Rights Protection
Programme of the Department of the Interior and Justice Ministry is
drawn up and finalised and other provisions are adopted” 88
• Resolution No. 2138 of the Interior and Justice Ministry, under
which the manual of definitions, uses and procedures of the
Human Rights Protection Programme measures is adopted.
85 http://www.disaster-info.net/desplazados/legislacion/LEY418de1997.pdf 89 http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/PAG/general/Sistemapenal/Proteccion.htm
86 http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/comunicados/2003/cp0318.pdf 810 http://www.mij.gov.co/eContent/newsdetailmore.asp?id=1467&idcompany=2&id
87 http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/decretoslinea/2003/octubre/ 02/ menucategory=142
dec2788021003.pdf 811 http://www.somosdefensores.org/
88 http://www.presidencia.gov.co/ prensa_ new/ decretoslinea/ 2006/ agosto/ 22/
dec2816220806.pdf
Declarations, legislation and policies
policies on witnesses State and institutional structures structures for
on defenders
Country
• Commitment No. 7 of the Global Commitment • Law for the • Coordinating Unit for the • Human Rights
on Human Rights (AGDH) signed on 29 March Protection of Protection of Human Rights Defenders
1994 by the Government of Guatemala and the Parties to Legal Defenders, Officers of the Law, Protection Unit
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit Proceedings and Journalists and Media (UDEFEGUA)816
(URNG)812 People Linked to Personnel of the Presidential
• Internal Agreement No. 11-2004 of the Presidential the Penal Justice Commission on Human Rights
Commission on Human Rights for Guatemala Administration814 of Guatemala (COPREDEH) 815
(COPREDEH) created the Coordinating Unit for • Public Prosecutor’s Office for
the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, crimes against human rights
Officers of the Law and Media Personnel activists, officers of the law,
• Public Policy Project of Prevention and trades unionists and journalists
Protection for Human Rights Defenders and divided into three public
Other Vulnerable Groups prosecution agencies each
Guatemala
one comprising three public
• Proposal for a Manual on Prevention and
prosecutors
Protection for Human Rights Defenders and
Other Vulnerable Groups • Authority for the Analysis of
Attacks against Human Rights
• Proposal for a list of Measures for the
Defenders in Guatemala,
Prevention and Protection for Human Rights
assigned to the First Deputy
Defenders and Other Vulnerable Groups
Ministry of the Ministry of the
• Ministerial Agreement No. 103-2008. Interior
Guatemala, 10 January 2008813
812 ht t p : / / w w w. c o ng re s o.go b.g t / D o c s / PA Z / AC U E R D O %20 GL OBA L%20 815 http :// www.minex.gob.gt/ index.php?Itemid = 39 & id =1225 & option = com_
SOBRE%20DERECHOS%20HUMANOS.pdf content&task=view
813 http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/acuerdos/2008/gtamx103-2008.pdf 816 http://www.udefegua.org/
814 http://www.congreso.gob.gt/gt/mostrar_ley.asp?id=868
State and institutional
Declarations, legislation and policies on defenders policies on witnesses structures for
structures
Country
• Decree No. 6.044, of 12 February 2007 approving the • National • Participation of
National Policy for the Protection of Human Rights Programme for the defenders’
Defenders - PNPDDH, defining the time limit for Protection of organisations in
the development of the National Plan for the Human Rights this national
Protection of Human Rights Defenders and other Defenders 818 programme
Brazil
provisions817
• Bill for the protection of defenders (under
discussion in 2009; see appendices to this volume)
817 http://legislacao.planalto.gov.br/legisla/legislacao.nsf/Viw_Identificacao/DEC%20
6.044-2007?OpenDocument
818 http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/sedh/protecao/defensores/
Declarations, legislation and policies
policies on witnesses State and institutional structures structures for
on defenders
Country
• Internal Regulations establishing the • Witness • Unit for the Support of Social • “Todos los
Programme for the Support of Human Protection System Organisations, of the secretariat derechos
Rights Defenders, under the Unit for the of the State of the Interior Ministry of Mexico para todos”
Promotion and Defence of Human Rights of Attorney (UAOS)819 (All rights for all)
the Ministry of the Interior General’s Office • Programme on Offences against network
• Agreement of the Board of the Commission (PGR) Journalists and Civil Human
on Human Rights of the Federal District, Rights Defenders of the National
through which various articles of the Commission on Human Rights820
Commission’s Internal Regulations are
Mexico
• Rapporteur for Freedom of
amended and supplemented Speech and Support for Human
Rights Defenders821
• Unit for the Promotion and
Defence of Human Rights
(UPDDH) of the Ministry of the
Interior (SEGOB)822
819 http://www.organizacionessociales.segob.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?nIdHeader=1 821 http://www.cdhdf.org.mx/index.php?id=bol10907

04&nIdPanel=81&nIdFooter=79 822 http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?pagina=upddh
820 http://www.cndh.org.mx/progate/agvperio/presenta.htm
Appendix 3: Example of table of protection measures for defenders
(extract from the Colombian Protection Programme)1
Preventive Measures
• Empowerment • Self-protection and self-security course
• Instruction in Preventive Measures • National police patrols
Individual or Soft Transfer Temporary relocation taking • National air transport

Group Measures the defender and his/her • Help with land transport
Protection family from one area and
Measures • Help with temporary relocation, up to three
resettlement in another which
minimum wages for up to three months
may include:
• Help with removals
Means of • Mobile telephones

communication • Radio telephones, where there is no mobile signal or
coverage
• Antenna or means of satellite communication
Measures in • Armour-plating of doors and windows

offices or • Closed circuit television
homes
• Metal detectors
Means of Secure means of transport, to • Cars or paid use of taxis

transport avoid the use of transport that
increases vulnerability
Armour-plating • Armour-plated cars
• Bullet-proof jackets
Appendix 3: Example of table of protection measures for defenders
(extract from the Colombian Protection Programme)1 (continued)
Individual or Severe Bodyguards Personal protective equipment • Trained bodyguards (with the possibility of them being
Group measures offered by different security forces)
Protection
• Trusted bodyguards where the person who guarantees
Measures
the safety of the defender is chosen by him/her, becomes
part of the DAS, which is always the case when they meet
the technical requirements (driving) and prove to be
trustworthy
1 As we have mentioned in another part of this document, the second volume of this study goes into detailed analysis of these and other operational methods for the
protection of defenders.
Protection of
Annexes
Annex 1: Assesing risk: threats,

vulnerabilities and capacities
There is no widely accepted definition of risk, but we can say that risk refers to possible events, however
uncertain, that result in harm.
In any given situation, everyone working on human rights may face a common level of danger, but not
everyone is equally vulnerable to that general risk just by being in the same place. Vulnerability - the
possibility that a defender or a group will suffer an attack or harm - varies according to several factors, as
we will now see.
An example: There may be a country where the Government poses a general threat against all kinds of human rights
work. This means that all defenders could be at risk. But we also know that some defenders are more at risk than others;
for instance, a large, well established NGO based in the capital will probably not be as vulnerable as a small, local
NGO. We might say that this is common sense, but it can be interesting to analyse why this happens in order to better
understand and address the security problems of defenders.
The level of risk facing a group of defenders increases in accordance with threats that have been received
1
and their vulnerability and capacities to those threats, as presented in this equation:
THREATS X VULNERABILITIES
RISK =
CAPACITIES
Threats
Threats are the possibility that someone will harm somebody else‘s physical or moral integrity or property
2
through purposeful and often violent action. A threat assessment analyses the likelihood of a threat being
put into action.
Defenders can face many different threats in a conflict scenario, including targeting, common crime and
indirect threats.
The most common type of threat – targeting - aims to hinder or change a group’s work, or to influence the
behaviour of the people involved. Targeting is usually closely related to the work done by the defenders in
question, as well as to the interests and needs of the people who are opposed to the defenders’ work.
Incidental threats arise at least from:
• Being in fighting areas in armed conflicts (‘being in the wrong place at the wrong time’).
• Common criminal attacks, especially if defenders’ work brings them to risky areas. Many cases
of targeting are carried out under the cover of ‘ordinary’ criminal incidents.
Targeting (targeted threats) can also be seen in a complementary way: Human rights defenders may come
across direct T (declared) threats, for example by receiving a death threat (see Chapter 1.3, for how to assess
declared threats). There are also cases of indirect threats, when a defender close to your work is threatened
and there are reasons to believe that you might be threatened next.
A summary of kinds of threats:
• Targeting (direct/declared) threats, indirect threats): threats due to your work.
• Threats of common criminal attacks.
• Incidental threats: threats due to fighting in armed conflicts.
1 Adapted from Van Brabant (2000) and REDR.

2 Dworken (1999).
140
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability is the degree to which people are susceptible to loss, damage, suffering and death in the
event of an attack. This varies for each defender or group, and changes with time. Vulnerability is always
relative, because all people and groups are vulnerable to some extent. However, everyone has their own
level and type of vulnerability, depending on their circumstances. Let’s see some examples:
• Vulnerability can be about location: a defender is usually more vulnerable when s/he is out on
during a field visit than when s/he is at a well known office where any attack is likely to be witnessed.
• Vulnerability can include lack of access to a phone, to safe ground transportation or to proper
locks in the doors of a house. But vulnerability is also related to a lack of networks and shared
responses among defenders.
• Vulnerability may also have to do with team work and fear: a defender that receives a threat may
feel fear, and his/her work will be affected by fear. If s/he has no a proper way to deal with fear
(somebody to talk to, a good team of colleagues, etc) chances are that s/he could makes mistakes
or take poor decisions that may lead him/her to more security problems.
(There is a combined check-list of possible vulnerabilities and capacities at the end of this chapter.)
Capacities
Capacities are the strengths and resources a group or defender can access to achieve a reasonable degree
of security. Examples of capacities could be training in security or legal issues, a group working together
as a team, access to a phone and safe transportation, to good networks of defenders, to a proper strategy for
dealing with fear, etc.
In most cases, vulnerabilities and capacities are two sides of the same coin.
For example: Not knowing enough about your work environment work is a vulnerability, while having this knowledge
is a capacity. The same can be said about having or not access to safe transportation or to good networks of defenders.
However, in most cases behaviour is a determining factor
For example: Having a phone can potentially be both a vulnerability and a capacity, depending on how it is going to
be used. If it is used loudly and confidential information is communicated, it is a vulnerability. If it used discretely and
confidential information is coded, it is a capacity.
(There is a combined check-list of possible vulnerabilities and capacities at the end of this chapter).
In summary
In order to reduce risk to acceptable levels -namely, to protect- you must:
• Reduce threats
• Reduce vulnerability factors
• Increase protection capacities
• Targeting
• Crime
• Indirect threats
• Ways of reducing vulnerabilities
• Situational analysis
• Threat assessment
THREATS X VULNERABILITY
RISK =
CAPACITIES
• Enhancing and developing capacities
141
Risk is a dynamic concept that changes with time and with variations in the nature of threats, vulnerabilities
and capacities. This means risk must be assessed periodically, especially if your working environment,
threats or vulnerabilities change. For instance, vulnerabilities can increase if a change of leadership leaves
a group of defenders in a weaker position than before. Risk increases dramatically with a clear and present
threat. In such cases, it is not safe to try to reduce risk by increasing capacities, because that takes time.
Security measures, such as legal training or protective barriers, can reduce risk by reducing vulnerability
factors. However, such measures do not confront the main source of risk, i.e. the threats, nor the will to
carry them out, especially in situations where perpetrators know they are likely to go unpunished. All
major interventions in protection should therefore aim to reduce threats, in addition to reducing
vulnerability and enhancing capacity.
An example: A small group of defenders are working on land property issues in a town. When their work starts
affecting the local landowner’s interests they receive a clear death threat. If you apply the risk equation to their security
situation, you’ll see that the risk these defenders face is very high, above all due to the death threat. If you want to
reduce that risk it is probably not the moment to start changing the locks on the door of their office (because the risk is
not related to a break-in at the office), nor the moment to buy a cell phone for each defender (even if communication
might be important to security it is unlikely to be enough if there is someone coming to kill you). In this case, a more
relevant strategy would be to work on networking and generating political responses to directly confront the threat
(and if that is unlikely to be effective quickly the only way to reduce the risk significantly might be to reduce the
defenders exposure, perhaps by moving away for a while – being able to relocate to a safe place is also a capacity).
Making and implementing such a decision also involves a psychosocial capacity for the defender to see
that withdrawal is not a synonym of cowardice or defeat… Withdrawing can allow reflection and resuming
work once better equipped.
Vulnerabilities and capacities, as well as some threats, may vary according to gender and age. You therefore
need to break down your findings accordingly.
Vulnerabilities and capacities assessment

Designing a vulnerability and capacities assessment for a given group (or person) involves defining the
group itself (a community, collective, NGO, individuals, etc), the physical area where it is located and the
time line (your vulnerability profile will change and evolve over time). Then you can proceed to assess
vulnerabilities and capacities, using the chart 1.3 at the end of this chapter as guidance.
Please note: The vulnerabilities and capacities assessment must be seen as an open-ended activity aimed
at building on existing information to maintain an accurate picture of a constantly evolving situation.
When assessing vulnerabilities and capacities, it is important to first draw the current inventory and only
then, list the potential and desirable ones. Later, you will need to establish a process to achieve the latter.
142
Chart 3:
Information needed to assess a group’s vulnerabilities and capacities.
“Note: Generally speaking, the information in the right column shows vulnerabilities or capacities of each
component”
INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS THE DEFENDERS’

VULNERABILITIES AND
VULNERABILITIES OR CAPACITIES IN RELATION TO
CAPACITIES
THOSE COMPONENTS
Components related to geographical, physical and technical features
The need to be in, or to pass through, dangerous areas to

Exposure carry out normal daily or occasional activities, with
threatening actors in those areas.
The characteristics of housing (offices, homes, shelters);
Physical structures building materials, doors, windows, cupboards. Protective
barriers. Night lights.
Are your offices open to visitors from the general public? Are
Offices and places open
there areas reserved only for personnel? Do you have to deal
to public
with unknown people that come to your place?
Are there any hiding places? How accessible are they
(physical distance) and to whom (for specific individuals or
Hiding places, escape routes
the whole group)? Can you leave the area for a while if
necessary?
How difficult is it for outside visitors (government
officials, NGOs, etc.) to access the area, for example in a
Access to the area
dangerous neighbourhood? How difficult is access for
threatening actors?
Do defenders have access to safe transportation (public
or private)? Do these have particular advantages or
Transport and accommodation
disadvantages? Do defenders have access to safe
accommodation when travelling?
Are telecommunications systems in place (radio, telephone)?
Do defenders have easy access to them? Do they work
Communication
properly at all times? Can they be cut by threatening actors
before an attack?
Components related to conflict
Do defenders have links with conflict parties (relatives, from

Links to conflict parties the same area, same interests) that could be unfairly used
against the defenders?
Do defenders’ work directly affect an actor’s interests? (For
example, when protecting valuable natural resources, the
Defenders’ activities affecting a
right to land, or similar potential targets for powerful actors)
conflict party
Do you work on a specially sensitive issue for powerful
actors? (such as land ownership, for example)
Do defenders have items, goods or information that could be
Transportation of items and valuable to armed groups, and therefore increase the risk of
goods and written information targeting? (Petrol, humanitarian aid, batteries, human rigths
manuals, health manuals, etc.)
Do you have information about the fighting areas that could
Knowledge about fighting
put you at risk? And about safe areas to help your security?
and mined areas
Do you have reliable information about mined areas?
143
Components related to the legal and political system
Can defenders start legal processes to claim their rights?

Access to authorities and
(Access to legal representation, physical presence at trials or
to a legal system to claim
meetings, etc.) Can defenders gain appropiate assistance from
your rights
relevant authorities towards their work and protection needs?
Ability to get results Are defenders legally entitled to claim their rights? Or are
from the legal system they subjects to repressive internal laws? Can they gain
and from authorities enough clout to make authorities take note of their claims?
Are defenders denied legal registration or subjected to long
Registration, capacity
delays? Is their organisation able to keep proper accounts
to keep accounts and
and meet national legal standards? Do you use pirate
legal standars
computer software?
Components related to the management of information
Do defenders have reliable sources of information to base

Sources and accuracy
accusations on? Do defenders publicise information with the
of information
necessary accuracy and method?
Can defenders keep information in a safe and reliable place?
Could it get stolen? Can it be protected from viruses and
Keeping, sending and hackers? Can you send and receive information safely? Can
receiving information defenders differentiate top secret and confidential
information? Do defenders keep information on them even
during non-working time?
Are defenders key witnesses to raise charges against a
Being witnesses or having
powerful actor? Do defenders have relevant and unique
key information
information for a given case or process?
Do the defenders have a clear, sustainable and coherent
explanation of their work and objectives? Is this explanation
Having coherent and acceptable
acceptable, or at least tolerated, by most/all stakeholders
explanation about your work
(specially armed ones)? Are all members of the group able
and aims
to provide this explanation when requested - for example at
a checkpoint -?
Components related to social and organisational features
Is the group structured or organised in any way? Does this

Existence of a
structure provide an acceptable level of cohesiveness to
group structure
the group?
Does the group’s structure reflect particular interests or
represent the whole group (extent of membership)? Are the
main responsibilities carried out and decision-making done
by only one or a few people? Are back-up systems in place for
Ability to make
decision-making and responsibilities? To what degree is
joint decisions
decision-making participatory? Does the group’s structure
allow for: a) joint decision making and implementation, b)
discussing issues together, c) sporadic, ineffective meetings,
d) none of the above?
Are security rules and procedures in place? Is there a broad
Security plans understanding and ownership of security procedures? Do
and procedures people follow the security rules? (For more details, please see
Chapter 1.8)
144
How do defenders manage their time outside of work (family

and free time)? Alcohol and drug use represent great
Security management outside of
vulnerabilities. Relationships can also result in vulnerabilities
work (family and free time)
(as well as strengths) How are families and friends involved
in the defenders’ activities?
Are there proper work contracts for everyone? Is there access
Working conditions
to emergency funds? Insurances?
Do you have proper procedures for recruiting personnel or
collaborators or members? Do you have a specific security
Recruiting people
approach for your occasional volunteers (such as students,
for example) or visitors to your organization?
Is your work done directly with people? Do you know these
Working with people or with
people well? Do you work with an organization as an
interface organizations
interface for your work with people?
Do we assess the risk of victims and witnesses, etc, when we
Taking care of witness or victims are working on specific cases? Do we have specific security
we work with measures when we meet them or when they come to our
office? If they receive threats, how do we react?
Are defenders well socially integrated in the local area? Do
some social groups see defenders’ work as good or harmful?
Neighbourhood and social
Are defenders surrounded by potentially hostile people
surroundings
(neighbours as informers, for example)? Are supportive
neighbours part of the defenders’ alarm system?
Mobilization capacity Are defenders able to mobilize people for public activities?
Components related to psychosocial impact (group/individuals)
Do key individuals, or the group as a whole, feel confident

about their work? Do group/community members clearly
express feelings of unity and joint purpose (in both words
Ability to manage stress
and action)? Are stress levels undermining good
and fear
communications and interpersonal relationships? Do people
have access to external psychological support and/or have
developed internal psychosocial skills?
Deep feelings of pessimism Are feelings of depression and loss of hope being clearly
or persecution expressed (in both words and action)?
Components related to society, culture and religion
Are defenders discriminated (both outside and inside

the organisation) on the basis of gender, ethnicity,
Discrimination religion or different sexual orientation? Is there confusion
between human, social, economic, identity, cultural and
religious rights?
Components related work resources
Do defenders have access to accurate information about their

Ability to understand work working environment, other stakeholders and their interests?
context and risk Are defenders able to process that information and get an
understanding of threats, vulnerabilities and capacities?
Ability to define Can defenders define and, in particular, implement action
action plans plans? Are there previous examples of this?
145
Can the group obtain reliable advice? From the right sources?
Ability to obtain advice from well
Can the group make independent choices about which
informed sources
sources to use?
Do the people or personnel available match the amount
People and amount of work of work needed? Can you plan field visits in teams (at least
two people)?
Do you have enough financial resources for your security?
Financial resources
Can you manage cash in a safe way?
Do you know the languages needed for the work in this area?
Knowledge about languages
Do you know the area properly? (roads, villages, public
and areas
phones, health centres, etc.)
Components related to national and international contacts and media
Do defenders have national and international contacts? To

visiting delegations, embassies, other governments, etc? To
Access to national and international community leaders, religious leaders, other people of
networks influence? Can you issue urgent actions via other groups? Do
you have access to particular organisations or membership
status that enhances your protection capacities?
Do defenders have access to media (national, international)?
Access to media and ability to obtain
To other media (independent media)? Do defenders know
results from them
how to manage media relations properly?
146
A risk scales: Another way to understand risk

A scales provides another way to understand this concept of risk: This is something we migth call ... a
“risk-meter”. If we put two boxes with our threats and vulnerabilities on one of the plates of the scales, and
another box with our capacities on the other plate, we will see how our risk gets increased or reduced:
FIG 1 FIG. 2
Risk Risk Risk Risk
C T V C
T V
The more threats and vulnerabilities we have, the

more risk we face.
FIG. 3 FIG. 4
Risk Risk Risk Risk
T V C
C T V
The more capacities we have, the less risk we face. But ... Look at what happens if we have some big
And for reducing the risk, we can reduce our threats: Never mind we try to increase our
threats and our vulnerabilities, as well as increase capacities at that very moment: The scales will
our capacities. show a high level of risk anyway!
147
Annex 2: Brazil:
Bill for the protection of defenders (2009)
BILL
Protection Programme for Human Rights Defenders (PPHRD)
under the Special Secretariat for Human Rights
of the Presidency of the Republic.1
THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT DECREES:
Chapter I
On the protection program for human rights defenders
ART. 1 This law establishes a Protection Program for Human Rights Defenders (PPHRD) under the Special
Secretariat on Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic. Its objective is the application of measures
to protect persons or entities whose rights are threatened as a result of their activities promoting or
protecting human rights.
ART. 2 Under this law human rights defenders are defined as:
I natural persons who act in isolation or as part of a group, organisation or social movement for the
promotion or defence of human rights;
II legal entities, groups, organisations or social movements which act with the purpose of defending
human rights.
ART. 3 The PPHRD focuses on human rights defenders whose rights have been violated or threatened as
a result of their actions or aims.
§1 The PPHRD protection measures may include or be extended to the spouse, companion,
ascendants, descendants and dependent persons who live with the human rights defender.
§2 The protection measures provided by the PPHRD will be based on the seriousness of the
coercion or threat, as well as the difficulty involved in preventing or curbing them using
conventional public security mechanisms.
ART. 4 Attacks or threats against a human rights defender are defined as any threatening behaviour
intended to prevent the defender continuing his/her personal or institutional activities, and may be aimed
directly or indirectly at that person, his/her relatives, friends or group members in particular by:
I threatening his/her physical, mental, moral or economic well-being and cultural freedom or beliefs;
II adopting discriminatory behaviour of any kind.
§1 Inclusion in the PPHRD, the adoption of safety restrictions and other measures to protect
human rights defenders are subject to their consent.
§2 The protection of the human rights defender under art. 2, paragraph II, may cover all his/her
associates or assets, depending on their relationship to the interests under threat.
§3 Under art. 2, paragraph II, it is not necessary to seek the consent of the legal entity, institution,
group, organisation or social movement for its members to be included in the PPHRD,
provided they meet the requirements of article 11.
ART. 5 The PPHRD is a confidential programme of an exceptional nature and priority will be given to
cooperation between federal bodies, in order to guarantee the defender’s safety and enable him/her to
continue to exercise his/her activities and maintain his/her physical well-being.
§1 The Executive may sign pacts, agreements, modifications or partnerships with states, the
Federal District and non-governmental organisations on how to implement the PPHRD in
order to adopt the measures included in it.
§2 To implement the PPHRD on a local level, the federal entities that are parties to the pact
should set up a local deliberation council and appoint a local executive coordinator.
1 This is not an official translation and should not be used for legal purposes..
148
Chapter II
The bodies of the PPHRD
ART. 6 The highest authority of the PPHRD shall be the National Deliberation Council, chaired by the
National Executive Coordinator.
ART. 7 The National Deliberation Council shall be part of the Special Secretariat for Human Rights of the
Presidency of the Republic, and will:
I discuss the implementation of the National Protection Policy for Defenders of Human Rights, in
accordance with this law or its regulations;
II discuss requests for inclusion in the PPHRD;
III rule on appeals lodged against the decisions of the local deliberation councils;
IV support the implementation of the PPHRD in the states and the Federal District;
V function as a PPHRD appeal body;
VI other functions will be defined in the regulations.
Annex: The National Deliberation Council will have equal representation from the public authorities
and members of civil society organisations that defend human rights, in the manner described by this
regulation.
ART. 8 The National Executive Coordinator shall:
I implement the public policy on protection of human rights defenders, complying with the
requirements of the PPHRD;
II deal with requests for inclusion in the PPHRD and pass them on to the National Deliberation
Council for decision;
III suggest security measures that match the PPHRD’s cases to the deliberation council of the federal
entities;
IV propose the extension or reduction of security measures to the local deliberation council of the
federal entities;
V decide on provisional inclusion in the PPHRD in urgent cases, and on the adoption of security
measures necessary to ensure the protection of human rights defenders;
VI urge the competent authorities to take legal and administrative measures for the protection of
human rights defenders;
VII monitor, with the cooperation of other federal bodies, the implementation of the recommendations,
resolutions and provisional measures of international bodies involved in protecting the work of
human rights defenders, of which Brazil is a member;
VIII create and maintain databases to consolidate statistics on violations of the safety and physical
well-being of human rights defenders;
IX promote, in collaboration with other federal bodies, action and policies at local level for the
protection of the work of human rights defenders;
X propose cooperation with international bodies for the protection of human rights defenders.
§1 The National Executive Coordinator will be supported by multidisciplinary technical
expertise to be defined in this regulation.
§2 Inclusion in the PPHRD under art. 8, paragraph V, shall not imply monthly financial
assistance, and must be ratified by the National Deliberation Council in the first meeting
held after the incident.
ART. 9 The local deliberation councils are responsible for, inter alia:
I discussing requests for inclusion in the PPHRD within their remit;
II defining the security measures to be adopted for each case in the PPHRD. Financial assistance
can only be granted by local deliberation councils;
III deciding on appeals lodged against the decisions of the local executive coordinator;
IV implementing and structuring the PPHRD;
V seeking associations to extend and improve the PPHRD;
VI requesting that the public authorities adopt measures guaranteeing the work of human rights
defenders.
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§1 Appeals against decisions of the local deliberation councils shall be made to the National
Deliberation Council.
§2 The local deliberation council shall define the powers of the local executive coordinator
according to the terms of this law and its applicable regulations.
Chapter III
On Protection Measures and Inclusion in the PPHRD
ART. 10 The PPHRD shall include, inter alia, the following measures for human rights defenders, applied
in isolation or in combination:
I police protection;
II safe and suitable transport to carry out their activities;
III access to private radio frequencies of public security bodies, for the purposes of monitoring and
making requests for help, in addition to the supply of suitable telecommunications equipment;
IV equipment for personal safety and for the security of the premises of the legal entity or group to
which he/she belongs;
V adoption of measures to overcome the causes that led to inclusion in the PPHRD;
VI confidentiality of identity, appearance and personal data;
VII social, medical, psychological and legal support and assistance;
VIII monthly financial help to contribute to individual or family subsistence, if it is impossible for the
human rights defender to hold a normal job or because he/she has no source of income;
IX support to meet civil and administrative obligations which require attendance in person;
X for civil servants or military personnel, temporary suspension of employment without forfeiting
privileges and with a suspension of expiry dates;
XI change of residence or provisional accommodation to a secret location, compatible with protection;
XII transfer to the Protection Programme for Threatened Victims and Witnesses under Law 9.807 of
13 July 1999.
§1 Monthly financial assistance shall be approved for a given period, and the maximum will be
set by the National Deliberation Council at the start of each financial year.
§2 Measures that lead to the interruption of the human rights defender’s work in his/her area
of activity will only be implemented if strictly necessary for his/her security or that of his/
her collaborators.
§3 The police force will provide the necessary collaboration and support to implement the PPHRD.
§4 Measures and provisions related to the PPHRD will be carried out and maintained in secret
by the human rights defenders and the agents involved in carrying them out.
ART. 11. The following are requirements for the inclusion of the human rights defender in the PPHRD:
I application for inclusion;
II proof that the applicant’s activities defend or are carried out with the intention of defending
human rights;
III established relationship between offences or threats and the subject’s work as defender;
IV acceptance of and compliance with its rules.
ART. 12. The application for inclusion in the PPHRD may be made by the human rights defender, any
member of the organisation, beneficiaries of the defender’s action through human rights networks, civil
society organisations, the prosecution service or any other public body that has knowledge of the violation
of human rights or the defender’s vulnerability.
§1 The application must be accompanied by documents or information to prove the person or
the members of the organisation are human rights defenders, with a description of the threat
or offence facing them.
§2 The person concerned may request documents or information proving their involvement in
human rights work and the resulting threats or offences against him/her from any public
authority with the purpose of making an application.
§3 The activities carried out in defence of human rights may be confirmed by documents and
information and, if necessary, by the statutes of the entity that is to be included in the PPHRD.
§4 The offence may be proven via statements, documents or any other form of legally admissible
proof.
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ART. 13. Continued inclusion in the PPHRD shall depend on the persistence of the threat, situation of
vulnerability or effects of the offence.
Annex: The human rights defender may leave the PPHRD:
I through personal choice or a formal decision taken by the majority of the members of the legal
entity, institution, group, organisation or social movement;
II by being forced to do so should they fail to comply with the rules, leading to further risk to the
safety of other protected people or public agents responsible for protection.
Chapter IV
On General Provisions
ART. 14. The local executive coordinator is responsible for taking suitable protection measures, which
should have the consent of the human rights defender.
§1 In the event of the human rights defender disagreeing with any of the protection measures
proposed by the local executive coordinator, the adoption of other methods will depend on
the signing of a statement of responsibilities and will only apply if the risks for the agents
involved in the implementation of this measure do not increase.
§2 In the case of legal entities, groups, organisations or social movements, the implementation
of the protective measures can only be applied to members who give their consent.
§3 The protective measures adopted within the scope of the PPHRD may be extended or
withdrawn by the local executive coordinator according to the varied level of risk to which
the defender is exposed.
ART. 15. The local executive coordinator shall make requests for appropriate protective measures to the
competent authorities.
ART. 16. The Executive Power of the signatories to the agreement to implement the PPHRD shall provide
the necessary training, resources or equipment to guarantee the safety of the public agents responsible for
protecting the human rights defenders at risk.
ART. 17. The PPHRD may adopt measures to improve the training of the human rights defender under its
protection with the intention of enhancing his/her safety.
ART. 18. Generally speaking the protective measures in Art. 10 are intended to:
I facilitate mutual access to the intelligence systems of the different public entities responsible for
public safety in the areas of activity of the human rights defender protected by the PPHRD;
II enhance public safety;
III provide the necessary public services to reduce the risks to human rights defenders;
IV address the structural causes underlying the offences against the human rights defender, through
comprehensive and coordinated action with the appropriate bodies and entities, including other
federal entities.
Annex: Priority shall be given to the administrative and legal processes governing the assessment of
the offences and the responsibility of the perpetrators, especially criminal investigations and trials in
which the defender is involved as a victim or threatened witness, whether he/she is included in the
PPHRD or the programme under Law 9.807 of 1999.
ART. 19. The Special Secretariat for human rights may set up a national inter-sectoral commission for the
coordination of public bodies and federal entities with powers related to policies for human rights
protection programmes.
ART. 20. The resources required for the implementation of the PPHRD shall come from the budget of the
Special Secretariat for Human Rights.
ART. 21. The Union, the States and the Federal District, according to their respective powers, shall adopt
measures to protect the work of legal entities and members of groups, organisations or social movements
who find themselves in situations of risk or vulnerability as a result of their work promoting human rights.
ART. 22. This Law shall become definitive within ninety days of its publication.
ART. 23. This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication.
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Brasilia,
MJ MPOG SEDH 00191 2008 PROTECION PROGRAMME FOR

THREATENED HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS
Brasilia, 30 October 2008
Most Excellent President of the Republic,
We submit the attached Bill “establishing the Programme for the protection of human rights defenders
under threat – PPHRD– under the Special Secretariat for Human Rights of the Presidency” for the
consideration of Your Excellency.
The issue emerged from discussions and debates held by members of the Working Group set up by
Decrees nos. 66 and 89, both in 2003, tabled by the Special Secretariat for Human Rights, with the aim of
presenting proposals for policies, actions and measures intended to guarantee the protection of human
rights defenders.
The Working Group, coordinated by the Special Secretariat for Human Rights of the President of the
Republic, was made up of representatives of the National Public Security Secretariat, the Federal Police,
the Federal Traffic Police, the National Attorney Generals’ Council, the National Council of Police and Fire
Service Commanders, the Military, the National Association of Police Officers, the Federal Prosecution
Office, the Parliament, the Magistrates’ Association of Brazil, UNICEF, the Brazilian Bar and the NGOs
‘Tierra de Derechos’, ‘Movimiento Nacional de Derechos Humanos’ and ‘Centro de Justicia Global’.
International legislation was taken into account – particularly Resolution 53/144 of the UN General
Assembly of 1998 – and the format of the Special Representations, both of the UN and Inter-American
organisations at the heart of Resolution 1842 of the OAS. The result of this Working Group was that in
October 2004 the Brazilian government, after making considerable progress with civil society
organisations, officially implemented the National Programme for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders to be carried out within the remit of the Special Secretariat for Human Rights.
This programme supports the preparation of Bills n°. 2980 (2004) - which establishes the National
Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and other matters, the work of MP Eduardo
Valverde - n°. 3616 (2004) - which inserts a chapter in the Law governing the Programme on the Rights of
Victims and Witnesses Under Threat - law n°. 9807/99 and other measures proposed by MP Iriny. Bill
n°. 3616 (2004) was annexed to section 2980 (2004), and these are currently being examined by the
parliamentary Constitution and Justice Commission , according to a report by MP Nelson Pellegrino,
appointed on June 17th 2004.
We can assure you that the preparation of the parliamentary initiatives is intended to satisfy social
demands for the formal establishment of a programme that protects the physical well-being, freedom
and dignity of human rights defenders. It is obviously an initiative that we consider worthwhile.
Given that the proposals made by the MPs deal with issues that have their origin in a private initiative
taken by the head of the executive, they suffer from what is known as ‘inherent defects’. Consider this:
article 1 of Bill 2980 (2004) sets out to create a National Programme for the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders within the remit of the Special Secretariat for Human Rights, and article 5 of Bill 3616 (2004)
assigns new functions to the Federal Police and the Federal Traffic Police.
These provisions therefore suffer from the defect of not being not constitutional, in accordance with the
terms of article 2 of the Federal Constitution, under which the powers of the Union are independent of
each other yet act in harmony, and article 84, VI, also from the Political Charter, which gives the President
of the Republic the power to determine, through a decree, the organisation and functioning of the
Federal Administration when this does not increase costs and neither creates nor eliminates institutions,
in the event of the initiative having its origins in ordinary law.
Progress was made in 2007 in the construction of the programme’s legal framework through wide-ranging
debates in society, as a direct result of the vulnerability and threats suffered by our human rights defenders
and social demands for the institutionalisation of guarantees for and protection of these citizens.
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This process led to the creation of a National Policy for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders through
Presidential Decree No. 6044/2007, which recognised the work of the defenders and highlighted the general
principles of respect for human dignity, non-discrimination for reasons of gender, sexual orientation, ethnic
or social origin, disability, nationality, occupation, race, religion, age, migratory status or any other status. It
also recognised the promotion and guarantee of citizenship and human rights, respect for international
treaties, human rights conventions and legislation and the universal dimension of human rights.
The PPHRD sets out to provide protection and assistance to individuals or groups, organisations or social
movements for the promotion and protection of human rights and who are in a situation of risk or
vulnerability as a result of their activities.
As a basic premise to understanding this policy, it is important to underline that all the efforts of the
protection network for defenders are based on guaranteeing their physical well-being as agents that
promote and protect human rights and denounce atrocities, eliminating delays in dealing with social
issues, and impunity.
The PPHRD works along three lines: prevention, which basically consists of designing policies that deal
with the causes of violations of the rights of human rights defenders and denouncing them, investigation
of the threats and violations of human rights and the combination of public and federal policies to deal
with the causes of these violations. There is therefore an urgent need for a law that establishes rules for
organising and maintaining the protection of human rights defenders, establishing a programme and
obtaining a commitment from the stakeholders involved.
At national level, the PPHRD has three state-level Coordinators and a General Coordination Institution
committed to guaranteeing and protecting 45 (forty-five) defenders who are either under threat or in a
vulnerable situation.
Sadly, we recall human rights defenders whose struggle was cut short, and whose deaths publicly
highlighted the urgent need to find solutions for the social and economic problems that people
experience in situations of vulnerability.
A symbol of the struggle for human rights was Dorothy Stang, a missionary from the Congregation of
Notre Dame and a recognised defender of environmental causes and landless peasant farmers against
timber merchants and stockbreeders. In 2004 she received the title of “Citizen of Pará” from the
Legislative Assembly of the State of Pará and the “José Carlos Castro” Prize, awarded by the Brazilian
Bar. Irma Dorothy, who had worked in Pará since 1966, died at the age of 73 in 2005, shot six times in an
ambush when she was walking along a path together with two peasant workers.
Mr. President, there cannot be any democracy if the state and society do not guarantee, for all citizens,
respect for the right to be safe. In addition to complying with international legislation on the protection of
human rights, it is essential for the consolidation of our young Brazilian democracy to have a public
policy that guarantees the dignity of the defenders of the rights of us all. The defenders of human rights
play a vital role in the consolidation of the Rule of Law, supported by the separation of powers, the
supremacy of the constitution and the guarantee of basic human rights.
Members of human rights organisations, lawyers, journalists, rural and indigenous leaders who protect
victims and other people who work in the defence and promotion of human rights often become victims
themselves. Recognising that many find themselves in a precarious situation in their work is essential for
the protection of their struggle. Rights that are recognised and guaranteed for all citizens, such as
freedom of speech, of conscience and religion, the right to demonstrate and hold peaceful assembly, or
the right to property, physical well-being and safety are precious to human rights defenders. By
defending our dignity, we refuse to be humiliated and excluded.
Mr. President, these are the reasons why we are presenting the attached Bill to Your Excellency for your
consideration,
Yours respectfully,
Tarso Fernando Herz Genro, Paulo Bernardo Silva, Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi
153
Annex 3: Brazil: Procedural manual

for programmes for the protection of
human rights defenders (extract)1
2. Programe objectives and aims
The objective of the National Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (NPPHRD), is to
offer protection and support to individuals and legal entities, groups, institutions, organisations or social
movements that promote, protect and defend Human Rights and which, as a consequence of their actions
and activities face risks or are vulnerable as defined in the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, approved by the UN General Assembly of the United Nations (UN),
Resolution 53/144, of the 9th December 1998.
Violations encompass all conduct that attacks the personal or institutional activities of Human Rights
Defenders (HRDs) or of the organisation or movements where they work or are active, including attacks
perpetrated, albeit indirectly, against family members or close associates. Such attacks include but are not
restricted to the following criminal acts : murder or attempted murder, torture, physical aggression,
threats, defamation, illegal or arbitrary imprisonment, false accusations, attacks or reprisals, and attacks
or reprisals motivated for reasons of politics, religion, economic status, culture, origin, ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation, colour or race, age or other forms of discrimination, or any attempt to undermine,
disqualify or criminalise their activities that may negatively affect their physical, psychiatric or moral
integrity, their honour, or their property.
3. Programme principles and guidelines
The NPPHRD was created in 1997 by Decree 6,044/07. Its fundamental principles are:
• Respect for the dignity of the all human beings;
• Non-discrimination for reasons of gender, sexual orientation, ethnic or social origin, mental
ability, origin, nationality, professional activity, race, religion, age, immigration or other status;
• Protection and support for HRDs, irrespective of their nationality or whether they are involved
in legal proceedings;
• Promotion and guarantees of citizenship rights and Human Rights;
• The universality, indivisibility and interdependence of Human Rights;
• The cross-cutting nature of gender, sexual orientation, mental disability, ethnic origin, religion,
nationality, professional activity, race and age in the design and implementation of public policy.
Based on these principles, the NPPHRD will adhere to the following general and specific guidelines.
General Guidelines
• Strengthen the Federal Pact by ensuring joint and coordinated actions by all spheres of
government for the protection of HRDs and to combat the causes that result in situations of risk
and/or vulnerability;
• Encourage bilateral or multilateral international cooperation;
• Collaborate with national and international Non-Governmental Organisations;
• Construct networks involving all spheres of government and civil society organisations;
• Confirm the condition of individuals as HRDs and guarantee of corresponding levels of
protection and attention;
1 Special Human Rights Secretariat, March 2009, Brasilia, www.direitoshumanos.gov.br
154
• Encourage and carry out research and diagnostics that take into account regional diversity,
guaranteeing the organisation and exchange of information;
• Encourage the training of protection professionals both for the verification of the status of HRDs
and assuring they receive the attention offered them;
• Harmonise legislation and administrative procedures concerning HRDs at Federal, Provincial
and Municipal levels;
• Encourage civil society participation;
• Encourage the participation of trade unions and professional associations; and
• Guarantee full and sufficient access to information and the establishment of channels for dialogue
between the state, society and the media.
Specific Guidelines
Specific Guidelines for the protection of HRDs:
• Implement integral preventive measures across all sectors of society as a part of public policy in
areas, including but not exclusive to, health, education, labour, security, justice, social security,
communications and culture;
• Support to establish social, educational and public information campaigns internationally,
nationally, regionally and locally with a specific focus on the image and actions of HRDs;
• Monitor and evaluate campaigns, with the full participation of civil society;
• Provide support to social action and strengthen civil society; and
• Strengthen existing projects and encourage initiatives to establish new projects.
Specific Guidelines covering the pursuit of those responsible for threats or acts of intimidation against HRDs:
• Cooperation between state security bodies;
• National-level cooperation in the legal sphere;
• Confidentiality in legal procedures; and
• Integrated action to identify and punish those responsible for related crimes.
Specific Guidelines covering attention for vulnerable HRDs and those at risk:
• Protection of life and limb;
• Social, medical, psychiatric and material support;
• Initiatives aimed at overcoming the causes of situations of risk or vulnerability;
• Protection of privacy, images and personal information;
• Support to fulfil civil and administrative obligations of HRDs associated with court appearances;
• Temporary suspension of activities; and
• Exceptionally, relocation or provisional shelter in a secret location as required for the protection
of HRDs.
4. Programme strategies
To fulfil its objectives the NPPHRD should develop a range of strategies designed to guarantee ample
coordination between the state and civil society in order to increase the levels of recognition afforded
HRDs and improve the protection available. Non-exhaustive guidance is provided below to help develop
strategies to guarantee the public recognition of HRDs:
• Public declarations and notices signed by high ranking figures including the President of the
Republic, high visibility figures, artists and personalities stating that the work of HRDs is vital to
the democratic process, highly valued and has their support;
• Distribution of information by the mass media concerning violations committed against HRDs,
including when the media themselves have been responsible for the violations;
• Education, awareness-raising and training on Human Rights and the role of HRDs for the police,
prosecuting authorities and courts;
• Publicity campaigns aimed at the general public in support of Human Rights and HRDs;
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• Revision of the legislation covering abuse of authority and the crime of issuing threats (Art. 147,
of the Penal Code);
• Incorporation of the NPPHRD into other programmes run by the Special Secretariat for Human
Rights, in particular the National Human Rights Education Programme (PNEDH);
• In situ actions and emergency measures in concrete cases where the rights of HRDs are violated.
In order to guarantee high quality analysis of the risks and vulnerability of HRDs:
• Guidance for the Civilian Police on the registration of threats and other related crimes, the
adoption of appropriate measures for their legal investigation and their immediate communication
to the prosecuting authorities;
• Provision of information to the HRDs who have suffered violations and to the entity representing
the case on the results of investigations;
• Guarantee that the prosecuting authorities investigate cases without prejudice to any other
investigations that may be undertaken by other competent authorities;
• In cases involving the violation of the rights of HRDs or threats against them, act rapidly to
prioritise an institutional response, communicating the actions taken to the Provincial
Programme Coordinating Committee or, in cases where there is no Provincial Programme
Coordinating Committee , the General Programme Coordinating Committee;
• Organise Specialised Hubs in the Provincial Civilian Police Forces, the Federal District Police and
the Federal Police, in order to expedite their actions in situations of risk and/or vulnerability of
HRDs and witnesses;
• Create mechanisms and criteria governing administrative and legal actions for the monitoring
of each case;
• Strengthen spaces to guarantee dialogue between civil society organisations and governments in
order to identify and resolve problems (especially in the case of the Councils established to treat
questions related to Human Rights);
• Implement the measures specified in the PNEDH in order to contribute to the construction of a
new Human Rights culture;
• Cooperate with international human rights protection organisations and adopt the resolutions and
precautionary and provisional measures ordered by the Inter-American Human Rights System;
• Establish links between the NPPHRD and a range of other public policies in order to establish the
best possible conditions for countering situations of risk and/or vulnerability generated by
situations of conflict;
• Propose the repeal or alteration laws that criminalise strategies designed to defend Human
Rights, because historically these have been used against HRDs;
• Guarantee viable conditions for the protection of public servants responsible for the protection of
HRDs in line with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials responsible for compliance with the law.
5. Indicative guidance on segurity
This section highlights a set of guidance intended to guarantee greater effectiveness in the implementation
of the strategies presented above and the procedures that appear in the next section. The guidance focuses
on basic security measures designed to protect the communication, information, documentation and
materials necessary for the protection of HRDs.
First, it is important to clarify the use of certain concepts in order to avoid confusion. In the Programme,
RISK refers to the possibility that a situation might occur that may damage or compromise the normal
development of activities intrinsic to the work of HRDs, including murder, whether it follows threats or
was unannounced. The NPPHRD should also provide training and workshops on Risk Management, in an
attempt to increase the timeliness and operational capacity of information systems and enable the mission
of protection to be fulfilled with the lowest number of “losses” possible.
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Classification of risks
1. Circumstantial Risk: conditions to which all human beings may be exposed for natural or
external reasons and which may only partially be resolved by preventive systems (possible
earthquakes, fire, floods, etc).
2. Personal Risk: individual conditions that the individual creates and whose consequences they
accept as a result of their responsible conduct (informing about illegal activities or Human Rights
violations, acting as a witness in criminal investigations) and/or caused by their irresponsibility
(debts, vices, etc). These risks should be controlled through the application of protection and
security measures.
3. Work-related Risk (consciously assumed): conditions assumed by an individual as a result
of their work-related activities, decisions they take, their decision-making role in relation to
complex situations and the management of complex information or the results they may generate.
These risks should be controlled by self-protection and prevention measures taken by the
institution or employer.
4. Extended Risk: are risks acquired by other people (family members, friends)
5. Situational Risk: all indirect circumstances in urban or rural zones.
Types of risk:
• The risk should be specific and individual, affecting an individual HRD; it should not, therefore,
be a generalised risk;
• It should be concrete, caused by concrete, manifest events and not based on abstract supposition;
• It should be current, that is, not past nor future;
• It should be relevant, that is, it should threaten property or legal interests that are valuable to
the individual;
• It should be a serious risk, likely to occur given the circumstances of the case as a result of which
it cannot be characterised as improbable;
• It should be clear and perceptible, and not a possible or ill-defined risk;
• It should be exceptional, and, finally
• It should be disproportionate when compared to the benefits derived by the person from the
situation that generates the risk.
Threat:
Is the manifestation of the desire to cause some form of damage to the HRD; the threat may be transmitted
in a variety of ways: written, verbal (face to face, by telephone or by other means), electronic, or by any
other medium.
Kinds of threat:
1. Clear and ambiguous.
2. Frank and aggressive.
3. Specific and general.
4. Simple and repeated.
5. Unconditional and conditional.
6. Proximate and remote.
7. Premeditated and impulsive.
Observations on communications and IT

• No form of communication is entirely secure; careful control should be exercised in all cases;
• Request the telephone company to carry out periodic inspections in order to protect telephone
communications;
• Install call identification equipment;
• Protected individuals should be given a 24 hour emergency mobile telephone number they can call
in emergency situations and the landline number of the office, made exclusively available for HRDs;
157
• In no circumstances should protected individuals be given access to the personal numbers of

members of the Protection Team;
• Protected individuals should be made aware of the kind of support it has been agreed they may
receive in an emergency situation;
• Avoid planning activities by telephone. When this cannot be avoided, use public or mobile
telephones and voice distortion apparatuses. It is always more secure to speak in coded language;
• The least risky way to send messages is by fax;
• To guarantee maximum security, e-mail messages should be sent in attached archives and
encryption software should be used. Confidential information should not be sent by e-mail;
• Microchips containing statistical and confidential information should not be connected to
the internet;
• The personal telephones of team members should be ex-directory;
• In order to guarantee security in communications it is important to create a culture of secure
communication; this is an educational process that should include the entire Protection Team,
beneficiaries and volunteers.
Guidance on documentation and materials

• Security Classification (reserved, confidential, secret, top secret);
• Document Security: pay attention to the quality control, protection, reproduction and destruction
of documents. Respect the following principles:
a. Discretionary Principle
b. S
ecurity Principle
c. Always seek a balance between the discretionary and security principles
• Exercise care in the distribution and reception of important documents and relevant legislation;
• At the end of each day collect, shred and burn papers, drafts, notes and copies of all papers with
confidential contents;
• Before leaving the office, remove all confidential documents form work surfaces, storing them in
their respective locked filing cabinets;
• Access to confidential documents depends on the function and not the seniority, social position
or professional status of staff members;
• Each individual with knowledge of the contents of confidential documents is automatically
legally responsible for their confidentiality.
158
6. Structure of the programme
In its structure the Programme should guarantee the coordination of the actions of the State, the Union and
Federal Units, guaranteeing participation and oversight by civil society. At federal level a National Inter-
Sectoral Coordinating Committee should be established to guarantee communication and coordination
between the Human Rights Secretariat (HRS), the Presidency (represented with decision-making powers
by the National Deliberative Council of HRDs) and Federal executive bodies.
HRS
National National
Inter-Sectoral Deliberative
Coordinating Council for
Commission HRDs
General Coordinating Committee
Coordinating Committees of Federal Units
159
The General Coordinating Committee and the Provincial and District Coordinating Committees
should have inter-disciplinary teams. Membership of the National Deliberative Council for HRDs,
established within the HRS, will ensure the participation of state employees and civil society on equal
terms. It will have the following responsibilities:
I. Decide on the implementation of the NPPHRD according to the parameters established by the
law and in its regulatory framework;
II. Discuss requests for inclusion in the NPPHRD;
III. Determine the resources to be assigned, taking into account the decisions of the Provincial
Deliberative Councils;
IV. Support and implement the NPPHRD in participating states;
V. Assume final responsibility and coordination of the NPPHRD at national level;
VI. Assume other responsibilities assigned as a result of the regulation of the law.
The General Coordinating Committee of the NPPHRD has the following main responsibilities:
I. Execute the state HRD protection policy according to the requirements established by
the NPPHRD;
II. Process requests for inclusion in the programme, presenting cases for decision by the Deliberating
Council;
III. Suggest a range of appropriate security measures to the Deliberating Council;
IV. Propose increases or reductions in security measures to the Local Deliberating Council;
V. Decide on provisional incorporation in the programme and the adoption of measures appropriate
to the protection of HRDs in emergency situations;
VI. Decide, in conjunction with the body responsible for public advocacy in the associated entity
where it is based, on the reach of the judicial measures designed to protect HRDs;
VII. In conjunction with the Federal Units, monitor the implementation of the recommendations,
resolutions, and provisional measures of the international bodies of which Brazil is a member;
VIII. Create and maintain data bases and consolidate statistics concerning HRDs and the violations
committed against them;
IX. Jointly with the Federal Units, establish local policies and actions for the protection of HRDs; and
X. Suggest cooperation with international Human Rights protection organisations.
The members of the National Inter-Sectoral Commission will be drawn from public bodies pertaining to
the Federal Executive Branch; it will have responsibility for guaranteeing cross-cutting activities for the
protection of Human Rights and HRDs.
It will encourage the creation of Joint Councils and executive coordination procedures in the States that
have signed agreements with the Union; these should have the same responsibilities as their national level
counterparts. It is furthermore recommended that Special Risk Evaluation Commissions should be
established in the Federal Units that will analyse the degree of risk and adopt emergency measures in
consultation with the Coordinating Committee, with the aim of guaranteeing efficient responses to the
requests for protection received.
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7. Procedures
The Programme activities will be implemented through a set of procedures that have been designed taking
into account the guidelines set out in this manual and the following flow chart.
}
Communications
Initial contact Urgent measure
Interview
Proposal
Analysis and decision
Rejection by
Approval
the HRD
Definition of
appropriate level
Protection request
Inclusion Implementation
Withdrawal from
Monitoring
the programme
At every stage, information will be gathered and recorded electronically; this will constitute the
Programme’s living archive but will also be the principal management tool. All staff involved in the
provincial and general coordination structures of the Programme should therefore commit to maintaining
the standard data base, which will be jointly administered with the beneficiaries.
The operational description of the procedures is detailed below, in adherence to the flow chart and the
specimen forms reproduced in the Annex.
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Communications
• Communications will be prepared by the threatened individuals or by their representatives, who
may include NGOs, the prosecuting authorities or others (eg the media, the Church, international
2
organisations, trade unions, Disk-Denúncia, human rights audits, etc.);
• Communications should be sent to the Programme Coordinating Committees;
• All communications are to be registered in the appropriate data base, which will be developed by
the General Coordinating Committee and maintained by the Provincial Coordinating Committees;
• Threatened individuals should communicate immediately with the institutions to which they
belong, such as trade unions, the Church, etc.
Initial contact
• Initial contact will be established in person by the applicant; alternatively, the Programme’s
Technical Team will travel to the place where the threatened person is located;
• Confidentiality is guaranteed for all the information imparted during this first approach unless
express authorisation is provided by the application for information to be shared;
• Once applicants have expressed their willingness to meet with the technical team they will be
provided with information about the Programme;
• Following the initial contact the coordinator and the technical team will analyse the threat,
conducting an exploratory examination of the situation, its implications and interconnections , and
identifying the body which will serve as the reference point in the locality where the HRD is based;
• Subsequently, according to need, other people or institutions may be involved in order to optimise
attention;
• Key information should be recorded in an Initial Contact Report and in written statements signed
by the applicants; these statements will be used to organise the interview. (See specimen
interview form in the Annex).
Emergency Measures
• It may be necessary at any given moment, pending the adoption of the other measures agreed as
part of the process described here, to adopt emergency protection measures for the threatened
HRDs in order to guarantee their physical safety.
Interview
• It is a principle of the programme that confidentiality is guaranteed for all the information
imparted, unless express authorisation is provided by the application for it to be shared;
• Interviews are to be conducted by the technical team; the threatened HRDs may nominate
a person to accompany them in the interview in order to guarantee the confidence of all
participants in the process and increasing the likelihood of full and faithful recording and
interpretation of the testimony;
• As a security measure, interviews should never be conducted in the offices of the organisations
where the threatened HRD work;
• The threatened HRD will be attended by more than one member of the technical team, preferably
in the presence of a lawyer;
• Whenever possible, video and audio recording equip ment should be used, always with the
consent of interviewees;
• The agreement should always incorporate the applicant’s statement; if any objection is expressed
great care should be taken at the point when the information is used;
• Relevant information should be recorded in the Interview Report which should be duly signed
by the threatened HRDs. (See specimen interview form in the Annex).
2 Translator’s note: Disk-Denúncia [sic] appears to refer to campaigns intended to support the use of the telephone
to report abuses to state bodies.
162
Proposal
• After the interview a Technical Report should be produced (specimen format attached) to include
the diagnostic, risk evaluation, an expression of the willingness or otherwise of the HRD to be
included in the Programme and, if they are to be incorporated, the measures proposed;
• The threatened individual should be informed of the kinds of protection the Programme is able
to provide including information on the rules, preliminary recommendations, stages, etc. Their
response should be duly recorded in the Technical Report;
• The case will be sent, along with the Technical Report, to be evaluated by the Provincial
Coordinating Committee or, if circumstances dictate, the General Coordinating Committee.
Analysis and decision

• The Coordinating Committee to which the report was sent meets to discuss it and decide whether
or not protection should be offered.
• The following factors should be taken into account during the design of the strategies:
a. Sensitivity: will the strategies provide a rapid response to the security needs of the
individual or group?
b. Adaptability: will the strategies adapt rapidly to the new circumstances once the immediate
danger of attack has receded?
c. S
ustainability: will the strategies have long term usefulness even though the threats or
attacks have not proved lethal?
d. Effectiveness: will the strategies provide adequate protection for the individuals or groups
involved?
e. R
eversibility: if the strategies do not work or the situation changes, is it possible to alter them?
Rejection
• The threatened individual may, within a reasonable timescale determined by the Coordinating
Committee, reject the proposed protection measures. In such cases the Programme is still
required to pass the case on to the relevant state bodies so that they may attempt to guarantee the
protection of the HRD;
• The Programme is at liberty to refuse to include the HRD if it considers that there is no causal
relationship between the threat and the activities of the HRD. In such cases the interested party
may appeal to the Programme’s National Council, in its capacity as superior administrative body;
• The Programme should urge action from the authorities to deal with the factors that led to the
initial request for protection.
Approval
• The most appropriate security measures for the case in hand will be approved by simple majority
in an ordinary or extraordinary meeting of the Provincial Coordinating Committee.
Definition of the appropiate level

When it approves the protection measures for a case the Provincial Coordinating Committee should
choose the kind of protection to be offered from the following list of alternatives without prejudice to
additional measures that may be deemed appropriate:
I. Police protection;
II. Secure and adequate transport so that the HRDs are able to continue their activities;
III. Access to radio frequencies assigned to the security services, to be used for monitoring purposes
and to request support, plus the provision of appropriate telecommunications equipment;
IV. Provision and installation of personal security equipment for the individual and the office of the
legal entity or group where the HRD works;
V. Adoption of measures designed to overcome the causes that that led to the inclusion of the HRD
in the protection programme;
VI. Protection of the identity, image and personal information of the HRD;
163
VII. Social, medical, psychological and legal support and assistance;

VIII. Monthly financial support to ensure individual or family subsistence in cases where the protected
HRD is unable to carry out their habitual activities or in the total absence of income;
IX. Support to comply with civil and administrative requirements that require the personal presence
of the HRD;
X. If the protected party is a public servant or member of the armed forces, temporary suspension
of work activities without prejudice to their salary or benefits;
XI. Change of residence or provisional lodging appropriate to the protection measures decided;
XII. Changes to the Programme for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses set out in Law Noº 9.807,
of 13 July 1999.
a. Monthly financial support will be provided for a fixed period, the amount to be established
by the council at the start of each financial year;
b. M
easures that require the temporary suspension of the HRD’s activities will be adopted only
when strictly necessary for the security of the beneficiary or, in the case of organisations, its
members;
c. The police will offer all necessary cooperation or support necessary for the implementation of
each programme;
d. The measures and precautions related to protection programmes will be adopted,
implemented and maintained so as to ensure the confidentiality of the protected parties and
the agents involved in its execution.
Protection Request
• The written protection terms shall include the authorization of the threatened party, and shall be
deemed to formalise the process by which they enter the programme.
Inclusion
• Inclusion will be formalised through the signing of a protocol or document in which the terms of
the agreement are set out (see attached specimen);
• The Terms of Commitment and Inclusion will establish the obligations of both parties: the
protected HRD and the state.
Implementation
• Refers to the protection itself, according to which all the measures agreed in the Terms of
Inclusion and Commitment are carried out.
Monitoring
• Monitoring is carried out in all the phases of the application of the protection measures; it will
ensure optimum implementation and consolidate the execution of the programme and the
conditions under which the HRD receives protection;
• Monitoring will be carried out through periodic visits to the protected parties in the places where
they carry on their activities, by providing accompaniment in the investigations or legal
procedures in which they are involved, and by publishing periodic reports (see Annex);
• In addition to the regular monitoring of the Programme, periodic evaluations will be carried out
by an external evaluator;
• It is the responsibility of civil society, represented in the Provincial and National Councils, to
systematise and set out the results of the regular evaluations of the effectiveness of the provincial
and national programmes;
• It is possible that during the execution of the protection measures it will be necessary to adopt
other recommendations, including changes in the level of protection, in response to new
information or changes in the situation.
164
Withdrawal from the Programme

• Withdrawal may occur for any of the following reasons:
I. Personal decision, or the formal expression of a decision taken by the majority of the members
of the legal entity, institution, group, organisation or social movement; or
II. Compulsorily, as a result of failure to comply with the norms of the protection programme
such that it implies an additional security risk to other protected parties or the public
servants charged with their protection;
• A report setting out the reasons for the decision for the withdrawal must be prepared for it to be
made effective.
165
Specimen terms of commitment and inclusion agreement
Agreement setting out the Terms of Commitment and Inclusion made between the National Programme
for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (NPPHRD) and in order to
guarantee that the latter may continue their work to promote, protect and guarantee Human Rights and
universally recognised fundamental freedoms.
The State’s national Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
3
(NPPHRD), represented by its Coordinating Committee , CONJ ,
whose office is represented by the NPPHRDs’ Coordinating Committee for Implementation
, bearer of Identification Document Nº
4
, CPF: ,
resident and domiciled in this city, and Mr/Ms , have
decided to sign the current agreement setting out the Terms of Commitment and Inclusion according to the
following clauses and conditions:
1. The aim of the National Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (NPPHRD)
is to protect and support individuals and legal entities, institutions, groups, organisations or
social movements that promote, protect, and defend Human Rights and which, as a result of their
actions and activities in these fields, face risks, or are vulnerable to, or suffer, rights violations.
2. In the case of this agreement, situations of risk, vulnerability, or violation of rights refers to any
conduct intended to attack the personal or institutional activities of HRDs or social organisation
or movement intended to discriminate against, disqualify or criminalise their activities, or attack
their physical, psychological or moral reputation, or their property. It also covers any attack,
albeit indirect, carried out against family members or loved ones, including murder or attempted
murder, torture, physical aggression, threat, intimidation, defamation, illegal or arbitrary
imprisonment, false accusation, attacks or reprisals or acts of discrimination carried out for
political, economic or cultural reasons, or because of origin, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
colour, age or any other reason.
3. In order to provide the protection defined above, after examining the case, the NPPHRDs may
adopt, individually or collectively, the following measures in favour of HRDs, being obliged, also,
to provide “hard protection”, that is, police escort, during the period of risk.
a. Protect life, liberty, physical integrity, property and honour;
b. O
bserve the measures taken by the police and legal authorities carried out to investigate the
crimes and formulate charges;
c. Offer social, medical, psychological and material support;
d. Adopt measures to overcome the causes generated by the situation of risk and vulnerability;
e. Protect identity, image and personal information;
f. Provide support for the fulfilment of civil and administrative obligations demanded of
individuals summonsed by the courts to appear as witnesses;
g. When relevant, guarantee the temporary suspension of activities and functions; and
h. E
xceptionally, change the place of residence or temporary lodging to a secret location
compatible with the protection offered.
4. All HRDs who wish to be included in the NPPHRD should, whenever possible, adopt the self-
protection measures suggested to them, including:
I. Inform the police and/or the prosecuting authorities and other bodies responsible for the
Defence of Human Rights;
II. Exercise care in their daily movements, avoiding routines, altering their physical
appearance and clothing, using well lit streets, avoiding remote and isolated places and
seeking always to be accompanied by others. If you notice that you are being watched or
followed, remain calm, observe the observer, note their characteristics, their height, colour,
age, physical features and the vehicle number plate if possible; request someone to take a
photograph, and inform the authorities immediately;
3 Translator’s note: acronym in the original.

4 Translator’s note: acronym in the original.
166
III. When travelling by bus, alight after or before your destination, observe who gets on,
keeping the windows slightly open, exercise care at bus stops, traffic lights, and observe
vehicles that have been driving close to the bus for a while. When travelling in a private
vehicle, as well as taking these measures, be careful at intersections and in major streets,
with people or vehicles that are close to entrances, or behind walls. Do not offer or accept
rides unless the person is known to you;
IV. Be aware of motorcycles, especially pillion riders when there are two people on the
motorcycle;
V. Whenever possible, avoid public places, parties, crowds, public meetings, bars,
restaurants, places where fireworks are being set off, cubicles in public toilets, avoid
having your back to windows and entrances; do not consume excess alcohol, and always
ask others to help you with your security;
VI. Always maintain your house well-illuminated, with the lawn cut; keeps dogs or geese,
and use electronic alarms or systems designed to alert the presence of strangers and
indicate their whereabouts;
VII. Strengthen the security of the house with padlocks, and prepare a room that is difficult to
access; acquire emergency equipment such as torches, candles, lanterns, bandages,
medicines, etc.;
VIII. Do not allow anyone to enter your residence without showing identification, especially if
they are using company uniforms (postal service, water or electricity suppliers,
prosecutors, police, public health professionals, etc.). If you do allow someone in always
keep them under observation;
IX. Acquire a mobile telephone, radio equipment, internet or other forms of immediate
communication. Record suspicious or threatening phone conversations, noting the
number from which the call was made;
X. Maintain routine contact with the authorities, religious institutions and friends and
establish support network with colleagues;
XI. Change address if the threats are very serious, even temporarily avoiding contact even
with those closest to you; do not stay with family members or loved ones;
XII. Trust your instincts and feelings when it comes to self-protection: many times this can
save lives.
This agreement is binding on the parties indefinitely or for the period that the situation of risk or
vulnerability continues; it may be rescinded at the written request of the HRD and, once reviewed, two
copies will be signed twice, the HRD keeping one copy, the other to be sent, along with the request for
protection, to the Secretary of Public Security.
Place and Date
Coordinating Committee for HRD

Implementation NPPHRD
167
Annex 4: Colombia: Decree 4065 (2011),

Creation of the National Protection Unit
– objective and structure established1
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT
DECREE No. 4065, 2011
31 OCTOBER 2011
"By which the National Protection Unit (NPU) is created and its Objective and Structure established”
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
Exercising the extraordinary faculties conferred on him by paragraphs e), f) and g) of article 18 of Law 1444
of 2011 and;
CONSIDERING
That the State should provide special protection to persons who face extraordinary or extreme risk to life,
integrity, liberty and personal security or those who are responsible for executing plans, programmes,
projects, actions and strategies designed to respond to these risks;
That, in order to organise, coordinate and implement the provision of this service and ensure the opportune,
effective and appropriate provision of protection measures, a specialised unit should be created that will
take responsibility for the functions in this area formerly carried out by the Ministry of the Interior and
Justice and the Administrative Department of Security (DAS);
That paragraphs e), f) and g) of article 18 of Law 1444 of 2011 conferred extraordinary faculties on the
President of the Republic to create entities or bodies within the Executive Branch and establish their
objectives and structure that, in this case, shall be exercised by the National Protection Unit;
DECREES:
SECTION I
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL PROTECTION UNIT (NPU)
ARTICLE 1._ Creation and Legal Nature of the National Protection Unit (NPU). Decrees the creation of
the national-level administrative unit to be called the NATIONAL PROTECTION UNIT (NPU), which shall
enjoy separate legal identity, administrative and financial autonomy and be responsible for controlling its
own assets. The Unit shall be attached to the Ministry of the Interior, forming a part of the Administrative
Area of the Ministry, and categorised as a national security body.
ARTICLE 2._ Head Office. The head office of the National Protection Unit (NPU) shall be in the city of Bogotá
D.C. The Board may decide to establish operational and administrative units anywhere in the country.
ARTICLE 3._ Objective. The objective of the National Protection Unit (NPU) is to organise, coordinate and
implement the provision of opportune, efficient, and appropriate protection services to such persons as the
National Government considers require them as a result of their activities, condition or situation, be these
1 [This] newer document outlining government policy for the protection of human rights defenders illustrates
that the new approach is an improvement compared to previous policies - a result of the decision to accept some
of the demands made by defenders’ organisations in Colombia. We have included this document as an annex
because it was published while this book was undergoing final editing and it was too late to analyse it in the
main text. For updates and comments go to http://focus.protectionline.org/-Focus-
168
political, public, social, humanitarian, cultural, ethnic, gender-related, or due to their status as victims of
violence, displacement, or as human rights activists or those who, because of public office or other activities
that may generate risk, such as leadership of a trade union, NGO or the displaced population, face
extraordinary or extreme risk to life, integrity, liberty and personal security.
Beneficiaries of the programmes run by the Public Prosecutor’s Office [Fiscalía General de la Nation], the
Solicitor General’s Office [Procuraduría General de la Nation] and the Protection Programme for Victims
and Witnesses established by the Justice and Peace Law do not fall under the responsibility of the Unit.
ARTICLE 4._ Functions. The National Protection Unit (NPU) shall have the following functions:
1. Organise, coordinate and implement protection services jointly with the relevant authorities at
national and regional level.
2. In coordination with the relevant authorities, define opportune, effective, appropriate and
differentiated protection measures sufficient to respond to the levels of risk identified.
3. Implement such protection programmes intended to protect the right to life, integrity, liberty and
personal security as are ordered by the National Government and that fall under the responsibility
of the Unit.
4. Monitor and evaluate the timeliness, appropriateness and efficiency of the protection programmes
and measures implemented and the ways they are made use of by their beneficiaries, and propose
such appropriate improvements as may be necessary.
5. Offer particular protection to population groups that face extraordinary or extreme risk as indicated
by the National Government or identified by the risk assessments carried out by the Unit.
6. Carry out, in coordination with the competent bodies or entities, the risk assessments of persons
who request protection from the programmes established by the National Government.
7. Carry out, in coordination with the competent bodies or entities, risk assessments of groups,
communities and territories in order to establish protection measures.
8. Support and provide technical advice to the regional bodies responsible for protection in
the design and implementation of strategies to protect the right to life, liberty, integrity and
security of persons, groups and communities, especially those facing special, extraordinary or
extreme risk.
9. Provide such information to the Ministry of the Interior’s Human Rights Unit as is necessary to
establish general guidelines for the design and implementation of the prevention and protection
policies for which it is responsible.
10. Support the Ministry of the Interior by providing human, technical, logistical and administrative
support for the implementation of prevention activities intended to protect the right to life,
liberty, integrity and security of persons, groups and communities subject to the jurisdiction of
the Colombian State, in compliance with the relevant guidelines provided by the Ministry.
11. Administer the system for the protection of information.
12. Fulfil any other functions appropriate to the nature of the Unit that may be assigned it.
ARTICLE 5._ Management and Administrative Bodies. The management and administration of the
National Protection Unit (NPU) shall be the responsibility of a Management Board and Director General.
ARTICLE 6._ Management Board, membership and meetings. The Management Board shall have five
members, as follows:
1. The Minister of the Interior, or delegate, who shall act as chair.
2. The Minister of Defence, or delegate.
3. The Director General of the National Police, or delegate.
4. The Director of the Presidential Programme for the Protection and Supervision of Human Rights
and International Humanitarian Law, or the person acting as such.
5. The Director of Human Rights at the Ministry of the Interior.
The Director General of the National Protection Unit, (NPU), shall attend the meetings of the Management
Board with voice but no vote.
The Management Board shall establish the frequency and nature of its sessions in its regulations.
169
ARTICLE 7._ Functions of the Management Board. The Management Board shall have the following
functions:
1. Formulate management and operational strategies consistent with the policies established by the
Ministry of the Interior in representation of the National Government, with any international
treaties and agreements in the fields of Human rights and International Humanitarian Law that
may be adopted and with the binding decisions of international Human Rights tribunals and
supervisory bodies.
2. Approve annual plans, programmes and projects for inclusion in sectorial plans that follow the
norms and criteria governing the National Budget as indicated by the National Planning
Department, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the Ministry of the Interior.
3. Evaluate the overall functioning of the National Protection Unit (NPU) according to agreed
policies and plans.
4. Agree results indicators in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the Unit in ensuring enjoyment
of the right to life, integrity and security for the persons under the Unit’s protection.
5. Approve the body’s draft budget as well as any modifications made to them.
6. Present proposals to modify the organisational and staffing structure of the National Protection
Unit (NPU) for approval.
7. Adopt its own internal regulations.
8. Any other tasks indicated by the Law.
ARTICLE 8._ Director General. Administration of the Unit shall be the responsibility of a Director
General, who shall be a public employee whose appointment and removal is in the gift of the President of
the Republic.
ARTICLE 9._ Assets of the Unit. The resources of the National Protection Unit (NPU) shall include:
1) The contributions assigned by the National Budget;
2) Such assets, rights and resources of any kind that it may acquire or that are transferred to it in any
way by the Nation or the regional authorities or other services;
3) Resources obtained through national or international agreements;
4) Resources obtained from international technical cooperation.
SECTION II
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPENDENT
STRUCTURES OF THE NATIONAL PROTECTION UNIT (NPU)
ARTICLE 10._ Structure. In order to exercise its functions the National Protection Unit (NPU) shall have
the following structure:
1. Management Board
2. General Directorate
2.1. Legal Advisory Office
2.2. Advisory Office for Planning and Information
2.3. Internal Supervision Office
3. General Secretariat
4. Risk Assessment Section
5. Protection Section
6. Human Talent Section
7. Advisory and Coordination Bodies
7.1. Personnel Commission
7.2. Internal Control Coordination Committee.
ARTICLE 11._ Functions of the General Directorate. The functions of the General Directorate are
as follows:
1. Present the Unit’s overall policies of the Unit to the Management Board and, once it has been
adopted, issue the administrative orders required for their implementation and ensure they are
carried out.
170
2. Develop the Unit’s Strategic Plan and the plans and programmes that are required to meet the
objective of the National Protection Unit (NPU), presenting them to the Management Board,
which shall discuss and approve them and ensure they are correctly implemented.
3. Coordinate the implementation of necessary preventive measures with the relevant authorities.
4. Lead the implementation of the risk assessment process for the protection programmes it is
responsible for, identifying in an opportune manner, the risks levels faced by persons, groups
and communities.
5. Jointly with the National Police and other bodies, design, formulate and implement measures and
mechanisms for the protection of persons who face extraordinary or extreme risk and, at the request
of the foreign Ministry, others for whom an international body has ordered protection measures.
6. Coordinate with the National Police concerning protection measures required by persons who
face risk as a result of their official employment.
7. In cases of imminent and exceptional risk, without the need for a risk assessment and employing
a differential approach, adopt provisional protection measures for the beneficiaries of the
programme and inform the Committee for the Regulation and Evaluation of Risks (CRER) – or
whoever acts as such – in order for it to recommend definitive measures should this be appropriate.
8 Adopt provisional protection measures for the displaced population in circumstances where the
Constitutional Assumption of Risk is applicable.
9. Implement the orders contained in precautionary measures or legal rulings concerning the
protection of persons, groups and communities, and inform the relevant authorities once they
have been faithfully and effectively carried out.
10. Adopt, by way of administrative order, the protection recommendations ordered by the
Committee for the Regulation and Evaluation of Risks (CRER) or whoever acts as such.
11. Present a proposal for internal regulation, and any modifications to the organisational and
staffing structure that may be required, to the Management Board.
12. Assume responsibility for appointing the Unit’s staff, other than those whose appointment is the
responsibility of other authorities.
13. Assign agents and representatives capable of representing the body in legal forums and other
processes requiring litigation.
14. By administrative act, create such internal working groups and advisory and coordination bodies
as are necessary to ensure the functioning of the National Protection Unit (NPU) so that it may
implement the services, plans, programmes and projects it has approved.
15. Adopt the regulations, establish the terms of functional and procedural manuals setting out the
roles and responsibilities of staff and other procedures required for the functioning of the Unit.
16. In compliance with the relevant organic and regulatory orders present the draft budget and
financial reports to the Management Board for revision and approval.
17. Order payments, issue administrative acts, carry out necessary actions and celebrate such
contracts, agreements and arrangements as might be required to ensure that the National
Protection Unit (NPU) functions effectively and achieves its objectives according to current
regulations.
18. Establish mechanisms to ensure that requests from citizens and officials of the National Protection
Unit (NPU) are dealt with opportunely.
19. Ensure internal discipline according to the terms of Law 734 of 2002 or such regulations as may
modify them.
20. Establish an Integral Management System based on the Internal Control and Quality Control
Systems.
21. Any other functions that may be assigned and are consistent with the nature of the body.
ARTICLE 12._ Functions of the Legal Advisory Office. The functions of the Legal Advisory Office are
as follows:
1. Contribute to the formulation of strategies to strengthen the legal capacity of departments of the
Unit in their areas of competence.
2. Analyse, design and endorse the administrative acts as indicated by the Director or Director’s
delegate where required by the Constitution or the Law.
171
3. Elaborate, examine and produce opinions on projected administrative acts, contracts and/or
agreements that the body is requested to sign or emit as well as on other matters assigned it
related to the nature of the Unit or its areas of competence.
4. Represent the body both legally and outside the legal sphere in cases and actions brought against
it or that it initiates, either itself or by delegation, and supervise such processes.
5. Coordinate and process the resources, acts of revocation and, in general, all legal activities
associated with the functions of the Unit that are not the responsibility of others of its departments.
6. Manage invoicing and payment of all sums owed to the Unit for whatever purpose, taking
responsibility for ensuing legal action should it be required.
7. Respond to requests and enquiries falling under its area of responsibility within the Unit.
8. Contribute to the development and maintenance of the Integrated System of Institutional
Management and the implementation of its recommendations in its areas of responsibility.
9. Any other functions that may be assigned and are inherent to the role of the department.
ARTICLE 13._ Functions of the Advisory Office for Planning and Information. The functions of the
Advisory Office for Planning and Information are as follows:
1. Design and coordinate the Unit’s planning process in its technical, economic and administrative
process.
2. Define the guidelines, processes and instruments required for the formulation, monitoring and
evaluation of the Unit’s strategic and operational planning and coordinate and provide advice to
the Unit’s departments on formulating monitoring and evaluating their procedures for fulfilling
the Strategic Plan and annual plans of action, according to the established procedures.
3. In coordination with the departments of the unit, and following the National Development Plan,
the strategic and action plans, the Annual and Multi-annual Operational Plans and the Sectorial
and Institutional Administrative Development Plans, and present them to the Director for
approval.
4. Monitor the performance to budget of the Unit’s plans, programmes and projects.
5. Ensure that the plans, programmes and projects of the National Protection Unit (NPU) are
carried out, and prepare monitoring reports and proposals for adjustment.
6. Develop and test process, outcome and impact indicators for the sector and carry out monitoring
according to systems established by the Management Board.
7. Prepare and consolidate the draft budget and present it and the multi-annual budget plan to the
Director for approval.
8. Support the Unit’s departments in preparing and ensuring the implementation of their investment
plans whatever the source of income.
9. Organise and administer the NPU’s data base of projects, arranging for approved projects to be
included in the National Data Base of Investment Projects and collaborate in the identification of
appropriate resources.
10. Monitor budget implementation and negotiate adjustments to the Unit’s budget with the Ministry
of Finance and Public Credit and the National Planning Department.
11. Ensure implementation of the Unit’s plans, programmes and projects, and prepare monitoring
reports and proposals for adjustment.
12. Prepare and consolidate and present any reports required by state bodies and external agents.
13. Plan, maintain and oversee the management and procedures followed by the Unit.
14. Prepare economic and financial studies, proposals and research in order to improve the quality
of services.
15. Give direction to and coordinate the implementation and development of the Integrated System
of Institutional Management.
16. Design policies, strategies and standards to ensure that the body’s information systems are
developed and implemented.
17. Formulate, revise, monitor and evaluate the Unit’s Information Technology Strategic Plan its
Information Technology Management System.
18. Recommend changes to the organisational structure of the Unit that contribute to its
modernisation.
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19. Attend to requests and enquiries that fall under its area of competence.
ARTICLE 14._ Functions of the Internal Control Office. The functions of the Internal Control Office are
as follows:
1. Advise and support the Director General in the design, implementation and evaluation of the
Internal Control System and ensure it functions correctly.
2. Develop tools and strategies to encourage a culture of internal supervision and quality control
that contributes to a permanent improvement in the levels of services provided by the Unit.
3. Design such plans, methods, procedures and mechanisms as are required to monitor and
evaluate the Internal Control System of the National Protection Unit (NPU).
4. Apply the management supervision system and interpret its results in order to present
recommendations to the Director General, with emphasis on the process indicators designed and
regularly reported on by the Advisory Office for Planning.
5. Ensure that the policies, guidelines, procedures, plans, programmes, projects and goals of the
Unit are fulfilled, recommending adjustments as necessary and monitoring their implementation.
6. Advise departments on the identification and prevention of risks that might affect the achievement
of their objectives.
7. Advise, accompany and support the Unit’s services in the development and improvement of the
Internal Control System and keep the Director informed of its functioning.
8. Present activities reports to the Director and the Coordinating Committee of the Internal Control
System.
9. Prepare and consolidate the Fiscal Performance Report that has to be presented annually to the
National Comptroller's Office at the start of each financial year.
10. Coordinate and consolidate responses to requests for information made by supervision and
oversight bodies respecting the Unit’s self-administration.
11. Support the development, maintenance and continuing improvement of the Integrated System of
Institutional Management, supervising its effectiveness and ensuring its recommendations are
implemented.
12. Develop evaluative auditing procedures and formulate appropriate observations and
recommendations.
13. Evaluate citizen participation mechanisms and ensure they are applied.
14. Ensure that requests, petitions and complaints are dealt with speedily and efficiently, and report
on actions taken.
15. Ensure that the measures adopted by the National Government, including those to fight
corruption, rationalise bureaucratic procedures and reduce spending are applied, in order to
contribute to improvements in the administration of resources.
16. Accompany and advise the different departments of the National Protection Unit (NPU) in the
implementation and development of risk supervision process and monitor and evaluate the
process.
17. Evaluate and monitor the actions of the National Protection Unit (NPU) and encourage the
relevant authorities to carry out such investigations as may be required.
ARTICLE 15._ Functions of the General Secretariat. The functions of the General Secretariat are as
follows:
1. Direct, coordinate and advance the implementation of the programmes and activities in matters
relating to finance and accounting, recruitment, technical and computing support, administration
and the management of documentation.
2. Jointly with the Planning and Information Office, coordinate fund-raising efforts to finance
institutional plans, programmes and projects.
3. In coordination with the other departments, lead the preparation and implementation of the
Unit's annual purchasing plan.
4. In coordination with the Planning and Information Office prepare the Unit’s draft overall budget
for presentation to the Director.
173
5. Plan, programme, oversee and supervise the procedures governing the storage, procurement,
custody, distribution and disposal of such assets as are necessary to the efficient functioning of
the Unit.
6. Elaborate the Unit’s Recruitment Manual and ensure its strict application.
7. Consolidate the Unit’s annual programme of monthly cash-flow supervision following to the
plans presented by each department.
8. Ensure that budgets and accounting procedures are implemented correctly and tax, budgetary,
accounting and cash-flow reports presented.
9. Make payments of the monies the Unit is obliged to pay under current legal rules.
10. Guarantee the sustainability of the Unit’s accounting system and its financial statements.
11. Monitor and oversee the Unit’s spending.
12. Apply and carry out the operation of the information systems required at the end of each financial year.
13. Coordinate the group responsible for disciplinary investigations that may be carried out into
employees of the Unit and make initial decisions on cases.
14. Coordinate with the Planning and Information Office concerning the most suitable indicators for
measuring the Secretariat’s performance.
15. Support the development and maintenance of the Integrated Institutional Management System
and ensure that the recommendations it makes in its area of competence are followed.
ARTICLE 16._ Functions of the Risk Assessment Section. The functions of the Risk Assessment Section
are as follows:
1. Develop the risk assessment procedure in order to identify opportunely and with a differential
focus the levels of risk faced by persons, groups and communities that form a part of the target
population of the Unit.
2. Plan and develop methodologies and strategies to evaluate the levels of risk faced by persons
who face extraordinary or extreme risk to life, integrity, liberty and personal security or those
who face such risks as a result of their work.
3. Analyse and monitor reports produced by national and international governmental and non-
governmental bodies and organisations on the situation of risk faced by persons, groups and
communities that might provide useful inputs to the risk assessments.
4. Carry out actions to establish and maintain an open channel of communication with
representatives of different groups or populations that are objects of protection or with any other
body that might offer information useful to preparing risk assessments.
5. In fulfilment of its established responsibilities and in coordination with the competent authorities at
regional level and with affected communities, support the Ministry of the Interior’s Human Rights Unit
in carrying out focused risk analyses, planning for risk scenarios, defining prevention and contingency
plans and implementing and monitoring any prevention measures that may be in existence.
6. Keep the system for the protection of information for which it is responsible up to date.
7. Once a year, or earlier if new facts occur that affect the level of risk, re-evaluate the levels of risk
faced by the beneficiaries of the protection programme by updating their risk assessments.
8. Ensure that cases involving persons in situations of forced displacement whose circumstances
are sufficiently grave and imminent for the Constitutional Presumption of Risk to be invoked are
transferred immediately to the Protection Section.
9. Provide initial psycho-social support when required by persons who request protection
measures.
10. Protect the information, data and computer systems that are the responsibility of the Section
from all attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of said information.
11. Help to develop and maintain the Integrated System of Institutional Management and ensure
that any recommendations relevant to its area of responsibility are fulfilled.
12. Respond to petitions and consultations related to its area of responsibility.
13. Present a plan covering its logistical and resource requirements to the General Secretariat to
ensure that the department can function.
174
ARTICLE 17._ Functions of the Protection Section. The functions of the Protection Section are as follows:
1. In coordination with the National Police and other relevant state bodies, design, formulate and
implement measures and mechanisms to provide protection to persons who face extraordinary
or extreme risk to life, integrity, liberty and personal security or those who face such risks as a
result of their work.
2. Recommend to the Director of the Unit the adoption of initial or transitory protection measures
for cases that fulfil the criteria of gravity or imminence.
3. Recommend to the Director of the Unit the adoption of protection measures for persons in a
situation of forced displacement who se situation is sufficiently grave and imminent for the
Constitutional Presumption of Risk to be invoked.
4. Implement the protection measures adopted on the basis recommendations made by the
Committee for the Regulation and Evaluation of Risks (CRER), or whoever acts as such, to the
Director of the Unit.
5. In coordination with the General Secretariat, oversee the logistical resources available to the Unit
in order to ensure that the programme functions efficiently.
6. Monitor the implementation of protection measures for persons who, as a result of their official
duties, are under the protection of the National Police, and provide such resources or logistical
support as may be necessary, according to the responsibilities of the Unit.
7. Monitor the protection measures provided in terms of timeliness, appropriateness and
effectiveness, and the use made of them by beneficiaries; when necessary, prepare an improvement
plan in conjunction with other departments of the Unit, and participate in its implementation.
8. Present any reports that may be necessary given the responsibilities of the department.
9. Update the system for the protection of information in its areas of responsibility.
10. Maintain open channels of communication with the target populations of the protection
programmes and respond to their concerns.
11. Support the development and maintenance of the Integrated System of Institutional Management
and ensure that the recommendations falling under the department’s areas of responsibility are
followed.
12. Protect the information, data and computer systems that are the responsibility of the Section
from all attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of said information.
15. Present a plan covering the needs of the department to the General Secretariat.
ARTICLE 18._ Functions of the Human Talent Section. The functions of the Human Talent Section are as
follows:
1. Assist the General Directorate in formulating policies covering human resources management,
applicable to the Unit’s different services.
2. Direct and coordinate the establishment of plans covering selection, administration, development,
training, performance evaluation, welfare, occupational health, organisational culture, and
stimuli and incentives for the public services offered by the National Protection Unit (NPU).
3. In coordination with the Planning and Information Office, elaborate such technical studies as are
required if staffing structures and administrative structures are to be modified, and prepare and
adjust the manual of staff functions and responsibilities, according to current guidelines.
4. Ensure that the policies, guidelines, procedures, plans and programmes governing Human
Talent are applied correctly.
5. Prepare such administrative acts as are necessary for it to fulfil its functions.
6. In coordination with other departments, respond to the needs of the Unit’s Human Talent in
order to ensure effective management.
7. Coordinate with the Planning and Information Office to ensure the adoption of the most
appropriate indicators to measure the performance of the area.
8. Maintain and organise the personnel files of the entire Unit’s staff, ensuring they are up to date.
9. Contribute to the development and maintenance of the Integrated System of Institutional
Management and the implementation of its recommendations in its areas of responsibility.
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SECTION III
ADVISORY AND COORDINATION BODY
ARTICLE 19._ Advisory and Coordination Bodies. The Personnel Commission, the Internal Control
Coordination Committee and other advisory and coordination bodies that may be created shall function
according to the terms of Law 909 of 2004, Law 87 of 1993 and the other current legal rules and regulation.
SECTION IV
FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 20._ Staff Group. Responding to the structure established by this decree and in exercise of the
faculties indicated in Article 189 of the Political Constitution and in Law 489 of 1998 the National
Government shall proceed to recruit such staff as shall be necessary to ensure due and correct functioning
of the National Protection Unit.
The employees of the Unit shall be contracted according to standard civil service terms and conditions
covering the classification and administration of staff.
Transitory Paragraph. The certificate of budgetary availability required to fund the posts of Director
General and Secretary General of the National Protection Unit shall be published by the Deputy Director
of Administration and Finance at the Ministry of the Interior.
ARTICLE 21._ Transfer of assets, rights and obligations. The ownership of fixed and moveable assets
currently owned by the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), currently in liquidation, the
Rotating Fund of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) and the Ministry of the Interior that at
the time when this decree comes into force are associated with the functioning of the NPU or are required
for the National Protection Unit (NPU) to function shall remain under the control of the National Protection
Unit (NPU), and shall be given in free title to it. The determination of assets and the time limits and terms
governing their handover shall be indicated in the Minutes signed by the Director of the DAS, currently in
liquidation, the legal representative of the DAS Rotating Fund, the delegate of the Ministry of the Interior
and the Director of the National Protection Unit (NPU), which shall be deposited in the relevant Registration
Office when convenient.
ARTICLE 22._ Current contracts and agreements. Current contracts and agreements, celebrated by the
Ministry of the Interior and Justice – now the Ministry of the Interior – and whose object corresponds to
functions and activities that fall under the responsibility of the National Protection Unit or the Protection
Programme of the Human Rights Unit are understood to be passed to the National Protection Unit (NPU),
which shall continue to execute them under the existing terms and conditions.
The documentation associated with these contracts and agreements should be passed to the General
Secretariat of the Unit within the time limit established to this effect by the Ministry of the Interior’s
Director of Human Rights and the General Secretary of the National Protection Unit (NPU).
Contracts that have been signed by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice – now the Ministry of the
Interior – and which have involved or still involve activities coming under the responsibility of the National
Protection Unit or the Protection Program of the Ministry of the Interior’s Human Rights Unit shall be
liquidated by the National Protection Unit, for which purpose the Ministry of the Interior should provide
all necessary documentation.
Where relevant, the Ministry of the Interior shall continue to execute the appropriations agreed by the
Ministry of the Interior before the publication of this decree up to 31 December 2011.
ARTICLE 23._ Handover of archives. The archives possessed at the point when this decree enters into
force by the Ministry of the Interior’s Human Rights Unit and the Administrative Department of Security
(DAS), currently in liquidation, and which are related to the responsibilities of the National Protection
Unit, should be transferred to this body according to the terms indicated by the [respective] General
Secretariats.
ARTICLE 24._ Normative References. Any reference made in the current regulations to the Administrative
Department of Security (DAS) and the Ministry of the Interior’s Protection Programme should be
understood to refer to the National Protection Unit.
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ARTICLE 25._ Inter-institutional coordination. In development of the principle of inter-institutional

coordination for the realisation of State policy, the different institutions of national and regional
government, and the supervisory bodies shall, according to their areas of responsibility, support the
programmes implemented by the National Protection Unit (NPU).
ARTICLE 26._ Validity. The current Decree shall run from the date of its publication and supersede all
measures provisions that are contrary to its terms.
BE IT PUBLISHED AND EXECUTED

Issued in Bogotá, D.C., on 31st October 2011.
The Minister Of The Interior Germán Vargas Lleras
The Minister Of Finance And Public Credit Juan Carlos Echeverry Garzón
The Director Of The Department

Of Public Administration, Elizabeth Rodríguez Taylor
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Annex 5: Colombia: Decree 2788 (2003),

Committee for regulation and risk
assessment of the protection programmes1
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE

DECREE NUMBER 2788 OF 2003
2nd OCTOBER 2003
“Establishing the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment of the Protection Programmes of the Human
Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice.”
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA,
pursuant to his constitutional and legal authority, in particular that conferred by articles 189 numeral 11
of the Political Constitution and 45 of Law 489 of 1998,
WHEREAS:
In compliance with the Preamble and article 2 of the Political Constitution, the aim of the state is to
safeguard and protect the lives, dignity, assets, beliefs and other freedoms and rights recognised for
persons residing in Colombia,
Article 81 of Law 418 of 1997, extended and amended by Law 782 of 2002, indicates various parameters to
be followed by the National Government to implement Protection Programmes for persons who are in a
situation of imminent risk affecting their lives, physical well-being, safety or freedom, due to causes
related to political or ideological violence or to the internal armed conflict,
Under numeral 4 of article 17 of Decree 200 of 2003, the National Government has assigned the Human
Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice the task of designing and coordinating the
general programmes for the protection and prevention of the violation of human rights, for the benefit of
persons in a situation of risk, in collaboration with the Presidential Programme for the Promotion, Respect
and Guarantee of Human Rights and in application of International Humanitarian Law,
The National Government, through Decrees 1592 of 2000, 1386 and 2742 of 2002, has created Protection
Programmes for journalists, media personnel, mayors, members of parliament, councillors and
spokespersons which are run by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice,
Having established the Protection Programmes the government set up the Committees for Regulation and
Risk Assessment to assess the levels of risk and degrees of threat to the persons to be protected and to
recommend appropriate protective measures,
It is necessary to establish the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment, CRER, for the Protection
Programmes run by the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice,
The provisions below are the result of the agreement between the National Government and the
representatives of the different target groups of the Protection Programmes, for whom the Human Rights
Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible,
DECREES:
ARTICLE 1. - Composition of the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment (CRER). The
Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment of the Protection Programmes run by the Human Rights
1 [This is] is an older document now superseded as a result of the new policies governing the National
Protection Unit (October 2011). We reproduce it here to illustrate the changes that have been made to
protection policies.
178
Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice shall be composed of the following representatives:
1. The Deputy Minister for Home Affairs or his/her representative, who shall chair it.
2. The Human Rights Director of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice or his/her representative.
3. The Director of the Presidential Programme for the Promotion, Respect and Guarantee of Human
Rights and the application of International Humanitarian Law or his/her representative.
4. The Director of the Administrative Security Department or a representative from the Protection
Directorate.
5. The Director-General of the National Police or his/her human rights representative.
6. The Manager of the Social Solidarity Network or his/her representative.
The human rights director of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice shall act as Secretary of the Committee.
Addendum 1. The Committee will be attended, with only the right to speak, by representatives from the
attorney general’s office of Colombia, the Ombudsman and the Office of the Treasury.
Addendum 2. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and four (4) representatives from
each of the target groups of the Protection Programmes run by the Human Rights Directorate of the
Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice shall participate as permanent special guests.
Addendum 3. Each of the members, taking into account their constitutional and legal competences, shall
be held accountable for their actions and omissions within the framework of the Committee’s functions.
Addendum 4. Non-governmental members shall only attend the sessions in which matters related to the
target group are discussed. During a single session matters affecting a number of target groups may be
discussed, in which case representatives of these groups shall participate in the Committee.
Addendum 5. The Technical Secretariat of the Committee shall be occupied by the government official from
the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice appointed by their Director.
The duty of the Technical Secretary is to prepare the minutes of each session, which must be approved and
signed by all attending committee members.
ARTICLE 2. - The functions of the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment (CRER). The
Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment of the Protection Programmes of the Human Rights
Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice shall have the following functions:
1. Assess cases submitted by the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Justice and, as an exception, by any Committee member. This assessment shall be carried out taking
into account the target groups of the Protection Programmes and the applicable rules of procedure.
2. Consider the technical assessments on levels of risk and degrees of threat and the technical
studies on secure premises, according to each case.
3. Recommend the protective measures it considers appropriate.
4. Periodically monitor the implementation of the protective measures, and based on this
monitoring, recommend any adjustments.
5. Create its own rules of procedure.
6. Take any other action necessary to pursue its objectives.
ARTICLE 3. - The meetings of the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment, CRER. The
Committee shall hold a session at least once every month to attend to each one of the target groups of the
Protection Programme of the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice,
following an invitation by the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs or the Director of Human Rights of the
Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice.
Additionally, extraordinary meetings of the Committee shall be held when deemed appropriate by the
Deputy Minister for Home Affairs or the Director of Human Rights of the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Justice, or when two (2) or more members of the Committee so request.
Addendum 1. The Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment, CRER, shall hold its sessions at the
office of the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice or at a location agreed
upon by its members.
Addendum 2. There shall be a quorum for the purposes of debate in the Committee when a number equal
to or greater than 50% of the representatives of the target groups and the institutional representatives are
in attendance. There will be a quorum for the purposes of a vote when an absolute majority of committee
members are present.
179
ARTICLE 4. - The provision of protective measures. The protective measures recommended by the Committee
shall be implemented by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice through the Human Rights Directorate,
following the signing of the document of commitment by the beneficiary of the Protection Programme. The
Human Rights Directorate shall establish rapid procedures for the signing of these documents.
In an obvious emergency, the human rights director of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice may adopt
and/or request, without the need for prior approval, protective measures for the recipients of the protection
programmes under his responsibility, and shall report to the Committee in the next session, in order to
allow it to revise them and recommend definitive measures.
Persons interested in being covered by a Protection Programme must prove that there is a direct connection
between the threat or risk and the position held or the activity carried out within the organisation to which
they belong.
In any event, in the course of their activities the members of the Committee for Regulation and Risk Assessment,
CRER, of the Protection Programmes of the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Justice, must comply with the principles described in articles 83 and 209 of the Political Constitution.
Addendum 1. In order to be admitted to the Protection Programmes run by the Human Rights Directorate
of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice, the interested party must fill in the form of the directorate and
attach any relevant annexes. Failing this a written application containing a minimum amount of evidence
to identify the risk or threat factors may be made. In this way their eligibility for the Protection Programme
shall be vouched for.
The completed application form must be filed at the offices of the Human Rights Directorate of the Ministry
of Home Affairs and Justice.
Addendum 2. In the cases mentioned in the second indent of this article, a commitment document shall be
signed within ten (10) calendar days following the implementation of the definitive measures.
Addendum 3. The Protective measures shall be temporary, subject to periodic review and may be
suspended temporarily or definitively, in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure.
ARTICLE 5. - Budgetary requirements. The implementation of the protective measures recommended by
the Committee shall be subject to an available budget. If there is no budget, the Human Rights Directorate
of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Justice must coordinate the implementation of transitional
supplementary measures with the national, departmental or local authorities.
ARTICLE 6. - Applicability. This Decree is not applicable to the Special Programme on Comprehensive
Protection for leaders, members and survivors of the Patriotic Union and the Colombian Communist Party,
to which Decree 978 of 2000, amended by Decree 262 of 2001, is applicable.
ARTICLE 7. - Validity. This Decree shall come into effect on the date of its publication and shall repeal any
provisions that are contrary to it.
LET IT BE KNOWN AND ENFORCED.

Issued in Bogotá, D.C., on 2nd October 2003.
ÁLVARO URIBE VÉLEZ
The Minister for Home Affairs and Justice, Fernando Londoño Hoyos
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Annex 6: Guatemala: National policy

for prevention and protection of
human rights defenders and other
vulnerable groups (2009)
INTRODUCTION
The Firm and Lasting Peace Agreements of 1996 provide a basic agenda for the judicial, political, economic,
cultural and social transformation of the State, by means of the new public administration enshrined in
democracy, peace and the constitutional rule of law which facilitate the protection of the individual, thus
guaranteeing life, physical well-being, freedom, equality, non-discrimination, justice, security, peace and
comprehensive development, with the common good as the ultimate aim.
In the last decade, the numerous and constant acts committed against human rights defenders, officers of
the law, witnesses, journalists, trade unionists and media personnel have not only attracted national and
international attention but have also given rise to countless recommendations to our country – both in
agreements and independently - by international and Inter-American bodies as well as several visits by
these bodies to Guatemala.
The governmental plan of the Constitutional President of the Republic, Engineer Álvaro Colom Caballeros,
set forth in his First Government Report as part of the Security and Rule of Law Policy, establishes human
rights as its third objective, emphasising the need to seek observance and compliance with the international
conventions signed and ratified by the state on this issue. This constitutes a return to the mandate to
generate a public policy of protection for human rights defenders, on which consultations are being held
internally at state level and with civil society, with the support of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in Guatemala.
Our Government regrets, rejects and publicly condemns all action that directly or indirectly threatens the
work of institutions or organisations that encourage, defend, protect or guarantee human rights and
universal freedoms, committed by individuals or groups whose overriding interest is to instil a permanent
atmosphere of terror and insecurity, preventing these sectors of society from developing in normal, safe
conditions but above all collectively spreading a climate of terror, fear and silence.
The Global Human Rights Accord of 1994 contains the commitments and obligations adopted by the
Government for the benefit of the Judiciary, the Human Rights Prosecutor, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and
the individuals or organisations that work in the field of human rights. Special prevention and protection
measures need to be implemented to effectively guarantee their work, which contributes to democratic
change by increasing citizens’ participation, improving living standards and social, political and economic
conditions, reducing social and political tensions and creating a peaceful, tolerant society in which to live.
The Government of Guatemala recognises the key role played by human rights defenders who, individually
or collectively, encourage and defend civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and contribute to
guaranteeing the exercise of universal freedoms and the proper operation of democratic institutions. Their
activities promote greater awareness and observance of human rights, safeguarding democracy and the
Rule of Law.
Democracy does not simply consist of holding free elections on a regular basis but also entails the
acceptance of other imperatives such as the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the
protection of human rights and the transparency of political funding. Participation and diversity are
fundamental aspects of democracy.
The situation of vulnerability and risk faced by officers of the law in Guatemala must be viewed in the
general and specific context of the observance, guarantee and exercise of human rights, in a fragile
democracy that characterises Guatemala as a weak state and at the same time prevents some of the premises
of the Rule of Law from being implemented, such as compliance with the law, equality before the law, legal
security and certainty, the binding nature of the law for each and every person, and due process.
Therefore various factors contribute to impunity de facto or de jure, which make the judicial sector vulnerable
regardless of the type of jurisdiction and powers. This is illustrated in various different ways, ranging
from subtle acts such as corruption, internal and external pressures and meddling, to acts that threaten the
181
lives and physical well-being of magistrates, judges, experts, lawyers, victims, legal applicants, the police,
joint plaintiffs, witnesses and/or prosecutors.
For this reason it is imperative to adopt a National Policy on Prevention and Protection that fully responds
to the level of urgency, threat, risk and vulnerability associated with the professional or occupational
activities of promoting, upholding, guaranteeing and protecting fundamental rights, the consequences of
which have not been able to be addressed by the normal procedure established by the Constitution and
other state legislation.
This Public Policy, in accordance with the National Policy on Human Rights and the National Action Plan
on Human Rights, proposes dynamic, efficient mechanisms by means of a framework of reference, with the
essential goal of strengthening existing national systems and programmes on protection, and setting up
whatever other programmes are necessary for the state to meet its obligations.
The success of this initiative requires a commitment from the state, non-governmental organisations and
society as a whole, with the hitherto continuous support of international cooperation. It should be reiterated
that firm political determination from every state body is indispensable. They must draft comprehensive,
sustainable solutions and translate these into public policies that establish single-minded, coordinated and
institutional management of the forms of action that need to be undertaken.
Therefore, on issuing this National Policy on the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights Defenders
and Other Vulnerable Groups, we are upholding the commitment we made in the National Agreement for
1
the Advancement of Security and Justice, which, amongst other points, contains Policies and Institutions
for Criminal Investigations and Investigations against Impunity (Topic IV) for creating Comprehensive
Protection Programmes for Officers of the Law and Human Rights Defenders.
V. Proposal
The proposal is, in accordance with the duty of the state, to provide a strategic, coordinated, structured and
permanent framework involving the public sector, civil society and international cooperation bodies that
guarantees prevention and protection. This is understood as a standard service that creates, improves and
strengthens the specialist infrastructure, in order to respond comprehensively with dynamic, efficient and
effective mechanisms in line with the level of urgency, threat, risk or vulnerability to which human rights
defenders, magistrates, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, witnesses, experts, journalists, trade unionists, media
personnel and other vulnerable groups are exposed as a result of activities related to their professions or
occupations, with the aim of avoiding irreparable damage.
The intention is to guarantee human rights under threat and ensure that regulations are in place to define
the powers of the authorities, appropriate transfer of resources, their best use and the practical
implementation of national, regional and/or global measures while the conditions of risk and vulnerability
persist. This will help to counteract the state of defencelessness, lack of governmental control and impunity,
and contribute to strengthening democratic institutions and the Rule of Law.
VI. Guiding Principles

Every action related to prevention and protection in this policy shall be governed by the following guiding
principles, which will serve as a conceptual guide and framework of reference for their implementation.
1. Prevention
The institutions responsible for guaranteeing security shall adopt effective, exhaustive strategies to prevent
intimidation and/or attacks, identifying the potential factors or elements that generate violence, taking
into account the periods of greatest vulnerability and risk, developing early-warning systems and
emergency, contingency and crisis management plans.
2. Efficacy
All the governmental and institutional bodies responsible for the different prevention and/or protection
programmes established by national and international legislation shall work in a coordinated and
cooperative manner to avoid any duplication of procedures and optimise material and human resources.
1 Signed on 15 April 2009 by the Congress of the Republic, the Executive Body, the Supreme Court of Justice and
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, with the support of the University of San Carlos de Guatemala, the Evangelical
Alliance of Guatemala, the Archbishopric of Guatemala and the Human Rights Prosecutor. National Theatre of
the Miguel Ángel Asturias Cultural Centre, Ciudad de Guatemala.
182
To achieve the anticipated results, the powers and responsibilities of central, autonomous and independent
authorities shall be clearly defined to guarantee consistency and the appropriate allocation of budgetary
and logistic resources, and any such mechanisms shall be implemented without re-victimizing the
beneficiary or his/her family members.
3. Suitability
Given the particularly urgent and serious nature and necessity of prevention and/or protection -
precautionary, provisional and security measures and urgent appeals - the mechanisms for the
coordination, adoption and provision of the protective measures shall be simple, accessible and processed
in accordance with the needs of the beneficiaries, depending on the level of threat, risk or vulnerability.
They should also comply in good faith with national and international obligations.
4. Jurisdiction
With the exception of the requirements of ordinary legal procedures, the preventative and/or protective
actions to enforce precautionary, provisional and security measures and urgent appeals shall not prejudge
the substance of the matter and shall be adopted immediately to guarantee the non-violation and free
exercise of human rights and universal freedoms. As these are precautionary measures, the rigour or ritual
involved shall not be the same as for other protective mechanisms in Guatemalan legislation, but rather
applied on the basis of the pro persona principle.
Likewise, administrative, legislative, political or any other type of measures should be developed to
implement judicial measures for national prevention and/or protection that govern the action of public sector
employees in situations of imminent danger or risk when exercising human rights. These should be simple,
free of complicated procedures, cost-free and characterised by all other aspects that inform due process.
5. Voluntary nature
The acceptance or withdrawal of the prevention and/or protection system adopted shall be voluntary,
notwithstanding the reasons for exclusion given in each of the regulations governing the different
mechanisms, at all times being based on the principle of legality. Therefore the adoption of precautionary,
provisional and security preventative and/or protective measures should be in consultation with the
beneficiaries in order to guarantee their relevance and allow them to do their work.
However, it is necessary to establish reasons for exclusion or withdrawal from this mechanism when the
beneficiary commits unlawful acts or behaves in such a way that his/her safety or that of other people is
endangered. The state institutions shall ensure due process is guaranteed at the time of withdrawing any
such protective mechanisms.
6. Equal treatment and non-discrimination

The national human rights institutions and organisations responsible for the mechanisms of prevention and/
or protection shall observe the guarantee of equal treatment and non-discrimination during the process of
requesting, adopting, providing or implementing the measures. Therefore no differences whatsoever shall
be made due to gender, ethnicity, social or economic status, sexual preference or orientation, language,
nationality, religion, political opinion or any other motive when providing this service.
7. Meetings and consultations

It is essential that state institutions, beneficiaries and civil society – human rights organisations, trade
unionists, journalists’ associations and other vulnerable associations – establish channels for consultation
and stable, respectful and constructive dialogue in order to identify needs and assess the performance of
the preventative and/or protective measures.
8. Specialisation
All the state institutions that coordinate and cooperate in the adoption and implementation of preventive
and/or protective measures shall ensure that their security forces are qualified to properly defend vulnerable
or threatened people. Therefore the process of selection, recruitment and training must be carried out with
the utmost transparency and with the participation of the target population benefitting from the preventative
and/or protective mechanisms and programs, equipping them with appropriate knowledge in this area and
information on best practices in human rights, the duty of the state and international human rights law.
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9. Confidentiality
All aspects relating to precautionary, provisional and security preventative and/or protective procedures
shall be confidential in order not to compromise the safety or increase the level of vulnerability of the
2
beneficiaries.
10. Temporary nature

The preventative and/or protective measures shall have a fixed duration of six (6) months, which may be
extended by an equal period. However, these measures shall be provided for any reasonable period during
which the conditions that led to their implementation persist, assuming these are still serious and urgent
and there is a need to prevent irreparable damage.
11. Graduation and proportionality

The prevention and/or protection system shall be adopted and implemented in accordance with the
situation or degree of threat, danger or risk, according to the risk and/or vulnerability study and analysis.
12. Comprehensive and binding

All preventative and/or protective procedures shall be based on the link between the threat, danger or risk
and the activity of the beneficiary; in other words, if they occur during or because of this activity. This
principle shall inform the action and services that the national preventative and/or protective mechanisms
and programmes offer the beneficiary, facilitating coordination, cooperation, information and follow-up of
investigations undertaken by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the National Civil Police into the incidents
that gave rise to them.
VII. Cross-cutting issues

This section includes topics which should be implemented intrinsically, comprehensively and appropriately
in every section of the National Policy on the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights Defenders and
Other Vulnerable Groups.
7.1 Gender perspective and equality

The preventative and protective mechanisms should encompass the gender and equality perspective in
order to guarantee equal opportunity, equal treatment and non-discrimination. This means implementing
a gender analysis as part of the evaluation indicators for the National Policy for Prevention and Protection,
as well as other governmental and state actions relating to this issue.
The causes of inequality, exclusion and discrimination that resulted in internal armed conflict are still part
of daily life. This exposes women, in particular those of indigenous origin, to the risk of violence triggered by
multiple discrimination motivated by gender, ethnicity and class. This is particularly the case for female human rights
3
defenders, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, journalists and media personnel.
In other words, this is about addressing the specific needs of women in terms of risk prevention and/or
protection, given that their status as women makes them more vulnerable to, and a target of, other kinds of
attacks and intimidations. This translates to different forms of violence based on gender; simply by their
presence, women can arouse hostility and challenge cultural, religious or social taboos relating to the role
that has been assigned by a patriarchal system to women in a particular country or society.
There may be various forms of aggression such as physical, verbal, psychological and even sexual
harassment and rape. On other occasions it can take on the more subtle form of discrediting women’s
personal, moral or professional integrity.
2 This right shall be exercised in accordance with Articles 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 44 and 45 of the Political Constitution
of the Republic of Guatemala. In the event that any invoked reservation is presented, the information shall
be requested in accordance with the procedural regulations so a Guarantee Control Judge can raise the case,
especially in military or diplomatic matters of national security, or with regard to details provided by private
individuals under guarantee of confidentiality.
3 Violence against women goes unpunished, as the authorities do not investigate these cases nor arrest or punish
the offenders. In this respect, the absence of the rule of law contributes to a never-ending series of violent acts
against women, including murder, rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment and sexual exploitation. The
institutions responsible for security and justice have not reacted with due diligence, particularly with regard to a
recent series of brutal killings of women which continues to be unresolved. Report from the Special Rapporteur
Yakin Ertürk on violence against women, its causes and consequences to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3 of 10 February 2005.
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Therefore the implementation of a preventative and/or protective mechanism for the beneficiary/ies
should match the risk or threat, the needs of the woman/women, the context, and the occupation or
profession of the woman/women. This applies both to challenging the cause of the threat and selecting the
appropriate protection personnel.
7.2 Multiculturalism
When adopting prevention and protection mechanisms, there is a need to look beyond cultural alliances,
most importantly because, as pointed out by Rapporteur Jean in his Mission in Guatemala, “access to justice
is limited by various factors including, inter alia, non-implementation by the courts of international human rights
treaties and agreements and the lack of appropriate legislation. Indigenous peoples experience particular difficulty in
accessing this for reasons such as discrimination, lack of court interpreters and non-recognition of the customary laws
4
of their indigenous legal authorities. These factors result in impunity due to the violation of human rights.”
In its Conclusions presented in the Report on Guatemala: Justice and Social Inclusion, paragraph 434, the
Inter-American Commission stated that:
“The State should in turn ensure that indigenous peoples, women and children do not suffer from different forms of
discrimination and social marginalization. The social exclusion that the Commission has witnessed in Guatemala
includes lack of access to justice and obstacles to the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social and cultural
human rights of these sectors of society”.
“The elimination of all forms of discrimination, especially for reasons of gender, ethnicity and race, and different forms
of intolerance, the promotion and protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples and respect for ethnic, cultural
and religious diversity, contribute to strengthening democracy and citizen participation.”
With this and the previous topics in mind, the remarks of the Special Rapporteur, Yakin Ertürk, on violence
against women, its causes and consequences in her Report to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council are particularly relevant:
“The peace agreements signed in 1996 put an end to 36 years of civil war in Guatemala and included provisions
designed specifically to protect the rights of women and indigenous peoples. Despite these achievements, inadequate
implementation has prevented women and indigenous groups from benefiting from these provisions and has
contributed to the atmosphere of insecurity and violence that still characterises Guatemalan society”.
7.3 Justice
In order for every sector in the National Policy for Prevention and Protection to work without any kind of
fear, it is not enough to simply offer them the necessary resources and protection. A judicial system also
needs to be established in order to:
a. Investigate serious past and present violations of human rights and prevent impunity
b. Facilitate access to justice and prevent illegal forces from acting, as well as threats, intimidations
and murder of human rights defenders, trade unionists, witnesses, journalists, victims and
aggrieved parties, and officers of the law
c. Provide adequate protection for officers of the law, representatives of the community and those
who stand for the solidarity demonstrated by the active stance of citizens against acts of
intimidation and the administration of justice.
Judges should act as the guardians of the rights and freedoms of every citizen and at the same time
guarantee the legal protection of human rights, the fight against discrimination and impunity, and support
the right to redress. As the legal system plays a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human
rights it should be financially independent from other authorities. An equal balance should be struck in
investments in the different areas of the Judiciary, whether these are the Public Prosecutor’s Office, defence
5
lawyers or prosecutors.
A key aspect to enable the legal system to win citizens’ confidence is its capacity to settle disputes in an
effective and impartial way throughout the country. This will combat the uncertainty and lack of trust in the
judicial system that is used as a pretext for privatising security and vigilante-style justice. These phenomena
4 See the Special Rapporteur’s Report on the Right to Food presented at the 64th session, paragraph 30, on Access
to Justice and Human Rights Institutions E/CN.4/2006/44Add.1, 18 January 2006 (see report by the Special
Representative of the Secretary General on the situation of defenders of indigenous peoples E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.1,
page 16, human rights E/CN.4/2003/104/Add.2, Paragraph 63).
5 Horacio Ravenna, Access to Justice and Impunity, Regional Workshop on Democracy, Human Rights and the
Rule of Law, organised by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the Ibero-
American Institute of Human Rights (IIHR), San José de Costa Rica, Costa Rica, September 2005.
185
entail just as much risk as the attacks against which victims are trying to protect themselves. For this reason,
the protection and strengthening of the administration of justice forms the basis of this policy to strengthen
the rule of law.
7.4 Democratic Security

The aim of this National Policy for Prevention and Protection is, inter alia, to try to gradually achieve the
right level of protection and safety to enable its beneficiaries to freely exercise their human rights.
At the same time, it aims to ensure that safety measures are efficiently put into practice whenever
circumstances demand them […] establishing special units of the National Civil Police and Public
Prosecutor’s Office, with the necessary resources and capabilities, so they can work in a coordinated way
6
to investigate these incidents with due diligence (…).
However, ideally Democratic Security would be developed, which entails the existence of a state capable of
promoting development which, in turn, leads to better welfare for the population. This should translate
into development policies i.e. the target of reference should be the human being in the fullest sense, as an
individual who interacts with his/her social and natural environment, based on national interests. In other
words, respect for the essential dignity of human beings, improving their quality of life and fully
developing their potential are essential requirements for security at every level.
Therefore achieving Democratic Security entails providing the essential conditions to guarantee protection
and security for every individual in exercising their universal freedoms and human rights, strengthening
and guaranteeing the rule of law across the whole country by reinforcing and legitimising democratic
authority, allowing institutions to freely exercise their authority, facilitating the rule of law and the active
participation of the country’s citizens in matters of common interest.
Democracy cannot be sustainable without strict adherence to the principles of non-discrimination,
including the protection of people who belong to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or
indigenous peoples, and by constantly striving to eliminate extreme poverty, underdevelopment,
7
marginalisation, economic inequality and social exclusion.
7.5 Prioritisation of vulnerable groups

The National Policy for Prevention and Protection should focus on the target population in order to comply with
the recommendations of human rights mechanisms laid down both in agreements and created independently.
Above all the policy should effectively guarantee their work, which contributes to democratic transformation,
increasing citizens’ participation and improving living, social, political and economic conditions, reducing
social and political tensions and creating an environment of tolerance and peaceful coexistence.
There is no doubt that one of the tasks required for the democratic consolidation of our country will be
precisely this strengthening of the system for the protection of human rights, in which once again the
involvement of society will play a key role.
It will therefore need to address certain categories or sectors of society that are at risk of violence – to their
lives, physical well-being, safety or freedom – such as:
a. Leaders or activists of political groups, especially opposition parties
b. Leaders or activists of social, civic and community associations, trade unions, farming
associations and ethnic groups
c. Leaders or activists of human rights organisations
d. Victims of crime, the abuse of power and/or witnesses of examples of human rights violations or
infringements of international humanitarian law, regardless of whether or not they have initiated
the respective criminal, disciplinary or administrative processes
e. Journalists and media personnel who publicise, defend, preserve and restore human rights and
promote the implementation of International Humanitarian Law, or who exercise the right to
freedom of speech
f. Mayors, councillors and trade unionists who are at risk due to the legitimate exercise of their
profession.
These persons are a priority whenever a complaint has been lodged with the competent bodies and
there is no national protection mechanism in place to protect them.
6 OAS, General Assembly, Resolution AG/RES. 2067 (XXXV-0/05), of 7 June 2005, cited in the Report on the Situation
of Human Rights Defenders, Page 38.
7 Democratic Communities, Declaration of Santiago, April 2005.
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7.6 Comprehensive nature of human rights

In order for the Prevention and Protection Programme of this policy to be effective and produce the
anticipated results, it must be backed up by a strong political commitment from the state.
The programme is part of the National Policy on Human Rights and the National Human Rights Plan,
which is a political priority in all the decision-making institutional bodies at both central and local levels.
It should ensure the existence of regulations that clearly define the powers and responsibilities of the
central and decentralised authorities, and guarantee a consistent transfer of competences and resources
8
from national to local bodies.
“…we will not have development without security, we will not have security without development, and we will not
9
have either security or development if human rights are not respected”
The observance, promotion and protection of human rights is an intrinsic element of any democratic system,
so we can state that there is an indivisible relationship between democracy, the rule of law and human rights.
Thus to the extent to which a democratic regime can guarantee the rule of law and respect for human rights
for all the inhabitants of a state, the strengthening of any of these elements has a direct impact on the strength
of the others. For example, the strengthening of democratic institutions and full implementation of the rule
of law increase the possibility that human rights will be respected, promoted and protected.
7.7 The fight against corruption and impunity

According to the expert Rooke, corruption facilitates and causes human rights abuses and is the enemy of
good government. What is needed to fight against corruption is to foster transparency, accountability, the
participation of civil society and fundamentally, the political will to attack and change the institutional
systems that foster, facilitate or allow structural corruption to become established.
The United Nations Rapporteur Lois Joinet recognises four main principles on the subject of the violation
of civil and political rights:
1. The right to know
2. The right to justice
3. The right to redress
10
4. The guarantee that offences will not recur.
On the subject of economic, social and cultural rights, their Rapporteur, Magistrate El Hadji Guise, showed
that the practices that lead to violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural rights (ESC) include debt,
structural adjustment programmes, corruption, fiscal and customs fraud and other economic crimes. The
consequences may be:
1. Violations of collective or community rights
2. Violations of individual ESC rights
11
3. Violations of the ESC rights of vulnerable groups.
The French legal expert Joinet, in his “Final Report on the Question of Impunity of the Perpetrators of Human
Rights Violations”, which was presented to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1998, attempts the
following definition:
“Impunity is understood as the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of calling the perpetrators of human rights violations
to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any
inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, convicted including being sentenced
to make reparations to their victims.”
Impunity, understood as “non-accountability”, “absence of punishment” or “immunity from sentencing” can manifest
12
itself in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive: a) statutory impunity and b) structural impunity.
8 IACHR “Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas”, Organisation of American States (2006),
Page 39.
9 Report from the Secretary General, A Wider Concept of Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All, A759/
2005/paragraph 17.
10 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1.
11 E/CN.4Sub.2/1997/Rev.1.
12 Kai Ambos, the classification of impunity. In “Impunity and International Criminal Law.” Editorial Ad-Hoc.
Buenos Aires, Argentina (1999).
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A. Statutory or legal impunity – de jure

The source of statutory or legal impunity, as its name indicates, is found in a law that entails the state’s express
13
abdication of the aims and sanctions inherent in its punitive authority. We believe it is important to note that
there are gaps in the substantive or civil procedural law that prevents the state from exercising ius puniendi.
More specifically, in his appeal against the “law against victims”, Joinet pointed out that these serious
offences often go unpunished by virtue of judicial impunity (“de jure”) that makes use of institutions such
as prescription, pardon and amnesty.
The Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action are explicit in calling for the abolition of laws that protect the
impunity of the most serious human rights violations.
It should be borne in mind that the measures that impeded access to justice for these serious crimes
through pardons or amnesties were regarded as being against the American Convention on Human Rights
in the Inter-American system.
B. Structural impunity – de facto

It is well known that it is not only in the judicial system that the issue of impunity needs to be tackled. As well
as impunity de jure there is also impunity de facto, and though the legislative framework clearly defines
people’s human rights and the legal obligations of the state that are part of its duty to guarantee constitutional
order, this framework should provide the inspiration for public policies to protect and defend human rights.
This concerns the protection of victims, their families, witnesses, the civil parties in lawsuits and lawyers,
civil servants and magistrates involved in protecting and defending these people.
Once again, there should be no impunity for those who work against these people by putting obstacles in
the way of processes that seek the truth, justice and redress. This requires a vigilant attitude from a
democratic state imposing the rule of law which is the only body capable of guaranteeing the functions of
building dignity, protecting memory, truth and justice.
Structural impunity comes from a series of factors of an endogenous or exogenous nature which affect the
duties of criminal justice. Despite the existence of a legal system which should be capable of reacting with
criminal sanctions or exercising ius puniendo, these factors lead to the state adopting a negligent approach
to the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations, thus making
the duty of criminal justice illusory. At the same time, this situation undermines the credibility of, and
society’s trust in, the institutions responsible for ensuring justice is done, creating a spiral of impunity that
14
can end up affecting the rule of law in its entirety.
According to Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, the exogenous factors – those found outside the legal or judicial
sphere – which promote structural impunity are expressed in: a) the absence of complaints about
punishable deeds due to the fear of reprisals or other negative consequences, and b) a simple lack of trust
in the judicial system as a viable alternative that is capable of solving the disputes that are brought before
it. Meanwhile the endogenous factors – those found within the legal system – are expressed in: a) the
existence of special legislation for sentencing certain crimes b) insufficient investigative action by the
15
authorities c) a lack of cooperation from the authorities d) an overloaded criminal justice system.
Meanwhile, according to the legal expert Manuel E. Ventura Robles, the concept of ‘impunity’ does not, in its
strictest sense, describe a legal matter but rather a phenomenon of legal, social, cultural, psychological and
even economic dimensions. In general terms, this can be understood as the lack of sentencing, non-
accountability or the absence of punishment, which evidently run counter to the widely-understood
16
concepts of impunability, imputability and immunity.
We know that during the internal armed conflict there were massive, systematic, extremely serious
violations of human rights which contributed to the collapse of law and public order, with a culture of fear
and silence prevailing for more than three decades.
13 Definition provided by Dr Sergio Garcia Ramirez in International Jurisdiction, Human Rights.

14 Kai Ambos, the definition of impunity. In “Impunity and International Criminal Law.” Editorial Ad-Hoc.
Buenos Aires, Argentina (1999).
15 Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Response to the
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court to the Various Forms of Impunity in Serious Violations of Human
Rights and their Consequences. Page 399 (2004).
16 Manuel Ventura Robles is a Judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and spoke on Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Subject of Justice in relation to Access to Justice and Impunity at
the “Regional Workshop on Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law”, invited by the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), between 5 and 7 September 2005, “Access to Justice and Impunity”.
188
Improving awareness of human rights and the rule of law and restoring confidence in state institutions is
the way to gradually build a culture of justice, one that addresses the development of human abilities and
long-term sustainable development, while fighting against impunity.
VIII. Strategic objectives

General Objective
The democratic rule of law is strengthened through the implementation of an comprehensive, well-
structured public policy that is driven by the different state sectors and civil society and effectively
addresses the problem of security. It should guarantee a favourable environment for the work of human
rights defenders, trade unionists, officers of the law, parties to proceedings, victims of crime, journalists
and media personnel as well as other vulnerable groups, helping to consolidate democracy.
This policy establishes the framework for strengthening the institutional capabilities of the state and civil
society, ensuring that human rights are better respected, promoted, protected and guaranteed, and also
ensuring that the State of Guatemala guarantees effective compliance with the protection measures called
for by the United Nations Rapporteurs and Special Representatives, the UN Special Mechanisms and the
Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, and also develops a national mechanism for
prevention and protection.
Specific Objectives
Specific objective 1: the fight against corruption and impunity
The institutions responsible for security and justice, and for their supervision and monitoring, shall adopt
effective and exhaustive strategies to prevent corruption. To do so, a monitoring mechanism shall be defined
to reduce power and create a counter-power, limiting the opportunities that make civil servants and public
sector workers in the national security or intelligence services vulnerable to corruption and cronyism.
The fight against corruption must be one of the main objectives of the new mandate of the Ministry of the
Interior and the reform process of the National Civil Police, so it is essential to tackle this issue head-on. In
this fight it must first be understood that efficiency and corruption are antagonistic, since in order for an
individual or collective to take advantage of what is public for personal or private gain they are unlikely to
be efficient at what they do. Secondly, corruption is the main cause of distrust, discredit or lack of
institutional legitimacy vis-à-vis citizens and thirdly, the beneficiaries of corruption, on seeing their
interests served, turn into the main opponents of change.
The fight against corruption and impunity as a public policy and the process of supporting and promoting
the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) should focus on the fundamental
objective of tackling and breaking up illegal security forces and clandestine security organisations
(CIACS), eradicating impunity and strengthening the legal system.
Our government has already started supporting and promoting the CICIG through the creation of the
Presidential Commission for the Support of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala,
as an interim measure, through Governmental Agreement No. 65-2009.
The state investigation and criminal justice system will be strengthened in every aspect, primarily enabling
it to penalise homicides and other violent actions against individuals who, like trade unionists, judges,
witnesses, joint plaintiffs, victims, magistrates, journalists, media personnel and human rights defenders,
are victims of intolerance and above all, impunity.
Specific Objective 2: Improving and strengthening mechanisms
and programmes for prevention and protection
The intention is to develop preventative mechanisms and to improve and strengthen existing protective
mechanisms and programmes for the benefit of human rights defenders, parties to proceedings, media
personnel and other vulnerable groups whose lives, physical well-being, freedom, security or other
universal freedoms are threatened or at imminent risk of violence as a result of common crime, organised
crime, illegal or clandestine security forces working in parallel to the official forces.
We have taken the first steps by passing the Central American Convention for the Protection of Victims,
Witnesses, Experts and other Persons involved in criminal investigations and prosecutions, especially
drug-related activities and organised crime.
The essential mechanism for protecting the lives and other rights of our citizens is to strengthen the rule
of law across the whole country. However, many Guatemalans need special attention as they are the direct
and immediate victims of violence generated by organised crime or illegal groups whose intention is to
spread fear, terror and impunity and hence make the law inoperable.
189
It is therefore essential for the state and civil society to jointly design, promote and implement a National
Plan of Action on prevention and protection that contains mechanisms to promote and orchestrate the
United National Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and action to protect the victims of serious
crimes and the abuse of power: judges, lawyers, public prosecutors, human rights defenders, journalists
and media personnel.
Specific Objective 3: the Culture of Human Rights
The intention is to promote a culture of human rights in which public servants publicly recognise the
legitimate function of human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, media personnel, officers of the
law and other parties to proceedings. To do so the periods of greatest vulnerability must be taken into
account, and support and protection made evident, but most importantly a culture of non-violence should
prevail, encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflicts and coexistence as the fundamental basis for the
prevention and prosecution of crime.
IX. Action to be taken

To achieve these specific objectives, governmental and non-governmental institutions, with the
collaboration of the international community, shall pursue the following action:
9.1 Establish a programme against corruption and impunity

A programme against corruption and impunity that has a legislative and institutional framework shall be
developed in order to take following action:
a. Develop mechanisms for public complaints to be made to the legal system – a dedicated telephone
line or email address for acts relating to offences, the abuse of police power or acts of political
intimidation and persecution, or those of illegal or clandestine forces operating in parallel to the
official security forces.
b. Mechanisms for the public to complain to the legal system about acts related to violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law, corruption and criminal acts that involve de
jure and de facto impunity.
c. Continue the process of declassifying archives, documents, information and intelligence of the
state security forces from the period of the internal armed conflict.
d. Support and strengthen the process of Historical Clarification, the Dignification of Victims and
National Reconciliation.
e. In accordance with Article 30 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, Article
244 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Legislative Decree 92-94, and the Law on Access to
Information 57-2008 of the Congress of the Republic, state institutions are required to hand over
information for human rights cases requested by public prosecutors and judges to support
judicial investigations and processes, without state secrecy and national security becoming
obstacles or mechanisms of impunity.
f. Public mechanisms to legitimise and strengthen the legal system, the culture of peace and human
rights in order to improve governance and maintain democracy.
g. Information and awareness-raising campaigns about the importance of the CICIG Convention
and the cooperation of the international community in the fight against impunity.
h. The creation of alliances with the media so they can adequately inform the public about the
results of investigations and procedural activities intended to legitimise and enhance the validity
of the legal system.
i. Develop actions to cleanse the Public Administration, especially the General Directorate of
Migration and the ports and airports department – the main focus of human trafficking. This
criminal activity is the third source of revenue internationally after drugs and arms trafficking.
j. Promote and strengthen judicial independence and fiscal autonomy, carrying out a cleansing
process and prosecuting any officers of the law involved in acts of corruption and the perpetration
of criminal acts, thus encouraging access to justice.
k. Review, reform or repeal any legislation that provides incentives for corruption and impunity,
promoting legal initiatives and sanctioning and enacting laws that allow them to be fought and
punished. These acts specifically include illegal enrichment, international bribery, undue use of
reserved or privileged information by public sector employees for their own personal gain, the
diversion of assets or property, cash or securities given to public sector employees for their own
benefit or that of third parties during the course of their job.
190
l. Legislate against and punish vexatious litigation, i.e. the malicious use of judicial resources by
litigant lawyers who represent defendants on charges of corruption or other criminal acts with
the aim of complicating the process and thus absolving those responsible from any criminal
sanctions. Vexatious litigation also includes the fraudulent use of resources that have been
created to ensure due criminal process and judicial guarantees.
m. Redefine the Public Prosecutor’s policy against crime, and strengthen the prosecutors’ offices
dealing with corruption and crimes against officers of the law, human rights activists, trade
unionists, journalists and crimes from the past.
n. Reform Criminal Code Decree 17-73 of the Congress of the Republic on criminal acts and crimes
that threaten Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press, as legally protected rights.
o. Develop a national strategy to fight against organised crime.
p. Implement the law against organised crime to positive effect and develop the Directorate General
for Civil Intelligence.
q. Prevent and combat corruption in the private sector, promoting improvements to auditing and
accountancy regulations in the private sector and, where necessary, providing for effective civil,
administrative or criminal sanctions that are proportionate and dissuasive in the event of any
breach of these measures.
r. Approve, sanction and enact Initiative 4021 of the Congress of the Republic which proposes a law
on asset recovery.
s. Include in the Criminal Code the offences listed in the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (Decree 15-2001) and the United Nations Convention Against International Organised
Crime (Decree 87-2003), ratified by the Congress of the Republic, such as: bribery of foreign public
sector employees and cronyism, illegal enrichment, bribery in the private sector, embezzlement or
misappropriation of assets in the private sector, money-laundering of criminal gains, receiving of
stolen goods, undue use of reserved or confidential information, diversion of assets, illegal profit,
failure to declare, failure to transfer rights, criminalisation of acts of corruption committed in the
private sector, and accounting crimes.
t. Reform the sentences for cases of corruption envisaged in Criminal Code Decree 17-73 of the
Congress of the Republic on crimes committed by public sector employees, increasing them in
proportion to the damage or social impact caused.
u. Review and reform administrative legislation – the Civil Service Law, the law on honesty and
liability of public servants and public sector employees, the Organic Budget Law, the State
Contracting Law, the Accounting Control Law including taxation and customs, especially the
section on evasion.
v. Propose a law to protect people who report acts of corruption.
w. Reform Decree 70-96 on Protecting Parties to Proceedings and People involved in the Criminal
Justice Administration, bringing it into line with international best practice.
x. Re-initiate work on a Law on Comprehensive Assistance for the Victims of Crime.
y. Implement the AFIS system established in the Law on the National Citizens’ Register as an
essential tool for the Ministry of the Interior and the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
z. Implement the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Maritime Drug Trafficking held in
17
the City of Mexico in 2005.
aa. Review and combat the privatisation of police work – paramilitary-type neighbourhood groups,
vigilantes – and the large market in services offered by security companies which allows private
vigilantes or bodyguards to be contracted, over whom there is no control.
17 Inter-American Committee on Ports GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE OAS/Ser.L/XIV.4 MARITIME DRUG

TRAFFICKING CICAD/doc.3/05 of 25-27 October 2005 Mexico City, Mexico. Original: English FINAL REPORT
(preliminary version)
– Recommendation 3. – Effective controls at ports and of maritime drug trafficking.
– Recommendation 4. – Systems of gathering data currently used in ports.
– Recommendation 6. – Establishment of an inter-institutional council or committee to coordinate the joint
implementation of anti-drug security in ports.
– Recommendation 11. – Effective, systematic control of chemical cargo passing through ports in order to
prevent its illegal diversion.
– Recommendation 12. – Strengthening of security in the free zones of ports and in free ports.
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bb. Prevent, combat and punish the practice of lynching.

cc. Draw up a guide for contracting private security and surveillance services.
dd. Create a State or National Register of Public Security Personnel and National Civil Police, the
National Army and the Secretariat of Administrative and Security Matters.
ee. Create a State or National Register of Arms and/or Equipment – weapons belonging to the
18
security forces.
ff. Establish a Directorate General for Control of Arms and Ammunition – DIGECAM.
gg. Create a State or National Register for Private Security and Surveillance Services.
hh. Establish a Supervisory Authority for Private Security and Surveillance.
9.2 Creation of a prevention and protection system

a. Mapping of the current distribution of competences and powers between the different institutions
responsible for providing and implementing protection mechanisms and programmes.
b. Diagnosis of the main obstacles or problems, challenges and goals of the special protection services
(the state’s duty to guarantee protection) provided for human rights defenders, trade unionists,
judges, prosecutors, lawyers, victims of crime, witnesses, journalists and media personnel.
c. Systematically determine the powers and competences of the institutions responsible for
protection mechanisms and programmes, with the participation of civil society, placing priority
on the needs of beneficiaries.
d. Instigate and approve by Government Accord a Prevention and Protection Programme for
Human Rights Defenders and other Vulnerable Groups.
e. Design the regulations for the Prevention and Protection Programme and obtain approval from
the Ministry of the Interior.
f. Design the manual for the Prevention and Protection Programme for Human Rights Defenders
and other Vulnerable Groups and obtain approval from the Ministry of the Interior.
g. Instruct the authorities – public sector employees – by means of directives or circulars in order to
facilitate open dialogue at the very highest level with civil society organisations so they are not
perceived as the ‘enemy’ or ‘anti-establishment’.
h. Recognize the importance of women in the defence, promotion and implementation of human
rights, guaranteeing them protective measures that accommodate gender and cultural identity.
i. Strengthen economic and human resources and logistics to protect parties to proceedings and
people associated with the criminal justice system within the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in
accordance with Decree 70-96.
j. Develop a coordination mechanism for precautionary and provisional measures and urgent
action by the Ministry of the Interior and the Presidential Human Rights Commission that
includes the participation of other governmental, state and civil society bodies in order to
evaluate, monitor and verify compliance with these measures.
k. Encourage the participation of state and civil society institutions and bodies in putting together
19
an Early Warning System, in accordance with the state’s duty to provide prevention, protection,
preservation and restoration of the human rights and universal freedoms of the beneficiaries.
l. Ensure and strengthen the financial, budgetary and administrative independence of COPREDEH
and hence the unity and protection of human rights defenders.
m. Strengthen the National Civil Police, especially in terms of human rights, crime prevention, gender,
multiculturalism, executive security, the security of premises and preventative intelligence.
n. Establish, as a permanent mechanism, the Body of Analysis on Attacks of Human Rights Activists
set up by Ministerial Agreement No. 103-2008 of the Ministry of the Interior, and include in its
members a representative from the Presidential Human Rights Commission.
o. Carry out a purge of the state security forces.
18 This aspect has already been addressed in Articles 82 and 83 of Initiative 3902 which recommended passing the
Arms and Munitions Law at the plenary of the Congress of the Republic on 7 October 2008.
19 A system of generating an alert that would allow the identification of risks and threats of common, organised
and/or trans-national crime against public safety or the safety of vulnerable sectors, in accordance with the
social, political or cultural context, in order to ensure a rapid, effective response to risk prevention and counteract
threat, risks or criminal activities, reducing the vulnerability of people, assets or institutions.
192
p. Professionalise the security forces and corps so they are properly equipped to provide protection
to people at risk and vulnerable people, by creating elite forces.
q. Focus on preventative and protective actions.
r. Set up a committee within the structure of the Ministry of the Interior to draw up studies on risks,
threats and/or vulnerability, upgrading the prevention and protection systems for these
vulnerable groups.
s. Promote risk or conflict studies at a local and regional level so that their results offer increased
opportunities for clearer and better national, departmental and municipal prevention policies.
t. Draw up security, protection, emergency, contingency and crisis management plans.
u. Implement, with the collaboration of civil society, an observatory to protect human rights
defenders, officers of the law, trade unionists, journalists and media personnel.
v. Promote and implement administrative, legislative, political and any other kind of measures to
develop or perfect judicial protective mechanisms nationwide, which govern the actions of civil
servants and public sector employees in situations of imminent risk or threat when defending
human rights These should be cost-free and based on simplicity, economy of procedure and other
aspects that inform due process.
w. Develop informal mechanisms and fora for conflict resolution between individuals or groups
from civil society organisations and civil and/or military authorities.
x. Promote the activities of human rights defenders and officers of the law.
y. Encourage the adoption of national and international cooperation agreements to guarantee
protection in the event that the protected person and his/her family are obliged to leave the country.
z. Strengthen the security division of the Judicial Body (USOJ) and create within the Ministry of the
20
Interior, or using a new model available to the executive body, a Judicial Security Division to
guarantee the secure execution of judicial processes and the protection of magistrates, judges and
their families. This Judicial Security Division should have the following structure: 1) Judicial
Operations 2) Centre for the Analysis of Judicial Security 3) Judicial Services 4) Protection
Intelligence Office 5) an administration office.
aa. Create an elite security corps to protect judges and prosecutors responsible for pursuit, indictment
and prosecution of alleged members of organised crime groups.
bb. Provide regular training for the security staff of the Judicial Body and the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in security techniques and protective systems.
9.3 Programme to instil a culture of Human Rights

a. Issue a public statement from the Government of Guatemala in which it recognises the importance
for the country as a whole of the work carried out by human rights defenders, officers of the law,
journalists and media personnel.
b. Provide regular public recognition for the legitimacy of the activities of human rights defenders,
farmers’ leaders, trade unionists, media personnel and journalists.
c. Strengthen human rights infrastructure by creating a National Human Rights Commission in
accordance with the Paris Principles on National Human Rights Institutions.
d. Raise awareness and train members of the police forces on the respect and protection of human
rights defenders, officers of the law, journalists and media personnel, to ensure that security
measures, whether precautionary or provisional, are effectively put into place during the time
warranted by the situation of risk.
e. Form alliances with the mass media to run awareness-raising campaigns on respect for and the
protection of officers of the law, human rights defenders and journalists.
f. Run strategic campaigns to raise the media’s awareness of the importance of the activities of
human rights defenders, judges, prosecutors, litigant lawyers, public defence lawyers, the police,
journalists and media personnel.
g. Undertake educational and awareness-raising activities aimed at all public servants and state
employees and at society in general in order to make them aware of the role played by human
rights defenders, judges, prosecutors, litigant lawyers, public defence lawyers, the police, trade
unionists, journalists and media personnel.
20 The National Security and Justice Accord refers to the creation of a Ministry of Public Security and a Ministry of Justice.
193
h. Coordinate, between human rights prosecutors, the Presidential Human Rights Commission and
the National Institute of Public Administration, a national programme on the culture of human
rights for public servants and public sector employees.
i. Review and update the curriculum in the state educational system to encourage and promote
human rights, with an across-the-board focus on gender and multiculturalism.
j. Publish and disseminate state reports on mechanisms adopted, both in agreements and independently.
k. Promote the implementation of best practice in human rights in the state security forces avoiding,
above all, the excessive use of force in public demonstrations or evictions by using the appropriate
measures for planning, prevention and investigation.
l. Implement the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.
m. Promote the decentralisation of public human rights policy.
n. Promote the National Plan of Action on Human Rights, creating the relevant Governmental
Accord and subsequently ratifying it before the UN General Secretary.
o. Promote a programme for a Culture of Peace and National Reconciliation.
p. Instigate the process of disarmament and control of firearms possession. To do so it will be
necessary, inter alia, to regulate the possession of firearms on the public highway, public places
and recreational areas in order to instigate periods when carrying firearms is prohibited.
q. Develop national disarmament campaigns.
r. Train the police in the subject of human rights and care for victims, depending on the type of
crime, in order to generate a culture of respect for and promotion of human rights.
s. Re-focus the Local Security Councils to perform crime-prevention tasks rather than act as
vigilantes, paramilitary patrols and/or people’s courts under the pretext of being indigenous
tribunals or applying vigilante-style justice.
Signed on 15 April 2009 by the Congress of the Republic, the Executive Body, the Supreme Court of Justice and the
Ministry of the Interior, with the support of the University of San Carlos de Guatemala, the Evangelical Alliance of
Guatemala, the Archbishop of Guatemala and the Human Rights Prosecutor. National Theatre of the Miguel Ángel
Asturias Cultural Centre, Ciudad de Guatemala.
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Annex 7: Guatemala: Agreement

to create an Analysis Institution (2008)
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Agreement to create an Institution for the Analysis of Attacks
against Human Rights Defenders in Guatemala.
MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT NO. 103-2008

Guatemala, 10 January 2008
Whereas in accordance with Article 36 of the law of the Executive, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible
for formulating policies, complying and ensuring compliance with the legal system in order to maintain
peace and public order, the safety of individuals and their assets and to guarantee their rights; and that for
this purpose it is responsible, inter alia, for drawing up and implementing plans for public safety and for
all matters relating to the maintenance of public order and the safety of individuals and their assets;
Whereas in enforcing these powers for the purposes of preventing attacks against human rights defenders in
Guatemala, it is advisable to establish a institution whose function shall be to analyse the patterns of these
attacks, if they exist, by means of specific scientific methodology that is approved and agreed by all parties;
Therefore
In exercising the functions assigned under Article 194, subsections a) and f) of the Political Constitution of
the Republic of Guatemala, and based on the provisions of Article 27, subsections c), f) and m) and Article 36,
subsection m), of the Law of the Executive, Decree 114-97, of the Congress of the Republic,
It is hereby agreed
ARTICLE 1 - To create an Institution for the Analysis of Attacks against Human Rights Defenders in
Guatemala, hereafter “the Institution”, reporting to the First Vice-Minister of the Ministry of the Interior,
whose function will be to analyse, in context, the patterns of attacks against human rights observers and
defenders, if they exist, by means of specific scientific methodology approved and agreed upon by the
members of this Institution.
This institution shall be set up for four years from the date this agreement comes into force.
ARTICLE 2 - The institution shall be made up of:
a) A representative from the Ministry of the Interior, who will act as coordinator;
b) A representative from the General Directorate for Civil Intelligence (DIGICI);
c) The Head of the Human Rights Department of the Criminal Investigation Division (DINC) of the
National Civil Police;
d) A representative from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, specifically the Public Prosecutor from the
Human Rights Department;
e) Two representatives from national human rights organisations;
f) One representative from an international human rights organisation.
The members of the institution shall be public servants at the highest hierarchical level within the
institution they represent, or be specially designated representatives for this specific purpose, who exercise
sufficient power to take decisions within the institution they represent. They will offer their services to the
institution without remuneration.
195
ARTICLE 3 - The members of the institution shall provide the necessary information, in accordance with
their particular area of competence, to study the cases to be analysed in the course of their work, complying
with any restrictions established by law on this issue. The governmental institutions and civil organisations
involved shall facilitate and provide their full cooperation for the analysis of each case in the study, the
purpose of which shall be to identify patterns of attack against human rights defenders.
ARTICLE 4 - The institution will hold an ordinary meeting once a week and an extraordinary meeting
whenever necessary, subject to advance notice from the coordinator. Its reports or recommendations shall
be approved by consensus.
ARTICLE 5 - The quorum for a meeting of the institution to be considered valid shall be half the number
of members plus one.
ARTICLE 6 - The institution shall draft a set of rules of procedure and shall allocate tasks that are of a
strictly administrative nature, within sixty days of the date this agreement comes into effect.
ARTICLE 7 - This agreement shall become effective on the day following its publication in the Diario del
Centro América.
Let it be notified
196
Annex 8: Guatemala: Catalogue of measures

for the prevention of human rights abuses
and protection of human rights defenders
and other particularly vulnerable groups
(Guatemala, February 2008)
Foreword
The Unidad de Coordinación de Protección (Protection Coordination Unit, PCU) was established in early
2004 as a dependency of the Comisión Presidencial Coordinadora de la Política del Ejecutivo en Materia de
Derechos Humanos (Presidential Coordinating Commission of Executive Branch Policies on Human
Rights, COPREDEH), to strengthen governmental action by encouraging the adoption of protection
measures – that is, precautionary and provisional measures and urgent calls for action. The PCU is
responsible for adopting, monitoring and evaluating the protection measures adopted and for keeping
international Human Rights protection bodies informed of progress.
As a result of discussions between governmental and civil society organisations and the International
Community a range of deficiencies have become apparent, including:
a. The absence of an integrated protection policy;
b. Defective national-level protection mechanisms and programmes;
c. An absence of risk and vulnerability assessments;
d. Deficient services;
e. The adoption of inappropriate measures;
f. Improvised security schemes; and
1
g. Little or no investigation of the facts leading to the adoption of special measures.
Building on these findings, this document draws on the experiences and evolution of the Human Rights
prevention and protection measures requested by civil society organisations, individual applicants and
the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office (the Procurador de los Derechos Humanos) that were adopted by
the Guatemalan state in fulfilment of its Treaty and Non-Treaty Human Rights obligations before the
United Nations and the Organisation of American States.
In response to this situation, the Catalogue of Measures for the Prevention of Human Rights Abuses and
the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and other Particularly Vulnerable Groups, is intended to
contribute to the implementation of Objective 2 of the Public Prevention and Protection Policy, namely to:
“Develop, improve and strengthen existing protection mechanisms and programmes that benefit Human Rights
Defenders (HRDs), others implicated in legal proceedings, and other vulnerable groups who have suffered threats or
whose lives, physical integrity, freedom, security and other universal freedoms are in immediate danger as a result of
actions of common criminals, organised crime or illegal, clandestine or parallel security bodies”.
These measures are intended to guarantee the fulfilment of the objectives and actions contained in this
Public Policy and to guarantee the security and protection of the social sectors mentioned above that have
been subjected to threats, intimidation, persecution and/or attempts on their lives and physical integrity
as a result of their activities and in exercise of their rights.
1 29 November 2004: Seminar on the First Proposal for a Protection Policy, National Plan of Action for the
Protection and Cataloguing of Protection Measures; , June 2006: First Workshop for HRDs; 12 December 2006:
First Inter-institutional Meeting to Analyse Prevention and Protection Programmes and Mechanisms; and the
February 2007 workshop “Towards Improved Protection for HRDs in Guatemala”.
197
Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. Guiding Principles
3. Prevention and Protection Programme
3.1 Target Population of the Prevention and Protection Programme
3.2 Structure of the Prevention and Protection Programme
3.1.1 COPREDEH
3.1.1.1 The Protection Coordination Unit (PCU)
3.1.2 Committee for the Assessment of Risks and Protection Measures (CERPM)
3.1.2.1 Procedures for Requesting National Protection

3.1.2.2 Criteria for Accepting Cases
3.1.2.3 Treatment of Urgent Cases
3.1.2.4 Assessment of Protection Measures
3.1.2.5 Reasons for the Refusing or Withdrawing Protection
3.3 Early Warning System
3.3.1 Basic Aspects of the Early Warning System
3.3.2 Specific Objectives
3. 4 Elite Prevention and Protection Unit
3.4.1 Specialised Training Bodyguards of the Elite Specialised Protection Unit.
4. Prevention and Protection Measures
4 .1 Prevention Measures
4.2 Protection Measures
198
1. Introduction
While the social, economic, political and legal circumstances in the country have produced changes in the
Human Rights situation and in prospects for the construction of peace following the Internal Armed
Conflict which ended with the signing of the Peace Accords, serious problems remain.
The illustrious Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, of the POrganizationof American States
indicated in 2003 that “In recent years the fundamental rights of citizens have been constantly violated as
a result of citizen insecurity…, and as the result of pacts of aggression, harrassment and intimidation
2
controlled or tolearated by state spheres or by its parallel structures…”
In 2004, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) found that “violence, a product
of different phenomena such as organised crime, youth gangs, and illegal bodies and clandestine security
apparatuses have become a national priority because of their effects on public security and in creating a
3
state of social alarm.”
However, neither the state institutions nor society at large have fully recognised the meaning of these
transformations, with the result that the ghosts of the past continue to haunt the present.
The many explanations for these phenomena include the fact that the years of conflict have not only created
a legacy of resentment and a culture of violence that in turn generates injustice, authoritarian, antisocial
and predatory attitudes, but also an environment of discrimination, racism, inequality, corruption and
impunity that taken together mean that there is still a need to investigate and punish grave Human Rights
violations committed during the internal armed conflict, as well as a whole range of violations and criminal
acts that continue to be committed.
Today, it remains difficult to ensure guarantees and the respect, defence and protection of Human Rights.
The multiple factors that in the past led to the violation of individual and collective civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights remain present.
This situation is manifested in organised crime, common criminality, youth gangs, drugs trafficking,
lynchings, vendettas, community or local-level violence, gender-based and domestic violence, in violence
against women, administrators and other employees of the legal system, others implicated in legal
proceedings [sujetos legales], HRDs, journalists and other communications professionals.
Given these circumstances, especially in the context of recent events involving the National Civilian Police
- whose agents were involved in the unacceptable murder of four Salvadoran citizens and the subsequent
murder in a detention centre of the four members of the Criminal Investigations Division accused of the
crime - there the security forces have been discredited and are widely distrusted, and there is widespread
condemnation of state responsibility for criminal acts.
The challenges faced by male and female HRDs, employees of the legal system, others implicated in legal
proceedings, victims of abuses of power, journalists and other communications professionals, trade
unionists and other vulnerable groups who work in situations of threat and intimidation demand that the
state should develop dynamic and effective mechanisms to respond to their security needs.
Today, recourse to supranational prevention and protection mechanisms challenges the security services and
the Guatemalan state to develop a specialised infrastructure capable of guaranteeing, among other things:
a) A Prevention and Protection Programme;
b) Strengthened institutions;
c) Improved coordination and cooperation;
d) Training for security personnel;
e) The development of a civilian intelligence service;
f) Effective investigation and punishment of perpetrators;
g) Analysis and assessment of risks and vulnerability;
h) A standard prevention and protection mechanism that strengthens state Human Rights policies
and the National Plan of Action in favour of these groups and individuals.
2 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, “Justicia e Inclusión Social los desafíos de la democracia en
Guatemala” Organization of American States (2003) p. 45.
3 Ninth Report of the Secretary General on the Verification of the Peace Accords, 30 August 2004, par. 4.
199
The Guatemalan government believes it is necessary to develop a comparative framework for the protection
of certain sectors of society, including those indicated above, in order to maximise the efforts of the security
forces to guarantee the enjoyment of their rights and fundamental freedoms.
Now is the time to provide a convincing response to the increased levels of violence committed against
some sectors of society with which unscrupulous groups, illegal armed groups, clandestine security
organisations and parallel powers increase the vulnerability of certain sectors of society that, through their
activities, contribute to the development of democracy, justice, peace and respect for Human Rights. Thus,
the many responsibilities of the Guatemalan state include the obligation to prevent and pursue crime within
4
a framework of respect for Human Rights and a commitment to combating hidden or invisible forces.
Given this situation, it is important to develop constitutional and ordinary legal norms that recognise the
fundamental rights of the Guatemalan population and establish new mechanisms for their protection.
While it is the case that the Prevention and Protection Policy has established national mechanisms for the
protection of Human Rights, these do not comply with international standards established under
5
International Human Rights Law.
Consequently, the aim of this Catalogue is to:
1. Strengthen the institutional capacity of the state and of society to implement a Prevention and
Protection Programme and, as a result, increase the guarantees and respect, promotion, and
protection of Human Rights, and hold the Guatemalan state accountable for the effective
fulfilment of the protection measures requested by the UN Rapporteurs, Special Representatives
and Special Mechanisms and by the Inter American Court and Commission of Human Rights.
2. Ensure inter-institutional coordination and cooperation between the existing mechanisms and
programmes for the protection of threatened sectors, optimising the response and avoiding
duplication between the different national protection mechanisms.
3. Offer preventive and protection measures to vulnerable individuals and groups that are
threatened as a consequence of their activities and in exercise of their rights; protecting and
guaranteeing their right to life, physical integrity, other universal freedoms and their ability to
continue carrying out their activities.
4. Instil confidence in these vulnerable populations in the state institutions responsible for
guaranteeing their protection and safety through the implementation of the State Prevention and
Protection Programme.
5. Combat and reduce levels of insecurity, vulnerability and risk faced by these groups in pursuit of
their activities and in exercising their rights, including the right to protect and defend Human
Rights and to fight impunity.
6. Provide a standard prevention and protection service in accordance with the seriousness of each
particular case, tailored to the needs of the beneficiaries, free of discrimination and guaranteeing
equal treatment.
7. Contribute to the functioning of democracy, promoting and strengthening the Rule of Law,
protecting vulnerable sectors from the groups and individuals that attack them and, as a
consequence, imperil social harmony and democracy.
4 In The Future of Democracy, Norberto Bobbio defines Invisible Powers as those which act at the margins of
democratic and jurisdictional controls, that resist and refuse to respect, legality and which, when they do not
manipulate or corrupt them, pressure political institutions, by the use of force if necessary, in order to produce
environments that enable them to preserve their privileged political space and pursue interests contrary to the
national. p. 21
5 Protection for witnesses, trade unionists, journalists and others involved in legal processes (witnesses, victims,
the aggrieved, experts, consultants, co-accusers, etc) is covered by the Ley para la Protección de Sujetos
Procesales y Personas Vinculadas a la Administración de Justicia (Law for the Protection of Parties to Trials and
Persons Involved in the Administration of Justice); Criminal Legislative Decree No 70-96; Ley Orgánica de la
Procuraduría General de la Nación: Decreto Legislativo Número 67-2002 (Law Creating the Office of the Solicitor
General: Legislative Decree No 67-2002); Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada: Decreto Legislativo número
21-2006 (Law to Combat Organised Crime: Legislative Decree No 21-2006); Código Procesal Civil y Mercantil:
Decreto Ley Número 107 (Civil and Commercial Code; Decree Law No 107); Reglamento de Organización de la
Policía Nacional Civil, y Acuerdo Gubernativo 662-2005, 9 de diciembre de 2005- del Decreto Legislativo Número
11-97 Ley de la Policía Nacional Civil (Regulation covering the Structuring of the National Civilian Police and
Governmental Agreement No 662-2005, 9 December 2005 of the Legislative Decree No 11-97vilian Police Law. See
also the prevention and protection measures developed by the Legal System and the Prosecuting Authorites.
200
2. Guiding principles
All the protection measures contained in the Prevention and Protection Programme, the Plan of Action,
this Catalogue, and the Programme it presents will be governed by the following principles:
1. Prevention.
The institutions responsible for providing protection will adopt effective and exhaustive strategies to
prevent attacks, intimidation or acts committed against HRDs, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, witnesses,
and others implicated in legal proceedings, journalists and other communications professionals and trade
unionists. In development of these responsibilities they will take into account the periods of greatest
vulnerability, and develop early warning systems.
2. Efficiency.
All the government and state bodies responsible for the different prevention and protection programmes
established under national and international legislation will coordinate and cooperate between themselves
in order to avoid duplication in their procedures and maximise material and human resources. In order to
guarantee the hoped-for results, the scope and responsibilities of the centralised authorities will be clearly
defined, guaranteeing their coherence, the budgets and logistical support they require and the
implementation of the protection measures, while avoiding victimising the beneficiaries or their family
members a second time.
3. Appropiateness.
Given the particular urgency and extreme seriousness of the situations confronted, and the need for
protection measures, including precautionary, provisional or other security measures and calls for urgent
action, the procedures governing the coordination, adoption and implementation of protection measures
should be simple, accessible, delivered according to the needs of the beneficiaries, and in compliance with
national and international obligations.
4. Tutelary functions.
Except when ordinary legal procedures are followed, protection activities designed to comply with
precautionary, provisional or other security measures including calls for urgent action, do not enter into
detail concerning the causes of the situation but are adopted immediately in order to prevent attacks and
6
permit the free exercise of Human Rights and universal freedoms, according to the pro persona principle.
This is because precautionary and provisional measures do not require the same rigour and procedural
complexity that is prescribed in Guatemalan legislation.
Consequently, various administrative, legislative, political and other procedures need to be adopted if the
legal protection measures to be implemented in the country are to be capable of regulating the actions of
public servants and employees in cases where HRDs face immediate threats or risk that affect their ability
to defend Human Rights. These procedures should be inspired in principles of due process, being for
example simple, administratively uncomplicated, and free to the user.
5. The voluntary principle.

Without prejudice to the reasons for exclusion defined in the regulations governing the different prevention
and protection mechanisms, acceptance in the protection scheme, and any decision to withdraw from it,
should be voluntary, according to legal principal. Consequently, all precautionary, provisional or other
security measures should only be adopted following consultation with the beneficiaries so that their
appropriateness be guaranteed and beneficiaries are able to continue with their activities.
However, the reasons for exclusion and withdrawal from the protection mechanism should be clearly
defined, and include cases where the beneficiary breaks the law or acts in ways that negatively affect the
security of others. The state bodies must ensure that due process is guaranteed should prevention and
protection measures be withdrawn.
6 Translator’s note [sic]: The term pro persona appears to refer to the pro homine principle, which in international
law means that when applying domestic legislation passed in reference to international law, the norm is to adhere
to the interpretation that most favours the respect for rights.
201
6. Equal treatment and non-discrimination.

The national Human Rights bodies and the entities responsible for prevention and protection measures
will, when responding to orders or requests for inclusion, acceptance, delivery and implementation of
protection measures, must ensure equal treatment and non-discrimination. Consequently there will be no
differential treatment or discrimination whatever in the provision of services for reasons of gender, ethnic
origin, social or economic condition, sexual preference or orientation, language, nationality, religion,
political opinion or any other reason. However, special or specific procedures should be adopted for
female beneficiaries because of the greater levels of risk and vulnerability associated with their gender.
7. The principles of negotiation and consultation.

Stable channels for respectful and constructive consultation and dialogue should be established between
state bodies, beneficiaries and civil society (including Human Rights organisations, trade unions,
journalists’ associations and other vulnerable sectors) so that their needs may be analysed and appropriate
protection measures offered.
8. Specialisation.
All state institutions involved in the adoption and implementation of protection measures will ensure that
security teams and bodyguards are fully trained so that they are able to offer adequate protection to
vulnerable persons and those at risk.
Their recruitment, induction and re-training should be carried out with complete transparency and with
the participation of the population for whom the programmes have been designed; they should,
furthermore, be trained in good practice in Human Rights, the responsibilities of the state and International
Human Rights Law.
9. Confidentiality.
All aspects related to protection procedures – whether precautionary, provisional or other security
measures – are to be developed according to strict criteria of confidentiality so as not to increase the levels
7
of vulnerability of the beneficiaries.
10. Timescale.
Protection measures will initially be granted for a reasonable period of six (6) months, extendable for a
further six (6) months on expiry. However, they will always be granted for a reasonable period that
coincides with the duration of the risk that led to their adoption in the first place.
11. Incrementalism and proportionality.

The prevention or protection offered, and the associated plan, will be implemented according to the degree
or situation of threat, danger or risk to life, physical integrity, security or freedom of the beneficiaries
identified in the analysis of risk and vulnerability.
12. Incorporation and the integral nature of the programme.

All protection procedures are rooted in the connection between the threat, the danger or risk and the
activity of the beneficiary (HRDs, servants of the legal system, others implicated in legal proceedings,
victims of abuses of power, journalists, including communications professionals, trade unionists and other
vulnerable groups ). That is, their need for protection results from their activities.
This principle should inform all the actions and services offered by the national prevention and protection
programmes, enabling coordination, cooperation, information exchange and monitoring of the
investigations carried out by the prosecuting authorities and the National Civilian Police into the
circumstances that led to protection being offered.
7 This right will be exercised according to articles 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 44 and 45 of the Guatemalan Political
Constitution. Should any reservation be lodged, clarifying information should be requested in accordance with
the procedural rules according to which a Supervisory Judge of Guarantees (Juez Contralor de Garantías) will
be responsible for dealing with it, especially in cases related to military or diplomatic affairs relating to national
security or to matters raised by individuals covered by guarantees of confidentiality.
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3. The prevention and protection programme
The Guatemalan government, in fulfilment of the recommendations of Treaty and Non-Treaty Mechanisms
for the protection of Human Rights, has produced this Catalogue to present the Programme for the Prevention
of Human Rights Abuses and Protection of HRDs, servants of the legal system, others implicated in legal
proceedings, journalists, trade unionists, communications professionals, and other vulnerable groups.
3.1 Target population of the prevention and protection programme

While the constitutionally enshrined duty to provide guarantees establishes that protection should be
available to the whole population or every inhabitant of the country, these principles incorporate a principle
of positive discrimination or affirmative action that responds to the urgency and vulnerability that
characterises the professional activities of those who defend fundamental rights.
The programme forms a part of the Public Human Rights Policy and the associated National Action Plan
and should be implemented proactively as a national mechanism, complementary and contributing to, the
other prevention and protection measures defined in constitutional and ordinary legislation, statutory
regulation or individualised legislation described in the Prevention and Protection Programme.
However, the programme should respond to requests for the adoption of security or protection measures
required by supranational Human Rights protection mechanisms, including preventive or precautionary
measures or calls for urgent action.
Thus, the prevention, protection, preservation and reestablishment of the rights of the reporting party are
intended to respond to benefit sections of society whose lives, physical integrity, security or freedom are at
risk because of their activities. These include:
1. Leaders and activists of Human Rights organisations.
2. Administrators and other servants of the Legal System.
3. Leaders and activists of social, civic and community organisations, interest groups, trade unions,
peasants and ethnic groups.
4. Leaders and activists of political organisations, especially those in opposition.
5. Victims of crimes, the abuse of power and/or witnesses or experts in cases of Human Rights
abuses and infractions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), independently of whether the
respective penal, disciplinary or administrative proceedings have been initiated.
6. Journalists and communications professionals who, in development of their professional
activities, take on the dissemination, defence, preservation and re-establishment of Human
Rights and the application of IHL.
7. Mayors, municipal councillors and representatives who, in the course of their activities, are
exposed to risk.
8. In the case of population groups identified in numbers 2, 5 and 6 above, providing they are not
already covered by a different protection system or beneficiaries of the “System for the Protection
of Witnesses and Other Legal Servants involved in the Administration of Criminal Justice” as
defined in Legislative Decree No 70-96
3.2 Structure of the prevention and protection programme

3.2.1 COPREDEH
The Presidential Coordinating Commission of Executive Branch Policies on Human Rights, or COPREDEH,
is the body responsible for coordinating the actions of ministries and other dependencies of the Executive
8
charged with ensuring the application and protection of Human Rights in the country.
In 2004 the COPREDEH, in exercise of its responsibility for implementing the Executive’s Human Rights
Policy, created the Protection Coordination Unit (PCU), a specialised body that coordinates, adopts and
monitors protection measures. The PCU is, furthermore, responsible for producing periodic reports on
protection activities for the international and Inter-American Human Rights protection systems.
This Catalogue has been produced jointly by the state and civil society organisations in fulfilment of the
recommendations of the international and/or regional Human Rights protection mechanisms.
8 According to Government Agreements Nos 404-91, 486-91, 468-91, 586-91, 549-91, 222-92 and 162-95.
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3.2.1.1 The protection coordinatio unit –PCU-

The Protection Coordination Unit has the following objectives:
A. Overall Objective: Ensure that the state guarantees effective compliance with the protection
measures requested by the Inter-American Commission (Precautionary Measures) and the Inter-
American Court (Provisional Measures) and the Calls for Urgent Action formulated by the United
Nations and/or measures requested by the Programme’s target population and included in the
National System for Prevention and Protection. The PCU compiles information on the implementation,
assessment and fulfilment of the Programme which is presented in periodic reports presented to
supranational mechanisms for the prevention and protection of Human Rights.
B. Specific Objectives: Develop a flexible and effective coordination of protection measures
between the entities responsible for guaranteeing the security of the recipients of threats, taking
into account the needs of victims, in order to avoid reprisals and/or Human Rights violations.
Ensure that security measures (calls for urgent action and/or Precautionary and Provisional
Measures) are put into effective practice during the period demanded by the risks in question.
According to the terms of the Programme the prevention and protection schemes should be
submitted to the Committee for the Assessment of Risks and Prevention and Protection Measures,
so that the schemes adopted to fulfil international or regional Human Rights obligations, and
those adopted as part of the National Programme, may be evaluated and monitored.
3.2.2 Committee for the assessmento of risks and protection measures (CERPM)
The Committee for the Assessment of Risks and Protection Measures is created to establish the levels of
risk and to evaluate, recommend and/or approve the prevention and protection measures required in each
individual case.
The Committee will carry out assessments of risk, vulnerability or conflict levels at national regional and
local level whose results will offer the best possibility of deciding on the establishment and implementation
of national, departmental and municipal prevention policies. The regional assessments of risk will permit
the adoption of more general and strategic measures suitable for a determined region.
As well as providing a mechanism for reaching agreements, the PCU will be authorised to specify the
protection measures that have been requested; the delegates representing different sectors of the protected
population will, jointly with state employees, present and analyse the cases, verify the information
contained in them, and suggest and approve the protection measures to be adopted.
The Committee will play an essential role confirming the information provided and, in the final analysis,
will determine who is to be included from among the target population, who will benefit from the scheme
and under what conditions.
This form of participation permits, in principle, close collaboration between the different participants in the
programme, facilitates the procedures to be followed, and guarantees the quality of the information available.
The PCU will have the following membership:
1. The Director of COPREDEH, who will act as chair of the Committee.
2. A delegate of the Instancia de Análisis de Ataques Contra Defensores de Derechos Humanos en Guatemala
(Office for the Analysis of Attacks against HRDs in Guatemala) , a dependency of the Vice-
Ministry for Security in the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio de Gobernación).
3. A representative of the Judicial Branch or a delegate of the Unidad de Seguridad (Security Unit).
4. The Director of the Dirección General de Inteligencia Civil (General Directorate of Civilian
Intelligence) or a delegate of the Director.
5. A representative of the División de Protección a Personalidades (Division for the Protection of Public
Figures) and/or the División de Protección y Seguridad Pública (Division for the Protection of Public
Safety) and/or the Oficina de Derechos Humanos de la Policía Nacional Civil (Human Rights
Department of the National Civilian Police), as appropriate.
6. A representative of the Unidad de Relaciones Internacionales del Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión
Social (International Relations Unit of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security).
7. A delegate or representative of the prosecuting authorities (special invitation).
8. Two (2) national-level civil society delegates (drawn from Human Rights organisations, trade
unions, interest groups and administrators and other servants of the justice system).
9. Two (2) national-level delegates in representation of journalists and the communications
profession.
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Representatives of the public supervision bodies (órganos de control):

10. A delegate of the Human Rights Ombudsman.
11. A delegate of the Solicitor General’s Office (Procurador General de la Nación).
The CERPM will meet regularly, every two weeks, and extraordinarily as necessary in situations of
extreme seriousness or urgency.
The CERPM will prepare its own internal regulations to ensure it functions efficiently and provides an
acceptable service to its beneficiaries.
3.2.2.1 Procedures for requesting national protection
The implementation of the Prevention and Protection Programme at national level requires:
1. The presentation of a written application to the PCU. The original complaint lodged with the
competent authority (legal body, prosecuting authorities, National Civilian Police or the Solicitor
General’s Office) should be annexed to the application.
2. The PCU will pass the application and annexed documentation to the CERPM as long as no
national protection mechanism has previously been agreed, or an application is still pending, in
which case responsibility will lie with a different state or governmental body.
3. The CERPM will analyse and evaluate the case and, depending on its urgency, make its decision
within a reasonable period, not exceeding two calendar weeks.
4. If the Committee approves the application the decision should be formally noted; the committee
will adopt the prevention and protection measures it considers pertinent according to the
assessment of risk and vulnerability, and will decide which administrative body will be
responsible for providing protection during a reasonable period of up to six (6) months, renewable
up to a maximum of one (1) year.
5. In special and extraordinary cases the measures may be extended after a review of the evidence
of risk provided by the victims, who should present documentation or provide the evidence
requested of them in order to continue enjoying the benefits of the protection scheme.
All decisions or resolutions of the CERPM should be communicated to the applicants in writing.
3.2.2.2 Criteria for accepting cases
1. Applicants should belong to one of the target groups specified by the Prevention and Protection
Programme.
2. They should present their complaint to the competent authorities and make the case known to
the legal system.
3. If they belong to a target organisation they should have the backing of the organisation. In the
case of journalists or communications professionals support may be provided by the Association
of Guatemalan Journalists or another organisation or mass media operation.
4. They should demonstrate their leadership role, which should be ratified by a local organisation
and/or entity. In the absence of such ratification there should be direct evidence of their
involvement in the struggle for justice, against impunity, or in favour of civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights.
5. There should be a causal relation between the threat and the risk.
6. The competent local or regional authorities should be made aware of the situation of risk or the
threat against the applicant.
7. The request for protection should have no other motivation beyond protecting the life, integrity,
security or personal freedom of the applicant.
8. The protection requested should not be the responsibility of any other state body; if it is, the case
will be passed on to the respective body for it to study.
9. The acceptance of a candidate for protection should not be such that it presents insurmountable
obstacles to the security or protection scheme run by the Interior Ministry.
10. The results of the technical assessment of risks and the level of threat against the individual should
be taken into account when a prevention scheme is adopted or when it implies protection of premises.
3.2.2.3 Treatment of urgent cases
When treating urgent cases the CERPM should observe the following procedure:
1. In the case of applications for protection presented by supranational Human Rights protection
bodies the PCU will coordinate, adopt, and monitor the prevention and protection measures
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according to the circumstances of the case. It will send a copy of the file to the Committee, which
will review it and evaluate the risks and protection measures or schemes adopted. The PCU will
contribute any information necessary for the production of reports; it will expedite procedures
for the adoption or reestablishment of the protection scheme according to the needs of the
beneficiaries and the level of risk the scheme is intended to combat.
2. In the case of applications presented by individuals or national organisations, and where the
victims face actual or imminent risk (cases in which the National Protection System should be
applied), the PCU will:
a) verify whether the person faces immediate risk to life, integrity and/or liberty;
b) whether the evidence demonstrates this to be the case – a decision requiring the backing or
support of a civil society representative or a member of the CERPM competent to express an
opinion (eg the Interior Ministry, the Solicitor General, members of the Early Warning
System and COPREDEH);
c) coordinate and adopt the appropriate prevention and/or protection measures.
Initially, a phone call, e-mail, radio communication or fax sent to COPREDEH or the CERPM will be sufficient.
The PCU will send a copy of the file to the CERPM, which will carry out the actions described in the
previous section. Urgent national protection measures will be adopted for an initial period of two (2)
months; if they are extended, they will be brought into line with the national procedure described above.
3.2.2.4 Assessment or Re-assessment of Prevention and Protection Measures.
In order to carry out these activities the PCU should:
1. Periodically interview beneficiaries.
2. Request contextualised or detailed reports of the preventive or protective security measures that
have been offered.
3. contextualised information on advances in investigations and legal processes.
4. Determine whether new or repeated actions exist that might increase levels of vulnerability or risk.
5. The Committee should carry out intermediary assessments of risk and threat.
The implementation of these measures should guarantee that timely, true, detailed and trustworthy
information is obtained to enable the evaluation or re-evaluation of the protection measures, in order to
assess adequately the facts that motivated their adoption.
The results of this exercise will permit the objectives of the protection measures to be adapted and the
components or resources adjusted in line with the prevention or protection measures agreed. If necessary,
the security scheme should be redefined, leading to the RESTRUCTURING OF THE SECURITY MODEL.
The PCU will present a report of the proposed re-evaluation to the CERPM, which will evaluate the PCU’s
actions; the CERPM enjoys the ultimate authority of suspending the measures is incorporated in the
national mechanism.
The evaluation is to be developed through a process monitoring the detection of any distortions in the
prevention and protection measures that may be detected. It is important to carry out this exercise regularly
so that the process is not discredited or delegitimized.
3.2.2.5 Reasons for the Refusing or Withdrawing Protection
The reasons for exclusion or withdrawal from the mechanism in the case of national or international
measures are as follows:
When the beneficiaries:
1. Carry out or have carried out illegal acts or are subject to legal proceedings in the national justice
system. This applies to individuals covered both by national and supranational protection. It
does not cover people who have been deprived of liberty in circumstances constitute a threat to
the right to life;
2. Conduct themselves in such a way that they endanger themselves or others;
3. Use the security measures they are offered for reasons other than those programmed;
4. Withdraw voluntarily from the proposed scheme;
5. Are no longer at risk or in danger;
6. Are no longer covered by supranational protection measures; or
7. Any other reason defined by the CERPM.
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3.3 Early Warning System

In order to prevent attacks, acts of intimidation and threats against these sectors the CERPM should
implement an Early Warning System (EWS), with the participation of state and government bodies and
civil society organisations. The EWS will be developed with the participation and cooperation of the Vice
Presidency, the Presidential Human Rights Commission, the Legal System, the Human Rights Ombudsman,
and the Secretariat for Strategic Analysis, the Directorate General of Civilian Intelligence, the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security, the Urban and Rural Development Councils and the Ministries of the Interior
and of Defence.
The principal function of the EWS is: to produce warnings that identify risks and threats faced by HRDs, judges,
prosecutors, lawyers, victims, witnesses, trade unionists, journalists, communications professionals and other
members of the vulnerable groups covered by the programme and who work in different regions of the country and
under different social, political or cultural contexts.
The EWS is established to provide: Rapid and Effective Prevention of Risk and Confront threats, thereby
9
diminishing the susceptibility to attack of persons, property or institutions.
While the function of the EWS is to provide the members of the CERPM with analysis of possible scenarios
of risk and vulnerability and the outlines of a plan, it should never act as a substitute for the State
Intelligence Service, nor be used for ends other than those established in its objectives.
3.3.1 Basic Elements of the EWS
a. Prevent abuses, ensuring that prevention or protection measures are taken at an early stage of events.
b. Provide the information necessary for the effective coordination of prevention or protection measures.
3.3.2 Specific Objectives
a. Guarantee an early response to threats or risks, and implement emergency or urgent measures
designed to protect the right to life, physical integrity, security, and other universal freedoms.
b. Replace the existing culture of improvisation with a culture of prevention.
c. Encourage a culture for the promotion, respect, guarantee and defence of Human Rights and peace.
d. Strengthen the institutions of civilian power through cooperation and coordination for the
prevention and reduction of risks and threats.
e. Decentralise Human Rights prevention and protection mechanisms and develop local
infrastructures in order to encourage joint responsibility between the state and civil society in
safeguarding HRDs, servants of the legal system, others implicated in legal proceedings,
journalists, trade unionists, communications professionals, and other vulnerable groups such as
mayors, local representatives and municipal council members.
f. Obtain the most accurate information possible on the events or circumstances that cause risk
and threat.
g. Contribute to governability, in order to increase the sense of security among those who have been
threatened.
3.4 Elite Prevention and Protection Unit

With the aim of increasing the professionalism and specialisation of the security details and bodyguards
provided by the Ministry of Government, a re-engineering process was carried out, involving various
measures including winding up the Protection and Security Section and, establishing in its place, under
the terms of Government Agreement No 662 of 2005, the Protection and Security Divisions, and the
Division for the Protection of Public Figures, or DPP. These bodies constitute an elite protection force and
are responsible for coordinating the implementation of the protection measures.
The members of these units have also received training in executive security, provided by the Presidential
Secretariat of Administrative Affairs and Security in order to ensure that they are optimally trained to
provide protection to people who are vulnerable or at risk.
There is also, however, a need to establish an Elite Security and Protection Corps (CESP) under the Ministry
of Government, with as many members as is deemed necessary, who will be responsible for personal
security (through the provision of bodyguards) and the protection of office buildings.
9 Author’s personal formulation.
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To achieve this there should be a process covering recruitment (involving polygraph tests), induction,
training and re-training. This process should be conducted with the utmost transparency and count with
the participation of representatives of the target population of the programme.
The CESP should be a specialist service for the provision of bodyguards; it will exist with the sole aim of protecting
people at risk; its members should belong to a state security body and be subject to its discipline. The role of the CESP
should be clearly differentiated from that of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Its instructors, supervisors
and security experts should therefore work exclusively for the CESP, which should have its own dedicated offices.
If the beneficiaries should for valid reasons, decide not to accept protection from CESP agents or from the
DPP they will receive support to contact their own bodyguards in whom they have full confidence privately.
Should this occur, the state will instruct appropriate personnel to provide training for the privately
recruited bodyguards and will provide them with the necessary weaponry to be able fully to carry out the
activities for which they were contracted.
Privately contracted security personnel may be recruited in the following ways:
a) As temporary security details employed by the CESP; in this case they are to be subject to the
same terms of employment as permanent employees of the CESP.
b) As private security personnel, employed by the CESP but responding to the beneficiaries of the
programme. In this case, the security personnel will be subject to the laws and legal rules
regulating the carrying of arms by individuals and private security firms. They shall also be
entirely responsible for the arms they carry, which will be assigned them by the beneficiary.
In conclusion, in order to fulfil the Treaty and Non-Treaty recommendations made to it, the Guatemalan
state should make sufficient resources available to guarantee adequate and effective protection measures
for the target population, for as long as is necessary, when their personal security or their lives are in
danger or when they are at risk.
3.4.1 Special Training by the CESP
The CESP should provide Human Rights training, with an emphasis on state responsibility and
International Human Rights Law.
The members of this elite corps should be capable of designing and implementing security strategies and
actions based on the needs of the users, to elaborate diagnoses, propose the use of resources and research
events that result in insecurity, to take decisions concerning security and elements of security strategy.
The CESP will carry out assessments of risk and implement the measures adopted, including those
intended to provide security and protection to offices and private homes. The results will be passed on to
the CERPM; if such studies do not exist, the reports prepared by the Office for the Analysis of Attacks
10
against HRDs will be made available.
The specialised training and capacity-building courses should include a presentation of the Cooper Color
Code, described in the section on risk analysis in the Prevention and Protection Manual.
3.5 The Office for the Analysis of Attacks against HRDs

The Office for the Analysis of Attacks against HRDs began operations in July 2007 under the terms of
Ministerial Agreement No. 103 - 2008, signed by the Vice Minister of Security in the Ministry of Government
and published on 23 January 2008 in the Central American Official Gazette.
The Office is established for a period of four (4) years.
3.5.1 Purpose
The office is charged with investigating Human Rights violations and attacks on Human Rights activists. Its
function is to analyse, in context, the patterns of attacks against observers and defenders of Human Rights,
should they exist, by applying a scientific method defined, approved and agreed between its members.
3.5.2 Membership
Article 2 stipulates that membership should be as follows:
a) A representative of the Ministry of Government who will serve as coordinator;
b) A representative of the General Directorate of [Civilian] Intelligence;
10 Christopher J. Simovich is Senior Vicepresident of U.S. Security Care, Inc., a member of ASIS International; his
article “Protección de Ejecutivos: Servir y Proteger, published in the Foro de Profesionales Latinoamericanos de
Seguridad listed the topics that should be covered by security details.
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c) The Director of the Human Rights Division of the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National
Civilian Police;
d) A representative of the prosecuting authorities, specifically from the Human Rights Section of
the Public Prosecutotor’s Office;
e) Two national-level representatives of civil society organisations; and
f) A representative drawn from among international Human Rights organisations.
4. Medidas de Prevención y Protección
The Prevention and Protection Manual is an instrument containing a minimum range of measures that, according
to the context and reality, or situation, of the country. It is dynamic, currently still under construction, and important
for prioritising prevention and protection measures.
Along these lines, prevention and protection measures will be adopted according to the Security Plan.
This process will involve Risk Mapping, a Contingency Plan and an Emergency Plan, which will be
summarised in the Prevention and Protection Manual.
4.1 Prevention Measures

These measure include all actions intended to avoid situations of vulnerability or risk that might be faced
by HRDs, communications professionals, administrators and other employees of the legal system, victims
or others implicated in legal proceedings, victims of abuses of power, journalists, trade unionists and other
vulnerable groups. They are also intended to prevent attacks against, and otherwise to help, individuals
who have been subjected to direct threats, intimidation, persecution or any violent act committed against
their person, who are in a situation of risk and/or where there are indications that they are in danger.
The Measures are classified as follows:
A. General
B. Promotion and Support
C. Self-Protection
D. Monitoring of Risk Situations
A. General Measures
a. Emergency Fund
In order to prevent disruption in the work of social or Human Rights organisations whose office
premises are vulnerable to the theft of their equipment or work materials, the government should
provide funds within COPREDEH’s overall budget for the establishment of an Emergency Fund.
b. National and International Networks
An emergency response system should be established as part of the regular operation of the EWS
to respond to situations of imminent risk; the situation should also encourage cooperation and
support to Human Rights organisations and others vulnerable groups by strengthening
accompaniment by national and international organisations.
When the accompaniment is provided by foreigners, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security
and the Foreign Ministry should facilitate their stay in the country by providing special permits,
as currently they are only offered tourist visas valid for 90 days, and frequently they will not have
not been resident for the period of one year necessary to apply for such a permit.
Consequently, permanent national and/or international accompaniment mechanisms should be
developed to provide backing to the legal and legitimate actions of the target groups and to
reduce or prevent aggressions carried out by public servants or private individuals.
c. Directory of Contacts
Governmental and non-governmental organisations should jointly create a directory and an
emergency network capable of responding immediately to attacks against HRDs and other
vulnerable groups.
Various people or organisations – including colleagues in the zones of risk and in their office
premises – will maintain an up to date list of emergency contacts.
The list should contain the telephones contact of organisations defending fundamental rights
who are able to mobilise an international response when necessary.
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B. Promotion and support

Government and other state and non-governmental institutions will develop and promote a Human Rights
culture that guarantees unequivocal public recognition of the fundamental role played by HRDs,
administrators and other employees of the legal system, journalists and other communications professionals
in guaranteeing democracy and the Rule of Law.
Actions that should be reflected in the activities of state, municipal, autonomous, semi-autonomous and
decentralised bodies include:
a. Campaigns, publicity and diffusion of information by television, radio and the written press.
b. Public statements
c. Training on the work of HRDs
d. Scenarios for dialogue.
These actions will be developed in order to guarantee that the protection and promotion of Human Rights
carried out by HRDs is recognised as a legitimate activity carried out by Human Rights organisations.
Educational and communications campaigns or activities aimed at state agents and society at large should
therefore be developed in the press concerning the individual or collective work of these vulnerable sectors.
Government and other state bodies and autonomous and semi-autonomous or decentralised agencies
should, at the highest level, develop participatory scenarios for dialogue with Human Rights organisations
in order to understand their views on the development of public policy.
They should also facilitate processes to reduce tension between civilian and military authorities and social
or Human Rights organisations with the aim of preventing illegal or violent acts against them, especially
in periods of heightened conflict or vulnerability that affect the exercise of civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights.
Administrative guidelines should also be established to avoid the excessive, irrational, disproportionate or
inopportune use of force in public demonstrations, illegal or arbitrary intervention against the homes of
11
vulnerable groups or in the offices of organisations, their correspondence, or communications.
It is the responsibility of the state to promote and facilitate Human Rights education at all levels of the
education system and ensure that the bodies responsible for the curriculums used in the training of
lawyers, employees of the legal system, public servants and the armed forces ensure they include Human
Rights education.
This training and education is particularly important in order to ensure that members of the armed forces
respect HRDs and that high ranking officials affirm unequivocally the legitimacy and importance of the
activities of HRDs and their organisations.
The training should emphasise state responsibility and international Human Rights law.
The state will guarantee and support the development of governmental and non-governmental institutions
for the defence, promotion and realisation of Human Rights protection by rolling out the following
programmes:
1. Training Programme for Public Servants and Employees in the, Promotion, Protection and
Realisation of Human Rights: In order to communicate the importance of respect for Human
Rights and assure that they are fully respected, a Human Rights education programme should be
designed for public servants and employees; its organising principles should involve, among
other focuses, publicising the role of administrative acts, freedom of expression, access to state
archives and records, the right of assembly, to demonstrate and of association, action against
violators, and the legitimacy of resistance in the context of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights.
2. Awareness-Raising Campaign for the Promotion, Protection, Defence, Guarantee and Respect
for Universally Recognised Rights Guaranteed under International Law. The campaign should
legitimise actions to promote, protect, defend and guarantee respect for Human Rights that are
advanced, in exercise of their rights, by individual or groups such as HRDs, journalists, judges,
prosecutors, lawyers, and social, indigenous and community leaders.
11 For example, according to Governmental Agreement No. 645-05 of 6 December 2005 the Executive Organ should
create the norms governing access to information in conformity with international standards based on the
principles of transparency and social audits. Articles 30 and 31 of the Constitution state that all other state bodies
should develop ordinary, regulatory or individualised guidelines covering access to information.
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3. Programmes to provide Mechanisms or Scenarios to Reduce Tension between Individuals

and Groups and Civil or Military Authorities. These programmes should contribute to reducing
the levels of conflict that affect the safety of HRDs, administrators and other servants of the legal
system, journalists, and victims of serious crimes and abuses of power.
Through these initiatives it will be possible to reduce the climate of public accusations or
defamatory statements by state employees and some press commentators who claim that the
activities of these groups destabilises the state, and who contribute thereby to a general belief that
the groups are linked to terrorist or former guerrilla groups.
4. Information Programme for Legal Institutions: According to article 30 of the Guatemalan
Constitution, article 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Legislative Decree No. 92-94,
state institutions should provide information concerning Human Rights to prosecutors and
judges whenever requested by HRDs in order to expedite legal investigations and trials; State
Secrecy and National Security arguments should not be allowed to act as an obstacle or as
mechanisms of impunity.
5. Programme for the De-Classification of Intelligence Archives, Documents and Information:
In this connection it is important to note the declaration made on 25 February 2008 by the
President of the Republic, Álvaro Colom Caballeros that the military archives would be opened
in order to enable the clarification of events that occurred during the internal armed conflict. The
President also signed the Chapultepec Declaration and promised to approve a freedom of
information law.
The state is made vulnerable by those who abuse Human Rights and not by those who denounce
their abuse.
Intelligence archives and reports compiled by the state security bodies on social and Human
Rights organisations should be examined and clarified, rectified and/or destroyed, and the
philosophy behind their compilation redefined.
Telephone lines or other means of communication used by Human Rights organisations and
HRDs, administrators or servant of the legal system and victims of crimes and/or abuses of
power should not be intercepted.
This rule does not apply to cases covered by the Law against Organised Crime (Legislative
Decree No. 21-2006) and the Regulations Governing Special Methods of Investigation and
Interceptions of Telephones and other Communications Media (Government Agreement No. 188
-2007) or the Law of the Directorate of Civilian Intelligence.
C. Self-Protection Measures
The beneficiary population of the Prevention and Protection Programme should receive training in self-
protection measures, especially as concerns their social and private lives, so as to reduce their levels of
vulnerability. For example, self protection in social, public or private life covers the home, vehicle, family
and social network, itineraries and transport, as well as the protection of correspondence. Therefore, the
following Manuals should be developed:
a. Manual on Self-Protection Measures.
b. Self-Protection Courses
Everybody involved should develop prevention, protection and self-protection mechanisms, particularly
in cases involving HRDs or where the protected person is a woman, leaving her vulnerable to verbal abuse,
sexual harassment, rape, or abusive acts deriving from her gender.
In other words, an attack may consist of bringing a woman into disrepute or questioning her reputation or
her moral integrity.
Consequently, the specific needs of women who face threats should be taken into account. This does not
mean ignoring that men, too, face threats, but that they are more often faced by women, especially when
they emanate from common criminality.
Maintaining contact means staying alive. At least one trusted individual should know the itinerary of the
beneficiary so they can act if they fail to return when expected.
Sensitive issues or activities should not be discussed by telephone. Mafia or clandestine apparatuses have
their own intelligence services – involving pedestrians, shopkeepers, taxi drivers, hotel receptionists and
waiters; they also have access to interception equipment and remote listening devices.
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These precautions also apply to the use of e-mail. It is recommended to use generic e-mail accounts such as
yahoo or hotmail which are harder to trace. Personal names should not be used and previously agreed
codes should be used in order to make communication more secure.
D. Monitoring Risk Situations
Protection and security measures should be monitored while the situation of risk demands them and the
PCU, CESP and the CERPM should develop methods designed to systematise information. That is:
a. Permanent Monitoring
b. Periodic Evaluations
c. Evaluation of Risk Criteria
4.2 Protection Measures

Protection measures are intended essentially to protect the life, physical integrity, personal security and
freedom of threatened individuals or who are subject to intimidation as a result of their Human Rights
activities or who have suffered attacks. These measures may be proactive (dissuasion or prevention) or
reactive (security).
As basic protection Manuals recommend, these measures should be understood as a security system that
is established in the immediate circle of a given individual or physical space and makes it possible to
control immediate events in order to prevent attacks against the individual or their property.
The protection measures permit the effects of aggressive acts to be neutralised, removed or diminished
and those responsible for them to be detained. The aim of any protection service is to surround the person
with a protective curtain, or capsule, which impedes any act of aggression.
Consequently, the Protection and Security Divisions, the Division for the Protection of Public Figures and
the Elite Security and Protection Corps are responsible – according to their areas of competence and
according to risk levels – with creating protective curtains as follows:
a. Watch and protect buildings and office premises as necessary.
b. Ensure the protection and security of beneficiaries.
c. Protect persons and property, as necessary.
The protection measures adopted may be: Static or Dynamic. The former refers to what is known in
Guatemala as “fixed place” measures (de puesto fijo), put in place to protect buildings, offices or places of
residence; the security agents in these cases remain in the vicinity of the point they are protecting.
Dynamic measures involve a team of protection agents responsible for the security of a person, whom they
should accompany in all their movements.
There is a third mechanism - known as counter-surveillance – that requires a degree of awareness , or
self-protection, on the part of the beneficiary and of the security detail and that is designed to confront the
trailing of beneficiaries carried out on foot and/or in vehicles, using public transport, on major roads or in
isolated areas, in urban, semi-urban, or rural areas.
For example, the beneficiaries should protect themselves and their families by recognising when they are
being watched. Beneficiaries should engage in things as simple, for example, as observing an unknown car
parked near the residence or office premises, or the arrival of a suspicious street seller in the neighbourhood.
The confluence of all these varied measures is usually known as Integral Protection, consisting of a
permanent mechanism that is constructed around an individual to guarantee their safety. These
mechanisms will involve dynamic, static and counter-surveillance activities.
This having been said it is important to clarify that Integral Protection extends to all aspects of the
individual: their physical integrity, place of residence, image, family, activities, etc. It is impossible to
guarantee 100% efficiency; but it is a utopia must not be renounced.
Integral Protection seeks to increase the effects of prevention and reduce reactive activities. It is therefore
necessary to develop hypotheses that help understand the causes of an attack, be they political, ideological,
psychological, racial, religious, personal, sociological or terrorist.
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There is common tendency to think of attacks in generic terms; it is therefore important to differentiate
between the different sources of risk. Different security measures need to be adopted in the face of murder,
12
physical aggression, kidnap, acts committed by hostile groups or acts of negligence: routine kills.
Consequently, protection measures are classified as follows:
A. Immediate
i. Material
ii. Human Aspects of Protection
iii. Investigation
B. Medium Term
i. Personal
ii. Investigation
iii. Institutional
A. Immediate Measures
i. Immediate Protection Materials
1. Individual
a) Provision of communication equipment (cell phones, radios)
b) Radios connected to police networks
c) Bullet-proof vehicles
d) Bullet-proof vests
e) Evacuation by land, sea or air
2. Place of residence or office premises
a) Metal detectors
b) Video equipment at entrances
c) Security doors and other protection systems including alarms
d) Emergency telephone lines
e) Call identification
ii. The Human Element
Assigning Protection Personnel
a) Protection from designated agents – bodyguards
b) Installation of “fixed place” security
c) Mobile monitoring unit
In addition to the aspects already covered in the relevant sections, when fixed place or perimeter security
13
is planned using a mobile monitoring unit the following factors should also be taken into account:
• Emergency lighting
• Barriers placed at entrances
• Designated parking bays
• Pedestrian access
• Points for t reception of goods and packages
• Traffic control
12 For Luis Estupiñán Chaustre, it is possible to avoid routine if all interested parties adhere to, accept and
implement established measures, if everyone fulfils the guidelines and no one is shy of commenting
when someone fails to do so. The greatest difficulty with security schemes is maintaining their rigorous
implementation. The ability of attackers to violate protection schemes resides in their patience. They are
constantly on the prowl, waiting for some routine to emerge or exceptions to occur. Security questions are a
whole; security is not the exclusive realm of specialists and no system or scheme of protection is infallible. The
point is to maintain the scheme alive, and this can only be achieved through collective action.
13 Factors recommended by Mark Lowers, Tony Raker and Jim Rodgers, in their article on Perimeter Security
published in Security Management, December 2001.
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• Visibility inside vehicles

• Stairways and lifts/elevators
iii. Investigation
a) Documentation of facts
b) Initiation of the investigation
As is indicated in the Prevention and Protection Policy and in this Catalogue, if prevention and protection
measures are to be successful it is important to establish specialised security and protection units - that is,
the CESP. Units should also be created within the prosecuting authorities; these should count with the
necessary resources and training to coordinate actions and respond with guaranteed quality to the events
that led initially to the adoption of precautionary and provisional measures or urgent calls for action.
The best Preventive Measure is prompt, effective and exhaustive investigation into those responsible for
the threats, intimidation and other acts which increase the level or degree of risk and are committed
against these sectors by the groups responsible for the attacks.
It is therefore important that the Guatemalan state adopts the recommendations of the CICIG, in order to
prevent de facto and de juris impunity generated by the violation of Human Rights, or infractions of IHL
during the internal armed conflict and today.
B. Medium Term Protection Measures
i. Personal Measures
a) Temporary relocation outside the area of risk
b) Installation of security equipment.
c) Requests for an processing of asylum or refugee status
When the risk or threat requires these measures to be implemented the government and other state bodies
will ensure the provision of a certificate of risk that may be used when requesting asylum or refugee status.
Human Rights and IHL strategies should be developed to make this possible, as should a network of safe
houses located outside the area of risk where threatened individuals will be assured of protection.
ii. Investigation
a) Monitoring complaints
b) Impartial and exhaustive investigation, and
c) Punishment for perpetrators
The strengthening of legal institutions and security bodies, and fulfilment of article 245 of the Constitution,
requires that the groups, clandestine security bodies and parallel structures that attack the target
population should be investigated, pursued and combated.
It has been shown that these groups are responsible for operations against the political opposition, Human
Rights activists, administrators of justice and other legal servants, others implicated in legal proceedings,
trade unionists, and social, indigenous and peasant leaders when they criticise government decisions, or
encourage and lead the struggle against impunity, corruption and the fight against organised crime.
The state will conduct rapid and impartial investigations or ensure the necessary enquiries are carried out,
when there are rational motives for believing that a violation of fundamental freedoms has occurred.
iii. Institutional
The implementation of official protection measures will respond to the following objectives:
a. Strengthen the COPREDEH with human, financial and logistical resources, facilitating as a result
greater autonomy of action for the PCU, or Defenders’ Unit.
b. Strengthen and implement the programme for the protection of witnesses and others implicated
in legal proceedings, linked to the administration of criminal justice and that also benefits
journalists, other communications professionals and trade unionists; the Protection Council
should be created, and the regulations observed.
c. Approval of the Law for the Integral Attendance of Victims of Crime.
d. Approval of the the Ministry of Government’s Prevention and Protection Manual
e. Develop and systematise the Programme for the Protection of Judges, Magistrates and other
Servants of the Administration of Justice developed by the legal authorities.
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f. Develop the actions set out in the National Human Rights Plan along with its Sectoral Operational
Plans defined in the State Human Rights Policy.
g. Training for investigators in the National Civilian Police and the Prosecuting Authorities.
h. Establish the Ministry of Government’s Office for the Analysis of Attacks against HRDs as a
permanent body.
i. Create the Elite Security and Protection Corps within the Ministry of Government.
j. Dismantle illegal groups and clandestine security apparatuses.
k. Contribute to or collaborate with the CICIG.
l. The Ministries of Government and Defence should publish ministerial guidelines covering the
respect and protection of HRDs, employees of the legal system, journalists and other
communications professionals and trade unionists.
m. Develop a model of preventive security to advance the mission and vision of a democratic,
preventive, investigative and communitarian model of society.
n. Government and state bodies should count with the human, budgetary and logistical resources
necessary to guarantee the implementation of adequate and effective protection measures when
the personal security and lives of the sectors referred to in this Catalogue are at risk.
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Annex 9: Nepal: Human Rights Defenders

Bill 2066 (2009) [Draft proposal]1
PREAMBLE
The executive parliament has drafted this act in accordance with an interim constitution taking into the
account that Nepal has been the party to various international covenants, treaties and agreements related to
the protection, promotion and respect of human rights; excellently evaluating the significant role played by
Nepalese human rights defenders at the time of Nepal’s democratic movement (Loktantrik Aandolan), and
recalling the national obligations following the adoption of UN General assembly of the “declaration 1998
on the rights and responsibilities of the individuals, groups and different social bodies regarding the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom which has been universally accepted”;
and also taking into the consideration that threats to life looms on the human rights defenders actively
engaged in Nepal’s human rights movement, and protection and promotion of human rights can be achieved
through the protection and management of their services; the need, therefore, has been felt for this Act.
Chapter One
Preliminary
1. Name in short and beginning:
1. This Act is called Human Rights Defenders Security Act, 2066
2. This act will be immediately regulated.
2 Definition. In this Act, if not interpreted differently due to issues or instances:
a. Human rights defenders mean any of the citizens, group of citizens or organization which
are protecting and promoting human rights either in an individual capacity or in both
organized or spontaneous manner. This term also indicates human rights activists, legal
professionals, media personnel, social worker, health personnels or any other individuals
who are actively engaged for the promotion and protection of human rights
b. Government bodies mean associations, institutions or bodies established/created and
being run in accordance with the existing law
c. Officials refer to President or members including member secretary
d. Local administration refers to district administration office, district police office or local
police office or any other similar existing or ad hoc governmental security mechanisms
e. Commission it should mean that it is a human rights defenders commission established in
accordance with this law
f. By stipulated or in accordance with the stipulation mean that it is stipulated in accordance
with this law or stipulated as per the regulations of this Act.
Chapter Two
Role, Responsibilities and Rights of Human Rights Defenders
3. Rights of Human Rights Defender: Human Rights Defenders will have the rights as follows:
1. Protect, promote and fulfil human rights in both individual and organized form
2. Establish/run or participate in any organization or association, as per the existing legislation,
with an objective to protect and promote human rights
3. Receive, send or disseminate any human rights related information
4. Promote or widely disseminate or facilitate human rights related new principles and conduct
necessary activities to obtain public support
5. Bring the immediate attention of government or concerned parties against any State or non-State
actions taken against, or have the strong probability of being against, the human rights norms;
and to organize peaceful protest programmes to meet this purpose
1 Draft proposal sent by the Nepalese NGO Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC, http://www.insec.org.np), in
September 2009, prior to it being discussed by the relevant authorities in Nepal.
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6. Provide/receive legal or other forms of assistance for the protection of human rights
7. Provide necessary support to hold the government responsible to national and international
human rights obligations; and create public census to serve this purpose
8. Receive assistance from the government bodies to access the places where either human rights
have been violated or there is a strong possibility of human rights being violated; while visiting
in and out of such places for the purpose of information collection, receive support from the local
government bodies and security forces
9. Organize various programmes on both individual or in coordination with Government organizations
or non-Government organizations/associations to protect and promote human rights
10. Provide suggestions to the government and other concerned bodies regarding the protection and
promotion of human rights.
4. Responsibilities of Human Rights Defenders – Responsibilities of Human Rights Defenders will be
as follows:
1. Advocate for all human rights for all
2. Abide by or made others to abide by the existing legislation while carrying on with their own
activities
3. Be sensitive while collecting and disseminating information related to national security,
sovereignty and indivisibility, social and religious harmony and national unity
4. To always consider the sensitivity and confidentiality of the victim side while carrying out your
activities
5. To prioritise the security to life and relief of the individuals who could be victims or injured or
are at risk rather than just collection of information
6. To carry on with your actions or make others carry on their action without creating obstacles in
the investigation or enquiries being conducted by the state bodies in relation to establish the
guilty or the crime
7. To completely support the other human rights defenders who could be at risk due to security or
other reasons
8. To always practice and make others practice the universal understanding of human rights and its
principles.
Chapter Three
Human Rights Defenders Commission
5. Human Rights Defenders Commission
1. Nepal Government will establish Human Rights Defenders Commission
2. The commission will be a continuous authoritarian autonomous institution. Can acquire, buy
and sell assets as an individual
3. Officials and members will be in the commission as following:
a. Member nominated by the Commission from (amongst)
the human rights commission members Chairperson
b. One legal expert nominated by Nepal Bar Association from (amongst)
the senior advocate/advocates who have been actively engaged in human
rights field for the last 15 years member
c. One journalist nominated by Federation of Nepalese Journalists from
(amongst) the journalists whose journalism has been actively engaged
in human rights and been collecting and disseminating news on human
rights for the last 15 years member
d. Four human rights defenders with at least one woman nominated
by Nepal Government, upon the recommendation of National Human Rights
Commission, selected from (amongst) the famous human rights defenders
who have been actively engaged and contributed in this field member
e. Joint-Secretary of Home Ministry, Nepal Government member
f. First Class Official serving in Nepal Justice Service, nominated by
Nepal Government member secretary
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6. Tenure of the Commission Officials

1. Except for the ex-officio, the tenure of other officials will be of 4 years
2. As per sub-article-1 - the appointed officials can be re-appointed.
7. Ineligibility The individuals as mentioned in the following will not be eligible to be appointed
in the commission:
1. Has been found guilty in human rights violation charge
2. Has received sentence in Criminal cases effecting his/her moral degradation
3. Has been charged with corruption
4. Is neither below 25 years of an age nor above or has completed 70 years of an age
5. Has to have at least bachelors degree or has not completed any of the equivalent and relevant
academic degree
6. Has been appointed or nominated in government service at the time of appointment in the
commission.
Chapter Four
Role, Responsibilities and Rights of Human Rights Defenders Commission
8. Role, Responsibilities and Rights of the Commission:
Role, Responsibilities and Rights of the Commission will be as follows:
1. To take or to make others take up necessary actions regarding the protection of human rights
defenders’ service
2. To make or to make others take up necessary provisions with regards to coordination amongst
all concerned parties to minimize the risk that the human rights defenders set out to collect
information might face in their working areas
3. Collect details on human rights defenders and on the basis of which distribute human rights
defenders identity card to the human on the basis
4. Formulate and implement code of conduct for human rights defenders
5. Organize national-level human rights defenders representational gathering at least once; prepare
and submit a report to the government on the working condition of the human rights defenders
6. Either in coordination with other human rights defenders or alone, take or to make others take
up necessary actions for the prevention of abuses against human rights defenders
7. To formulate and implement human rights defenders’ protection policy and to have it
implemented
8. Assist national human rights commission and Nepal government as required to implement
human rights defenders declaration; and conduct necessary programmes to serve the purpose
9. To prepare and submit an annual report to UN special rapporteur on the security condition of
human rights defenders, security to their service, human rights defenders related activities carried
out by the government and non-government parties and the situation of the human rights defenders
10. Assist Nepal government or national human rights defenders as required on the protection and
to capacitate professional competency of the human rights defenders
11. Distribute and renew institutional or individual membership of human rights defenders as identified.
Chapter Five
Protection of Human Rights Defenders’ Service
9. Security of Human Rights Defenders
1. In the course of their professional activities, human rights defenders have to be supported by all
government or administrative or security bodies, political parties and concerned all parties
including local individuals – for or against – of the place where human rights have been violated
or where the strong probability of the human rights violation exists; and each human rights
defender holds the right to receive support in relation to the concerned subject
2. Local administration or the government bodies will have the responsibility to provide as much
possible security as it is in its reach to the human rights defenders if such a request is made by the
human rights defenders while collecting and disseminating information on their visit to and
from the places where human rights violation has taken place or a strong probability of such
violation exists
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3. Local administration or the government bodies will have the responsibility to provide information
as sought by the human rights defenders – during their visit, stay or in the aftermath of the
incident – related to the places where human rights violation has taken place or a strong
probability of such violation exists
4. Except in criminal cases, human rights defenders should not be arrested while they are fulfilling
their professional responsibilities related to incidence of human rights violations or in due course
of other investigations
5. In relation to any of the activities/actions carried out by the human rights defenders as human
rights defenders, no case should be filed in the court against human rights defenders, and s/he
will not be asked to be witness against his wishes and forcefully compel him/her to make public
the information that s/he has received in his capacity.
Chapter Six
Right to Remedy
10 Right to Remedy
1. As per this Law, human rights defenders can lodge complaint with the district court on the
difficulties that they face if they are deprived of the use of facilities or against the restrictions
imposed except in the cases when it is in accordance with this Act allowing the human rights
defenders to enjoy their rights and facilities as per the act
2. If such complaint is received, as per the law, the concerned district court can issue an order asking
the defendant to be present with a reply in writing within three days
3. After receiving the defendant’s reply in writing, or after the time frame given to receive the
defendant’s reply passes out, the district court has to prioritise the case and decide on whether or
not the concerned party should be subjected to the rights as per this Act
4. If the decision is for the rights to be subjected as per sub-article 3, such order should be sent to the
concerned party as soon as possible through the use of the most efficient means
5. After receiving the order as per sub-article 3, the concerned party should immediately implement
the order
6. While executing the case or sidelining it as per this Act, the district court can use the rights that
it has received from the existing law.
11. Interim Order – As required, the court can hold unilateral hearing and can issue an interim order on the
complaint received as per the sub-article 1; or an interim order can be issued by the district court after
listening to both the parties. The other party can lodge a complaint with a court if an interim order has
been issued based on the unilateral hearing requesting for its annulment; in such a case, the court may
annul or modify its previous order. However, if such an interim order has been issued after receiving the
written reply then this article will not be viewed as being an obstacle to the decision of the case.
12. Penalty Compensation – According to this Act, the individuals or the concerned official who are not
implementing the court order can be subjected to district court fine up to 10,000/- NPR and a letter can
be sent to the concerned department directing appropriate departmental action. The amounts fined as
such will be collected as the government dues.
13. Provision related to Appeal – According to this law, the concerned party expressing dissatisfaction
against the district court’s decision on penalty/compensation may lodge an appeal with the concerned
Appellate Court within the 15 days of the decision made. Hence, if such an appeal is received then the
concerned Appellate Court will have to immediately proceed with and decide on the case as per this act.
14. Court Date and Extension – According to this law, the concerned court can provide the court date or
its extension up to 5 days if it is foreseen that the reply cannot be received in the previously decided
court date or the appeal cannot be lodged within that time frame owing to situations beyond control.
Chapter Seven
Human Rights Defenders Fund
15. Fund – A fund will exist in the commission where the amount will be deposited as mentioned in the
following:
a. Contribution or loan received by the Commission from the government or non-government
areas
b. Individual or institutional membership fee received from the human rights defenders
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c. Assisting contribution received from the national or international individuals or

organizations/associations
d. Amounts received from the assets of Commission
e. Amount received from any other sources.
16. Use of Fund – Fund will be used by the joint signature of Fund Committee President or any member
or secretary authorized by him/her.
Chapter Eight
Miscellaneous
17. Action against contempt of the court – In the case under this Act, if an individual does not implement
the court’s decision or creates obstacles during or while implementing the decision, then the court can
take action against such an individual for holding contempt of the court.
18. Contact with Nepal Government – Commission can contact Nepal Government through Home
Ministry.
19. Office – Central office of the Commission will be in Kathmandu. It itself can open its regional and
contact offices after pre-informing Nepal government. Till such offices are operated, with a pre-
consent of National Human Rights Commission, Commission can operate its office in National
Human Rights Commission’s office.
20. Provision related to Personnel and Expense of the Commission – Nepal government has to provide
the required personnel to the Commission. The officials and personnel of the Commission will be
provided with the stipulated salary and allowances. These will be provided as stipulated by Nepal
Government till the Commission stipulates on the salary and expenses.
21. Right to formulate Regulations
1. For the fulfilment of this Act, the Commission can formulate the rules and regulations as felt
necessary
2. Rules and regulations as per sub-article 1 will be in force following the approval of Nepal
Government.
22. As per the existing law – Everything mentioned in this Act will be as per this Act and other existing laws.
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Annex 10: Democratic Republic of the Congo:

Draft Bill on the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders (2008)
DRAFT BILL – BKB
Preamble
We, as members of the National Assembly,
meeting in plenary session,
• Mindful of the situation and determined to introduce the democratic rule of law founded on
respect for human rights, and committed to guaranteeing, with no form of discrimination, the
effective exercise and enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms for all Congolese citizens
• Reaffirming the elemental principles of the United Nations Charter of 26 June 1945, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, international agreements and other
conventions and protocols on human rights
• Likewise reaffirming the provisions of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders presented by
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1998 and adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on 9 December 1998 in its resolution 53/144
• Having regard to the mandate of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary
General for Human Rights Defenders
• Having regard to the significant number – some 500 – of national and local organisations for the
promotion and protection of human rights currently operating in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the essential role they play in the rule of law and in the establishment of justice
• Whereas human rights defenders are increasingly the target of attacks, death threats, arbitrary
imprisonment and exile, and that their rights are held in contempt by those in power in many countries,
with total impunity, and in the absence of any legal framework to protect human rights defenders
• Recognising the role played by human rights defenders and the ability of Congolese organisations
for the defence of human rights to collaborate with the human rights protection bodies of the
United Nations and other competent regional and national institutions on matters related to the
promotion of human rights
• Considering the need to establish a national legal framework for the protection of human rights
defenders
• Underlining the fact that the primary responsibility and duty to protect the fundamental rights
and freedoms of all citizens lies with the State
• Recognising that individuals, groups and associations have the right and the responsibility to
encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to disseminate them both
nationally and internationally
• Taking inspiration from the guidelines and from the role of the diplomatic missions of the
European Union in relation to human rights defenders
• We hereby approve and pass this law.
Section I:
General provisions:
ARTICLE 1: This law has been drawn up based on the current Constitution of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, particularly its provisions relating to fundamental freedoms, rights and obligations of its
citizens and international legal instruments, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
and the Declaration on Human Rights of 1998.
221
ARTICLE 2: This law guarantees that the inviolable rights, freedoms and work of Congolese human rights
defenders will be safeguarded.
ARTICLE 3: The public authorities shall respect and protect the rights, freedoms and work of human
rights defenders.
Section II:
Definition of the role of human rights defenders
ARTICLE 4: The definition of human rights defenders is enshrined in the first article of the 1998 Declaration
on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that “Everyone has the
right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and implementation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms at national and international level.”
ARTICLE 5: Human rights defenders are individuals, groups and organs of society which promote and
protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. They are dedicated to the
promotion, protection and practical implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. They also
promote and protect the rights of the members of groups such as indigenous communities. This definition
does not include individuals or groups who commit acts of violence or who propagate violence.
ARTICLE 6: Although the primary responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights lies
with the state, it is evident that individuals, groups and organs of society make a significant contribution
to promoting the cause of human rights. In particular, human rights defenders:
• Make offences public
• Try to ensure that the victims of these offences can exercise their legal rights by providing them
with legal, psychological, medical and other assistance
• Fight against the culture of impunity that serves to hide systematic and repeated violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Section III:
Foundations of the mission of human rights defenders:
ARTICLE 7: The mission of human rights defenders is based on the application of the different international
legal instruments detailed below:
• Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10/12/1948 which state
that everyone, including human rights defenders, has the right to enjoy freedom of thought,
speech, peaceful assembly and association
• Freedom of opinion and speech includes the right to hold opinions without interference, the right
to seek and receive information and ideas, and the right to disseminate them through any media
regardless of frontiers
• Articles 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1996, which also
guarantee the freedom of peaceful assembly and free association for human rights defenders in
order to protect their interests
• Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 which recognises that every
individual shall have the right to freely constitute associations, provided that he abides by the law
• The provisions of the Declaration of 1998 on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
ARTICLE 8: In the national domain, the mission of human rights defenders is based on the provisions of
the current Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially those relating to the individual
freedoms in articles 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30 and 37.
* Equally, law No. 004/2001 of 20 July 2001 regarding the freedom to create and join not-for-profit associations in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Section IV:
The rights and protection of human rights defenders
ARTICLE 9: Human rights defenders, like all other people, individually and in association with others,
have the right to promote and strive for the protection and implementation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms both nationally and internationally.
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ARTICLE 10: For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,
human rights defenders have the right, individually or in association with others, both nationally and
internationally:
• To meet or assemble peacefully
• To form, join and participate in non-governmental organisations, associations or groups
• To communicate with non-governmental or intergovernmental organisations.
ARTICLE 11: They also have the right:
• To know, seek, obtain, receive and hold information about all human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including having access to information regarding how those rights and freedoms are
made effective in domestic legislative, judicial and administrative systems
• To freely publish, communicate or disseminate to others ideas, information and knowledge on all
human rights and fundamental freedoms
• To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the respect, both in law and in practice, of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to draw
public attention to these matters.
ARTICLE 12: Human rights defenders also have the right to develop and discuss new human rights ideas
and principles and to advocate their acceptance.
ARTICLE 13: The right to participate effectively, without being exposed to discrimination, in the
government of his or her country and in the conduct of public affairs.
This particularly includes the right, individually and in association with others, to submit criticism and
proposals intended to improve the way government institutions and agencies involved in public affairs
operate, and to draw attention to any aspect of their work that may hinder or impede the promotion,
protection and implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
ARTICLE 14: When exercising human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the promotion and
protection of human rights, the right, individually and in association with others, to lodge an appeal and
be protected in the event of the violation of those rights.
To this end, any human rights defender whose rights or freedoms are allegedly violated has the right,
either in person or through legally authorised representation, to submit a complaint and have that
complaint promptly reviewed in a public hearing before an independent, impartial and competent judicial
or other authority established by law, and to obtain from such an authority a decision, in accordance with
the law, providing redress, including any compensation due, where there has been a violation of that
person’s rights or freedoms, as well as enforcement of any decision and verdict, without undue delay.
ARTICLE 15: To this end, human rights defenders have the right, individually and in association with
others, in particular:
• To complain about the policies and actions of individual officials and governmental bodies with
regard to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, by petition or other appropriate
means, to competent domestic judicial, administrative or legislative authorities or any other
competent authority provided for by the state legal system, which shall render their decision on
the complaint without undue delay
• To attend public hearings, proceedings and trials in order to form an opinion on their compliance
with national law and applicable international obligations and commitments
• To offer and provide professionally qualified legal assistance or other relevant advice and
assistance in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms.
ARTICLE 16: In accordance with applicable international instruments and procedures, human rights
defenders have the right, individually and in association with others, to communicate freely and benefit
from unhindered access to international bodies with general or special competence to receive and consider
information on matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
ARTICLE 17: Human rights defenders have the right, individually and in association with others, to
participate in peaceful activities against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
In this respect, they have the right to be protected effectively under national law when reacting against or
opposing, through peaceful means, activities and acts attributable to the state, including those by omission,
that result in violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated
by groups or individuals that affect the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
223
ARTICLE 18: Human rights defenders have the right, individually and in association with others, to
request, receive and make use of resources, under article 37 of the current Constitution of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with article 3 of the Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders of 1998.
ARTICLE 19: In the event of imminent danger that threatens the lives of human rights defenders, they
have the right to save their lives and seek the protection of the European Union’s accredited diplomatic
missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or those of other African nations that agree to shelter and
protect them. The right to seek exile abroad is recognised in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948 and Article 33 of the current Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Section V:
Duties and obligations of human rights defenders
ARTICLE 20: In exercising their mission, human rights defenders, like any other citizens, have a duty to
respect other people’s rights and the laws in force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
They also have the obligation, during the exercise of their functions, to respect the provisions of articles 27
to 29 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1987 concerning citizens’ rights.
ARTICLE 21: Human rights defenders must be guided in their mission by their ethical or deontological code.
ARTICLE 22: Human rights defenders shall not participate, by act or by failure to act, in violating human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and shall not be punished or harassed for refusing to do so.
ARTICLE 23: In exercising their rights and freedoms and their mission, human rights defenders,
individually and in association with others, shall be subject only to such limitations as are in accordance
with applicable international obligations and are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and general welfare in a democratic society.
Section VI:
The duties and obligations of the State
ARTICLE 24: The Congolese State has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly by adopting such steps as may be necessary to
create all the conditions necessary, as well as the legal guarantees required to ensure that all people under
its jurisdiction, including human rights defenders, may, whether individually or in association with others,
enjoy all those rights and freedoms in practice.
The Congolese State must adopt the legislative, administrative and other measures necessary to ensure that
the rights and freedoms of its citizens are guaranteed.
ARTICLE 25: In the event of a complaint or finding that the rights of a human rights defender have been
violated, the state shall conduct a prompt and impartial investigation and ensure that an inquiry takes
place whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that any such violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms has occurred in any territory under its jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 26: The state shall take all the necessary measures to ensure that the competent authorities
protect human rights defenders, whether acting individually or in association with others, against any
violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a
consequence of their legitimate exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by national and international
legal instruments.
ARTICLE 27: Deportation of human rights defenders who have fled from persecution when their lives are
in danger shall be prevented.
ARTICLE 28: The need to address the issue of impunity by conducting in-depth, independent investigations
and putting an end to the violence perpetrated against human rights defenders shall be highlighted.
ARTICLE 29: This law shall go into effect on the date of its enactment.
224
Annex 11: United Nations: Declaration on the

right and responsibility of individuals, groups
and organs of society to promote and protect
universally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms (1998)
Fifty-third session, agenda item 110 (b)
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Third Committee (A/53/625/Add.2)]
General Assembly resolution 53/144. Declaration on the right and responsibility

of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Reaffirming the importance of the observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations for the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in
all countries of the world,
1
Taking note of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/7 of 3 April 1998, See Official Records of the
Economic and Social Council, 1998, Supplement No. 3 (E/1998/23), chap. II, sect. A. in which the Commission
approved the text of the draft declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs
of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Taking note also of Economic and Social Council resolution 1998/33 of 30 July 1998, in which the Council
recommended the draft declaration to the General Assembly for adoption,
Conscious of the importance of the adoption of the draft declaration in the context of the fiftieth anniversary
2
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A (III),
1. Adopts the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, annexed to the present resolution;
2. Invites Governments, agencies and organizations of the United Nations system and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify their efforts to disseminate
the Declaration and to promote universal respect and understanding thereof, and requests the
Secretary-General to include the text of the Declaration in the next edition of Human Rights:
A Compilation of International Instruments.
1 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1998, Supplement No. 3 (E/1998/23), chapter II, section A.
2 Resolution 217 A (III).
225
85th plenary meeting, 9 December 1998

ANNEX
Declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect
universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms

Reaffirming the importance of the observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations for the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in
all countries of the world,
2
Reaffirming also the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
3
Covenants on Human Rights Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex. as basic elements of international efforts to
promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
importance of other human rights instruments adopted within the United Nations system, as well as those
at the regional level,
Stressing that all members of the international community shall fulfil, jointly and separately, their solemn
obligation to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction of any kind, including distinctions based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and reaffirming the particular
importance of achieving international cooperation to fulfil this obligation according to the Charter,
Acknowledging the important role of international cooperation for, and the valuable work of individuals,
groups and associations in contributing to, the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals, including in relation to mass, flagrant or systematic
violations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign
domination or occupation, aggression or threats to national sovereignty, national unity or territorial
integrity and from the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination and the right of every
people to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources,
Recognizing the relationship between international peace and security and the enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and mindful that the absence of international peace and security does not
excuse non-compliance,
Reiterating that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal, indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated and should be promoted and implemented in a fair and equitable manner, without prejudice
to the implementation of each of those rights and freedoms,
Stressing that the prime responsibility and duty to promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms lie with the State,
Recognizing the right and the responsibility of individuals, groups and associations to promote respect for
and foster knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels,
DECLARES:
Article 1
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection
and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels.
Article 2
1. Each State has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, by adopting such steps as may be necessary to create
all conditions necessary in the social, economic, political and other fields, as well as the legal
guarantees required to ensure that all persons under its jurisdiction, individually and in
association with others, are able to enjoy all those rights and freedoms in practice.
2. Each State shall adopt such legislative, administrative and other steps as may be necessary to
ensure that the rights and freedoms referred to in the present Declaration are effectively guaranteed.
3 Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
226
Article 3
Domestic law consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other international obligations of the
State in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the juridical framework within which
human rights and fundamental freedoms should be implemented and enjoyed and within which all
activities referred to in the present Declaration for the promotion, protection and effective realization of
those rights and freedoms should be conducted.
Article 4
Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as impairing or contradicting the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations or as restricting or derogating from the provisions of the
2
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and other
international instruments and commitments applicable in this field.
Article 5
For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the
right, individually and in association with others, at the national and international levels:
a) To meet or assemble peacefully;
b) To form, join and participate in non-governmental organizations, associations or groups;
c) To communicate with non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations.
Article 6
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others:
a) To know, seek, obtain, receive and hold information about all human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including having access to information as to how those rights and freedoms are given
effect in domestic legislative, judicial or administrative systems;
b) As provided for in human rights and other applicable international instruments, freely to publish,
impart or disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and
fundamental freedoms;
c) To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to
draw public attention to those matters.
Article 7
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to develop and discuss new human
rights ideas and principles and to advocate their acceptance.
Article 8
1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to have effective access, on a
non-discriminatory basis, to participation in the government of his or her country and in the
conduct of public affairs.
2. This includes, inter alia, the right, individually and in association with others, to submit to governmental
bodies and agencies and organizations concerned with public affairs criticism and proposals for
improving their functioning and to draw attention to any aspect of their work that may hinder or
impede the promotion, protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Article 9
1. In the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the promotion and
protection of human rights as referred to in the present Declaration, everyone has the right,
individually and in association with others, to benefit from an effective remedy and to be
protected in the event of the violation of those rights.
2. To this end, everyone whose rights or freedoms are allegedly violated has the right, either in person or
through legally authorized representation, to complain to and have that complaint promptly reviewed
in a public hearing before an independent, impartial and competent judicial or other authority
established by law and to obtain from such an authority a decision, in accordance with law, providing
redress, including any compensation due, where there has been a violation of that person’s rights or
freedoms, as well as enforcement of the eventual decision and award, all without undue delay.
227
3. To the same end, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, inter alia:
a) To complain about the policies and actions of individual officials and governmental bodies
with regard to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, by petition or other
appropriate means, to competent domestic judicial, administrative or legislative authorities
or any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, which should
render their decision on the complaint without undue delay;
b) To attend public hearings, proceedings and trials so as to form an opinion on their compliance
with national law and applicable international obligations and commitments;
c) To offer and provide professionally qualified legal assistance or other relevant advice and
assistance in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms.
4. To the same end, and in accordance with applicable international instruments and procedures,
everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to unhindered access to and
communication with international bodies with general or special competence to receive and
consider communications on matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
5. The State shall conduct a prompt and impartial investigation or ensure that an inquiry takes
place whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms has occurred in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 10
No one shall participate, by act or by failure to act where required, in violating human rights and
fundamental freedoms and no one shall be subjected to punishment or adverse action of any kind for
refusing to do so.
Article 11
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to the lawful exercise of his or her
occupation or profession. Everyone who, as a result of his or her profession, can affect the human dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms of others should respect those rights and freedoms and comply
with relevant national and international standards of occupational and professional conduct or ethics.
Article 12
1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful
activities against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities
of everyone, individually and in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation,
de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence
of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration.
3. In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be
protected effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful
means, activities and acts, including those by omission, attributable to States that result in
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by
groups or individuals that affect the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Article 13
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources
for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through
peaceful means, in accordance with article 3 of the present Declaration.
Article 14
1. The State has the responsibility to take legislative, judicial, administrative or other appropriate
measures to promote the understanding by all persons under its jurisdiction of their civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights.
2. Such measures shall include, inter alia:
a) The publication and widespread availability of national laws and regulations and of
applicable basic international human rights instruments;
b) Full and equal access to international documents in the field of human rights, including the
periodic reports by the State to the bodies established by the international human rights
treaties to which it is a party, as well as the summary records of discussions and the official
reports of these bodies.
228
3. The State shall ensure and support, where appropriate, the creation and development of further
independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in all territory under its jurisdiction, whether they be ombudsmen, human rights
commissions or any other form of national institution.
Article 15
The State has the responsibility to promote and facilitate the teaching of human rights and fundamental
freedoms at all levels of education and to ensure that all those responsible for training lawyers, law
enforcement officers, the personnel of the armed forces and public officials include appropriate elements of
human rights teaching in their training programme.
Article 16
Individuals, non-governmental organizations and relevant institutions have an important role to play in
contributing to making the public more aware of questions relating to all human rights and fundamental
freedoms through activities such as education, training and research in these areas to strengthen further,
inter alia, understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations among nations and among all racial and
religious groups, bearing in mind the various backgrounds of the societies and communities in which they
carry out their activities.
Article 17
In the exercise of the rights and freedoms referred to in the present Declaration, everyone, acting
individually and in association with others, shall be subject only to such limitations as are in accordance
with applicable international obligations and are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
Article 18
1. Everyone has duties towards and within the community, in which alone the free and full
development of his or her personality is possible.
2. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an important role to
play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental
freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions
and processes.
3. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important
role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone
to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realized.
Article 19
Nothing in the present Declaration shall be interpreted as implying for any individual, group or organ of
society or any State the right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of the
rights and freedoms referred to in the present Declaration.
Article 20
Nothing in the present Declaration shall be interpreted as permitting States to support and promote
activities of individuals, groups of individuals, institutions or non-governmental organizations contrary to
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
229
Annex 12: United Nations: Additional

resolution to the Human Rights Defenders
Declaration – see previous annex – (2009)
Sixty-fourth session
THIRD COMMITTEE:
AGENDA ITEM 69 (B)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches
for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Vanuatu: revised draft resolution,
Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Recalling its resolution 53/144 of 9 December 1998, by which it adopted by consensus the Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms annexed to that resolution, and reiterating the
importance of the Declaration and its promotion and implementation,
Recalling also all previous resolutions on this subject, in particular its resolution 62/152 of 18 December 2007
1
and Human Rights Council resolution 7/8 of 27 March 2008,
Noting with deep concern that in many countries persons and organizations engaged in promoting and
defending human rights and fundamental freedoms frequently face threats, harassment and suffer
insecurity as a result of those activities, including through restrictions on freedom of association,
expression or the right to peaceful assembly, or abuse of civil or criminal proceedings,
Gravely concerned that, in some instances, national security and counterterrorism legislation and other
measures have been misused to target human rights defenders or have hindered their work and safety in
a manner contrary to international law,
Gravely concerned also by the continuing high level of human rights violations committed against persons
engaged in promoting and defending human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world and by
the fact that in many countries impunity for threats, attacks and acts of intimidation against human rights
defenders persists and that this has a negative impact on their work and safety,
Gravely concerned further by the considerable number of communications received by the Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights defenders that, together with the reports submitted by some of the special
procedure mechanisms, indicates the serious nature of the risks faced by human rights defenders, in
particular women human rights defenders,
1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53), chap. II, sect. A.
230
Stressing the important role that individuals, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations,
groups, organs of society and independent national institutions play in the promotion and protection of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including in addressing all forms of human rights
violations, combating impunity, fighting poverty and discrimination, and promoting access to justice,
democracy, tolerance, human dignity and the right to development, and recalling that all have rights as
well as responsibilities and duties within and towards the community,
Recognizing the substantial role that human rights defenders can play in supporting efforts to strengthen
peace and development, through dialogue, openness, participation and justice, including by monitoring,
reporting on and contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights,
2
Recalling that, in accordance with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
certain rights are recognized as non-derogable in any circumstances and that any measures derogating
from other provisions of the Covenant must be in accordance with that article in all cases, and underlining
the exceptional and temporary nature of any such derogations, as stated in General Comment No. 29 on
states of emergency adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 24 July 2001,
Welcoming the cooperation between the Special Rapporteur and other special procedures of the Human
Rights Council, as well as other relevant United Nations bodies, offices, departments, specialized agencies
and personnel, both at Headquarters and at the country level, within their mandates,
Welcoming also regional initiatives for the promotion and protection of human rights and the strengthened
cooperation between international and regional mechanisms for the protection of human rights defenders,
and encouraging further development in this regard,
Welcoming further the steps taken by some States towards adopting national policies or legislation for the
protection of individuals, groups and organs of society engaged in promoting and defending human
rights, including as follow-up to the universal periodic review mechanism of the Human Rights Council,
Recalling that the primary responsibility for promoting and protecting human rights rests with the State,
reaffirming that national legislation consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other
international obligations of the State in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the juridical
framework within which human rights defenders conduct their activities, and noting with deep concern
that the activities of some non-State actors pose a major threat to the security of human rights defenders,
Emphasizing the need for strong and effective measures for the protection of human rights defenders,
1. Calls upon all States to promote and give full effect to the Declaration on the Right and
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
3
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including by taking, as appropriate,
practical steps to that end;
4
2. Welcomes the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders and
her contribution to the effective promotion of the Declaration and the improvement of the
protection of human rights defenders worldwide;
3. Condemns all human rights violations committed against persons engaged in promoting and
defending human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world, and urges States to take
all appropriate action, consistent with the Declaration and all other relevant human rights
instruments, to prevent and eliminate such human rights violations;
4. Calls upon all States to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of human rights
defenders, at both local and national levels, including in times of armed conflict and peacebuilding;
5. Also calls upon States to respect, protect and ensure the rights to freedom of expression and
association of human rights defenders and, in this regard, to ensure, where procedures governing
registration of civil society organizations exist, that these are transparent, non-discriminatory,
expeditious, inexpensive, allow for the possibility to appeal and avoid requiring re-registration, in
accordance with national legislation, and are in conformity with international human rights law;
6. Urges States to ensure that any measures to combat terrorism and preserve national security are
in compliance with their obligations under international law, in particular under international
human rights law, and do not hinder the work and safety of individuals, groups and organs of
society engaged in promoting and defending human rights;
2 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

3 Resolution 53/144, annex.
4 See A/63/288 and A/64/226.
231
7. Also urges States to take appropriate measures to address the question of impunity for attacks, threats
and acts of intimidation, including cases of genderbased violence, against human rights defenders
and their relatives, including by ensuring that complaints from human rights defenders are promptly
investigated and addressed in a transparent, independent and accountable manner;
8. Further urges all States to cooperate with and assist the Special Rapporteur in the performance of her/
his mandate and to provide all information in a timely manner, as well as to respond without undue
delay to communications transmitted to them by the Special Rapporteur;
9. Calls upon States to give serious consideration to responding favourably to the requests of the Special
Rapporteur to visit their countries, and urges them to enter into a constructive dialogue with the
Special Rapporteur with respect to the follow-up to and implementation of her/his recommendations;
10. Strongly encourages States to translate the Declaration and to take measures to ensure its widest
possible dissemination at national and local levels;
11. Encourages States to promote awareness and training in regard to the Declaration in order to enable
officials, agencies, authorities, and members of the judiciary to observe the provisions of the
Declaration and thus to promote better understanding and respect for individuals, groups and
organs of society engaged in promoting and defending human rights, as well as for their work;
12. Encourages relevant United Nations bodies, including at the country level, within their respective
mandates and working in cooperation with States, to give due consideration to the Declaration
and to the reports of the Special Rapporteur, and, in this context, requests the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to draw the attention of all relevant United
Nations bodies, including at the country level, to the reports of the Special Rapporteur;
13. Requests that the Office of the High Commissioner, as well as other relevant United Nations
bodies, offices, departments and specialized agencies, within their respective mandates, consider
ways in which they can assist States in strengthening the role and security of human rights
defenders, including in situations of armed conflict and peacebuilding;
14. Requests all concerned United Nations agencies and organizations, within their mandates, to
provide all possible assistance and support to the Special Rapporteur for the effective fulfilment
of her/his mandate, including through country visits;
15. Further requests the Special Rapporteur to continue to report annually on her/his activities to the
General Assembly and to the Human Rights Council in accordance with her/his mandate;
16. Decides to consider the question at its sixty-sixth session under the item entitled “Promotion and
protection of human rights”.
232
Acknowledgements
Many people made a direct contribution to this study. We first mention those on the
Protection Desks of the partner organisations of Protection International:
– Claudia Samayoa (Defenders’ Unit of Guatemala – Unidad de Defensores/as de Guatemala)
– Diego Pérez, Irma García y Julia Madariaga (Social Thought and Action, Colombia –
Pensamiento y Acción Social)
And in alphabetical order we would like to express our gratitude to:

– Carolina Aldana (We Are Defenders Programme, Colombia - Programa Somos Defensores)
– Adolphe (Asadho Bukavu, RDC)
– José Juan Alonso Ramírez (Programme on attacks against journalists and civil defenders of
human rights of the National Human Rights Commission, Mexico – Programa de Agravios a
Periodistas y Defensores Civiles de Derechos Humanos de la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos
Humanos -CNDH-)
– Albertine Amazani (Association for the fight to promote and protect the rights of women and
children -ALUDROFE-, Fizi and Baraka, RDC – Association de Lutte pour la promotion et la
protection des droits de la femme et de l’enfant -ALUDROFE-)
– Coronel Efraín Oswaldo Aragón (Human Rights Programme of the National Police, Colombia
– Programa Derechos Humanos de la Policía Nacional)
– Ignacio Arango (Penca de Sábila, Medellín, Colombia)
– Luis Arriaga (HRD Centre Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez, México – Centro de DDHH Miguel
Agustín Pro Juárez)
– Miriam Awad (Santa Marta Land of Hope Association, Colombia – Asociación Tierra de
Esperanza Santa Marta)
– Patrick Bakula Impempe (Dynamic movement of human rights activists -DADH-, Matadi,
RDC – Dynamique des activistes des droits de l’homme -DADH-)
– Franck Banza Ngoy (Friends of Nelson Mandela for the defence of human rights, ANMDH,
Kinshasa, RDC – Les amis de Nelson Mandela pour la défense des droits humains, ANMDH)
– Paola Barruti (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia
– Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Colombia)
– Dieudonné Basedeke Mongane (Walungu, RDC)
– Léonard Basilwango Mutumoyi (ACPD, Bukavu, RDC)
– Cyprien Birhingingwa (National Centre for the support of development and people’s
participation -CENADEP-, Kivu, RDC – Centre national d’appui au développement et à la
participation populaire -CENADEP-)
– Diana Paola Botero Morales (Governmental Human Rights Programme, Colombia – Programa
Gubernamental de derechos humanos)
– Cécile Bwabuy (Consultation and Thoughts on Action for Basic Development -CRADEB-,
Kitwit, RDC – Concertation et réflexion sur les actions pour le développement de base -CRADEB-)
– Laurent Bwenia-Muhenia (ASADHO, Kikwit, RDC)
– Owen Campbell (Peace Brigades International - Guatemala Project – Brigadas Internacionales
de Paz -Proyecto Guatemala)
– Jean Carlos (REPRDODHOC and RENADHOC, RDC)
233
– Sandra Carvalho (Justicia Global, Brazil)

– Francisco Cerezo Contreras (Cerezo Committee, Mexico – Comité Cerezo)
– Marcellin Chamwa Murho (RDC)
– Olimpia Chatá (Organisation of Ixquic Women of Petén, Guatemala – Organización de Mujeres
Ixquic de Petén)
– Kizito Cimbembe (Collective for organisations of young supporters of the Congo, Université
Kinshasa-Institut supérieur études médicales -COJESKI UNIKIN-ISTM-, Kinshasa, RDC –
Collectif des organisations des jeunes solidaires du Congo, Université Kinshasa-Institut supérieur
études médicales -COJESKI UNIKIN-ISTM-)
– Patricia Colchero (Human Rights Commission of the Federal District -CDHDF-, México –
Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal -CDHDF-)
– Vanessa Coria (Centre for Justice and International Law -CEJIL- Central America, Costa Rica
– Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional -CEJIL- Mesoamérica)
– Rosita Corrales (Organisation of Ixquic Women of Petén, Guatemala – Organización de Mujeres
Ixquic de Petén)
– Edgar Cortés (All rights For All Network, Mexico – Red de Todos los Derechos para Todos)
– Eréndira Cruzvillegas Fuentes (Human Rights Commission of the Federal District -CDHDF-,
Mexico – Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal -CDHDF-)
– Jorge Cubides (Protection Programme, Government of Colombia – Programa de Protección,
Gobierno de Colombia)
– Defender (Kontras Aceh, Indonesia)
– Defenders - 13 individuals (Kenya)
– Defender (Jagaran Media Centre, Nepal)
– Defender (INSEC, Nepal)
– Defender (Human Rights House, Nepal)
– Defender (NEFIN, Nepal)
– Defender (CVICT, Nepal)
– Defender (Blue Diamond Society, Nepal)
– Defender (HUDEP, Nepal)
– Defender (LANCA, Nepal)
– Defender (NDC, Nepal)
– Defender (WHR, Nepal)
– Defender (People’s and Human Rights Watch, Kenya)
– Defender (WOREC, Nepal)
– Defender (Amnesty International, Nepal)
– Defender (National Human Rights Commission, Nepal)
– Defender (NWC, Nepal)
– Defenders (Democratic Republic of Congo: some 100 participants in various workshops in
Kinshasa, Kikwit, Mbandaka, Kinshasa, Matadi, North Kivu and South Kivu)
– Defender (Mandera, Kenya)
– Defender (Centre for Advocacy and Research Against Torture, Kenya)
– Defender (The voice of those with no voice or freedom, South Kivu, RDC – Voix de sans Voix
ni Liberte)
– Rafael Dias (Justicia Global, Brazil)
– Mireya Duque (Corporación Avre - Support to Victims of Socio-Political Violence - emotional
recovery programme, Colombia – Corporación Avre - Apoyo a Víctima de Violencia Socio Política
Pro - Recuperación Emocional)
234
– Oscar Gómez (Avre Corporation - Support to Victims of Socio-Political Violence - emotional

recovery programme, Colombia – Corporación Avre - Apoyo a Víctima de Violencia Socio Política
Pro - Recuperación Emocional)
– Alejandra González (“Tlachinollan” Mountain A.C, Mexico Human Rights Centre –Centro de
Derechos Humanos de la Montaña “Tlachinollan”)
– Diana Gutiérrez (Medellín Proxy, Colombia)
– Marta Falqueto (PPDDH-ES, CADH, Brazil)
– Gloria Flórez (Minga Association, Colombia – Asociación Minga)
– Marina Gallego (Women’s Peace Road, Colombia – Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres)
– Lourdes Gutiérrez Ortiz (Unit for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights of the
Secretariat of the Interior Ministry, Mexico – Unidad para la Promoción y Defensa de los
Derechos Humanos de la Secretaría de Gobernación)
– Kentaro Harriet (Human Rights Concern, Kampala, Uganda)
– Iduvina Hernández (Security and Democracy -SEDEM-, Guatemala – Seguridad en Democracia
-SEDEM-)
– Miguel Huerta (CNDH, Peru)
– Françoise Ikwapa (Women’s League for the development of and education in democracy -LIFDED-
Kitwit, RDC – Ligues des femmes pour le développement et l’éducation à la démocratie -LIFDED-)
– Olona Imbungu (Comprehensive Project for Human Rights in National Entities -PIDEN-,
Kitwit, RDC – Projet intégré pour les droits de la personne dans les entités nationales -PIDEN-)
– Judith (Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya)
– Miguel Jugo (Pro-Human Rights Association -APRODEH- Peru – Asociación Pro Derechos
Humanos -APRODEH-)
– Etienne Kabala (Association APDP)
– Justine Kakesa (Dynamic Movement for Congolese Youth -DJFC-, Kitwit, RDC – Dynamique
de la jeunesse congolaise -DJFC-)
– BKamau (Social Refund Center, Kenya)
– Georges Kapiamba (ASADHO, African Association for the Defence of Human Rights,
Kinshasa, RDC – ASADHO, Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme)
– Albert Kawumbu (League for raising elector awareness, LICE, Kinshasa, RDC – Ligue de
conscientisation des électeurs, LICE)
– Blanchard Kepiasila Keke (Debout moeurs, Matadi, RDC)
– Abjata Khalif (Wagalla Centre for Peace and Human Rights, Kenya)
– Jeremie Kibukila (RADHF, RDC)
– Rosalie Kilunya Ndedi (Pax Christi, Kitwit, RDC)
– Célestin Kingenzi (AJPR, Kikwit, RDC)
– David Kisule (Integrity, Kampala, Uganda)
– Marie-Pierre Kitambala (Missionary Information and Action Centre, Kitwit, RDC – Centre
d’information et d’animation missionnaire)
– Joseph Kitungano (REPRODHOC, South Kivu, RDC)
– Angèle Kombe (Association of Congolese Women Lawyers -AFEJUCO- South Kivu, RDC –
Association des Femmes Juristes Congolaises -AFEJUCO-)
– David Koros (Centre Against Torture -CAT-, Kenya)
– Cintia Lavandera (Amnesty International, UK)
– Célestin Limbeya Omoho (The friends of Nelson Mandela for the defence of human rights,
ANMDH, Kinshasa, RDC – Les amis de Nelson Mandela pour la défense des droits humains,
ANMDH)
235
– Jorge López (Organisation for supporting the sexuality of people with AIDS -OASIS-,
Guatemala – Organización de Apoyo a una Sexualidad Integral frente al Sida -OASIS-)
– Benjamin Lukamba (ASADHO, African Association for the Defence of Human Rights,
Kinshasa, RDC – ASADHO, Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme)
– Vanesa Marcos (Peace Brigades International - Guatemala Project –Brigadas Internacionales
– Javier Márquez Valderrama (Penca de Sábila, Medellín, Colombia)
– Hugo Martínez (Defenders’ Unit, COPREDEH, Guatemala – Unidad de Defensores, COPREDEH)
– Espérance Mayoka (Trade Union Confederation of the Congo, Kitwit, RDC – Confédération
syndicale du Congo)
– Olivier Mbala Matadi (Alternative Youth Foundation for the promotion of human rights -FAJHR-,
Matadi, RDC – Fondation alternative jeunesse pour la promotion des droits humains -FAJHR-)
– Pamphile Mbuangi Mayimbi (Socio-cultural Promotion Office -BUPOSC- and Collective for
organisations of young supporters of the Congo Kinshasa -COJESKI-, Matadi, RDC – Bureau
de promotion socio-culturelle -BUPOSC- et Collectif des organisations des jeunes solidaires du
Congo Kinshasa -COJESKI-)
– Jane Meriwas (Kenya)
– Hassan Mopembe (CONADHI -Mbandaka, RDC)
– Luis Mosquero (Living Together, Medellín, Colombia – Convivamos)
– Julien Muanda Lusala (League for the promotion of women and human rights -LIPFEDH-,
Boma, RDC – Ligue pour la promotion de la femme et des droits humains -LIPFEDH-)
– Philomène Mukendi (Angels from Heaven, Kinshasa, RDC – Les Anges du Ciel)
– Alain Mullenex (Peace Brigades International – Brigadas Internacionales de Paz)
– Norbert Musanga Amissi (REPRODHOC, RDC)
– Gabriel Muyui (Indigenous Ombudsman’s Office, Colombia – Defensoría Indígena)
– Loochi Muzaliwa (Justice for All - member of REPRODHOC- RDC – Justice pour Tous
-membre de REPRODHOC- RDC)
– Faith Mwende (Center for Rights, Education and Awareness -CREAW-, Kenya)
– Otsieno Namwaya (Media Center Of Africa, Nairobi, Kenya)
– Remy Ngabo (SEDI, South-Kivu, RDC)
– Nöelly Nkubukulu Bulumonano (Women as a pattern for peace -WOPPA-, Matadi, RDC)
– Elise Nyandinda (Women’s Network of associations for development -RFDA-, Uvira and Fizi,
RDC – Réseau des Femmes pour un développement associatif -RFDA-)
– Diana Nyawanda (defender, Kenya)
– Caleb Ochanda Twenya (Bware Youth Action Network, Nyanza, Kenya)
– Dr. Godrey Odongo (Amnesty International, Kenya)
– Elena Openshaw (Amnesty International, UK)
– Argentina Osorio (Organisation of Ixquic Women of Petén, Guatemala – Organización de
Mujeres Ixquic de Petén)
– Philippe Pagé (Peace Brigades International - Colombia Project PBI – Brigadas Internacionales
de Paz - Proyecto Colombia PBI)
– Mario Patrón (“Tlachinollan” Mountain A.C, México Human Rights Centre – Centro de
Derechos Humanos de la Montaña “Tlachinollan” A.C, México)
– Marie Pemba (Women’s league for the development of and education in democracy -LIFDED-
Kitwit, RDC – Ligues des femmes pour le développement et l’éducation à la démocratie LIFDED)
– Julien Pepe (Sexual Minorities Uganda -SMUG-, Kampala, Uganda)
– Mar Pérez (CNDH, Peru)
236
– José Pilar (Zacapa Lutheran Church of Guatemala, ILUGUA – Iglesia Luterana de Guatemala
de Zacapa, ILUGUA)
– Jaime Prieto (expert, Colombia)
– Adrián Ramírez (Mexican League for Human Rights, Mexico – Liga Mexicana por los Derechos
Humanos)
– Luis Ramírez (Institute for Comparative Studies in Criminal Science -ICCPG-, Guatemala –
Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales -ICCPG-)
– Enrique Riestra (Peace Brigades International - Guatemala Project – Brigadas Internacionales
– Luis Rocca (Risk Assessment Commission - CNDH Peru – Comisión de Evaluación de Riesgos,
CNDH Perú)
– Carlos Rodríguez (Colombian Lawyers’ Commission, Colombia – Comisión Colombiana de Juristas)
– Pablo Saavedra (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Costa Rica – Corte Interamericana
de Derechos Humanos)
– Fabien Safari (ACAT South-Kivu, RDC)
- Diana Sánchez (Asociación Minga, Colombia)
– Javier San Juan (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Guatemala OACNUDH – Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los
Derechos Humanos en Guatemala OACNUDH)
– Aura Selmis (Living Together, Medellín, Colombia – Convivamos)
– Agnès Shagayo (Association for Solidarity and Peace for Comprehensive Development
-SODAPI-, Uvira, RDC – Association Solidarité et Paix pour le Développement Intégré)
– Robert Shemamba (Mitumba Community Radio, Uvira, RDC – Radio communautaire Mitumba)
– Alejandro Silva (Labour Consultancy Centre -CEDAL-, Peru – Centro de Asesoría Laboral
-CEDAL-)
– Titi (Justice and Solidarity, RDC – Justice et Solidarité)
– Patrick Tumwine (Human Rights Network -HURINET-, Uganda)
– Iliana Tzin (Organisation of Ixquic Women of Petén, Guatemala – Organización de Mujeres
Ixquic de Petén)
– Germán Vargas (Association for Peace and Hope, Peru – Asociación Paz y Esperanza)
– Mónica Valencia Giraldo (Women’s Peace Road, Colombia – Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres)
– Ruth del Valle (COPREDEH, Guatemala)
– Eduardo Vega (Peruvian Ombudsman – Defensoría Pública de Perú)
– Juan Antonio Vega (independent expert, Mexico)
– Passy Walumbuka (ELIMU Association, Uvira, RDC – Association ELIMU)
– Juliet Were Oguttu (Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange Isis-WICCE-,
Kampala, Uganda)
– Roxana Yzusqui Rios (expert, Peru)
– Julie Zenga (League of Electors, RDC – Ligue des électeurs)
Finally this work could not have been done without the commitment and cooperation of all
the people of Protection International, and especially those who worked closely with us.
Our thanks go to Marie Caraj (from the team working on this topic), to our colleagues in
the PI office in Brussels, and our assistants Almudena Díaz Barrio, Ángela Díaz Barrio,
Jérôme Hieber and Steve Ashton.
237
The authors - biographies
Luis Enrique Eguren
(Spain, 1962) Medical doctor and expert in protection, co-director
of the Research and Training Unit of Protection International.
He has worked with various international organisations on
projects in El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Colombia and Guatemala and
on short missions to other countries. He is a trainer, researcher
and consultant and has published various articles and books on
the subject of protection.
María Martín Quintana

(Santander, Spain, 1979) Lawyer, member of the Research and
Training Unit of Protection International. She has worked as a
consultant, researcher and legal advisor in various human rights
institutions in Latin America, mainly on matters relating to the
protection of defenders and the prevention and eradication of
torture. She has run courses in universities, public institutions
and civil society organisations and has published various works
on human rights.
With the financial support of:

PANTONE 144 PANTONE 144
Protection of human rights defenders: Best practices and lessons learnt

Protection of
www.protectionline.org
One-stop website on protection
for human rights defenders

11 rue de la Linière - 1060 Brussels – Belgium

Tel: +32 (0) 2 609 44 07 or 05
Fax: +32 (0) 2 609 44 06
www.protectioninternational.org
doi:10.1017/aju.2018.90
SYMPOSIUM ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT SEVENTY
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUTURE OF BEING HUMAN
Alexandra Huneeus*
The seventieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) comes at a time of more
contestation than usual over the future of human rights. A sense of urgency animates debates over whether the
institutions and ideas of human rights can, or should, survive current geopolitical changes. This symposium, by
contrast, shifts the lens to a more slow-moving but equally profound challenge to human rights law: how tech-
nology and its impacts on our social and physical environments are reshaping the debate on what it means to be
human. Can the UDHR be recast for a time in which new technologies are continually altering how humans inter-
act, and the legal status of robots, rivers, and apes alike are at times argued in the language of rights?
Esoteric as this may sound, it is a question provoking real-life legal activity, with implications for international
law. In January, the EU Parliament asked the EU Commission to consider “creating a specific legal status for
robots … so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status
of electronic persons.”1 A recent AJIL Unbound symposium on global animal law noted a trend towards de-reifi-
cation of animals, and, in some jurisdictions, the “cautious acknowledgments … of a ‘nonhuman’ or ‘human-like’
right of several animals” to physical liberty.2 National courts or constitutions in New Zealand, India, Ecuador, and
Colombia have extended the concept of a rights-bearing person to encompass geological features and ecosystems,
such as rivers, forests, and mountains, and to nature itself, a trend approvingly noted by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights in a recent judgment.3 Several legal instruments and judgments speak of duties to future gen-
erations, and some cast humans that do not yet exist as rights-bearing persons with claims against humans that do
exist.4
Individually, these developments do not seek to upend the current human rights regimes so much as to include a
broader set of behaviors under their umbrella. Some of this is tactical. Casting a claim in the language of rights
allows access to a broad array of established domestic, regional, and international legal institutions, including
courts, commissions, councils, committees, rapporteurs and ombudspersons, and a transnational corpus juris.
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.

1
European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report with Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics,
A8-0005/2017 (Jan. 27, 2018).
2
Anne Peters, Introduction to Symposium on Global Animal Law (Part I): Animals Matter in International Law and International Law Matters for
Animals, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 252, 253 (2017).
3
The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee
of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity – Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, para. 62 (Nov. 15, 2017).
4
See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Costitutional Court], abril 5, 2018, Sentencia T-622/16, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.]
(Colom.).
The American Society of International Law and Alexandra Huneeus © 2018. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the 324
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2018 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUTURE OF BEING HUMAN 325
Taken together, however, these various strands of legal argument raise the possibility that we are not just strate-
gically tinkering with existing rights regimes, but pushing them towards a new paradigm. It is this possibility that
our symposium commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the UDHR explores.
The “Human Family” and Beyond
The UDHR itself does not directly define “human,” nor does it explain why membership in “the human fam-
ily” grounds the rights and freedoms it announces.5 Rather, it punts on these questions by relying implicitly on
shared intuitions from which we can build a “common understanding.”6 But of course the UDHR’s contentious
history, and the struggles over how to write it into treaty law, makes clear that our intuitions were never shared.7
Often, the universal and regional human rights systems have but provided a stage for “the exciting drama of man
seeking to grasp himself,” as Charles Malik, the Lebanese philosopher, diplomat, and UDHR coauthor,
observed.8
In these struggles over the meaning of the UDHR, two lines of contestation have been particularly prominent.
The first is relativism/universalism, and the question of whether membership in a human family, as opposed to a
particular culture or people, can tell us anything about our moral commitments, or, conversely, whether the idea of
rights by virtue of our humanity is itself but a Western cultural construct. A second fundamental, and related,
cleavage is that of liberty/equality, and whether we are first self-realizing individuals whose natural liberty must
be protected, or whether we are, rather, deeply shaped and constrained by duties to each other. Both lines of con-
testation undergird today’s debates about human rights and nationalism, populism, and rising inequality, just as
they animated Cold War era debates about the relative importance of economic and social rights, and post-Cold
War debates about cultural rights.
The essays in this symposium show that these abiding debates are taking on new shapes. The development of
technologies that give us ever greater power over the natural and human worlds prods us to reconsider our moral
duties to each other. They push us to “grasp” ourselves anew. The essays also suggest, however, that in the early
twenty-first century a new line of contestation is becoming prominent. It queries not the relations of those within
the UDHR’s human family to each other and to the state, but rather our relations with other entities—natural,
man-made, and hybrid. At its most radical, it questions whether the human/non-human boundary still has the
meaning with which human rights law has always imbued it.
Each essay in the symposium grapples with whether the UDHR and its progeny of international and regional
instruments can guide us through these new challenges. Three of the essays examine how the advent of social
media and algorithmic decision-making forces us to reconsider our moral relations to one another. Molly Land
of the University of Connecticut Law School argues that online social media platforms magnify the impact of
ordinary individuals’ speech, and should cause us to strike a new balance between rights and duties.9 Although
the promise of the Internet was in part to provide access to broader and different sets of communities, it is a
lack of sense of community that characterizes online speech, silencing women, marginalized communities, and
other bullied speakers. Drawing on the UDHR’s Article 29 and new insights from cognitive psychology, Land
shows how states could promote online community structures that foster a sense of responsibility to others.
5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A (Dec. 10, 1948).
6
Id.
7
CHRISTOPHER N.J. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2014).
8
Charles Malik, Speech on Human Rights, delivered to United States Chamber of Commerce in New York (Nov. 4, 1949).
9
Molly K. Land, Speech Duties, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 329 (2018).
326 AJIL UNBOUND Vol. 112
Turning to the use of algorithms, the Free University of Berlin’s Helmut Aust argues that governance by non-
human decision-making disrupts the logic of human rights law, which is grounded on the rights and duties among
human beings.10 What happens, then, if the decision behind an act of governance is made not by a human, and
cannot be justified by reasons, but is simply the product of an unfolding algorithm? Not only does this create a
rupture in the relation between humans that grounds the UDHR, it also makes it more difficult to fashion a rem-
edy. Aust also examines how these nonhuman decision-makers are undermining public discourse, and therefore
democracy, by isolating us in our specially-tailored information bubbles.
While the first two essays focus on how technologies reshape our interactions, Catherine Powell of Fordham
Law School points us to the irony that certain aspects of our interactions remain intact: even as our exchanges are
increasingly disembodied, they are persistently racialized.11 Drawing on Osagie Obasogie’s study of how race is
perceived by the blind, she shows how the use of algorithms reproduces structural differences, including race-
based inequality, even absent visual cues. Future posthuman or transhuman societies, it seems, will continue to
be racialized, just as human-like robots are raced and gendered.
The three remaining essays query our relationships with others: humans and genetically engineered humans,
humans and the planet, and humans and animals. Reflecting on the fast-moving advances in gene-editing tech-
nologies, University of Wisconsin bioethicist Alta Charo challenges the existing human rights law approach.12 The
Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine views the human being “both as an individual and as a
member of the human species,” and seeks to protect the species by banning heritable man-made changes to the
genome. But this conception, Charo argues, misunderstands both the mechanisms of genetic mutation and recom-
bination, and the moral basis for human rights. International law should not prescribe a ban on germline editing,
but instead should take a more reasoned approach that weighs societal and health benefits against a scientifically
sound calculation of the risks. This is a change consonant with the UDHR’s right to share in scientific advance-
ment and its benefits, as well as the right in Article 27 to the protection of interests resulting from scientific
production.
It is not only new technology that is reshaping our moral relations; it is also a growing understanding of tech-
nology’s long-term impact. The concept of the Anthropocene conveys the idea that human activities are perturb-
ing the planet’s main systems, such as climate and geology. Ellen Hey of Erasmus University Rotterdam argues that
this new knowledge demands that we rethink our duties to each other and to the natural world.13 The UDHR,
perhaps more so than its treaty progeny, is capacious enough to encompass such Anthropocene thinking if recon-
strued to emphasize community (Article 29), economic and social rights (Articles 22–26), a right to an interna-
tional order (Article 28), the duties of actors other than states (preamble), and the duty of states to uphold a context
in which human rights can be fulfilled (Article 30). It is not enough, however, to stay within the UDHR: human
rights law must be understood to interact with other treaty regimes, and in particular that of international economic
law (trade, investment, and finance).
Anne Peters, the Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law
Heidelberg, turns our focus to those outside the human family with whom we have the closest relation.14 We
have always viewed animals as more like us than any other creature; we have always believed we have duties toward
10
Helmut Philipp Aust, Undermining Human Agency and Democratic Infrastructures? The Algorithmic Challenge to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 334 (2018).
11
Catherine Powell, Race and Rights in the Digital Age, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 339 (2018).
12
R. Alta Charo, Germline Engineering and Human Rights, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 344 (2018).
13
Ellen Hey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in “The Anthropocene”, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 350 (2018).
14
Anne Peters, Rights of Human and Nonhuman Animals: Complementing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 355
(2018).
2018 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUTURE OF BEING HUMAN 327
them; and they have always been a foil against which we understand ourselves. The precise question of their legal
status, however, has varied by place and time. To mark the seventieth anniversary of the UDHR, Anne Peters
rereads human rights law to argue that a next step in its evolution should be the creation of a legal instrument
for the protection of animals that sits at the international rather than the national level, that is created by states
as a formal treaty, and, most radically, that is articulated in the language of rights rather than welfare—thus granting
animals a legal personhood akin to ours.
Does the UDHR, then, still matter, or do human rights law and institutions hamper our ability to respond to the
changes wrought by new technologies? Will these advances introduce debates that sustain creative work in human
rights, or will they rip open the rights conceit? Taken together, the essays suggest that the UDHR is capacious
enough to provide moral guidance in our times, but only if reread with greater emphasis on its later and relatively
less developed articles. These are the articles that emphasize innovation and right to science and culture (Article
27), participation and community (Article 28), and individual duties (Article 29). Interestingly, the essays lay special
emphasis on the final articles of the UDHR, which speak to community, duties, and limitation. The final provisions
(Articles 28–30) belong to what René Cassin called the “pediment” in his visualization of the UDHR as the façade
of a temple leading to a better world. For him, the last three articles thus sit atop the others, binding together the
rights below.15 Perhaps the future of human rights law lies in developing the less explored pediment, and the way in
which it infuses the articles that precede it.
Law and the Long Now
When the EU Parliament recommended that robots be granted legal personhood, a group of scientists, ethicists,
and business leaders countered that to do so was itself an affront to human rights. They also suggested the par-
liamentarians’ thinking had been “distorted by Science-Fiction.”16 The same critique might be made of this sym-
posium. By chiming in about the long-term future of being human, one might argue, it sidelines the urgent and
fast-moving issues of inequality, populism, nationalism, and migration that are facing the human rights movement
and challenging its institutions. Perhaps it is a luxury, or a type of escapism from our pressing sense of crisis.
But there are reasons why these questions also matter here and now. First, as noted above, lawyers are raising
these arguments in courts and other legal venues, with implications for human rights law. Further, there is a blos-
soming field of posthumanism in the humanities in dialogue with the social sciences and even natural sciences,
and an important national security law debate on autonomous weapons (or killer robots) and humanitarian law.
Yet these themes are still treated as somewhat peripheral within human rights academic debates. Since 2017, for
example, five books have been published that take stock of human rights today and ask after their future, each
written or edited by highly regarded human rights scholars. Not one of these general studies thematizes how
technology and its impacts will test human rights law.17 Similarly, the major human rights journals have focused
on these questions only sparingly.18 There are of course, excellent scholars now writing on technology and human
15
AGI MARC, RENÉ CASSIN: FANTASSIN DES FROITS DE L’HOMME (1979); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 11(2001).
16
Open Letter to the European Commission Robotics and Artificial Intelligence.
17
ALISON BRYSK, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2018); HUMAN RIGHTS FUTURES (Stephen Hopgood et al. eds., 2017); MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, THE ORDINARY VIRTUES (2017); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018); KATHRYN
SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2017). But see UPRENDA BAXI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
POST HUMAN WORLD (2007).
18
But see 9 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. (2015).
328 AJIL UNBOUND Vol. 112
rights law,19 and this symposium builds on their work. But rather than asking only how technology can be a threat
to human rights, or a tool for their realization, it is a gesture towards creating deeper dialogue between human
rights law and our changing self-understanding in light of scientific knowledge and evolving morality.
Second, human rights law and discourse provides a legal framework for vastly different conversations to con-
verge. The issues areas covered by this symposium, and other emerging issues that similarly challenge us to recon-
sider what it means to be human, are dispersed across different areas of law and politics, and across geographic
regions. Yet those pushing for animal rights, for example, can fruitfully draw insights from those in the Global
South debating the rights of mother earth, and from bioethicists trying to think through the rights of the unborn to
a particular genetic structure. In this way, human rights scholarship, law, and institutions could provide a site for
cross-fertilization. It is a site that also puts these issue areas in conversation with the human rights debates that
have preceded them, including transversal issues such as discrimination, poverty, and other forms of inequality,
even as it provides a set of institutions that can help articulate new norms.
Finally, the objection leveled against the EU parliamentarians that it is too soon does not stick in the realm of
scholarship, where not all thinking must be immediately tied to a case in controversy. On the occasion of the
UDHR’s seventieth anniversary, it seems fitting to understand being human as a long-term project, with an eye
to fostering human rights law scholarship for the long now.20
19
See, e.g., NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE (Molly Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018); NEW TECHNOLOGIES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Therese Murphy ed., 2009).
20
See THE LONG NOW FOUNDATION.
Active PArticiPAtion
in HumAn rigHts
COnferenCe, 4 – 5 June 2011
Amnesty international is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters,
members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign
to end grave abuses of human rights. our vision is for every person to enjoy all
the rights enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights and other
international human rights standards.
We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest
or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
freedom from torture (formerly known as the medical foundation for the
care of victims of torture) was set up 25 years ago by Helen Bamber and other
clinicians working with Amnesty international opposing torture abroad who
wanted to give practical help to the many thousands of torture survivors
who arrive in the uK.
the centre for Applied Human rights (cAHr) at the university of York, uK, is an
inter-departmental research and teaching centre focused on applied human rights,
founded in 2007.
copies of this report can be requested from the this work is licensed under the creative commons
individuals team at individuals@amnesty.org Attribution-noncommercial-shareAlike 3.0 unported
License. to view a copy of this license, visit
© Amnesty international, freedom from torture and http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ or
university of York: centre for Applied Human rights send a letter to creative commons, 171 second street,
suite 300, san francisco, california, 94105, usA.
index: Act 10/023/2011 english
original Language: english
Printed by Amnesty international,

international secretariat, united Kingdom Cover photo: Attendees at a group session of the
‘Active participation in human rights’ conference, held
www.york.ac.uk/inst/cahr/ at Amnesty international’s headquarters in London,
www.amnesty.org.uk/ June 2011.
www.freedomfromtorture.org/ © Amnesty international
THE ORGANIZERS WOULD LIKE TO THANK
ALL OF THOSE WHO CONTRIBUTED THEIR
TIME AND EXPERTISE DURING THE
APPLICATION STAGE, THE CONFERENCE
AND THROUGHOUT THE FOLLOW UP.
WITHOUT THEIR INPUT THIS REPORT
WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE.
ABOUT THE ORGANIZERS
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
Amnesty international is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and
activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of
human rights. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the universal
declaration of human rights and other international human rights standards.
We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and
are funded mainly by our membership and public donations.
FREEDOM FROM TORTURE

Freedom from Torture (formally known as The Medical Foundation) was set up 25 years ago
by Helen Bamber and other clinicians working with Amnesty International opposing torture
abroad who wanted to give practical help to the many thousands of torture survivors who
arrive in the UK.
OUR VISION
“Freedom from Torture desires a world where torture and organized violence have been
vanquished and where their lasting consequences are recognized and redressed.”
OUR MISSION:
“Freedom from Torture is a human rights organization that exists to enable survivors of
torture and organized violence to engage in a healing process to assert their own human
dignity and worth. Our concern for the health and well-being of torture survivors and their
families is directed towards providing medical and social care, practical assistance, and
psychological and physical therapy. It is also our mission to raise public awareness about
torture and its consequences.”
UNIVERSITY OF YORK: CENTRE FOR APPLIED HUMAN RIGHTS

The Centre for Applied Human Rights (CAHR) at the University of York is an inter-
departmental research and teaching centre, founded in 2007.
THE CENTRE:
 Offers a unique fellowship scheme for human rights defenders at risk
 Runs an MA in Applied Human Rights and an LLM in International Human Rights Law
and Practice
 Conducts research, often in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, on
human rights and development, transitional justice, refugee law, and the practical challenges
facing human rights defenders
 Hosts the Journal of Human Rights Practice (Oxford University Press)
 Organizes events on pressing human rights issues, including conferences and workshops
on ‘Transformative Justice’ (November 2010), ‘Human Rights Defenders and Peace
Processes’ (May 2010), ‘Social Justice in Challenging and Changing Times’ (November
2009), and ‘The Responsibility to the Story’ (September 2009)
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1
2. EXPLORING PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS WORK.............................................2
3. KEYNOTE ADDRESS .................................................................................................4
4. DILEMMA SESSIONS................................................................................................6
4.1 INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE ...........................................................6
4.2 HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION AND EMPOWERMENT ................................................8
4.3 SURVIVOR VOICE ...................................................................................................9
4.4 POWER DYNAMICS...............................................................................................12
5. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES...................................................................................14
6. SURVIVORS AS ADVOCATES ...................................................................................16
7. ETHICS AND PRACTICALITIES OF PARTICIPATORY VIDEO AND CITIZEN SOCIAL MEDIA

IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY. ..................................................................................17
8. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................20
ENDNOTES ................................................................................................................21
ANNEX 1: ..................................................................................................................22
ANNEX 2: ..................................................................................................................29
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS 1
CONFERENCE, 4-5 JUNE 2011
1 INTRODUCTION
“A space to develop ideas and share best practice

suggestions.”
On 4 and 5 June 2011, human rights practitioners 1 from across the globe were brought
together at Amnesty International’s International Secretariat in London to attend the ‘Active
Participation in Human Rights Conference’.
The aim of the conference was to provide a space in which participants could explore the
possibilities and challenges of active participation within human rights research, advocacy
and campaigning through real-life examples shared during small ‘dilemma’2 discussions and
interactive plenary sessions.
The conference focused mainly on practical discussions, which were preceded with a brief
outline of the current debate on active participation theory.3 This was done for two reasons;
firstly, so that participants could start discussions from a similar conceptual framework and,
secondly, to ensure that those who were unfamiliar with the conceptual framework were not
isolated as discussions progressed.
Key speakers and delegates then presented their own experiences of using active
participation in a human rights context. Plenary sessions were followed by dilemma groups
that explored the four themes that emerged during the application process. These were
survivor voice, power dynamics, internal organizational governance and human rights
education and empowerment. The dilemma group leaders presented case studies that
exemplified the four themes. These sessions were run on a rotation to facilitate smaller group
discussions and encourage participants to share experiences and methods that have worked
for them, and identify the challenges they faced when using participatory methodologies. It
was hoped that within this space, suggestions of best practice would emerge.
This conference report aims to provide an outline of each session, the key findings and any
action points. It is important to note that the recommendations and suggestions given here
are not intended to be concrete conclusions on how active participation should or could be
implemented in human rights work. Rather, they should be seen as a springboard from which
ideas can develop and be adapted to the different and unique contexts in which we all work.
Questions regarding the conference can be directed to any of the partner organizations at
individuals@amnesty.org.
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2 ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS
2 EXPLORING PARTICIPATION IN
HUMAN RIGHTS WORK
The opening session of the conference aimed to provide a theoretical framework for delegates
to take forward throughout both days. The session first explored various definitions and
interpretations of participation within human rights work. It then presented a working
framework developed by Amnesty International for understanding active participation in this
context.
KEY POINTS FROM THE SESSION

 Participation is an umbrella term for a range of different approaches.
 There is debate about whether participation should be viewed as a ‘hierarchy’ (where

more participation is seen as necessarily better) or as ‘spokes on a wheel’ (where the ideal
form of participation is context-specific).
 More participation can be desirable in that it may increase individuals’ sense of

ownership over human rights principles, give rights holders increased control over self-
representation (as opposed to individuals being represented by human rights practitioners)
and build rights-holder capacity . However, more participation may not always lead to better
practice. For instance, consider the implications of involving survivors in campaigning
without offering them counseling/psycho-social support for any difficulties that may arise
from their stories being made public.
 The core component of the working framework/definition4 of active participation is a

breakdown of different forms of participation varying from ‘informing’ (understood as a ‘low’
level of participation) to ‘stakeholder control’ (understood as ‘full’ participation). The working
framework/definition identifies ‘legitimate consultation’ as the threshold for ‘active
participation’. The session discussion raised the question of how key terms are being defined
within the framework. It was asserted that the term ‘rights holder’ was too broad to be
meaningful given that, within human rights, we seem to be interested in encouraging
particular individuals/groups to participate.
The discussion also raised the question of how human rights practitioners ensure we draw on
conceptual understandings and lessons learned within related fields, such as development. It
was suggested that before advocating participatory approaches within human rights work we
need to ensure we have examined the mistakes made and good practice learned within these
fields. Participants felt that it was unclear whether Amnesty International’s framework offered
something new as it resembled previous participatory approaches. In response to this, it was
suggested that the framework was not intended as something new but to encourage Amnesty
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International staff to consider deeper forms of participation at various stages of their project
cycles. It was also intended to anchor discussions around a starting definition of active
participation.
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3 KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Professor Sarah Deer, an activist, law professor, and citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
of Oklahoma, presented the Keynote address. She spoke of her experiences of partnering with
Amnesty International on the Maze of Injustice5, a report that focused on Native American
and Alaska Native women’s experiences of sexual violence in the United States.
The Maze of Injustice report was produced using participatory methods. Building trust and
developing the research agenda in co-operation with tribal communities created a greater
sense of legitimacy and potentially allowed the research process to be an empowering one for
the women involved. Professor Deer explained that those choosing to tell their stories were
doing so in order to be “no longer invisible” and so that “those outside of their native
communities would maybe understand them”. This is not to say that Native people wanted to
be a part of the process. Some individuals chose not to be involved, concerned that a
European organization would be unable to do justice to their issues, and expressing
frustration that “being studied” previously had not resulted in positive change. Listening to
individual concerns encouraged reflection by the researchers and resulted in greater care in
ensuring the report did not perpetuate the negative stereotypes that Indian women are merely
victims with nothing substantial to contribute to the human rights movement.
The public launch of the report continued to emphasize the importance of listening to tribal
concerns first and foremost. The aim was to make the launch as participatory as possible by
having Native people present at every stage of the process. Amnesty International USA
provided resources for one of the survivors interviewed in the report to attend the press
conference. In addition, a traditional healer from the Sicangu Lakota Nation, Jim Clairmont,
provided a morning ceremony and prayer for those participating in the press conference.
The report was greeted with significant interest by the media and Congress. Staffers from
Capitol Hill contacted Amnesty International staff and arranged meetings within a few days of
the launch. Over the next three years, Amnesty International researchers partnered with
Native women to advise staffers and help shape responsive legislation. These discussions
culminated in the establishment of a Maze of Injustice Advisory committee and changes in
federal law in line with the majority of recommendations made in the report, to be
implemented within three years of its release. Such significant impact probably could not
have been achieved if either Amnesty International or the Native women's advocates had
acted alone.
Below are a number of the key issues that arose in the process of producing the Maze of
Injustice report:
 What may work in one community may not necessarily be transposed and used in
another. There are important cultural differences between communities.
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 Language is key. Using terms and definitions from ‘the outside’ fails to reflect the
realties of the communities. For example, in the United States there are 565 separate tribal
nations – each one has its own history, language, culture, and legal system.
 In practice, it is not always feasible to conduct research in all communities. It is

important to justify why research focuses on particular communities/areas. In the report,
Alaska was one of the three areas of focus because it has the highest level of rape in the
United States, with a disproportionate impact on Native women.
 Do not start with a pre-determined research agenda; let the communities decide the
research focus by listening openly to their stories and the issues that concern them. In this
case the Native women were asked “what stories would you like to tell?” and “how would you
hope publicity would alleviate your concerns?” In this way potential outcomes were directed
by the grassroots activists.
 Alert the communities of the possible risks of participating in the research. If you fail to
do this, you could lose trust and access to the community – an obstacle to change.
 Engage with the communities on their terms. This helps to build trust and respect and
ensures that communities’ concerns are better reflected in any reports, recommendations or
campaign objectives. This should mean that any changes in law, policy or practice have local
relevance. For this project, those involved in the research process would stay near the
communities and share meals with Native people.
 Explain who you are and the work you have done in the past. In this case, Professor Deer
and her colleagues asked the tribal communities if they had any questions about the project
and what they wanted from it.
 Had there been the opportunity, a national roundtable discussion with tribal
communities of the findings would have been useful before publishing the report. This could
have ensured that the report was more inclusive, that more stories could be told and that the
changes would be in line with as many tribal communities’ wishes as possible.
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4 DILEMMA SESSIONS
Each of the four dilemmas are outlined below, followed by a brief synopsis of the case studies and
the ‘good practice’ suggestions that were submitted by practitioners through first-hand experience.
These suggestions are in no way asserting that every situation is the same and that they will work
regardless of the context, but they offer some practical considerations that participants have found
or may find beneficial.
4.1 INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The dilemma concerned the challenge of how to ensure the participation of all stakeholders
and employees in organizational governance.
CASE STUDY
An international organization working on women’s rights decided to launch a new project
addressing violence against women. The board of directors and senior staff of the
organization, which comprised 19 men and one woman, were invited to a planning meeting
by the managing director of the organization. Five female non-management staff working in
the organization as social organizers were not invited to participate. The result of the
planning meeting was a five-year plan to address the issue of violence against women in
specific target communities. After a mid-term external evaluation, it was reported that the
project was not able to achieve its goals and meet the needs of women in the target
communities because they, and the women social organizers (who work very closely at
community level), were not involved in the planning. Now, the organization wants to change
the project, and is thinking of building a strategy to involve all stakeholders in the project
planning, implementation, and evaluation.
SESSION
The dilemma leader began the session with an outline of the dilemma and case study, asking
the group to consider whether they too have faced similar situations. The group was asked
why they felt it was important for a rights holder to actively participate, to which a variety of
responses emerged, including: to create a sense of ownership, to ensure sustainability, and to
save time and money. The discussion asked “how do we, as human rights practitioners,
ensure the active participation of all stakeholders?” The suggestions that the groups found
most useful were grouped into the following clusters:
ACCOUNTABILITY
 Make organizations accountable to stakeholders. This creates a sense of empowerment
within communities and ensures those in charge of projects are listening to the rights
holders. Consequently, projects are more likely to be successful.
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 Create a Responsibilities charter for all stakeholders in which roles and responsibilities
are agreed. Ensure that this is done early on so that issues and disagreements can be
minimized.
PARTICIPATION/EVALUATION
 Carry out regular evaluations of the project so that you can ascertain how effective the
process is and make adjustments if necessary.
 Ensure that the views of staff directly involved in projects are incorporated within the
evaluation process. The closer you are to the realities for the people who are working on/with
the project, the more effective your project will be.
REMOVING OBSTACLES
 To ensure individuals can participate there is the need for capacity building, training and
resources.
 Ensure the security of participants by creating safe spaces – the presence of risk can
prevent many from participating.
OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE
 Create a space for all to express their concerns and collectively brainstorm/define
problems to be solved.
 Involve rights holders from an early stage so that you create a sense of ownership that is
more likely to last.
 Initially consult rights holders without a pre-defined agenda. This would mean that the
project is more likely to reflect the rights holders’ needs.
 Make sure that when you organize meetings you provide the structure for rights holders
to attend. This can include ensuring the location and time of the meeting is suitable, that
there is child care available, and financial compensation for the loss of income. Finally,
should the rights holders not be able to attend, make sure you provide another means of
communication, such as online groups.
 Stakeholders must be informed about the whole programme in which they are involved.
INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

 Create advisory panels which include stakeholders.
 Organize subgroup meetings so that any existing cultural understandings/power dynamics

do not discourage participation.
 Simultaneously train rights holders and staff, preferably in the field, so there is better
mutual understanding and the relationship between the two (especially in terms of trust) is
established at an earlier stage.
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4.2 HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION AND

EMPOWERMENT
This dilemma looked at whether active participation leads to empowerment, and in the
instances in which it does, discusses the circumstances that were present. The potential for
empowerment was explored through a case study in human rights education (HRE), as it is
often assumed that HRE cannot be efficiently delivered at community level without
beneficiaries and key actors actively participating.
CASE STUDY
Amnesty International’s Africa HRE project is fostering a culture of active participation in
order to empower the communities they are working with. The aim is to enable communities
to solve their human rights concerns by themselves. In Sierra Leone, the Africa HRE project
is working with a local partner NGO to engage with a group of Soweis (female genital
mutilation [FGM] practitioners) to fight FGM in communities where nearly all girls are
initiated. As a result of training sessions, discussions and health information on the harms of
this traditional practice, the Soweis have decided not to initiate any girl below 18. This
decision has been met with tough opposition from both women and men. The activism of
these women, considered as the guardians of traditions, is seen as a provocation by some
men. Threats have been made to the Soweis, some of whom now live in fear.
SESSION
The session began by outlining the dilemma and screening a short film6 on Amnesty
International’s HRE project (summarized above). This helped to focus discussions on key
ethical questions and the delegates’ own experiences with active participation in HRE. It was
felt that at the core of the discussions was that active participation should come from within.
For the NGO, HRE leading to empowerment takes time: the act of changing mindsets is a
long-term process, so being humble, listening, supporting and respecting communities’
realities and experiences is key. Empowerment is a mutual learning process.
 It is important to be flexible and creative with our tools and methods as factors such as
illiteracy can often be an obstacle to active participation. The use of images or role-play
exercises to discuss human rights issues can actively involve more members of the
community. People often find it enjoyable and less daunting than discussing the issues in
‘real life’, and through this they can learn more about their rights.
 When it is deemed appropriate and safe, bringing the victim and the perpetrators
together can be a helpful approach. The discussion on this point was based on the idea that
in some situations speaking to ‘victims’ alone will not create change; that practitioners need
also to change the behavior of perpetrators; and finally that having perpetrators hear directly
from victims can be powerful.
 Using local resources is beneficial as it helps to build trust.
 Building capacities and encouraging a platform of expression.
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 It is important to understand the community you are working in and to understand the
root causes of the issues for effective intervention. Talking in the language of needs rather
than rights can often facilitate dialogue and entry in the communities.
 Find concrete deliverables.
 HRE should not only empower communities but also individuals: victims/survivors should
be given the opportunity to actively participate.
 It is important to build alliances and partnership: mobilization and solidarity is important

to break the isolation of victims/survivors.
 Empowered rights holders and disempowered duty-bearers can lead to failure since the
latter also need to know more about human rights issues and how they can solve them:
change should be accepted by all stakeholders.
 Empowerment is creating frictions in families: providing a network of support and

conveying this risk to the individual is essential.
 Finally, HRE should explore how to support the communities with advocacy for more
impact.
4.3 SURVIVOR VOICE

This dilemma session looked at how survivor voices could be effectively integrated into
campaigning and fundraising activities without compromising the dignity and interests of the
individual concerned. The dilemma sought to explore the actions that practitioners could take
to ensure that the participation of survivors can be active, meaningful and most importantly
based on informed consent. The challenge that the session addressed was how practitioners
can bring the horrors of human rights violations to the negotiating table in a manner that
respects the fundamental precepts of participant-driven human rights activism.
CASE STUDY
The Mine Ban Treaty represented one of the first occasions in which survivors were involved
in the process of negotiations, actively campaigning for the treaty, and for the provisions to
ensure assistance was provided to them. Since then, participation of survivors has been
recognized as essential, but over time it seems to have become nominal. There is a sense
that survivors are often “wheeled out” and given statements to read that do not reflect their
own voice to allow the “box” for “survivor participation” to be checked off.
SESSION
There was a general sense amongst participants that although their organizations are keen to
ensure survivors are actively participating in campaigning, communications and fundraising,
there was a gap in the policies and structures needed to do this effectively. Participants
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expressed that organizations needed to give clear warnings7 to the survivor about the
implications of telling their story and divulging their identity according to the media/mode of
communication8 and placement of the story. Experienced practitioners shared their
suggestions of best practice which have been grouped into four main areas of concern below.
The delegates also discussed consent and agreed upon a shared understanding of consent
which is captured subsequent to the recommendations below.
Managing expectations and explaining how organizational priorities may differ from survivors’
priorities. A lack of clear communication between the survivor and the organization can
potentially result in conflict so it is suggested that organizations need to:
 Differentiate between the role of the organization in determining its messages and the
say of individual survivors.
 Set and agree the time line for the use of any story.
 Be clear that the use of a story is for the organization to decide, and it may decide in
future not to use a particular narrative.
 Clarify that the organization is not necessarily representing the survivor but working with
them so that they can speak for themselves.
 Recognize that participants are not only victims – they are agents of change – and that
setting a clear plan for how survivors can participate in creating change working within the
organization is important.
 Set and communicate the limits9 to the amount of persuasion appropriate in recruiting
survivors to engage in public facing work.
Ensuring survivor ‘approval’10 and intention. Tensions between the organization and survivor
can arise when a survivor feels their intention is not reflected in the use of their story. To
avoid this, the organization should ensure that when speaking with the survivor there is:
 An agreement as to where and how their story will be used so the organization may
capture what survivors intend to accomplish.
 Provision of clear examples of how their stories might be used.
 Active engagement in agreeing key messages and reviewing them over time so that the
person is not seen as ‘forever a victim’.
 Building of trust, acknowledging it takes time and that many victims have little
experience of public life.
Organizations must actively manage story/narrative use. Tensions can emerge when stories
told by survivors are not managed. To avoid conflict, organizations should ensure that they:
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

 Track current and future intended use with time limits and have an exit strategy for each
participant and their story.
 Collect more than one emblematic story to avoid creating ‘heroes’ or survivor fatigue by
using a small range of narratives repeatedly.
 Inform survivors of risks and timing of publications.
The organization’s structures and processes, from governance to daily management, need to
be set up to support participatory work with survivors. It should:
 Have policies to guide work in relation to survivor participation.
 Regularly test assumptions about the need to use certain types of narratives and images
– especially in relation to fundraising – as the organization may be able to secure
organizational campaigning and fundraising goals without the use of survivor stories or
images.
 Have a clear and agreed conflict of interest and complaints procedure that has been
consulted on with survivors.
 Develop monitoring and accountability processes to ensure that survivors’ participation is

active and follows appropriate and agreed standards.
 Hold an ‘information management review’ to check that policies are in line with data
protection regimes.
Consent is the most important issue in regard to survivor voice and must be achieved because
the survivor ‘owns’ their story. Consent is:
 Informed and for a specific purpose (in that it is tailored to each particular use of the
story and the individual survivor’s needs).
 Responsive and reflects the demands of new media
 Reviewed and renewed over time.
 Given provided there is a cooling off period, with an option to withdraw at any stage.
 Clear about the policy and practice on the use of pseudonyms or ensuring the anonymity
of survivors.
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4.4 POWER DYNAMICS

This dilemma explored the challenge brought on through various power dynamics to active
participation. Power was conceptualized as being both formal (through governance
structures) and informal (though community and/or family power dynamics).
CASE STUDY
The dilemma was explored by looking at children as rights holders and the right to education
without discrimination, with a focus on Romani children. Romani children’s access to
education and the issue of their segregation in special education is a significant issue in
Slovakia. There the Roma constitute an ethnic minority facing a disproportionate level of
poverty and marginalization as a result of discrimination and historic exclusion. Power
dynamics that were in play were not only formal governance structures within schools that
chose to send the Roma children to the special schools – but the parents who ‘accepted’ the
decision.
SESSION
The session began with an outline of the dilemma and the initial questions it raised to ensure
that the group would be prepared for the role-play exercise based on the case study. The use
of role-play proved to be an engaging participatory method as it quickly highlighted issues
surrounding power dynamics. Through the discussions, the following suggestions as to how
best to campaign for change were proposed:
 Carry out a power dynamic analysis. You cannot expect to challenge unfavourable power
dynamics without knowing exactly how they interact. This analysis is a continuing process as
dynamics change over time.
 Address different power holders and do not just work with rights holders in order to deal
with that power imbalance. More specifically, bring different stakeholders together by
discussing the issue indirectly at first.
 Active participation must address the needs from within communities and those of rights
holders. Practitioners external to the process must also show empathy for the perspectives of
the power holders to improve the likelihood of engagement by all parties (including those
opposing a human rights agenda).
 Take into consideration that human rights practitioners are also part of the power
dynamics and avoid paternalistic approaches of entering as experts who know the “answer”
regardless of the position of the rights holders or other actors.
 It is important to understand and work on issues that underlie the power imbalance and
to address them in a non-accusatory manner (for example, lack of education of parents,
historic exclusion, and discrimination).
 Make sure that when speaking to different power holders, you discuss issues in
accessible ways; use understandable language, not just legal language or perspectives.
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 As there are different understandings and approaches to human rights issues, you may
need to discuss and educate people about their rights before entering a campaign stage.
 For campaigns to have a sustainable impact we need to be able to work and engage with
communities, especially marginalized communities – human rights education and
empowerment processes are integral.
 A participatory approach may not always be necessary. In certain situations where the
objectives are at a legal level or there is an urgent need to take action on behalf of an
individual, there may not be the time to engage in active participation.
 Look at each organization’s added value, understand the limits of what you are doing and
make sure that all those involved are aware of this.
 Risk assessments must be done in a participatory way. People who are at risk often
understand what dangers are present as they are most familiar with and affected by the
situation. Listen and understand how to mitigate that risk and support them when in a
position to do so.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

5 SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
After feedback from participants that they wanted to hear more practical experiences from other
delegates, this plenary session changed format from being led by a pre-determined speaker to
opening the floor up to conference delegates. Without being restricted to a particular dilemma topic,
the delegates were encouraged to share stories, experiences and challenges around participation.
A few of the stories presented are included below11:
SURVIVOR VOICES
A campaigner on mental health issues began by laying out the guiding principle of her
project: that in order to legitimately campaign on mental health it was vital to include those
who were working within this area as well as those who are affected by mental health issues.
As with most project work, funder support came with certain obligations and in this case one
of the requirements was that they set up an ‘expert by experience advisory panel’. Their role
was to be involved in developing and implementing the campaign, which made the process of
finalizing a campaign a long, often emotionally draining and difficult procedure. Despite this
it was integral in order to gain trust and have the most effective impact on mental health
legislation. Throughout this process the advisory panel had to be consulted and consistently
involved in decisions, which also called for her organization to be honest about what it could
and could not do. She explained that although agreeing on objectives caused the process to
be slow, it also gave those a part of the panel a sense of meaningful involvement and
enhanced the legitimacy of the work carried out during the project.
She explained, “When thinking about active participation, you need to recognize where active
participation is necessary and what it will look like. You need to be aware of the fact that
people will want to walk away, and you have to be accepting of this. For us a key issue that
emerged was that the survivors that were coming in needed a per diem for their time. They
are experts for having gone through that experience and should be compensated for their
time”.
She also explained that the stigma attached to mental health issues meant that in order to
ensure legitimacy and avoid contributing to the social stigma, the affected individuals were
involved all the way and not just pulled in at the end to tick the box for survivor participation.
HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

“My story is about my experiences working with social movements and the challenges that
emerged”. The speaker, who worked in development and human rights in Nepal, discussed
working with agricultural families who had lived on the land for generations, laboring
extensively to pay off the capital and the interest to their landlords. He was working with
these communities at a time when political awareness was also increasing in the country, and
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

a movement was suddenly triggered around this issue. The movement sought freedom from
the landlords, and the government ended up declaring them free from the charges.
Although the people were initially successful, other challenges emerged. Anger grew as a
sizable number of those promised an area of land did not receive it and, as a result, decided
to protest. In order to help the protesters air their frustrations, his organization planned to
provide food for the movement during three days of demonstrations. When the situation did
not change in three days, the protests continued – for a far longer period than expected. His
organization did not have the funds budgeted to continue support, and there was further
complication when protesters captured land illegally. This meant that by funding the protests
his organization could be supporting an illegal action. The speaker concluded that you cannot
ultimately control or predict the actions a movement will take when they are in the lead, so
organizations must remain flexible while ensuring that they do not compromise their core
values.
PARTICIPATORY PHOTO PROJECT

The speaker, a delegate from South America, spoke about a participatory photography project
his organization ran. It sought to allow community members to “portray in a very realistic way
the situation in which the Indigenous communities live in their country through a community-
led photography project”. The first phase of the project was to set up training workshops,
followed by holding meetings with the leaders of the communities in order to explain how to
use the photo equipment. Members of the communities were then given cameras and began
to take pictures of their day-to-day lives.
The speaker briefly discussed what was learned from the project. He mentioned that there
was a lot of positive feedback: the communities liked the democratic nature of the work
carried out, in that each group of Indigenous photographers had total control of what they
produced; they were in charge of the agenda and the schedule. He also stated that his
organization felt it was important not to go in and encourage any particular way of doing
things. The result was that those involved in the project became better educated not only in
human rights issues affecting them, but also in how to draw attention to these violations
through the medium of photography, both of which could be taken back into their
communities. On the other hand, it was found that during this process men dominated the
women – a discovery that would be taken into account for future projects.
GOVERNANCE
The speaker began by stating that “service users need to be incorporated into the way we are
run as a larger organization”. He explained that his organization set up groups comprising
service users who are experts by experience, and therefore best suited to discuss the projects
the organization is seeking to set up. Discussions with the group of experts allows for an
organization to connect more effectively with those they are seeking to help. He explained
that the conversations brought to light the potential for a cultural clash; that “some needs of
the organization may not align with the character of the individuals they are working with”. In
this case, many service users were not used to complaining, so instead of criticizing the
functioning of the project, they remained silent. It was through engagement that this problem
was discovered, discussed and rectified.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

6 SURVIVORS AS ADVOCATES
This session was led by the Survivors Speak Out network. It explored the challenges that
survivors experience, the importance of transparency and minimizing risk when survivors
speak out.
Originally choosing to speak out to break barriers, the session leaders explained that as
survivors they felt it was important to make those who can change policies understand torture
survivors’ experiences by campaigning as a group of ‘experts through experience’ – “as
victims of torture, we know better than anyone else to speak out and make a change. Why?
Because that was my life. It’s my voice, my history.”
The survivors identified certain challenges – the trauma they went through, their vulnerability
and ability to speak for themselves, which was occasionally further hindered when they were
unable to speak the language. Despite these complex challenges, a core issue was to ensure
that the organization was building trust with the survivor, ensuring that each individual was
involved in the process. The survivor would help to decide the information that would be
confidential or published to minimize risks. The survivors highlighted the distress of images
or names becoming public without a survivor’s consent – a clear obstacle to healing and
engagement. Despite these obstacles and fears, survivors are likely to actively participate if
they have the necessary respect and support, both financial and psycho-social.
“We are survivors. We go to the communities ourselves and engage with them so that they
understand us directly.” This community interaction is important as having the opportunity to
explain their experiences has a positive effect on understanding. It can also potentially
counteract some of the negative group stereotypes that are often fuelled by the media. When
stories are made public, there is a very real risk of survivors becoming so traumatized by the
attention they receive that they need to get psychiatric help again. Therefore every action
needs to be thought about extensively.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

7 ETHICS AND PRACTICALITIES OF

PARTICIPATORY VIDEO AND CITIZEN
SOCIAL MEDIA IN HUMAN RIGHTS
ADVOCACY
WITNESS12 , a global organization specialized in training and supporting people in the use of
video for human rights advocacy, led the session on the use of video and social media for
participation in human rights work. The group also led discussions of new directions in
citizen media, exemplified in the Arab Spring. In an era of increasing citizen documentation
and social media interaction the session sought to encourage delegates to think beyond what
active participation means within an institutional frame towards understanding social media
as a form of active participation.
The session began by drawing attention to the increasing potential for active participation in
human rights work, resulting from the growing ability of people to create and share media
that documents their experience and advocates change. Following on from this delegates
were given hand-held cameras and asked to film one another talking in order to think about
what they found simple and challenging about video as a tool for documentation. Delegates
noted that being able to speak the same language was not critical in the documentation of
events, and crucially the cameras themselves are easy to use. The fact that they are widely
available means that they are a viable tool for active participation and empowerment
especially as they are standard features on mobile phones that often have internet access.
Challenges noted by delegates included that the presence of the camera changed the
dynamics and made some people more reserved. Other concerns included the control over
narrative that happens in the editing process, as well as issues around consent and
understanding of how the material will be used. It was also noted that with mobile filming,
data such as GPS location and whose phone material was shot on, may be contained in the
metadata of the image, carrying unexpected risks.
A short film providing a brief practical guide for first time users of video advocacy was
screened, which is summarized below:13
 Assessing risk is important, as risks occur when you film, edit and distribute.
 An advocacy video has a clear goal in mind for change, coupled with a defined audience
that can help achieve it. The audience can be large or small; it’s their ability to act that is
important.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

 Once you have created your video you need to get it out at the right place at the right
time – timing is critical. You can organize a day of action and mobilize a community to take
action, or put a video in front of a judge or a policy maker about to vote on legislation.
 What do you want your audience to do? Make sure you have a direct and concrete
request of action underlining your video. Often a sentence with an action verb is useful; for
example: FREE prisoners of conscience.
 What is the best way to convey your message to your audience? The story and images you
use are key, so make sure it is emotive and persuasive, well-grounded in personal experience
as well as in a specific time and place. Let those affected by the issue speak for themselves.
 Go for informed consent. Try to ensure that those you film provide consent. This means
they understand the risks and benefits of being filmed and on that basis make the choice of
being filmed, telling you if they need their identity to be concealed. You may need to talk
them through worst-case scenarios, such as what would happen if their oppressor saw the
film.
 Place the video in a campaign context and engage your audience to act. Make them feel
included and engaged; give them clear options as to what they can do next.
Following on from the brief practical guide, the speaker moved on to discuss the various
styles and creators of citizen videos by playing delegates a series of clips. These ranged from
raw visual evidence documenting an event to individual testimony featuring those who are
purposeful advocates or even those who were perpetrators of human rights violations. By
discussing the variety of video documentation available online, the speaker drew attention to
the most interesting emerging trend; that more people are able to produce and publish videos
without an NGO or filmmaker mediating. With this in mind WITNESS have identified a
number of ways NGOs and human rights advocates should be responding to events:
 Contextualizing and incorporating widespread citizen documentation of testimonies/raw

evidence through the use of tools like Storyful (storyful.com), and Crowdvoice
(crowdvoice.org). This will help to create an accurate and verifiable account of events by
providing a space in which evidence can be pieced together.
 Building their audiences via online platforms and regular video blogs which often result
in more meaningful engagement due to the content being more personal.
 Creating opportunities for participation in gathering data, and creating advocacy tools by
generating remix videos from existing footage, contests, and participatory documentation of
events.14
 Updating from the field via live-casting, which helps to engage people and emphasizes
the fact that these are events happening in real time (see use of the mobile video tool
Bambuser in Egypt around January 25 movement).
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

Alongside these approaches, three key challenges were highlighted in relation to citizen video
and social media/increased participation. These three elements were:
 Dealing with issues of dignity, safety, consent and anonymity.
 Authentication and the evidentiary value of footage.
 Ensuring that footage translates into storytelling or visual evidence that compels action.
Continuing the discussion of video responses, the speaker highlighted examples of

authentication and verification from various countries including Bahrain, people annotating
YouTube videos to indicate alternate views on a shooting; from Syria, in which Ahmad Bayasi
countered a misleading official explanation of a video showing military violence with his own
video documenting the location of the incident and the victims15; from the UK, the police
violence towards Ian Tomlinson was recorded by a bystander, and from Iran in which ‘Only
Mehdi’ acted as a curator of citizen footage from Iran during the Green Movement16 . Further
to this the speaker acknowledged other crowd-sourced verification and contextualization
approaches such as Crowdvoice, Storify, or Storyful17. These approaches illustrate an exciting
era in participatory video and highlight the impact that both individuals and networks can
have in challenging the dominant narrative.
In relation to human rights values of dignity, consent, and privacy, the risks run by protestors
in Burma and Iran caught on camera were highlighted. These included how arrests took place
on the basis of people identified from footage shot in both situations; the Iranian
government’s use of crowd-sourcing to ask for people’s assistance in identifying opposition
activists seen in videos18; and also the importance of anonymity (in certain circumstances) to
enable free expression19.
Finally, the presentation highlighted that the locations for active participation in human
rights are increasingly occurring in commercial spaces like Facebook or YouTube. This was
illustrated with an iconic image from Egypt in early 2011 in which a group of men are
photographed holding up a “Thank you Facebook” sign. An important issue to consider is
that these social media sites set the parameters for participation and for freedom of
expression which raises the question; ‘how can these spaces allow for active participation in a
meaningful way, sensitive to human rights?’
The speaker concluded with an overview of WITNESS’ ‘Cameras Everywhere’ initiative which
seeks to come up with ways to engage with new stakeholders in human rights, including
technology companies/investors. This is because there is an emerging need to ensure that
people turning to video for human rights can use it as effectively, safely and ethically as
possible. This requires both new skills and tools for traditional human rights organizations
and new citizen activists, but also increased responsible engagement by the facilitators of
social media sites. Recommendations to technology providers from the upcoming Cameras
Everywhere report20 were shared, as well as how WITNESS is working on tools that everyday
citizen-activists can use to better protect themselves while filming21.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

8 CONCLUSION
“Listen, listen, listen…”

Throughout the conference, delegates were exposed to and critically explored active
participation in a wide variety of circumstances, contributing their experience and expertise
as well as suggesting potential action points. Although participatory methodology was used to
establish dilemma topics, it was further implemented during the conference when delegates
were given the option to alter the agenda structure for the second day and did so.
Engaging with both practical and theoretical approaches, in conjunction with selecting a wide
background of participants, the conference organizers sought to open up greater discursive
space to encourage constructive debate. Representatives from smaller organizations from
across the globe were supported in order to attend, enhancing discussions and leading to a
greater number of suggestions for action.
Across the sessions a number of common ‘best practice’ themes arose: most notably, clear
communication and the involvement of participants from the outset of a project to ensure
legitimacy and a participant-led agenda. This is not to suggest that all the ‘best practice’
recommendations laid out in this report will be applicable, or that participation will be free
from obstacles. Many members of the communities you might wish to engage with may not
choose to be a part of the process for different reasons, including frustration about previous
experiences of others speaking on their behalf. That being said, the groups of rights holders
that were present stressed that as long as individuals have the necessary respect and support,
both practically (in terms of financing) and ethically (in terms of psycho-social support), they
are likely to actively participate. This means that in order to increase the likelihood of
participatory engagement, human rights practitioners should actively seek to ‘listen, listen,
listen’ as this recognizes that the rights holder lies at heart of any change.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

ENDNOTES
1 The term human rights practitioner is a being used to denote a variety of roles including all human rights defenders, individuals
who are lawyers, activists, campaigners, researchers or survivors working in/collaborating with organisations on human rights
issues
2 For information on dilemma discussions please refer to Annex 1
3 For more information on how the agenda was developed please refer to “Annex 1”, Active Participation in Human Rights Pre-
Conference Paper.
4 For the full framework/definition please see “Annex 2”, Working Framework for Understanding Participation in the Context of
Human Rights Work.
5 Amnesty International, Maze of Injustice: The failure to protect Indigenous woman from sexual violence, 2007 (Index: AMR
51/035/2007) Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/035/2007
6 Edhamnesty, 2011. Short Video of the AHRE Africa Project / Amnesty International. [video online] Available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0j-_A2yfAkc
7 Explain the possible worst case scenarios or the potential for a communication to be manipulated leading to harmful outcomes.
8 Especially in an era of uncontrolled digital communication.
9 These limits should be well understood by staff who recruit survivors.
10 Approval was seen as a challenge in that it can be a time consuming process as it requires a great deal of back and forth
discussions before campaigning or fundraising materials can be completed.
11 The stories included here are adapted from transcripts. Every effort has been taken to ensure that the text reflects what was
said during the session and the overall sentiment of the individual’s presentation.
12 See: http://www.witness.org
13 See: http://www.witness.org/training/how-to-videos
14 See for example WITNESS-STAND Pledge on Camera campaign: http://hub.witness.org/STAND-SPOTLIGHT
15 See http://blog.witness.org/2011/07/ahmed-bayasi%E2%80%99s-story-citizen-video-authentication-in-syria-and-beyond/
16 See http://www.youtube.com/user/onlymehdi
17 See http://www.crowdvoice.org, http://www.storyful.com, http://www.storify.com
18 See http://hub.witness.org/en/blog/digital-media-and-irans-green-movement-look-back-cameran-ashraf
19 See http://blog.witness.org/2011/02/human-rights-video-privacy-and-visual-anonymity-in-the-facebook-age/
20 See http://www.witness.org/cameras-everywhere
21 Such as the Secure Smart Cam project, available at http://www.witness.org/cameras-everywhere/witness_labs
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

ANNEX 1:
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS

PRE-CONFERENCE PAPER
INTRODUCTION
This conference on active participation in human rights seeks to bring together human rights
practitioners to explore examples, possibilities and challenges of active participation within
human rights research, advocacy and campaigning. Active participation provides exciting
opportunities (for example, for increased ownership over rights-based outcomes) but also
poses challenges (for instance, how should you respond if rights holder priorities contradict
human rights principles, lie outside organizational capacity or conflict with your
organization’s priorities.) The conference examines what active participation means in the
context of human rights research, advocacy and campaigning.
Throughout the development of the conference, those organizing the event felt it was
important to put into practice participatory approaches as much as possible; this was
achieved by allowing the application process to set the agenda. In summary, the process was
not only meant to allow us to identify participants, but also to acquire information on what
they wanted to discuss at the conference and achieve from it.
This method is not something we regard as limited to the beginnings of the process. We also
recognize the importance of involving participants during the conference itself through the
conference process evaluation. Therefore, in one sense, the goal has been to use the
conference itself as a test or case study for participatory methodologies.
The purpose of this paper is to set a general baseline of understanding amongst the
participants and share some of the early insights. It therefore provides a brief summary of the
information gathered throughout the application-consultation process.
The paper consists of four main parts: the first is a brief description of the application
process; the second is an overview of the themes that emerged through the submitted
issues/dilemmas; the third is a summary of the desired outcomes that you suggested; and the
fourth section is a reflection on the application process from the perspective of the
conference organizers.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

THE PROCESS
Applicants were invited to propose specific dilemmas accompanied by a corresponding case
study from their own experience whilst utilizing participatory methodologies within human
rights work. For example, issues around power dimensions in communities, community
decision-making, planning and/or evaluation of participatory methodologies, institutional
hurdles, etc.
The process of selecting applicants and dilemmas involved a number of stages. The
applications were divided amongst those organizing the conference. Organizers individually
made comments on the applications and graded aspects of the application (the statement of
intention, suggested conference outputs and proposed dilemmas). Conference organizers
then discussed themes that had arisen from the applications. The six most relevant themes
were used as the basis for selecting the six dilemmas for the conference. Each conference
organizer then made suggestions as to the strongest dilemmas falling under these themes.
The final dilemmas were selected on the basis of the strength of the dilemma and case study
and its applicability across different areas of human rights work.
In deciding which applicants to accept, two factors were key: the overall strength of the
application and the ability to fund the application. Secondary was a desire for a range of
applicants reflecting a regional spread, gender mix and range of fields/areas of work.
PART ONE – EMERGING THEMES

The dilemmas put forward in using participatory tools and/or putting into practice
participatory methodologies covered a wide range of themes, from individual experiences to
institutional challenges; from issues of one’s own participation to one’s experience of
facilitating the empowerment of others. The conference organizers would like to thank every
applicant who shared a personal story of participation and in particular for the honesty that
applicants showed in sharing the challenges that they have faced. This spirit of openness and
learning from mistakes will enrich the conference for all who attend and participate.
Although some dilemmas fell outside the themes described below, these represent the
majority of the applications submitted. The first four are themes that will likely be discussed
in more detail at the conference. These four were chosen either because they represented a
large proportion of the dilemmas submitted or because it was necessary to include them to
ensure an adequate representation (or spread) of issues.
1. Survivor voice: This theme looks at representation of people in the campaigning and
funding activities of human rights organizations. Specifically, it explores how survivors’ voices
and needs can be balanced against the demands of campaigning.
2. Power dynamics: This theme looks at power dynamics in formally structured systems of
governance; and informally in different situations, such as community and/or family power
dynamics.
3. Internal organizational governance: This theme looks at the challenges of balancing the
primary needs of affected people and organizational needs. For example, in organizational
planning, are people outside organizational staff really engaged in setting organizational
priorities?
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

4. Human rights education and empowerment: This theme looks at whether active
participation can lead to empowerment and if so in what circumstances. This discussion will
be facilitated through the lens of Human Rights Education.
FURTHER DILEMMA THEMES

5. Monitoring and impact evaluation: This theme questions how we know that active
participation actually works and to what end. It examines what we need to do to better
evaluate projects using participatory methodologies and how to use participatory monitoring
and evaluation tools.
6. Challenges in working with communities: This theme relates to the complexity of

identities and experiences. Even if we agree that active participation should involve a
community, which individuals within the community should be included? Should we prioritize
certain aspects of identity over others?
7. Reconciling community needs with organizational needs: This theme is focused on the
realities of how organizations set priorities for their work and whether/how that addresses
what the engaged communities are looking for. It also looks at whether it is always
appropriate to use participatory methodologies or whether doing so can sometimes clash with
the desires of the affected people.
8. Active participation in a non-supportive environment: This theme is focused on the

challenges of participation in unstable or authoritarian political regimes and/or where access
to the communities is controlled by various power structures.
9. Risk: This theme looks at the risks associated with the use of participatory
methodologies. The risks can be to the rights holders but also to the people and organizations
that are carrying out the research or campaigning activities.
10. Youth: This theme focuses on capacity-building efforts that would allow young people to
participate and/or to address issues of their access to community/family decision-making
structures directly.
11. Bridging the gap between participation and real policy change: This theme explores how
to use information gathered in a participatory way in order to bring about real change for
those people affected. It also looks at how to manage expectations of people involved.
12. Participating in democratic/political processes: This theme addresses the macro

challenge of supporting the participation of citizens in the political processes that affect their
lives.
13. Who is participating?: This theme relates to the power theme and the monitoring, impact
and evaluation theme in that it is sometimes a challenge to look at who is participating and,
importantly, who is not participating and how to address under or misrepresentation.
14. Making rights real: This theme looks to how participatory methodologies can ensure
rights are, and appear, meaningful to people’s lives.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

PART TWO – SUGGESTED OUTCOMES

Applicants have submitted thoughtful and creative suggestions for conference outcomes. The
overarching message that came through this part of the application procedure was that
applicants want practical guidance, tools and tips on how to use participatory methodology
rather than theoretical ideas or approaches. Although this, in part, emanated from the fact
that many applications where from practitioners rather than academics – even the
applications from academics placed emphasis on the need for practical/applied outputs over
theoretical and potentially abstract discussions. Therefore, the agenda was devised in an
attempt to deliver practical guidance and tools. In addition to the requirement that outputs
be practical, the more specific suggestions for outcomes are detailed below.
While there will certainly be a conference report, the conference agenda will also be created
in a way to attempt to deliver practical guidance and tools. Further, while recognizing the
constraints of developing outcomes without pre-conference preparations, the organizers will
also attempt to leave as much space as possible during the conference for participants to
discuss, define or develop their plan for further, post-conference outcomes.
A number of applicants stressed the need for documents compiling examples of good
practice, in using active participation within human rights work. Some specific suggestions
included:
 A code of ethics to guide the incorporation of active participation within human rights
work and/or specifically guide engagement with ‘personal histories’.
 Guidelines on key principles of a rights-based approach to research, specifically how to

conduct and adapt research in response to active participation.
 Guidelines on how organizational structures can be participatory.
 Guidelines on how to incorporate active participation within advocacy and campaigning.
 Guidelines on how to respond to a range of dilemmas associated with working within a

participatory framework.
 Guidelines on how to balance ethics, protection of personal data and stories,

empowerment and advocacy.
 Guidelines on the specific applicability of implementing active participation within the

Roma community, with religious minorities, within conflict and post-conflict contexts, with
women and with children.
 The development of a checklist for using participatory methodologies, including perhaps

the development of indicators of success.
 Guidelines on participatory evaluation tools.
Applicants also gave numerous suggestions for continued sharing of information at the
conference. Some specific suggestions included:
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

 The production of journal articles was suggested by many applicants – suggestions were
for individual articles and a ‘special edition’ on ‘active participation’ within an appropriate
journal. The need to further conceptualize active participation, within different areas of
human rights work, was specifically mentioned. Some applicants suggested a report on what
‘survivors’ can bring to campaigning.
 A number of applicants also suggested the circulation of a newsletter or some sort of

semi-permanent communication tool.
 Some applicants suggested a conference report that included a summary of all

sessions/workshops, while one applicant suggested that some key sessions are filmed so that
they can be shared with those who were not able to attend the conference.
 One applicant suggested that each attendee produce an action plan on how they will
integrate/develop the conference discussions.
There were also many suggestions for facilitating networks and continuing the discussion of
issues of participation in human rights work. Some specific suggestions included:
 Many applicants emphasized they would like further conferences. The emphasis was on
the need for further conferences or meetings at local, national and regional levels to address
specific country cases and issue-specific needs.
 Some applicants requested the development of workshops on active participation based

around different themes or alternatively, the development of a framework for a training
programme on active participation.
 Many applicants emphasized the advantages of an online community that enables

Amnesty International staff, partners, human rights practitioners and academics to exchange
resources and debate active participation dilemmas; specifically, an online discussion group
and website to act as a ‘hub’.
 One applicant mentioned they would like to see a follow-up committee while another
suggested that working groups be established to take forward discussions on specific issues.
 If agreed upon by conference participants, one applicant suggested the distribution of

the name/contacts of participations among conference attendees to facilitate networking and
partnerships.
In addition to the above suggestions, one applicant flagged they were keen for a certificate of
attendance, and others suggested producing a declaration of the things that were decided at
the conference.
PART THREE – REFLECTIONS BY THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS

In reviewing and selecting applicants/dilemmas two particular challenges surfaced
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

repeatedly. The first was how to balance diversity in relation to the individual. We tried to
balance prioritizing the strongest applications with achieving a regional spread. Organizers
ultimately questioned whether a western bias in their understanding of ‘strong’ applications
also impacted their thinking. For example, the assessment of strong applications relied on a
high standard of written communication in English, but many of the applications, particularly
those from the global South, were written in the applicant’s second language.
This challenge was also reflected in the interest in dilemmas of ‘wider applicability’. The
desire for dilemmas to be relevant to a range of applicants meant selecting the final
dilemmas from prioritized themes that arose from the applications. However, this means
dilemmas were excluded not based on their weaknesses, but because their focus was outside
the set prioritized themes. Although we tried to ensure that minority rights issues were
represented, there is a risk that this process excluded less ‘popular’ issues/concerns. To make
matters more complex, different regions’ dilemmas also seemed to group around different
themes. For instance, the interest in the internal governance of NGOs tended to come from
academics/practitioners from the global North.
Another key facet of the tension between theory and practice was the ideal of ensuring a
diversity of participants, for example through the process of advertising the conference
through the use of networks and due to the limitation in available funds. The organizers
looked for obvious gaps in the applications we received (we had a distinct lack of
applications from those working on HIV/AIDS) and then sent application forms in a more
targeted way. However, our reliance on certain networks clearly shaped the pool of
applicants.
The majority of applicants also requested funding, but funding constraints limited the ability
to support many of these applications. The majority of applicants requiring funding came
from the global South, making this a significant factor in the diversity of participants.
Another issue to note with ensuring diversity is the limited information available, principally
gender, nationality and first language. Given the complexity of identity politics and life
experiences, what aspects should be prioritized to promote diversity and participation of less
advantaged groups?
The second challenge that ran throughout the process was how to reconcile theory and
practice. The conference organizers set the parameters for the conference before sending out
the applications by focusing on active participation in human rights work. Our evaluation of
the strength of applications and dilemmas was shaped by how well they fit within our
conception of active participation. As one example, many of the applications had a very broad
understanding of active participation, in terms of interest in democratic processes/politics.
These applications were often deemed not strong as they fell beyond the parameters of what
the conference seeks to explore. This invites the question of whether the conference would
need to include participants in establishing the initial parameters for the project to meet the
requirements for active participation.
Many of the challenges of active participation in practice have been evident within the
organization of the conference itself. As an approach it is invariably imperfectly applied, and
itself may throw up dilemmas rather than neat solutions. Going forward, lessons learned from
the challenges that emerged during the application process will be incorporated into future
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

processes. There will be time to feed into the evaluation of the application process and the
conference at the event itself, but the organizers would also be happy to receive any further
suggestions or hear from applicants about their experience of the application process.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

ANNEX 2:
WORKING FRAMEWORK FOR

UNDERSTANDING PARTICIPATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORK AND THE
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION CONFERENCE1
PARTICIPATION
Action through which stakeholders are part of the processes and/or decisions made. The term
can be used to refer to all action through which stakeholders are part of the processes and/or
decisions made – from informing to full stakeholder control.
Active participation: Only refers to forms of participation which grant stakeholders influence
over the processes and/or decisions made within human rights work.
There is considered to be a threshold for active participation. Active participation includes

forms of participation that can be classified as, or are closer to full stakeholder control than,
legitimate consultation.
Non-active participation: Refers to forms of participation which inform or involve stakeholders

but do not enable stakeholders to have influence over the processes and/or decisions made
within human rights work.
POINT TO NOTE
It is suggested that in many circumstances active participation can be an empowering and
enabling process through which rights holders participate in and influence the processes and
decisions which affect their lives in order to gain recognition and attainment of their human
rights. However, this is not intended in any way to underestimate the value of working with
non-active participation in circumstances where active participation is either not possible or
is not appropriate.
1
This framework is intended only as a guide to be used during the ‘Active participation in human rights’ conference.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

Participant: Refers to a stakeholder who is in some way part of the processes and/or decisions
made within human rights work.
Active participant: Refers to a stakeholder who is directly involved in influencing the

processes and/or decisions made within human rights work.
Non-active participant: Refers to a stakeholder who is informed of, or involved in, the
processes and/or decisions made within human rights work. However, the stakeholder is not
given the means to directly influence the processes and/or decisions made.
Facilitator: A person (individual or group) responsible for overseeing and enabling the use of
participation.
Rights Holder: People (individuals and groups) whose human rights have been, or are at risk
of being, violated.
Stakeholder: Any person (individual or group) who has an interest in the processes and/or
decisions made within human rights work. This is inclusive of, but not limited to, rights
holders. Examples may include human rights practitioners or NGO members.
A CAVEAT
The definition of stakeholder is broad. On one hand this enables a discussion of participation
in a range of settings (for example within the internal structures of NGOs, in the planning of
this conference). Conversely, the term does not exclude those in positions of relative
power/authority. Therefore, wherever possible, please be specific about the persons
(individuals or groups) you are referring to.
Please see next page for table on levels and forms of participation.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

TERMINOLOGY EXPLANATION LEVEL OF

PARTICIPATION
Not informing, involving or
Unilateral consulting stakeholders before NO
decision making making a decision or designing a
PARTICIPATION
process. PARTICIPATION
NON-ACTIVE
Informing stakeholders of a
Informing decision or process.
Information flows in only one
direction.
Involving stakeholders in the

Involving implementation of a decision or
process in which they did not
take part, for example requesting
rights holders to take action.
Prior to making a decision or

Legitimate designing a process stakeholders
consultation are offered options and then
enabled to assert their views in
order that their views inform and
influence the direction of the
work.
Processes are designed and

PARTICIPATION
Joint decision decisions made together with

making stakeholders and steps are taken
to overcome the influence of
ACTIVE
power imbalance.
A co-operative relationship with

Participatory stakeholders where there is an
partnership agreement to share responsibility
and leadership in the design and
achievement of a goal.
Supporting stakeholders to
Stakeholder undertake work independently, FULL
control through building their capacity
and advising them. Through PARTICIPATION
progressive empowerment,
stakeholders would be in a
position to self-mobilize and
initiate change.
Table 1: Terminology that indicates different levels and forms of participation
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

Active PArticiPAtion in
HumAn rigHts
conference, 4 – 5 June 2011
in June 2011, Amnesty international, freedom from torture and the
centre for Applied Human rights at the university of York, uK, held an
‘Active participation in human rights’ conference, attended by human
rights practitioners from around the world.
the conference provided a forum for participants to explore the

possibilities and challenges of active participation within human rights
research, advocacy and campaigning, and served as a space to develop
ideas and share best practice suggestions.
this report gives an overview of the sessions, discussions and

suggestions of best practice that emerged from the event. the ideas
presented are intended to be helpful and thought-provoking aids to
integrating participatory approaches in human rights work.
the report’s recommendations can be adapted to suit a variety of

amnesty.org situations and so reflect the essence of active participation: an
york.ac.uk/inst/cahr empowering and enabling process in which rights holders can
freedomfromtorture.org participate and influence outcomes.
Index: ACT 10/023/2011

October 2011
Human rights movement
Human rights movement refers to a nongovernmental social movement engaged in activism related to the
issues of human rights. The foundations of the global human rights movement involve resistance to:
colonialism, imperialism, slavery, racism, segregation, patriarchy, and oppression of indigenous peoples.[1]
A key principle of the human rights movement is its appeal to universality: the idea that all human beings
should struggle in solidarity for a common set of basic conditions that has to be followed by all.[2]
Contents
History
Anti-colonialism
World War II and the United Nations
Global human rights struggles
Changes in the 1970s
Since the 1990s
Issues and activities
Limitations and criticism
Organizations
See also
References
Sources
History
Human rights activism predates the 20th century, that includes the anti-slavery movement.[3][4] Historical
movements were usually concerned with a limited set of issues, and they were more local than global.[5] One
account identifies the 1899 Hague Convention as a starting point for the idea that humans have rights
independent of the states that control them.[6]
The activities of the International Federation for Human Rights (originally the International Labor
Organization)—founded in France by the international labor movement in the 1920s—can be seen as a
precursor to the modern movements.[5][7] This organization was quickly embraced by the United States and
European powers, perhaps as a way to counteract the Bolshevik call for global solidarity among workers.[8]
Anti-colonialism
Another major global human rights movement grew out of resistance to colonialism. The Congo Reform
Association, founded in 1904, has also been described as a foundational modern human rights movement. This
group used photographs to document terror wrought by Belgians in the course of demanding rubber
production in the Congo. These photographs were passed among sympathetic Europeans and Americans,
including Edmund Morel, Joseph Conrad, and Mark Twain—who wrote satirically as King Leopold:
...oh well, the pictures get sneaked around
everywhere, in spite of all we can do to
ferret them out and suppress them. Ten
thousand pulpits and ten thousand presses
are saying the good word for me all the time
and placidly and convincingly denying the
mutilations. Then that trivial little kodak, that
a child can carry in its pocket, gets up,
uttering never a word, and knocks them
dumb![9]
The photos and subsequent literature triggered

international outrage at Belgian crimes committed against
the Congolese.[10]
As the century went on, African Americans including W.

E. B. Du Bois, Walter White, and Paul Robeson joined
with leaders of the African diaspora (from Haiti, Liberia,
the Philippines, and elsewhere) to make a global demand
for basic rights.[11][12] Although the origins of this
movement were multifaceted (owing strength both to the
capitalist Marcus Garvey and to the more left-wing
African Blood Brotherhood), a definitive moment of
international solidarity came after Italy's annexation of
Ethiopia in 1935.[13] Human rights activists circulated images of
mutilated Congolese children among concerned
Europeans and Americans, pressuring the Belgium
World War II and the United Nations government to make political reforms
In the aftermath of World War II, the Pan-Africanist

contingent played a major role in causing the United Nations to explicitly protect "human rights" in its
founding documents. Du Bois compared colonies across the world to ghettos in the United States and called
for a world document affirming the human rights of all people.[12]
Representatives of small countries (particularly from Latin America), as well as Du Bois and other activists,
were unhappy with the version of human rights envisioned for the UN Charter at Dumbarton Oaks in
1944.[14] Du Bois stated at the time that, evidently, "the only way to human equality is through the
philanthropy of the masters".[15] However, the US government supported powerful domestic organizations
willing to promote its concept of human rights, such as the American Bar Association and the American
Jewish Committee. These organizations won public approval of the United Nations and the human rights
concept.[16]
The concept of human rights was indeed built into United Nations with institutions such as the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Active diplomacy by Latin
American countries was instrumental to the process of promoting these ideas and drafting the relevant
agreements. As a result of this pressure, more human rights language was adopted at the 1945 San Francisco
Conference to create the UN Charter.[17] Revelations about the Holocaust, followed by the Nuremberg Trials,
also had a major influence on the movement,[18][19] particularly among Jewish and Christian lobbying
groups.[20] Some NGO's represented the UN charter as a victory for the human rights movement, while other
activists argued that it paid lipservice to human rights while basically serving the interests of the great
powers.[21]
Early in the Cold War, the "human rights" concept was used to promote the ideological agendas of the
superpowers.[22] The Soviet Union argued that people in colonized lands around the world had been exploited
by Western powers. A large percentage of Soviet propaganda to the Third World centered on charges of
racism and human rights violations. The United States countered with its own propaganda, describing its own
society as free and the Soviet Union's as unfree. Human rights language became an international standard,
which could be used by great powers or by people's movements to make demands.[12]
Global human rights struggles
Within the United States, participants in the civil rights movement

called for human rights in addition to civil rights. Du Bois, the
National Negro Congress (NNC), the NAACP, the Civil Rights
Congress (CRC), and other activists, soon began charging the U.S.
with human rights violations at the U.N. In 1951, Du Bois, William L.
Patterson and the CRC presented a document called "We Charge
Genocide", which accused the US of complicity with ongoing
systematic violence against African Americans.[12]
Poor People's Campaign March at
An Appeal for Human Rights, published by Atlanta students in 1960, Lafayette Park, 1968
is cited as a key moment in beginning the wave of nonviolent direct
actions that swept the American South.[23] In 1967, Martin Luther
King Jr. began to argue that the concept of "civil rights" was laden with isolating, individualistic capitalist
values. He said: "It is necessary for us to realize that we have moved from the era of civil rights to the era of
human rights. When you deal with human rights you are not dealing with something clearly defined in the
Constitution. They are rights that are clearly defined by the mandates of a humanitarian concern."[24] For
King, who began to organize the multi-racial Poor People's Campaign just weeks before his April 1968
assassination, human rights required economic justice in addition to de jure equality.[25]
After the decolonization of Africa and of Asia, former colonies gained majority status in the UN's Commission
on Human Rights, and focused their attention on global white supremacy and economic inequality—in doing
so, choosing to admit other types of human rights abuses. Some of these nations argued that focusing on civil
rights, as opposed to human rights, was a privilege available only to the wealthy nations that had benefited
from colonialism.[12] Demands for human rights in the Third World increased throughout the 1960s, even as
the global superpowers turned their attention elsewhere.[26]
Changes in the 1970s
Since the 1970s the human rights movement has played an increasingly important role on the international
scene.[18][27] Although government support for human rights decreased, international organizations increased
in strength and number.[26] Some of the events of the 1970s, which gave global prominence to the human
movements issue, included the abuses of Chilean Augusto Pinochet and American Richard Nixon
administrations; the signing of the Helsinki Accords (1975) between the West and the USSR; the Soweto riots
in South Africa; awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty International (1977); and the emergence of the
Democracy Wall movement in China.[27][28] Nixon was succeeded by the Jimmy Carter administration, much
more supportive of the human rights issues. Even before Carter made human rights central to his foreign
policy, progressives in Congress had institutionalized human rights in the State Department and passed
legislation tying human rights to foreign aid considerations.[29]
Pressure from the international human rights movement brought
human rights increasingly to the political agenda of numerous
countries and diplomatic negotiations.[27] As the issue of human
rights became important for dissidents in the Eastern Bloc (Soviet
human rights movement, Charter 77, Workers' Defence Committee),
this period also saw a growing reframing of the struggle between the
West and USSR from the economic terms ("communism versus free
market") into a struggle for human rights ("totalitarianism versus
liberty").[30] Since the end of the Cold War, the issues of human
rights have been present in a number of major political and military
conflicts, debated by global public opinion, from Kosovo to Iraq,
Afghanistan, Congo and Darfur.[31]
Originally, most international human rights organizations came from

France and the UK; since the 1970s American organizations moved
beyond rights for Americans to partake in the international scene, and
around the turn of the century, as noted by Neier, "the movement
became so global in character that it is no longer possible to ascribe
leadership to any particular [national or regional] segment".[32] Charter 77 Memorial in Prague
However, others, like Ibhawoh, point out that there still is a gap
between regions, particularly as most of the international human rights
movement organizations are located in the global North, and thus continuous concerns are raised about their
understanding of the situations in the global South.[33]
Since the 1990s
The global human rights movement has become more expansive since
the 1990s, including greater representation of women's rights and
economic justice as part of the human rights umbrella. Economic,
social and cultural (ESC) rights gained new prominence.[34]
Advocates for women's human rights (sometimes identifying as part

of the feminist movement), criticized the early human rights
movement for focusing on male concerns and artificially excluding
women's issues from the public sphere. Women's rights have
nevertheless gained prominence in the international human rights
movement, particularly insofar as they include protection from
gender-based violence.[35] In Latin America, the issue of women's
human rights intersects with the struggle against authoritarian
governments. In many cases, for example the Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo, women's groups were some of the most prominent advocates
of human rights in general.[36] Mainstream acceptance of women's Graffiti on a metal plate in Plaza
human rights within the international human rights movement has Montenegro, Rosario, Argentina,
increased since 1989.[36] related to the Mothers of the Plaza
de Mayo movement.
The authority of the United Nations human rights framework
diminished in the 1990s, partly due to the emphasis on economic
liberalization that followed the Cold War.[37]
The 1990s also saw a call to "defend the defenders" of human rights—to protect human rights activists from
violence and repression.[38] Unfortunately, there has been an increase in the number of attacks on the
activists.[39] The movement has come to a standstill as individuals continue to push for liberation but are
unable to report their findings out of fear of harm or death. The number of female activists has been growing
since the beginning of the Feminist movement however, there have been increased number of attacks on
women. Recently, the Taliban targeted the female activists to send a message.[40]
The internet has expanded the power of the human rights movement by improving communication between
activists in different physical locations.[41] This is known as mediated mobilization. Individuals who are using
their voices to communicate about the injustices are now able to communicate with like minded people who
use their voices through participatory journalism.[42]
The human rights movement has historically focused on abuses by states, and some have argued that it has not
attended closely enough to the actions of corporations.[43] In the 1990s, some first steps were taken towards
holding corporations accountable for human rights abuses. For example, the Parliament of Britain approved a
resolution to censure British Petroleum for funding Colombian death squads.[44] Organizations such as Human
Rights Watch also began to pressure other nongovernmental organizations to take human rights into account.
In 1993, Human Rights Watch successfully lobbied the International Olympic Committee to vote against
awarding the 2000 Olympic Games to Beijing because of China's human rights record.[45]
Issues and activities

The international human rights movement is concerned with
issues such as deprivation of life and liberty, deprivation of the
right of free and peaceful expressions, gatherings and
worship,[46] equal treatment regardless of individual
background, and opposition to unjust and cruel practices such
as torture.[18] Other issues include opposition to the death
penalty[47] and to child labor.[48]
Much of the human rights movement is local in nature,

concerned with human rights violations in their own
countries, but they rely on an international network of
support.[49] The international nature of the movement allows United Workers demonstrating for human
local activists to broadcast their concerns, sometimes rights and fair development in Baltimore's
generating international pressure on their home Inner Harbor.
government.[26] The movement generally espouses the
principle that sovereignty ends where human rights begin.
This principle justifies intervention across borders to rectify perceived violations.[50]
The human rights movement is also credited with supplying local activists with a vocabulary to use in support
of their claims.[51]
Limitations and criticism

One major schism within the international human rights movement has been between NGOs and activists from
the First and Third Worlds. Critics of the mainstream movement have argued that it suffers from systemic
biases and is unwilling to confront inequality on a global scale.[52][53] In particular, some critique the role of
neoliberal capitalism in creating economic conditions that engender 'human rights violations', arguing that the
dominant human rights movement is blind to these dynamics.[54] (See also: structural adjustment.) Makau
Mutua has written:
As currently constituted and deployed, the human rights movement will ultimately fail because it
is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western societies. The movement does not deeply
resonate in the cultural fabrics of non-Western states, except among hypocritical elites steeped in
Western ideas. In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the
cultures of all peoples.[55]
David Kennedy has criticized a tendency of the international human rights movement to "treat human rights as
an object of devotion rather than calculation", arguing that human rights language is vague and may impede
utilitarian assessments of a situation. Kennedy also argues that this vocabulary can be "misused, distorted, or
co-opted", and that framing issues in terms of human rights may narrow the field of possibility and exclude
other narratives.[51] Others have also critiqued the movement and its language as vague.[56]
Some have argued that the human rights movement has a tendency to subtly debase people by portraying them
as victims of abuse. However, others have argued that this very argument is used in order to downplay human
rights abuses.[57]
Organizations
Particularly since the 1970s, the international human rights movement has been mediated by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).[26]
Major international human rights organizations include Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch.[58][59]
Historically, the influence of the International Federation for Human Rights is seen as highly important on the
movement.[5]
The creation of the International Criminal Court at the turn of the 21st century is seen as another achievement
of the international human rights activists.[60]
See also
Revolutionary movement
References
1. Clapham, Human Rights (2007), p. 19. "In fact, the modern civil rights movement and the
complex normative international framework have grown out of a number of transnational and
widespread movements. Human rights were invoked and claimed in the contexts of anti-
colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-slavery, anti-apartheid, anti-racism, and feminist and
indigenous struggles everywhere."
2. Clapham, Human Rights (2007), p. 19–20. "...the sense of solidarity amongst those who
believe they are the victims of a human rights violation can transcend class, gender, and other
distinctions. This sense of connectedness is critical to understanding the changing world of
human rights."
3. Thomas M. Leonard (2006). Encyclopedia of the Developing World: Index. A-E (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=3mE04D9PMpAC&pg=PA771). Taylor & Francis. p. 771. ISBN 978-0-
415-97662-6. Retrieved 14 November 2012.
4. Clapham, Human Rights (2007), p. 27.
5. Neier, The International Human Rights Movement (2012), pp. 7–9.
6. Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN (2008), pp. 40–43.
8. Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN (2008), p. 57.
9. Mark Twain, King Leopold's Soliloquy, quoted in: Bruce Michelson, Printer's Devil: Mark Twain
and the American Publishing Revolution, University of California Press, ISBN 9780520247598,
p. 202.
10. Sharon Sliwinski, "The Childhood of Human Rights: The Kodak on the Congo (http://tps.jkdwe
b.biz/sites/default/files/uploads/Sliwinski_Kodak_Congo.pdf) Archived (https://web.archive.org/
web/20150205163712/http://tps.jkdweb.biz/sites/default/files/uploads/Sliwinski_Kodak_Congo.
pdf) 2015-02-05 at the Wayback Machine", Journal of Visual Culture 5(3), 2006.
11. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire (1997), pp. 1–2.
12. John David Skretny, "The effect of the Cold War on African-American civil rights: America and
the world audience, 1945–1968", Theory and Society 27(2), 1998.
13. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire (1997), pp. 10–11. "The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935
marked an especially critical moment in the articulation of diaspora thought and politics. Paul
Robeson claimed it was a watershed for black American consciousness, since it exposed 'the
parallel between [black American] interests and those of oppressed peoples abroad.'"
17. Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN (2008), p. 118. "These proposals were
reintroduced in San Francisco during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Latin America's significant intellectual production supporting human rights is a major
reason the region has been called 'the forgotten crucible' of universal human rights. Latin
American jurisprudence was particularly well suited to bridging cultural divides in human rights
by linking civil and political rights with economic and social rights."
19. Winston E. Langley (1999). Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues Since 1945 (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=0j1KI6Utrd0C&pg=PR11). Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 11–16.
ISBN 978-0-313-30163-6. Retrieved 14 November 2012.
21. Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN (2008), pp. 136–138. "A few activists, in particular
those whose agenda focused on racial equality and decolonization, were dismayed by the
results of San Francisco. The NAACP and allied groups, which had invested significant time,
resources, and hopes in using the global forum to highlight the evils of entrenched racism
inside the United States and internationally, were bitterly disappointed at the outcome. To no
avail, they criticized the failure to dent the vastly unequal power relations operating both
between states and within their borders. Rayford Logan, civil rights activist and chair of the
history department at Howard University, characterized the human rights articles in the Charter
as a 'tragic joke'. But these were minority voices. Just as Roosevelt anticipated, the NGO
consultants were thrilled with the role they had played in establishing the organization and
fanned out across the country to spread the good news."
22. Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (1999), p. xiv.
23. Edward A. Hatfield, "Atlanta Sit-ins (http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-3
615)", The New Georgia Encyclopedia, 28 May 2008.
24. Sam Trumbore, "From Civil Rights to Human Rights, King’s Legacy For Us (http://blog.timesuni
on.com/trumbore/from-civil-rights-to-human-rights-kings-legacy-for-us/986/)", Times Union, 15
January 2012.
25. Tomas F. Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., And the Struggle
for Economic Justice, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. ISBN 9780812239690
26. Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Christine Min Wotipka, "Global Civil Society and the International Human
Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental
Organization", Social Forces 83(2), 2004; accessed via JStor (https://www.jstor.org/stable/3598
341), DOI: 10.1353/sof.2005.0022.
27. Lawson, Edward (Edward H.); Mary Lou Bertucci (1996). United Nations Decade on Human
Rights Education, 1995-2005 (https://books.google.com/books?id=J-SrdFtSuDUC&pg=PR36).
Taylor & Francis. pp. 36–38. ISBN 978-1-56032-362-4. Retrieved 14 November 2012.
29. Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s
(Harvard University Press, 2014).
30. Neier, The International Human Rights Movement (2012), p. 13.
33. Bonny Ibhawoh (16 October 2006). "Human Rights INGOs and the North-South Gap" (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=fCWz8IxbrbIC&pg=PA81). In Daniel A. Bell; Jean-Marc Coicaud
(eds.). Ethics in Action: The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights
Nongovernmental Organizations. Cambridge University Press. p. 81. ISBN 978-0-521-86566-1.
Retrieved 14 November 2012.
34. Nelson and Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy (2008), p. 14. "Since the mid-1990s the human
rights movement has begun to take seriously the economic and social rights guaranteed in the
international human rights covenants; development and human rights NGOs have joined in
human rights–driven social movements for food, health, education, water, and other rights, often
challenging development orthodoxy."
35. Charlotte Bunch, "Transforming Human Rights From a Feminist Perspective", in Women's
Rights, Human Rights, (1995) ed. Stone & Wolper.
36. Elisabeth Friedman, "Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement", in Women's
Rights, Human Rights, (1995) ed. Stone & Wolper.
37. Nelson and Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy (2008), p. 51. "The 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna was expected by some to be a celebration of the post–cold war era,
the new freedom of the United Nations to operate in a less politicized international
environment, and NGO human rights successes. Instead it marked a watershed moment for the
integrity of the human rights system, as NGOs battled a coalition of governments determined to
undermine the principle of the universality of human rights standards and weaken the UN
human rights system. [...] The challenge to shore up the fundamental concept of universality of
rights was compounded by shifts in the foreign policy priorities of Western governments. A new
Democratic administration in the United States made promoting free-market democracies,
rather than human rights, its top priority, resulting in human rights regressions, including the
delinking of trade and aid from human rights guarantees (Mann 1999)."
38. Nelson and Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy (2008), p. 53.
39. "Defend the Defenders" (http://www.hrln.org/hrln/defend-the-defenders.html). www.hrln.org.
Retrieved 2016-02-29.
40. "Taliban Targeted Female Activist in Afghan Attack" (http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/taliban-t
argeted-female-activists-leaders-afghan-attack/). takeaway. Retrieved 2016-02-29.
41. Halpin and Hoskins, Human Rights and the Internet (2000), pp. 8–9.
42. Lievrouw, Leah (2011). Alternative And Activist New Media. Polity Press.
43. Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (1999), p. xix. "...business
corporations (especially transnational ones) are often more powerful than states, and therefore
enjoy the capacity to promote or undermine the rights and well-being of individuals and groups.
Yet, the human rights movement, as it initially developed, did not seek to make business
corporations accountable for human rights abuses, such as child labor, business-supported
political repression, environmental degradation, and sexual harassment..."
44. Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (1999), pp. 36–37.
45. Barbara Keys, "Harnessing Human Rights to the Olympic Games (https://journals.sagepub.co
m/doi/abs/10.1177/0022009416667791?journalCode=jcha): Human Rights Watch and the
1993 ‘Stop-Beijing’ Campaign,” The Journal of Contemporary History 53, no. 2 (2018): 415-38.
doi: 10.1177/0022009416667791
46. Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (1999), p. 240.
47. Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (1999), p. 41, 256.
51. David Kennedy, "The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? (http://www.l
aw.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/publications/humanrights.pdf)" 15 Harvard Human Rights
Journal 101, 2002.
53. Langley, Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945 (1999), p. xviii.
54. Normand and Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN (2008), p. 325–326.
55. Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (2002), quoted in Clapham,
Human Rights (2007), p. 161.
57. Clapham, Human Rights (2007), pp. 160–161. "Some critics argue that human rights
organizations may tend to generate a narrative that reinforces images of helpless victims
oppressed by an alien culture; in turn, this could be said to continue imperialism by other
means."
60. Neier, The International Human Rights Movement (2012), p. 18
Sources
Clapham, Andrew (2007). Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
ISBN 9780199205523
Langley, Winston E. (1999). Encyclopedia of Human Rights Issues since 1945. Westport:
Greenwood Press. ISBN 9780313301636
Halpin, Edward F. Hick, and Eric Steven Hoskins (2000). Human Rights and the Internet. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780333777336
Neier, Aryeh (22 April 2012). The International Human Rights Movement: A History (https://boo
ks.google.com/books?id=yrRMuZCtsFYC&pg=PA7). Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-
4008-4187-5. Retrieved 14 November 2012.
Nelson, Paul, and Ellen Dorsey (2008). New Rights Advocacy : Changing Strategies of
Development and Human Rights NGOs. Georgetown University Press. ISBN 9781589012042
Normand, Roger, and Sarah Zaidi (2008). Human Rights at the UN : The Political History of
Universal Justice. Indiana University Press. ISBN 9780253000118
Peters, Julie Stone, and Andrea Wolper, ed. (1995). Women's Rights, Human Rights:
International Feminist Perspectives. New York: Psychology Press (Routledge).
ISBN 9780415909952
Von Eschen, Penny M. (1997). Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism,
1937–1957. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8292-5
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Human_rights_movement&oldid=1017999861"

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Human rights education
Human rights education is defined as the learning process that builds up the required knowledge, values, and
proficiency of human rights of which the objective is to develop an acceptable human rights culture. This type
of learning teaches students to examine their experiences from the human rights point of view enabling them to
integrate these concepts into their values and decision-making.[1] According to Amnesty International, human
rights education is a way to empower people so that they can create skills and behavior that would promote
dignity and equality within the community, society, and all over the world.[2]
Contents
Non-discrimination
Human rights education and training
Demand for human rights education
Human rights education and the United Nations
Human rights education history
Human rights education organizations
Human rights education at schools
Human rights education uses in the 21st century
Human rights education models
Criticism
See also
References
Sources
External links
Non-discrimination
The "National Economics and Social Rights Initiative" stated the importance of Non-Discrimination in Human
Rights Education. Governments must see to it that it must be exercised without bias to race, gender, color,
religion, language, national or social origin, political or personal opinion, birth, or any status. All students,
parents, and communities possess the right to take part in decisions affecting their respective schools and the
right to education.[3]
Human rights education and training

The OHCHR promotes Human Rights Education by supporting national and local initiatives for HRE within
the context of its Technical Cooperation Programs[4] and through the ACT Project which subsidizes the
grassroots projects.[5] The ACT or Assisting Communities Together Project is the collaboration between the
OHCHR and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)[6] to make grants available for civil society
organizations in implementing human rights activities in local communities.
The OHCHR also develops preferred Human Rights Education training materials and resource tools such as
the Database on Human Rights Education and Training,[7] Resource Collection on Human Rights Education
and Training,[8] and web section on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[9] Finally, it takes care of
coordinating the World Program for Human Rights Education.[10]
The "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" is acknowledged as a landmark document in human rights
history. It was drafted by representatives from various countries and regions with varying legal and cultural
experiences. The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed this declaration in Paris, France, on 10
December 1948. This Declaration states that basic human rights require protection. It was translated into more
than 500 languages worldwide.[9]
Demand for human rights education

The demand for human rights education continues to grow globally. Academic institutions are in the position
to train students as future business leaders capable of managing human rights impact on their respective
corporate organizations. The United Nations Global Compact[11] in cooperation with the Principles for
Responsible Management Education[12] invites different corporations to incorporate business along with
human rights topics to their curricula.
The Asia-Pacific Center for Education for International Understanding and the United Nations Academic
Impact mutually organized the 2018 United Nations Global Citizenship Education Seminar at the UN
Headquarters in New York City. These seminars are useful in the formulation of new ideas and concepts
related to HRE.[13] Human Rights Education is crucial because it is one of the keys to making governments
and political leaders accountable. It also imparts and spreads out the human rights vocabulary and provides a
critical approach towards human rights.[14]
Human rights education and the United Nations

The United Nations High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights functions as
coordinator of the UN Education and Public Information Programs in the area of human rights.[15]
The United Nations General Assembly has proclaimed it as central to the achievement of the rights enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):[16]
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms...
— Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
Article 26.2 of the UDHR states the role of educators in achieving the social order called for by the
declaration:
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
— Article 26.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states to ensure that children are enabled to
develop a respect for their own cultural identity, language and values and for the culture, language and values
of others.[17]
The importance of human rights was reaffirmed by the United Nations in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action:
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms that States are duty-bound, as stipulated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and in other international human rights instruments, to ensure that education is
aimed at strengthening the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
— Paragraph 33, section 1 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action[18]
States should strive to eradicate illiteracy and should direct education toward the full development
of the human personality and to the strengtheng of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The World Conference on Human Rights calls on all States and institutions to include
human rights, humanitarian law, democracy and rule of law as subjects in curricula of all learning
institutions in formal and non- formal settings. Human rights education should include peace,
democracy, development and social justice, as set forth in international and regional human rights
instruments, in order to achieve common understanding and awareness with a view to
strengthening universal commitment to human rights.
— Paragraph 79 and 80, section 2 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
As a result of the Vienna Declaration the decade from 1995 to 2004 was declared the UN Decade of Human
Rights Education.[19][20]
UNESCO has a responsibility to promote human rights education, and was a key organiser of the UN's
Decade for Human Rights Education.[21] UNESCO attempts to promote human rights education through:[22]
Development of national and local capacities for human rights education, through its co-
operation in development projects and programmes at national and sub-regional levels.
Elaboration of learning materials and publications and their translation and adaptation in
national and local languages.
Advocacy and Networking Activities.
Following the Decade of Human Rights Education, on 10 December 2004, the General Assembly proclaimed
the World Programme for Human Rights Education, and ongoing project to advance the implementation of
human rights education programmes in all sectors:
Building on the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-
2004), the World Programme seeks to promote a common understanding of the basic principles
and methodologies of human rights education, to provide a concrete framework for action and to
strengthen partnerships and cooperation from the international level down to the grass roots.
— United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights website[23]
Human rights education history

The emphasis on Human Rights Education began in 1995 with the beginning of the UN Decade for Human
Rights Education, though previously addressed in 1953 with the UNESCO Associated Schools Program,
which served as an "initial attempt to teach human rights in formal school settings". The first formal request for
the need to educate students about human rights came about in UNESCO’s 1974 article Recommendation
concerning Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and Peace, and Education Relating to
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The participants of the International Congress on the Teaching of
Humans Rights eventually met in 1978 to form a specific definition of what would be required application of
the education in formal curricula. The aims at which the Congress agreed upon including the encouragement
of tolerant attitudes with focus on respect, providing knowledge of human rights in the context of national and
international dimensions as well as their implementations, and finally developing awareness of human rights
translating into reality whether social or political on national and international levels.
Human Rights Education became an official central concern internationally after the World Conference on
Human Rights in 1993. This conference brought the issue of educating formally to the top of many countries'
priority lists and was brought to the attention of the United Nations. It was two years later that the United
Nations approved the Decade for Human Rights Education, which reformed the aims of application once
again. Since the development of the UN Decade, the incorporation of human rights education into formal
school curricula has been developed and diversified with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, and individuals dedicated to spreading the topic through formal education.
Today the most influential document used to determine what qualifies as human rights and how to implement
these ideas and rights into everyday life is the Universal Declaration. The declaration was adopted by the
General Assembly in 1948, making 10 December annual Human Rights Day ever since. To this day the 30
article compilation is seen as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations".[24]
Human rights education organizations

Arab Institute for Human Rights (http://aihr-iadh.org/) The Arab Institute for Human Rights is an
independent Arab non-governmental organization based in Tunisia. It was founded in 1989 at the initiative of
the Arab Organization for Human Rights, the Arab Lawyers Union, and the Tunisian League for Human
Rights and with the support of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights. The Institute received the
UNESCO International Award for Human Rights Education for the year 1992. Goals : The Arab Institute for
Human Rights aims to promote a culture of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights, as
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international conventions, and to strengthen the
values of democracy and citizenship.
Organizations such as Indian Institute of Human Rights,[25] Amnesty International and Human Rights
Education Associates (HREA)[26] promote human rights education with their programmes,[27][28] believing
"that learning about human rights is the first step toward respecting, promoting and defending those rights".
Amnesty International defines Human Rights Education as a "deliberate, participatory practice aimed at
empowering individuals, groups and communities through fostering knowledge, skills and attitudes consistent
with internationally recognized human rights principles"[29] and explains the goal of Human Rights Education
is to "empower yourself and others to develop the skills and attitudes that promote equality, dignity and respect
in your community, society and worldwide."[30]
Human Rights organizations aim to protect human rights on different levels some being more specific to
geographical areas, others are based on governmental influences, others are nonprofit and education based,
while others specifically aim to protect a certain group of individuals. The following are organizations with
brief descriptions of their aims, targeted audiences, and affiliations.
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), each submission whether
private or public, governmental or NGO is evaluated with regards to the following context: appropriateness,
effectiveness, originality, ease of use, adaptability, sustainability, approach, and inclusiveness. Each
characteristic of which is detailed in the article Human Rights Education in the School Systems of Europe,
Central Asia, and North America: A Compendium of Good Practice.[31]
African Centre on Democracy and Human Rights Studies[32]
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights[33] This commission is in charge of monitoring the
protection of humans' rights and ensuring the protection and promotion of these rights. It also is charged with
the responsibility of interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. This commission is
limited to the continent of Africa and the countries within it.
Amnesty International[34] One of the largest human rights organizations, Amnesty International includes 2.2
million members from over 150 countries. The organization concerns research as well as action in order to
prevent and end human rights abuses. They are also focused on seeking justice for the violations which have
already been committed.
Art and Resistance Through Education (ARTE) (https://www.artejustice.org) engages young people to
amplify their voices and organize for human rights change through the visual arts.
The Asian Human Rights Commission[35] The goals of the AHRC are "to protect and promote human
rights by monitoring, investigation, and advocating and taking solidarity actions". This commission is limited
to the continent of Asia and the countries within it.
The Australian Council for Human Rights Education[36] (formerly National Committee on Human Rights
Education) was established in 1999 actively pursue human rights education in Australia in response to the UN
Decade on Human Rights Education. ACHRE is registered in Victoria under the Associations Incorporations
Act 1981 and Dr Sev Ozdowski[37][38] is its current President. The key achievements of the committee
include establishment of State and Territory networks to promote nationwide the goals and program of
activities of the Citizen for Humanity project; provision of online human rights educational materials for
primary and secondary schools community organizations as well as for government representatives and
officials; establishment in 1983 of Centre for human rights education at Curtin University[39] and in 2007 of
the National Centre for Human Rights Education at RMIT University in Melbourne; organization of in
international human rights education initiatives such as conferences, for example International Conferences on
Human Rights Education - see:,[40][41][42] and provision of HR training.
The Chapel Hill and Carrboro Human Rights Center[43] The Human Rights Center (HRC) in Carrboro is
home to advocacy and service organizations, run as a 501(c)3 non-profit organization by UNC professor
Judith Blau and by volunteers, many through the University as well. Many volunteers come through the Social
and Economic Justice SOCI 273 APPLES course, and they mainly focus on immigrant rights.
Children’s Defense Fund (CDF)[44] The Children's Defense Fund attempts to create policies and programs
to ensure equality to all children. They work towards decreasing the child poverty rate as well as protecting
children from abuse and neglect. The members of the CDF act as advocates for children to help ensure they
are treated equally and have the right to care and education in the future.
Coalition For Human Rights Education (COHRE)[45] The Coalition For Human Rights Education formed
as a result of experiences of human rights abuse. It is operating in Uganda based in Wakiso District. The
organisation will have links through the country and wants to expand knowledge about human rights
throughout the country. COHRE works with government bodies, private organisations, schools, minority
groups and women and children in communities through training in order to bring about learning the basic
human Rights. It provides training to the rural communities and organised groups which equips an individual
to better living concerning human rights in areas like health, protection, love, and hope.
Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe[46] The commission is an independent institution
which promotes awareness of human rights in the forty-seven Council of Europe Member States. Since it has
such a broad area of concern its purpose is more to encourage reform and it takes "wider initiates on the basis
of reliable information regarding human rights violations" rather than acting on individual complaints.
EIP Slovenia – School for Peace[47] This Slovenian organization practices My Rights: Children’s Rights
Education Project for children in elementary and middle schools. The organization promotes this project with
the intent to endorse principles of the "UN Convention on the Rights of the Child". They produce materials
which allow for comprehensive learning methods in order to train their teachers and pass information to their
students. To encourage teachers to participate, each month of the academic calendar focuses on one children’s
right and corresponding activities and materials are used as guidelines.
Equitas- International Centre for Human Rights Education (Centre international d’education aux
droits humains)[48] Canada has instituted this non-formal program in which primary school aged children are
introduced to human rights education through after school programs and summer camps known as Play it Fair!
Its purpose is to educate the public on how important human rights are by starting the education at such a
young age. It is "intended to raise human rights awareness in children and educate them against discriminatory
attitudes and behaviours, thus equipping them with skills to confront them".
European Union Ombudsman[49] This organization exists to investigate grievances about the
maladministration that occurs within the institutions and bodies of the European Union.
Facing History and Ourselves[50] This US developed online module organization aims to provide
information investigating "how societies attempt to rebuild, repair, and bring a sense of justice and security to
their citizenry in the aftermath of conflict and genocide". As the topics about which this particular organization
are concerned with are more mature and sensitive than others, this program is designed for students in middle,
high school, and at the university level. The module has specifically designed its program based on four case
studies: Germany, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. This resource has proven helpful in order to
study how individuals, organizations, and governments have fostered "stability, security, reconciliation,
coexistence and/or justice", all of which are explained in further detail on the organization’s website,
www.facinghistory.org.
History Teachers Association of Macedonia The most upper level of secondary educated Macedonian
students are given the option of participating in a human rights based lecture called Retelling of History. This
class is one in which they study from a different textbook than traditional history classes specifically focusing
on the history of the country’s transitional period from 1990 to 2000. The alternative textbook not only focuses
on the political and military aspects of history, as most do, but also includes social and cultural topics and
themes of the historical time period. The course focuses on four main topics throughout the year including
interethnic relationships, the new political scene, the transition itself, and how everyday life has been altered.
Human Rights Action Center[51] This nonprofit organization is based in Washington, DC and headed by
human rights activist Jack Healy. This center is supportive of other growing organizations across the world.
Their focus is on the issues documented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
United Nations Human Rights Council This council includes forty-seven states and is charged with the
responsibility of promoting and protecting human rights on the international level. The council has a specific
Advisory committee which assesses each situation as well as an outlined Complaint Procedure which must be
followed in order for an individual or organization to bring a violation to the attention of the council.
Human Rights Watch[52] Functioning as another global organization, the Human Rights Watch protects
human rights by investigating claims, holding abusers accountable of their actions, and monitoring and
challenging governments to make sure that they are using their power to end abusive practices efficiently and
to the fullest.
Istituto Comprensivo "Socrate" This Italian-based organization takes part in the practice they have named
Preserving Human Rights: A Year-Long human Rights Education Course. This education course is a two
semester class available to students ages 11 to 18. The class aims to familiarize students with the framework of
human rights and educate them in regards to more contemporary issues. By educating the students with
regards to these matters it is intended by the organization that they will then be able to take the knowledge they
have gained and be able to develop a platform to initiate action and raise awareness of the issue at hand.
'John Humphrey Centre for Peace and Human Rights (http://www.jhcentre.org) The John Humphrey
Centre exists to promote the principles of the Universal Declaration of Peace and Human Rights through
human rights education and learning. The organization develops curriculum, conducts training, works with
children and youth, and fosters public discourse on matters of human rights.
National Association for the Advancement of Color People (NAACP)[53] "The mission of the NAACP is
to ensure the political, educational, social, and economic quality of rights of all persons and to eliminate racial
hatred and racial discrimination”.
Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children[32]
Namibian Legal Assistance Centre[32]
People in Need[54] People in Need developed a project called One World in Schools: Human Rights
Documentary Films in which they provide teachers with films, over 260 of which are available, and other
multimedia tools to assist in their education of human rights around the world. The purpose of the videos is to
teach the students, specifically primary and secondary school aged students in the Czech Republic, the values
of tolerance and respect by way of audio-visual stimulation.
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (OSCE)[55] The OSCE comprises fifty-six states from participating countries in
Europe, Central Asia, and North America. The main focuses of the OSCE include the freedom of movement
and religion. They specifically monitor torture prevention and human trafficking.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights[56] Unlike many other organizations
this office is not limited to a specific geographic area, but instead works to protection all human rights for all
peoples. This organization also states within its mission statement it aims to "help empower people to realize
their rights" versus many organizations which state that they wish to promote knowledge etc.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees[57] This organization has a specific target
audience of refugees which it hopes to protect from violations of their rights. They aim to ensure that any
person can seek a safe refuge in some place while remaining to have the option to return home, integrate at a
new locale or resettle in a third location.
Simon Wiesenthal Center[58] The Simon Wiesenthal Center is a human rights organization which focuses on
the international Jewish community. The Center addresses anti-Semitism including the hate and terrorism
associated with it. By teaming up with Israel and cooperating closely with the Jewish religious community, the
Center defends the safety of Jews worldwide and serves to educate others about Jewish history including but
limited to the Holocaust.
Tostan (http://www.tostan.org) Tostan is an international non-profit organization headquartered in Dakar,

Senegal, operating in six countries across West Africa. Tostan's mission is to empower African communities to
bring about sustainable development and positive social transformation based on respect for human rights. At
the core of Tostan’s work is its 30-month Community Empowerment Program (CEP) (http://tostan.org/commu
nity-empowerment-program), which provides participatory human rights education in local languages to adults
and adolescents who have not attended formal schools, primarily in remote regions.
United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) "UNESCO’s goal is to build
peace in the minds of men". The organization hopes to act as a catalyst for "regional, national, and
international action in human rights".
US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Confined to the United States,
the Department strives to take action against abuse of human rights. Although they are not particularly
involved with the investigations, they are the enforcers and have partnered with many other organizations
committed to protecting human rights.
Human rights education at schools

Several schools offer human rights education as part of their curriculum, for example linked subjects like
History, Politics and Citizenship, but there are also specialised courses, such as Human Rights offered as part
of the International Baccalaureate Diploma programme for high school students.
IB Human Rights is an academic subject containing units on:
The theory of human rights

The practise of human rights
Contemporary human rights issues
In order to pass the course students are required to study for two years, take a final examination and produce a
coursework.
As part of their diploma programme, students may also choose to write their Extended Essay on Human
Rights. This is a 4000 word research paper focusing on human rights.
The IB Human Rights course was originally authored by Joni Mäkivirta, the developer of Cognitive
Emotional Pedagogy. Part of the 2002 version of the IB Human Rights (https://web.archive.org/web/20110411
121849/http://www.hrea.org/erc/Library/pre-service/syllabus-ibo02.pdf) syllabus is at the Global Human
Rights Education (HREA) website. Only part of the syllabus is available at the HREA website for copyright
reasons.
The complete IB Human Rights syllabus that contains more details, including the assessment criteria, as well
as the guide for the Human Rights Extended Essay can be acquired from the International Baccalaureate
Organisation (http://www.ibo.org).
Some cities in the world have adopted a municipal law to stimulate successfully the HRE in the public schools,
as the example of the Municipal Plan of HRE of the city of São Paulo (Decreto Nº 57.503, DE 6 DE
Dezembro de 2016), in Brazil [1] (http://portaledh.educapx.com/).
Human rights education uses in the 21st century
As a strategy for development (Clarence Dias)
As empowerment (Garth Meintjes)
As a way of change for women’s rights (Dorota Gierycz)
As a legal prospective and for law enforcement (Edy Kaufman)[59]
Human rights education models

1. Values and awareness The Values and Awareness Model focuses on transmitting "basic knowledge of
human rights issues and to foster its integration into public values" based on its philosophical-historical
approach. This model is what people commonly think of when human rights are concerned with the target
audience being the general public with topics including global human rights and more cultural based matters.
2. Accountability The Accountability Model is associated with the legal and political approach to human
rights in which the learners which the model targets are already involved via professional roles. The model is
incorporated by means of training and networking, covering topics such as court cases, codes of ethics, and
how to deal with the media.
3. Transformational This model of education focuses on the psychological and sociological aspects of human
rights. The topics towards which this model is effective are those including vulnerable populations and people
with personal experiences effected by the topic, such as women and minorities. The model aims to empower
the individual, such as those victims of abuse and trauma. The model is geared towards recognizing the abuse
of human rights but is also committed to preventing these abuses.[60]
4. Munir’s socioecoethical model of human rights education is an integrative approach to the applicability of
HRE for teachers, educators and learners. It applies to formal, informal and non-formal educational settings in
developed, developing and third world countries. This model emerged by applying grounded theory from
learners and practitioners’ viewpoints, gathered from across 39 developing Asian countries. It is the result of
10 years of author’s local human rights practices, documentation and observation of HR practices across a
range of teaching and learning settings particularly in the developing and the third world countries. Existing
human rights education models proposed by Tibbitts (2017) is instrumental to promote human rights education
across the developed countries. In Dr. Munir’s viewpoint, human right education practices should be
categorized into formal, informal and non-formal education. Informal education is the source of learning
human rights for children and female belonging to the marginalized communities, who do not have access to
formal or non-formal education, whereas formal and non-formal education is the medium of learning human
rights for everyone who have access to education informal educational settings . HRE is of utmost importance
for all of them. Unless we accommodate HRE into informal education settings, parallel with formal and non-
formal education, it is likely that these young minds will get inclined towards violence and radicalization. In
the view of Sadruddin (2020), HRE is situated in context, thus requires educators to look at the sensitivities
and sociocultural and political contexts of the under-developed and developing nations. According to
Sadruddin (2020), human rights education should begin with assessing the sociocultural context and political
will. What are the ideological practices of a particular country? Is there any social acceptance towards all HR
values? Which HR values are sensitive to discuss? What are the cultural intakes on HR values? According to
Sadruddin, the ideological clashes between conservatives and the liberal thoughts have always drawn line
between acceptable and non-acceptable HR norms. Further, the educational constraints imposed by the
fundamentalists in many parts of the world have perhaps discouraged policymakers from disseminating HR
values. In addition, many developing and third world states strong oppose western human rights laws and
values and consider it as a political weapon to harm the cultural value system. Therefore it is pertinent to
highlight the sociocultural context, the acceptable values and the values that are in clash. The next stage is
understanding and assessing the dynamism of ecological environment, i.e., convergence and divergence of
human rights. It assesses the risks and opportunities of HRE at multiple levels, i.e., individual’s wellbeing,
community and at policy making level. The third stage is ethrical stage. Moral reasoning and ethical ownership
is at its disposition. Forth stage is assessing general knowledge and attitude towards HR. As an alternate,
ethnography may work. After passing the initial phases, decisions about HRE content should be made.
According to Sadruddin, human rights educators often extract/adapt the best practices/models of human rights
curricula and course work from other countries, despite knowing that it is not reflective to the need of that
particular country and could not sustain for long. They sometimes set lofty goals and create the momentum
within bureaucracy and not actually reorganizing the issues in context. The foremost important thing is to add
local content knowledge on HRE and filter the global HR knowledge that best fits the sociocultural context of
that particular country. Adaption may work but all the resources should be socio-culturally fit. It should begin
with local and shift towards the global. Next, self-empowerment skills such as critical thinking, rational based
decision making, situation analysis, social and voluntary skills, digital literacy, peace building, negotiation, etc.
Next comes values, that should be negotiated with the cultural context. Finally, teaching HRE alone does not
ensure that there will be peace and unity in the world. The actual litmus test occurs in the society through the
reflection of attitudes and action in a sustainable way that is often ignored.
Criticism
Sudbury model of democratic education schools maintain that values, human rights included, must be learned
through experience[61][62][63][64] as Aristotle said: "For the things we have to learn before we can do them,
we learn by doing them."[65] They adduce that for this purpose schools must encourage ethical behavior and
personal responsibility. In order to achieve these goals schools must respect human rights in school by
allowing students the three great freedoms—freedom of choice, freedom of action and freedom to bear the
results of action—that constitute personal responsibility.[66]
See also
Children's rights education
Democratic education
Humanitarian education
Peace education
Educational technology
Education for justice
References
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2. "Human Rights Education" (https://www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights-education/).
www.amnesty.org. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
3. "Join NESRI in supporting people's movements for human rights" (https://www.nesri.org/progra
ms/what-is-the-human-right-to-education). www.nesri.org. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
4. "OHCHR | Technical Cooperation Homepage" (https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/Tec
hnicalCooperationIndex.aspx). www.ohchr.org. Retrieved 22 June 2018.
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Rights Education (http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-a
genda/human-rights-education/Human), UNESCO
University of San Francisco Human Rights Education Program (http://www.usfca.edu/soe/progr
ams/ime/ma_hre/)
Human Rights Courses (https://www.humanrightscareers.com/courses/)
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Human_rights_education&oldid=1023105486"
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Human Rights Movement

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THE UNIVERSAL

Edited by Gordon Brown

© 2016 NYU Global Institute for Advanced Study.

Further details about CC BY licenses are available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/

ISBN Paperback: 978-1-78374-218-9

Printed in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia

2. The Evolving Understanding of Rights 39

3. Limitations and Derogations 57

4. Social and Economic Rights 63

5. Responsibility for Human Rights 71

7. Human Rights and a Global Ethic 105

CAT Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

ILO International Labour Organization

The P5 Permanent Members of the Security Council

RtoP Responsibility to Protect

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UPR Universal Periodic Review

When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted

(NYU) from 2002 to 2015, the Commission’s members met in a series of

2 The members of the Commission are set out in Appendix B.

Commission, Andrew Hilland, and our Staff Directors Melissa Friesen

This report by the Global Citizenship Commission is the first of the

develop a report that would be presented, at his request, to Ban Ki-moon,

I am grateful for the assistance and support of the following people

1 Online Appendix D, on Human Rights Education, is available at https://www.

We have benefitted immensely from the input and advice of UN

The Long and Influential Life of the

interconnectedness and dependence have diminished our moral distance.

The Evolving Understanding of Rights

and the rights of peoples prejudiced at the national or communal level

Implement Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.7, which

Strengthen the international refugee protection system.

 onsider adopting a new international convention on refugees

And to ensure the protection of the rights of children, we recommend

 he international community support the creation of a Children’s

 he International Criminal Court investigates and prosecutes

 he UN Security Council convenes a “Children’s Council” – an

 t the national level, all states create accessible complaint

Limitations and Derogations

measures, but also systematic preventative measures that address the

Social and Economic Rights

cannot be resolved entirely by actions in those states alone. There is

Responsibility for Human Rights

Implementation of Human Rights

State of play on representative rights

elaboration of human rights. Second, historic progress has been made

UN system of human rights implementation

The Commission supports a number of existing proposals for improving

 he UN should seek to ensure that the problems and priorities

 he UN should expand the Office of the UN High Commissioner

 he UN Secretary-General should exercise his or her power

 he permanent members of the UN Security Council should

 he UN should consider ways in which new forms of technology

National and regional legal systems

he international community must redouble its resolve to

 he international community should aim to bolster the role of

 t the global level, the UN should consider the creation of a

Non-governmental organizations play a frontline role in highlighting

Human rights education

Human rights education also has an indispensable role to play.

and more sophisticated than we have today, and which relies on

Human Rights and a Global Ethic

2 The members of the Commission are set out in Appendix B.

1 Online Appendix D, on Human Rights Education, is available at https://www.

Strengthen the international refugee protection system.

onsider adopting a new international convention on refugees

he international community support the creation of a Children’s

he International Criminal Court investigates and prosecutes

he UN Security Council convenes a “Children’s Council” – an

t the national level, all states create accessible complaint

he UN should seek to ensure that the problems and priorities

he UN should expand the Office of the UN High Commissioner

he UN Secretary-General should exercise his or her power

he permanent members of the UN Security Council should

he UN should consider ways in which new forms of technology

he international community must redouble its resolve to

he international community should aim to bolster the role of

t the global level, the UN should consider the creation of a

1 The use of gender-specific language and assumptions in the UDHR – such as the

the world as equal to men – irrespective of religions and cultures. Our

2 It is worth noting that Article 1(d) of the UN Supplementary Convention on

4 There are a number of causes of statelessness. Some countries do not recognize

8 A Special Rapporteur is an individual working on behalf of the UN within the

1 The most common formulation of proportionality is as a three-part test, which

2 Article 4 of the ICCPR states:

3 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Report of the Secretary General,

concept of dignity – while abstract – provides a yardstick against which

For some rights – such as the due process provisions in Articles 9 to

the division of their powers – the major safeguard against state-based