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Perhaps the best way I can illustrate this point is by asking the
question: Is Say's Law valid, and if not, just what is wrong with
it? This is a very old question, hotly debated already in the early
nineteenth century, if not earlier, and ever since then (until Keynes
came along) it was the hallmark of all true economists to have
understood the reasons why competitive markets necessarily bring
about a situation in which all scarce resources are fully utilized.
The reason, in essence, is a very simple one. The laws of supply
and demand state that in any competitive market, say, for the jth
commodity, there is a "market clearing" price, characterized by
dj= sj,
where dj and sj, respectively, are the maximum quantities that buy-
ers are willing to buy or sellers to sell, at those prices (not just sales
purchases).
dj
Pjd
Si di~~~~S
XS
FIGURE I
p = (1 + 7) W"1,
where
p = prices of industrial goods per unit, in terms of agricul-
tural prices
w" =wages per man, ditto
l=labor required per unit of output (inverse of produc-
tivity)
7r=profits as a share of output,
of trade") that really determines the level and the rate of growth of
industrial production, according to the formula,
1
0 1=
m
where
0= industrial output
DA= demand for industrial products coming from agricul-
ture
m = share of expenditure on agricultural products in total
industrial income.
This is really the doctrine of the foreign trade multiplier, as
against the Keynesian savings-investment multiplier. In both cases
multipliers arise on account of a "fixed-price" situation: the liquidity
preference rate of interest in the one case, and the fixed real wage
giving a cost-determined supply price for industrial products in the
other case. In some ways I think it may have been unfortunate that
the very success of Keynes's ideas in explaining unemployment in a
depression - essentially a short-period analysis - diverted atten-
tion from the "foreign trade multiplier," which over longer periods
is a far more important principle for explaining the growth and
rhythm of industrial development. For over longer periods Ricardo's
presumption that manufacturers and traders only save in order to
invest, so that the amount or the proportion of savings or both
would adapt to changes in the opportunities for, or profitability of,
investment, seems to me more relevant than the Keynesian assump-
tion for explaining the true constraints on the growth of production
and employment in the "capitalist" industrial sector.
II
3. Added to this is the second major point I want to make in
this lecture, albeit only briefly, and this concerns the existence of
increasing returns to scale or falling long-run costs in industry.
This was first emphasized by Adam Smith in the first three chapters
of the Wealth of Nations and subsequently emphasized by English
economists of the Ricardian school and by Marshall; while in the
United States (in a more isolated way) by a single great economist,
Allyn Young.
Marshall's falling long-run supply curve, unlike the ordinary
supply curve, is a schedule of minimum quantities, not maximum
quantities.
Di
pi
D Si
xi
FIGURE II
labor ratio: the larger the scale of operations, the more varied and
more specialized the machinery that can be profitably used to aid
labor. As Young said, "It would be wasteful to make a hammer just
to drive a single nail; it would be better to use whatever awkward
implement lies conveniently at hand." 10 The form that increasing
returns normally takes is that the productivity of labor rises with
the scale of production, while that of capital remains constant. The
best proof of this resides in the fact that, while the capital-labor
ratio increases dramatically in the course of progress (and varies
equally dramatically at any given time between rich and poor
countries), these differences arise without corresponding changes in
the capital-output ratio. (For example comparing the United States
with India, we see that the capital-labor ratio is of the order of 30:1,
while the capital-output ratio is around 1:1). Paul Samuelson em-
phasized as the central proposition of neoclassical value theory
(placed in italics in his well-known textbook) "Capital-labor up:
interest or profit rate down: wage rate up: capital-output up." 11
These propositions are only true in a world of homogeneous and
linear production functions, where an increase in capital relative to
labor increases output less than proportionately. In reality this is
not so: higher wage rates in terms of products are associated with
higher capital-labor ratios but are not associated with higher capital-
output ratios. (This is to my mind an even more important "pull on
the rug" than the discovery of the possibility of "double-switching"
of techniques.)
Third, for the same kind of reason for which increasing returns
lead to a monopoly in terms of microeconomics, industrial develop-
ment tends to get polarized in certain "growth points" or in "success
areas," which become areas of vast immigration from surrounding
centers or from more distant areas, unless this is prevented by politi-
cal obstacles. As the postwar experience of European countries (e.g.,
Germany, France, Switzerland) has shown, the emergence of a
labor shortage need not hold up the further fast development of a
successful industrial area, since such political obstacles tend to be
removed when it becomes profitable to import foreign labor.
But this process of polarization - what Myrdal called "circular
and cumulative causation" -is largely responsible for the growing
division of the world between rich and poor areas, which, in per
capita terms at any rate, still appears to be widening. It would be
10. Ibid., p. 530.
11. P. A. Samuelson, Economics -An Introductory Analysis, Seventh
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill 1967), p. 715.
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE