Criminal Law 1 Module on Dolo, Culpa and Case Digest

CRIMINAL LAW 1 – MODULE 3
Dolo & Culpa
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
RPC, Art. 3
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are
committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Elements
The elements of felonies in general are:
1. That there must be an act or omission.
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal Code.
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa.
Actus reus
Actus reus refers to the act or omission that comprise the physical elements of a crime as required by
statute.
Act - By act must be understood any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external
world, it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the possibility of its production is
sufficient. (See People vs. Gonzales, supra) But the act must be one which is defined by the Revised
Penal Code as constituting a felony; or, at least, an overt act of that felony, that is, an external act which
has direct connection with the felony intended to be committed. (See Art. 6)
Omission - By omission is meant inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound to
do. There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act.
Mens rea
Mens Rea refers to criminal intent. The literal translation from Latin is "guilty mind." The plural of mens
rea is mentes reae. A mens rea refers to the state of mind statutorily required in order to convict a
particular defendant of a particular crime
Presumption of Criminal Intent

Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the
person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (THE UNITED
STATES vs. CATALINO APOSTOL)
General and specific intent

General Intent – Most crimes require general intent, meaning that the prosecution must prove only that
the accused meant to do an act prohibited by law. Whether the defendant intended the act's result is
irrelevant.
Specific Intent - crimes typically require that the defendant intentionally commit an act and intend to
cause a particular result when committing that act. (U.S. v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995).) In that
regard, merely knowing that a result is likely isn't the same as specifically intending to bring it about.
(Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704 (2007).
Case Digests:
(Talocod v. People, G.R. No. 250671, [October 7, 2020])
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information6 dated October 23, 2012 filed before the RTC accusing
petitioner of committing acts of child abuse, defined and penalized under Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA
7610, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about November 5, 2011, in ██████████ and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully committed (sic) acts of child
abuse against one [AAA], 11 years old (DOB: September 9, 2000), by uttering the following words
"Huwag Mong Pansinin Yan. At Putang Ina Yan (while angrily pointing her finger at him)...Mga Walang
Kwenta Yan, Mana-Mana Lang Yan!", thereby subjecting said minor to psychological abuse, cruelty and
emotional maltreatment prejudicial to his natural development.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis in the original)
The prosecution alleged that, in the morning of November 5, 2011, AAA,8 an 11-year old with other
children along the road near his residence in ██████████. As his playmates were bothering passing
motorists by throwing sand and gravel on the road, AAA berated and told them to stop. Upset by AAA's
reprimand, one of the children, EEE, reported the incident to her mother, herein petitioner. Together with
EEE, petitioner immediately confronted AAA about his behavior, and while pointing a finger at the latter,
furiously shouted: "Huwag mong pansinin yan. At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana-mana
lang yan!" Upset by what petitioner said, AAA ran home and cried, later relaying the incident to his
mother, BBB. Allegedly, AAA was traumatized as a result of petitioner's utterance of harsh words and
expletives, since after the purported incident, he no longer went out to play with other children and started
to suffer from nightmares.
In defense, petitioner claimed that the words she actually uttered were: "anak wag mo na patulan yan
walang kwenta makipag-away," and that the same were addressed to EEE, not to AAA.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated October 6, 2017, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. The RTC also ordered
petitioner to pay AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of its decision until full payment. The trial court ruled that the
prosecution had successfully established all the elements of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, as it
was shown that petitioner's harsh words and expletives caused AAA, an 11-year old child, to suffer from
nightmares and compulsive fear.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that she should be acquitted on account of: (a) her lack
of specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA as a human being,
as the words she allegedly uttered were mere expressions of common usage; and (b) the absence of
evidence showing that AAA suffered psychological injury, since an expert witness was not presented in
court.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated July 30, 2019, the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner in toto. The CA ruled that
petitioner's utterance of harsh words and expletives at AAA, while simultaneously pointing a finger at
him, were indicative of an intent to debase, degrade, or demean the latter's intrinsic worth and dignity as a
child. In any case, the CA found petitioner's intent immaterial, observing that the crime of Child Abuse
under Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610 is considered malum prohibitum and thus, mere acts or
words which debase, degrade, or demean a minor were already constitutive of the offense. Moreover, it
found the presentation of an expert witness to prove the existence of psychological injury unnecessary,
holding that such element had been sufficiently established by the testimony of AAA himself.
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated November 28,
2019.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming petitioner's
conviction for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is
the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment, whether
they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. Guided by the foregoing considerations, and as
will be explained hereunder, the Court finds that the acquittal of petitioner for the crime charged is in
order.
It is well to point out that the enactment of RA 7610 "was meant to advance the state policy of affording
'special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation[,] discrimination[,]
and other conditions prejudicial to their development' and in such regard, 'provide sanctions for their
commission.' It also furthers the 'best interests of children' and as such, its provisions are guided by this
standard.
Verily, based on the foregoing narration, there appears no indication that petitioner deliberately intended
to shame or humiliate AAA's dignity in front of his playmates. On the contrary, it is rather apparent that
petitioner merely voiced the alleged utterances as offhand remarks out of parental concern for her child.
Hence, in view of the absence of a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the victim's intrinsic
worth and dignity in this case, the Court finds that petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for
committing acts of Child Abuse under Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30, 2019 and the Resolution dated
November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40871 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Lina Talocod is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
(Yap v. People, G.R. No. 234217, [November 14, 2018])

SUMMARY
Yap invoked self-defense in the charge of attempted murder for hitting his friend Ang on hisforehead.
The SC did not find unlawful aggression, hence self-defense was not present. However, since therewas no
proof of intent to kill, the SC found that Yap committed slight physical injuries.
DOCTRINE
Without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.When intent to
kill is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder butphysical
injuries only.
FACTS
Yap was charged with attempted murder. He invoked self-defense. Thus, the defense first presented its
evidence. According to the defense, Yap and the alleged victim, George Hao Ang, had been long-time
friends. Around 3:20 p.m. of November 5, 2012, Yap and Ang met at the KFC store along Vito Cruz St.
in Manila for the purpose of meeting some girls. Since it was drizzling, they decided to wait inside Ang's
car. While waiting, Yap informed Ang that they are going to meet the same set of girls they have
previously gone out with before. Ang complained because he did not like the girl with whom he was
paired. This led to an argument between the two. Ang then punched Yap's face causing the latter to
retaliate. They then engaged in a scuffle and in the process, Ang got hold of a rolling pin and used the
same to hit Yap on the forehead. Yap was eventually able to wrest possession of the rolling pin and was
able to hit Ang also in the forehead causing a wound from which blood oozed. Ang tried to recover
possession of the rolling pin from Yap, but the latter bit the former's hand. The rolling pin fell and,
thereafter, both Yap and Ang got out of the car and ran towards opposite directions. Meanwhile, the
prosecution alleged that on November 5, 2012, Ang and Yap met at the KFC store because the latter
wanted to introduce the former to a businessman. Between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m., Yap arrived carrying two
cups of coffee and a plastic bag. Ang invited Yap to go inside the KFC, but the latter insisted that they
wait inside Ang's car. Yap then offered Ang a cup of coffee, but the latter refused because he does not
drink coffee. Yap, nonetheless, insisted saying that the cup of coffee he bought was expensive. Ang
acceded and took a sip but Yap encouraged him to finish his coffee. Ang drank 3/4 of the coffee. Shortly
thereafter, he felt groggy and, subsequently, lost consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness, Ang felt
something hit his head. Thereupon, he saw Yap holding a bloodied rolling pin and hitting him with it. He
tried to parry the blows and kept asking Yap why he was hitting him but the latter did not reply and,
instead, hit him several times more. Feeling helpless, Ang opened the car door and successfully escaped
despite Yap's attempt to prevent him from doing so. He was eventually able to ask help from passers-by
who brought him to the hospital.
ISSUES - 1
Whether or not Yap was bound by his previous counsel's gross mistake in invoking self-defense as the
latter did not explain the nature and concept of such defense to him.
RULING - 1
YES. It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in
handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had
his lawyer proceeded differently. An exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel had been so
egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court. In this case, the general
rule applies and the above exception finds no application because Yap failed to prove that his previous
counsel's act of invoking self-defense, on Yap's behalf, is tantamount to gross negligence as to deprive
Yap of his right to due process.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that records would show that Yap was
ably represented by his former counsel during trial and was not denied due process, as shown by the
following:
First, Yap and his wife were able to take the witness stand 'where they themselves were personally able to
present their case to the court during direct examination; Second, during cross-examination, Yap was able
to knowingly and intelligently answer the questions propounded to him by the prosecutor and the trial
judge; and Third, when the prosecution presented its case, Yap, through his former counsel, was able to
examine the witnesses and the evidence presented.
Moreover, for the abovementioned exception to apply, the gross negligence of counsel should not be
accompanied by his client's own negligence or malice. In this regard, the Court likewise agrees with the
OSG's observation and accompanying argument that Yap was guilty of negligence for his failure to raise
the issue of his former counsel's alleged incompetence before the trial court and the CA, after engaging
the services of a new counsel. It appears that this defense is a mere afterthought because if Yap and his
present counsel really believed that the previous counsel was guilty of gross incompetence in handling
Yap's case, they would have brought this matter to the attention of either the RTC or the CA at the first
instance. But they did not. Hence, they must suffer the effect of their passivity and inaction.
ISSUES – 2
Whether or not Yap’s invocation of self -defense has merit
RULING - 2
NO. Both the RTC and the CA found that the evidence shows that there was no unlawful aggression
coming from Ang. The Court finds no error on the part of the RTC and the CA inholding that the records
are bereft of sufficient proof to support Yap's allegation that Ang punched and hit him on the face. In fact,
the CA held that Yap stated in his testimony that he has no evidence of his claimed injury and, indeed, his
medical certificate states that he did not exhibit any external signs of physical injuries at the time of his
examination. Neither was there competent evidence to prove Yap's claim that Ang's head injuries were
accidentally self-inflicted when Yap supposedly lost grip of the rolling pin when he and Ang were
fighting for its possession which allegedly caused Ang to hit himself on the head. The RTC also observed
that Yap never mentioned during the police investigation that he acted in self-defense.
ISSUES – 3
Whether or not RTC and CA committed error in finding Yap guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder
RULING - 3
YES. The following factors are considered to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the
means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. Yap's alleged
intent to kill Ang cannot be clearly inferred from the surrounding circumstances. As to the means used by
Yap, there is no evidence to show that he carried with him any deadly weapon during his meeting with
Ang. The rolling pin which he used as a weapon to hit Ang was already inside the latter's car when they
met. Also, if Yap really intended to kill Ang, he would have hit the latter several times. However, the
physician, who examined Ang and was presented as a witness by the prosecution, testified that the
injuries sustained by Ang were only caused by a single blow to the forehead." As to the nature, location
and number of wounds, contrary to the conclusion of the CA,there is no evidence to show that Ang's
wounds were serious and severe. He did not obtain any head fracture and his injuries proved to be
superficial as they only consisted ofa hematoma, contusion and laceration. In fact, the laceration is only
about an inch inlength. Moreover, Ang was fully treated within two hours and was immediately sent
home. The superficiality of the injuries sustained by the private complainant is a clear indication that his
life and limb were never in actual peril.
With respect to the conduct of Yap, and the surrounding circumstances before and during the time that
Ang was injured, there is no clear evidence of Yap's intent to kill the former. In fact, even at the time that
he testified in court, Ang was still at a loss why Yap wanted to harm him.
When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder
but physical injuries only. Article 266 of the RPC provides that "[t]he crime of slight physical injuries
shall be punished by arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during
the same period." Indeed, although the charge in the instant case is for attempted murder, a finding of
guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries is proper, considering that the latter offense is
necessarily included in the former, as the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and
form part of those constituting the offense of murder. As earlier discussed, evidence on record shows that
Ang was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical treatment immediately after the incident. Right
after receiving medical treatment, Ang was then released asan out-patient. There was no competent
evidence to establish that he was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than
nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.
ISSUES – 4
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present
RULING - 4
NO. There was no clear evidence to show that Ang was unconscious• at the time that Yap began to attack
him. On the contrary, there is no dispute that Ang was immediately brought to the hospital after he
sustained his injury and that the physician who examined him testified that he arrived at the Emergency
Room of the hospital fully conscious and he did not exhibit any physical manifestations of being
intoxicated or drugged.
Decision
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated March 8, 2017, in CA-G.R. CR No. 38903, which affirmed the August 7,
2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 13-297324, finding
herein petitioner guilty of the crime of attempted murder, is hereby MODIFIED and instead finds
petitioner GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and
penalized under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of fifteen (15)
days of arresto menor. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY the victim, George Hao Ang, moral damages in
the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
(Etino v. People, G.R. No. 206632, [February 14, 2018])

FACTS:
In an Information, petitioner Eden Etino (Etino) was charged of the crime of frustrated homicide.
According to the prosecution, while complainant Jessierel Leyble (Leyble) and his companions, Isidro
Maldecir, and Richard Magno, were walking on their way home, he was shot with a 12 gauge shotgun by
the petitioner, hitting the back portion of his right shoulder and other parts of his body. Leyble's testimony
was corroborated by Maldecir who categorically stated that Leyble was shot by petitioner from behind,
and was thereafter brought to the Don Benito Lopez Memorial Hospital for treatment. To prove the
injuries suffered by Leyble, the prosecution presented Nida Villarete Sonza (Sonza) in her capacity as the
officer-in-charge of the security of all the medical records of the patients in the hospital for the reason that
Dr. Rodney Jun Garcia, who treated Leyble, was unable to testify as he is now based in a different city.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It ruled
that petitioner was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged against him, especially so,
when the complainant, Leyble, was alive to tell what actually happened. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that his guilt for the charged crime of frustrated homicide was proven
beyond reasonable doubt, since the physician who examined the victim was not presented in court.
HELD
YES. The Court ruled in several cases that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by
his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal,
then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill
on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed
may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury. Thus, in order to determine whether the crime
committed is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries),
the crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and b) whether
there was intent to kill on the part of the accused. It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence
to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is
doubtful," and such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. In the present case, there is no proof
of the extent of injury sustained by the victim. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to present
evidence to prove that the victim would have died from his wound without timely medical assistance, as
his Medical Certificate alone, absent the testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or
any physician for that matter, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. This is especially
true, given that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital,
the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing. Without such
proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained enters the realm of doubt, which the
Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner. "The assailant's intent to kill is the main element that
distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide
if the intent to kill is proven." The intent to kill must be proven "in a clear and evident manner so as to
exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor." In the present case, the intent to
kill was not sufficiently established. When the intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are shown to have
been inflicted upon the victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated or attempted homicide but
physical injuries only. Since the victim's period of incapacity and healing of his injuries was more than 30
days — he was confined at the hospital from November 5 to 25, 2001, or for 20 days, and his period of
healing was "two (2) to four (4) weeks barring complications" — the crime committed is serious physical
injuries under Article 263, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Martel v. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, [February 2, 2021]; Read also Dissenting
Opinion of J. Javier)
FACTS:
 This is a case involving violation/s of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
 2 consolidated petitions were filed before the court.
1. GR Nos. 224720-23, petitioner Richard T. Martel, etc, filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari on the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan founding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
2. GR Nos. 224765-68, petitioner Benjamin P. Bautista Jr., also filed the same seeking the
reversal of the assailed decision and resolution of the same violation.
 The case revolves for having a direct purchase of 5 motor vehicles for the use of the Governor
and Vice Governor of Davao del Sur (the Province).
 Subsequently, a letter was filed by the Concerned Citizens for Good Governance (CCGG) before
the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao alleging that the manner of acquiring the said vehicles
is violative of the procurement laws.
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurer to Evidence asserting that the
prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish the conviction of the accused. The
Sandiganbayan denied the aforesaid Motion.
 The Sandiganbayan founded the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt violating Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 with a sentence of an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 6yrs and 1mo, as
minimum, to 8yrs, as maximum, for each of 4 cases. And all are perpetually disqualified from
holding public office.
 Petitioners filed for Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed their separate appeals before the SC.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
RULING:
 YES. Violation of the procurement law does not ipso facto lead to a violation of RA 3019.
 Absent a well-grounded and reasonable belief that the accused perpetrated the procurement
irregularities in the criminal manner that he is accused of, then there is not even a basis for
declaring the existence of probable cause, more so a finding of guilt for any violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019.
 It is only sought to be emphasized that while holding public officers accountable is a laudable
objective, the same must be achieved within the bounds of law.
 In this case, it failed to prove the elements for a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court reverses the conviction of petitioners.
 Wherefore, the SC resolves, dismissed the case insofar petitioner Gan is concerned, in view of
his death.
 Petitioners Martel, Guinares, Mier, and Bautista Jr. are hereby ACQUITTED for failure to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(Spouses Igdalino v. People, G.R. No. 233033, [July 23, 2018])
FACTS:
Spouses Igdalino together with their sons were charged for the crime of qualified theft defined and
punished under Article 310 of the RPC in relation to Article 308.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty. The case against their son Romeo Jr was dismissed considering his age was
below 15 at the time the alleged commission of the crime.
It was that on June 29, 2000 that the Igdalinos were picking nuts from the coconut trees from the land
registered to Francisco Jaboli. It was said that the Igdalinos allegedly gathered a total of 2,500 pieces of
coconuts.
RTC founded Rowel Igdalino ACQUITTED. However, founded GUILTY for Romeo Igdalino and Rosita
Igdalino.
The Spouses appealed to the CA, however the said appeal was rejected.
The CA held that the belief of the accused of their ownership over the property must be honest and in
good faith. It held that this requirement was lacking supposedly because at the time the coconuts were
taken, the subject lot had already been adjudicated in favor of Francisco in a separate civil action for
quieting of title and damages. Thus, the CA upheld the RTC's conviction of the Igdalinos but deleted the
award of moral damages for not having been substantiated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Igdalinos' guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.
RULING:
SC found merit on the appeal, reversed the decision of the CA and acquitted the Igdalinos for the crime of
qualified theft.
Defining the crime of theft, Article 308 of the RPC provides:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use
of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs
to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or
other forest or farm products.
Oft-cited, the elements of the crime of theft are: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done
with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the
person or force upon things.
On the other hand, theft becomes qualified if attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 310 of the RPC, thus:
ART. 310. Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
The SC finds that the Igdalinos' open and notorious harvesting of coconuts was made under their belief
that they, in fact, owned the land where the plantation is situated.
In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and thus, reasonable doubt
persists.
Wherefore, the appeal was GRANTED. The conviction of Spouses Igdalino are reversed and set aside.
(Casilac v. People, G.R. No. 238436, [February 17, 2020])
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with murder of Ryn Loui Navarez and attempted murder of Ramil
Navarez. On June 23, 2009 at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, Ramil, the victim, and his younger
brother, Ryn Loui were on their way home aboard a motorcycle. Upon reaching the curved portion of the
road, Ramil saw his cousin, Roel Casilac, standing on the right side of the road. Meanwhile, Agripino
Casilac, the father of Roel, was positioned on the left side of the road together with Tarciano Cirunay, Jr.
at the center. Each of them was carrying a firearm and began shooting at Ramil and Ryn Loui. Ramil was
hit on the left arm, and the motorcycle fell to the ground. Ryn Loui then stood up and ran, but the
continuous firing of the said armed men hit him on the different parts of his body causing him to fall on
the ground for the second time. On the other hand, Ramil was able to run and get help from the Barangay,
leaving the latter in the scene.
Roel, Agripino and Cirunay continued to chase and shoot him. Fortunately, he was not hit. He was
brought to the Deiparine Medical Clinic at Sibonga, Cebu, and subsequently, to the Vicente Sotto
Medical Center (VSMC) in Cebu City where he was confined for fourteen (14) days. As the police
officers responded to the shooting incident at Barangay Sayao, they saw the lifeless body of Ryn Loui
with gunshot wounds.
On the other hand, the petitioner claimed a different version. According to him, on June 23, 2009, while
he and his cousin Cirunay were gathering grass for their cows at the land belonging to his parents, he saw
Ryn Loui driving a motorcycle with his elder brother Ramil riding at the back, going uphill. At the time
they passed by, Ramil shot him causing him to drop to the ground, even if he was not hit. He was able to
run together with Cirunay and asked the latter to give him the gun Cirunay was carrying. Cirunay gave
him the gun and fled. Petitioner was left alone and continued to cut grass. Again, he saw Ryn Loui and
Ramil come back, still holding their firearms and in the act of aiming it at him. Using Cirunay's gun, and
as an act of self-defense, petitioner shot them and hit Ryn Loui, causing the latter to fall to the ground,
while Ramil ran away. Thereafter, the petitioner went home to Barangay Sayao where he was advised by
his father to surrender.
The RTC found him guilty of murder of Ryn Loui Navarez, citing treachery as a qualifying circumstance
and guilty of serious physical injuries of Ramil Navarez. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision
with modification, only finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder and less serious physical injuries
instead of serious physical injuries. In the appeal of Roel Casilac, he argues that the CA erred in finding
him guilty of murder despite the presence of the elements of self-defense and also in considering
treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes committed are less serious physical injuries or attempted murder.
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense is present to exonerate petitioner from the
crime of Murder.
RULING: The Court finds that the crime committed was attempted murder of Ramil Navarez and not less
serious physical injuries. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: (1) the offender
commences the commission of the felony directed by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony; (3) the offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance. In the present case, the prosecution has established the accused-appellant's
intent to kill Ryn Loui. This Court also finds such intent to be present with respect to Ramil. It is hard to
reconcile that there is an intent to kill Ryn Loui while there is none to Ramil considering that the attack
was committed directly and simultaneously against the two by shooting them both while aboard their
motorcycle. Therefore, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION to guilty of murder
and attempted murder.
The petition is denied. Considering that self-defense is an affirmative allegation, and totally exonerates
the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when it is invoked, the burden of evidence
shifts to the accused to prove it by credible, clear and convincing evidence. The essential elements of self-
defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. To successfully invoke self-defense, there must have been an unlawful
and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. The elements of self-
defense are not present in the instant case.
Intent and motive

Intent distinguished from motive. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite
result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. Motive is not an essential
element of a crime, and, hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. (People vs. Aposaga, No.
L-32477, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 574, 595)
An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the
sake of committing it. Or, the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily
mean that there is none, but that simply it is not known to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one's
conscience where it may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. (People vs. Taneo,
58 Phil. 255, 256)
One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive
is proven. A good motive does not prevent an act from being a crime. In mercy killing, the painless
killing of a patient who has no chance of recovery, the motive may be good, but it is nevertheless
punished by law.
CASE DIGEST
Manuel v. People, 476 SCRA 461 (2005)
Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, while Eduardo was
39. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even
brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still
single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single.”
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took
all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina made inquiries from the (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo
had been previously married. In his defense, Eduardo insisted that he married Tina believing that his
first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus, his former wife from the first
marriage, for more than 20 years.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate
him from liability for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his
first marriage no longer existed. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful
marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil
Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa and
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the
accused. The CA averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in
United States v. Enriquez were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. It held that before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Rubylus’ presumptive death as the absent
spouse.
Eduardo now filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.
Ruling:
YES.
RPC states that: Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the RPC means that the requirement
for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be
charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found
incredible.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
The burden of proof is upon the petitioner. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code and that could constitute proof that the petitioner acted
in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and,
as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349
of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
People v. Delos Santos, 403 SCRA153 (2003)

Facts:
On November 6, 1997, in the Municipality of San Jose, del Monte, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
appellant Danny Delos Santos Fernandez accused guilty with intent to kill Rod Flores Juanitas, with
evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, willfully and feloniously
attacks, and stab, hitting him on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death. That on
Novermber 1997, De Leon witnessed the gruesome killing of Flores, while drinking with three men
(Salvador, Tablate & Rainier) in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. He denied the
accusation and declared that at 8:00 p.m., he was in his auntie's house in Muson, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, that he was fetching water.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies of the witness are credible even after two-month period.
Ruling:
Yes. The court ruled that the two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural
for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is
of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of relation
can have a paralyzing effect to the witness. Thus, in People vs. Dacibar, we held that the initial reluctance
of the witness to volunteer information about a criminal case is of common knowledge and has been
judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility, especially when a valid reason exists for such
hesitance. Besides, settled is rule that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial. Decision is
affirmed with modification.
The Decision dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos y Fernandez guilty of the crime of
murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Rod Flores y Juanitas the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P25,0000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P266,400.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Guiyab v. People, 473 SCRA 533 (2005)
Facts:
On March 11, 1993, petitioner Joey Guiyab was charged with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court
of Cabagan. That on or about December 12, 1992 in the Municipality of Tumauini, Province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the honorable court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and without any just motive, assault, attack and
stab with a bladed pointed instrument one Rafael Bacani, inflicting upon him, a stab wound on the right
anterior back wall, which directly caused his death. On the other hand, petitioner raised the defense of
alibi which was corroborated by Domingo Gumaru, and petitioners’ parents Silvano and Vicenta Guiyab,
that at the time of the incident he was not at Tumauiani; he averred that he was farming until 5:00 PM at
Sitio Bayabo,
Camasi and slept around 9:00 PM.
Issues:
Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict him of the crime
charged.
Whether or not the identity of the accused as the assailant was fully established by the prosecution.
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that in the person of Joseph Madriaga who served and witnessed the whole incident
and testified in a categorical and straightforward manner on the events leading to the death of the victim
and positively identified the petitioner, is sufficient to convict the petitioner. Further, through careful and
thorough examination of the records, the judgment rendered the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of RPC.
Yes. The court not doubt Joseph's identification of Joey Guiyab. Even if he did not know the name of the
petitioner prior to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court. Besides, Joseph maintained that
although he did not know the name of the petitioner, he knew him by his fact. There is nothing in law or
jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive identification of a felon by a
prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally. The witness need not
have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face. And ruled that knowing the
identity of an accused is different from knowing his name.
People v. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)
FACTS:
About 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, while Julius Cagampang (victim), his wife and their
two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista,
Province of Agusan del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald (accused), arrived and asked to
buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a
sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head. His
wife Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name "Jul". Two
persons, one of whom she later Identified as the accused, barged into the interior of the store through the
main door and demanded that she brings out her husband's firearm. The accused fired two more shots at
the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the "maleta" (suitcase) where her husband's firearm
was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38
caliber revolver, and fled. Some months after the incident, Victorina Cagampang (wife of Juluis) was
summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and
Identified the accused as the man who killed her husband. The accused alleged that from 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay
Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered dog as
"pulutan," until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was possitively identified as the killer of Cagampang
RULING:
YES. The testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Cagampang did not diminish her credibility because she
had positively identified the accused as her husband's assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the
other witnesses. Appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive
Identification made by the witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime.
Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's
house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a
well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes. The testimony of the witnesses who had positively
identified him could not be overcome by the defendant's alibi.
People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)
Facts:
- Usman Hassan, an illiterate 15 y.o. pushcart cargador, was accused of murder for stabbing to death
Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, on July 23, 1981.
- Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness, Jose Samson, who was with
the victim during the stabbing incident that took place in the Fruit Paradis where both went to buy
mangoes.
- According to the witness, while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a man went behind Ramon and
stabbed him “only once” while he was seating on his motorcycle parked about 2-3 meters from where he
was.
- He added that after stabbing the assailant ran towards the PNB building.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Usman Hassan is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt thus should be set free
Ruling:
Yes. The court finds the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof
— beyond reasonable doubt — required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to
convict an accused person.
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, was weak and unconvincing. Moreover, the
investigation conducted by Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section of the
Zamboanga City was sloppy. The expert testimony of the medico-legal from the NBI and that of Jose
Samson’s did not coincide as the former identified two stab wounds while according to the latter, the
victim was stabbed “only once”. Prosecution witness, Police corporal Carpio presented the accused alone
to the eyewitness, Jose witness at the La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. Prosecution witness
Police Corporal Carpio adopted the method of “confrontation” instead of being placed in a police line-up
in order for the eyewitness to identify the accused. This subverted Jose Samson’s credibility as
eyewitness as the procedure done for identification went against the accepted principle of scientific crime
detection and is deemed unacceptable. This violates the right of the accused to counsel in all stages of the
investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of
the accused.
Decision is REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Mistake of Fact
While ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith (ignorantia legis non excusat),
ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat).
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to another. He is
not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with criminal intent. An honest mistake of fact
destroys the presumption of criminal intent which arises upon the commission of a felonious act. (People
vs. Coching, et al., C.A., 52 O.G. 293, citing People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257)
Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful.
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
CASE DIGEST
US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488 (1910)
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, and the deceased, Pascual Gualberto, were employed at
“Officer’s quarters, No.27,” Fort Mc Kinley Rizal Province as a cook and a house boy
respectively. Both lived in a small room towards the rear of the building. No one slept in the
house except the two helps. The room had a porch covered by heavy growth of vines and the
door had no permanent lock or bolt. To substitute its missing lock, the occupants attached a small
hook on the inside of the door and reinforcing this insecure means of fastening the door by
placing a chair against it.
At about 10 o’clock of August 14, 1908, Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by the noise
of someone trying to forcibly open the door of the room. The defendant, Ah Chong, called out
twice to identify the person who was trying to enter the room. There was no answer and was
convinced by the noise of the door that it was being pushed open by someone forcing himself to
enter the room. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped out of his bed and warned
that if he entered the room, he will kill him. In the darkness and confusion of the defendant, he
hit himself just above the knees by the chair of which had been placed against the door. The
defendant grabbed his kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow and struck out wildly at the
intruder, stabbed him in the stomach where it afterwards turned out was his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto. Ah Chong then sought help from his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28,
and went back to his room to aid his wounded roommate.
There had been several robberies at the said area and as the defendant alleges, it was
because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for protection. The
defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate but under the impression
that he was a robber for Pascual forcibly opened the door, despite Chong’s warnings. The
defendant was immediately placed under arrest and Pascual, on the following day, died from the
effects of the wound.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried and found guilty by the
trial court of simple homicide and sentenced to six years and one day presido mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant be entitled to complete exemption from criminal liability
Whether or not malice or criminal intent is an essential element of the crimes of homicide
and assassination
RULING:
YES. Under Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that the following are not delinquent
and are therefore exempt from criminal liability; 4. He who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances (1) Illegal aggression (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it (3) Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. That under such circumstances there is
no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of facts was not due
to negligence or bad faith.
YES. The general provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code clearly indicates that malice,
or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense; (1) Crime and
misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law (2) Acts and omissions
punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear (3) A
person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The meaning of the word “voluntary” says that a voluntary act is free, intelligent, and
intentional act and roundly asserts that without intention there can be no crime.
The defendant, Ah Chong, stabbed his roommate in the information that the intruder who
forced open the door of his room was convincingly a thief, from whose assault he was in
imminent peril, both his life and of his property; he acted in good faith, without malice or
criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of
self-defense; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believed threatened his person and his property and the property
under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court against the
defendant, Ah Chong, is reversed, acquitted of the crime he was charged with and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.
(People v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, [July 11, 2018])

FACTS:
At Barangay Milan, Lemery Iloilo, at around 6:30 p.m. of November 25, 1991, Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) officers Banes, Castigor and two companions
approached Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) Commander Hernando Villegas and
members, Jose Villegas, Benito Basug Jr, outside of Hernando’s residence and asked him for
money. Hernando gave CAFGU officers P20.00. Castigor took the money, complained why it
was only P20.00, and said “You just watch out”.
At around eight o’clock on the same evening, Hernando, Jose Villegas and Basug Jr.,
went to the wake of CVO member Saturnino Inventor’s wife, as seen by Delia and Isaac, Jose
Villegas’s wife and younger brother respectively, passing by Villegas’ house. On their way to the
wake, while navigating through a rice field, Delia, Roda and Isaac, heard burst of gunfire from
where Hernando, Jose and Benito were walking. Delia, from her window, heard someone shout
“This is Hernando, a CVO!” and someone replied “Birahi na!” (“Shoot now!”). Hernando, as
seen by Delia, attempted to turn back but was also gunned down. She also witnessed the group
firing from close range the three CVO members.
Later that same night, the accused told Barangay Captain Balinas, they made a mistake in
shooting Hernando, Jose and Benito thinking they were members of the New People’s Army
(NPA). Brgy. Capt. Balinas asked if the victims were able to shoot back, but the accused
answered in the negative. After inflicting numerous gunshot wounds, Hernando Villegas, Jose
Villegas and Benito Basug Jr., were proclaimed dead immediately after the shooting.
The accused were said to have been given oral instructions by Senior Inspector Benigno
Baldevinos to conduct tactical patrol and combat operations against NPA members. In that
briefing, they were told to use the password “Simoy”, to which the response would be “Amoy”.
When the accused noticed three people approaching, prompted the accused, Flocerencio
Arbolinio, to use the password “Simoy” but there was no reply which resulted in a said exchange
of gunfire.
The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses straightforward, credible, and in accord with the physical evidence. With regard to the
defense of fulfillment of duty, the trial court ruled that the attendant circumstances leading to the
killing of the three victims by the accused clearly showed absence of two essential requisites for
such defense to prosper. It declared that while it may be initially said that the accused in
obedience to the order of their superior to conduct foot patrol and take up ambush they
undoubtedly exceeded in the performance of their duties by immediately firing successive shots
on the three unsuspecting victims. The RTC observed that the accused approached their victim
and mercilessly sprayed them with bullets to completely silence them.
The accused, ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, CELSO SOLOMON,

DANILO CASTIGADOR and EDUARDO BANES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER under Article 248 of the RPC, and were sentenced the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Each of the accused were also ordered to pay heirs of the victims temperate damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused but modified the amount of
damages awarded. As to grounds of unnecessary use of force, the unprovoked violent treatment
of the offender, and the resort to dangerous means, when such apprehension could be done
otherwise.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of mistake of fact
RULING:
MISTAKE OF FACT FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE. The court ruled that
mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or
omission which is the subject of the prosecution. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a)
that the mistake be honest and reasonable (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negates the
culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
There was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they were
traversing an open area illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition,
the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and laughing in a loud manner and to
borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the victim as, in fact, both
parties had met hours prior the shooting.
Hernando identified himself, however, instead of verifying the identities of the victims,
the accused continued to fire at them. At that point, they could no longer claim that they did not
recognize the victims; and still not contented, approached the victim and mercilessly sprayed
them with more bullets. Contrary to their testimonies during the trial to the effect that the victims
were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused
whether or not the victims were the first to fire their weapons, they answered him in a negative.
The accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word “Amoy”
which must be uttered in response to “Simoy” in order to determine whether in fact they were
membersß of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe words as accused
Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his co-accused were present during their
briefing. All these facts negate the accused-appellants’ claim of mistake of fact.
Article 248 of the RPC. Murder. Any person, not falling within the provisions of the
Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the attendant circumstance: (1) with treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
The accused-appellants are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with added monetary amount to be paid to
the heirs of the victims.
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil 257 (1943)
FACTS:
Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly
called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45
caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at
the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene.
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson
RULING:
YES. Appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person
in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed.
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not
be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-
not present
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120744, 25 June 2012.

FACTS:
These are petitions for review on certiorari... assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted
murder
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva
(Villanueva). Accused were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan
Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were
barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio
Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime
Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in
three Informations after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. The accused except Pabalan
who died earlier and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed entered individual pleas of not guilty.
A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered
a negative plea.
The prosecution established Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the
residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m. The
company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m. shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they
were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch
out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his
companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with
headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire
and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander
of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners
Cunanan and Puno.
He narrated that he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a
summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a
reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station
in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he
had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms.
Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno
took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would
make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target
vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop.
He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly
inspired him, and his fellow police officers to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing
forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly
came bursting from the direction of Naron's house directly at the subject jeepney.
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in bad
shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed
supposedly by rebel elements and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported
sightings of unidentified armed men therein.
He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from
his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, in as much
as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were
assembled, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-
principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva
(instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those
cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of
Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.
Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the
eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining
peace and order; that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there
was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan's
report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude
ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did; that there was insufficient
or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or
criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned
and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay
Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.
ISSUES:
Whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of
peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence,
could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or
whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.
RULING:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never
justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition occupies
no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement.
The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life. The invocation of the concept of mistake
of fact faces certain failure in the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a
fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution.
Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime.
It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.
The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant and it does not look at all to the belief or state of
mind of any other person.
A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a
matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the
mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber carbine.
While the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless
inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to
imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the
subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too
difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be
exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do
not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in
the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the
likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being hit and injured
or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise.
This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the
jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances
like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or
to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests
that petitioners' actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the
passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences
arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing
was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
Gaviola vs. People, G.R. No. 163927, 27 January 2006.
Facts:
With the land dispute issue between the parties, the court clearly identified thedemarcation of the
properties involve therein. Having known of the said court decision,the accused still gathered 1500 of
coconuts from the land of Cleto Eusebio and wasconvicted of qualified theft. On appeal, he invoked his
honest belief that he owned theland which negates intent to steal, an essential element of the felony of
theft.
Issues:
Whether or not the act of taking the coconuts from another’s plantationconstitutes qualified theft.
Ruling:
Yes. In all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property underclaim of title in himself, he is
exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerileor mistakenthe claim may in fact be.And the same is
true where the taking is onbehalf of another, believed to be the true owner.Still, if the claim is dishonest,
amere pretense, it will not protect the taker. Gaviola cannot feign ignorance oreven unfamiliarity with the
location, identity and the metes and bounds of theproperties involved as it is categorically stated clearly
that the three parcels ofland are distinct and separate from each other. Hence, Gaviola’s claim of
goodfaith in taking the coconuts is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability andwas guilty not only of
simple theft but of qualified theft but under Article 310 of theRevised Penal Code, theft is qualified if
coconuts are taken from the premises ofa plantation.
Culpa or constructive intent – Arts. 3 & 365
RPC, Art. 3
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos). Felonies are
committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
RPC, Art. 365
Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if
it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person
shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended
by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).
Elements
Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and imprudence in felonies committed by means of culpa.
In felonies committed by means of culpa, since the doing of or failing to do an act must also be voluntary,
there must be freedom and intelligence on the part of the offender, but the requisite of criminal intent,
which is required in felonies by dolo, is replaced by the requisite of imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill. Such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence is, in law, equivalent
to criminal intent. (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 507) But in felonies committed by means of culpa, the mind
of the accused is not criminal. However, his act is wrongful, because the injury or damage caused to the
injured party results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the accused.
Therefore, in order that the act or omission in felonies committed by means of fault or culpa may be
considered voluntary, the following requisites must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do the act;
(3) He is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENT or LACKS FORESIGHT or SKILL while doing the act or
omitting to do the act. In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
Distinguished from dolo
If a felony is committed by means of deceit it is dolo or otherwise known as intentional felonies such as
robbery. If it is committed by means of fault, then it is culpa or otherwise known as culpable felonies such
as reckless imprudence resulting in damage to properties.
Case Digests
Ivler vs. Hon. Modesto-San Pedro (G.R. No. 172716, Nov. 17, 2010)
JASON IVLER Y AGUILAR v. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO- SAN PEDRO, GR No. 172716, 2010-
11-17
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's... vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second... punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.[4] Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest.[5] Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion... remained
unresolved.
Issues:
whether petitioner's... constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366
Ruling:
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine... the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes... and prosecution... s.[
Principles:
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,... its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to
Determine... the Penalty
People v. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (1968)
FACTS:
1. Jose Buan was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company in 1962, along the MacArthur
Highway in Guiguinto, Bulacan. The bus driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of
Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers.  Six of the
latter suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days; three other riders came
out with serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was
damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
2. A charge was filed against Buan, one for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on December 16, 1963. 
Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the
information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision. 3. When the
accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash the charges on the
ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The
prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion to quash. Unable to secure
reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense,
and is barred by the previous acquittal - YES
2. Whether or not the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence - NO
RULING:
1. YES. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. The essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under article
365 RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. o The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. o And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions. o This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme
Court, and is also that of this Court. See notes. 2.
2 . NO. The charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. In People vs. Diaz: ". . . The
prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the
accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to
press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court." DISPOSITION: Order appealed from is reversed, and the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge.
CRIMES DEFINED AND PENALIZED BY SPECIAL LAWS
Crimes mala in se and mala prohibita

Mala in se and mala prohibita, distinguished. There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se,
or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or
wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms. Crimes mala in se are
those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members;
while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited or reasons of public policy, as in illegal
possession of firearms. (People vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies denned and penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
When the acts are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other
hand, there are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which were originally defined and penalized by special
laws. Among them are possession and use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and libel. The term mala
prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws.
Case:
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659..
Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
Ruling:
No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress’
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended
a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part.
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080
No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or
element necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form
a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong,
they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder that predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the
larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so
deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of people it governs over.
Note:
A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons
of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction.
The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such exalted statute in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against
the second whenever directed against such activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value of all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed
to justify along attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the persons making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute draw with narrow specificity. The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terorrem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 484 SCRA 617 (2006)
FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino Pimintel,
Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and unlawfully
decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes.
Pimintel filed a complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due to
lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646,
Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg.
881.
Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no motive on her
part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law,
which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se.b(2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate
in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit
the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
(2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the
board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting
statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents
whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is
AFFIRMED.
(Sama y Hinupas v. People, G.R. No. 224469, [January 5, 2021])

Napoles vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 213529, 13 July 2016.
FACTS:
Janet Lim Napoles is the owner of JLN group of companies, filed before the court of appeals a
petition for review on Certiorari with the application for a temporary restraining order/ writ of
Preliminary injunction. Dated march 26, 2014 and resolution dated July 8, 2014, which no found
grave abuse of discretion in the filing of an information for serious illegal detention anomalous
transactions involving the priority development assistance fund which Janet Lim Napoles and her
brother Reynald Lim allegedly mastermind of the pork barrel scam.

ISSUE:

Napoles moved for reconsideration as to the issue whether there was grave abuse of discretion in
its issuance.

RULING:

DECISION UPHELD

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for Certiorari as there was no grave
abuse of discretion. Napoles has been found guilty of serious illegal detention with proof beyond
reasonable doubt, a quantum of evidence higher than the probable cause. Issuance of warrant of
arrest against the accused for the crime of serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code there being probable cause to believe that the crime of Serious Illegal
Detention has been committed by the accused
Relation of RPC to special laws
RPC, Art. 10
Article 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Cases:
Padilla v. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (1988)
Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that
Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least
the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take
out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the
Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of
foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty
of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal
(minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to
the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he
and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and
kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business
associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for
acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of
the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Held:Yes.
Ratio: Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to
Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is
nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the
said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
Facts:
Petitioner, Robin Padilla was found in possession of a high-powered firearms with live
ammunitions, namely:
“(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.”
The petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions pursuant to P.D.
1866 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City. Thereafter, the lower court ordered
petitioner’s arrest but was granted bail. During arraignment, petitioner plead not guilty and
waived in writing his right to be present in any and all staged of the case. On April 25, 1994, the
court (RTC) rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to
an “indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum,
to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum. Petitioner filed for an appeal.
Petitioner voluntarily surrendered item no. 3 and a black bag containing two (2) additional long
magazines and one (1) short magazine.
Issue/s:
WON his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunition surrendered be
admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
NO. The arrest made, although warrantless, was still legal. Hence, the recovered firearms are
admissible to the courts. Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.”
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's
conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty MODIFIED to "ten
(10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day, as maximum.

Criminal Law 1 Module on Dolo, Culpa and Case Digest

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CRIMINAL LAW 1 – MODULE 3

Dolo & Culpa

Presumption of Criminal Intent

General and specific intent

(Talocod v. People, G.R. No. 250671, [October 7, 2020])

(Yap v. People, G.R. No. 234217, [November 14, 2018])

(Etino v. People, G.R. No. 206632, [February 14, 2018])

(Spouses Igdalino v. People, G.R. No. 233033, [July 23, 2018])

(Casilac v. People, G.R. No. 238436, [February 17, 2020])

Intent and motive

Manuel v. People, 476 SCRA 461 (2005)

People v. Delos Santos, 403 SCRA153 (2003)

Guiyab v. People, 473 SCRA 533 (2005)

People v. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)

People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)

Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488 (1910)

(People v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, [July 11, 2018])

The accused, ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, CELSO SOLOMON,

People v. Oanis, 74 Phil 257 (1943)

Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120744, 25 June 2012.

Gaviola vs. People, G.R. No. 163927, 27 January 2006.

Culpa or constructive intent – Arts. 3 & 365

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

Distinguished from dolo

CRIMES DEFINED AND PENALIZED BY SPECIAL LAWS

Crimes mala in se and mala prohibita

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 369 SCRA 394 (2001)

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 484 SCRA 617 (2006)

(Sama y Hinupas v. People, G.R. No. 224469, [January 5, 2021])

Napoles vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 213529, 13 July 2016.

Relation of RPC to special laws

Padilla v. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (1988)

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