The South China Sea

Geopolitics: Controversy and Confrontation

David A. Mattingly

American Military University

© David A. Mattingly 2013

 David A. Mattingly

‗‗When we were [the] sick man of Asia, we were called ‗The Peril‘.
When we are billed to be the next superpower, we are called ‗The Threat‘.
When we had a billion people, you said we were destroying the planet.
When we tried limiting our numbers, you said it was human rights abuse.
Why do you hate us so much?‘‘
Chinese poem ―Silent Protest Spring 2008 (Gries 2009).

Introduction

The South China Sea is one of the global flashpoints, which many analysts assess as an

area of possible confrontation between the United States and the emerging regional power of the

People's Republic of China (PRC) (Cronin 2013 1). The South China Sea occupies 648,000

square miles from the Malacca Straits to the Straits of Taiwan and is bordered by China,

Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Due to the confined

nature of the sea there are overlapping territorial claims on the multitude of islands, rocks, reefs

and shoals which the majority are located in the Spratly and Parcel Chains (Burgess 2003 7).

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS) attempted to define territorial and

economic claims but stopped short of providing a clear acceptable answer to the sovereignty of

the thousands of rocks, reefs, and islands in the South China Sea.

Although China and the majority of the claimants including Vietnam, and the Philippines

make historical claims to the various islands, they were virtually uninhabited until 1974 when

China and then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) confronted each other in a naval

skirmish in the Parcel Islands. China‘s response in most likely linked to the end of U.S.

involvement in Vietnam (1973) and the decline of troops in Asia. Additional confrontation and

diplomatic maneuvering has continued to present day.

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China has over the years confronted its land bound neighbors to dispute boundaries and

territories which it believed where sovereign territory of China—Soviet Union, Vietnam and

India. Additionally China has maintained the position of ―one China‖ and maintains its claim to

sovereignty over the Taiwan Island chain (former Republic of China) which lacks international

recognition (State 2013 & C.I.A. 2013).

With the exclusion of Taiwan, China has proffered to negotiate the territorial claims with

each nation individually. (Taiwan and China have entered into economic agreements that

demonstrate a level of cooperation.) However, the claimant nations have organized as the

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and have attempted to negotiate

multilaterally as a regional body. ASEAN and participation by the U.S. in the negotiations is

considered a threat and China and has refused multilateral negotiations or accept as binding the

decisions made by the body.

The economic growth of China and many of the other neighboring South East Asian

nations has resulted in increasing demands for hydrocarbons or oil. A range of estimates

indicates the possibility of large oil and natural gas fields below the surface of the South China

Sea that could alleviate the demand for Middle Eastern oil. Additionally the sea has provided

seafood to feed not only Asia but to export too many other parts of the world. If China

successfully receives sovereignty over all its claims, it would equal an area approximately that of

the Mediterranean Sea and the ―heart of Southeast Asia with far reaching consequences for the

strategic environment (Emmers 2005 1).

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The UNCOLS establishes the ancient right of free navigation in international waters by

naval and merchant shipping. However, the interpretation by China has caused concern among

maritime shipping nations as well as nations that depend on imports that transverse the South

China Sea.

Tensions between the United States and China as the emerging regional power has

increased along with its acquisition of new naval ships and weapons systems is seen by many

Western powers as a threat to Taiwan, the South China Sea claimants and free navigation of the

sea. All of which would increase tension in East Asia.

To understand the tension between China and the West and specifically the U.S. the

reader must understand the differences in Western and Oriental thought. China profess a desire

for a peaceful and harmonious settlement—Confucianism—while retaining its territorial claims

—Maoist thought—whilst the U.S. sees the claims as bullying by the larger and stronger nations

against the smaller weaker claimants.

The economic wheel of the world has pivoted to Asia as a financier, manufacturer and

importer and exporter of raw materials. The South China Sea is the highway for the economic

blood of the region and globally (Brzezinski 1997 153). Who controls the South China Sea

controls the Pacific and who controls the Pacific can control the world.

President Obama declared the U.S. Pivot to the Pacific as operations in the Middle East

concluded (Rogin 2013). Secretary of State Clinton speaking for the administration said, the

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South China Sea is a national interest to the U.S. however she stipulated the territorial disputes

should be peacefully negotiated (Landler 2010).

Is it in the U.S. national interest to negotiate a peaceful settlement and accept China as a

power for the 21st Century or attempt to use its hegemony as the remaining super power to

contain China at the risk of an armed confrontation or disruption of the economic flow of

shipping?

―Whoever commands the sea commands the trade; whoever commands the trade of the
world commands the riches of the world and consequently the world itself.‖
Sir Walter Raleigh (Rubel 2012 21).

Literature and Common Terms

There is a plethora of literature and news reporting on China‘s claims and its attempt to

become a naval power. The majority of the literature paints Chinas as a bullying power over its

smaller neighbors. Likewise, in the West the majority of the literature and reporting shows the

claimants as struggling small nations that look to the U.S for protection when politically

expedient while maintaining their economic relations with China when it is in their financial

interest. There is a small but growing amount of literature, which defends China or attempts to

differentiate Chinese from Western thought.

Terms—the lack of consistent terminology and naming convention contributes to the

problems in the South China Sea. The terms used are from the UNCLOS. In this paper, the

geographical name used will reflect what is most common in Western writing though there may

be other names associated with the area based on the claimant nation. Unless otherwise noted

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China refers to the current, legitimate government of the People‘s Republic of China and Taiwan

the former Republic of China.

Territorial Sea-every state has the right to establish territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines (UNCLOS 23).
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil…The exclusive economic
zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines (UNCLOS 43-44).
Continental Shelf- a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baselines (UNCLOS 49).

Rocks-which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf (UNCLOS 66).
Islands-is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide (UNCLOS 66).
Archipelago-a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and
other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other
natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such (UNCLOS 40).

Low tide-A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by
and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide(UNCLOS 29).
Baselines-the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-
water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized
(UNCLOS 27).

Innocent passage-Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good

order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with
this Convention and with other rules of international law (UNCLOS 31).

China and Geopolitical Thought

―Geostrategy represents a countries effort in the world arena to use geographic

orientation and principles to pursue and safeguard its natural interest‖
Senior Captain Xu Qi, People‘s Liberation Army Navy (Xu 2000 1).
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China for most Americans has been a closed society with the Great Wall as a symbol of

China‘s national foreign policy; its international relations and military (Holmes & Yoshihara

2006 33). Holmes and Yoshihara state that Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross ―declared China

uses a ―Great Wall strategy‖ of ―protecting territory by surrounding it‖ and they go on to argue

China is applying the same theory to sea power and protecting its extensive coast line (Holmes &

Yoshihara 2006 33). However, Mao disassociated himself with the ―Great Wall‖ strategy

writing, ―Only a complete fool or a madman would cherish passive defence as a talisman‖

(Holmes & Yoshihara 2006 38)

Observers of China‘s new attention to the sea argue U.S. naval strategist Admiral Alfred

Mahan has influenced the growing Chinese Navy (PLAN) and the it‘s maritime strategy.

However, the ―Great Wall strategy‖ is defensive in nature and Mahan‘s theories are based on

―offensive naval strategy‖ stating, ―The eminence of sea power thus lay in its ability to control

the sea lanes along with critical geographical nodes that facilitated or impeded the flow of

commercial and naval shipping‖ (Holmes & Yoshihara 2006 36). Holmes and Yoshihara argue

China links national power to a strong naval power using Mahan‘s Three Pillars ―overseas

commerce, naval stations, and naval and merchant fleets‖ (Holmes & Yoshihara 2006 33-36).

Whilst including Mao‘s thought and theories of land warfare that Chinese military leaders are

modifying to naval warfare.

China has since the mid-1970s has indicated its policy to protect its claim to the South

China Sea both diplomatically and physically challenging other nation‘s ships, which enter what

China has declared, is its sovereign territory. Maritime power is the ability of a nation to use the

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sea to its advantage, to exploit the seas bounty and to use it to protect the nation (Yoshihara &

Holmes 2006 24). Maritime history professor Geoffrey Till has defined sea power with ―four

key and interdependent attributes; sea as a medium for trade, as a resource, for informational and

cultural exchange, and lastly as a medium for domination‖ (Raine, Sarah and Christian LeMiere

2013 12)

China created a defensive line, sometimes called the ―String of Pearls‖ islands that would

act as an ―active defense‖ to protect the inner sea and coastline. The string reaches from Hainan

Island in the Pacific through the South China Sea, the Malacca Straits and into the Indian Ocean

(Pehrson 2006 3). Each ―pearl‖ represents ―Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence‖

(Pehrson 2006 3).

Liu Huaqing, commander of the People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (1982-1988)

was responsible for modernizing the Chinese Navy and adapting its strategy using both Mahan

and Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov theories (Li 2009 123). Li, in Evolution of Strategy: From

“Near-Coast” to “Far-Coast” states, ‖Liu appreciates Mahan‘s argument that oceans are

central to growing the wealth and power of a nation‖ and that he used islands—String of

Pearls—as a defensive positions similar to Ghorshkov‘s idea of a layered defense (Li 2009 123).

Today naval strategist describes Chinese naval strategy as moving from ―near-coast defense, to

near-seas active defense, to far- sea operations (Li 2009 133). James Holmes of the U.S. Naval

War College and a writer on Chinese maritime issues argues Mahan‘s ―three pillars of sea

power; are relevant to the economic future of China (Holmes 2009 223). Sayers writes that

when Mahan‘s ―three pillars‖…. are found [to be favorable] in the same place, it becomes of

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great consequence strategically and may be of the very first importance,‖ (Sayers 2013 49).

Senior Captain Xu Qi, also a student of Mahan states, ―A nation‘s geostrategy, including its

national power, fundamental geographical factor, can more or less determine its level of

development and strength‖ (Xu 2000 49).

Advancing sea power theory Sir Julian Corbett argued the ocean is ―uncommanded most

of the time…the error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses command of the

sea that command passes at once to the other belligerent (Rubel 2012 23). The basis of Western

political thought is a zero-sum game where for a winner there must be a loser.

MacKinder argued the ―comparative analysis of land and maritime power, concluding

human history was principally a struggle between land and sea power‖ (Xu 2006 53). In

addition, in his 1904 ―The Geographical Pivot of History‖ he wrote that if China expanded its

borders, ―might constitute the yellow peril to the world‘s freedom just because they would add

an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent… China with its large landmass and

nearly 9,000-mile coastline is both a land and a sea power (Kaplan 2010).

China and the South China Sea a Historical Perspective and Thought

―The Chinese charm you when they want to charm you, and squeeze you when
they want to squeeze you, and do it quite systematically,‖ A Singapore official.
(Kaplan 2010)

China is a civilization that is traceable for over 2,000 years; the history provides writings, which

illustrate the idea of ―Chinese exceptionalism‖ based on their ―long history, pursuit of peace, and

inherently defensive rather than offensive approach to international relations‖ (Craig 2007 6). In

analysis published by The East West Center by Denny Roy states ―Chinese historical baggage‖
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shapes China‘s current security policy; ―China is the rightful leader of the region, China‘s

exceptionalism has created a society different from others, and China has been a victim and not

an aggressor‖ (Roy 2013 2).

Thought: Confucianism and Mao

Chinese scholars in 1919 believed Confucianism caused the ―impeding Chinese

modernization and continued during the People‘s Revolution and the birth of the People‘s

Republic of China (Ho & Schneider 2009 1).

Asia has a long history of territorial conquest by various dynasties and eventually by

European colonialist and the United States. International strategist considers the ―Century of

Humiliation‖ (bainian guochi—1839-1949) as the basis for China‘s decision-making since 1949

(Kaufman 2010 1). Gries opines the period could explain the Chinese ―experience of

victimization‖ by the West as creating sensitivity to their international standing (Gries 2009

228). Lieutenant General Li Jijun, speaking at the U.S. Army War College, attempted to explain

Chinese internal thought by stating, ―China is the only uninterrupted civilization in world

history‖ (Craig 2007 7). There are three schools of thought among Chinese leaders of which all

consider that today‘s international stage has not changed since the 19th Century, secondly China

plays a dominant role in international affairs, and lastly China is in a position to ―remake:‖ the

international system. (Kaufman 2010 1).

In rebuilding China, Mao during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) rejected Confucius

who was nearly worshiped for over 2,000 years as ―feudal ideology‖ (Adler 2011). Confucius‘s

thought is based on ―social and political harmony, through ―humanity/humaneness (ren), ritual

propriety (li), and filial respect (xiao) (Adler 2011). It is argued that due to the long period of
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influence by Confucian school of thought; ―notions of benevolence and justice as well as the

‗doctrine of the mean‘ philosophy‖ that China has ―pursued peaceful coexistence with its

neighbors‖ (Xu 2006 53).

After Mao‘s death there began a resurgence of Confucian though not only among the

Chinese people but also the government. Adler argues, ―…PRC government's support of

Confucianism is politically –even geo-politically– motivated. First, they are reclaiming

traditional Chinese culture as one of the world's great civilizations. In fact, there is a wide-

ranging strategy of claiming that Chinese civilization was the world's first great civilization.

Second, they are claiming Confucius, the world-renowned philosopher whose ideas permeated

traditional Chinese culture, as their own‖ (Adler 2007). Former president of China Hu Jintao

included ―a harmonious society‖ as his political slogan (Adler 2007).

Critics of the resurgence of Confucianism in the Chinese government argue the failure of

the Marxist economy and the emergence of capitalism has left the Chinese Communist Party as

morally bankrupt and is using Confucianism to avert an ―ideological legitimacy crisis…‖

according to Daniel Bell, a professor of ethics and political philosophy at Shanghai's Jiaotong

University (Ting-I 2011).

The travel distances on the Asian continent as well as natural barriers, sea and mountain

produced a disjointed landmass that did not develop, as did Europe with defined nation-states

with boundaries accepted by the international community.

Mao Zedong as the leader of the Communist Party of China created the psychic of

Chinese thought after the Peoples Revolution through his writings and actions in establishing the

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new nation as a metaphor for the Party. The CPC ―analyzes the contradictions inherent in the

capitalist system that it is incapable of resolving internally and shows that socialist society will

inevitably replace capitalist society and ultimately develop into communist society‖ (CPC 2007).

Mao‘s theoretical principles begin by answering the, ―basic questions as the nature, motive force

and object of the new-democratic revolution and the road to socialism‖ (CPC 2007).

Mao defined armed conflict within the framework of ―people‘s war‖ and ―active defense‖

as the basis of his ―military doctrine (junshi zhidao sixiang/zhunze)‖ (Huang 2001 131). Since

his death the doctrine has been revised to meet changes in the ―security environment and national

priorities‖ however, it remains as ―timeless principles of warfare that are the product of

accumulated PLA warfighting experience…ideals of justice, the use of military for only

defensive purposes, and unity between the army and the people. (Huang 2001 131-135). Gries

argued, ―The root cause of U.S.-PRC tensions is American ignorance of China. They claim

while Chinese understand America, Americans do not understand China‖ (Gries 2009 223). This

can be explained by the number of Chinese students studying for both undergraduate and

advanced degrees in the U.S. and then return to China (Haizheng 2010 269).

Chinese Claims

China derives its claims to a large part of the South China Sea based on exploration

during the reign of Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty in 1405 by Admiral Zheng He

(Pehrson 2006 1). France sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese legation in Paris claiming the

Parcel Islands as well as the Spratly‘s for Vietnam as the first challenge to China‘s claim in

1931 (Katchen 1976 1178). In addition to the historical claim, the People‘s Republic of China‘s
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claim is based on a map of the region with a 9 or 11 dashed ―U‖ shaped line marking its claim.

The Republic of China Land Water Maps Inspection Committee produced the original map after

World War II (Franckx and Benatar 2012 89-90). After the Nationalist left the China mainland

for Taiwan, the PRC continued using the ―U‖ shaped line on its maps including a copy of the

map submitted to the United Nations to counter the Malaysian-Vietnamese joint submission and

the Vietnamese individual submission in May 2009.

In the article ―Dot and Lines in the South China Sea‖, the authors discuss at length the

issue of cartographic evidence in sovereignty claims and states ―like statistics they can lie‖

(Franckx and Benatar 2012 89-90). For example, one degree of latitude at the equator equates to

approximately 70 statute miles, a small error on a small-scaled map could equate to a large error

of hundreds of miles, ―a map has probative value proportionate to its technical qualities‖

(Franckx and Benatar 2012 109). Minister of the executive Yuan Chang King Yu called the area

within the U-shaped line as historic waters of the Republic of China which the People's Republic

of China has all rights and privileges (Franckx and Benatar 2012 95).

The map of the territory supporting China‘s claim as state originated with the Republic of

China, which occupies the island of Taiwan and several smaller islands. Since the recognition of

the People‘s Republic of China as the ―one China‖ by the United States in 1979, the U.S. no

longer has a common security treaty with Taiwan (State 2013). However, U.S. ties and support

to the government of Taiwan continues as a source of tensions. The U.S. has continued to act as

the de facto protector of Taiwan by continuing to sell it military equipment and sending Navy

units to the area in reaction to China‘s threats. U.S. policy opposes the use of force by China or

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the claimants in settling the disputes. However, China perceives the Obama administration‘s

Pacific Pivot equates to the possibility of U.S. involvement in the event of a crisis with either

Taiwan or the South China Sea claimants (Goldstein 2013 55). ―Ultimately the smaller and

medium sized powers of Southeast Asia have a great deal to lose from breakdown in U.S.-China

relations what would force them to choose between a U.S. centric model and a China-centric

model for the region‖ (Raine & Le Miere 2013 20).

The island chains of the South China Sea, the multitude of rocks, reefs and shoals

presents an additional issue with the ―concept of the archipelagoes‖ and the innocent passage of

ships between islands. The UNCLOS allows in time of emergency, a nation can temporarily

suspend the right of innocent passage for self-defense or protection. This could affect both naval

and maritime shipping if China exercised the right in the Spratly or Parcel Islands essentially

closing the South China Sea to outside shipping (Katchen 1976 1169).

China‘s defense from 1949 focused on the great landmass and establishing territorial

boundaries of its sometimes-hostile neighbors India, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. At the

Enlarged Meeting of the Party Central Military Commission in 1985, new threats were evaluated

and how modern warfare would evolve which would be marked as a ―strategic transformation‖

in China‘s military doctrine (Huang 137-138).

―As long as we can initiate new ideas based on traditional principles and crystallize them
to meet the requirements of modern warfare, we will be able to gain victory in future
people‘s war‖ PLA officer (Huang 137-138).
American writers often refer to the South China Sea as being a ―core interest‖ of China.

Reportedly, ―high ranking‖ Chinese official‘s allegedly made the claim in a meeting with U.S.
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Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and National Security Council Senior Director Jeffery

Bader. Additionally, in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in an interview that Chinese

delegates ―reaffirmed the claim‖ (Yoshihara & Holmes 2011 45) However, ―no official Chinese

writing can be found to corroborate this. The designation of an issue as a ―core interest‖ by

China would imply the will to safeguard its interest with military means‖ (Gupta 2011).

The Ryukyu Islands—the largest Okinawa—are located in the East China Sea from the

southern Japanese island of Kyushu to Taiwan, which is outside the geographic area of this

paper, were repatriated to Japan in 1972. It is worth noting however both the PRC and Taiwan

claims the Senkaku Island group located in the southwest portion of the chain (Sayers 2013 45).

The PLAN has deployed ships to the region since 2004 and this confrontation has often

approached the level of armed conflict and adds an additional facet to the growth of the PLAN

shipbuilding program and its ―far sea‖ operations to the Indian Ocean and Middle East (Sayers

2013 45).

A Chinese Naval White Paper published in 2010 states the mission is to ―defend the

security of China‘s lands, inland waters, territorial waters and airspace…safeguard its maritime

rights and interests‖ (Sayers 2013 54). However, outsiders see China‘s rise as a naval power as

analogues to Germany‘s rise in maritime power (Rehman 2012 2) and argue ―the buildup would

alert the U.S. ―making China‘s naval development a self-destructive play with fire‖ (Holmes &

Yoshihara 2006 37).

Chinese strategy emerged as four points in the 1990s; sovereignty is irrefutable, it is

willing to work towards a peaceful resolution based on international law, establishing an

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infrastructure on the islands, and dismissal of efforts for multilateral negotiations (Beukel 2010

13).

China has moved from a true communistic economy to one embracing the ideas of

capitalism. Chinese leaders today rely on improving the standard of living of the growing

middle class through economic development and export to legitimize their rule (Holmes 2009

222). China‘s economic life is therefore depends on its ability to import raw material and export

finished products via the South China Sea as well as the possibility of minerals, oil and fish that

could answer China‘s demand for resources and food.

Richard Nisbett, an American psychologist studied the differences in Asian and Western

decision-making and found differences in ―thought processes were ―strikingly‖ different and also

in the way information is processed and view the world (Craig 2007 5).

China‘s strategic thought is based on two components: ―the attainment of strategic

advantage, the ability to mislead an opponent‘s perception and thinking processes‖ (Thomas

2011 1-2). Senior Captain Xu Qi wrote, ―…use of geopolitical relations and the rules governing

such relations in the international realm and takes state-to-state geopolitical relations as the

object of research, such geopolitical elements as the geographic position, the comprehensive

national strength and the distance in space…‖ (Thomas 2011 3).

As previously discussed Confucianism is a growing force in China and has

emerged in the writings of intellectuals discussing the future of China which they define as

―peace, opening-up, cooperation, harmony and win-win‖ as the future basis for Chinese

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international policy (Callahan 2012 623). Liu Mingfu wrote in The China Dream ―China‘s

military is not to attack America but to make sure China is not attacked by America‖ (Callahan

2012 634) and Thomas Schelling in Arms and Influence states, ―The enemy does not need a war

wining force but only a war threatening force‖ (Goldstein 2013 86).

International Law

China and the major claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines, are signatories of the UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS establishes the territorial limits of

estate as outlined above however, due to the confined nature of the South China Sea has resulted

in overlapping claims and the threat of restrictions on free navigation and some nations have

misapplied the treaty to justify their claims (Emmers 2005 3).

Bautista argues once a state agrees to an international law the state must comply

with the ―obligations arising for the undertaking in good faith‖…There is always a fragile

balance between obeying international law and maintaining sovereign autonomy. (Bautista 2011

46-47). The member nations of ASEAN and China in November 2002 negotiated and signed the

Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The intent of the agreement

was to promote cooperation and prevent cooperation in the South China Sea (Tønnesson 2003

55). Tønnesson argues the disputes in the South China Sea is ―clearly multi-lateral‖ however

China as early as the signing ceremony stated it wanted to settle the dispute through bilateral

negotiations (Tønnesson 2003 56). The declaration is non-binding and sets out peaceful bilateral

negotiations to settle disputes (Cooley 2012 81).

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The South China Sea territorial claims emerged as a flashpoint in 2009 and 2010 and

were a point of discussion at the 17th ASEAN Conference in Hanoi and the Shangri-La dialogue

in Singapore. In accordance with the UNCLOS Vietnam and the Philippines submitted territorial

claims to the United Nations Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf. China protested the

territorial claims submission by submitting the ―nine dash map‖ to support their claim (Thayer

2011 556).

China has maintained its position that it will negotiate a peaceful settlement bilaterally

with each nation but refuses to negotiate with ASEAN or involve any other international group

or tribunal (Thayer 2011 559-560).

―China remains committed to the declaration of on conduct the parties in the South China
sea. We take the position that territorial disputes over maritime rights and interest should
be peacefully addressed in result by the countries concerned through bilateral channels.
We disapproved of referring bilateral disputes to multilateral forums will only
complicates the issue... I totally agree that the countries concerned can and should have
joint development of resources in the South China Sea because this is in the interest of
regional peace and the area and also serves the interest of all claimant countries,‖
Premier Wen Jiabo April 2011.(Thayer 2011 560).

Philippine President Aquino in 2011 requested ASEAN members to unite as a common

front as the best way to counter China‘s claims (Thayer 2011 563). At a press conference, he

said, ―We govern ourselves there (The Spratly Islands). Instead of one country has a bilateral

agreement with China and the other has a different bilateral agreement with China. Let's come

together as a body. Why do we have to fight or increase all these tensions when it profits

nobody? (Thayer 2011 563).

The Claimants

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The historic claims made by the Philippines and Vietnam are traced to previous

governments and were passed by treaty. In the case of the Philippines, they are based on the

boundaries passed from Spain to the United States and in the case of Vietnam from the France

(Bautista 2011 35, Tønnesson 2003 60). The legal argument resides in conformity of national

law with international law—the Law of the Sea—(Bautista 2011 46).

The claimants; primarily the Philippines and Vietnam believe that the ―China threat‖ is

becoming a reality (Gupta 2013 66). The smaller nations in Southeast Asia view China‘s

increased power—economically and militarily—as a challenge to the status quo and eventually a

challenge U.S. hegemony. Western observers see the area as a zero-sum game where for China

to grow the U.S. must recede whilst the countries often look both to the U.S. and China to

provide for their security—militarily and economically.

United States

―I am fully confident that our accession to this Convention would advance U.S.
national security interests in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR). Specifically, the
Convention sets forth and locks-in a rules-based order that protects military activities
which are vital to our operations in defense of the nation, as well as our allies and
partners,‖ Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III, U.S.N. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
(Locklear 2012 2)

The United States is at a disadvantage when arguing the legitimacy of the UNCLOS

because of its failure to ratify the agreement. President Ronald Reagan originally objected to the

agreement believing it would jeopardize U.S. interests specifically in the area seabed mining.

After the agreement was renegotiated in 1994, the U.S. signed the agreement but to date the U.S.

Senate has failed to ratify it (Wright 2012). Critics argue the U.S. enjoys the benefits of the

agreement without possibly being hamstrung by the treaty, Wright argues, ―Since the world
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seems to have functioned perfectly well in this halfway house for some time, it would make no

sense to codify the convention now‖ (Wright 2012).

―We do have to get tough on China... This country manipulates its currency to our
disadvantage, they engage in broad-based intellectual property theft, industrial
espionage... What do we get in return from them? Well, we get tainted pet food, we get
lead-laced toys, we get polluted pharmaceuticals.‘‘- Hillary Clinton, May 4, 2008.
(Gries 2009 220)

The U.S. defense strategy released in 2012 is to maintain ―America‘s global leadership

and military superiority despite budgetary constraints‖ (Chase & Purser 2012 9).

―The core content of US global strategy since the 20th century has been to establish and
consolidate its world leadership status, or in other words, to contend for and maintain its
world hegemony status. Liu Jianfei, Professor, CPC Central Party School‖ (Craig 2007
27).
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated at the ASEAN in 2010 that freedom of navigation is a

national interest (Scott 2012 1036) and settling the disputes in the South China Sea was ―a

leading diplomatic priority‖ (Cronin 2013 2) and most observers agree the single most important

element, which could lead the U.S. and China into a direct confrontation. The U.S. and most

other signatories to the UNCLOS accept the 12-mile limit of territorial seas however China

recognizes ―unrestricted freedom of navigation extends…outside the country‘s exclusive

economic zone (200 nautical miles) (Goldstein 2013 56).

The U.S. could be drawn into a conflict with China because of the presence of the

Philippines, a former territory, which maintains a Cold War era defense security agreement with

the U.S. (Dobbins et al 2011 4). However, since the Philippines ordered the U.S. to leave its

bases in the Philippines in 1992 relations have been questionable which could play into the U.S.
19
 David A. Mattingly

decision to come to the rescue. Since 2001, the U.S. has supported Philippine military

operations against Muslim insurgents on the island of Mindanao that has resulted in renewed

cooperation including U.S. Navy ship visits to former U.S. bases.

When considering confrontation between China and the U.S. escalation of the incident

from an incident at sea to a nuclear confrontation could come to play. The reliance of

maintaining the status quo fails to take into account the ambiguity and lack of certainty in the

―red lines‖ which could lead to armed or nuclear confrontation (Goldstein 2013 59). For

example, the U.S. sees the status quo regarding Taiwan as it remaining independent whilst China

sees unification as the status quo.

In the Pentagon‘s 2005 Annual Report to Congress stated, ―The outside world has little

knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making‖ (Craig 2007 1). It is difficult when

trying to understand why a person does things and it is even more difficult to understand an

organization like a ―nation‖ whose basic character; language, religion, and history is at the

extreme (Craig 2007 1). Craig argued, ―In order to understand others‘ behavior, and in order to

behave in a manner such that we can influence others, we must try to understand the world as

they do‖ (Craig 2007 1).

In Chinese strategy circles analyst have the opinion ―…that the U.S. is shifting its focus

toward Asia-Pacific not only because the region is an engine of economic growth, but also

because Washington is worried that China‘s emergence as a great power will threaten U.S.

interest and threaten U.S. supremacy‖ (Chase & Purser 2012 9). PLAN Rear Admiral Yang Yi

said the strategy ―clearly targets China…‖ (Chase & Purser 2012 10). Former Secretary of
20
 David A. Mattingly

Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2005 stated ―the belief that China did not face any threats from

other nations‖ (Craig 2007 3). Additionally, Beijing University professor Zhu Feng argued,

China should follow a ―balanced response…by coupling strength and gentleness, and using

softness to conquer strength‖ (Chase & Purser 2012 11).

International Interest

―As the last age of globalization showed us, globalization is not inevitable, and it is not
reversible, but it is breakable…When it breaks, the consequences are catastrophic,‖
Norman Angell (Carmel 2013 55).
The claimants to the disputes in the South China Sea have attempted to negotiate a

peaceful settlement through international, regional, and bilateral talks with the People‘s Republic

of China (PRC). However, the PRC wants to deal with each claimant individually and not allow

the United States to bring the issue to the international level (Scott 2012 1021). Tønnesson raises

the ―question whether China and Vietnam could approach a bilateral understanding that might

pave the way for regional solution‖ (Tønnesson 2003 65)

The U.N. has not involved the Security Council even though it has the power to do so

under the U.N. Charter Chapter 7, Article 51 as ―threats to the peace, breaches of peace or acts of

aggression‖ and the International Court of Justice which has ruled on other sovereignty issues is

not involved (Scott 2012 1021).

International economies discussed within the realm of globalization that requires the free

movement of raw materials and finished goods across the world‘s seas. Stephen Carmel, Vice

President of Maersk Line Limited argued, ―Economies have become so interdependent due to

advances in transportation and communication technology that actions in one country produce

21
 David A. Mattingly

nearly instantaneous effects in many others‖ (Carmel 2013 41). He goes further to argue, The

―world‘s economies are interdependent does not adequately, or even remotely, express the true

nature of today‘s global economic activity‖ (Carmel 2013 54).

Former Secretary-General of ASEAN Surin Pitsuwan stated in late 2012 that the South

China Sea could become as destabilizing to the Pacific as Palestine is to the Middle East (Storey

2013 1). Storey argued that five drivers to instability in the region have moved the issue from

bad to worse; popular nationalism, continued strengthening of jurisdictional claims, competition

to exploit fisheries and hydrocarbons, ongoing militarization, and growing competition between

the U.S. and China. John Mearsheimer, described as an ―offensive realist‖ argues, ―…there is no

way to know the intentions that drive other states, the only thing a rational state can do is to build

up its military capabilities and prepare for the worst‖(Gries 2009 231).

Conclusion

―In the pursuit of peace, all nations—not just the United States—will need both wisdom
and deft statecraft to manage this complicated and interwoven challenges‖ (Cronin 2013
10).
China is restrained by several factors; China benefits from the current international

system, China understands nations often act in a balancing maneuver against real or perceived

threats, China is domestically frail and faces internal challenges from its emerging educated

middle class and elites (Roy 2013 4).

The U.S. should take on the role of supporter and interlocker to bring China and the

claimant countries to support a secure environment for economic growth, exploitation of the

natural resources, and free navigation of the sea. ―U.S. policymakers should look for

22
 David A. Mattingly

opportunities to help sculpt an agenda that tips the balance of behavior in the region away from

conflict toward cooperation, especially on energy issues‖ (Rogers 2013 7).

Geographically, the South China Sea links the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean via the

Malacca Straits, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea the international community cannot

afford it becoming a ―seaborne Palestine‖ (Storey 2013 1). China and all of the parties in the

South China Sea dispute have accepted the principle of joint cooperation-development yet have

failed broadly to translate that into practice. China‘s former president Hu Jinatao at the U.N

General Assembly in 2005 introduced ―Harmonious world of lasting peace and common

prosperity‖ (Callahan 2012 617). However, Clark Reynolds argued, ―International agreements

depend on the willingness of the participants to live up to them and especially upon the

acquiescence of the great powers which are capable of commanding the sea‖ (Rubel 2012 24).

Admiral Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence and Commander, Pacific

Command, stated the best option for the U.S. would be to support efforts by ASEAN too multi-

laterally negotiate the sovereignty issues since economic development will be retarded until

investors are certain of the security of their investment. Additionally, the U.S. should not turn

the disputes into a U.S.-China confrontation and the U.S. should ratify the UNCLOS to ensure

legitimacy of the U.S in maritime negotiations (Mattingly 2013).

It is arguable that the U.S.‘s role in the dispute should be that of the world‘s last super

power. However, the possibility of a conflict in the South China Sea would best be avoided by

supporting American allies whilst not appearing to be creating an anti-China bloc. To

accomplish this U.S. should attempt to bring China into the security process (Dobbins). The
23
 David A. Mattingly

U.S. should ―maintain its policies prioritizing the Asia-Pacific, supporting ASEAN centered

diplomatic efforts…which could produce a durable peace to the South China Sea (Storey 2013

5). The stakes are too high to do otherwise.

24
 David A. Mattingly

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