Managing Risk of Tailings Storage Facilities through

Surveillance, Monitoring and FMEA-Type Analysis

Jasna Zúñiga1, Gonzalo Suazo1 and Gabriel Villavicencio2
1. Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María, Chile
2. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile

ABSTRACT
A relevant aspect for the implementation of an integrated safety and risk management system in the
operation of tailings storage facilities (TSF) is the monitoring and surveillance of critical physical
stability variables. In Chile, several large TSFs have robust, real-time, high-frequency monitoring
systems. Variables such as piezometric levels, deformations, seismic accelerations, particle velocities,
temperature, among others, are commonly monitored.
Undoubtedly, the state of the practice in TSF monitoring has been revolutionized due to global
development of new structural health monitoring technologies and advanced equipment, such as
remote sensing imagery technologies and low cost IoT sensors.
A question that still remains unanswered, however, is how such monitored variables relates to
original design assumptions, potential TSF failure modes and their causes and effects. The latter is
usually described in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) studies, which - if properly
developed - not only identify failure mechanisms but also physical reasons behind collapse. If
surveillance and monitoring can rationally be interpreted as part of a whole and integrated Life of
Mine Tailings Management Strategy, then risk management – i.e., assurance that the organization is
achieving its greater objectives – should be effective.
This paper, then, reviews current TSF monitoring and surveillance practices in Chile. We include
discussions on TSF risk management in the light of new local and international standards. In
addition, we present recommendations for interpreting monitoring results and defining sensors
triggers and alerts in the context of FMEA or TARPs.

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INTRODUCTION

Among the main tools for evaluating Tailings Storage Facilities (TSF) stability during operational
stages – and for identifying anomalies – are monitoring systems. The ICMM guide on good practices
for tailings management indicates that surveillance, which includes inspection and monitoring, may
identify trends and behaviors that are indicative of the tailings facility’s actual performance (ICMM,
2019). Although these systems have greatly advanced in recent decades through sensor automation
and remote detection systems, the direct variable measurements taken require adequate
interpretation and evaluation regarding TSF behavior for a satisfactory monitoring process. The latter
within the life of mine and closure.
This study analyzes such practices in large mining deposits in Chile from information obtained on
instrumental systems implemented in the field in terms of technology, data processing, and
integration into tailings management systems.
Based on current practices and potential failure mechanisms at each deposit, the study concludes
with recommendations for adequate integration of measurements to better ensure that
instrumentation is an effective tool in the detection of anomalies and early action.

CHILEAN TAILINGS STORAGE FACILITIES

The process for the extraction of copper concentrate – for which Chile is one of the main producers
worldwide – involves the production of tailings. According to the latest registry of the National
Geology and Mining Service (SERNAGEOMIN), there exist 757 TSFs distributed throughout the
country; of these, only 15% are active (i.e., continuous deposits), with 85% inactive or abandoned.
While the legal framework in Chile that regulates TSF operation life cycle (design, construction,
operation, and closure) has established the minimum standard by which companies must govern the
design and operation of deposits, it has also evolved over the years. This is not only due to new
industry challenges regarding best practices and procedures applicable to deposits, but also to the
occurrence of catastrophic failures in the last decade. Such disasters have given the industry impetus
to develop the concepts of risk management and continuous improvement in the operation of TSF to
guarantee safe closure towards post-operation stages.
Similarly, the Methodological Guide for the Evaluation of Physical Stability of Remaining Mining
Facilities (SERNAGEOMIN, 2018) provides tools and technical criteria to evaluate the stability of
mining facilities towards closure. Evaluations consider potentials for environmental impact and
failure occurrence, taking TSF relevant monitored variables (e.g., storage capacity, height) and the
expected impact in the environment.
While such risk classification, mitigation, and control tools propose action to manage risk, the new
industry vision requires we question how risk assessment and management are incorporated into
operational stages; and what tools are used to evaluate performance and safety during operation.
Monitoring and surveillance systems are among the most commonly used tools in TSF performance

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assessment, and so their proper integration into management systems will provide decision makers
with critical information on stability regarding implementation of preventive and risk-mitigating
controls.

Monitoring Tailings Storage Facilities in Chile

The study assessed the state of monitoring systems practices in Chile – both for technological and
integration levels in tailings management systems – by, first, obtaining information on
instrumentation and surveillance systems for monitoring variables associated with physical stability.
Data pertained to 15 large mining TSF in Chile, of which 13 are conventional tailings deposits, and 2
to thickened tailings deposits. Additionally, 11 are operational, and 4 are inactive. Surveys were
carried out with key personnel at different mining companies, and documentation was gathered from
tailings deposit registry at the National Geology and Mining Service (SERNAGEOMIN, 2020) and
the Consejo Minero association (https://consejominero.cl). Figure 1 presents reviewed TSFs
characteristics in terms of storage volume and height.

Figure 1 Volume and height of surveyed TSF

Analysis shows that current monitoring and surveillance systems have two main components:
instrumentation, which comprises all sensors, devices, and systems to measure any variable
subsequently interpreted; and inspection, or any activity such as periodic visits to identify visual
anomalies in the TSF. Table 1 summarizes TSF characteristics, instrumental systems, and risk
management integration within the facilities considered in the analysis.

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 Table 1 Characteristics of surveyed TSF monitoring systems

Monitored Variables
Storage Height
ID TSF ERP1 Thresholds2 FMEA3 Piezometric Remote
[Mm3] [m] Topography Meteorological
level / Pore Deformation Acceleration Seepage Geochemistry Sensing
/bathymetry conditions
pressure System

TSF1 1044 52 Y Y N x x x x x x x x

TSF2 467 105 Y Y N x x x x x x x x

TSF3 932 94 Y Y N x x x x x x x x

TSF4 1371 51 Y WI WI x x x x x x x x

TSF5 466 172 Y Y WI x x x x x x x WI

TSF6 153 32 Y WI WI x x x x x x WI

TSF7 249 36 Y WI WI x x x x x x x

TSF8 355 63 Y WI WI x x x x x x x

TSF9 128 109.5 Y WI WI x x x x x x x x

TSF10 193 50 Y Y WI x x x x x x x x

TSF11 13 54 Y N N WI x x x x x x x

TSF12 35 63 Y N N WI x x x x x x x

TSF13 259 198 Y WI WI x x x x x x x

TSF14 122 94.5 Y Y WI x x x x x x x x

TSF15 706 72 Y WI WI x x x x x x x x

Notes: Definition:
1: Emergency response plan Y: Yes
2: Defined alert thresholds N: No
3: FMEA study linked to the instrumental system WI: Without information

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Data acquisition, recording, and processing
Most of the surveyed TSF companies have an internal or subcontracted team in charge of updating
instrumental system records, according to measurement frequencies defined for each instrument;
and of processing this information to assess deposit stability, which is – in most cases – summarized
in a monthly report.

Measured variables and types of instruments

Of the variables monitored, there are on the one hand those associated with stability and
performance; and on the other, those for the operational control of the deposit, such as freeboard
verification, level of the water pond, and the tailings beach distance. Figure 2 shows the types of
sensors installed in greater numbers. As shown, all have instruments for the control of piezometric
levels or pore pressure, which take the form of level or pressure transducers arranged mainly
throughout TSF dams or containment structures. Notably, periodic topographic and bathymetry
controls were only identified in actively operating structures. All reservoirs, however, had
groundwater and surface water geochemical management and control systems – for both chemical
and turbidity profiles.

Figure 2 Number of monitoring instruments

Integration of monitoring and surveillance into the risk management system

Surveyed TSF monitoring and management systems had integrated response plans and manuals,
also called TARP (Trigger Action Response Plan) In most cases, monitoring is effectively linked to
respective instrument alerts or trigger levels. A common factor across TSFs, however, was lack of
integration between controlled/monitored variables (and respective alert levels) and potential failure
mechanisms. In this sense, although FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) studies had been

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developed at many of the deposits, their usefulness within the risk management systems was not
clear.
MONITORING, FMEA, AND TSF MANAGEMENT
Fundamental to any risk assessment and management methodology is understanding what could go
wrong. In deposits, this is generally considered through credible failure modes in the structure;
indeed, for Clarkson and Williams (2021), understanding these and their contributing factors is
essential to monitoring, anticipating occurrences, and integrating them into design and evaluation of
TSF safety. By understanding what could occur after failure, the various parties involved in the life
cycle of a deposit can improve the standard in terms of managing safety.
As such, prior to defining a TSF monitoring system for operational stages, deposits should be
evaluated for possible failure mechanisms and the conditions that must be present to trigger the
mechanism. The objective is to prevent the evolution of these conditions from reaching values such
that they favor the progressive advance of any given failure mechanism.
Finally, according to the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), to prevent unwanted
events, monitoring and surveillance systems must be designed or redesigned considering the
possible failure modes associated with the highest levels of risk in order to identify any abnormal
behavior that may lead to a possible reduction in security (ICOLD, 2018).

Definition of measurement thresholds

Given the established failure mechanisms, and once the variables to be monitored and the type of
sensors for measurements have been defined, TSF stability conditions under different scenarios of
monitored variables must be understood. In the development of tailings deposits incidents or
failures, many variables simultaneously interact; therefore, interpretations of instrumental systems
and surveillance must integrate different variables. This may be undertaken by defining alert levels
that associate TSF stability condition with the measurements from instrumental systems.
Below are practical recommendations for defining triggering levels for those variables with the
greatest impact on deposit stability, given the national context.

Pore pressures and water table

Phreatic and pore pressure levels inside the TSF may increase until the materials saturate and
phenomena such as liquefaction, piping, and slope instability is susceptible to occur. Instruments that
monitor infiltrations and water levels are thus the most often installed types.
Regarding the definition of alert levels, the most important aspects to consider are the following:
 Seepage control systems: within the main TSF works are those that control and manage
seepage, such as drainage systems, impermeabilization systems, and pumping wells.
Because these systems are meant to be permanent, many safety considerations assume their
proper operation. The location of piezometers must control the operation of these systems,
with alert levels raised based on loss of functionality.

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  Routine deposit behavior: instrument data and measurements are accumulated to predict
TSF behavior and how operating variables influence it. Historical observations of
performance patterns allows identification of anomalies.
 Sensitivity analysis of TSF stability: a reference framework for variance effects under
different groundwater level scenarios on TSF stability. Sensitivity can be conducted from a
deterministic or probabilistic approach.

Deformation
Potential deformation mechanisms require previous geotechnical and geological characterization of
foundation soil, main retaining structure, and tailings. This is also sensitive to external loading,
construction of raises, tailings deposition scheme, seismic events, among others, as well as
deformations due to consolidation, elastic deformations, and post-seismic deformations. Monitoring
should determine if deformations are within expected ranges or are indicators of deposit conditions
outside its design assumptions.

Accelerations
Accelerometers arranged throughout the TSF monitor and record accelerations from seismic events
or vibrations. These records allow to evaluate performance and response of the dam to seismic events,
as well as verify design conditions (periods of vibration, damping, etc.).
The main purpose of acceleration measurement thresholds is to activate emergency response plans,
inform the deposit performance monitoring system, and ultimately evaluate residual risk (under the
possible existence of risk assessment systems). Additionally, accelerometers generally integrate or
activate measurements from the rest of sensors.
Recommendations on procedures following seismic events to ensure operation and integrity of earth
dams mainly call for evaluations and post-seismic response analysis. For example, the US Army
Corps of Engineers (bulletin ER 1110-2-1802, U.S Army Corps of Engineer, 2017) provides
recommendations for inspecting works (or not) after an earthquake based on moment magnitude
(Mw) and epicentral distance. Similarly, ICOLD (bulletin No. 166, ICOLD, 2016) recommends a visual
inspection and review of monitoring records following an earthquake of a certain magnitude and
epicentral distance. Briefly, then, both distance and magnitude may yield expected values of PGA.
Figure 3 schematically presents a definition of trigger levels for accelerometers based on both
variables.

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 600

Hipocentral Distance R [km]

500

400

300

200

100

0
2 3 4 5 6 7
Moment magnitude [Mw]

Figure 3 Accelerometer thresholds depending on the magnitude of the earthquake and epicentral distance

FINAL COMMENTS
Monitoring and surveillance systems play a fundamental role in the operations of TSFs through
performance reports, verifying compliance with design conditions, and early detection of incidents
and anomalies. However, given the direct nature of the sensors measurements in an instrumental
system and the large amount of information and data that result from them, a thorough analysis is
required to integrate the measurements into the TSF management strategies.
Surveillance practices and instrumental systems in large mining deposits in Chile monitored diverse
variables for physical stability, overall facility performance, and geochemical characteristics. This is
largely determined by local regulatory context (Decreto Supremo No. 248 de 2007; Ley 20.551 del
Ministerio de Minería de 2011; Decreto Supremo No. 50 de 2015). To this end, there is widespread
instrument deployment in facilities consistent with global standards in technology and practice.
However, the operation of these systems under the concept of risk management is, in practice, the
main weak link.
In this sense, the main recommendations of international guidelines for proper integration indicate
that instrumentation systems should be designed based on plausible failure modes for a particular
TSF. This allows clarity of both the variables that affect the development of these mechanisms, as well
as the admissible ranges that these variables can reach without risking the security of the TSF. For
these concepts to be applied satisfactorily during operational stages, alert levels must be defined
consistent with TSF characteristics, its environment, and observed historical behavior supported by
existing data.

NOMENCLATURE

TSF tailings storage facilities

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FMEA failure mode and effects analysis
TARP trigger action response plan
ICOLD international commission on large dams
PGA peak ground acceleration
ICMM international council on mining and metals

REFERENCES
Silva-Tulla, F. & Lambe, T. & Marr, W. (2008) ‘Probability and Risk of Slope Failure’, Journal of Geotechnical and
Geoenvironmental Engineering, 134. 10.1061/(ASCE)1090-0241(2008)134:12(1691).

Clarkson L. & Williams D. (2020) ‘Critical review of tailings dam monitoring best practice’, International Journal
of Mining, Reclamation and Environment, 34:2, 119-148.

International Council on Mining & Metals (2021) Tailings Management, Good practice guide.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineer (2017) Engineering and Design reporting earthquake effects, ER 1110-2-1802

International Commission on Large Dams (2016) Inspection of Dams – Following earthquake guidelines, 166.

International Commission on Large Dams (2018) Dam Surveillance Guide, 158.

Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería (2018), Guía metodológica para la evaluación de la estabilidad física de
instalaciones mineras remanentes