L. M.

DE RIJK

ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING

A Chapter of Boethian Semantics

O. INTRODUCTION

From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a special

liking for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative thought was
most influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle. However, what the
Christian thinkers achieved in metaphysics was definitely more than just
applying and adapting what was handed down to them. No student of
medieval speculative thought can help being struck by the peculiar fact
that whenever fundamental progress was made, it was theological
problems which initiated the development. This applies to St Augustine
and Boethius, and to the great medieval masters as well (such as
Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus). Their speculation was, time
and again, focused on how the notion of being and the whole range of
our linguistic tools can be applied to God's Nature (Being).
It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being
should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises,
especially De hebdomadibus.
John Mair has recently remarked that the study of Boethius's
Opuscula sacra "still proceeds on a fairly low level of certainty".' Given
their clarity and conciseness in dealing with matters of basic importance
to medieval thought, we need not wonder that, despite the rival position
of St Augustine's major works, they managed to survive for a rather
long period in the medieval schoolrooms.
The Opuscula are quite interesting, indeed, not least from the
methodological point of view. Their clarity is mainly due, I think, to the
lucidity of Boethius's semantic views. Among them Tractate III, which
has the appearance of being a working paper, 2 deserves our special
attention as it makes and uses a number of vital distinctions concerning
the notion of being.
However, it would be a mistake to leave other works out of con-
sideration here. Indeed, ancient and medieval semantic views were of a
much wider scope and, from the ancient period onwards, deeply
concerned with our use of names in general because of their basic

Norman Kretzmann (Ed.), Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. 1-29.

© 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
2 L. M. DE RIJK

function in all ontological speculation. 3 As for Boethius, we have to pay

special attention to his commentary on Perihermeneias.

1. ON THE PROPER MEANINGS OF NOUNS AND VERBS

Every noun (name, nomen) signifies some 'thing'; if not, it cannot even
be called nomen. I give a quotation from Boethius' Commentary on
Perihermeneias (ed. Meiser): 4
II 32.17-25: Vox enim quae nihil designat ut est 'garulus': licet earn grammatici,
figuram vocis intuentes, nomen esse contendant, tamen earn nomen
philosohia non putabit, nisi sit posita ut designare animi aliquam concep-
tionem eo que modo rerum aliquid ponit. Etenim nomen alicuius nomen
esse necesse erit; ... quare si nullius est, ne nomen quidem esse dicetur. 5
For a word which signifies nothing, e.g. 'garulus', although grammarians
take it as a noun (name), with regard to its having the shape of a word,
yet philosophy will not consider it a noun, unless it is used to designate
some mental concept and thus posits some 'thing'. Indeed a name neces-
sarily is a name of some 'thing'; ... therefore, if it is 'of no thing', it will
not even be called nomen. 6

It should be borne in mind, however, that Boethius does not say that
every name should signify some thing existing in the external world.
What he has in mind is that every name has a definite descriptive value,
or is not empty, and thus signifies some 'thing'. He is quite explicit
about the real nature of the significate: it truly is an immutable form,
which should act as a standard for thinking 7 and talking about things.
Quite indignantly he rejects the interpretation put forward by Aspasius,
the old commentator on Perihermeneias (2nd cent. A.D.) to the effect
that when speaking of the passiones animae (De into 1, 16a 3-4:
"Spoken sounds are symbols of mental impressions") 8 Aristotle had
nothing in mind but sensible things, and no imperishable entities.
Boethius agrees that perhaps erroneous thinking should imply its
having such a passio animae, yet to have it does certainly not come
down to real comprehension (intellexisse); In Periherm. II 41.19-23.
Indeed, to properly comprehend something is not merely to have some
conception or other of it, but rather to acquire a notion of that thing's
true nature (ibid., 41.24-42.4).
One of the characteristics assigned to the verb by Aristotle is that "it
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 3

is a sign of things said of something else" (De into 3, 16b7), which is

explained some lines further by saying (16b9-10): "it is always a sign
of things that are the case (ton hyparchonton); that is, (it is a sign) of
what is said of a subject (substrate),,9.
Boethius explains Aristotle's words as in fact indicating that the verb
signifies 'accidents':

II 67, 9-21: Quod huiusmodi est ac si diceret [sc. AristotelesJ nihil aliud nisi acci-
dentia verba significare. Omne enim verbum aliquod accidens design at.
Cum enim dico 'cursus', ipsum quid em est accidens, sed non ita dicitur ut
id ali cui inesse, vel non ~n)esse, dicatur Si autem dixero 'currit', tunc
ipsum accidens in alicuius actione proponens alicui inesse significo. Et
quoniam id quod dicimus 10 'currit' praeter aJiquid subiectum esse non
potest ... , idcirco dictum est omne verbum eo rum esse significativum
quae de aItero praedicantur, ut verbum quod est 'currit' tale significet
quiddam quod de aItero, idest de currente, praedicetur.
It is as if Aristotle said that verbs signify nothing but accidents. Indeed,
every verb designates some accident. It is true, if I say 'running', it II is
(also) an accident, yet is not properly said to inhere, or not to inhere,12 in
somebody. However, when I say 'runs', then I am putting forward the
accident qua being involved in somebody's action and indicating that it
inheres in somebody. And it is because the expression 'runs' cannot be
without something being its subject term ... that it is said that every verb
is significative of those things which are 'said of' something else. For
example, the verb 'runs' signifies something such that it may 11 be said of
something else, viz. of that which runs.

Here Boethius is stressing the important difference between noun

(name) and verb. While both of them signify a/non-subsistent quality
which, as such, cannot occur without a substrate (subject) in which it
inheres, the noun presents it as a quality taken in itself, without
connoting its actual inherence in something else, whereas such a
connotation is explicit in the verb. It should be borne in mind that the
actual inherence involved in the verb does not mean that the verb must
really refer to some (or any) occurrence of the quality or form in the
outside world, it only refers to an actualization or 'materialization' of
that form, whether or not it factually occurs in the outside world. 14 To
say it otherwise, the noun signifies nothing but some form (in our
example, the accidental 15 form running), and the verb (when used in an
assertion) signifies a form together with the substrate (subject) in which
it inheres, in our example the running thing.
4 L. M. DE RIJK

2. THE BASIC SEMANTIC EQUIVALENCE OF NOUNS

AND VERBS

The basic semantic equivalence of nouns and verbs which was touched
on in the previous section is once more confirmed in the extensive
comments Boethius makes on De into 3, 16b 19-21, which runs in his
own rendering: ipsa quidem secundum se dicta verba nomina sunt et
significant aliquid. Constituit enim qui dicit, intellectum et qui audit,
quiescit ("when taken just by itself a verb is a name and signifies some
'thing'. For the speaker (of it) performs understanding and the hearer
stops asking (further questions)".16 Again, the basic similarity obtaining
between noun and verb consists in signifying some 'thing' (or having a
determined semantic value). It is this common semantic nature that
enables us to use a verb, no less than a noun, to signify some 'property'.
So 'currit' ('runs') as well as 'cursus' ('running') signify the property
running. As when we use nouns, our taking a verb just by itself leaves
the substrate (subiectum inhaerentiae) out of consideration. Boethius is
pretty clear on this point:
In Periherm. II 71.22-30: Omne verbum per se dictum neque addito de quo illud
praedicatur tale est ut nomini sit adfine. Nam si dicam 'Socrates ambulat', id quod dixi
'ambulat' totum pertinet ad Socratem; nulla ipsius intelligentia propria est. At vero cum
dico solum 'ambulat', ita quidem dixi tamquam si alicui insit, idest tamquam si quilibet
ambulat, sed tamen per se est propriamque retinens sententiam huius verbi significatio
est.

When a verb is taken by itself and that which it is said of is not added. it is such as to
be quite similar to a noun. For if I say 'Socrates walks', the expression 17 'walks' entirely
pertains to Socrates; there is no understanding of walking as taken by itself. However,
when I just say 'runs', it is said as if the running inheres in somebody, i.e., as if anyone
you please walks; yet it stands on its own and, while retaining its own proper meaning,
it is Oust) this verb's signification.

3. THE SEMANTIC VIEWS INVOLVED IN BOETHIUS'S

DISCUSSION

Some remarks may now be made on semantic theory. First, 'accidens'

(although it is used in our context, i.e., when speaking about adjective
verbs, to signify incidental qualities) does not as such exclude essential
qualities. In our context, its proper sense is 'what is secondarily said of
something' in opposition to a thing's specific name, which is primarily
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 5

said of it. So it is definitely not taken in opposition to substance.

Elsewhere Boethius is most explicit to this account:

In Periherm. II 483.6-10: Sed quod dixit bono accidere ut malum non sit, non ita
intelligendum est quemadmodum solemus dicere substantiae aliquid accidere . ... Sed
'accidere' hic intelligendum ist 'secunda loco dici'. Principaliter enim quod est bonum
dicitur 'bonum'; secundo vero loco dicitur 'non-malum'. 18

Aristotle's saying [De into 14, 23b 16-17J that it is an accident of good not to be bad
should not be understood in the usual way in which we say that something is an
accident of a substance .... Instead, 'to be an accident' should here be taken as 'to be
secondarily called'. Indeed, that which is good is primarily named '(the) good', second-
arily '(the) not-bad'.

Of course, it is not accidental (in the usual sense) to that which is

good to be not-bad, but rather a necessary concomitant of its essential
nature. As a matter of fact, in the meaning of the Greek term
symbainein l9 (Latin accidere, in the sense of 'coincide', 'go together
with') two undertones are connected, viz., 'going with' and 'following
from'. In 13th-century logic this was clearly understood when the
'fallacy of accident' was discussed.
It may be helpful to introduce at this point a short exposition of the
proper meaning of 'accidens' as it emerges in later discussions. The
whole discussion of the fallacy of accident, not only in medieval logic
but in Aristotle as well, is in fact focused on semantic views and, in
particular, on the conceptual relationship existing between our different
modes of name-giving.

4. EXCURSUS ON A PRIMARIL Y SEMANTIC SENSE

OF 'ACCIDENS'

Every student of medieval philosophy is well acquainted with the use of

the word 'accidens' in the context of metaphysics (or theology), where it
is contrasted with 'substantia' and refers to all contingent properties,
according to Porphyry's famous definition: 'An accident is that which
may be present or absent from its subject without the subject being
destroyed' (lsag. 20.7-8; ed. Minio-Paluello = Arist. Latinus I, 6).
However, it is also found in a slightly different sense, which, in contrast
with the 'metaphysical' one, can be best characterized as 'semantic'. It is
my aim in this section to bring out this semantical use of 'accident'. My
6 L. M. DE RIJK

principal evidence will be the medieval discussion of the 'fallacy of

accident'.
When dealing with this fallacy Peter of Spain (Tractatus VII, llf. 103;
p. 146.19-26 ed. De Rijk) explicitly says that, in this connection,
'accidens' should not be taken in its Porphyrian sense and is not
contradistinguished from 'substance' but is to be taken as 'non-neces-
sarium in consequendo'. The erroneous inference which is drawn in this
fallacy is opposed by Peter to what is called 'ex necessitate accidere'
which is defined (147.4-7) as a necessary inference that is based on
conceptual relationships (the so-called habitudines locales).
In this connection also the exposition of fallacy of accident given
by James of Venice is worth noting. In the Summa Sophisticorum
Elencorum dating from the first half of the twelfth century he is
reported (I, 357.5-24) by the anonymous author to have taught that
such a paralogism occurs "when something is taken coniunctim first,
and then divisim". He instances this by the paralogism 'Socrates is
white; white is a color; therefore Socrates is a color' and explains the
fallacy as consisting in first taking 'white' (albus in the first premiss) to
stand for whiteness as inhering in Socrates, and then (album in the
second premiss) for whiteness in itself, apart from its inherence in
Socrates. Again, there is unmistakable evidence that here 'accidens' has
nothing to do with 'non-substantial' ('non-essential'), especially in
James's second example, which is about Socrates and 'being-man'
(homo), where, in a similar manner, 'being-man' simpliciter is opposed
to its being connected with some special individual being. 20
It is easy to see that what is at issue here is not the syntactic
(predicative) relation between some thing's quality, "F" (whether essen-
tial or accidental to it) and its subject of inherence ("x"), which enables
us to say 'x is F', but the semantic relationship (whether or not
expressed in an'S is P' formula) existing between a thing's essential
name and all other appellations (ways of naming) by which we can
bring it up for discussion. So a tree may be brought up as 'tree' (using
its specific name, which is primarily used of it) or as 'the green
(thing)',21 or 'the living (thing)', 'the material (thing)', and so on. In the
final analysis, it is not syntax but semantics proper that is involved.
It should be stressed, however, that in both ancient and medieval
logic (as well as later on, up to our own day) the syntactic picture has
been predominant. Of course, to my mind, most unfortunately, albeit
quite understandably_ The syntactic and semantic points of view are not
mutually exclusive; what is 'said of' something, is frequently 'predicated
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 7

of' it,22 but 'naming' is not per se 'predicating'.23 However, on several

occasions the ancient or medieval authors apparently had the purely
semantic approach in mind, instead of the syntactic one, despite the fact
that they were (quite understandably) using sentences of the'S = P'
type.
One such occasion 24 is found in medieval logicians' attempts to
explain the proper nature of the fallacy of accident, which seems to
have been in dispute in the 12th and 13th centuries at least. 25 As can be
easily seen from James of Venice's exposition of the fallacy under
discussion, he distinguishes regarding the word album (albus) between
its signifying whiteness as such, quite apart from its bearer (Socrates),
and whiteness as inhering in Socrates. Its diverse syntactic position
(once as subject-term, once as predicate-term) is left out of account. A
similar approach to the question is found in the Dialectica Monacensis
(13th cent.). After all misconceptions of 'accidens' have been dismissed
(cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus VII, 103, quoted above, p. 6), the anony-
mous author argues (y, p. 585.13-21) that the fallacy consists in our
failure to distinguish sharply between the same and the diverse, the one
and the many. We erroneously take a property and its substrate for the
same, whereas there is only partial identity. Thus, the partial identity
causes us to overlook the partial diversity. In modern parlance, we
wrongly take the material identity to include also formal identity. Their
diversity is then explained as concerning the opposition of a property
inhering in a subject to that subject itself. So in the sentence 'An animal
is a donkey' (animal est asinus), there is a material identity between
animal and asinus (our author has: 'sunt in subiecto' = they are
substantially the same), 26 but they still differ from the formal point of
view (the author has: sint diversa ratione = they are diverse by (their
respective) modes of being). That is why what goes with one (accidit
uni) does not necessarily go with the other.
It is of some interest that our author here refers to the Sophistical
Refutations (6, 168a 40ff.) of Aristotle, who is admittedly the basic
source for any discussion of that fallacy. There, too, the 'accident' is in
fact an essential feature (viz. being in a mathematical figure, schema)
said of triangle. 27 The fallacy consists in taking this essential feature as
the ground for the triangle's property of having its angles equal to two
right angles. 28 From the semantic point of view the fallacy arises from
connecting that property with the ratio, 'being a figure' instead of the
ratio, 'being a triangle'.
A corollary may be added on the use of 'praedicare'. The Greek
8 L. M. DE RIJK

kategorein ti kata tin os, the Latin formula: praedicare aliquid de aliquo
primarily stands for 'to say something of something else'. As is quite
obvious, the two expressions are most frequently used to mean 'to
predicate something of something else' by means of a sentence. How-
ever, the verbs praedicare and kategorein are used, time and again, for
just 'using a name' or 'designating something through a name', regard-
less of the syntactic role performed by that name in a sentence. For
kategorein I have given much evidence elsewhere. 29 As to the use of
praedicare as 'to describe as', 'to designate as', it is found as early as
with the Latin authors of the preclassical period (esp. Plautus and
Terence).3o
For Boethius, we may refer to the passage quoted above (p. 4) where
praedicare apparently has the general sense of 'being said of' which
equally covers naming and predicating, and, in the context, is just a
variant for dici (as in Aristotle, De into 3, 16b6ff., and Boethius'
translation of it). Also in his In Porph. Isag. Boethius sometimes uses
praedicare to stand for just dicere ('to call', 'to name') e.g., 102. 5-6 ed.
Brandt (id accidens merito praedicatur); many times in his comment on
the lemma Eorum enim quae praedicantur (=dicuntur): 183.7-188.8;
cf. 208. 16: quod corporeum est, substantia dicitur et item quod
incorporeum est substantia praedicatur; also at 243.14 and 21. A
similar use is found in Boethius's In Arist. Periherm. II 136-46, when
he discusses the extensional use of universal terms (e.g. 'homo') as
opposed to their descriptive use (see esp. 136.26-137.2: non in unam
quamcumque personam per nomen hoc [viz. 'homo'] mentis cogitatione
deducimur sed in omnes eos quicumque human ita tis definitione partici-
pant. Unde fit ut haec [qualitas singularis] quid em sit communis
omnibus, illa [qualitas singularis] ut Platonis vel Socratis vero prior
incommunicabilis quidem cunctis, uni tamen propria. There the phrase
'omnis homo' (regardless of its use in subject or predicate position) is
called 'praedicatio' (138.11; cf. 138.19) and 'quidam homo' or 'Plato'
'particularis praedicatio' (138.24-27); the context makes it patently
clear that not sentential predication but name-giving is at issue (139.3-
6: 'quod vero dicimus 'Plato' numquam esse poterit universale; nam etsi
quando [= sometimes] nomen hoc 'Plato' pluribus imponatur, non
tam en idcirco erit hoc nomen universale').
Finally, a remarkable piece of evidence is found in In Periherm. II
321.8ff., where the difference between definite and indefinite proposi-
tions is said to consist solely in the fact that the former predicate
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 9

universal terms by indicating universality, the latter without doing so.

Far that matter Boethius discusses sentences such as 'currit homo',
'currit omnis homo', where the phrase praedicare hominem is obviously
used to refer to the use of the name 'homo' in subject position:
'cum indefinitae universalia praedicant praeter universalitatis determi-
nationem, determinatae et definitae idem illud praedicant universale
cum adiectione et significatione quoniam universal iter praedicatur' (II
321.9-13; cf. I 142.1 where 'omnis' in 'omnis homo' (used in subject
position!) is said to be added to the universal predicate' homo').

5. ON BOETHIUS'S SEMANTICS OF NOUNS AND VERBS

Boethius's discussion of the (partly similar, partly different) natures of

noun (name) and verb is predominantly semantic, rather than syntactic
(i.e., organized on the basis of the different roles they have when they
are used in a sentence). At the outset, we may recall the attention
he pays to their semantic similarity, which consists in their equally
signifying some 'thing' or 'quality', despite their different modes of
signifying that 'thing'.
Boethius's semantic approach is nicely shown in In Periherm. II
73.17ff., where he introduces somebody's alternate explanation of Aris-
totle's discussion of the verb's nature. This interpretation is remarkably
labeled by Boethius 'a better explanation' (melior expositio). It says that
the meaning of 'accidens' (which stands for any form whatsoever which
is said of some substrate) does not necessarily include the substrate in
which it inheres. So the verb sapit signifies some 'thing' (or has a res
signzficata ar intellectus) i.e., is not an empty concept 3 ! - and that
despite the fact that this res is represented as being non-subsistent. So
the hearer comes to have some notion and his thinking comes to an
end:

II 73, 18-74, 5: ... verba ipsa secundum se dicta nomina esse [Arist., De interpr.
3, 16bI9-20] idcirco quoniam cuiusdam rei habeant significationem. Neque enim si
talis rei significationem retinet verbum quae semper aut in altero sit aut de altero
praedicetur, idcireo iam nihil omnino signifieat. Nee si signifieat aliquid quod praeter
subieetum est. Ut cum dieo 'sapit', non ideirco nihil signifieat quoniam hoc ipsum 'sapit'
sine eo qui sapere possit, esse non potest. Nee rursus cum dieo 'sapir, ilium ipsum qui
sapit signifieo, sed id quod dieo 'sapit' nomen est euiusdam rei quae semper sit in altero
et de altero praedieetur. Unde fit ut intelleetus quoque sit. Nam qui audit 'sapit', lieet
10 L. M. DE RIJK

per se constantem rem non audiat (in altero namque semper est et in quo sit, dictum
non est), tamen intellegit quiddam et ipsius verbi significatione nititur, et in ea constituit
intcllectum et quiescit, ut ad intellegentiam ultra nihil quaerat om nino .
. . . taken just by themselves verbs are nouns (names), because they signify some 'thing'.
For although the verb in that position still signifies a 'thing' that always is in something
else or is said of something else, yet this does not imply that in that position it should
signify entirely nothing, as it does not follow either that, if it signifies some 'thing' which
cannot be apart from a substrate, it should signify that substrate. For example, when I
say 'is wise' it is not the case that, because 'is wise' cannot be without there being a
person who may be wise, it signifies nothing. Again, when I say 'is wise', I do not signify
the person himself who is wise; rather the expression, 'is wise' is the name 32 of some
'thing' that always is in something else and is said of something else. That is why also
some understanding arises. Indeed, although the hearer of 'is wise' does not hear of a
'thing' that is by its own (for it is always in something else and it is not said in which),
yet he comes to understand some 'thing', leans on the meaning of the verb just as it
stands 33 and arrests his thought and acquiesces so that he does not ask furtherques-
tions 34 in order to perform understanding.

So the anonymous interpretation of Aristotle's words which is put

forward by Boethius as 'the better one' argues that verbal expressions
such as 'is wise' (sapit) always signify some 'thing', yet do not as such
include a designation of the substrate involved and signify only a
non-subsistent form (quality, property), viz., 'being-wise'. Next Boethius
(whether or not following his anonymous source) adds an important
remark about another difference between noun (name) and verb:

Ibid. 74,5-9: Sicut fuit in nomine; quemadmodum enim nomen cuiusdam rei significa-
tio propria est per se constantis, ita quoque verbum significatio rei est non per se
subsistentis sed alterius subiecto et quoddammodo fundamento nitentis.
The situation is the same as we saw it to be with a noun (name). Indeed, as a noun
(name) is a specific 35 signification of some 'thing' (as) being subsistent, in a similar way
a verb is a signification of a thing (as) being non-subsistent and leaning on something
else as its substrate and, so to speak, its foundation.

As is well known, this very difference was to play an important role

later (from the 12th century onwards) in the pre-modistic and modis tic
theories, the study of which owes so much to the Copenhagen school
and to Jan Pinborg in particular.
Finally, Boethius discusses (II 74.9-33) a problem which was raised
and solved by Aspasius, whose solution is above all interesting from the
semantic point of view. Aspasius had asked whether Aristotle is not
wrong in saying "the speaker comes to arrest his thinking (thought) and
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 11

the hearer pauses", since when hearing only the noun (name) 'Socrates',
the hearer's immediate reaction is an impatient asking "Socrates what?
Does he do or undergo something?" The same holds good for an
isolated verb, such as 'reads'. Aspasius makes Aristotle reply:
Ibid. 74,19-28: Sed ad hoc Aristote!em rettulisse putandum est quoniam quilibet
audiens cum significativam vocem ceperit animo, eius intellegentia nitetur. Vt cum quis
audit 'homo', quid sit hoc ipsum quod accipit mente comprehendit constituitque animo
audisse se 'animal rationale morta!e'. Si quis vero huiusmodi vocem ceperit quae nihil
omnino designet, animus eius, nulla significatione neque intellegentia roboratus, errat ac
vertitur nec ullis designationis finibus conquicscit.
It may be assumed that Aristotle would have offered this rejoinder: After having taken
into his mind a significative word, every hearer will lean on his understanding of it. So
when one hears 'man', one comes to grasp what it is what one receives into one's mind
and says that he has heard 'mortal rational animal'. But if he has heard some word
which lacks any meaning, his mind continuously wanders about without finding it rest
within the delimitation of some meaning.

Aspasius thinks such a reply would be to the point (74, 19). It is

obvious that all this has nothing to do with assertions, and is rather
concerned with the first mental act, which was called afterwards 36
'simple apprehension' (simplex apprehensio), our grasping of (the
significate of) a single word when taken apart from any propositional
context (vox incomplexa) and, from the 14th century onwards, opposed
to the bearer of truth and falsity (complexe significabile) 37 as incom-
plexe significabile. From the semantic point of view 'name-giving' is at
issue here, rather than the building of sentences (involving syntactic
'predication').

6. A SURVEY OF BOETHIAN SEMANTICS IN HIS

PERIHERMENEIAS COMMENTARY

(1) The Noun

1.1. every noun (name) necessarily is a name of some 'thing', i.e., it is
not empty and has some definite semantic value of its own; see above,
pp. 2; 4; 9-11.
1.2. Its significate is not some sensible 'thing' existing in our sensible
world (as Aspasius held), but an imperishable and immutable 'nature';
see above, p. 2.
1.3. Boethius seems to have had some (rather vague) notion of the
12 L. M. DE RIJK

later distinction between formal and material significate, at least in his

discussion of the 'verb when taken just by itself', which is considered to
equal a noun (name). In this context he indeed distinguishes between
'being wise' ('wisdom', one may add) and the person who is wise; see
above, p. 9f.
1.4. Unlike the verb the noun signifying an 'accident' may designate
it in such a way as to omit its inherence in something else; see above,
p.10.

(2) The Verb

2.1. the verb is always a sign of 'things' said of something else, i.e., the
verb always signifies an 'accident', and, unlike the noun signifies it, qua
inhering in something else; see above, p. 4; 9-11.
2.2. The inherence connoted by the verb is to be taken as an
actualization or materialization of the form involved (where 'actualiza-
tion' should be set apart from 'factuality' (= occurrence in the external
world); see above p. 3; below 13-15.
2.3. The verb when taken just by itself equals a noun (name) and,
accordingly, admits of a clear-cut distinction between its formal and its
material significate (d. 1.3 above); see p. 4; 9-10.

(3) Noun and Verb

3.1. They have in common the characteristic of signifying some 'thing',
see 1.1 and 2.1 above.
3.2. They seem also to have in common indiscriminately signifying
the formal or the material significate of the form involved (d. 1.3 and
2.3 above).

(4) The Different Modes of Signifying

4.1. The distinction between formal and material significate is based on
that between two corresponding modes of signifying, one a signifying of
the form quite apart from its actualization in matter (significativum
formale), the other including it (significativum materiale)3R (see 1.3,2.3
and 3.2 above).
4.2. Another distinction of modes of signifying is found where
Boethius opposes the signification of some 'thing' as being subsistent (as
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 13

it is performed by a noun) to the signification of some 'thing' as being

non-subsistent 39 (see p. 10 above).

(S) Naming versus Predication

S.l. As is also usual in medieval logic, in Boethius the syntactic
approach is predominant, in that the meaning of terms is most often
discussed as dependent upon their syntactic function in propositions. So
'praedicare' most often stands for using (a term) as a sentential pre-
dicate (see p. 7-9 above).
S.2. However, like Greek kategorein, Latin praedicare is also used
to stand for 'using (a term) as a name'. In that case the proper semantics
of an unconnected term is at issue (see pp. 7-9 above).

7. THE CONCEPT 'BE' (ESSE) AS FOUND IN IN PERIHERM

In more than one passage of his Perihermeneias commentary Boethius

throws some light on his notion of being. When speaking about
composite concepts such as 'goat-stag' (hircocervus) he remarks that
this is a concept to which no 'substance' or 'underlying thing' corre-
sponds (II SO.4: nulla tamen eius substantia reperiretur; SO.7: omnino in
rebus nulla illi substantia est; S0.14: cui res nulla subiecta sit). This type
of word is discussed in the framework of the thesis that a single word
uttered just by itself has no truth or falsehood; if it had, such a word as
'goat-stag' would be a 'false word' (II 45.2-S2.20).40
But words such as 'goat-stag' are not meaningless in Boethius's
view,41 and so the phrases 'no substance' and 'no underlying thing' here
must concern existence in the external world. 42 Therefore, substantia
and res subiecta seem to be intended here to stand for physical
occurrence. For the latter to be actually involved esse or non esse
would have to be added,43 and then truth and falsity will also show up.
This may suggest that in Boethius's view esse ('be') equals 'exist in the
outside world', a truly Aristotelian view, to be sure. 44 On this inter-
pretation, 'substance' and 'be' as well would be taken as having to do
with existence in the outside world.
However, in the very same passage Boethius clearly distinguishes
between two senses of 'esse'. It may signify either substance or some
kind of presence (praesentiam quandam significet; Sl. 7). The former
14 L. M. DE RIJK

sense is instanced by 'Deus est', the latter by 'dies est'. He makes the
difference between 'substantia' and 'praesentia' pretty clear:

In Periherm. II 51,7-16: Cum enim dicimus 'Deus est', non Eum dicimus nunc esse
sed tan tum in substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiae quam ad
tempus ali quod referatur. Si autem dicamus 'dies est', ad null am diei substantiam
pertinet nisi tan tum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc est enim quod significat 'est',
tam quam si dicamus: 'nunc est'. Quare cum ita dicimus 'esse' ut substantiam designemus,
simpliciter 'est' addimus; cum vero ita ut ali quid praesens significetur, secundum
tempus.
When we say: 'God is', we do not say that He is now, but only that He in substance is,
to the extent indeed that this ('be') is related to the immutability of His substance rather
than to some time. But if we say 'It is day', it (viz. 'be') has nothing to do with the
substance of 'day' but just its establishment in time. For that is what 'is' signifies, as if
we say 'is now'. Therefore, when we use 'be' so as to designate substance, we add 'is' in
its unqualified sense (to the word concerned); however, when we use 'be' in such a way
that something is signified as present, (we add it) in its temporal sense.

Two other expositions are mentioned (51.17-30 and 51.30-52.6),

and Boethius does not show any preference for one of the three
(52.6-7). The second takes 'is' as what is called later on praesens
confusum (where praesens does not refer to any time in the present,
past, or future).45 The third one opts for an indefinite use of 'is' (and
'was' and 'will be' as well).
This much may be gathered from Boethius's comments on the
Aristotelian passage: 'be' (and 'is' in particular) is not exclusively linked
up with just (contingent) existence but has also some affinity with the
things' natures or 'intrinsic being'. But just some affinity, it would seem.
Indeed, as a faithful commentator on Aristotle Boethius presents a
notion of being which is predominantly informed by the Aristotelian
conception of 'being' as 'being in existence', in which 'be' has no
intrinsic semantic value of its own, as is most clearly the case in Plato's
notion of 'be'.46 However, one catches a glimpse of the Platonic
conception in the same discussion of Perihermeneias, where we need
not be surprised to find it being associated with the example 'Deus est'.
As a matter of fact, as was the case with St Augustine (and in the Greek
patristic tradition as well, of course), Boethius's metaphysical specula-
tion was closely connected with, and basically inspired by, theology, i.e.,
thinking about God's nature and the nature of the external world
viewed as God's creature. It is especially there that we have to look for
Boethius's metaphysics and his semantic views concerning the notion of
being (see above, p. 1).
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 15

It seems useful to begin by surveying the semantic model Boethius

apparently worked from when commenting on the logical writings of
Aristotle,

8. BOETHIUS'S SEMANTIC MODEL IN IN PERIHERM

Boethius firmly argues (II 31.14ff.) that a vox is a noun or verb only if
it is informed in a special way, just as a bit of bronze is not currency
until it is coined as a piece of money (cf. 32.13-17). Indeed, utterances
(voces) should first be coined to be significative of notions (intellectus),
as is explicitly stated at II 29.21-23, where Boethius is commenting on
the conventionalist thesis defended by Aristotle.
Kretzmann rightly claims that conventionalism is what is meant by
Aristotle's kata syntheken (at 16a26-8).47 However, in following the
Hellenistic tradition Boethius infers this view from the phrase 'ea quae
sunt in voce' (at 16a3) which is taken by him to stand for something
like 'vox certo modo sese hebens' (32.11), i.e., getting some significative
force by convention (positione).
Another noticeable feature in Boethius's (traditional) interpretation is
that the passiones animae ('affections of the soul' or 'mental imp res-
sions')48 as well as the 'likenesses' are taken to be interchangeable with
'thoughts' (intellectus); see esp. II 27.18--29.16; 35.16 ff. and 43.9-25.
Some further seemingly careless rendering is found where Boethius
puts the Greek symbola (16a4) and semeia (16a6) on a par, as is
rightly remarked by Kretzmann. 49 However, this is not so dramatic as it
seems. Indeed, thanks to his Greek predecessors, who were apparently
fully aware of the different meanings of symbolon (broadly an 'artificial
indication') and semeion (broadly, a 'natural indication'), Boethius lays
much stress on the artificial character of ea quae sunt in voce and ea
quae scribuntur (II 23.1-5; 24.27-25.5; 31.21-33.2; esp. 37.20-23:
Aristoteles vero duobus modis esse has notas putat literarum, vocum
passionumque animae constitutas: uno quidem positione, alia vero
natural iter. For that matter, the use of semeion (at 16a6) should not be
pressed since it seems to be used there generically (as covering both
natural and artificial indications). Indeed, once something has been
established as a sign it may act as such, regardless of the fact that it
is not of natural origin. Incidentally, pragma (at 16a7, as in all its
other occurrences, I think) should be taken to stand for 'thing-in-its-
actualized-state' or 'thing-being-so-and-so', rather than just 'actual
thing'; it should certainly not be taken as referring to 'factuality'.50
16 L. M. DE RIJK

Apart from words that signify absolutely nothing i.e., that are
completely meaningless - there are meaningful words signifying an
intellectus without any 'thing' underlying it (sine re ulla subiecta), such
as poetical fabrications (,centaur', 'chimaera'; II 22.1-6; ct. 32.17-25,
discussed above, p. 13). But if we attentively consider nature, we find
that wherever there is a 'thing' (res), there is also a notion (intellectus)
of it, if not with men, at least with "Him who knows everything in His
own divine Nature". In this line of thought Boethius can find the
Platonic view I mentioned before (p. 14 above), to the extent that
nouns (names) and verbs (inasmuch as their significative character is
concerned, which makes them equal to 'names' - see p. 4-9f. above)
all signify some immutable and everlasting nature (quiddity). In locating
them in God's mind our author is following an old (Hellenistic)
tradition. 51
On the other hand, the immanent form 52 (eidos enhylon), recognized
already in the Old Academy, also plays a role in Boethian semantics. In
his penetrating discussion of the different extensional uses of a uni-
versal name as set apart from its intensional use, the difference comes
down to distinguishing a name's signifying an object's incommunicable
quality from its signifying a universal quality which is found also in
other objects. Boethius thinks the former quality, which makes an
individual thing unique, to be important enough to propose a special
term for it - 'platonitas' in the case of Plato. The distinction is made in
his discussion of the meaning of sentences (II 136.1-16). The con-
sideration of the res-aspect leads Boethius to distinguish between two
qualities in the objects of the outside world, the qualitas singularis and
the qualitas communis: 53
In Periherm. II 136.17-137.10: Videmus namque alias esse in rebus huiusmodi
qualitates quae in alium convenire non possint nisi in unam quamcumque singularem
particularemque substantiam. Alia est enim qualitas singularis, ut Platonis vel Socratis,
alia est quae, communicata cum pluribus, totam se singulis et omnibus praebet, ut
est ipsa humanitas .... Quotienscumque enim aliquid tale animo speculamur, non in
unam quamcumque personam per nomen hoc mentis cogitatione deducimur, sed in
omnes eos quicumque humanitatis definitione participant. Unde fit ut haec quidem
sit communis omnibus, ilia vero prior incommunicabilis quidem cunctis, uni tamen
propria. Nam si nomen fingere liceret, illam singularem quandam qualitatem et incom-
municabilem ali cui alii subsistentiae suo ficto nomine nuncuparem, ut clarior fieret
forma propositi. Age enim incommunicabilis Platonis ilia proprietas platonitas appel-
letur ... quomodo hominis qualitatem dicimus humanitatem.
We see that there are in those objects some qualities that can only belong, each time 5 4,
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 17

to one singular and particular substance. For there is a difference between a singular
quality such as that of Plato or Socrates, and that one which, possessed in common with
more people, offers itself entirely to them all one by one, such as Manhood itself ....
Whenever we consider such a thing, we are not led by that name ['man'] to think of just
one single person, but rather of all those who share in the definition of manhood.
Hence the latter quality is common to all, while the former is completely unshareable
and exclusively one's own. If coining a name were allowed, I would call that singular
quality which is incommunicable with another subsistent entity by a suitably fancy
name, so that my intention would be more perspicuous. So let that incommunicable
property belonging to Plato be called 'platonity' ... just as we call the quality of man,
'manhood'.

We may now draw up the following table:

(1) non-significative (and, accordingly, not a name properly speaking,
e.g. 'garulus'; see II 32.27ff.)
(2.11) as being in
noun God's Mind (II 22.6-11)
(2.1) signifying an
immutable nature
(2) significative (2.12) as being immanent
(= 'name' or 'verb') in particulars (II 136ff.)

(2.2) signifying some notion

to which no 'thing' corresponds (II 22.1-6; 7-15)

9. THE NOTION OF 'BE' (ESSE) IN THE AXIOMATIC PART OF

DE HEBDOM.55

While in Boethius's commentaries on Perihermeneias attention is

focused on the diverse meanings of terms (nouns and verbs) rather than
on esse, in De hebdomadibus the emphasis goes just the other way
around, as the central theme there is the notion of being itself.
Boethius starts from the metaphysical thesis that for everything that
is, to be (esse) and to be good (esse bonum) are one and the same.
Whoever holds this thesis is immediately faced with the problem of
finding the respect in which things that are good substantially differ
from the Good-in-Itself, which is God. Boethius's solution to the prob-
lem consists in stressing the basic difference between the individual that
is (id quod est) - a collection of qualities (both essential and incidental
ones) which are unique, irreducible to those belonging to any other
individual - and the constitutive 'ontic element' of such an individual,
18 L. M. DE RIJK

which is just 'being' (esse).56 The latter, qua constitutive element, is

called the thing's forma essendi. This (or the collection of all the
constitutive elements which are so many formae or 'modes of being') is
the determining element but nevertheless cannot be identified with the
whole substance of the 'that which is'. To be more precise, when taken
by itself, i.e., before entering into a 'whole' (,complete substance'),
'being' (esse) still awaits materialization. 57
Let us now turn to the various 'axioms':
II.58 Diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est; at vera quod est,
accepta essendi forma, est atque consistit.
Being and that which is is not the same; indeed, being taken by itself is not yet; but (it
is) the that which is, (that), having received the form, being, is as a substance.
Some comments: (1) the axiom does not only say that being and that
which is are not the same but also makes clear what the difference
consists in.
(2) The phrase ipsum esse is quite erroneously taken by SR (as by
Schrimpf, ad lac.) to mean 'Being Itself', 'Simple Being' or 'Absolute
Being' (= God) which makes no good sense (and produces an awkward,
even heretical thesis), in claiming that God does not be until he
manifests himself in concrete beings. Anathema sit!, one would think.)
Of course, ipsum added to esse is only intended to set 'being' (esse)
apart from the compound substance of which it is the constitutive
element. 59 The expression ipsum is similarly used in Axioms III, IV and
IX.
(3) The phrase quod est (at 40.29) should be taken to be equivalent
to the previous id quod est, in order to obtain the same opposition as is
found in the first sentence. The same holds good for the opening words
of the next axiom. The complete phrase is found in Axioms IV, VI and
VII.
(4) The property expressed by the finite verb 'est' ('is') is to be taken
as 'being-as-a-(material)-subsistent-thing', as clearly appears from the
final words.
Here is the third Axiom:
III. Quod est participare ali quo potest; sed ipsum esse nullomodo aJiquo participat; fit
enim participatio, cum aliquid iam est; est autem ali quid, cum esse susceperit.
That which is can be participate in something else; but being, when taken by itself, can
in no way participate in anything else; for participation is effected when something
already is, and that is the case after it has received being.
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 19

Of course, Boethius does not intend to claim that 'that which is' first
is and then can participate. Rather he tries to make clear that to
participate is possible only for 'that which is', and no participation can
occur when just the form being is concerned. Forms of course cannot
participate. 6o
IV. Id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest; ipsum vera esse
nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum.
That which is can possess something besides what it is itself; but being, when taken by
itself, has no admixture whatsoever.

Two remarks: (1) this axiom is complementary to the previous one in

that it points out the pure and complete nature of being when taken as
just being. It reminds us of the general Platonic doctrine claiming that
all Forms (or forms when embodied in matter), such as 'just itself',
'beautiful itself', 'stone itself', are just that and nothing else. 6l
(2) SR are seriously mistaken in rendering id quod est 'that which
exists'. The esse discussed in De hebdomadibus (as in all Platonic
contexts, to be sure) has, as such, nothing to do with existence in the
outside world. What is at issue in contexts like these is actuality rather
than what I have labeled factuality (see p. 12, 2.2 above).
The fifth axiom further defines the position of the aliquid introduced
in the previous axiom in that it clearly opposes 'to be-some-thing' (i.e.
'to be this or that'), to 'being-so me-thing qua (this or that form of)
being'. So the eido-Iogical point of view is contrasted with the onto-
logical one. 62 Whereas the three previous axioms are concerned with
the opposition between the 'that which is' (id quod est) and its main
constitutive element, the form being (forma essendi), the fifth axiom is
about the difference to be found within the 'that which is'. It opposes
the latter's being a particular as affected by some form to its being-ness
as affected by its forma essendi. It should be noted that it opens with
the same introductory phrase (Diversum est) as the previous cluster
II-IV:
V. Diversum est tantum esse aliquid et esse aliquid in eo quod est; illic enim accidens,
hie substantia significatur.
To be just something and to be something qua being is not the same; in the former
phrase indeed, an accident is signified, in the latter a substance.

Some remarks: (1) the phrase 'just something' refers to one particular
form belonging to some particular object, whose referent is opposed to
20 L. M. DE RUK

the 'being' (forma essendi) of the whole particular. The phrase esse
aliquid in eo quod est is nothing but Boethius's rendering of the Greek
einai ti hCi on. It should be noted that the latter formula may as such
refer to the element, being occurring in the particular form under
consideration, as well as to the main forma essendi mentioned in the
previous axioms. However, the wording of the final section of this
axiom, where accidens is opposed to substantia, shows that the opposi-
tion here is to the over-all forma essendi of the object involved.63
(2) The concluding part of the axiom semantically opposes the two
phrases to one another. The former signifies an accidental mode of
being, e.g., a particular whiteness or being white (albedo, album esse),
inhering in some object (e.g., a stone), while the latter signifies that
object's subsistent mode of being; in our example, the 'being-a-white-
thing' (esse album = esse aliquid affectum albedine).64
(3) So substantia seems to be in a way quite similar to the phrase est
atque consistit in Axiom II.
The sixth axiom contrasts two modes of participation, one affecting
an object's being-subsistent, the other its being some thing. Since here
two modes of participation are distinguished, it does not make any
sense to read 65 (with, of all MSS, the codices deteriores!; see SR. p. 42,
n 1) omne quod est participat instead of following the codices optimi
(see ibid.) which all omit est (T, C, E and B where it is noticeable that
B deleted it; see ed. Peiper). It is true, to follow the better manuscripts
implies the need of emending the alio vero into aliquo, but this
fortunately gives us back the phrase aliquo participare (used twice in
Axiom III). My reading of this axiom makes it both oppose the two
modes of participation to one another and state their complementary
character as well, since one is needed for a thing to 'be' (or to possess
being), the other to 'be something' (or to have a certain mode of being).
In addition, the usual reading (with est) of the first part of the axiom
cannot avoid making its second part rather superfluous, since it is then
nearly a repetition of the first part, instead of summarizing axioma 11-
VI:
VI. Omne quod participat eo quod est esse ut sit, aliquo participat ut aliquid sit. Ac per
hoc id quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; est vero ut participet aliquolibet. 59
Everything that participates in Being in order to be, participates in 'some thing' in order
to be some thing, Hence that which is participates in Being in order to be, but it is in
order to participate in anything you please.

Some remarks: (1) the phrase participat eo quod est esse is Boethius's
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 21

rendition of the Greek metechei tau einai, where the Latin paraphrasis
is needed to avoid the barbaric essendo (note that participare takes the
ablative case, so that the accusative esse cannot be used).66 SR's remark
(p. 42) to the effect that id quod est esse = to ti en einai is entirely
beside the point, even apart from their confusion of Platonic and
Aristotelian metaphysics.
(2) SR's rendering, which makes the accusative esse dependent on
participare (which admittedly requires an ablative case) and which
takes eo quod est apart as meaning 'through the fact that it exists', is
both unacceptable from a grammatical point of view 67 as well as
philosophically horrible. However could a Platonist be asserting that
something's existence is the cause of its participating in Being?
The seventh and eighth axioms oppose the esse of a simple entity
(such as God) to that of a compound one. I cannot see why tradition
takes them apart as two axioms. It would be much better to take the
second part of Axiom VI as a fresh one and to take VII and VIII
together as VIII.

VII-VlII: Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet; omni composito aliud
est esse, aliud ipsum est.
Every simple entity possesses its being and its actuality (,individuality') as one and the
same thing; for every compound entity, its being is not the same as the entity's actuality.

Several remarks should be made: (1) SR translate unum habet

'possesses as unity'. This is confusing in that every subsistent entity is
taken to form some unity, a substantial unity, to be sure.68 The
opposition to what is said about its counterpart (in Axiom VIII) makes
it much more attractive to translate 'possesses as one and the same
thing'.
(2) The seventh axiom formally distinguishes between a simple
entity's form of being (its 'what' or 'quiddity') and its individuality (its
'that which') and then states that in point of fact (,materially', so to
speak) they coincide.
(3) Of course, the seventh axiom alludes to what is later called the
identity of God's Essence and God's Being. As has been rightly
remarked by Gilson 69 [1955: 1051, Boethius was not yet asking the
question of the relation which obtains between essence and existence
but rather that of the relation between substance and the principle of its
'substantial being', that is to say: what causes it to be a substance?
(4) In fact the eighth axiom concerns the semantic distinction
22 L. M. DE RIJK

between the material and formal significates (see p. 12 above). It should

be noted that in Axiom VII the phrase id quod est is used in a manner
somewhat different from its earlier uses. Before the 'that which is' was
materially signified, while now the phrase rather means 'being a that
which is' and so formally refers to a thing's actuality (which, for God,
includes his 'factuality', of course). Thus, the two diverse shades of
meaning may also be rendered 'the individual' and 'individuality',
respectively.
(5) Similarly, in Axiom VIII the phrase ipsum est does not mate-
rially mean, properly speaking, 'the thing itself is' but formally refers to
'its being-itself', i.e., its actuality as an individual being.
Finally, the ninth axiom aims at defining the rather complex relation-
ships obtaining between a desire (esp. a natural or instinctive one) and
good as well as its counterpart, repulsion (discordia) , and that together
with the related notions of diversity and similitude. A discussion of
them is outside the scope of this paper.

10. THE SEMANTIC IMPACT OF DE HEBDOMADIBUS

My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is

clearly articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is
most clearly seen in the main argument of De hebdom. where they may
be actually seen at work.
As is well known, the proper aim of De hebdomadibus is to point
out the formal difference between esse and esse bonum, or in Boethius's
words: "the manner in which substances are good in virture of their
being, while not yet being substantially good" (38.2-4). Its method
consists in a careful application of certain formal distinctions, viz.:
(a) The distinction between an object7° when taken as a subsistent
whole and id quod est = the constitutive element which causes the
object's actually 71 being; it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.
(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining
between the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being
(forma essendi, or ipsum esse) and the object's actuality as such (id
quod est or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.
(c) The distinction between esse as 'pure being' (= nihil aliud
praeter se habens admixtum), which belongs to any form, whether
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 23

substantial or incidental, and id quod est admitting of some admixture

(lit. 'something besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom IV and in
fact implies the distinction between esse simpliciter and esse aliquid.
(d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', tantum esse
aliquid, and 'being something qua mode of being'. It is made in Axiom
V and used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a further
distinction made within the notion of id quod est. It points out the
differences between the effect caused by some form as constitutive of
being some thing and that caused by the main constituent (forma
essendi) which causes an object's being simpliciter.
(e) The distinction between two different modes of participation,
one effecting an object's being subsistent, the other its being some thing,
where the 'some thing' (aliquid) refers to some (non-subsistent) quality
such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good', etc.
The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a
solution to the main problem: although the objects (ea quae sunt, plural
of id quod est) are (are good) through their own constitutive element,
being (being good), nevertheless they are not identical with their
constitutive element nor (a fortiori) with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM
ESSE) of which their constituent is only a participation.
Let us have a closer look.

42.60-44.85: 72 the status quaestionis is presented: 73 "In what way are

things good?". Not in the same way as qualities (such as white) are
participated in, to the extent that 'being white' does not belong to an
object's subsistence, but rather is something supervenient. In other
words, 'being-good' is to be associated with 'subsistence', and with esse
and forma essendi, accordingly.
On the other hand, things are not God, and for that very reason, not
substantialia bona. This could lead one to infer that they are not good
in eo quod sunt. However, such a conclusion is not acceptable.

44.86-46.117: In order to solve this problem, Boethius, at the outset,

points out our ability to formally distinguish, by a mental process
(animo et cogitatione), between 'things' in spite of the fact that they
cannot actually be separated. Such a distinction is first applied to
bonum esse and esse in the way in which it only holds good for God's
Being, definitely not for creatures.
24 L. M. DE RIJK

46.117-127: Created things (non-simplicia) have an esse that can be

called bonum only denominatively; both their esse and their esse
bonum are secondary.
46.121-127: Primum enim Bonum,14 in eo quod est, bonum est; secundum vero
bonum, quoniam ex Eo fluxit Cuius ipsum Esse bonum est, ipsum quoque bonum est.
Sed ipsum esse omnium rerum ex Eo fluxit quod est Primum Bonum et quod bonum
tale est ut recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum; ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est.
For the Prime Good is good in virtue of its being; but the secondary good, because it
derives from That whose Being Itself is good, in its twin is also good. But the being
taken as such of all things derives from that Which is the Prime Good and is indeed
good in such a way as to be rightly said to be good in virtue of its being. For that
reason, the being of all things is good.

Thus the problem has been solved in principle (see 48.128). There
follows a further explanation in which the author argues, again, that the
esse of the Prime Good is essentially identical with Being (Boethius
always speaks of substantiale bonum) and that Its esse (= esse bonum)
is without any admixture (48.134-136). On the other hand, while all
created things are good in virtue of their being, they owe this only to
their being derived from the Prime Good (= Prime Being). Next, for
the sake of clarification, Boethius raises and solves an objection. 7)

48.150-50.162: At non etiam alba, in eo quod sunt, alba esse oportebit,'" quoniam ex
voluntate Dei fluxerunt ut essent alba? Minime! Aliud enim est eis 77 esse, aliud albis
esse; hoc ideo quoniam Qui ea ut essent effecit, bonus quidam est, minime vero albus;
... neque enim ex Albi voluntate defluxerunt. Itaque quia voluit esse ea alba Qui erat
non albus, sunt alba tantum; quia vero voluit ea esse bona Qui erat bonus, sunt bona in
eo quod sunt.
So should not white things be white in virtue of their being because they derive their
being-white-things n from God's Will? By no means! For them, indeed, to be is one
thing, to be white another; and that is because He who caused them to be is good, but
not white; ... ; indeed, they did not originate from the will of a White Person. And so,
Because He who was not white willed them to be white things, they are white sim-
pliciter; but because He who was good willed them to be good things, they are good-by-
virtue-oFtheir-being.

The treatise concludes (50.162-174) with a similar objection (and

solution) about 'being just' (iustum esse).
Thus we see the distinctions previously made applied in their main
outlines (cf. our list p. 22-23 above):
the distinctions, (a) and (b) between id quod est (or ea quae sunt),
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 25

i.e. (the that which is (are) or is a (are) white thing(s) on the one hand,
and the form of being on the other;
distinction (c) between pure esse (esse bonum) and esse album,
iustum etc., i.e., being by some admixture;
distinction (d) between esse aliquid tantum and esse aliquid in eo
quod est;
distinction (e) between two modes of participation (this distinction is
not made explicitly by Boethius himself, as it was to be by Gilbert of
Poitiers; see ed. Haring, nr. 98, p. 208-209);
distinction (f) between Ipsum Esse (= Ipsum Bonum) and ipsum
esse throughout the treatise.
Whoever carefully reads Boethius's De hebdomadibus may easily
understand why this work, together with his (and St Augustine's) De
Trinitate, was so important for forging the linguistic tools that proved
so useful for medieval speculative thought.

NOTES

I Mair 1981, p. 211.

1 See Mair 198 I, p. 211. It was quite understandably viewed later on as a set of axioms
CAxiomenschrift'); see Schrimpf 1966, passim.
1 For Parmenides, see Owens 1975 and De Rijk 1983; for Plato, see Kretzmann 1971
and De Rijk 1985; for Aristotle, see De Rijk 1980, passim.
4 Karl Meiser, Anieii Manlii Severini Boethii commentarii in librum Aristotelis, recen-
suit Carolus Meiser. Pars posterior secundam editionem et indices continens; Leipzig:
Teubner, 1880.
, See also In Periherm. I 41.3-5 and 62.16-19.
6 Cf. Plato, Sophist 237B7-E7 and De Rijk 1985,4.21.
7 DeRijk 1981, pp.146-147.
S Using Kretzmann's translation in Kretzmann 1974, p. 4.
" Rather than "it is always a sign of what holds, that is, holds of a subject" (Ackrill).
III The autonymous use of an expression is indicated in both classical and medieval

Latin by formulas such as id quod dieimus (dieo, dixi, dieilur) or hoc ipsum put before
the expression. (When following an expression such a formula is often used in classical
and Vatican Latin to introduce a term taken over from another language; e.g. 'motor-
cycle quod dicitur' = a so-called 'motor-cycle'); cf Thesaurus linguae latinae VI, col.
982.2-15.
II Where 'it' = 'that which I am speaking of'.

11 'Not properly said to inhere'; lit. 'not said in such a way that it is said to inhere'.
Remember that inherence (esse in subiecto) is one of the characteristics of 'accident'.
I.' 'Such that it may be said' is my translation of quod praedicetur, where the use of the

subjunctive mood should be noted.

26 L. M. DE RIJK

14 It seems useful to distinguish between 'actuality' and 'factuality'. For a sentence such

as 'A man runs' to have meaning, the actuality of running in somebody must be
supposed (or rather 'conceived of'). In order for the sentence to have reference as well,
some factual occurrence in the outside world is required. (Whether or not the occur-
rence is rightly supposed does not matter until the question of truth of falsity is in
order). For the distinction between 'actuality' and 'factuality', see also De Rijk 1981, pp.
28-32.
15 Of course, other nouns (viz. the substantive nouns) signify substantial forms, e.g.

'man', 'tree', 'stone'. The substantive noun has its counterpart in the meaning of the verb
'be', which is called verbum substantivum, to distinguish it from the adjective verbs.
16 For this interpretation, see De Rijk 1985, 14.3 and 15.23; see also p. 10-11 below.

IX The MSS read non est malum, but the Aristotelian passage has twice the indefinite
expression 'non-malum'; at b 15 (ou kakon) and at b 17 (ou kak6i).
19 Used by Aristotle in De into 14, 23b 16. See also below, p. 5ff.

20 'Tunc fit paralogismus secundum accidens quando ali quid prius accipitur coniunctim,
postea divisim. Ut, cum dico: 'Socrates est albus; sed album est color; ergo Socrates est
color', dicit (viz., James of Venice) quod hoc nomen 'album' significat albedinem
coniunctam vel coherentem Socrati, in prima propositione; sed cum dico postea: 'album
est color', significat albedinem per se, idest separatim, ita quod non coniunctam alicui
... Fit quoque idem in aliis; ut, cum dico: 'Socrates est homo; sed homo est species; ergo
Socrates est species', sophisma est secundum accidens secundum ilium [James], quia
'homo' in prima propositione significat illam speciem coniunctam illi individuo, scilicet
Socrati; sed postea, cum dico: 'homo est species', significat illam speciem non ut
iunctam alicui individuo, sed seorsum vel separatim (357.6-23; ed. in De Rijk 1962.
21 Unlike Greek and Latin, most modern languages (esp. English) do not (easily) admit

the substantial use of adjectives (esp. in the singular) and require adding such 'tiresome
makeweights' (as Guthrie A History of Greek Pholosophy V 404, n. 1, labels them) as
'thing', 'entity'. See also De Rijk 1985, 13.1 n. 12 and 14.2, n. 13.
22 So Boethius (75.5-22) takes the expression 'verbum secundum se dictum' to come
down to 'the verb (predicate) apart from its relation to the subject of the proposition',
rather than 'apart from its relation to the subject of inherence'.
2, In my view, the (mostly unconscious!) equating of 'naming' and 'predicating' by
modern commentators. (and a great many of their predecessors) is at the root of quite
of lot of misunderstanding about ancient and medieval doctrines. For Plato's meta-
physical doctrine the issue is discussed in De Rijk 1985, passim, and for Aristotle's
doctrine of the categories of being, in De Rijk 1980, passim. However, James of
Venice's view of the fallacy of accident (see above, p. 6) does start from the semantic,
not the syntactic, approach in that his remarks on the different meanings of 'white' do
not consider the word's acting as a subject or a predicate (see below).
24 For some other examples, see the studies mentioned in the previous note.

25 See Summa sophist. Elenc. I, p. 357.5-359.31 ed. in De Rijk 1962, where the
anonymous author mentions the different views of James of Venice and Alberic of
Paris and then adds his own.
", Rather than 'the same in the substrate', Cf. 'idem (in) numero' = 'numerically the
same'. Of course 'substantially the same' is to be taken here as 'being the same material
thing'.
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 27

'7 A similar use of :,ymbainein (symbebekota) is found in Cat. 7, 7a35-36, where

'being a man' is instanced as an 'accident' of a master (despotes). See also De Rijk 1980,
62.
2S The passage is parallelled by An. Post. I 1, 71 a 17 ff.; cf. I 4, 7 3b31 ft.
20 De Rijk 1980, pp. 18-33.
30 See Oxford Latin Dictionary, art. 'praedico'.
31 Cf. above, p. 4.
32 Note that the Latin expression 'sapi!' is a one-word expression. For the verb's being

a noun (name) when uttered just by itself, see above, p. 4.

33 The verb just as it stands' is my rendering of ipsius verbi.
34 For this interpretation of Aristotle's words see De Rijk 1985, 14.3, n. 11 and 15.23,
n. 8, and also what Boethius tells us (In Periherm. II 74.9-33) about Aspasius
(discussed below, p. 10f.).
35 Cf. ibid. 71.29-30; p. 4 above.
36 E.g., by Thomas Aquinas, In Arist. Periherm., prooemium.
37 This topic is extensively discussed in Nuchelmans 1973, pp. 227-271.
38 This may be compared with what was later called the distinction between 'formal'
and 'total abstraction', or, with what Thomas Aquinas distinguishes as 'abstracte signi-
ftcatum' and 'signiftcatum in concreto' (in his commentary on De hebdomadibus). See
De Rijk 1970,pp.14-15.
30 This opposition runs only partly parallel to that mentioned in 4.1, since the nouns
involved in 4.2 are exclusively non-connotative nouns (names), such as 'man', 'stone',
etc.
40 This is not the case, Boethius states, where (50.8) one should put a full stop after
designare. The next sentence (Sed ... falsitatem) is explained in 50.9-11 (nisi ...
perpenditur); see n. 41 below.
41 II 45.11-14: "Si quis hoc solum dicat, 'homo' vel 'album' vel etiam 'hircocervus':

quam quam ista quiddam significent; quoniam tamen significant simplicem intellectum,
manifestum est omni veritatis vel falsitatis proprietate carere"; ct. 50.17-23.
42 Cf. also in rebus (= among the things of the outside world) nulla illi substantia est.
(II 50.7).
43 II 50.9-18: 'Nisi enim dicatur hircocervus vel esse vel non-esse: quamquam ipsum
per se compositum [non, Migne and Meiser] sit, solum tamen dictum nihil falsi in eo
sermone verive perpenditur. Igitur ad demonstrandam vim simplicis nominis quod omni
veritate careat atque mendacio, tale in exemplo po suit nomen, cui res nulla subiecta sit.
Quodsi quid verum vel falsum unum nomen significare posset, nomen quod earn rem
esse designat quae in rebus non sit, omnino falsum esset. Sed non est. Non igitur ulla
veritas falsitasque in simplici umquam nomine reperietur'. - - - At 50.1 0 the reading
non does not make good sense; moreover, the point consists in hircocervus being a
compound word. Cf. 50.3: 'po suit huiusmodi nomen quod compositum quidem esset,
nulla tamen .. .', and the parallel passage in I 45.1-2, where compositum is actually
read ('ipsum enim quamquam sit compositum, tamen simpliciter dictum .. .').
44 See De into 3, 16bI9-25.
45 See De Rijk 1981 b, pp. 29-30.
46 See De Rijk 1985,2.5,4.21,5.3.
47 Kretzmann 1974,p.16.
28 L. M. DE RIJK

48 Kretzmann 1974, p. 4.
49 Kretzmann 1974, p. 5.
50 Cf. De Rijk 1985, 11.2, n. 12; 14.2, n. 10; 15.23.
51 See De Rijk 1975, pp. 206 f. and Dillon 1977,29,95,255,410.
52 For the decisive role played by the notion of 'immanent form' (or rather, the

Transcendent Form in its immanent status) in Plato's own development, especially in

the Sophist, see De Rijk 1985, passim. Among many others, Dillon failed to see this, in
Dillon 1977, pp. 137 and 274.
5, Boethius speaks of communicata cum pluribus (136.21) or communis omnibus
(137.1).
54 My rendering of unam quamcumque lit. 'just one, which one does not matter'.
55 Cf. De Rijk 1981, esp. pp. 146-56. In the present paper I am correcting it in some
respects. The interpretation of this treatise in the Steward-Rand translation [19261 is
misleading and even untenable in many cases. A clear summary of its content is found
in Gilson 1955, pp. 104-105, and the first modern over-all interpretation is due to
Schrimpf 1966, which presents a penetrating study which is, however, rather unclear in
its exposition (esp. of Boethius's terminology) and even its composition. The author,
who seems unfamiliar with basic semantics, even comes to "discover" a number of
terminological deficiencies in Boethius (pp. 23; 24-26; 28, n. 2) or to force some
bizarre distinction upon him (pp. 16; 21).
5(, Its complement being 'undetermined Matter' (Aristotle's materia prima, Plato's

chora (discussed in the Timaeus»; see De Rijk 1985, 14.3.

57 Steward and Rand (hereafter 'SR') have 'manifestation', which is quite acceptable
and has thc advantage of covcring also all immaterial being other than God. However,
since Boethius in fact discusses throughout the treatise material substances as they
occur in the external world, I would prefer 'materialization' or 'concretization'.
5X The first of them deals with the general nature of 'axiom' or 'common conception'
defined as "a statement generally accepted as soon as it is made"; 40.18-19, ed. SR.
59 For this (quite common) use of Greek autos and Latin ipse, see the lexica and Dc
Rijk 1985,4.21.
60 Also the famous 'Communion of Forms' (Kinds) discussed (especially) in Plato's
Sophist should not be viewed as (mutual) participation, as it is frequently viewed by
modern scholars. See De Rijk 1985, 7.3; Cf. 8.
(,1 See De Rijk 1985.

62 For this opposition (which also concerns the basic difference between Aristotelian

and Platonic metaphysics), see De Rijk 1970, pp. 11-21 and 1981, pp. 32-35.
6.1 I am afraid SR's translation is sheer nonsense: "merely to be something and to be
something absolutely are different". What on earth could be meant by the phrase 'to be
somcthing absolutely' as opposcd to 'merely to be something'? Schrimpf ]19661 is of the
opinion that Boethius's use of three different expressions for 'being' ('esse', 'ipsum esse'
and 'id quod est esse') betrays the complexity of his notion of being. That conclusion is
completely wrong in that (1) ipsum is intended only to bring into relief the notion of
esse (see n. 59 above), and (2) the phrase id quod est esse surely does not mean
anything like 'that which is being', but is used only for grammatical reasons (see p. 20f.
and n. 67 below), as may appear from the fact that it is found only in the oblique form
'( ex) eo quod est esse'. See also De Rijk 1981, 154-155 and n. 22 there.
64 SR's rendering "the latter connotes (italics mine) substance" for substantia signi-
 ON BOETHIUS'S NOTION OF BEING 29

Jicatur is rather unfortunate, since the 'substance' is primarily signified, and the 'acci-
dent' connoted,
6, As usual; see Migne P.L 64, col. 1311 C; SR, p. 42.1; as to my knowledge, also the
medieval commentators of De hebdomadibus all read "omne quod est participat".
no I read aliquolibet instead of the usual reading alio quolibet, which seems to be a bit
clumsy for Boethius.
67 The nominative case esse is quite acceptable, of course, and is used in the second,
third, fourth, fifth and eighth axioms, as is the accusative case, which is used in the third
and seventh axioms. The paraphrastic construction is used after participare, which here
requires an ablative. Note that Greek easily admits all oblique cases (tou einai, toi
einai) equally well as the nominative and accusative cases, to einai. A similar para-
phrasis is found in St Augustine, De Trinitate V, 2.3 and VIII, 4.8. It should be recalled
that Boethius always uses here participare with the ablative case. As is known, classical
Latin distinguishes between the use of the accusativc case after participare (to mean 'to
possess something together with others') and that of the ablative case (to indicate 'taking
a share in something'). In the former case, the object is some whole, in the latter a part
of the whole. A similar use is found in the Greek verbs meaning 'to eat'; with the
accusative they mean 'to eat something all up', with the genitive, 'to eat of' or 'to take a
(some) bite(s) of'. Homer, Odyssey 9, 93-94 presents a nice illustration, where we are
told about the country of the Lotus-eaters. The messengers sent inland were given some
lotus (genitive case) to taste, and "as soon as each had eaten up the honeyed fruit (ace.)
"
6~ One may be reminded of the hot debates (from the 13th century onwards) on the
pluralitas formarum.
6~ Gilson 1955, p. 105.
7() I use 'object' here (as I have been using it before) to mean an entity taken as a

subsistent whole (e.g. stone, tree, etc.) and 'thing' to loosely mean any entity, whether or
not subsistent (e.g., stone-ness, whiteness, stone, white-thing, etc.).
7 I It cannot be stressed too much that here 'actually' refers to actualization or

materialization of a formal nature rather than any occurrence is the external world (=
'factuality').
J2 The passages are quoted according to SR. So 42.60 = p. 42, line 60.
JJ Note that the solution to the main question (see 38.1-4 and 42.56ff.) starts from
the commonly accepted view (supported by Axiom I, which has no semantic import)
that "everything that is tends to Good", from which it is inferred that "things which are,
are good" (see 42.56-60).
74 SR follow Migne and Peiper in adding quoniam est.
7j Pcipcr's punctuation (ut essen!, alba minime) followed by SR and SR's translation is

incorrect in that it fails to recognize the objection. Gilbert of Poi tiers and Thomas
Aquinas did recognize it. A similar objection is raised at 50.162-164.
76 The editions add the superfluous ea quae alba sunt (a gloss on the preceding alba ?),
which was not read by Thomas (or Gilbert?).
JJ Wrongly omittcd by the cditions. It should be read because of the subsequent dative

albis, which requires a preceding dative case referring to things that are white. Cf.
Gilbert's reading and his explanation of the construction (225.9-12, ed. Haring).
JR Rather than 'their being-white', since (as is remarked some lines further on), not
their quality of 'being white', but their being some thing, or subsistence, derives from
God's Will.