The Battle of Giarabub – the First Test of the 2nd AIF

Peter H. Davis

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

UNSW CANBERRA

July 2013
 Table of Contents

Table of Contents ..............................................................................................................ii

Copyright Statement ........................................................................................................iii

Authenticity Statement .....................................................................................................iii

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iv

Declaration ........................................................................................................................ v

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... vi

Abbreviations and Glossary ............................................................................................ vii

Figure .............................................................................................................................. vii

Maps ................................................................................................................................ vii

Tables .............................................................................................................................. vii

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1 ......................................................................................................................... 12

The Siege of Giarabub – Build up to a Battle

Chapter 2 ......................................................................................................................... 39

Operation Galley, the Final Battle for Giarabub

Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 77

Why Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley unfolded the way they did.

Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 94

The Wider Impact of Giarabub

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 107

Bibliography.................................................................................................................. 115

Appendix A ................................................................................................................... 111

Appendix B ................................................................................................................... 112

ii
 Copyright Statement

I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to
archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the
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Date 1 July, 2013.

Authenticity Statement

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Signed
Date 1 July, 2013.

iii
 Abstract
In 1911 Italy seized Libya, then in 1935 Mussolini’s Italian forces occupied
Ethiopia. In June 1940 Mussolini declared war on the British Empire with designs of
advancing into Egypt with his sights set on the strategically significant Suez Canal. The
Italian 10th Army stalled close to the Egyptian – Libyan border, confronted by a
numerically inferior Allied force attacking west from Egypt, along the Libyan coast. Far
to the south in the Sahara Desert there existed an alternative route for military forces
travelling east or west. This route transited a fortress called Giarabub located at the
southern end of a string of Italian forts spaced along a 300 kilometre north–south barbed
wire fence.1

Allied troops finally conquered the Giarabub garrison following a siege from
which the defenders had little hope of escape. This thesis seeks to answer the question
of why this garrison behaved so differently from all the other Italian forces, who
generally capitulated rapidly, involved in the First Libyan Campaign. Further questions
address the wider impacts resulting from this battle for the Italians and Australians
involved. The garrison’s tenacity appears to have been largely a result of the
determination of its leader, Lieutenant Colonel Castagna, to never surrender.

The methods used have included study of all the available literature including
contemporaneous Italian and British records located in archives in Italy, Australia and
Britain. Interviews with survivors of Mussolini’s regime and younger Italians have
further added to the body of knowledge.

Many inequities between the Italian and Allied forces at Giarabub have been
identified and analysed as reasons for the final dominance by the Allies, such as
disparity in weapons, training, logistics, transport, communications and strategic and
tactical leadership ability. Numerous mistakes in the Australian Official History and
others have also been identified. This thesis goes some way to redressing these and fills
the gap pertaining to Giarabub in Australian historiography.

1
MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 33, 34.
iv
 Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge
it contains no materials previously published, or written by another person, nor material
which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma
at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is
made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others with whom I have
worked at UNSW or elsewhere is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work,
except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or
in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Peter H. Davis
1 July, 2013

v
 Acknowledgements

My sincerest thanks goes to my family for its endless patience and support in allowing
me to pursue my passion for Australian military history, especially to my wife Narelle
for moving with me to Italy for three months, and learning a new language. The
archivists at the National Archives of Australia, in Canberra, the Royal Artillery
Museum, Imperial War Museum and The National Archives in London, the ever helpful
staff at the Australian War Memorial were all of great assistance with access and
advice. The staff at the Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME) in
Rome gave me privileged access to Castagna’s handwritten notes and Giarabub files.

Associate Professor Craig Stockings deserves my sincere thanks as my principal

supervisor. Dr John Connor’s work as my assistant supervisor is also much appreciated.
Mr Chris Dawkins of the ADFA library performed sterling work with bibliographical
assistance. Ms Bernadette McDermott’s ADFA administrative support has always been
much appreciated. Thank you to my patient proof readers, Dr Angela Davis and Ms
Margaret Hassall and to Ms Monica Davis for encouragement and invaluable help with
formatting.

Obtaining the Italian perspective was the most challenging aspect of this thesis
and to this end my thanks go to Romana and Mario Fior who shared their memories of
life under the Nazis in Italy whilst Romana translated Fattore’s and Castagna’s books.
Lugano Rochelli likewise patiently translated the Italian Official History. In Italy,
numerous villagers from Sismano and Todi helped me with contacts, stories and
translating, especially Giuseppe Veneziano and Andrea Rafenelli. Luigina Pastorelli
from Avigliano persevered through days of my questions. The English Language
School staff in Todi likewise did many hours of patient translating of archival records
from Rome, whilst sharing their Italian hospitality with me.

Lastly, Major John Thurgar, until recently of the Australian Army History Unit
and my mentor for Kokoda expeditions, deserves special mention for his
encouragement and motivation in support of my studies of military history.

vi
 Abbreviations and Glossary
ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corp
BTE British Troops in Egypt
Caposaldo Stronghold, in a large defensive position
KRRC Kings Royal Rifle Corps
LAD Light Aid Detachment (mobile vehicle mechanics)
LRDG Long Range Desert Group
LRDP Long Range Desert Patrol
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
Presidium Main fortress
RHA Royal Horse Artillery
Ridotta Small fort, generally isolated
WDF Western Desert Force
2nd AIF Second Australian Imperial Force

Figure
Figure 1 Aerial view of Giarabub taken 16 April 1942. .................................................. 9

Maps
Map 1 The Western Powers in Africa, 1939. ................................................................... 5

Map 2 Giarabub’s defensive system............................................................................... 46

Map 3 Allied artillery objectives 21 March 1941. ......................................................... 61

Map 4 Allied battle plan for 21 March, 1941. ................................................................ 64

Tables
Table 1 Estimated number of Allied soldiers at Giarabub 21 March, 1941. .................. 41

Table 2 Disposition of defenders and weapons on 21 March 1941. .............................. 47

Table 3 Allied artillery fire plan 21 March, 1941. ......................................................... 60

Table 4 Comparison of troop and vehicle numbers. ...................................................... 85

vii
 Introduction

On 21 March 1941, during the opening phases of the North African Desert
campaigns of World War II, soldiers of the 6th Australian Division captured the ancient
Libyan desert fortress of Giarabub. The garrison of some 2,000 Italian (and Libyan)
troops defending this well–prepared position withstood months of siege, deprived of
food and medical support, until being overrun by a well–trained but inexperienced
Allied force. Importantly, the tenacity of the Italian defenders marks this battle as all but
unique within the context of the First Libyan Campaign of 1940–41. For the Australians
this was an important engagement. It represented the first shots fired in anger by
Australian troops in World War II. It was a test, therefore, not only of the training,
preparation, leadership and equipment of certain elements of the 2nd AIF, but also of the
fighting abilities of the ‘sons of ANZAC’1 legend, as perceived in the consciousness of
the Australian public and within the minds of the first volunteer formations of the 2nd
AIF.2

Congruent with a more general Italian awakening of interest in the operational

history of World War II, the first aim of this thesis is to help fill the clear
historiographical gap in the published record with respect to Giarabub within the North
African campaigns of World War II. Despite its clear significance to Australian military
history and historiography, Giarabub is largely unknown to scholarly communities and
the public alike. The nine month Allied effort to capture this Italian fort remains largely
absent from the modern historical record. From a publishing standpoint it would appear
that when compared with the other battles of North Africa, such as Tobruk’s dramatic
siege, Bardia’s spectacular rout, and El Alamein’s decisive effect, Giarabub has been

1
Craig Stockings, Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, University of New South Wales Press,
Sydney, 2010, p. 95.
2
Ibid, pp. 93–115.It is now known as Al–Jaghbub. However in this thesis the Australian Official
History’s name will be used. It has also been known occasionally as Jarabub, as described in Sir Ian
Hammerton’s The War Illustrated, Amalgamated Press, London, 1941, Vol 4, p. 90; Gavin Long,
Australia in the War of 1939–1942 – To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, pp. 287–
304.
1
neglected as no more than a ‘wilderness side show’3 as described in the Australian War
Memorial’s contemporary book, Active Service. The timing of the much larger scale
Battle of Bardia in particular, in January 1941, overshadowed Giarabub, as Giarabub
did not fall until March 1941. Further, Giarabub did not have Bardia’s complexity of
armoured and maritime support. The battle for Giarabub was fought in an extremely
isolated region, far from the public gaze. It was also a relatively small scale
engagement. It never captured the Australian or other Allied public imagination at the
time – there were better propaganda opportunities available. These combined factors
help explain Giarabub’s obscurity – they do not, however, belie its importance.4

The small amount of literature that has been produced concerning Giarabub is
almost solely restricted to side references in larger works. Many such books draw
heavily on Gavin Long’s Official History, Australia in the War of 1939–1942 – To
Benghazi, which itself, despite 17 pages of narrative, but in line with its purpose as an
official history, simply records events, without analysis.5 Other large and well known
works of North Africa, such as The Crucible of War, Wavell’s Command – The
Definitive History of the Desert War, make no mention in the text of Giarabub nor its
battle, with not even a notation on a map. Likewise, the Oxford Companion to
Australian Military History has no entry for this battle. Giarabub rates barely two pages
in The Proud Sixth – An Illustrated History of the 6th Australian Division 1939–1946.
Twenty-one pages of Never Late – The 2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion are devoted
to this, their first battle; however, this work draws heavily on Long. Alternatively, the
Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles simply summarises Long’s account in two pages.
There is only one historical article, ‘The Siege of Giarabub’ by Tom Richardson, which
aimed to integrate published English language histories to determine the significance of

3
The Military History and Information Section, AIF (Middle East), Active Service with Australia in the
Middle East, The Board of Management of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1941, p. 26.
4
Peter Dennis et al, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University Press,
South Melbourne, 2008; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 26.
5
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287– 304; http://www.AWM .gov.au/histories, (accessed 29 May, 2013);
Examples of books drawing on Long, To Benghazi,[Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History;
Clarke, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles; Dickens, Never Late, The 2/9th Australian Infantry
Battalion 1939–1945, Australian Army History Publications, Loftus, 2005; Bill Spencer, In the Footsteps
of Ghosts, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1999; Mark Johnston, The Proud 6th, An Illustrated History of
the 6th Australian Division 1939 – 1946, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008.]
2
Giarabub in World War II, and no English language book has even been written solely
about Giarabub.6

None of this scant literature represents a concerted attempt at historical analysis

or in depth scholarly inquiry, nor provides an insight as to the Italian perspective at
Giarabub. The Italians went so far as to make a movie, entitled ‘La saga di Giarabub’, in
1942, depicting Giarabub’s besieged defenders as heroes fighting on regardless, with no
hope of escape. There is significant unexplored territory surrounding the Italian story,
which is in stark contrast to the typical portrayal of Italian military performance in
English language narratives. The commander of the Italian force at Giarabub,
Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Castagna, first published a memoir in 1950 entitled La
difesa di Giarabub. This book, written in a now seldom used, and therefore difficult to
translate, bureaucratic Italian style, gives a chronological account of events at Giarabub.
It is a key source and one yet to be utilised by English language historians. In 2006
another Italian language book, by Fabio Fattore entitled Dai nostri inviati a Giarabub
was published. Fattore’s book indicates ongoing interest in Giarabub in Italy (see
Chapter 4). It should be noted that Fattore wrote his book largely based on Castagna’s
published work, which was in part sourced from reports written by Castagna following
his repatriation to Italy post World War II. Castagna’s work was based on his
recollections following his incarceration as a prisoner of war in India, some five years
after the Battle of Giarabub, therefore detracting from its accuracy.7

The second aim of this thesis, in addition to helping to fill the clear
historiographical gap with respect to Giarabub, in the published record of the North
African campaigns of World War II, is to examine a range of important questions that
remain as a consequence of the lack of attention traditionally paid to this battle. For
example, to what extent does an analysis of Giarabub give us an insight into later battles

6
Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War, Wavell’s Command – The Definitive History of the Desert War,
Cassell &Co, Great Britain, 2001; Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, p. 20; Johnston,
The Proud 6th; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 51–72; Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 179–180;
Tom Richardson, ‘The Siege of Giarabub’, SVSS document, AWM , 2010.
7
Salvatore Castagna, La Difesa di Giarabub, Longanesi & Co, Milan, 1950; Fabio Fattore, Dai nostri
inviati a Giarabub, Mursia, Milan, 2006. Tom Richardson, The Siege of Giarabub, SVSS document,
AWM , 2010; ‘La saga di Giarabub’, Argo Films, 1942, www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQeYT4CNKW8
(accessed 19 November 2012).
3
in North Africa? Why was this battle, especially with regards to Italian tenacity, so
different from others of the First Libyan Campaign? What was it that kept the Italians
from surrendering for nine months – was it simply their inability to escape or was
Giarabub unique in other ways? How was the conduct of this battle different from other
battles in Operation Compass? How well did the Australians perform, and why? What
does this tell us about the early 2nd AIF, its preparation, training and operations? Then
lastly, how does Giarabub add to the overall understanding of the First Libyan
Campaign in 1941?

In order to begin to provide answers to these important questions, an

understanding is first needed of the strategic context, course, conduct and consequences
of the battle together with the reasons why Giarabub was considered worth fighting for.
The Italian Fascist Party leader, Benito Mussolini, seized power in 1922 amidst a
deteriorating social, industrial and economic situation with a dream of returning to the
heydays of the ancient Roman Empire. Mussolini’s ambitions were emboldened by
Hitler’s emerging dominance in Germany and increasingly energised following Hitler’s
renunciation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935 and the ongoing conquests by Imperial
Japan in Manchuria. The Italians had colonised Libya, their first 20th Century African
possession, in 1912. The proximity of Libya to Italy across the Mediterranean made it
an attractive target. Mussolini further expanded that influence with the invasion of
Ethiopia in October 1935. Occupation of Egypt and Sudan was then deemed essential to
allow fulfilment of Italy’s aspirations to Empire status (see Map 1, p. 5.).8

Of significant strategic importance within Libya, the ancient fortress village of

Giarabub, complete with an airport and an adequate supply of underground water, is
located deep in the Sahara Desert at the important crossroads of an alternate route to the
coastal route which was ultimately used as the primary access in the First Libyan
Campaign. Its location nearly 300 kilometres south of the coast gives it a fearsome
climate of extreme heat, icy nights and blasting sandstorms. Being close to Egypt’s
border, Giarabub, at the southern extreme of a line of oases, had significant value, from

8
Glenn Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign 1940–41, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2006, p. 6;
Christopher Duggan, Fascist Voices: an Intimate History of Mussolini’s Italy, Random House, London,
2012, p. 65; Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, a Biography, Reprint Society, London, 1963, p. 33.
4
a logistics viewpoint (an important consideration in North Africa), to Italy’s designs on
Egypt.9

Giarabub

Map 1 The Western Powers in Africa, 1939.

Source: Glenn Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign 1940–41, Australian

Army History Unit, Canberra, 2006, p. 6.

With France about to collapse under the German onslaught, Mussolini felt that it
was now clear to him which side was going to prevail. On 10 June 1940 he declared war
on Britain and her Empire, satisfied that Britain’s surrender was imminent. One of
Mussolini’s main motivations for going to war was to release Italy from what he saw as
Italy’s Mediterranean prison, the gates of which were guarded by the British and French
navies at Suez and Gibraltar. A poorly planned and executed Italian advance into Egypt

9
Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 10; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287, 288; Active Service, p. 26;
Minutes of War Cabinet meeting 20th September 1940, The National Archives, London, CAB/66/12/11;
W.G. Jackson, The North African Campaign 1940–1943, B. T. Batysford, London and Sydney, 1975, p.
145; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 179; M. Montanari, Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, Le
Operazioni in Africa Settenrionale, Sidi el Barrani (Giugno 1940 – Febbfaio 1941), 2nd Ed, Rome, 1990,
p. 18.
5
followed, with the aim of capturing the strategically significant Suez Canal. The
following month Giarabub was occupied by 2,000 Italian and Libyan troops under
Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Castagna. During that same month, July, a British
force was sent out across the desert to capture the fortress. A shortage of water,
however, in the extreme summer heat forced a halt and ultimately this initial Allied
probe withdrew. This aborted attack marks the opening of the preliminary stage of the
actual Battle of Giarabub. By 13 September 1940 the Italians had occupied the Egyptian
towns of Sollum, and coastal Sidi Barrani, but at this time the Italian 10th Army
Commander, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, called a halt to resupply and reinforce his
advance. With Graziani located 500 kilometres to the rear, the Italian 10th Army
dispersed into seven defensive localities spread over 50 kilometres of featureless desert
from Sidi Barrani southwards. These Italian positions were too distant to be mutually
supportive in the face of an attack, and the entire defensive arrangement lacked depth.10

Meanwhile, following the first unsuccessful Allied army attempt to capture

Giarabub, General Sir Archibald Wavell, British Commander in Chief Mediterranean,
decided to deploy a motorised infantry company of the 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps
from the 7th Armoured Division at Siwa, located in Egypt, approximately 70 kilometres
south east of Giarabub. These British troops proceeded to dig and wire defences across
access routes to Giarabub from the west. This infantry company was subsequently
replaced by B Squadron of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment which
arrived at Siwa on 3 December 1940, led by Captain F. H. Brown. This deployment
marked the start of the Australian involvement at Giarabub.11

Further north, Western Desert Force had been limited, up to this point, to
harassing the Italian advance into Egypt. On 7 December 1940 General Wavell
authorised Western Desert Force, under the command of Lieutenant–General Sir
Richard O’Connor, to initiate a counterattack against the Italian Sidi Barrani positions
known as Operation Compass. The result for the Italians was a disaster. In what became
known as the Battle of the Camps, some 20,000 prisoners were captured along with 180

10
The size of the British force sent to attack Giarabub in July 1940 is not known, although Long later
describes it as a column. Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 36; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287,
288; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 18-21, 107, 123.
11
Long, To Benghazi, p. 288.
6
guns and in excess of 60 tanks, all at a cost of only about 600 Allied casualties. The
Italians were emphatically driven from Egypt, and fell back to Bardia and Tobruk.12

Back in the vicinity of Giarabub, on 11 December, 96 Australians headed out

from Siwa to Garn el Grein, one of the small enemy frontier posts, located some 50
kilometres north-northeast of Giarabub. The Australians engaged the post, occupied by
Libyan colonial troops loyal to the Italians, with Vickers machine guns, Bren guns and
rifles, but were briskly shelled, then strafed by three Italian aircraft. Captain Brown
withdrew his troops back to Siwa. Five days later Brown’s squadron attacked an Italian
convoy, destroying two trucks and forcing the abandonment of four others, which the
Australians promptly requisitioned for their own use. The following day Lieutenant
Colonel M. Fergusson, the Commanding Officer of the 6th Australian Cavalry
Regiment, arrived at Siwa with his Regimental headquarters and Major J. E. Abbott’s C
Squadron. The arrival of Fergusson coincided with the isolation of the Italian 10th Army
at Bardia, following O’Connor’s advance west across the Libyan frontier on the heels of
his action at Sidi Barrani. Although the subsequent Battle of Bardia was a much larger
engagement, being on a divisional versus battalion scale, the numerous similarities with
the Battle of Giarabub make it useful for comparison in this study.13

With Italian–occupied Bardia virtually under siege, the Italians chose to abandon
their smaller frontier outposts. Garn el Grein was one of the first to be forsaken. This
left Giarabub cut off from resupply by land. A nearby Italian airfield remained
operational, however, unbeknown to the Allies. At this point Wavell expected that the
Italians at Giarabub would simply run out of supplies, so the Australian truck mounted
cavalry were ordered only to observe the fort and ensure that no supplies reached the
isolated Italian garrison.14 (see Figure 1, p. 9.) The small Australian cavalry force based
at Siwa, now numbering around 200 by the first week of 1941, had neither artillery nor
aircraft, but was reinforced with the addition of a troop of Bofors guns, and an engineer

12
Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 51, 52.
13
Long, To Benghazi, p. 289; Craig Stockings, Badia, Myth, Reality and the Heirs of ANZAC, UNSW
Press, Sydney, 2009; S. Castagna, Relazione Relativa Ai Fatti D’Arme Di Giarabub …Mano Avuto …
Conseguenza la Gaduta Del..., Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito, hereafter cited as Battle
of Giarabub Report, AUSSME, Rome, File DS 1160A/2/12.
14
Long, To Benghazi, p. 290; Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
7
detachment. With orders to increase the pressure on the Italians at Giarabub, Lieutenant
Colonel Fergusson set about subduing the isolated posts located around the fort to
reduce the distances and area to be covered in order to encircle the defenders. Following
the conclusion of these raids on the outlying posts, and their resulting abandonment,
subsequent action could be directed entirely at Giarabub itself.15

From this point the routine of almost daily Australian raids forced the Italians to
stay behind their wire. All the while the Australians were gaining knowledge of the
Giarabub defences, in preparation for an eventual assault designed to take the fortress
once and for all. While this was happening, it became apparent that supplies were still
getting into the fortress via aircraft. Fergusson, frustrated, could do nothing to stop this
as no Allied air support was available. On 4 January 1941, a British troop of four 25–
pounder guns of the 8th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, arrived to reinforce the
Australians outside Giarabub, bringing the Allied force to 456. The arrival of the 25–
pounders enabled the destruction of Italian aircraft on the ground, and from then on
Italian resupply was restricted to airdrops on the soft ground near the Giarabub Fort
itself. On 11 January yet more reinforcements arrived. A detachment of the Long Range
Desert Group (LRDG), equipped with vehicles specially modified for desert operations,
was deployed in the area west of Giarabub, with instructions to report any enemy
activity to Fergusson. Allied intelligence had by this stage established that the Giarabub
Fort was garrisoned by 1,200 Italian troops plus 755 Libyans, leaving the Allies still
outnumbered by four to one.16

On 7 March, 1941 Fergusson was seriously wounded by artillery fire and replaced by
Major J. E. Abbott, in command of Allied forces pressuring Giarabub. At this stage
Operation Compass had driven the Italians from northern Cyrenaica. Wavell’s
Headquarters decided that Giarabub needed to be taken immediately so as to free troops
for service in other theatres, and to finally clear out the last vestiges of the Italian Army
on his left flank. Brigadier George Wootten, commander of the 18th Australian Brigade,
which was a part of the recently arrived 7th Australian Division in Egypt, was ordered
by Wavell to use his brigade to assist the Australian cavalry force at Giarabub to capture

15
Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
16
Long, To Benghazi, p. 293.
8
the fortress. Wootten began planning immediately. He concluded that available
transport would limit his reinforcement to one infantry battalion plus one company, with
enough supplies to last only ten days. Further,

Fort with wired

perimeters

Figure 1 Aerial view of Giarabub taken 16 April 1942.

Source: http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/042697, accessed 10 June 2010.

he had no tanks and no aircraft. His plan envisaged a three day movement to Giarabub
from Mersa Matruh, four more for the reconnaissance and capture of the position, and
three for the return journey. It was a tight schedule.17 A note from Wootten, written after
the battle indicates his thinking following his initial reconnaissance:

17
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 294, 295; Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, p. 608.
9
 It appeared that the ground vital to the enemy’s defence of Giarabub was the
(Tamma) heights (approx. 200ft high) situated 400 to 600 yards south of the
village. These dominated the whole of the defences. The enemy’s main defences
lay to the north, northeast and northwest of this and within approximately 1,500
yards. Any advance by us from these directions by day would be under direct
observation from the heights mentioned…Any attack from the north, northeast or
northwest of this would have to penetrate the outposts, then deal with the defence
in depth and then finally with the southern heights which were themselves a
tough object to attack owing to their being wired and fortified and to their
steepness and inaccessibility. Such an attack would probably have necessitated a
large expenditure of artillery ammunition, a further attack at dawn on the second
day to get the high ground and would have resulted in heavy casualties. On the
other hand the vital ground was not protected by any depth from the south and its
altitude would obviously very largely defilade any attack from the south from fire
from the…north…There was also another high feature (Ship Hill) south–east,
some hundreds of yards from the vital ground and outside the enemy’s wire,
which if occupied by us would give good observation to support an attack from
the south…Subject to the ground to the south proving suitable…and being able to
get the necessary infantry, guns etc. into position…the commander decided upon
this course.18

The stage was set for the Battle of Giarabub to commence.

In order to fulfil its dual aims of filling the historiographical gap and answering
a number of important questions, this thesis has consulted a range of sources, such as
Italian, British and Australian participants’ diaries, notes, orders, maps, recordings of
interviews, films, letters and photographs. These are located in archives in Italy, Britain
and Australia, such as Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME) in
Rome, The National Archives, the Royal Artillery Museum, the Imperial War Museum
in London, the Australian War Memorial and the National Archives of Australia in
Canberra. Two field trips to North Africa were to be undertaken to review the
topography and gain firsthand knowledge of the conditions of the battle ground.
Although the author visited Italy for three months to facilitate the European and African
research, the civil war in Libya in 2012 precluded any visits to the Giarabub battlefield.

This thesis is structured into four thematic chapters. Chapter 1 sets the basic
narrative and analytical framework for subsequent investigations. It analyses the lead up
to the final battle in detail, including the long Allied siege, and in so doing uncovers a
number of omissions and errors in the current historical record. Chapter 2 investigates

18
Quoted in Long, To Benghazi, p. 295.
10
what occurred during the subsequent and ultimately successful Allied attack on
Giarabub, known as Operation Galley, revealing for the first time accurate casualty
statistics for both sides and the details surrounding a little known Allied friendly fire
disaster. Chapter 3 discusses why the siege of Giarabub and the subsequent Operation
Galley unfolded the way they did, including investigating why the Italians held out for
so long, and why it took five months for the Allies to prevail. Chapter 4 considers what
effects the Giarabub campaign had on the First Libyan Campaign in general, its effects
on later Western Desert Force operations for the Allies and on the Italian forces,
including its impact on the Italian home front.

The Battle of Giarabub is a neglected episode within the First Libyan Campaign.
An analysis of events at the fortress provides the scholarly attention it deserves, and in
so doing, allows for a better informed historical understanding of the early desert
campaigns of World War II.

11
 Chapter 1

The Siege of Giarabub – Build up to a Battle

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a basic narrative and analytical

framework for subsequent investigations. In addition, it uncovers and addresses a
number of shortcomings in existing historical interpretations of Giarabub, such as the
assertion that Giarabub was nothing more than a ‘wilderness side show’.1 The chapter
achieves this through an analysis of the first phase or ‘siege’ of Giarabub, which
preceded Operation Galley, from both the Italian and Allied perspectives. The siege is
first placed in physical context through an examination of Giarabub’s geographical
location, landscape, history, access, climate and the Italian defensive position. Second,
study of the opposing leaders and their forces provides a necessary understanding and
framework of the opposing forces. Finally, issues associated with the ‘driving in’ of
outlying Italian posts, the gathering of intelligence by the Australians preparatory to the
battle and the difficulties that the Italians faced are investigated.

The oasis of Giarabub is located 283 kilometres south, by road, of the Libyan
coastal city of Tobruk and 30 kilometres west of the Egyptian border, on the northern
edge of the Great Sand Sea in the vast and forbidding Sahara Desert. The oasis is
situated in a basin some 25 kilometres long running north–south, and six kilometres
measured east to west. Remarkably, for the Sahara, south of Giarabub there are brackish
wetlands and marshes. The Giarabub basin is surrounded by a rocky ridge, leaving its
floor as much as eight metres below sea level. To the north of this ridge lies a large
plateau. The terrain to the south and west of the oasis is predominately broken hilly
country. About six kilometres from the eastern entrance of the Giarabub oasis lies a salt
bog, which merges into a substantial area of scrubby vegetation on flat sandy country.
Further west the landscape rises steadily to 30 metres above sea level. The 100 metre
high rocky ridge or escarpment to the north completely dominates the depression which
was five kilometres from a small village. The Italian wartime fort at Giarabub was

1
AIF (Middle East), Active Service, pp. 24-29.
12
located on this higher ground, 22 kilometres from the eastern entrance of the oasis, on
sandy country set amongst rocky knolls. The fort and village of Giarabub were
established, complete with wells, cultivated gardens, palm trees, and a white domed
mosque in the late nineteenth century. The majority of the buildings were grouped
together on high ground overlooking the oasis and joined together by a town wall some
four metres high. This wall had only three large access doors. It was constructed of
rough stone and was up to 4.3 metres thick. The village of Giarabub was a maze of
narrow streets with a main road down the centre.2

Of strategic significance to the siege and the following battle, there was an
operational airport, complete with hangars, located 2.8 kilometres north of Giarabub
town. There was also a rudimentary disused airfield west of the Italian fort. Some 97
kilometres southeast of Giarabub, on the Egyptian side of the frontier, lay the large
oasis of Siwa, which in 1941 had a resident population of some 4,000 Berbers. Siwa
became the main base for the Allied forces which came to blockade the Italian post, and
later for the attacking force which finally captured Giarabub. The attackers subsequently
established a forward base 13 kilometres southwest of Melfa, 16 kilometres east of
Giarabub.3

Aside from its strategic importance to the Allies and the Italians, in 1940
Giarabub was also the centre of an important religious fraternity known as the Senussi.
The Senussi were followers of Mohamed Ben Ali el Senussi (1787–1859), who was
buried in the Giarabub village mosque. Senussi practised asceticism, being the self–
denial of all pleasures. The mosque itself became the most sacred site of the indigenous
inhabitants of Cyrenaica, the Senussi Arabs, an issue that was to become significant
with respect to Italian relations with the local people during the lead up to and
throughout the conduct of military operations at Giarabub. Such was its significance, it

2
Ministro Della Difesa, Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, La Prima Controffensiva Italo – Tedesca in Africa
Settentrionale, 15 Febbraio – 18 Novembre 1941, Ufficio Storico, Tipografia Regionale Rome, 1974. p.
58; ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
3
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The
National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial,
Canberra, 1952, p. 287; ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
13
was later impressed upon all Allied soldiers thrown against Giarabub that no damage be
done to the mosque, in order to maintain a good relationship with the local inhabitants.4

Since the settlement of Giarabub village its political history had been turbulent.
In 1855 the village was given by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to the founder of the
fraternity, who made it his headquarters. El Senussi sought to return Islam to what he
perceived as its original purity by freeing it from modern heresies and innovations. A
basic tenet in this respect was a polite avoidance of civilised races. The Senussi doctrine
became firmly established among the Arab tribes of North Africa and was taught in the
Zavies (instructional colonies or universities) with the fraternity stretching from Arabia
to Morocco. Despite this basic principle, the Senussi were embroiled in war against the
French in 1901, the Italians in 1911, and the British in 1915. They were on the losing
side in each case. Following World War I the Senussi pursued an intermittent guerrilla
war against the Italians until 1925. Despite all Senussi efforts Egyptian authorities gave
possession and command of Giarabub to the Italians following a border agreement
signed on 6 December 1925. Actual Italian occupation of the oasis area began on 7
February 1926. With this occupation the Senussi were compelled to abandon Giarabub,
reluctantly. From 1929 to World War II the Senussi were relentlessly harried and
scattered by the Italian occupiers, generating a burning desire to return to their holiest
place – the mosque containing the tomb of Senussi. Italian treatment of the locals during
this period was to have far–reaching consequences in the days leading up to the final
battle for the oasis.5

During their occupation, physical access to Giarabub for the Italians was limited
to a few rough roads and by air. The relatively small numbers of Italian wheeled
vehicles in North Africa in 1940 were not capable of transiting the trackless desert sands
thus limiting land access to the road south from Tobruk and the road southwest from
Siwa. The Italian garrison had no tracked vehicles as the supply of Italian armour was
limited in quantity and reliability, as well as being unsuited to the vast Saharan

4
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 58; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 26; Peter
Badman, North Africa 1940–1942, The Desert War, Time–Life Books, Sydney, 1988, p. 47; Long, To
Benghazi, p. 287.
5
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 58; ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No.
16’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
14
distances. Supply was greatly assisted by Italian aircraft which used Giarabub as a
refuelling point en–route to the colonies in Italian Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The
nearest railhead was Mersa Matruh on the coast some 300 kilometres away – and on the
wrong side of the Egyptian border from the Italian perspective. The Senussi had long
used camels and donkeys for transport in this area, as the Libyans still do, but these
were of negligible military significance. As an aside, this author was offered donkeys as
a means of transport to visit Giarabub from Egyptian Siwa in 2011.6

The Australians and their allies, like the Italians, had road vehicles and aircraft
for use in the Western Desert. They had a major advantage however, in that they had
vehicles capable of effective operations over the vast distances, and the sands of the
Sahara, without the need for roads. In particular, the Allies had the Long Range Desert
Patrol (LRDP) equipped with heavily modified 30 cwt trucks. The men of the LRDP
were highly trained and specially selected. Their extraordinary skills and the vital part
that the LRDP played in the Battle of Giarabub are examined in subsequent chapters. 7

The extent of Australian use of aircraft in the subsequent siege of Giarabub was
not as crucial as it might appear. It was useful but not decisive in the final outcome of
the battle. Brigadier G. F. Wootten, commander of ‘Wootten Force’ which was created
on 10 March, 1941, and tasked with the capture of Giarabub, sought air support or co–
operation from General R. N. O’Connor, Commander of the British Western Desert
Force (WDF) but was told by O’Connor: ‘Please don't ask me for any planes. I have
only two Wellington bombers with which to prevent Rommel bringing his reinforcing
units and supplies into Tripoli. If I give you one, I will only have one left.’ 8 Two
Lysander air–ground support aircraft were in use by the Allies at Giarabub in January,
during the final battle in March 1941 for aerial photography and map verification prior
to the battle, and for close observation during the final day. Gavin Long, the Australian
Official Historian of World War II, mistakenly states only one was available during the

6
Duncan McNab, Mission 101– The untold story of five Australian soldiers’ extraordinary war in
Ethiopia, Pan McMillan Australia, Sydney, 2011, pp. 155, 161; Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva
Italo, pp. 58, 59; This author, was offered a three day trip by donkey from Siwa to Giarabub in December
2011. Civil war in Libya precluded safe travel however.
7
‘Summary of Operations at Giarabub, 1941’, AWM 54 519/2/20; One of the original vehicles used in
the Sahara in WWII is displayed in the Imperial War Museum, London.
8
Long, To Benghazi, p. 294.
15
final battle. The 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry (6th Cavalry) diary entries show this
to be incorrect as both aircraft flew. Yet these Lysanders were not decisive. They were
slow heavy machines, good for reconnaissance, but only lightly armed with a few
bombs and two machine guns.9

The climate of Giarabub’s isolated corner of the Sahara was a major factor
influencing health, morale and logistics, whilst the weather on the final day of the battle
for the oasis was one of a number of key determining factors. Temperatures in the
March–April period can fluctuate by up to 38o Celsius in a day. Rain is rare. The most
dramatic feature is the wind. The wind storms of the Sahara are known as ‘Khamsin’ in
Arabic. The local inhabitants have a saying which describes the dread which it instils in
those who have experienced it; ‘If the khamsin blows for three days in succession a man
has the right to kill his wife; five days, his best friend; seven days, himself.’10

The initial Italian defensive line in the Western Desert, from the Libyan coast to
Giarabub, was based on a barbed wire fence built in 1931 by General Rodolfo Graziani
for the purpose of restricting the movement of lightly armed Senussi rebels. Graziani’s
Fence, as it was known, was some 300 kilometres long, 5 metres high and 3.7 metres
wide stretching from Sollum in the north on the coast, to Giarabub in the south. The
fence traced the Egyptian–Libyan border and was reinforced with isolated fortified
posts scattered along this line from which armoured patrols sallied to patrol the fence.
Aircraft also patrolled the fence from airfields constructed along its length. The fortified
posts were named ‘ridotta’ by the Italians, such as Ridotta Maddalena located half way
between Giarabub and Sollum. The English translation of ‘ridotta’ is ‘redoubt’, meaning
‘military outwork or fieldwork, usually square or polygonal and without flanking
defences.’11 Whilst other historians have described redoubts as being common in the
17th century as a means of static defence, the modern equivalent Italian structure was
still built without flanking defences and provides some insight into anachronistic Italian

9
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cav. Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National
Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
10
http://113squadron.com/id35.htm accessed 3.4.2012; Khamsin is Arabic for fifty, referring to the notion
that the wind blows for fifty days each year; Bruce Moore (ed), The Australian Oxford Dictionary,
Second Edition, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2004, p. 691.
11
Moore, The Australian Oxford Dictionary, p. 1081.
16
defensive thinking in 1940. These ridotta were located up to 50 kilometres apart,
making timely mutual support impossible across the Saharan sands. The reasons for this
spacing by the Italians will be discussed in Chapter 3, as it was one of a number of
deciding factors in the outcome of the looming battle. Even though modern mechanised
warfare was being conducted by Germany at this time, Mussolini declared that ‘the
world was moving toward an age of ‘walled nations’’12, in February 1940.13

Australian knowledge of the layout of the Italian defences at Giarabub

developed over the months of the siege from 3 November 1940 to 10 March 1941. By
19 March 1941, two days before the final battle, Wootten Force was armed with a
comprehensive picture of the Giarabub fortifications and occupants. This knowledge
was greatly boosted by a deserting Libyan soldier’s statement which corroborated
details previously garnered from air photographs, radio intercepts and numerous patrol
reports. The locations of Italian tactical barbed wire, tank traps, access points,
minefields, strong points, buildings and their uses, calibres and locations of artillery and
machine guns were all plotted on an Australian battle map using a 50 yard grid and
disseminated to all commanders involved. Such detailed knowledge of the dispositions
at Giarabub was an enormous tactical advantage.14

Giarabub’s local defence was based upon four Caposaldos or strong points, (the
English translation of the Italian term) numbered one to four, each with multiple
machine guns and artillery pieces, spaced around the central fortress (see Map 2, p. 46.).
In detail the Italian garrison at Giarabub, as estimated by Australian intelligence on 19
March 1941, possessed 100 Breda machine guns, twenty 47mm guns, three 65mm guns,
two or three 77mm guns and four truck mounted Breda machine guns, for anti–aircraft
defence. The Italian commander of the Giarabub fort, Major Salvatore Castagna,
described his defensive plan as a four kilometre perimeter of defensive positions
divided into four sectors, each reinforced with 47mm guns and 20mm machine guns,
with the whole area surrounded by barbed wire. Minefields and antitank trenches were

12
Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 79.
13
Jackson, The North African Campaign 1940–1943, p. 16; David Atkinson, Nomadic Strategies and
Colonial Governance, in Joanne Sharp et al (ed), Entanglements of Power-Geographic Domination,
Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 114, 115.
14
‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
17
sited on the northern and eastern sides. Castagna had advanced observation posts at the
outlying villages of Melfa, Bahar El Arrascia and Baharia, plus blocking posts at Garet
El Barud, Garet El Gazal, Garet En Nuss and Gara Del Diavolo. Inside this perimeter
was the landing ground, north of Giarabub town.15 The village of Giarabub stood north
of these defensive positions. An example of the depth of Australian knowledge of these
Italian dispositions, based on an intelligence summary of 19 March 1941, was as
follows:

High ground South – enclosed by wire. Manned by some 300 men with 20 Breda
MG’s, 1 possibly 2 x 77mm guns (in sq 3722), 1 or 2 65mm guns in same sq, 2 x
47mm guns, area permanently held. The hills are mostly very steep and the
enemy approach and occupy the area by steps in Squadron 3722, then walk along
hills to posts in sq 4219, then along bases of hills to steps leading from point
386156 up to posts about sq 3715. There are 30 men holding the strong point in
sq 3722.16

The two opposing forces facing each other at Giarabub were commanded by
energetic and highly motivated leaders. The Italians were led by Major Castagna who
came from southern Italy, and who was known for his particularly obstinate personality.
Interestingly, Long spells Castagna as ‘Costiana’ and gives his rank as Colonel. Both
are incorrect. Castagna was a passionate believer in the Fascist cause, but somewhat
bitter at missing out on what he thought were earned promotions due to not fitting the
Fascist ideal of being a family man as he was single. His posting to such a remote place
as Giarabub also left him feeling somewhat dejected. Castagna, however, threw his
heart into forging the defence of Giarabub.17

The Australians were initially led by Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Fergusson

D.S.O., M.C., Commanding Officer (CO) of 6th Cavalry, who developed the first plan of
attack on the Giarabub fortress. Fergusson had served in Gallipoli and France in World
War I, then in the peacetime Australian militia in artillery and cavalry units. On 9
March 1941, Fergusson was seriously wounded during a reconnaissance of the

15
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 59.
16
‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
17
The 6th Cavalry Report for the period spells Castagna as ‘Costina’. Long did spell Castagna correctly in
his hand written draft; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cav. Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Long, To Benghazi, p. 293; Dickens, Never Late,
2005, p. 57.
18
Giarabub defences and evacuated to Egypt. At this point he was replaced by Major J. E.
Abbott, previously one of his squadron commanders. On 10 March 1941 Brigadier
Wootten took command of the composite force gathering to attack Giarabub which was
henceforth known as ‘Wootten Force’. Fergusson’s untimely wounding and evacuation
meant that his extant plans for the attack on Giarabub went with him to Egypt. Wootten,
thereafter, was left to develop his own plan. There is little question of his ability
however, as he went on to ascend to the rank of Major General, commanding the 9th
Australian Division in Papua against the Japanese. Major T. J. Daly was Brigade Major
of Wootten’s 18th Brigade and of Wootten Force at Giarabub. An indication of Daly’s
ability as a leader is likewise evidenced by his future career path – he went on to
become Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, Chief of the Australian General Staff
from 19 May 1966 to 18 May 1971 during the Vietnam War. Lieutenant Colonel J. C.
“Jock” Campbell who commanded the British 4th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (4
RHA) at Giarabub was also a dynamic leader, and was later awarded the Victoria Cross
for service at Sidi Rezegh on 21 November 1941. He was also the instigator of the
famed “Jock” columns comprising armoured cars, artillery and truck–borne infantry
later used so effectively to harass Italian forces throughout the Western Desert.
Campbell was killed in action in Libya on 26 November 1942. The last important Allied
commander at Giarabub was Lieutenant Colonel J. E. G. Martin, Commanding Officer
of the 2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion, which supplied the bulk of the infantry for the
Giarabub attack. Martin was another talented Australian leader, going on to command
19th Infantry Brigade. Further attributes and other aspects of the commanders on both
sides, are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.18

Initially the Italian Forces at Giarabub were far superior, numerically, to those of
the Allied force as was also the case in three major battles in North Africa during this
period: Bardia, Tobruk and El Alamein. On 13 December 1940, following Italian

18
Jock columns were the equivalent of a modern Task Force, that is, a group of selected units, formed for
a specific task. ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Australian Cavalry to A.D.M.S. 6 th Australian Division for
March 1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79; Fergusson arrived at 63 General Hospital, Egypt on 10
March; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cav. Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National
Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Dennis, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 608;
A. Ekins and I. McNeil, Fighting to the Finish, the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1968–1975,
Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012, p. 824;
http://www.pictureaustralia.org/apps/pictureaustralia?action=PADisplay&mode=display&rs=resultset–
7571041&no=8 , photo captions, accessed 16.3.2012; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 49, 57, 289.
19
withdrawals from the Libyan – Egyptian border posts located consecutively from the
north of Sceferzen, Maddalena, Vescechet el Heira and Garn el Grein to Giarabub,
Castagna reported that he had a total of 2,100 troops stationed at the Giarabub fort. The
garrison was made up of 1,350 Italian and 750 Libyan soldiers.19 These troops
comprised the following:

4 Companies of G.A.F. (Guardia alla Frontiera, i.e. Italian special

frontier guards) 20
5 Companies of Libyan infantry
1 Assault Artillery Company with fourteen 47mm guns
1 Platoon of Libyan general infantry
1 Artillery Battery with four 77/28 guns
1 Artillery Section with two 65/17 guns
1 Artillery Battery with sixteen 20mm machine guns
1 Signals Group
1 Medical Group
1 Quartermaster Group21

The numerical balance at Giarabub gradually changed over time. Allied forces at
Giarabub were built up slowly following a failed British expedition which set forth in
July 1940 to capture the oasis. The British force withdrew, only a day away from their
objective, due to extreme summer heat and a shortage of water. The aborted attempt was
followed in September by the deployment of one company of the 1st Battalion, King’s
Royal Rifle Corps (1 KRRC) at Siwa, where it dug in and wired defences across routes
to the west of Siwa, that is between Giarabub and Siwa, with the aim of preventing
Italian access to Siwa and also to keep movements in the vicinity of Giarabub under
observation.22

19
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 59; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME,
Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long states 2,000 men, Long, To Benghazi, p. 290.
20
http://www.vecio.it/cms/index.php/guardia–alla–frontiera/322–storia–della–guardia–alla–frontiera,
accessed 13 April 2012.
21
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Italian company, platoon,
section and group establishments vary, and do not correspond to Allied unit establishments.
22
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287, 288.
20
 The 1 KRRC company, resident at Siwa, was insufficient to force the Italians
out of Giarabub in July 1940 so a strategy of containment and isolation, driving in of
outlying Italian posts, siege, then, when this failed, direct assault of Giarabub was
pursued. On 3 November the RAF bombed one of Castagna’s outposts at Garn el Grein
killing two and wounding 18 men. The next day Castagna flew to Cyrenaica to meet
General Rodolfo Graziani to discuss Giarabub’s situation. The meeting followed an
attack on the Carabinieri (Police) Station at Gialo Oasis by a force of ‘armoured cars’
(probably the LRDP), some 280 kilometres west of Giarabub. Gialo was strategically
significant to Giarabub as it was the closest major settlement to the west, and on the
only access route from that direction. Castagna recommended that all access points
made through the Libyan – Egyptian border fence by the British be more effectively
closed off. This exchange showed the degree to which the Italian commanders were
thinking in terms of a fortress mentality – walled forts and a fenced border – even
though British mobile units were clearly penetrating the fence at will. The meeting
finished with Graziani promising fighter planes and armoured cars to Castagna, but they
never materialised.23

On 3 December the 1 KRRC company was replaced by B Squadron 6th Cavalry,

led by Captain F. H. Brown, at Siwa, so beginning direct involvement by Australian
forces. The 1 KRRC troops rejoined their battalion and went on to take part in the Battle
of Sidi Barrani. To this point the 6th Cavalry had been in training with the 6th Australian
Division, its parent formation, at El Amiriya on the northern Egyptian coast. The
training of the Australian cavalrymen is covered in more detail in Chapter 3. In El
Amiriya 6th Cavalry had been partly equipped with machine gun carriers and obsolete
tanks; however, before departing for Siwa, these were replaced with 15 cwt and 30 cwt
trucks which could travel faster, and would be more durable in the harsh desert
conditions.24 Siwa offered water and limited supplies of meat and vegetables, but other
military supplies had to be trucked from Mersa Matruh on the coast, necessitating a
weekly convoy of seven trucks for the five weeks during November and early
December. C Squadron, under Major Abbott, and Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson’s
Headquarters (HQ) Squadron of 6th Cavalry, a Bofors troop, four 25–pounder guns of a

23
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 223.
24
Long, To Benghazi, p. 288.
21
British regular regiment under Captain O’Grady, and 32 engineers joined B Squadron
bringing the force up to 456 men in total. Out of this force, 200 men served as a mobile
arm, 115 were artillerymen and signallers and 109 were stationed at Melfa and Siwa
Bases. The Giarabub garrison still outnumbered their attackers by 4:1.25 An indication of
Fergusson’s rapid grasp of the situation at Giarabub and his energetic activity upon
arrival in the Giarabub area is given in a letter to Morshead dated 6 December 1940:

The enemy expects attack from the North. Ref inst 3.[Reference Instruction
Number 3. viz, To destroy any enemy force attempting to leave and detect
preparations for departure.] My appreciation of the courses open to the enemy
is:–
To leave with his whole force or,
Delay my force with a portion of his, and leave with that portion of his force
which can be transported.

There are between 30 and 60 lorries in Giarabub. The garrison is stated to be

2000. Unless additional transport is sent, there is little likelihood of a whole force
being evacuated unless my squadrons are attacked and defeated.

Every ruse which has occurred to me has been adopted to persuade the enemy
that there is a considerably larger force than two squadrons watching him.26

From December 1940 Australian pressure increased with systematic driving in

of Castagna’s outlying posts north of Giarabub. Abbott’s B Squadron made the first 2nd
AIF raid against enemy lines in Libya when they cut phone lines near Maddalena Post
on 11 December, and returned to their base at Siwa with information about the enemy
defences.27 On this same day another force of 96 men from Fergusson’s garrison
travelled north all night in the bitter cold, under Captain Brown, to attack the Italian
outpost of Garn el Grein. On approaching the post Libyan troops could be seen. Brown
sent one troop to cut the fence and phone line to the north, and one troop to the south to
cut the fence, pass through and attack from the west, whilst a third force was to advance

25
2,100 Axis soldiers versus 456 Allied soldiers per figures as described here. Johnstone quotes 10:1. The
date of C Squadron and 6th Cavalry HQ etc’s arrival at Siwa is unclear. The ‘Summary of Operations at
Giarabub’ has them in action on 11 March attacking Garn el Grein. 6 th Division records have them
arriving on 18 March. Long has them arriving on 3 March; ‘Summary of Operations at Giarabub, 1941’,
AWM 54 519/2/20; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cavalry Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Johnstone, The Proud 6th, p. 62; Long, To Benghazi,
pp. 288–292; ‘8th Royal Artillery War Diary, 1940 – 1943’, The Royal Artillery Museum, Woolwich,
London, Box 437.
26
‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
27
AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 26.
22
to a position 900 metres east of the post armed with Vickers machine guns. A vigorous
Italian response with truck mounted infantry caused the northern troop of Australians to
withdraw. About an hour later the Australian Vickers machine gunners were shelled
briskly and attacked by three Italian fighter aircraft. Long noted:

After the aircraft had gone VX4682 Trooper W. J. Tope, (of Foster, Vic)
discovered that he had been wounded and, in the next two days, five shell
fragments and a bullet were removed from his groin and buttock. Thus, so far as
is known, Tope was the first soldier in the second AIF to be wounded in action
against an enemy on the ground, although enemy aircraft had already caused
casualties among Australians in camps and rear areas both in England and the
Middle East.28

Simultaneously, Italian artillery shelled one of Brown’s troops, under the

command of Lieutenant G. C. Corey, in the west and Brown’s own headquarters. After
an hour Brown decided to withdraw, as he felt his small force could not effectively
continue the attack. On their arrival in the afternoon another of Brown’s Troop
Commanders, Lieutenant E. J. Ryrie, led his vehicles forward to investigate, was fired
upon, and saw about 100 Italian reinforcements entering the post in trucks. The
Australian force departed for Siwa that evening.29

During the following days Fort Maddalena was assaulted by Allied troops and
Garn el Grein was attacked for a second time. According to Castagna, the British tactics
then changed from direct attacks on posts to setting ambushes for mobile Italian
columns. Castagna still had air transport freely available, but the noose was tightening.
More bad news arrived by telegram from the headquarters of Italian forces in Libya
concerning the routing of the Italians far to the north near the Mediterranean coast at
Sidi el Barrani, Solum and Ridotta Capuzzo by O’Connor’s Western Desert Force.
Some 40,000 Italian prisoners were captured over the period 12 to 17 December. In
Castagna’s sector, which now had a front of 200 kilometres, the RAF intensified their
incursions. Italian vehicle columns destined for Giarabub near Bardia were attacked
with some soldiers killed and others wounded.30

28
Long, To Benghazi, p. 289.
29
Ibid.
30
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 223.
23
 On 11 December, according to Fattore, Castagna was ordered to abandon the
small forts at Maddalena, Garn el Grein and Sceferzen, and to concentrate his men at
Giarabub, which he accomplished between 16 and 18 December. However Castagna
himself stated that on 13 December, after the fall of other small outposts at Buq Buq
and Sidi Omar, he received orders to regroup all troops from the forts of Garn el Grein,
Uescechet el Hetra, Maddalena and Sceferzen, north of Giarabub. This would appear to
be the more likely version. In any case, the outlying forts were lost and the siege of
Giarabub itself closed in.31

Major Castagna, in an account of events at Giarabub written by Fabio Fattore,

describes in dramatic terms how the “English” launched their first attack with armoured
cars on the fort at Garet el Berud, 6 kilometres north of Giarabub:

The Libyan guards opened fire with machine guns and hand grenades. The
garrison at that time had no larger guns capable of piecing armour. Our
nationals and the Ascari [Libyan soldiers] fought with great bravery, with not
much time to rest. Altogether they were under fire for 80 hours. The day after at
the other posts of Melfa, Barra Arrascia, Saniet and Deffa (on the coast, south
and west of Giarabub some enemy armoured vehicles were sighted).32

On 13 December 18th Brigade’s Commander, Brigadier Leslie Morshead,

communicated a plan of attack on Giarabub developed by Lieutenant Colonel M. A.
Fergusson to 1st Australia Corps HQ. For this attack Fergusson requested two British
armoured squadrons, each consisting of two troops of medium tanks, two troops of light
tanks and one troop of carriers plus one medium tank and one light tank, together with
squadron and regimental headquarters. This plan was rejected however, due to a
shortage of serviceable British armour.33

The opportunity for the second assault, on the outpost of Garn el Grein arose on
16 December 1940, following receipt of an intercepted Italian radio message. The
message, decoded by Australians at Siwa, was from the Italian commander asking for
reinforcements. A reply was received informing Castagna that a convoy would leave

31
The telegram read ‘Carate di far ripiegare au Giarabub le truppa dai presidi staccati.’; S. Castagna,
‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 223.
32
Fattore, Giarabub, p.191.
33
‘Message: Morshead to 1st Australian Corps, 13 December 1940.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
24
Garn el Grein at 4.30 pm that afternoon. Captain Brown was ordered directly by
Western Desert Force, to attack the Italian convoy. This second message, however, did
not reach Brown until after the Italian reinforcements convoy had arrived. The
cavalrymen travelled 197 kilometres across the desert and set their ambush astride the
track leading north from the outpost. The Italian convoy duly appeared at 7.30 pm and
was fired upon for 75 minutes with Vickers and Bren guns. The Italians fought back
with machine guns and anti–tank fire. Before withdrawing, the Australians destroyed
two trucks and acquired four others that the Italians had been forced to abandon.34

Far to the north the larger contest between WDF and the Italian 10th Army was
unfolding. By 17 December, around 40,000 Italian troops had been isolated in Bardia
and ordered by Mussolini to ‘hold fast’ and await reinforcements. Giarabub was now
isolated 320 kilometres to the south, connected to 10th Army by nothing more than a
string of abandoned posts and a lonely windswept and very porous barbed wire fence.35

Back at Siwa, Fergusson learnt of the Italian abandonment of Garn el Grein and
many of the other border posts when he sent Australian detachments and who found
them deserted of men, but with useful quantities of equipment and supplies left behind.
From this point on Fergusson’s task was to keep Giarabub, with its few remaining small
outposts still standing to the east, southeast and south under observation, whilst
preventing Castagna’s resupply. Wavell expected that as the Italian garrison’s supplies
dwindled, so too would their resolve to resist, forcing their surrender. Fergusson,
however had only about 200 men, other than those maintaining the Siwa base, to
implement the blockade, and no aircraft. Opposing him, the Italian garrison fielded
numerous guns and 2,100 men in a position with considerable defensive potential, with
the only approaches being over open country and devoid of cover.36

34
Long, To Benghazi, p. 289.
35
Much of this fence remains today, and is visible from space on public domain satellite imagery.
Stockings, Bardia, p. 86.
36
The Australian War Memorial holds a tattered Italian tricolour flag taken from an office at Garn el
Grein with the names of Private S. Lang (who was attached to 6th Cavalry), and Major Brown penned in
the centre of it; Flag in AWM collection, RELAWM 32854; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian
Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London,
WO/06/2137; Long, To Benghazi, p. 290.
25
 Yet the Italians had considerable difficulties of their own. On 18 December
Castagna calculated that he had only enough food for 12 days’ rations for the Italians
and 20 days’ worth for the Libyan soldiers, forcing him to reduce the rations by half for
the Italians and by one third for the Libyans. He made an exception for tea as he knew
that the Libyans would not function without it. He removed coffee from the Italian’s
menu however, to conserve sugar. Castagna explained to his higher headquarters that
the air dropped supplies were insufficient.37 An inventory of ammunition taken on the
same day at Giarabub stated that Castagna had only enough ammunition for the 20mm
machine guns and 47mm guns, for six days of fighting. He therefore urged economy of
use and the rationing of ammunition. Castagna reported that he had only two days’
supply of hand grenades. Note that this is in stark contrast to the amount of Italian
ammunition salvaged from the fort by the Australians three months later on 21 March
1941 – 900,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 17,950 rounds of Breda 20mm and
4,000 rounds of Breda 47mm plus much other materiel such as 70 vehicles. This
disparity in quantities of ammunition cannot be accounted for by the later meagre Italian
resupply. Either Castagna was understating the figures to add weight to his requests for
more support, or one set of figures is incorrect. On the same day Fergusson’s small
force was bolstered with the arrival of a Bofors 40mm Anti–aircraft Group from the 4
RHA at Siwa.38

Despite the small size of Fergusson’s force, during the period 20–29 December,
B and C Squadrons of 6th Cavalry successfully blocked road communications to
Giarabub. Indicative of the often conflicting reports that bedevil historical accounts of
military actions, there are three different versions of an action that took place on 24
December during the siege of Giarabub. Australian records state that Brown’s squadron
drove off a half hearted attack by a dozen or so Libyan troops from the post at Melfa, 30
kilometres east of Giarabub, just inside the Libyan border. At the same time the
defenders of the Italian El Aemra post southeast of Giarabub were also forced to retreat

37
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 226; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS
1160A/2/12; Long states that half rations were instituted on 20 December, 1940; Long, To Benghazi, p
293.
38
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 228; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12;
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The
National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
26
to Giarabub. Castagna’s version, recorded five years later, related that on 24 December
the Australians attacked Melfa with armoured cars and that the Libyan soldiers tried to
defend the position until they were forced to retreat back to Giarabub. He stated that the
retreating troops hid a radio with its operator in a cave to provide further reports. Recent
Italian author, Fattore, however, states that the post was temporarily retaken by a mobile
Italian force yet there is no mention of this in Australian records. For his part,
Fergusson, in his contemporary report, stated that Melfa was visited by his men after the
raid and the post showed no signs of occupation and nor had a nearby Egyptian position
seen any movement there. Fergusson’s account would appear to be the most credible
version. Significantly, in relation to the behaviour of the combatants during this period,
an Australian account states: ‘The enemy troops at Melfa pretended to surrender twice,
and when approached took up their arms and opened fire.’39 This episode may well have
helped to provoke the incident in which it was claimed that Australian soldiers shot
Italian soldiers immediately after their surrender on 21 March, 1941, as discussed in
detail in Chapter 2.

On Christmas Day, 1940, Brown’s B Squadron moved down the track towards
Giarabub from the northeast along a dry gully or wadi, which the Australians had
named Pipsqueak Valley. This name was bestowed on account of a small 47mm
(incorrectly described a number of times as 44mm in the Australian Official History)
Italian gun, nicknamed Pipsqueak by the Australians. As they moved through the area
Brown’s men came under sharp fire from field artillery and machine guns. A
subsequent attempt by Brown to raid nearby Italian gun positions at night was
unsuccessful due to vigilant Italian sentries. The would–be raiders withdrew without
loss. Later that night, however, Sergeant K. W. Walsh lost his way, was wounded and

39
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 290, 291; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS
1160A/2/12 and map No. 2; ‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5;
‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; An interesting
comparison can be made here with an incident at Bardia nine days later, when on 3 January, Italian
prisoners emerged from a captured post with hands raised. An Australian, Captain David I. A. Green,
began walking towards them. When about 20 metres distant, a lone Italian soldier climbed the steps from
the post, raised his rifle and mortally wounded Green. This incident is similar to another that occurred in
the same theatre. An Australian corporal was shot from a dugout by an Italian officer during the Battle of
Bardia. A later inquiry found he had not broken the rules of war, however the corporal’s platoon had
‘burst in fury’, killing all the defenders of the post; ‘Battalion Report on Operations at Bardia on 5
January, 1941’, AWM 52 8/3/11; Johnson, 2/11th Australian Infantry Battalion, p. 65. in Stockings,
Bardia, p. 257; P. J. Hurst, My Army Days, AWM MSS1656, in Stockings, Bardia, pp. 210, 211.
27
captured by two Libyan soldiers. When interrogated by Castagna, Walsh gave nothing
away. Castagna however claimed that the prisoner had important papers with him.
Walsh was flown by the first available plane to 10th Army’s headquarters in Benghazi
and then on to Rome.40

The next day Abbott’s C Squadron drove an Italian detachment from a well
located in the southeastern part of the Giarabub depression, by using anti–tank rifles
against the low stone–walled sangers (firing positions). This was Castagna’s final
outpost on the eastern edge of the oasis, leaving the Australian cavalrymen free to
concentrate on Giarabub itself. From this point on Australian raids and reconnaissance
patrols went forth almost daily, each extending a little further. This probing enabled the
Australians to continue to build their knowledge of the Italian positions whilst the
Italians no longer ventured from beyond their wire. The sight of any Australian vehicle
on the escarpment tended to draw unrestrained fire from field and machine guns, despite
Castagna’s pleas for economy.41

According to Castagna, on 26 December Allied armoured cars attacked the

Italian observation post of Cesbaia, west of Giarabub. The Libyan garrison withdrew
back to Giarabub when they realised their position was hopeless. On hearing of this
Castagna says he sent a column to stabilise the situation, allowing the lookout to be
used once more. The same report describes a further attack on Garet el Barud on 28
December during which an Australian soldier was captured and sent to the 10th Army
Headquarters. This would appear to be the same incident in which Sergeant Walsh was
captured on 25 December. Castagna’s accounts were written some five years after the
battle, whereas the Australian accounts are based on contemporaneous documents such
as message logs, orders and reports. It is likely, therefore, that the events Castagna

40
He was not the first Australian POW in WWII. Three Australians soldiers were captured in British
Somaliland at the Battle of Tug Argan Gap on 15 August 1940, whilst numerous RAN sailors were
captured in 1939. Greg Swinden, Navy at War: Sailors Behind the Wire, in Wartime, Official Magazine
of the Australian War Memorial, Issue 62, Autumn 2013, Hardy Grant Media, Neutral Bay, pp. 24-29;
http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/farflung/firstpows.html accessed 22 June 2012; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of
Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, p. 290; Fattore, Giarabub, p.
224.
41
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, pp.
290, 291.
28
described as occurring on 26 and 28 December were actually the same as those already
discussed.42

Despite successful Australian raiding, by the last days of 1940 it had become
apparent that the plan to starve the Giarabub garrison into submission through exclusion
of food or ammunition was not going to succeed in the short term. Large aircraft were
regularly landing on the Giarabub airfield, bringing in supplies. In response Fergusson
asked for British fighter aircraft, even preparing a landing ground at Garn el Grein for
their use. None was forthcoming. In spite of the long siege, the Australians realised they
would need to attack Giarabub itself. To this end General Wilson ordered the
Australians to establish an advanced position at Melfa, for the storage of rations, fuel
and 25–pounder ammunition. Melfa was henceforth developed as a base; however this
was no easy process. The local water, for example, was considered unfit for drinking so
supplies had to be laboriously trucked from Siwa, 130 kilometres southeast of
Giarabub.43

Once Melfa was established as a depot, the Australian cavalrymen camped well
forward of it, and using either a small detachment, one squadron, or both, continued to
scout towards Giarabub on an almost daily basis. This regularly drew Italian artillery
fire which further added to the Australians’ knowledge of the Italian defences. By 29
December Fergusson was satisfied that his knowledge of the Italian strength was
accurate and that the time was ripe to capture the fort. He thus submitted a second plan
for an attack on Giarabub to General Wilson, requesting 6th Cavalry (including A
Squadron without its armour, although with four carriers if the decision was made to
send tracked vehicles), a small detachment of engineers, a six–gun troop of 18 pounder
guns (a battery if no Bren carriers were to be used), two infantry companies, an Army
Service company and a company of Field Ambulance.44

42
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
43
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 291, 292.
44
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 290, 292; ‘Reconnaissance Report of Giarabub, Lt. Col. Fergusson, 29
December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
29
 Fergusson was refused his requested reinforcements but his force slowly grew
nonetheless. The Bofors troop had arrived, then a detachment of engineers.45 Fergusson
was ordered not to commit his forces to an attack at this stage. He therefore kept up his
efforts to drive in the few remaining outlying Italian posts, making it possible to confine
the enemy to a diminishing area. This in turn meant that he could now use smaller
parties for reconnaissance and raiding, who had shorter distances to travel, thereby
reducing the strain on his supply lines. Fergusson considered that his force’s frequent
appearances on the edge of the dominating plateau, in view of the Italians, would cause
them to expend ammunition, perhaps irreplaceably. These frequent appearances also
had the benefit of promoting the idea that the Australians were far more numerous than
only the two 6th Cavalry squadrons. Further, the Australians began to build an
expectation in Castagna’s mind that an attack should be expected to come from the
north, in keeping with his defensive plan. This erroneous assumption was to have grave
consequences for the Italians during the final battle.46

Fergusson’s many reconnaissances had, in fact, ascertained that a force could be

led to Giarabub by night from the southwest. He requested air photos of the area
covering the edge of the escarpment to the north, northwest and northeast of the
Giarabub village.47As such planning unfolded, the Italian outpost of Garet el Barud was
attacked on 31 December 1940. According to Castagna, the Australian penetration
initially succeeded until he sent a fast response group to the western side of the post, a
Libyan group to the eastern side and a truck to the nearby aviation camp. The struggle
went on until the afternoon when the Italians overcame the Australians, after which the
attackers withdrew with their dead and wounded. Castagna states that they destroyed
two radio trucks and captured a Ford truck, for the loss of two Libyans killed and some
wounded. The Australian versions of such events were somewhat at odds with
Castagna’s account. The attack is described by Long as a reconnaissance with the aims
of photographing the fort and advancing close enough to the airport to damage supply

45
See Footnote 25 on p. 22 regarding confusion over actual arrival date.
46
Long, To Benghazi, p. 290; ‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5;
Dickens, Never Late, p. 57.
47
‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
30
aircraft, which led to a ‘brisk engagement’48. Two men, Trooper J. S. C. Fuller and
Corporal E. F. Trounce, were killed in the action. They were the only fatalities in 6th
Cavalry, with six others wounded, during the whole Giarabub campaign. Trounce’s
body was buried in the sand by the Italians and recovered by the Australians once the
siege ended in March 1941. Fuller and Trounce were the second and third members of
the 2nd AIF to be killed by ground forces in World War II, following the death of
Corporal E. Goble at Bardia.49 Two men were also wounded including Corporal Riedel,
the photographer, whilst three vehicles were disabled. One of the disabled vehicles, a
1½ ton Ford truck, which had bullet holes shot in its fuel tank, was quickly repaired,
under Australian fire, by two Italian aviators named Fermanti and Santarossa. The pair
proudly drove this modern vehicle back to the Giarabub fortress and presented it to
Major Castagna. Following this engagement Brown’s exhausted squadron returned to
Siwa to rest and wash. They had been in the dusty desert continuously for nearly three
weeks. Brown’s men had hot meals delivered from Melfa; however, strict rationing of
water and frequent dust storms had added to their discomfort.50

On 5 January reports of the capture of Bardia, with the loss of more than 40,000
prisoners, arrived at Giarabub.51 Hoping to capitalise on this bad news for the isolated
Italians at Giarabub, RAF Lysander aircraft dropped leaflets encouraging the Italians to
surrender:

We have occupied Sidi el Barrani capturing 40,000 prisoners and much

materiel. We have not yet counted the prisoners from Bardia. Every resistance
from you is useless. Do you want to be destroyed by our 80 ton tanks? The
Empire does not forgive. Surrender!52

Meanwhile the Australian 18th Infantry Brigade had arrived in Egypt on 31

December, under the command of Brigadier Morshead. From 7 January to 12 January
Morshead, with his Brigade Major, Major Thomas Daly, Lieutenant Colonel J. E. G.

48
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, p.
292.
49
A photograph shows Trounce’s body being transported for burial in Johnston, The Proud 6th, pp. 62,
63.
50
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 225; Long, To Benghazi, p. 292.
51
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 225; The number captured is estimated at around 36,000 prisoners, in Stockings,
Bardia, p. 276.
52
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
31
Martin, the CO of the 2/9th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Verrier, the CO of the
2/10th Battalion, Captain G. D. T. Cooper and Lieutenant Colonel Horace Strutt, an
artillery officer, reconnoitred the Giarabub area. Following his inspection Brigadier
Morshead favoured the current strategy of starving out the garrison, with good reason.
Giarabub remained an excellent defensive position. Its thick walls still stood and there
were plenty of Italians still behind them.53

Fergusson received news from Cairo on 9 January, via an intercepted radio

message, that an Italian force was leaving from Benghazi to relieve the besieged
Giarabub garrison. Fergusson’s cavalry, less one troop left to maintain the siege, set
forth immediately on a 32 kilometre front scouting for the Italian convoy. Aircraft were
summoned and the convoy destroyed, terminating any further thoughts of
reinforcements for Castagna. Morshead went forward with the cavalry on 9 and 10
January to reconnoitre once again, each time drawing Italian artillery and machine gun
fire. On the next day, 11 January, three Italian aircraft added to the daily skirmish. On
the same day a New Zealand detachment of the LRDP, under Captain D. E. Steele,
arrived and was tasked with patrolling west and northwest of Giarabub, watching the
tracks west of Giarabub and passing information back to the Australians by radio. This
force, although small in number, produced a projection of force out of proportion to its
size, due to its ability to move freely across the desert, unhindered by the need for roads.
The LRDP’s ability to attack behind enemy lines or gather intelligence on enemy units
became legendary. Over the next five days more Australian detachments drove forward
drawing fire. On one of these trips O’Grady’s guns destroyed an aircraft on the
Giarabub aerodrome, marking the last landing of a supporting flight for the Italians.54

On 1 February 1941, Brigadier Wootten took command of 18th Brigade whilst

Morshead took command of 9th Australian Division. The composite Allied force now
gathering in the vicinity of Siwa became known as “Wootten Force”. This growing
Australian presence had begun to concentrate as it became apparent that the Allied siege

53
Dickens, Never Late, p. 57.
54
Tim Moreman, Long Range Desert Patrol, The Western Desert 1940–43, Osprey Publishing, Oxford,
2010, p. 4; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 292, 293.
32
operations were not succeeding and that a larger force would be required to break the
Italian garrison.55

For the Italians, still no supplies could be brought in by vehicle, and after the
recent raid on the airfield, aircraft could no longer land. Some limited supplies were still
being delivered, dropped from aircraft on the sand north of Giarabub.56 Further bad
news arrived on 21 January 1941. Castagna told his men: ‘Tomorrow you will hear on
the radio that Tobruk has fallen. The defence has done a good job, but do not let this
news weaken your spirit. Defend Giarabub, better times will come.’57 Castagna
reiterated how important Giarabub had become, protecting the road to Gialo, the next
Italian outpost, 280 kilometres to the west, and the flank of what remained of the 10th
Army at Gebel.58

Despite Castagna’s determination, for the Italians the situation continued to

decline with every day. On 7 February the British broadcast news of the fall of
Benghazi. Anthony Eden wrote to Winston Churchill saying: ‘never have so many
soldiers surrendered to so few.’59 Italian radio broadcasts no longer reached Giarabub,
increasing its isolation. Fattore states that on 9 February Castagna gained contact with
the Kufra post commander, who told him that they would not be able to send any more
supplies to Giarabub. Kufra was 640 kilometres south of Giarabub and resisted until 1
March when it was captured by Free French forces emanating from Chad.60 Castagna’s
own report states that this message came as a telegram from Supreme Command, not
Kufra, on 8 February. Castagna was told: ‘We can no longer provide food: resist as long
as you can and then surrender and ask the honour of arms. Don’t go back since every
road is controlled by enemies.’61

55
The first known written reference to ‘Wootten Force’ is ‘Wootten Force Movement Table No. 1.’, 17
March, 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/5, although it is likely that the name was used from the first day of the
force’s existence; Long, To Benghazi, p. 294.
56
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
57
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 226.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Andrea Molinari, Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special forces 1940-43, Osprey Publishing, Oxford,
2007, p. 41.
61
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
33
 By this point Castagna’s resistance at Giarabub was becoming the beginning of
a legend back home in Italy, where good news stories were in very short supply. Such
was Giarabub’s growing fame that Castagna’s superiors planned to deliver more
supplies on 17 February to support his stand. Yet more trouble was brewing, however,
in the form of desertions by his Libyan soldiers. On 7 February three Libyans
surrendered at Melfa, then from 7 – 17 February a flood of some 600 more Libyans
similarly offered themselves up as prisoners. Castagna had asked his superiors for
permission to release the Libyans who were wishing to leave, as once they had heard of
the collapse of 10th Army in Cyrenaica, he could not physically stop their departure. He
wanted to avoid a mass desertion with the Libyans taking their arms. Castagna still
sought to treat his Libyan soldiers as best he could, even though he could see they were
suffering obvious signs of malnutrition. He tried to maintain their ration of tea and food,
and the payment of their wages to their families. Castagna also tried to encourage them
by telling them that Cyrenaica would be recaptured and that they should continue to
fight with the Italians, but it was useless. With the general rout of Italian Cyrenaica, the
Libyans were worried about their families. Most of the Libyans decided to leave, and
did so in groups of up to 50 at a time. On 15 February 218 of them were rounded up by
the Allies as they either walked north towards the coast, or southeast towards Siwa.
They reported their situation as desperate, but there was no talk of an Italian surrender at
Giarabub.62

The Libyan prisoners described to the Allies how the food supplies in Giarabub
were becoming scarce. By now rations for individual Italian soldiers was reduced to 100
grams of army biscuit and half a tin of meat per day, enough to last until 25 February.63
Sixty years later the Sicilian soldier Benedetto Pipitone remembered only one thing
about Giarabub – the terrible hunger:

We would share a ration of bread and a tin of meat between four of us. We had
to kill the camels and even the donkey which pulled up the water from the well.

62
‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Fattore, Giarabub, p 226; Long, To
Benghazi, pp. 293, 294.
63
To what extent the reduction in the garrison’s numbers aided the ongoing food situation is not known,
although it was noted that the deserters appeared well fed and had provisions with them. ‘Medical report
by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for February 1941 and March 1941’, AWM 54 481/12/79;
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 227.
34
 Lighting a cooking fire was forbidden so we were forced to eat raw meat. Some
soldiers took the lieutenant’s dog, killed it and ate it, but I refused to eat it.
When we were starving we ate grass and the pulp from the palm trees even
though this was forbidden by Castagna.64

Pressure on Castagna continued to mount. On 19 February the Australians

succeeded in driving the Italians out of Garet el Cuscia, only five kilometres east of
Giarabub. Castagna took stock of his force. With the small group of 60 Libyans who
had decided to stay, he now had 1,046 soldiers and officers, plus 251 sick, injured or in
supporting roles. The sick and wounded had been relocated on 22 January inside the
Giarabub Mosque for safety. Castagna changed the dispositions of his troops, but still
maintained the overall method of defence.65

Meanwhile, with the 10th Italian Army all but destroyed by Western Desert
Force, the overall Italian commander in Libya, General Graziani, returned to Rome on
24 February, and submitted his resignation. Mussolini accepted it and replaced him with
General Italo Gariboldi. Two days later the Australian 18th Brigade Intelligence
Summary noted: ‘The Italian 10th army has now ceased to exist and the whole of
Cyrenaica is in our hands with the exception of Giarabub.’66

Major Castagna sent a message of his own on 25 February to his superiors:

‘Promised food provisions not as yet arrived. I have rations for only one more day. It is
really sorrowful that after so many sacrifices we have to surrender because of hunger.’ 67
Two days later an Italian plane arrived over Giarabub and jettisoned food without
landing. A little more biscuits and tinned meat was on offer but it did not go far. The
garrison had now been on half rations for 50 days but the news of this latest delivery
lifted their spirits – they had supplies for another five days. The decline in the general
condition of Castagna’s men was, however, becoming desperate.68

64
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 228.
65
Ibid, pp. 227, 234; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
66
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 232; Dickens, Never Late, p. 56.
67
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 60.
68
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Ministro Della Difesa,
Controffensiva Italo, p. 60.
35
 On 27 February the Italian garrison at Kufra, south of Giarabub was captured.
Like Giarabub, Kufra was an isolated Italian post, with an airfield, and was part of the
strategic plan for Italian held East African colonies. At the same time shelling of
Giarabub continued from various positions by the British artillery attached to Wootten
Force throughout February. Strict instructions were issued that on no account was the
Giarabub mosque to be damaged. Most of the shelling was carried out by British
artillery with 25–pounders which, unfortunately for the Italians, considerably outranged
the Italian guns. The largest gun the Italians possessed inside the Giarabub fort was a
65mm/17 World War I relic, nicknamed by its unfortunate gunners “Count of Culagna”,
the principal figure disparaged in an ancient satirical poem. 69 In this context a second
exhortation to surrender was dropped from a British aircraft on 2 March:

Giarabub’s defenders, surrender! Your command does not tell you the truth, the
entire Cyrenaica is ours. We captured 115,000 soldiers and large quantities of
arms and material. Our troops are going to conquer Tripoli. Do not sacrifice
yourselves any longer. You cannot retreat. Surrender and we will treat you
well.70

As with the previous suggestion to surrender, Castagna responded with artillery.

His 47mm guns however had a range of only 2.4 kilometres – a sixth of the range of
Fergusson’s guns. While some of these were mounted on trucks to get closer to the
attackers the impact was minimal.71

Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson conducted yet another reconnaissance of

Giarabub, this time with three war correspondents, one of whom was Gavin Long, the
future author of the Australian Official History, and his artillery commander, Captain

69
The Italian Official History map of Giarabub shows two 65/17 guns in Caposaldo No. 1., Ministro
Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, appended loose maps, Schizzo No. 5, p. 57; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th
Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew,
London, WO/06/2137; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 234;
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=5kk9AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=Count+of+Culag
na&source=bl&ots=n0hSU5xz2Z&sig=mhb7_wnSHMgPJ5W9vDde96Lq5CA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gPlCT
73XFs–XiQfx8PDVBA&sqi=2&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Count%20of%20Culagna&f
=false accessed 21 February 2012.
70
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
71
‘AMC Pamphlet, Trajectories, Differential Effects, and Data for Projectiles’, Headquarters, U.S. Army
Materiel Command, AMCP 706–140, 1963;‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust
Div for March 1941’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79;
http://www.flamesofwar.com/Default.aspx?tabid=112&art_id=1019&kb_cat_id=33 accessed 13 June
2012; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 233.
36
O’Grady on 7 March 1941. They ventured forward in a car down a track, through a
gully named O’Grady’s Dell. This track was mined by the Italians a few days later, after
which the Australians relocated the mines to a detour and managed to blow up an Italian
truck. Fergusson was keen to know if troops were arriving or departing via the flights
that could be seen (although not landing) in the area. In order to get a better view he and
his party progressed closer to the airport. The Italian artillery opened fire. A shell
exploded close to Fergusson with a small piece penetrating the left side of his chest, just
above his heart. Fergusson was moved about 48 kilometres by ambulance to El Qarn
which had a landing ground with a plane waiting to take him to a hospital in Egypt. Five
days later Wootten arrived, but Fergusson’s intimate knowledge and plan of attack had
departed with him.72

Castagna, in his post war report, stated that on 6 March his last remaining
outpost, at Garet el Cuscia, east of Giarabub, ‘was overwhelmed but thanks to the
intervention of our mobile patrol and some support from Giarabub we were able to slow
and stop the enemy advance. Finally we reversed the situation and started attacking,
pushing back the enemy to Malfa (sic)’.73 This report is not in accord with the report
from the 6th Cavalry which describes the relocation of the Australian forward base on 9
March. The advanced base, complete with cook houses, was moved further forward, this
time to a site about 13 kilometres southwest of the old base and 16 kilometres east of
Giarabub. Melfa was now only to be used for reserve tanks of water. Future supplies of
food and ammunition were to come direct from Siwa. There are no Australian or British
records to support Castagna’s claim of pushing the Australians back to Melfa during
March. In truth the Italians could only move safely within their compound at night, due
to the persistent British artillery fire. They worked in the darkness to rebuild the
defensive positions destroyed during the day.74

72
O’Leary, To the Green Fields Beyond, pp. 95–97, in Tom Richardson, AWM , SVSS document, The
Siege of Giarabub, 2010; ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for March
1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79; Fergusson survived in spite of his serious wound, living until
1975.
http://www.26cavcommando.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1551&Itemid=60&l
imit=1&limitstart=1 accessed 15 May 2012.
73
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
74
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; ‘Medical report by
R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6 Aust Div for March 1941’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79.
37
 The scene was thus set for a final Australian attack on Giarabub. Significantly in
a historiographical context, the Italian obstinacy during the siege was completely out of
character with other performances of the Italian army in Cyrenaica. From July 1940 to 8
March 1941 Major Castagna had used his strength of personality and leadership to
maintain the resolve of the garrison whilst the odds of escape or success dwindled with
every day as the Allied noose tightened. His land and air supply lines were cut. His
observation posts were driven in. The wider Italian 10th Army defensive scheme of a
fence and fortified posts lay in tatters, yet still he held on. One third of his total force
deserted. Those that were left were on half rations but still he would not surrender. He
was outgunned. His superiors and his comrades on the coast were capitulating by the
tens of thousands and still he would not yield. The Allies were at first frustrated by the
hostile environment from July 1940, then by Castagna's tenacity. They were compelled
to expand the force steadily in a grinding effort to impose an Italian surrender, all the
while building their knowledge of the defence positions, until they finally had to
concede that the besieged Italians simply would not give up. The only way to break this
obdurate garrison was to be with a numerically superior, better supplied and better
armed full force attack – the subject of the following chapter.

38
 Chapter 2
Operation Galley, the Final Battle for Giarabub

The final Allied operation to capture Giarabub, named Operation Galley, began
with an acceptance that besieging the Italian fortress had not caused and was not going
to cause their capitulation. The central purpose of this chapter is to investigate the
subsequent Allied attack of Giarabub. Specific issues to be examined include the build
up of Allied forces under Brigadier Wootten, their movement to the battle site, the
challenges of supply which beset both the attackers and the defenders, and the evolution
of Allied plans to capture Castagna’s garrison. In the process inaccuracies in the
Australian Official History are revealed. Such issues, for example, include the fact that
half of the Allied deaths were caused by friendly fire, and an example of how
Australians may not have always operated according to the rules of war by shooting
prisoners on the battlefield at Giarabub.

The pace of the Giarabub campaign quickened when Brigadier Wootten was
advised by AIF HQ, at his Brigade HQ at 1.00 am on 10 March 1941, that one of his
battalions plus one additional company were to form part of a force to attack Giarabub.
Chosen were the 2/9th Battalion and D Company 2/10th Battalion. These infantry
companies were advised of the situation and ordered to prepare themselves for battle
immediately. Wootten reported to Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey, General Officer
Commanding AIF, at 9.00 am the following day. Wootten received instructions from
Blamey and Lieutenant General Sir Richard N. O’Connor, General Officer
Commanding XIII Corps (formally WDF) and the architect of the highly successful
Operation Compass. 1

To conduct his attack Wootten was allotted sufficient transport for one battalion
plus one company with enough supplies for ten days. In spite of the enemy defences
being protected by wire, artillery and machine guns, Wootten was informed that he
would have no tanks. Fuel and ammunition would also be restricted, due to the
limitation of available transport. One Lysander aircraft was made available at this stage.

1
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
39
Following the production of detailed arrangements for the long journey to Giarabub, the
complex task of moving this force commenced on 14 March 1941, when Lieutenant
Colonel Martin inspected every man in his 2/9th Battalion, thanking them for their
cooperation and hard work during their training. He forecast: ‘We would make for
ourselves a splendid record and gain distinction in the field.’2 He also expressed regret
that they may not all be there at the next battalion parade. Part of the 2/9th Battalion
moved by road and the remainder travelled by train from Ikingi Maryut, close to
Egypt’s capital, Alexandria, to Mersa Matruh 250 kilometres to the west on the
Egyptian coast in full battle order, during a raging sandstorm. The train trip, which
started at 10.00 am, was slow and erratic due to sand on the track and questionable
brakes making for a rough stop–start ride. With 71 men per carriage, 37 officers and
777 Other Ranks from 2/9th Battalion plus the composite 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions’
Machine Gun Platoon arrived at Mersa Matruh at 2.00 am then boarded open trucks to
move to barracks a few kilometres away, where they spent what little remained of the
night. Those travelling in the 124 vehicles, which included D Company 2/10th Battalion,
47 Light Aid Detachment (LAD3), anti–aircraft and mortar detachments, had detailed
arrangements for water, fuel and rations. Orders for dress were to be shorts and shirts,
with service dress carried in packs. This was later roundly cursed by the men as they lay
shivering at night on the cold windswept dunes. Convoy speed was to be 36 kilometres
per hour with a density of only 15 vehicles per 1.6 kilometres.4

The road and rail parties combined at Mersa Matruh and moved out on
15 March in a convoy of 200 trucks headed for the Siwa Depression. ‘The desert was
arid, flat and so rocky that the men in the back of the trucks spent as much time airborne
as they did actually seated on the hard wooden seats.’5 After travelling 100 kilometres
south of Mersa Matruh to Bir Fuad they met 4 RHA at 5.00 pm, which was to support
them in the impending battle. With a meal of biscuits and bully beef the weary men
rolled themselves into their blankets and spent a bitterly cold night under a stark desert

2
J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 1. AWM 76 B198.
3
Mobile field mechanics equipped to operate in the desert.
4
‘Administrative Instructions, Road Movement–Ikingi to Matruh.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on
Giarabub Incident, O.C. 10/12 Bn Composite M.G. Pl. March 1941’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; ‘Wootten Force
Movement Table No.1, 17 March, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F.
Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
5
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 58, 59.
40
sky. Fuel had been placed at Bir Fuad to refuel the convoy during the advance and
return journeys. More fuel and rations were left at Melfa for operations around Giarabub
with guards set at each dump. The water allocation was 4.5 litres per man per day and
the same per vehicle.6 Wootten Force now numbered 2,219 all ranks, including units
already on the battlefield, as described in Table 1 below:
Unit Men
nd
552 Res Motor Transport Company R.A.S.C. 150
18th Brigade Head Quarters 65
Two Mortar Platoons 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions 24
Two Protection Platoons (Anti–aircraft) 2/10th Battalion 50
Machine Guns 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions 24
47th Light Aid Detachment 12
J Section Signallers 30
One Battery 4th Royal Horse Artillery 255
One Troop 4th Field Squadron Royal Engineers 91
13th Light Field Ambulance 165
th th
2/9 Battalion plus D Company 2/10 Battalion 750
B and C Squadrons 6th Cavalry plus 8th Field Regimental Artillery 456
Long Range Desert Patrol 7 50
Less 1 captured and 2 killed in December 1940 –3
Estimated Total 2,219

Table 1 Estimated number of Allied soldiers at Giarabub 21 March, 1941.

Sources: ‘Administrative Instructions, Road Movement – Matruh to Melfa’, AWM

52, 8/2/18/5; Long, To Benghazi, p. 293; ‘HQ Matruh Sub–Area, Admin instructions,
Operations – Giarabub Area, 13 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.

6
‘HQ Matruh Sub–Area, Admin instructions, Operations – Giarabub Area, 13 March, 1941.’, AWM 52
8/2/18/5.
7
Estimated from similar expedition. Tim Moreman, Long Range Desert Group Patrolmen, The Western
Desert 1940–43, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010, p. 50; The Italians estimated 60 men in the LRDP
which attacked Kufra to the south. Ministro Della Difesa, Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, La Prima
Controffensiva Italo – Tedesca in Africa Settentrionale, 15 Febbraio – 18 Novembre 1941, Ufficio
Storico, Tipografia Regionale Rome, 1974, p. 56.
41
 In contrast, by 21 March 1941, the defenders numbered only 1,287
(1,086 fighting men and 201 wounded and noncombat troops) following the further
defections of all but 35 of the original 750 Libyan troops. The ratio had switched from
Italian numerical superiority of 4:1 to being outnumbered by 2:1. The Allies’ superiority
of numbers together with their concentration of force was further bad news for
Castagna’s defence.8

Whilst the majority of his force was en–route to their first battle of World War
II, Wootten set off on a reconnaissance of Giarabub. He returned to Mersa Matruh at
2.00 am, 15 March, not entirely pleased with the result. The reconnaissance had been
brief due to the party being unable to get close to the enemy positions. It did, however,
provide an efficient overview. The Italians were occupying positions some five
kilometres north of Giarabub, but the exact locations of these positions were unknown.
Other than in this northern area, further accurate information of enemy dispositions and
outposts was still required. South of Giarabub no reconnaissance had been conducted
due to a marsh in the east and a sand sea in the west. Even with air photographs, the
need for more detailed information was obvious to Wootten. Following his first
reconnaissance, Wootten needed to ascertain if an attack from the south would be
possible. This would need to cross the depression and marsh south of Giarabub and west
of the frontier wire. Wootten preferred this southern approach as the Italians clearly
expected an attack from the north of the town.9

At 10.30 am the next day Wootten left Mersa Matruh by vehicle with his
Brigade Major, Major T. J. Daly, for Giarabub arriving at 8.00 am next morning, 16
March. At 9.30 pm a conference was held of the commanding officers of all Allied units
then at Mersa Matruh, discussing a move to Melfa and preliminaries for the Giarabub
attack. Units were to travel independently to arrive at Melfa on the evening of 18
March. Another reconnaissance was arranged by Wootten for the following day, 17
March, rendezvousing at Melfa at 9.00 am. This group contained Lieutenant Colonel J.
C. Campbell, the Commanding Officer of the 4 RHA, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, the

8
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
9
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, War Diary’, March 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
42
Commanding Officer of the 2/9th Battalion, Officer Commanding Troop of 4th Field
Squadron Royal Engineers, (name unknown), the Officer Commanding D Company
10th Battalion, (name unknown), and Captain I. D. Hayward the Brigade’s Supply
Captain.10

Time available for the looming attack was limited by the difficulty of supplying
a large force operating 320 kilometres from the coastal supply line. This made it
essential for Wootten to produce a definite plan quickly. Air photographs and a sketch
map of Giarabub only showed the defences in the immediate vicinity, within 1.4
kilometres of Giarabub. The 6th Cavalry, however, had already ascertained that the
defenders held positions to the northwest, north and east of the village out to some five
kilometres. At this stage nothing other than map information was available covering the
area south of a line through Giarabub and Qaret Hamra (Brown’s Hill) as no
reconnaissance of this area had yet been conducted. Wootten decided that the vital
ground to the enemy’s defence of Giarabub was the heights (altitude approximately 70
metres) located some 370 to 700 metres south of the village, which dominated the
whole of the defences. Wootten’s appreciation revealed that any attack from the north
would require an advance in full view of the heights, penetration of the outlying posts,
then dealing with the defences in depth, and finally assaulting the steep and inaccessible
heights which were wired and fortified; all this with the Italians heavily armed with
considerable numbers of machine guns and artillery. Wootten concluded that this
approach would result in a two–day battle, with a large amount of artillery ammunition
required and heavy casualties taken.11

The alternative was to attack from the south where higher ground would
preclude Italian fire from the northern defences. The southern area was essentially
undefended, standing largely by itself. There was another high feature, Ship Hill, sitting
just outside of the wire some 100 metres east of the vital ground, which if occupied,
would provide clear observation to support a southerly attack. Wootten assessed that an

10
Long’s version is somewhat different, mentioning only Abbott and a day earlier viz: ‘Consequently, on
16 March, he (Wootten) ordered Abbott to examine the country south of the marshy depression which lay
between the cavalryman’s familiar ground north of the oasis and the tracks leading into Giarabub from
the south, along which Wootten proposed to attack.’; Long, To Benghazi, p. 295.
11
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
43
attack from this direction would provide a higher probability of surprise, fewer
casualties, a lesser quantity of artillery expenditure and a quicker, and therefore more
decisive, result. This southerly approach was dependent upon suitable access for
infantry and guns being found, and suitable ground over which to undertake the attack.
Communications to Giarabub for Wootten Force ran east from Melfa on an east–west
line so the difference between heading north or south mattered little. Wootten noted that
the east–west communications would require a measure of protection from Castagna’s
mobile forces but he considered that this would not present any great difficulty.12

A final reconnaissance was therefore ordered by Wootten from Brown’s Hill by

6th Cavalry of the southern area. A good view was obtained; however, it was too far
from the objective to be effective. Another reconnaissance by 6th Cavalry was thus
ordered from the south. The cavalry had never been further south than Brown’s Hill so
this necessitated finding a route across the marsh located east of Giarabub. A track was
found, with the reconnaissance party reaching the frontier wire approximately 14
kilometres south of Giarabub. The wire was cut to provide a gap large enough for
vehicles but by this time there was insufficient daylight to proceed further. This
reconnaissance proved that it was possible to use wheeled vehicles around to the south,
and that the Italians were occupying a position at El Aamra on the southern end of the
frontier wire. This position needed to be reduced, so a 6th Cavalry squadron was
immediately ordered to move to the south and capture the position at first light on
Monday 17 March.13

Castagna later wrote that the Australians attacked his positions at El Aamra and
Garet el Cuscia, east of Giarabub, forcing his soldiers back to the fort. Italian mobile
patrols then obliged the Australians to retreat, but, as they departed, they cut the
telephone line between Giarabub and El Aamra. The commander of the El Aamra patrol
decided to return to Garet el Nuss (Wootten House) after having seen huge numbers of
enemy troops. He had seen more than 200 Allied motor vehicles crossing the El Aamra

12
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
Long, To Benghazi, p. 295.
13
Salvatore Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, Longanesi, Milano, 1967, p. 183, Schizzo No. 2. Il confine
egiziano; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB
106/836.
44
area. Castagna reported this to his commander and received an ‘encouraging’ reply
ending with the phrase, ‘...we follow you with our heart.’14 During this time Castagna
seriously considered surrender, but still hoped that help would come. The garrison
received provisions by air on 17 March, with a message from General Erwin Rommel
who was endeavouring to maintain Castagna’s resolve: ‘I salute the valiant defenders of
Giarabub and I express my heartfelt admiration. Carry on doing your duty. We shall be
with you in a very few weeks.’15 Castagna thanked Rommel for his words, passing
Rommel’s message to his men, trying to lift their spirits. In the wider campaign for
Libya, Rommel had arrived in Tripoli on 12 February and was already planning a
counterattack against gains made by XIII Corps during Operation Compass. He was
confident that in the process he could help Giarabub and retake Kufra to the south.
Rommel’s plan was to use these two bases to support his advance through Cyrenaica.
For this reason Rommel asked General Mario Aimone–Cat, Commander of the Italian
5th Squadra (Air Force Squadron), to continue to supply Giarabub until the Afrika Korps
could relieve it. This relief operation was planned for April using Italian battalions
supported by German troops and transport.16

In spite of not being able to hold the eastern post of Garet el Cuscia, Castagna
decided to leave a clandestine lookout post nearby, manned by four men. He still
maintained the post at Garet el Barud, because of its position north of the Giarabub
settlement, and because it had always resisted and repelled enemy attacks. The position
had two officers, 50 men, three machine guns, one 47mm gun and one 77mm gun. By
this time the Italians were restricted to a four kilometre front based around four
caposaldos or strong points centred on Giarabub. The locations of Castagna’s defenders
are shown on Map 2 below whilst the number of men and weapons are summarised in
Table 2 following.17

14
The name of Castagna’s immediate commander at this stage is not known. The figure of 200 vehicles
would appear to be overstated, considering that this was only one (B) squadron of Australian Cavalry; S.
Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
15
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 61; Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 189.
16
Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 189; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome,
DS 1160A/2/12; Rommel sent a letter with Lieutenant Colonel Viebahn von dem Bourne to the Italian
Supreme Command with details of his plan; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 235.
17
Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 191; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome,
DS 1160A/2/12.
45
Map 2 Giarabub’s defensive system

Source: Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, Schizzo No. 5.

46
 Arc of responsibility, 47mm Machine
Caposaldo Men Units
centred on Giarabub Fort Guns Guns
1 SE to SW 475 10th GAF 3 2
2 SW to NW 205 3rd GAF 3 6
3 NW to E 150 1st GAF 2 2
4 E to SE – 7th GAF 5 6

Table 2 Disposition of defenders and weapons on 21 March 1941.

Source: Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 169, Schizzo No. 6.18

As the Allied preliminary operations unfolded on 16–17 March, a minor action

was fought near Wootten House on 17 March when B Squadron, 6th Cavalry, ambushed
two vehicles en route to a southern outpost. Lieutenant Lo Mazzi was on his way to
El Aamra (southeast of Giarabub) to replace the lookout. With him was 2nd Lieutenant
Leonardo Guerrieri of a machine gun group, and engineering Lieutenant Lualdi whose
task was to repair the telephone line, with 14 men. B Squadron had driven across the
swamp during the night using a track east of Brown’s Hill, then at 5.00 am, moved
southwest of Wootten House. At 8.30 am, two Italian vehicles appeared two kilometres
north of Wootten House. The Australians sprang the ambush. The Italians fought back
with a 20mm machine gun and rifle fire after dismounting from their vehicles. Guerrieri
died in a hail of bullets. The truck blew up, the ammunition exploded and shrapnel
killed Lance Corporal Oreste Verardi. Lo Mazzi attempted to move back to Giarabub
but was captured with his men. Castagna’s only indication of what had happened at this
time was from the smoke of the burning truck, as the telephone line was still cut.
Several more Italians were wounded with 13 captured and both vehicles destroyed.
Later a captured officer provided extremely valuable information, describing the Italian
position and indicated the site of each gun. Lieutenant F. C. Taylor, the 6th Cavalry’s
Intelligence officer, informed Wootten’s headquarters of this action as the Australians
advanced northwards towards Qaret el Tamma (Tamma Heights), located only 3.2

18
Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 169, Schizzo No. 6; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’,
AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.

47
kilometres south of Giarabub. Lieutenant C. A. Wade’s B Squadron troop advanced
putting the garrison to flight and occupied the position. The Australians were surprised
at this point that the captured Italian officer would so willingly pass on information
about Castagna’s defence. In this regard it was noteworthy that of the 30 officers in total
in the Giarabub garrison, only eight were permanent soldiers. The rest were conscripts
and said to be tired of the war. Other prisoners had reiterated that it was only the
garrison commander, Castagna, who was holding the defence together.19

Eventually a Libyan fleeing from Wootten House post arrived at Giarabub on

foot with news of the enemy attack. Castagna immediately sent a 20mm machine gun, a
47mm gun and a troop of all the available Libyans, under 2nd Lieutenant Rossetti to
counterattack and rescue Lo Mazzi’s troop. Rossetti captured the position and one truck
but the Australians escaped west at 1.50 pm to El Aamra. Wootten stated: ‘This recce
had little value other than to discover the location of further enemy posts south of the
main defences’.20 On reaching the site of the attack on Lo Mazzi, only 22 year old
Verardi’s body was found. Guerrieri’s body had been buried by the Australians.
Rossetti’s troop then returned to Giarabub without rescuing Lo Mazzi or his men. Three
wounded Italians were evacuated by Australian ambulance to Siwa, under the command
of British Colonel Wallace who was in charge of medical arrangements for the attack on
Giarabub. There were no Australian casualties during this engagement.21

Whilst these minor actions were taking place south of Giarabub, the bulk of
Wootten Force was closing in from the east. They departed at 8.00 am from Bir Fuad
for Melfa, crossing the readily identifiable Egypt/Libyan border, marked by the
300 kilometre long barbed wired fence, an hour later. After travelling 16 kilometres
from Bir Fuad the column split into three parallel columns spaced 300 metres apart. The

19
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, p.
295; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; 6th Cavalry records have 3 killed and 13 captured.
Long’s has 2 killed and 15 captured. Castagna’s version has 2 killed and 13 captured; ‘18th Aust Inf
Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
20
Long describes the day: ‘…having accomplished the task: the crossing of the swamp and the
examination of the track leading into Giarabub from the south.’ Long, To Benghazi, p. 296; ‘Report on
Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, CAB 106/836.
21
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 244; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12;
‘Medical report by R.M.O. Cavalry to A.D.M.S. 6 Aust Div for March 1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54
481/12/79.
48
force bivouacked at 6.00 pm on 17 March, 48 kilometres east of Giarabub and endured
a bitterly cold night. The country was arid, devoid of vegetation and dominated by
many abrupt features with cliff–like sides. Extra magazines were issued for the Bren
guns whilst small arms fire could be heard in the distance. The Australians continued to
prepare, removing all traces of oil from their weapons to reduce the problems of dust
and grit jamming the mechanisms. During the advance of Wootten’s columns the
commander of the LRDP reported in and was tasked with preventing any escape by the
Italians to the west from Giarabub.22

Throughout the first half of March, back in Italy, much propaganda was being
generated about the heroic defence of Giarabub and its leader, Castagna. Three Italian
reporters visited, and promoted the story widely on their return. The wider fall of
Cyrenaica had largely passed unnoticed in the Italian papers. Giarabub, however, was
being covered every day with photographs and stories. Italian radio commentators such
as Mario Appelius also helped build the enduring heroic image of Giarabub in a nation
short of good news, and where bad news was heavily censored. News was also
broadcast of Castagna’s promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The promotion stiffened his
resolve to continue resistance, while the morale of his men slid ever lower, eroded by
isolation and hunger. RAF aircraft flying over the inner defences of Giarabub and
vehicles being seen in every direction around the fortress further depressed Italian
spirit.23

The next day, Tuesday 18 March 1941, Wootten’s advance columns continued
towards Giarabub through a landscape where vegetation was plentiful, small lakes could
be seen and small gazelle–like creatures were visible in the distance. After lunch the
men of A Company, 2/9th Battalion, organised a game of cricket to while away the time
with Bren guns mounted on a nearby hill for anti–aircraft protection. With the game
underway, A Company’s officers were busy studying the Italian positions in the
southeast and planning the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Martin spent the day surveying

22
‘Administrative Instructions, Road Movement – Matruh to Melfa.’ AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on
Giarabub Incident, O.C. 10/12 Bn Composite M.G. Pl. March 1941.’ AWM 52 8/3/10/7; J. Calvert, ‘The
Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, , Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 2, AWM 76 B198; ‘Report on Giarabub
Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
23
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 236; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
49
the Italian wire, Daly House and Tamma Heights which remained in Italian hands and
Wootten House which had been recaptured by the Italians the afternoon before. Martin
was escorted by two platoons under Lieutenant A. F. Nixon–Smith of 10 Platoon B
Company, 2/9th Battalion, and Lieutenant W. H. Noyes.24

As Martin headed off on his reconnaissance at first light, 18 March, the 25–
pounder guns of 8th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (8th Field Regiment), attached to 6th
Cavalry, opened fire on the Giarabub fort from the north to provide a diversion, while
the remainder of Martin’s battalion closed up into position behind them. As Martin’s
men moved up, Italian artillery opened fire. Their guns being of shorter range, the
Italian gunners were unable to respond with counter battery fire; however, they were
able to produce a direct hit on the front of the Vickers Machine Gun Platoon truck,
blowing it up and making for a very rapid unloading of equipment. Meanwhile, it was
hard going for Martin’s party through the swamp and sand with his vehicles bogging
frequently. Eventually the group arrived back at the battalion headquarters after dark
having covered 50 kilometres. Martin’s reconnaissance provided the best view so far of
the Italian defences. Two vital questions, however, remained largely unanswered – the
disposition of the southern defences, and whether the approaches were suitable for an
assault.25

A fighting patrol consisting of two platoons from 2/9th Battalion, accompanied

by the commander of Wootten’s engineer detachment, departed the bivouac area that
evening, intending to find answers to the two key questions, and to make a close
reconnaissance of the wire and approaches to the southern Giarabub defences. As with
Martin’s daytime reconnaissance, this patrol was held up by bogging in the sand and
other mishaps, meaning that they did not get to their rendezvous point until after dark.
The patrol decided that the objective was too distant to walk to, in addition to the fact
that they had not seen the ground in daylight, hence they did not complete their task.
They did, however, discover six enemy vehicles of which two were mounted with
Bredas, near El Aamra post. Concurrently, another patrol was sent to reconnoitre a

24
J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 2, AWM 76 B198; Dickens,
Never Late, pp. 61, 62.
25
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 61, 62; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National
Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
50
shorter route across the bog. This patrol was successful; however, the newly discovered
track could not be used until enemy observation posts overlooking it could be captured.
Owing to the difficulties encountered traversing the swamp and sands to the south, four
captured Italian tractors were summoned from Melfa and placed at the most treacherous
parts of the southern route, rendering excellent service towing bogged vehicles. Later
that night Lieutenant Noyes came under the command of Captain Bernard Berry, the
Officer Commanding C Company, 2/9th Battalion, for the following day’s operation.26

On the other side of the wire, Lieutenant Colonel Castagna assessed that his
enemy was gathering more men and artillery to overwhelm his forces. His plan was to
wear down and hold the enemy whilst waiting for help from Rommel. He explained this
to his officers and described the general disposition of the enemy forces which led him
to foresee a main attack coming from the southeast against Caposaldos Numbers 1 and
4, then eventually other attacks from the north. He told his officers not to overestimate
the size of the enemy forces since the same vehicles may have been counted several
times. (He had reports from all of the lookouts that day, counting 500 vehicles in all
directions.) Castagna considered it likely that the enemy was intensifying artillery
activity rather than receiving more guns. Castagna told his men that they still had
possibilities to repel the attackers and, with this victory, regain contact with their troops
and return home safely. Castagna sought help from afar. The Australian J Section
Signals intercepted a radio message from the Giarabub garrison asking for bombers.
Castagna received a reply from his commander informing him that aircraft would
intervene the following day.27

On Wednesday, 19 March, pressure continued to build on all sides of the

Giarabub defenders. On the southern side two companies of 2/9th Battalion guided by
one troop of 6th Cavalry, under Martin’s command, advanced towards the fortress and

26
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 61, 62; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National
Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; The Active Service version states; ‘They were not strong enough
to attack, and the commander did not feel justified in continuing his task across completely unknown
country while an enemy detachment was at large behind him. The reconnaissance was therefore
abandoned.’ There is no mention in Wootten’s version of enemy at large behind the patrol. AIF (Middle
East), Active Service, p. 28.
27
It appears that these messages were unencoded. ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt
Porter, 1941’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS
1160A/2/12.
51
occupied a line running northeast to southwest through the northwest promontory of
Tamma Heights. On the eastern side B Squadron, 6th Cavalry, occupied a line running
north to south from Brigadier’s Hill. In the north, C Squadron made a demonstration,
while in the west the LRDP patrolled. Wootten’s aim in sending the 2/9th Battalion
companies to the south was to test what appeared from maps to be a possible line of
approach from that direction. Of particular concern to Wootten were the grave doubts
expressed by Campbell, regarding his ability to move his guns to the south by the
currently reconnoitred route. If this was not achievable, then attacking from the north
would have to be reconsidered.28

The southern force’s task was to secure a northeast–southwest line close to

Giarabub by sunrise on 20 March. The result of this thrust would determine if an assault
from this direction was viable. Air photographs appeared to show that Giarabub’s
defence was dominated by the knolls located to the southeast of the town, and that their
loss would therefore unravel the Italian defensive plan.29 Operational Order No. 1 from
Major Daly, to Lieutenant Colonel Martin, included the following instructions:

You may destroy any vehicles or posts discovered to the south of the first
objective but only on the condition that the attainment of the first objective is
not jeopardised by so doing. The operation will be carried out with the utmost
speed and determination and every effort will be made to come to close quarters
with the enemy.30

During the afternoon of 19 March, B and C Companies, 2/9th Battalion plus

mortar and anti–aircraft detachments departed on the mission to the south of Giarabub
from the bivouac area forward of Melfa in a long convoy lurching and crawling below
rocky outcrops and escarpments. Some of the trucks became bogged whilst others
overheated. At 1.30 pm Martin ordered an assault on the wire defences on the
Giarabub–Siwa road. C Company was ordered to attack on the left flank whilst B
Company was to attack on the right. The 2/10th Battalion Mortar Platoon, under
Lieutenant R. E. Porter, was to be in reserve and supporting B Company. The first

28
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1941’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten,
The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
29
AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28.
30
‘Operational Order No. 1, 19 March, 1941 from 18 Aust Inf Brigade to 9 Bn.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
52
objective was the high feature, Daly House, 4.5 kilometres south of Giarabub. The
attack was launched in open order and the position was captured without opposition.
The Italians then commenced shelling Daly House and the Siwa Road area at 1.20 pm.
B and C Companies reformed, and at 3.45 pm, rushed the high features of Tamma
Heights, closer to Giarabub, at right angles to Siwa Road, and the wire defences running
along the road. The attack was made using vehicles, with artillery screening the
advance. These high features were also taken without opposition, by 5.00 pm.31

At Daly’s suggestion, Martin then ordered C Company to move towards Ship

Hill, some 800 metres southeast of the town and to their right. As this company
advanced the Italians opened fire with 20mm machine guns whose tracer rounds
‘bounded all over the desert.’32 As darkness fell the leading platoon reached the barbed
wire at the south–eastern corner of the Giarabub perimeter. C Company was now
600 metres ahead of the nearest support, but Captain Berry decided to investigate the
Italian position east of Caposaldo Number 1 still further. He went through the wire
alone until challenged by an Italian sentry who fired a shot. Berry turned back and
found Lieutenant Russell Foster’s 14 Platoon. Berry then sent one platoon to the east to
enfilade the Italian occupied knoll, whilst he and Forster, with the other two platoons,
advanced on the knoll itself to the left.33 Whilst Berry quietly gave orders the Italians
threw grenades from their sangers only 20 metres away. The Australians advanced but
not a shot was fired, as the Italians had escaped, leaving a machine gun behind.34

Berry then left Forster’s platoon in the post with orders to exploit and explore,
while he went back to Lieutenant Beresford Lovett’s 13 Platoon. Lovett’s platoon had
moved onto the knoll and was soon joined at 8.00 pm by Nixon–Smith’s 10 Platoon and
the Mortar Platoon.35 Lieutenant Porter, Sergeant Atkinson and Private Shepherd of the
2/10th’s Mortar Platoon, also with Berry made a reconnaissance, cutting through the

31
Note that the Australian map marked G.S.I. (A) 10/10/41 M.I. A.H.Q. in AWM incorrectly states that
Daly House and Tamma Heights are one and the same. This is not the case. Tamma Heights is some four
kilometres north of Daly House; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 63, 64; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p.
28; ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7.
32
Long, To Benghazi, p. 297.
33
Long incorrectly describes these platoons as sections.
34
Long, To Benghazi, p. 297.
35
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 63, 64; Long mistakenly says a second company, then mistakenly describes a
machine gun section. It was a platoon; Long, To Benghazi, p. 297.
53
wire across Ship Hill. Atkinson and Shepherd returned to bring up the platoon and
ammunition. Porter continued on to make a reconnaissance of the position for his
mortars. The platoon arrived under the cover of darkness followed by their trucks whilst
receiving considerable fire from Italian Breda and 47mm guns. The mortar platoon took
no casualties and set up their weapons whilst the enemy kept up spasmodic artillery and
machine gun fire throughout the night.36

Berry returned at 10.00 pm to 2/9th Battalion’s headquarters located south of

Tamma Heights, and explained to Martin where his men were positioned.37 Lieutenant
Forster was, meanwhile, following his orders to explore and exploit. He discovered
Post 36 (west of Post 42, on the western side of Caposaldo Number 1) was manned by
only one Italian with a 47mm gun who was captured and sent back to Martin’s
headquarters for interrogation, carrying a wounded Australian. 38 Little fire came from
the Italian defenders in Caposaldo Number 1 until, as the moon rose at 2.00 am, a
strong counterattack was launched. Captain Caccamo with two Italian platoons, one
Libyan platoon and artillery support drove Lieutenant Forster’s men back beyond the
perimeter fence.39 Forster had been ordered by Berry not to get involved in ‘anything
serious’. During this counterattack, by Foster’s platoon, Private E. E. Powell was killed,
Private B. N. Casement died of wounds two hours later and Privates L. H. Conley, K.
Currell, H. Clunes, A. Clark, M. Cotterell and A. Woodrow were all wounded.40 The
Italians sustained 13 wounded including Lieutenants Cau and Libotte.41 Cau found a bag
left by an Australian which he took to Castagna. Castagna was most surprised when, in
the bag, he found a map of the Giarabub defences including accurate locations of the
command posts, food supplies, fuel stores and the minefields. Castagna reasoned that

36
‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7.
37
Long, To Benghazi, p. 297; Dickens confusingly and mistakenly names Caposaldo Number 1 as
‘Tamma’ protected by 400 men; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 63, 64.
38
Long mistakenly describes this as a 44mm gun. Spencer and Dickens both repeat the mistake. There
were no 44mm guns used by Italians at Giarabub. 47mm was the closest calibre. Its full name was
Cannone da 47/32 M35 where 32 describes the bore length as multiples of the calibre ie 32 x 47 =
1504mm long; http://comandosupremo.com/cannone4732.html, accessed 31 May 2012; Long, To
Benghazi, pp. 290, 297; Spencer, In the Footsteps of Ghosts, p. 38; Dickens, Never Late, p. 65.
39
Initial unavailable for Captain Caccamo; Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 203; Fattore, Giarabub,
p. 247.
40
Long incorrectly states that three of Forster’s men were wounded and another two went missing; Long,
To Benghazi, pp. 297, 298; Dickens, Never Late, p. 65.
41
First initials not available for these Italian soldiers.
54
the map had been produced from air photographs and completed with details probably
provided by a deserting Libyan.42

Importantly for Wootten’s preferred plan of attack from the south, with Martin’s
force pushed forward, Major Geoffrey Goshen’s C Battery, 4 RHA, was able to push
two guns right around to the south, in close support of the attacking infantry to a point
some 1,000 metres south of Tamma Heights. Another two guns were brought forward
across the swamp and sand with the aid of the captured Italian caterpillar tractors. This
movement ended all lingering doubts regarding the possibilities of getting the guns into
a position for a southern attack. Likewise, Martin’s infantry’s advance to within
600 metres of the enemy’s main southern defences proved that the advance could be
implemented from this direction. Further information arrived at 6.00 pm in the form of
more photographs. During the day a RAF Lysander detachment photographed the
southern and northern defences of Giarabub, neither of which had been photographed
before. The films were developed, printed and delivered to Wootten’s headquarters and
provided invaluable supplementary information. Wootten therefore decided to carry out
the attack from the south.43

At noon on 19 March, one squadron of 6th Cavalry, supported by 8th Field

Regiment guns, commenced a demonstration north of Giarabub which was to last until
11.00 pm. The purpose of the demonstration was to distract the defenders of Giarabub
from the activities to the south. At 10.00 pm, D Company, 2/10th Battalion, plus one
squadron of 6th Cavalry, was ordered to attack and hold Brigadier’s Hill by first light the
next day. Brigadier’s Hill was located immediately east of Giarabub and its possession
would cover the passage of the remainder of the force to the south on the following day.
As can be seen from Castagna’s subsequent remarks below, the demonstration was
entirely successful, with the Italians in the north keeping up a spasmodic fire on fixed
lines all night, even though the Australian cavalry had withdrawn at 11.00 pm. During
the same night, Wootten’s engineers cut gaps in the wire on this southern side whilst

42
It is more likely that this information came from the Italian officer captured on 17 March; Fattore,
Giarabub, p. 247.
43
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 62, 63; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 296, 297; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G.
F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
55
raiding parties captured three Italian prisoners. Castagna ordered that all the holes
created in the defensive wire that day be repaired during the night.44

Meanwhile the Italian situation continued to deteriorate. Allied artillery shells

landed on their positions throughout the day leaving the ground completely covered
with craters. Castagna recalled:

Only because of the dugouts that we had built near every post, were our men
saved from carnage and our weapons not destroyed. Every movement was
paralysed making it difficult to move food, water and ammunition. Our largest
gun, the 65/7 ‘Count of Culagna’ is hit and out of action. This gun could only
fire every quarter of an hour but it was better than nothing. We still had the
77/28 and 47/32 guns.45

To make matters worse, the Khamsin (desert wind), which had started blowing on
18 March, gained in strength on 19 March, blasting a dense cloud of dust and sand
across the oasis. Not only did the wind make breathing difficult, jam weapons and make
living conditions generally miserable, it also uncovered the concrete blocks that the
Italians had emplaced to secure the base of the defensive barbed wire. The defenders
were forced to work under enemy artillery fire to clear the sand from their trenches and
anti–tank ditches. In the evening the sandstorm intensified, to be the worst seen in seven
years.46

By dawn, 20 March, it was apparent that the previous day’s Australian attacks,
designed to explore, had surpassed the original aims, thus prefacing the following day,
21 March, as the day of the final assault on Giarabub. Australian morale was high in
spite of the raging Khamsin which had reduced visibility to almost zero. The signal wire
which the Australians used to navigate from post to post or back to battalion
headquarters was buried by up to two metres of sand. Lieutenant Forster described the
effort required to keep Bren guns operational in the extreme conditions:

44
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report,’ AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Dickens, Never Late, pp.
62, 63; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March
1941,’ The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F.
Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
45
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 248.
46
Ibid, p. 249.
56
 Each section had to dismantle the Brens under cover of a groundsheet and pass
each piece to a section member to clean under whatever cover they had. Then
the gun was reassembled, sight unseen under a clean groundsheet. By this
means we were able to keep our weapons ready for immediate use.47

During the previous night’s withdrawal Private Powell’s body had not been
recovered. Powell, a South Australian aged 32, was the first member of 2/9th Battalion
to be killed in action. Significantly, the official Australian records and the headstone on
his grave in Halfaya Sollum Cemetery incorrectly show his date of death as 21 March
1941. Private Casement aged 31 from Queensland was the second 2/9th Battalion man to
die. He was buried in a shallow grave in the afternoon of 20 March 1941.48

At 6.00 am, 20 March, the 2/10th Battalion Mortar Platoon opened fire from
Ship Hill. Lieutenant Porter was pleased with the ranging as several machine guns were
knocked out. Their tasks for the day were mainly a roving commission on observed
targets of opportunity. Water and food were in short supply until, at 7.00 pm, they
moved back under cover of darkness to resupply. The day was spent with the Allied
units close to Giarabub disposed, as per the previous day, under cover of a reduced sand
storm which blew from the east all day. Trucks ferried the remaining troops of 2/9th
Battalion and ancillary units into position for the next day’s attack. Captain Berry’s C
Company with 10 Platoon lay amongst the sand hills all day, where they had a view of
the white domed mosque and some of the buildings of the town of Giarabub through a
gap in the hills.49

Following these attacks on Caposaldo Number 1, Castagna decided that he had

insufficient forces in Caposaldo Numbers 2, 3 and 4 to replace casualties in that
position. He considered moving some of the 1st GAF from Caposaldo Number 3 but
decided against this due to the persistent attacks from the north against Garet el Barud

47
Dickens, Never Late, p. 65.
48
Photograph of Casement’s headstone, http://twgpp.org/information.php?id=2202873 accessed 7.6.12;
http://www.AWM .gov.au/research/people/roll_of_honour/person.asp?p=535574 accessed 1 June 2012;
Dickens, Never Late, p. 66.
49
‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; Dickens,
Never Late, p. 66; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28.
57
which led him to expect another attack from the north, although he did move a 47mm
gun from Caposaldo Number 2 to Caposaldo Number 1.50

During the morning of 20 March, Captain Reidy’s A Company arrived and

occupied a position on the right of Berry’s company. They brought with them hot food
which was very welcome to Berry’s men, as they were facing a second night dressed in
only shorts and shirts in the cold sand laden wind. The Italian lines were only
100 metres distant in some places and the Australians could hear their own shells going
overhead and exploding on the Italian positions beyond the wire. 51 One of Berry’s
soldiers later recalled a story which indicates the character of the company commander
during this period:

While taking photographs of a machine gun that was firing at them Berry
reassured his men by saying ‘they cannot hit you’. No sooner had he spoken the
words when a bullet went through his camera case. Without batting an eyelid he
just kept on taking snaps. He was still ‘Berry the Bastard’ but he had won the
respect of the men.52

As the Australian infantry moved into their forward positions in the afternoon
some small Italian outposts still had to be overcome. Eleven Australian casualties were
sustained, mostly minor and caused by hand grenades. During the night B Squadron, 6th
Cavalry, was withdrawn and D Company, 2/10th Battalion, occupied its position east of
Giarabub. The LRDP continued its patrolling in the west. Wootten’s HQ moved up into
the lee south of Tamma Heights where final preparations were made for the coming
attack.53

On the other side of the defences, Castagna’s view of 20 March was bleak. He
described enemy aviation attacking Italian vehicles and troops with British artillery and
machine guns attacking continuously. His two 77/28 guns continued to attack the ‘light
enemy artillery, motor vehicles and access points.’54 Castagna recorded that the strong

50
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report,’ AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
51
Dickens, Never Late, p. 66.
52
Fountain, BMA, in Dickens, Never Late, p. 65.
53
‘Medical report by R.M.O. Cavalry to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for March 1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54
481/12/79; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March
1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28.
54
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
58
Khamsin blew from the southwest which favoured the attackers, while it blinded the
defenders located in Caposaldo Number 1. Castagna’s superiors informed him that
aircraft would intervene the following day. That night telephone communications were
restored with the Garet el Barud post. They informed him that the enemy had intensified
their artillery activity and movement of arms. Castagna renewed the absolute order to
resist until the end.55

At 10.30 am 20 March Wootten conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Martin and

Lieutenant Colonel Campbell to determine the final plan of attack for the following day.
The forward troops for the attack were to be 2/9th Battalion, with a medium machine
gun section from 2/12th Battalion, and a mortar platoon from 2/10th Battalion. The
attack was to be in two phases as shown on Map 3, p. 61. Firstly the southern
fortifications (all of Caposaldo Number 1 and the western part of Caposaldo Number 4)
to a line running northeast from the northern side of Caposaldo Number 1, were to be
taken. The second involved capturing the line running northeast through the plantation
and village. The start line was to be 365 metres south of the fort’s internal perimeter, or
tactical wire. Phase 1 was set to begin at 5.15 am. Phase 2 was to start immediately
following completion of Phase 1. The first phase was to be supported by the twelve 25–
pounder guns of 4 RHA. Table 3, p. 60 summarises the fire plan issued for the Allied
attack on 21 March 1941.

For Phase 2 of the Australian attack, one troop of 4 RHA was to support
B Company on the right and one troop was to support A Company on the left. The
quantity of artillery ammunition to be expended was limited by the amount available,
being 200 rounds per gun. Two thirds was to be used up to Z + 25, after which the
remainder was to be used for observed shooting. One troop of engineers was to blow
eight gaps in the wire south of the first objective using Bangalore Torpedoes to let the

55
This wind direction is almost opposite that quoted above. This is significant in relation to the artillery
disaster the next day. Trooper Fred Moon, 2/10th Battalion, described how the wind was so strong that it
blew down the tent in which he was conducting signals work. Interview with author, 4 May 2012; ‘Misi
l’ufficiale al corrente delle situazione generale e rinnevai il categorico ordine di resistensa ed eltranza.’; S.
Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
59
infantry through, clear booby traps, reconnoitre a shorter track across the marsh and
clear any mines on the Melfa – Giarabub road, including on the airfield.56

Targets Rounds per gun Total

Time
(refer Map 3, p. 61) per minute rounds 57
Z to Z+10 1st Objective
Z+10 to Z+25 2nd & 3rd Objectives
Z to Z+2 3 72
Z+2 to Z+10 2 192
Z+10 to Z+25 3 540
Total rounds planned 804

Table 3 Allied artillery fire plan 21 March, 1941.

Source: ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52
8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The Nation Archives, Kew,
London, CAB 106/836.

While the main attack unfolded to the south of Giarabub the two 6th Cavalry
squadrons were ordered to mount a supporting attack from the north. This was again to
be in two phases. Phase 1 was designed to penetrate the defences from the northeast to
an east – west line running through the Egbert feature, which required destroying the
machine gun posts to the north of the fort and an outpost at the entrance to Pipsqueak
Gully. Phase 2 was to exploit to the south and west with the limit to their operation
being a line running east–west through the airport hangar. The cavalry was to be
supported by one troop of British artillery.58

56
Trooper Fred Moon, 2/10th Battalion, described driving over a mine located in a break in the fence. The
mine was displaced by the vehicles running over the edge of the large mine, until it surfaced without
exploding. Interview with author, 4 May 2012; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20
March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National
Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302.
57
For example, 12 guns x 15 minutes x 3 rounds per minute. Total rounds extrapolated by author; ‘18th
Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub
Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade,
Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
58
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; This was from 8th Field Regiment. ‘18th Aust Inf
Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
60
Map 3 Allied artillery objectives 21 March 1941.
Sources: ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’,
AWM 52 8/3/10/7; Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, Schizzo No. 4.
61
 Aside from the two main avenues of attack, the LRDP was to maintain its
patrolling to the west to ensure no escape by the Italian garrison in that direction. Air
reconnaissance flights were planned for 8.00 am, 12.00 pm and 4.00 pm on 21 March.
Detailed instructions covered medical arrangements, rations, fuel, water, prisoner
movement and supervision, and salvage of captured equipment and stores. Particular
mention was made regarding the Senussi mosque. ‘All ranks are to treat the mosque
with the greatest respect. This mosque must not be damaged in any way by fire or by
any other means as it is held most sacred by the Senussi and if damaged in any way
would do great harm to the British cause.’59

The remainder of 20 March was spent conducting further reconnaissances by

junior leaders, general preparations and registration of artillery. During the night of 20
March, vigorous patrolling was carried out by 2/9th Battalion on the southern perimeter
to ascertain whether any withdrawal was being attempted by the Italians. D Company,
2/10th Battalion, relieved the 6th Cavalry position, freeing the calvalrymen for their role
in the attack the following day and subsequently advanced to Brigadier’s Hill. This
advance protected the newly reconnoitred shorter route across the bog which then
became the route for supply and evacuation of the wounded.60

The battle of Giarabub reached its hard–fought climax on Friday 21 March 1941
with the capture of the fort and total deaths from both sides of a maximum of
approximately 272. The events of this day are covered in five parts; the northern Allied
attack, the southern Allied attack, the Italian defence, the Allied artillery disaster and
the final results.

The northern attack was carried out by B and C Squadrons of 6th Cavalry, with
artillery support from 8th Field Regiment (see Map 4, p. 64.). The cavalrymen departed
from the forward base west of Melfa at 1.30 am, reaching their start line, which ran
east–west through Knox’s Pimple, north of Giarabub at 3.00 am. From 7.00 pm on 20

59
Note that the Australians viewed themselves as British. ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No.
2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
60
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
62
March the sandstorm had intensified until, at 1.00 am, the wind dropped a little. The
dust and sand kept swirling however in the icy wind, keeping visibility to almost nil.
This wind played an important role in the progression of the battle. It blinded the
defenders, allowing concealed movement by the attackers, jammed the weapons of both
protagonists and had a deadly effect on the accuracy of artillery trajectories. The 25–
pounder guns went into position west of the fence and had forward observation officers
with each squadron. Using the north–south fence, which paralleled the road to Tobruk,
as an axis, at 6.15 am B Squadron advanced on the left or east side of the fence. C
Squadron advanced on the right or west side of the fence. B Squadron moved forward to
occupy Lapthorne’s Hill and high ground west towards the fence and C Squadron’s
position. B Squadron’s right troop continued the advance until held up by a strong
enemy post on the Egbert feature. Valuable information about this post was provided by
B Squadron’s centre troop enabling artillery fire to be brought to bear. Meanwhile, C
Squadron east of the fence moved to the edge of the escarpment overlooking the fence
and road to Tobruk, coming under considerable Italian shell fire. Under cover of
Vickers machine guns they moved forward. The troop on the left flank, with assistance
from the attached machine gun section, captured an outpost at 7.30 am containing three
heavy machine guns and six prisoners61

Castagna’s long awaited air support arrived at 9.30 am when a twin engine
German Junkers JU–88 bombed and machine gunned 6th Cavalry’s headquarters and its
vehicles, without causing casualties. At 10.00 am the two cavalry squadrons moved
forward once more. C Squadron’s left troop, with support from B Squadron’s right
troop and C Squadron’s centre troop, attacked and captured another Italian artillery
position. This post contained two officers and 35 men of whom three were killed and
four wounded.62 A further advance brought the cavalry to the Giarabub aircraft hangars,
where five Libyans and the machine gun post surrendered at 10.15 am. The cavalrymen
occupied their final objective – the east–west line through the hangars. Wootten

61
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
62
One 65mm field gun, one 47mm and one Breda 20mm, two heavy machine guns, 50 rifles and ample
ammunition were recovered; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment,
December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
63
considered it undesirable for the cavalry to continue their advance south, owing to
continued poor visibility, as there were no further objectives north of the fort and

Map 4 Allied battle plan for 21 March, 1941.

Source: ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December

1940 to March 1940’, The Nation Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.

plantation delineated. If they had moved further, uncertainty about their exact location
would have seriously compromised artillery concentrations as the infantry advanced
from the south.63 At 11.30 am, still occupying their final objective, the cavalry received
the news that the infantry attack to the south was progressing well. The cavalrymen to
this point had captured 80 prisoners, including wounded. They continued their

63
Long states: ‘Wootten had ordered them to remain because he feared that in the sandstorm they might
clash with the infantryman advancing in the opposite direction.’; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on
Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
64
administrative jobs including collection and counting of stores and equipment, tending
to and evacuating wounded and managing prisoners. That night the men of the 6th
Cavalry slept in the village of Giarabub marking the end of their part in the five month
siege.64

Meanwhile to the south, the main and larger attack was set to commence at
5.15 am. Phase 1 was planned to coincide with the dawn, following a waning moon
which would assist the attack. Throughout the early hours of the morning desultory
Italian mortar and medium machine gun continued. At 4.30 am the men of A Company
2/9th Battalion filed past their Company Commander, 29 year old Captain R. F. (Bull)
Reidy, receiving a handshake and good wishes from him. Reidy was keen to be as close
as possible to the Italian wire for the start of the assault, moving his men to within
50 metres – the closest distance that the swirling dust allowed. The attackers lay in the
sand waiting for the guns located to their rear to open fire on their target to their front.
At 5.15 am the first salvo crashed forth.65 The first and subsequent salvos landed right
on top of 8 and 9 Platoons:

Our artillery landed right among us (said Noyes afterwards). I yelled to them to
scratch into the sand which they did. We had no word of 8 Platoon or the OC
who was with it. As soon as the barrage ceased we got up and into it.66

This was our first experience of shell fire. The noise and the flashes of bursting
shells, with which were intermingled the cries of suddenly startled men, and the
groans of the wounded, were shockingly frightening. We were so unprepared, it
was so unexpected. This was the enemy's portion, not ours. Again the baroom–
boom of our guns, the thin whine of the approaching shells, a screaming crash
and flashes of light, redly orange, blinding in the strange brilliance. Then
silence. We were smothered in choking sand, fumes and smoke. These were our
own shells falling among us.67

The 2/10th Battalion Machine Gun Platoon gunners, as they lay in reserve on Ship Hill
at 5.30 am, were likewise hit by 4 RHA’s fire landing short. Lieutenant Porter described

64
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
65
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 3, AWM 76 B198; Dickens,
Never Late, pp. 68, 69; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew,
London, CAB 106/836.
66
Long, To Benghazi, p. 301.
67
J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, quote by James Calvert, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 4,
AWM 76 B198.
65
‘becoming uncomfortable for ¼ hour’. In A Company’s position, 11 Australians were
killed and about 20 wounded. Reidy was with 9 Platoon and almost certainly saved 16
year old Private William Held’s life when he threw the young soldier to the ground and
lay on top of him, protecting him from shrapnel. Reidy died in the process, without
having fired a shot at the enemy. Reidy’s artillery forward observer was blasted out of
his position, with his signal wire cut, which delayed redirecting the guns to lift their
range.68

Eleven Australians were killed in this one incident during the initial stages of
Phase 1 of the southern attack, out of a total of 23 killed during the entire Giarabub
campaign.69 That is, almost half of all Allied deaths were caused by friendly fire, or in
army parlance, ‘drop shorts’. A number of reasons have been given for the disaster.
Porter of 2/10th Battalion recorded: ‘Artillery barrage opened at 0515 hrs. A Coy on left
apparently moved too far forward and caught in own shellfire. Some casualties.’70 Reidy
may have moved his men too far forward. He was, however, known for his careful
leadership and he had an artillery observation officer with him who would be unlikely
to place himself and others in harm’s way. Long states, ‘The artillerymen were firing
under very difficult conditions. They had found the range when a strong tail wind was
blowing and opened fire on the 21st in a still fiercer headwind. Evidently the
adjustments made were not sufficient.’71 The guns were firing to the north-northwest.
Historian Jeffery Grey states that the infantry were out of position and that visibility
was appalling due to the ferocity of the dust storms.72 Castagna stated that the wind on
20 March was a tailwind. ‘That was a day with strong Ghibli wind, which favored the
forces located in that direction [i.e. from southwest], while it blinded our soldiers in
Caposaldo Number 1.’73

68
12 men were killed and about 20 wounded according to Dickens, although he states that Millard was
killed by machine gun fire as he led a dash across open ground. Spencer states Captain Reidy, WO2 Jack
Millard plus 11 others were killed ; ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’,
AWM 52 8/3/10/7; Dickens, Never Late, pp 68, 69; Spencer, In the Footsteps of Ghosts, p. 40.
69
Long states 17 killed. Refer to Appendices for names of Italians and Australians killed; Long, To
Benghazi, p. 302.
70
‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7.
71
Long, To Benghazi, p. 302.
72
Jeffery Grey, A Soldier’s Soldier, A Biography of Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Daly, Cambridge
University Press, Port Melbourne, 2013, p. 24.
73
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
66
 Following the battle, Reidy’s 9 Platoon walked about a kilometre back to its
position at the time of the first barrage. Calvert’s assessment was that the heavy wind
which blew throughout the night may have displaced the guns slightly, or perhaps the
heavier more humid air (showers had fallen that night) may have affected the flight of
the shells. Perhaps the bitterly cold weather may have affected the charges. Reidy’s
other platoon, 8 Platoon, which was also well outside the designated target area, also
lost a number of men. Later exploration of the site by the men of 9 Platoon revealed that
the shells had landed as much as 100 metres behind their position.74

Captain Edward Fleming took command of A Company following Reidy’s

heroic death. The men were on their feet as soon as the barrage ceased and stormed
towards the first knoll. The Italian defenders appeared to have been stunned by the
hundreds of shells and very little fire emanated from them, although casualties were still
incurred, with C Company’s Captain Berry being one of those wounded. Lieutenant
Noyes’ men found the Italians in caves dug into the side of the rocky hill, protected by
sandbag or stone parapets. The positions generally had blankets over the entrances
which had to be pulled back to allow the attackers to toss grenades inside. The
Australians were carrying two grenades each and before they had passed the first knoll
they had run out. By this time the artillery fire had lifted to the furthest knoll so Noyes
told his men to wait for the bombardment to lift before advancing again. Noyes
unsuccessfully searched for a platoon on his left; then without waiting for the barrage to
lift, Noyes’ platoon advanced. At the foot of the second knoll they met Berry’s
company.75

The second knoll, deep inside Caposaldo Number 1, southwest of the Giarabub
Fort, was heavily defended and put up a determined resistance. The assaulting
companies moved onto the north face of the knoll, coming under direct fire from the fort
itself and the plantation beyond. By 8.00 am, however, all resistance from the first
objective had ceased. Lieutenant Nixon–Smith reached this last feature, where he met
Lieutenant Noyes, and together they set about readying a captured gun for action against

74
J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 6, AWM 76 B198.
75
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
Long, To Benghazi, p. 301.
67
the Italians. Suddenly they were on the receiving end of some very accurate machine
gun fire – friendly fire, from their own Machine Gun Platoon’s Privates George Morris
and Peter Murphy. A round penetrated Nixon–Smith’s haversack driving a fork some
50 millimetres into his shoulder. Fortunately the gunners were interrupted by Italian fire
on their own position, limiting their shooting to one burst. They had been assured by
their range finder (a member of the machine gun platoon) that the targets (the Australian
Lieutenants) were Italian.76

As Phase 1 of Wootten’s southern assault was completed the new track across
the bog was opened for use, reducing the distance to travel back to the advanced base by
some 11 kilometres. The wounded were henceforth moved via this shorter route. At this
point B Company, 2/9th Battalion, pushed around the left flank ready for the second
phase. The ongoing lack of visibility caused a breakdown in communications between
B Company and battalion headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Martin decided it was
inadvisable for A Company, which was to move on the right flank, to cross its start line
until this situation was rectified. A further issue for Martin was that prisoners had stated
that the plantation east of the fort was strongly held. In view of this information, and of
the limited amount of artillery ammunition remaining following the previous 48 hours
of operations, Martin considered it prudent not to expend the remaining shells on small
scale attacks, when it may well be required for a full scale attack on the plantation.
There was, therefore, almost no supporting Allied artillery fire after the initial
concentrations from Z + 25 (5.40 am).77

By 9.00 am the situation on the left was clarified. Captain F. E. C. Loxton’s

D Company made a wide flanking movement west of the main defences and
encountered heavy fire, sustaining 15 casualties.78 Martin sent a message at 10.00 am:

One of my pls is reported W of town. I have 2 pls on enemy post centre of main
defended feature. Have not been fired on for one hr. Previously when using

76
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
Dickens, Never Late, p. 69.
77
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
‘4th Royal Horse Artillery War Diary, 1939–42’, The Royal Artillery Museum, Woolwich, London, Box
419.
78
Long, To Benghazi, p. 302.
68
 Boys rifle ws shelled suffering 6 casualties slightly wounded. Have exposed
ourselves inviting fire but no response. Fort Flag at half mast. Can push on.79

At the same time Loxton reported that opposition had ceased and that he was continuing
to advance toward his second objective which was reached without further difficulty.
Berry, with two of his platoons, arrived at the fort at about the same time as Loxton’s
company. They entered the fort at 11.30 am and replaced the Italian flag with the black
and blue flag of 2/9th Battalion. At 12.00 pm the Australians entered the mosque where
they were welcomed by the Senussi.80

Meanwhile, at 10.00 am A Company, 2/9th Battalion, advanced slowly on the

right towards the plantation. A RAF Lysander reconnaissance had observed a minefield
which required time–consuming clearance. At about 1.30 pm this company finally
entered the edge of the plantation and it became clear that all resistance had ended, as
parties of the enemy occupying posts to the north were coming in to surrender. By
2.30 pm the position was completely mopped up. Every endeavour had been made to
avoid damage to the mosque, and it was found that no damage was caused whatsoever
during the battle. A guard was mounted to protect the ancient building until it was
handed over to the occupying force the next day.81

By 2.00 pm, 21 March, some 600 prisoners had been captured and sent back to a
Prisoner of War cage established at Brigade headquarters, south of Tamma Heights.
These were then transported by a Motor Transport Company under Colonel Ken Eather,
of later Kokoda fame. Lieutenant Colonel Castagna was one of those captured. He was
slightly wounded by a grenade, and when captured was heard to exclaim ‘No surrender!
No surrender!’82 That evening C Battery, 4 RHA, returned to Melfa. 13th Light Field
Ambulance maintained their Medical Dressing Station at Melfa until the next day.83

79
‘18th Brigade Message Log, 21 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
80
The original Italian Flag is held in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, RELAWM 30011; Long,
To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew,
London, CAB 106/836.
81
Long, To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives,
Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
82
Long, To Benghazi, p. 302.
83
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
69
 From an Italian perspective, Castagna’s last day at Giarabub commenced with
an inspection at 4.00 am of the forward posts of Caposaldo Number 1. The storm had
abated but the wind was still blowing strongly as the Allied bombardment started.
Castagna later recalled: ‘In some 45 minutes of preparatory artillery these positions
were devastated by the fire of 36 guns of 63mm or 88mm, with approximately 10,000
shells plus those of many smaller guns.’84 Castagna was left in no doubt about an
imminent attack. He returned to his headquarters to alert his officers. There he found all
the phone lines had been cut by the artillery fire except the one to Caposaldo Number 1,
so he sent runners to the other posts. At 5.45 am the Allied artillery reached Caposaldo
Numbers 2 and 4, then not long after this Caposaldo Number 1 was attacked. A platoon
led by 2nd Lieutenant Napoleone De Vincenzo counterattacked, forcing the attackers
back. Napoleone was killed later that morning. The Italians were forced to use their
personal weapons and hand grenades as the strong winds and visibility reducing dust
had caused the automatic weapons to jam. A few of the 47mm guns continued to fire
constantly at the gaps that the enemy had created in the wire. Enemy [RAF] planes flew
low over the fort, ‘bombarding nonstop our weapons positions.’85 Wootten’s message
log for the morning had the following entry from a Lysander aircraft:

Sortie 0930–1030.
21 lorries and 20 men …400yds S of mosque 0840.
4 lorries and 5 posts, possibly MG, near wire perimeter W of the fort. 0850. 4
lorries but no men in palm trees E of village – 0900. Have scoured within 2 miles
around but can observe no further movement.
Height 300ft. Gun post 300 yds W of the Mosque – 0930. Gun posts W of village
near wire perimeter – do not appear to be manned. Can observe no further
movement anywhere. Visibility very bad. Impossible to observe above 300ft.86

This message does not mention strafing or bombing, but it does give an indication of the
extremely difficult and dangerous flying conditions.87

Castagna used a support section to stop momentarily the progress of the

attackers who had penetrated Caposaldo Number 1. At around 7.30 am the Australians

84
Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, pp. 202, 203; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME,
Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
85
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
86
‘18th Brigade Message Log, 21 March’, 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
87
The author is a licensed pilot.
70
in Caposaldo Number 1 were contained but the battle broke out in Caposaldo Numbers
2 and 4. Three caposaldos were now under attack but the greatest pressure remained on
Caposaldo Number 1 where the attackers had now succeeded in breaking his defensive
line. Caposaldo Number 1 subsequently gave way as the Australians got closer to
Caposaldo Numbers 2 and 4. At the same time artillery concentrations had been
bombarding the posts at Garet el Cuscia and Garet el Barud (east and north of Giarabub
respectively). Garet el Cuscia fell first whilst Garet el Barud lasted longer, and
counterattacked. By 11.00 am, however, it too was overwhelmed. By 9.30 am the
enemy had occupied the ‘old redoubt’ (fort) and the surrounding peaks. The Australians
installed mortars and anti–aircraft guns on these hills, hitting the fort’s inner defences,
then attacked further engaging in a ‘vehement struggle using hand grenades’.88

A few Italian soldiers continued to resist inside Caposaldo Number 1. Castagna

hoped to hold this position as it was an important key to the defence. He sent the Libyan
platoon to counterattack, with the Italians, but they were beaten back. A grenade
exploded close to Castagna but Soldato (Private) Barbagallo saved him, using his body
as a shield. By 11.00 am, however, all of the remaining Italians were captured,
including Castagna. He later stated:

The enemy victory was evident. I could even surrender and claim the honour of
arms, but I decided to go on in order to show the courage and the pride of the
Italian soldiers who were struggling until the death. The behaviour of all the
soldiers was absolutely honourable, as it had always been in the glorious
military tradition of Italy.89

Castagna insisted that he be allowed to stay with his men despite his wound, but
he was moved to the 13th Light Field Ambulance post west of Melfa for treatment then
to Siwa, thence to Mersa Matruh. He was interrogated by an Australian sergeant at the
aid post, then by General Wavell at Mersa Matruh. ‘The General told me that the Italian
Government would be informed about our heroic behavior during the battle’,90 wrote
Castagna. ‘Finally, the interpreter told me in French’, he continued, ‘It is a pity that we

88
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
89
Ibid.
90
Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 217.
71
were adversaries this time.’91 Castagna asked if he could go back to Giarabub to bury
the dead, but he was told the Australians would do this. The Italian commander later
stated that it was impossible to gather figures on the number of his troops that were
killed due to his being evacuated, but he read later in the Bourse Egyptienne newspaper
of 25 March 1941 that 800 prisoners were captured. Since the total number of men was
1287 he estimated that his losses were 400 dead or wounded.92

At 9.30 am another German Junkers JU–88 overflew and bombed Abbott’s

headquarters and his vehicles without damage or casualties. The plane was brought
down by fire from a 6th Cavalry trooper, but as the aircraft crashed some 16 kilometres
away it was not until 25 March that the Australians learned of it, and of the crew’s
difficulties, from two captured crewmen. The Germans led a party back to the Junkers
JU–88 to rescue the badly injured pilot and observer.93

One particular incident occurred on this last day of Operation Galley which
requires further discussion regarding captured Italians being shot by Australians.
Wootten made reference to confusion about what happened when Noyes’ platoon made
contact with Berry’s C Company, as mentioned on page 67 of this thesis. ‘Soon after the
second phase of the southern attack commenced some of the enemy surrendered and
there was then a mix up, some fighting, some surrendering, but it gradually cleared up
and by early in the afternoon it was all over.’94 Private James Bowditch, of 2/9th
Battalion, is quoted as being interviewed:

91
Ibid.
92
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, File DS 1160A/2/12.
93
Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 62; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, War Diary, March 1941.’,
AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to
March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
A 6th Cavalry soldier, Trevor Limb, recalled that after the battle Italian arms and ammunition were
stacked up together with some larger guns. Some of the Australians were inspecting these guns and trying
them out. Limb thought he would do so himself. He picked up a large gun, loaded it and fired at a distant
knoll. The shot missed so he let fly with a few more. He was about to fire again when a message was
received from a nearby vehicle requesting, ‘Cease Fire’. It appeared that the German crew of the crashed
bomber thought that the Australians knew they were still alive, and were firing at them. Soon they
appeared waving a white flag; Cavalry News No. 40, 1987 in
http://www.26cavcommando.org.au/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id =2677&Itemid=74 ,
accessed 4 December 2011.; A photograph of two Australian cavalrymen playing with some of the
captured equipment appears in Johnstone, The Proud 6th, p. 62.
94
‘Letter: Brig. Wootten to Maj. Gen. Lavarack, 28 March 1941, AWM 54 211/11/1.
72
 Contrary to popular myth, the Italians fought very bravely, but after a while
realised they could not win and surrendered. Between 50 and 100 had been
captured. When the troops were told to quickly move to another area where
fierce fighting was going on they were told to shoot the Italians. This would be
denied by authorities, Bowditch said, but it definitely took place. We were
instructed to mow down these prisoners and that, in fact, is what was done. It
was contrary to conventions and all the rules governing war.95

Long made reference to the incident in his first draft of his Official History; ‘Noyes’
men, who had been told to take no prisoners in the first phase, found that the Italians
were in caves dug into the side of the hill...’ 96, however Wootten directed that it be
edited out of the final draft. A recent author on Giarabub, Tom Richardson, wrote:

Most accounts describe the Italians as being ‘too stunned’ to offer much in the
way of resistance, but the Australians still made liberal use of grenades in
clearing dugouts and soon exhausted their supply. Noyes’s men were also
apparently operating under a ‘no prisoners’ order (the origin of which remains
unclear) that they were reluctant to follow, particularly when it became clear
that many of the Italians had no intention of resisting further. Berry ordered
Noyes and his men to encourage the Italians to surrender, and this continued to
happen.97

Documentation of some Australian soldiers’ attitudes towards Italian soldiers supports

the probability of harsh treatment of Italians at the point of capture. The incident
described on p. 27 where enemy (Castagna’s) troops at Melfa pretended to surrender
twice, and when approached took up their arms and opened fire on Australians may well
have been a major catalyst for the shooting of surrendering Italians. Johnston states:

...Italians often enraged their opponents by firing at advancing Australians then

tried to surrender at the last moment, when it was clear they could not halt the
attack. This occurred during the assaults on Bardia and Tobruk. At the end of
the Australians’ desert campaigns, an Australian NCO told his mother of the
same practice at Alamein: ‘on one occasion we attacked a position held by the
Ities and they fought like hell right up until we were 3 yds off them then they
brought their hands up and called for mercy (they never got much)’.98

Whilst Bowditch’s unsubstantiated account and the documented editing of this aspect of
the Official History could be considered highly controversial, unfortunately unless more

95
The date of this interview is not known. http://littledarwin.blogspot.com/2011/03/last–of–fighting–
editors–big–jim.html, accessed 20 May 2011.
96
Long’s draft notes for the Official History. ‘Volume I (Army) Ch 12, Giarabub’, AWM 67 3/435; ‘The
Siege of Giarabub’, Tom Richardson, AWM 67 3/435 in AWM , SVSS document, 2010.
97
‘The Siege of Giarabub’, Tom Richardson, AWM 67 3/435 in AWM , SVSS document, 2010.
98
Mark Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 2000, p. 17.
73
information comes to light, the truth of the matter is likely to remain buried in the
Giarabub dunes.

The day after the battle on 22 March 1941, 6th Cavalry salvaged captured
armaments, ammunition and other stores. A Libyan platoon under a British Lieutenant
was placed in charge of the huge collection.99 The captured equipment included:

70 Diesel trucks
900,000 Small arms rounds
17,950 Breda 20mm rounds
4,000 Breda 47mm rounds
1,000 Breda 77mm and 65mm rounds
39 Boxes of hand grenades
16 Respirators
70 Aerial bombs
23 Shovels
40 Diesel fuel drums
Qty Spare parts for Breda and Schwarzloise guns.100

For the men of 2/9th Battalion the end of the battle was marked by souvenir
hunting.101 They visited the mosque where they were welcomed by the Senussi who
showed them around the buildings. A total of 23 Allied soldiers died during the
Giarabub campaign, including two killed in December 1940. The men returned to camp
and learnt that their dead comrades were to be buried at noon. The service was
postponed until 1.30 pm when four or five Italian planes belatedly bombed and machine
gunned the area, causing no casualties. The Australians buried their dead in separate
graves marked with stones and a simple cross inscribed with their regimental details and
name in a short sad ceremony. These were later reinterred in military cemeteries.102

99
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.
100
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’,
The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137.
101
Calvert’s description – others may describe this as stealing. J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’,
Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 7.
102
Calvert states five Italian bombers bombed and machine gunned the area. Wootten states four JU 88’s
appeared at 2.00 pm and dropped 12 bombs west of the fort. Dickens states that the bombs fell during the
service; J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 7, AWM 76 B198;
74
 On entering the Giarabub Oasis after the battle a wooden coffin was found
inscribed with the words ‘Soldat Inglese’ containing the body of Australian Private E.
E. Powell. The Italians had carried his body back with them as they retreated. The
respect shown by the Italians for the dead Australian touched the men, such that they
found it hard to feel real animosity towards their defeated foe. The Italian dead were
buried with respect. Some Italian bodies were lost when covered by blowing sand
beforehand so an accurate count could not be made. However, Long states that 250
Italians were killed, which appears high considering that Italian Lieutenant Marini told
Castagna that he counted the burial of 84 Italian dead of whom 21 were not identified.
To arrive at Long’s 250 killed assumes 164 Italians were buried by wind–blown sand.103

Australian wounded numbered approximately 77, with the Italians suffering

some 100 injured during the battle. The Italians had some 1,300 taken prisoner and the
Australians just one, in December 1940. The Allied units travelled back to the coast to
prepare for their move to Greece. Three members of 2/9th Battalion received gallantry
awards on 7 May 1941 for their part in Operation Galley at Giarabub. Captain Berry
received the Military Cross while Sergeant MacIntosh and Private Taylor each received
the Military Medal. A little later, on 24 April, news arrived at Tobruk that the Germans
had recaptured Giarabub.104

In summary, working with very limited time, in one of the world’s most hostile
environments, the Allied force finally broke the Giarabub defence on 21 March 1941.

‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
Dickens, Never Late, p. 71; 20 are buried at Halfaya Sollum Cemetery, one at Melfa, one at Ismailia and
one at El Alamein. Appendices A and B show details of all Allied deaths and many of the Italian deaths.
One of the 23, Sapper A. Dixon, was a member of the Royal Engineers. Two others were killed in
December 1940 in the same campaign; however even if these three are not included, the Allied death toll
is 20. Long states 17 deaths and Dickens 20; Long, To Benghazi, in Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s
Battles, p. 180.
103
This conversation took place in April 1942. Lieutenant Marini was present at the burial but was not
permitted to gather the names of all those killed. Appendix B lists the names of 64 Italians known to have
been killed in action at Giarabub; Dickens, Never Late, p. 71; Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva
Italo, p. 62; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB
106/836; Long, To Benghazi, in Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 180; S. Castagna, ‘Battle
of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, in Clarke, Encyclopedia of
Australia’s Battles, p. 180.
104
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 82, 97.
75
This had followed an unsuccessful British attempt to subdue the garrison in July 1940,
followed by a five month siege. Operation Galley finally overcame stout Italian defence
by driving in the outlying Italian posts, making full use of deception as to the size of the
force and the direction of their attack, together with the concentration of force at critical
points ascertained by thorough persistent intelligence gathering. This allowed the well
resourced, well led and well trained attacking force to prevail. The cost for the Italian
defenders was high, with half of the Allied attacker’s deaths caused by their own fire –
a feat unlikely to be repeated in World War II. The reasons for the Italians’ tenacity and
ultimate defeat are analysed in Chapter 3.

76
 Chapter 3

Why Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley unfolded the way they did.

Whilst the preceding chapters focused primarily on establishing and examining a

narrative of events during the siege of Giarabub through to the finalé of Operation
Galley, this chapter, in turn, explains why the Italians were able to hold out for so long,
why they ultimately capitulated and why it took the Allies five months to finally drive
the Italians out of their heavily fortified but lonely fortress. These are complex issues
with no one simple answer or singular dominant explanatory factor; rather, the sum of a
number of issues made the difference between success and failure for either side.
Training, leadership, logistics, food, medical support, artillery quality and deployment,
planning, communications, morale, geography and terrain each played a part in the final
outcome.

To begin, differences in the relative level of training between the Allied and
Axis forces were stark. The 2/9th Battalion, as an example, was formed in November
1939 and immediately commenced individual and unit training, which ranged from
attacking Adelaide’s sandhills to undertaking long route marches interspersed with drill
and weapons training, all the while building its esprit de corps. In May 1940, the unit
left for Palestine, where training continued, then on to Egypt, arriving at Ikingi Maryut
on 31 December 1940. More route marches ensued, acclimatising the Australians to
desert operations. The 6th Cavalry had arrived in Palestine in January 1940, having
undergone basic training in Australia, going on to exercise continuously for 12 months
to December 1940 in the Middle East. The Australian 6th Cavalry Regiment’s training
involved using machine gun carriers and six old Vickers light tanks. Training progressed
for the Australian units that went on to fight at Giarabub from section through platoon,
company, battalion and brigade operations. Much of this training was directly
applicable to the Giarabub experience, when, for example, on 7 March 1941, the 2/10th
Battalion exercised holding a defensive position overnight. This was followed by a three
day march to gain experience in administration of a company on detached duties,
exactly as the unit’s D Company undertook during Operation Galley. From 10 – 13

77
March, 1941, 18th Brigade held a major training exercise involving 2/9th, 2/10th, 2/12th
Battalions, 1st Antitank Regiment, 5th Field Ambulance and J Section Signals. The
exercise required the brigade to defend against an imaginary attack, by German and
Italian forces, on oil storage facilities located on the northern Egyptian coast. The
Australians trained in night patrolling, water discipline and the use of their battle
equipment, again, all key aspects of the Giarabub campaign.1 Most weeks saw three day
marches of 30 kilometres or more per day in the harsh rocky desert terrain. Dickens
describes a typical 2/9th Battalion training exercise held on 15 February, 1941:

A battalion exercise in the vicinity of Abu Mina on the 14th started with
reveille at 0230 and ended on return to camp at 2000 hrs that night. This was
followed by a three–day tactical exercise in the vicinity of Abu Mina from
the 19th during which the men subsisted on hard rations and a single bottle
of water per day.2

Long described the general preparedness of the division, of which all Australian
troops at Giarabub were a part: ‘...it is doubtful whether in the succeeding five years
any Australian force was fitter for battle than the 6th Division...’3 This thoroughly
detailed and extensive training, in every aspect of the challenges they would face,
frustrated the men – they were keen to get into action, but it meant that their skills
were honed to the highest possible levels. When Captain Reidy and ten other men of
A Company, 2/9th Battalion, were killed, along with twenty wounded, by friendly fire
on 21 March 1941 during the final assault, it was training that provided the impetus
for the stunned survivors to continue their advance.4

As to the defenders of Giarabub, their training is more difficult to quantify.

Castagna, Fattore, the Italian Official History and the Italian Archives all make no
mention of training. One obvious possibility for this dearth of information is simply that

1
Spencer, Footsteps of Ghosts, pp. 19, 29;
http://www.AWM.gov.au/units/unit_13634second_world_war.asp, accessed 31 July, 2012; ‘No. 3 Pl,
2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt. Porter,1941’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; ‘18 Aus. Inf. Bde., Defence
Exercise 10–13 Mar. 41’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; Stockings, Bardia, p. 59.
2
Dickens, Never Late, p. 55.
3
Long, To Benghazi, p. 204.
4
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 68, 69.
78
there may not have been any training. In a wider study of the North African campaign,
Stockings described the status of Italian Army training succinctly:

A woefully inadequate system of individual and group training, in many ways

a consequence of deficiencies in leadership...handicapped the Italian Army
throughout the early stages of the war... Italian units in North Africa... trained
ineffectively or not at all, and fought poorly as a consequence. Senior Italian
officers were seemingly oblivious to the importance of individual and
collective training.5

If training instils confidence and the ability to function under extreme pressure, then
Castagna’s men were handicapped from the start. In contrast, Wootten Force’s training
was tailored precisely for desert operations, such as those at Giarabub, and contributed
substantially to their success.6

Tactical leadership went hand–in–hand with training – and again a clear relative
mismatch at Giarabub is evident. The Allied leader on the Giarabub battlefield in the
final stages was Brigadier G. F. Wootten. Wootten landed at Gallipoli in 1915, served
as a company commander, then in France as a Brigade Major. He was mentioned in
despatches five times and awarded the DSO. During the interwar period Wootten
excelled whilst studying at the Camberly Staff College in England. Wootten was highly
respected by those he commanded.7 Ably supporting Wootten were his battalion
commanders. The commander of 2/9th Battalion, the largest Allied unit at Giarabub was
Lieutenant Colonel J. E. G. Martin who was a strict disciplinarian, stern but just, and
who demanded the best of himself and those around him. The 2/9th’s success was
credited in no small part to his insistence on a full and carefully planned training
program at all times. As one of his men, James Calvert noted; ‘He was cursed at times
for his ruthless insistence that manoeuvres be carried out in the last detail, and the least
instruction complied with.’8 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Australians had a large
proportion of effective leaders. Many company and battalion commanders had earned
their leadership skills on the battlefields of World War I. The junior officers of the AIF

5
Stockings, Bardia, p. 383.
6
For a more detailed study of the state of Italian military training at this time see Stockings, Bardia, pp.
383–386.
7
Dennis et al, Companion to Australian Military History, p. 608.
8
J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 1, AWM 76 B198.
79
had learnt the importance of initiative in NCOs and platoon leaders. By 1918 the
Australians had advanced the art of aggressive patrolling to an extent that ‘bewildered
their enemy and astonished senior British commanders.’9 Many of the junior leaders
serving in North Africa in 1940 were, as far as possible, sourced from within the ranks;
for example, on 3 January, 1940, nine NCOs were detached from the 2/9th Battalion to
attend officer training, completed their course successfully and returned to the battalion.
The effectiveness of the experienced 2nd AIF officers was later further demonstrated in
the Kokoda campaign at Isurava where they were employed in leadership roles in the
39th Battalion, versus the disastrous results on the opposite ridge at Abuari when
inexperienced leaders were employed in the same theatre with 53rd Battalion.10

The value of having officers drawn from their units and of having so many high
quality leaders throughout the Allied force at Giarabub lay in the confidence that this
built in the men. Strong esprit de corps was cemented by shared adversity and the long
journey from the recruiting office in Australia to the Libyan desert. Importantly,
inspired leadership encouraged lateral thinking, as demonstrated with Wootten’s push to
force a way across the marshes south of Giarabub, previously considered impassable,
and which provided the path to tactical surprise.11

The Italian tactical commander throughout the Giarabub campaign was Major
Salvatore Castagna, aged 43 in 1940; he was lean and vigorous with a dark complexion
and Sicilian features. Castagna possessed a commanding air which drew respect and
engendered trust from those around him. Awarded a Silver Medal of Military Valour
(equivalent to the British Military Cross) during his World War I service, he rose to 1st
Lieutenant in 1917.12 After 1918, Castagna continued serving with the army and was
posted to Libya with the Raggruppamento Ruggeri for four years, during which the
Italians were still attempting to overpower an Arab rebellion, which had begun at the

9
Long, To Benghazi, p. 130.
10
Dickens, Never Late, p. 19; Peter Brune, A Bastard of a Place, The Australians in Papua, Allen and
Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003, pp. 163-166.
11
Dickens, Never Late, p. 18.
12
Italians from Northern Italy generally have fine features and thin bodies. Their southern counterparts,
for example, from Sicily are generally of a more solid and thicker set build with darker complexions. In
1940 the southern and northern Italian dialects were markedly different. The Italian name of the medal is
Medaglia d'Argento al Valore Militare. Fattore, Giarabub, p. 182.
80
start of World War I. A term as a full–time instructor in Naples left him frustrated with
perceived inactivity, but he continued to hone his leadership skills. A posting to Jeffra
near the Tunisian border in 1937 saw Castagna promoted to Major, commanding the 2nd
Battalion, 85th Infantry Regiment. Following his Jeffra posting, Castagna was given
command of the VIII Libyan Battalion for nine months, furthering his skills in leading
African colonial troops.13A colleague, Mario Capucci, described him thus:

A man who is very strict with others and himself. If he made a decision he
would stick to it, and would not tolerate superficialities nor indecision. He
preferred to praise rather than punish. He had few vices, did not smoke
and rarely drank a small beer with the other officers. He loved Africa, and
like an African, had trained himself to renounce anything unnecessary.14

On 22 April, 1940, Castagna was ordered to Giarabub where he set about

transforming the 19th century defences. Ridotta Marcucci (the ancient central fort), for
example, was constructed for defence against Bedouins, not a modern army. Castagna
worked his men hard to improve the defences. Barbed wire was removed from the
border fence and used to construct perimeter defences. Tank traps were dug, mine fields
laid, gun emplacements constructed, telephone lines laid and ammunition was prepared.
There is little evidence of instruction and training of Castagna’s garrison. Whilst the
lack of evidence of training does not prove that there was no training, the poor fire
discipline repeatedly exhibited, as an example, during the siege and final battle lends
weight to a lack of training as being a significant factor in the Italian performance under
fire. Stockings, in Bardia, makes the point forcefully:

Field exercises and detailed practical instruction were neglected almost

entirely. By the time Graziani's advance into Egypt began, only a little
over half of all troops in the Italian metropolitan infantry divisions
involved in the invasion had received any formal military instruction. 15

Only eight of the 30 officers in the Giarabub garrison were permanent soldiers with the
rest being conscripts. Captain S. H. Good, the 18th Brigade Intelligence Officer, reported
on 19 March, 1941 of the conscripted Italian officers: ‘The rest are conscripts and said

13
Fattore, Giarabub, pp. 181, 182, 184.
14
Ibid, p. 183.
15
Stockings, Bardia, pp. 383, 384.
81
to be tired of war’.16 Whether being a conscripted or a regular soldier made a difference
to the officers’ motivation is difficult to prove in Giarabub’s case, but it may have been
an additional factor affecting the outcome. This contrasts with the Australian officers
and men, who were all volunteers. An Australian intelligence report commented that
captured Italian prisoners had described the importance of Castagna’s leadership in
explaining why the garrison did not surrender:

A considerable portion of the garrison – possibly about half of the garrison –

wanted to surrender, but the remainder are desirous of fighting and find
inspiration in their commander, who is credited with holding the force
together.17

There is no doubt that Castagna’s personality was the key reason for the Italians holding
out until their final defeat on 21 March 1941. Whilst we have a picture of Castagna’s
personality, his post war book and scant Italian records to go by, the actual methods that
he used to achieve this motivation remain unclear. We do know that Castagna himself
struggled with the conscripted members of his force:

Castagna, with his long experience as a colonial, knew the Askari [Libyan
warriors] well and had great admiration for them, but was much less
enthusiastic about the later conscripted Libyans. He said, ‘the graduates and
volunteers are excellent soldiers, obedient, hard working and dedicated to
their duties. After the Ethiopian Campaign they were proud to belong to our
army. The conscripts, soldiers and officers, do not show the same
enthusiasm. Some are old (nearly 40) and not suited to our army, complain a
lot, and leave for agricultural excuses and subsidies. They cause me a lot of
worry.’18

The ability of this one man to motivate 1,200 men to stand and fight, completely
isolated and with little hope of winning, in the dire circumstances described in this
thesis, is quite at odds with the archetypal image of Italian Army officers of World War
II as portrayed in popular literature.19

16
Captain Good’s assessment was based upon captured prisoner statements;‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int.
Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
17
‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
18
Fattore, Giarabub, pp. 201, 202.
19
Stockings, Bardia, pp. 299, 300; Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, p. 9; Mark Johnston: Correspondence
with author, June 2013.
82
 Senior battlefield leadership in the North African theatre of World War II
provided great contrasts. On one hand the Allies were usually led by modern thinking
generals with considerable drive, tenacity and energy, whereas the Italians were more
often handicapped by unimaginative leaders using outdated strategies poorly applied. A
case in point is Graziani’s 300 kilometre barbed wire fence, mentioned in Chapter 2,
built in 1937 to stop the resupply of Senussi rebels. Even as the British demonstrated
that they could simply drive over or cut the fence at will, Graziani continued to maintain
this fence, believing that it would block British movement west from Egypt. The widely
used Italian strategy of placing forts at 50 kilometre intervals along this fence likewise
demonstrated a failure to understand the principles of mutual support. Even the concept
of the Giarabub fort itself demonstrates outmoded thinking. Modern warfare in 1940
had evolved from fighting a colonial insurgency to encompass force mobility over vast
distances and the use of long range artillery, not static defence in isolated strongholds.
No force of personality, on Castagna’s part, could make up for such anachronistic
thinking.20

Senior Allied military leadership ability pertaining to Giarabub was

demonstrated firstly with Field Marshal Archibald Wavell’s drive to instigate desert
offensives against Italian forces in 1940–41. The skills required of Wavell, when faced
with a vast area defended by a numerically superior enemy, would be, amongst others,
bluff, audacity and imagination.21 Wavell ordered Major General Sir Richard O’Connor
to produce a plan. The plan that O’Connor conceived was the stunningly successful
Operation Compass. O’Connor had a reputation for ‘boldness and unorthodoxy’.22 Much
has been written about these senior commanders and the figures themselves speak
volumes. Wavell’s 30,000 men faced 200,000 Italians and Libyans to the west and
250,000 to the east (not including 150,000 occupying troops far to the south in
Ethiopia), yet Wavell would go on to destroy Mussolini’s vast 10th Army. For the loss
of less than 2,000 Allied troops the Italians sustained 130,000 captured or killed whilst
the Allies advanced 800 kilometres in 10 weeks.23

20
Jon Diamond, Masterstroke in the Desert, in WWII History, Vol. 11, Sovereign Media, Virginia, USA,
2011, p. 36.
21
B. Pitt, The Crucible of War, Wavell’s Command, Cassell and Co, London, 2001, pp. 5–7.
22
Diamond, Masterstroke in the Desert, p. 32.
23
Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 94.
83
 Disparity of logistics was one of the main factors that ultimately determined the
outcome at Giarabub. The difficulty of logistics was summed up well by German
General Johann von Ravenstein who famously described operations in the Libyan
deserts thus: ‘a tactician’s paradise but a quartermaster’s hell.’24 Wavell was faced with
severe shortfalls in equipment on his arrival in North Africa but understood the vital
importance of adequate logistics, later stating, ‘[Logistics]...the crux of generalship –
superior even to tactical skill.’25 Difficulties started for both sides with sea transport to
North Africa across the Mediterranean Sea. Much of this route was within bombing
range of land based aircraft. The Italian navy was substantially damaged or confined to
inactivity following the Taranto raid of 11 November, 1940, which utilised British
torpedo aircraft from the Naval Air Arm in a brilliant night attack. Further devastation
for the Italian navy, off Cape Matapan two weeks later, cleared it from the
Mediterranean for the next three months, allowing Wavell’s attacks in Cyrenaica to
proceed.26

The similarities of the Battle of Bardia to the Giarabub campaign are numerous
and illuminating, and none more so than when analysing logistics. The weaknesses of
Italian logistics greatly facilitated the imposition and enforcement of sieges at both
Bardia and Giarabub. The Italians’ lack of terrestrial mobility was not a matter of choice
for the battlefield commanders, but rather the result of a dysfunctional logistics train,
commencing with a lack of political power or will to enforce wartime production
requirements, an enfeebled economy and an antiquated industrial design and production
system which was unable to provide modern equipment in the quantities or time
required.27 Many historians claim that the Italians did not understand or adjust to the
concept that modern warfare demanded mobility on an industrial scale. Stockings
highlights this, pointing out that the Italians at Bardia had no option but to ‘stockpile

24
Allyn Vannoy, North Africa: The War of Logistics, in WWII Quarterly, Winter 2012, Sovereign Media,
Virginia, 2012, p. 96.
25
A. Wavell, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell of Cyrenaica (1883–1950), in Peter G. Tsouras, (ed), The
Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, Greenhill Books, London, 2000, p. 276.
26
H. C. O’Neill, (ed.), Odhams History of the Second World War, Vol. 1, Odhams Press, London, 1951,
p. 108; Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 180-182.
27
Stockings, Bardia, pp. 303, 309, 321.
84
and defend’.28 An eloquent example in this regard is transportation. It is difficult to
quantify precisely the total number of vehicles available to Castagna at Giarabub prior
to Giarabub’s isolation from 10th Army on 16 December, 1940; although, Australian
Intelligence estimated that the Italians had only 30 to 60 vehicles on 14 March, 1941.
On the final day of Operation Galley, 70 trucks were captured. Allowing for perhaps 10
Italian vehicles destroyed during the siege and battle, this still stands in stark contrast to
the Allies’ mobility. The 1,716 Allied men moved to the Giarabub area for Operation
Galley were transported on 300 trucks. This was in addition to the LRDP and 6th
Cavalry vehicles already at Giarabub. If the same ratio of vehicles to men is
extrapolated to these units, then their additional 89 trucks brings the total to 389 (see
Table 4).29

Giarabub Castagna’s Force Wootten Force

Troops 2,100 2,219
Vehicles 80 389
Men per vehicle 26.25 5.7

Table 4 Comparison of troop and vehicle numbers.

Sources: per footnote 29.

On the Allied side at Giarabub, every logistical detail of the Allied operations
was planned for – fuel dumps, vehicle repair (47th LAD), number of men per vehicle,
bivouac sites, meal and rest stops, vehicle spacing and speeds, number of rations,
weight of ammunition and, critically, water. There is little evidence of similar planning
or management on the Italian side at Giarabub. Stockings notes that in addition to a
severe shortage of vehicles in North Africa, there was no system for repair or recovery
of vehicles and the vehicles were unsuited to the environment, often with 40 per cent

28
Stockings, Bardia, p. 321.
29
‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 14 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5;
‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The
National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; ‘H.Q. Matruh Sub–Area Administrative Instructions,
Operations Giarabub Area. 13 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
85
unserviceable. For the Italians located 300 kilometres south in the Sahara, the situation
could only have been worse.30

To continue the comparison of Bardia versus Giarabub; as at Bardia, the

defenders at Giarabub suffered dire shortages of rations. At Bardia the ten days of
rationing has been described as a major contributor to the Italian defeat. 31 Castagna’s
men were on half or less rations for ninety–three days from 18 December 1940 to
21 March 1941. The extent to which this affected the Italians at Giarabub is difficult to
quantify. It is a reasonable assumption, however, that this would have had a major
impact on their health, strength and morale, and therefore on their ability to resist the
Wootten Force onslaught. On the other hand, the Australians had excellent provisioning
throughout the Giarabub campaign. The 6th Cavalry, whilst enforcing the siege, were
well fed, often having a hot meal brought forward for them from the field kitchens
established at Melfa. During the battle, on 20 March, hot food was brought forward to
the men of 2/9th Battalion whilst they were only 100 metres from the Italian front line,
lying on the sand with the British 25–pounder shells screaming overhead. Attention to
detail for the attacking force’s provisioning even included planning for a rum ration to
be issued at 5.00 pm on 21 March, after the battle.32

The health of the defenders versus that of the attackers provides yet another
contrast. By 7 February, 1941, 20 defenders were in the Giarabub hospital, which was
located in the mosque, suffering from gastro conditions. Libyan deserters described the
water as ‘bad’.33 Once the Giarabub airfield was closed by Allied artillery in January
1941, no medical evacuations could be undertaken. At Bardia some three per cent of the
Italians were suffering from dysentery and others hepatitis. One in ten had serious lice
infestations and medical supplies were inadequate. At Giarabub, far distant from
support of any kind, short of clean water, and besieged for four and a half months, one
can only imagine the state of the garrison’s medical affairs. Wootten’s planning for

30
Stockings, Bardia, p. 310.
31
Ibid, pp. 315, 316.
32
Long, To Benghazi, p. 292; Dickens, Never Late, p. 66; ‘18 Aust Inf. Bde. Administrative Instn No. 2’,
AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
33
‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for February 1941, 1 March 1941’,
AWM 54 481/12/79.
86
Operation Galley included detailed arrangements for every possible aspect of medical
requirements including those of the expected large haul of prisoners. Air evacuations
were arranged from an airfield to the north, Australian 13th Light Field Ambulance was
on hand to move and manage patients, a forward dressing station was set up at Melfa,
and further attention was provided at Siwa, then in Egypt at Cairo’s Number 63 General
Hospital at Helmier. Five of the 23 Allied fatalities resulting from the siege and battle at
Giarabub are recorded as ‘Died of Wounds’ from 82 wounded in total. The equivalent
figures are not known for the defenders while the efficient, prompt and professional
Allied medical service must surely have been a factor in producing such low mortality
among the Allied casualties.34

Differences in equipment continue the theme of relative inequality between the

attackers and the defenders. The second most important ‘tool’ after transport was
artillery, both in its quality and its use. Wootten Force artillery outgunned the Italians in
terms of range, destructive power, mobility, concentration, accuracy, volume, fire
discipline and gun placement: all of which led to a crushing advantage over the Italian
garrison. The Italian gunners had short range, inaccurate small calibre guns which were
poorly deployed and used without the disciplined fire plans of the British artillery. The
British 25–pounder was new technology, introduced just prior to World War II, with a
range of 12,253 metres whereas the three Italian guns, the 47/32, 65/17 and the 77/28 all
had ranges of only 7,000 metres or less. The 65/17 and 77/28 were both of World War I
vintage, with slow rates of fire and low reliability, particularly in sandy or dusty
conditions. The British Boys Anti–tank rifle was a devastating weapon against the
Italian stone sangers, although ineffective for its designed purpose against armour. The
37mm Bofors anti–aircraft guns were also in use by the British artillery at Giarabub.
The approximate equivalent of both these British weapons used by the Italian defenders
was the 20mm Breda machine gun which required each cartridge to be mechanically
oiled on loading to facilitate extraction. This was a serious weakness in the swirling dust
storms of Giarabub. As to the quantities of artillery pieces, the Italians had fourteen
47/32 guns, four 77/28 guns, two 65/17 guns and sixteen 20mm Breda machine guns,

34
Stockings, Bardia, pp. 320, 321; ‘Medical report by R.M. O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6 th Aust Div for
March 1941, 3 April 1941’, AWM 54 481/12/79; Appendices A and B. It is not known if the air
evacuation system was ultimately used.
87
against Wootten’s Bofors, Boys and sixteen 25–pounder guns. However, the
unreliability, ineffectiveness and short range of the Italian weapons negated any
numerical superiority. Long recorded the Australian view of Italian weaponry: 35

The Australians considered that nearly every sort of Italian weapon

compared unfavourably with their own. The Italian rifle seemed like a toy
beside the Lee–Enfield; the red painted, thin–skinned grenade was far less
lethal than the British equivalent. The Italian field guns ‘were of all sizes,
shapes and vintages; shell fragmentation seemed poor and many men blown
off their feet got up again.’36

Comparison of planning and intelligence yields further revealing contrasts,

particularly during the Operation Galley phase. Fergusson, then Wootten, vigorously
pursued knowledge of their enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities, employing almost
continual patrolling, numerous reconnaissance expeditions, aerial photography and
frequent interrogation of prisoners. Prisoners provided confirmation of assumed or
sketchy information, facilitating accurate production of maps and their continual
improvement, identification of the vital ground, discovery and testing of previously
unknown access routes and awareness of minefield locations. Through persistent
probing the Italian strong points and gun emplacements were precisely located, which
allowed for accurate, concentrated, and therefore highly effective, artillery fire prior to
and during the final assaults. All unit commanders and junior leaders were sent forward
to study the ground for the impending attacks.37 Watches were synchronised, code
names allocated, fire plans produced and guns laid onto targets – all as per Wootten’s
plans. The importance that Wootten placed on planning is demonstrated by the fact that
26 copies of the detailed plan for the movement of the 1,716 men on 300 vehicles from
Mersa Matruh to Giarabub were distributed on 13 March, 1941, as ‘Administration

35
Long, Benghazi, pp. 200, 290, 291; Wahlert, Western Desert Campaign, pp. 115–120; S. Castagna,
‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
36
The Australians did however use Italian weapons, which became known as the ‘Bush Artillery’ during
the siege of Tobruk. Timothy Hall, Tobruk 1941, The Desert Siege, Methuen Australia, North Ryde,
1984, pp. 31, 110, 185; Long, Benghazi, p. 200; Stockings describes similar scenes at Bardia. Stockings,
Bardia, pp. 335, 336.
37
‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 14 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘18th
Aust Inf Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Operational Order No. 1,
19 March, 1941 from 18 Aust Inf Brigade’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order
No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
88
Instructions Operations – Giarabub Area’.38 This document was accompanied by
movement tables, maps and other appendices. The plans for the final attack were
promulgated firstly as ‘Operational Plan No. 1’ on 15 March, then, demonstrating
flexibility as new information came to light, a revised plan, Operational Plan No. 2, was
distributed on 20 March. The planning of the logistical support has been discussed
above but bears emphasising as evidence of the thoroughness and detail of the
Australian planning. In the tradition established by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash
on 4 July 1918 at the Battle of Hamel, meticulous planning, communicated to all ranks,
helped lead to outstanding success on the battlefield.39

In his 1950 book, Castagna described the layout of defensive positions within
the outer perimeter wire and the adjacent knolls, but this shows little sign of attempting
to understand the Allied force’s capabilities or activities. Even though German and
Italian aircraft were in use, and did make one report of an Allied convoy en route to
Giarabub, there appears to have been ineffective use made of this resource for the
gathering of tactical intelligence.40 Castagna’s shortage of vehicles meant that mounted
reconnaissance patrols were not an option available to him; however, Castagna did have
static lookouts in place around the Giarabub area and along the border fence. Due to the
distances between them – up to 50 kilometres apart – these were easily neutralised. The
Italian defenders could not make use of captured prisoners for intelligence, as the
Australians did, as the Italians only captured one attacker, who was eventually flown to
Rome for interrogation. It could be considered that Castagna could have used foot
patrols to ascertain the Australian strengths and locations. It is not hard to imagine the
difficulties in undertaking such strenuous reconnaissance trips after months of
starvation.

Battlefield communications have always been vital in warfare and this was
especially so in the vast featureless desert of North Africa in World War II during the
Giarabub action. The Australians made full use of radios, telephones and heliographs,
using coded messages when required, coded names for units and locations, and pre–

38
‘HQ Matruh Sub–Area, Administration Instructions, Operations – Giarabub Area, 13 March, 1941’,
AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
39
Clark, The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 148, 149.
40
Castagna, Giarabub, Schizzo No. s 4–6, p. 168.
89
planned radio procedures such as frequency allocations and radio silence periods to
ensure secure communication systems. There were failures, such as when the Forward
Observation Officer with 2/9th Battalion’s A Company had his phone line cut by his
own British artillery fire on 21 March 1941; yet, viewing the copiously detailed 18th
Brigade message log for that final day clearly indicates that the Allied communications
were of a high standard.41 Italian communications suffered from unreliable radio
availability, poor radio security and easily intercepted telephone lines between isolated
observation posts, as described in the previous chapters. The poor state of Italian radio
security was demonstrated by an unencoded message, sent from inside Giarabub by the
Italians, received at 18th Brigade Headquarters on 15 March 1941: ‘Enemy wireless
message intercepted calling for bombers.’42 The telephone lines within the fortress were
destroyed during the final battle on 20 and 21 March, as would be expected under
sustained artillery attack, contributing to the compounding failure of the Italian
defences.

Much is made of the importance of morale in modern populist histories as a

reason for the relatively small Allied force involved in Operation Compass being able to
conquer the vast numbers of men of the Italian 10th Army. Morale can be defined as ‘the
mental attitude or bearing of a person or group, especially as regards confidence,
discipline, etc.’43 Napoleon stated: ‘Morale makes up three quarters of the game; the
relative balance of man–power accounts only for the remaining quarter’;44 however, this
was not necessarily the case at Giarabub. If high morale is considered to be the outcome
of a long chain of positive events then the 6th Cavalry firstly, followed by the balance of
Wootten Force, had peak morale. They were executing a well–promulgated detailed
plan, had good equipment, had trained for a year; their officers were drawn from the
ranks, were of exceptional quality and had earned the highest respect of the men. They
were fit, healthy, well fed and rested with adequate leave. The only thing that could add

41
‘Special Issue of Code Names for “Galley” Operation’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘O. Inst. No. 1 19 March
41.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Message Log 18th Brigade’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
42
‘Message Log 18th Brigade’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.
43
Moore, The Australian Oxford Dictionary, p. 829.
44
Napoleon, Correspondance de Napoleon ler publiee par ordre de l’Empereur Napoleon III, XVII, No.
14276, 1858–1870, in P. Tsouras (ed.), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, Greenhill
Books, London, 2000, p. 312.
90
to the morale of the men in Wootten Force was the ultimate measure of a soldier’s
ability – success in battle.

This situation stands in stark contrast to the Italians (the Libyan defenders will
be discussed separately), who were fighting with little or no hope of success once their
support on the coast was destroyed. Their equipment was old and insufficient, their
weapons were ineffective, their training was limited, and, in the nature of the Italian
army of World War II, the junior officers were usually unskilled in even the most minor
infantry tactics. An ever shrinking supply of food to well below subsistence levels
provided every Italian soldier with a nagging reminder of their hopeless position.
Lastly, watching one third of their fellow soldiers – the Libyans – desert in the hour of
most need, just before the final battle, must surely have driven a stake through the heart
of the remaining defenders’ morale.45

The Australian intelligence reports make repeated mentions of the low morale of
the defenders at Giarabub. This was clearly accepted as an accurate assessment by
Wootten and the other Australian commanders at Giarabub, as evidenced by two
separate air drops of pamphlets urging the defenders to surrender. However, despite
popular conceptions of World War II Italian soldiers literally running up the white flag
at every opportunity, this simply did not happen at Giarabub. 46 A 2/9th Battalion flag
was raised over the fort on 21 March 1941, but it replaced the Italian Tricolour, not a
white flag.47 Castagna is quoted as shouting: ‘No surrender! No Surrender!’48 upon his
capture. Some parties of Italian soldiers did surrender, but generally in the face of
overwhelming force, as described in the previous chapters. During the final days of
Operation Galley, between 84 and 250 of the defenders were killed, depending upon
which report is consulted. Even allowing for the possible shooting of Italian prisoners,

45
Stockings, Bardia, p. 376, 377, 400.
46
A further example of Italian steadfastness was exhibited by some of their artillerymen at Badia, who
stayed at their post until killed. Ibid, p. 152.
47
‘18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 14 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; The original Italian
Flag is held in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra; RELAWM 30011; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302;
‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836;
There is one report of the 2/9th Battalion flag replacing a white flag over the fort, however the balance of
evidence does not support this. Mark Johnston, The Silent 7th, an Illustrated History of the 7th Australian
Division 1940-46, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005, p. 22.
48
Long, To Benghazi, p. 302.
91
this would indicate that the Italians were intent on fighting to the finish. In view of the
above, low morale amongst the Italian defenders cannot be seen as a major contributor
to their defeat.

Castagna’s Libyan soldiers, however, need to be considered in a different

context. The Libyans had been suppressed by the Italians since 1912 then further during
Mussolini’s quest for Empire. The Senussi desire for an isolated and independent
existence at Giarabub had been thwarted and their Koranic University destroyed. They
had little reason to support far off Mussolini’s dreams of new Roman prominence in
Africa. When Operation Compass thrust westwards, the Libyan soldiers’ families were
directly in line. They had every reason to avoid dying from starvation or Allied gunfire
at Giarabub, and none to stay. For the Libyans, surrender was the only viable alternative
to a trap offering a lingering or violent death as the likely outcome.49

The use of geography and terrain are the final issues to be considered when
analysing the outcome of Operation Galley. Chapter 1 discussed the fact that Giarabub
had a virtually impassable marsh to the south, a rocky escarpment to the west and sandy
terrain interspersed with rugged outcrops to the north and east. Castagna correctly
deduced that access from the south of Giarabub was extremely difficult, and therefore
less likely to be used by attackers. He did not, however, appreciate that Wootten would
use this more difficult route to instigate complete tactical surprise. Castagna’s concept
of strong points or caposaldos was itself flawed (like all Italian defended locations
across North Africa) in that the strong points did not provide mutual support to each
other (e.g. interlocking arcs of fire), even though there were opportunities to achieve
this, with much high ground available. Stockings gives an in–depth analysis in Bardia
of why this may be so, with the principal reason being that of poor officer training.
Wootten’s use of the LRDP to the west made excellent use of the terrain. Despite being
numerically minute, the LRDP was ideally suited to operating in the difficult desert
conditions prevailing in that direction. With its virtually unlimited mobility, effective
armament and unmatched ability to operate in the extreme environment, the LRDP was
able to use terrain to deny the Italians any possibility of escape to the west and

49
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 226.
92
northwest of Giarabub, helping in no small way to seal the fate of the besieged
defenders. The dominant geographical features of the siege and battle at Giarabub were
the distances and difficulties of supply 300 kilometres deep into the Sahara Desert.
Defenders and attackers alike faced the same problems. The Italians were not able to
overcome the challenges of the harshest geography on the planet, but Wootten Force
was.50

Of the issues discussed above, for the victors at Giarabub, their superior training,
high quality and depth of leadership, thorough logistics, careful and complete
reconnaissance, complete planning and modern equipment provided the highest possible
probability of success. For the Italians at Giarabub, their problems started with
Mussolini’s decision to pursue the dream of empire status, then were compounded by
outdated strategy implemented by pedestrian senior commanders. The ineffective Italian
logistics left the defensive system of forts in an unsustainable situation. Even if these
factors had been overcome, the antiquated weapons used by poorly trained soldiers in
static defence against the highly mobile attackers meant that Giarabub was doomed
from 16 December 1940, when the limited Italian vehicle access was severed. None of
these points differ significantly from other Italian battles against the Allies in North
Africa in World War II; however, the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Castagna
held his starving countrymen to their posts for four and a half months, against hopeless
odds remains the standout feature of the Battle of Giarabub.

50
Stockings, Bardia, pp. 361–382.
93
 Chapter 4

The Wider Impact of Giarabub

The previous chapters have examined what happened and why at the desolate
oasis of Giarabub during World War II. This chapter now considers what effects the
siege, then capture, of Giarabub had on the First Libyan Campaign, their effects on
subsequent operations of the Western Desert Force, and also their wider impacts upon
the Italian 10th Army and the converse effects of the operations of the 10th Army on
events at Giarabub. The potential for Giarabub to provide an alternate route for
movement of both Allied and Italian forces to travel east and west is analysed and the
influence of the siege on the strategic calculations on both sides is examined. Taking a
wider perspective, the important impact of Castagna’s stand at Giarabub on Italian
morale during World War II, and beyond, are also placed in historical perspective.

The First Libyan Campaign, as defined in the Oxford Companion to Australian

Military History, spanned from December 1940 to February 1941, encompassing a
series of operations undertaken during the initial advance of Allied forces during World
War II in North Africa, westward against Mussolini’s Italian 10th Army. From the
Australian perspective, the 6th Australian Division led the way as the first Australian
force in action with the 2nd AIF, following behind the British (including other Empire
troops) who opened the campaign with attacks on the camps around Sidi Barrani then
on the village itself. The British 7th Armoured Division and the Australian 6th Division
constituted Western Desert Force which was commanded by Lieutenant General
Richard O’Connor and later renamed XIII Corps. XIII Corps drove a vastly numerically
superior Italian army 800 kilometres westward from the north western corner of Egypt
back into Libya in a series of spectacular battles. The line of the Allied advance
generally followed the coast, as this provided the fastest and most practical route for the
retreating Italians, with their limited ability to travel off formed roads. Originally
planned to occupy only four or five days due to limited availability of logistic support,
the initial British advance, Operation Compass, grossly exceeded expectations as the
Italians rapidly capitulated. The sequence and timings of the Italian defeats is significant

94
to Giarabub’s Operation Galley and the siege that preceded it. Advancing westwards,
Operation Compass commenced with the conquest of Sidi Barrani on 11 December,
1940. At this time Giarabub, some 300 kilometres to the south, became effectively the
southern end of the Italian front line, now delineated by the string of forts, joined by
Graziani’s barbed wire fence along the Libyan – Egyptian border. On the Italian side,
continued occupation of Giarabub was seen as vital to maintain the option of using it as
an inland base from which to sally forth, in a flanking action against the southern side of
the expected Allied advance.1

Such flanking actions as initially envisaged by the Italians for Giarabub, were in
fact a feature of Operation Compass, with the immense featureless wastes of the Sahara
Desert providing near perfect opportunities for manoeuvre, not unlike battleships at sea.
Those with the means of transiting these terrestrial oceans of sand, together with the
logistical ability to maintain operations, held the winning advantage. Giarabub thus
offered a port of sorts with an airfield and water, dominating the junction of a number of
desert tracks. To the north lay the road to Bardia on the coast, east was Siwa, west led to
Gialo, and far to the south lay Kufra. The significance of Giarabub as a future Allied
base was not lost on O’Connor. For him, Giarabub provided an alternative route
westward which could have allowed a flanking manoeuvre to be instigated into the
southern flank of the Italians as they retreated west. In the event, the rapid pace of the
Italian retreat and the limitations of logistics, especially for large forces, precluded the
need for the Allies to travel as far south as Giarabub to accomplish the encirclement and
destruction of the Italian 10th Army. This does not, however, belie the perceived
significance of the Oasis in the early planning and conduct phases of Operation
Compass.2

The practical difficulties in using the Giarabub route for access to the west,
however, can be gauged by the logistics effort required to undertake Operation Galley.
Wootten Force required 389 vehicles to transport 2,219 men and their equipment for a
maximum of only ten days. The number of vehicles required to transport even a portion

1
Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, pp. 316, 317; O’Neill (ed), History of the Second
World War, pp. 135–144; Stockings, Bardia, pp. 77–81.
2
Italian occupied Kufra lay 640 kilometres to the south of Giarabub, but this was a staging post for Italian
aircraft en–route to the East African colonies, rather than a defensive position, see Chapter 1.
95
of a fighting force of the tens of thousands involved in Operation Compass deep
through the desert, and far from decent roads, water and naval support, was clearly a
serious disincentive to the Allies using the Giarabub route. As O’Connor’s Operation
Compass advanced westward against unexpectedly ineffective opposition, the
desirability of Giarabub as an Allied base, or as an access route, thus decreased. As
events overcame Giarabub’s initial strategic significance, a second requirement for
O’Connor to focus on Giarabub then emerged. As O’Connor advanced, the Italian
garrison’s potential to impact from the south against his logistics tail grew. With every
kilometre that the Allies advanced west of the Libyan – Egyptian border, the theoretical
risk that Castagna could attack and cut off the Allies from behind increased. On
5 January 1941, the Italian occupation of Bardia was emphatically terminated by the
Allies in a three day battle, as Compass relentlessly swept westward. Meanwhile, as
noted earlier, O’Connor’s expectation was that Giarabub would capitulate simply by
continued enforcement of the state of siege. At this stage B and C Squadrons of the 6th
Cavalry, plus some ancillary troops, were engaged at Giarabub, so its numerical impact
on Operation Compass was not significant – 456 men at Giarabub from a total force of
30,000. Tobruk fell on 22 January, followed by an inland sweep to Mechili on
27 January. Derna, further west again, on the coast, was captured on 30 January.
Interestingly, A Squadron, 6th Cavalry featured prominently in Derna’s demise, whilst B
and C Squadrons were jousting with Castagna, far to the southeast. Yet with each
conquest, Giarabub fell further to the rear, increasingly exposing O’Connor’s line of
communication. With the benefit of hindsight, and perhaps it should have even been
clear from early 6th Cavalry intelligence reports, it is now obvious that Castagna did not
have the means, in particular, transport, to mount a serious attack over any great
distance. At the time, however, the Italian threat to the Allied flank appeared very real,
especially considering the possibility of aerial reinforcement.3

Benghazi, on the western coast of Cyrenaica, fell to the Allies on 6 February,

followed by the final humiliating trapping and surrender of the remnants of 10th Army at
Beda Fomm on 7 February. Operation Compass had swept all before it, except for

3
Long, Benghazi, p. 294; Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 55; B. H. Liddell Hart, History of
the Second World War, Pan Books, London, 2011, p. 144; Castagna had only about 80 vehicles (see
Chapter 3), Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 83; Dennis, Companion to Australian Military
History, pp. 316, 317; Long, To Benghazi, p. 294.
96
Lieutenant Colonel Castagna’s tenacious garrison. Giarabub remained besieged, yet
unyielding, with Castagna’s hopes of rescue or support fading ever further as each day
passed. In short, Giarabub’s relevance was initially as a route for either side to use as an
alternative line of advance, then as a base for flanking manoeuvres, but by the time the
last Italian prisoner straggled into captivity at Beda Fomm on 7 February, 1941,
Giarabub’s strategic relevance had faded.

The influence of Giarabub did not, however, end with the conclusion of the First
Libyan Campaign. The siege of Giarabub also had an important impact on subsequent
Allied and Axis operations. The First Libyan Campaign ended with the spectacular
Allied success at Beda Fomm, but the Western Desert remained an active theatre.
Wavell’s first offensive was certainly over, leaving Mussolini to lament the defeat of the
10th Army and the 5th Squadron of the Regia Aeronautica. Yet half of Graziani’s
215,000 troops remained in Tripolitania. Further, from this point on, the tide of war in
North Africa soon turned. Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel arrived at Tripoli in North
Africa on 12 February 1941, and quickly established that the remnants of the 10th Army
were in total disarray with many having thrown away their weapons and seized trucks to
escape. On the Giarabub front some 715 Libyans had deserted from 7 to 17 February.
Rommel’s first action was to about–face two retreating Italian divisions and send them
forward. German forces then took six weeks to build up their operational strength. With
the front some 700 kilometres to the east of Tripoli, Rommel’s logistics problems were
serious, dogging him for the rest of his North African campaign. Rommel was always
more inclined to blame the jealousies within the Wehrmacht for his logistics crises;
although, these are more accurately ascribed to the RAF and Royal Navy when his
transports were sunken en–route to Africa. Meanwhile in the early hours of 22 June
1941, Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia, exploded across Eastern
Europe. This second German front took priority over operations in North Africa, further
reducing logistical support to the Afrika Korps. Luckily for Rommel, the Allied
Western Desert Force was itself largely spent by this time and in urgent need of
refitting.4

4
Graziani started the First Libyan Campaign with 215,000 men under his command, but lost over
100,000 men captured. Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 64, 94; Stockings, Bardia, p. 285; An
97
 The following brief description of the subsequent siege of Tobruk identifies
similarities and actions that were affected by involvement with Operation Galley.
Following Operation Galley the battle weary Australian 2/9th Battalion endured a
difficult journey back to Mersa Matruh on 25 March, in part using captured Italian
vehicles, complete with Italian drivers. The wounded had a particularly painful trip,
grinding over the bumpy desert tracks. The 7th Australian Division, of which 2/9th
Battalion, 18th Brigade, was now a part, was under orders to move to Greece but, with
Rommel’s Afrika Korps now advancing east, events in Cyrenaica competed with
Wavell’s plans for other Mediterranean operations. Wootten’s 18th Brigade was instead
ordered to Tobruk on 4 April 1941. Continued Allied occupation of this newly captured
port was seen as vital. Tobruk possessed a fine harbour and whoever controlled it held
the key to landing supplies within 130 kilometres of the Egyptian border. Rommel was
just as determined to access the Tobruk harbour. The imperative for Rommel was that
access to Tobruk would remove the 1,200 kilometre motor vehicle route from his
logistics calculations.5 The 18th Brigade arrived in Tobruk, exhausted, on 7th April,
1941, some having travelled by road and the rest by sea. On disembarking the seafarers
faced a 16 kilometre forced march to join their companions manning posts on the
Tobruk perimeter. Speed was imperative as Rommel was advancing rapidly. The 2/10th
and 2/12th Australian Battalions, some members of which had also served at Giarabub,
manned posts close by or were in reserve.

Further useful comparisons of Giarabub with Tobruk can be drawn from the 18th
Brigade War Diary for the month of April 1941 alone, written during the siege of
Tobruk, which has 163 pages describing daily bombings by German aircraft, almost
daily attacks and breakthroughs by German tanks – all on a vastly larger scale than that
at Giarabub, with its very occasional and ineffective Axis bombings, and no Italian
armour. Yet the similarities of Wootten’s 18th Brigade operations at Tobruk to those at
Giarabub include movement orders, training, level of detail of intelligence gathered
about the enemy strengths and dispositions, morale, food and armaments.

Italian Air Force Squadron was the equivalent of an RAF Command; Antony Beevor, The Second World
War, Weindenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2012, pp.174, 175, 191.
5
Dickens, Never Late, p. 73.
98
Unsurprisingly the movement orders to transport the 18th Brigade to Tobruk were
produced in an identical format to that used for Operation Galley. The number of
vehicles, how many men per vehicle, vehicle spacing and speed, planned rest stops,
refuelling arrangements, vehicle recovery and anti–aircraft protection, were all detailed
precisely, just as for the final assault on Giarabub. So too training for the impending
defence of Tobruk was, as for Giarabub, tailored to match the expected requirements.
The training instruction issued on 1 April 1941, covered company exercises in
occupation of defensive positions, siting of localities, digging and organisation plus
local counterattacks. The men, NCOs and officers, all had specific training goals. Tank
hunting was a special skill requiring training in the siting of traps, obstacles and
ambushes, knowledge of simple explosives, and preparation then use of Molotov
cocktails. An examination of this training regime, instituted before the long siege began,
almost suggested that Wootten’s men had prior knowledge of what was to come in the
seven dark months ahead. All this planning of training requirements, as promulgated by
Major Thomas Daly, who was recently on operations at Giarabub, indicates that the
benefits of such thorough training of troops and officers would, at the very least, have
strengthened these practices by vindicating them at Giarabub.6

The importance placed on gathering, assessing and dispensing accurate and

timely intelligence by the 18th Brigade, as practised at Giarabub, was reiterated at
Tobruk. At Giarabub, months were spent in collecting information about such things as
enemy dispositions, their state of morale, enemy leadership, placement, quantity and
calibre of weapons, number of vehicles, access routes, mine field locations, water
quality and quantity. The Allied defenders at Tobruk produced, almost daily, highly
detailed intelligence summaries which were then disseminated to appropriate
commanders. These reports covered, for example, enemy patrol activity, enemy artillery
locations and shells fired, aircraft seen or shot down, number and types of tanks seen or
destroyed, use of captured Allied vehicles by the enemy, enemy uniform descriptions
and fifth column activities. The results obtained by the small Allied force at Giarabub,
which were largely founded on sound intelligence, could only have reinforced the

6
Dickens, Never Late, p. 73; ‘HQ 18th Aust Inf Bde Administrative Instn No. 2’, Appendix A, AWM 52
8/2/18/8; ‘18th Aust Inf Bde Tng Instn No. 11’, Appendix W, AWM 52 8/2/18/8.
99
positive aspects of continuing this approach to Allied battle craft as used in the later,
larger, battles in North Africa.7

The effect of Operation Galley on morale of the succeeding operations of

Western Desert Force is difficult to quantify; however, accounts of how the men of
Wootten Force felt about their first wartime action illustrated a new–found self
confidence and resignation to the realities of war:

The Battalion had fought and won its first action. Its leaders, men,
equipment and tactics had been tested as only battle can test. The Battalion
had suffered its first casualties and confronted the bitter reality of death and
injury on the battlefield. Sixteen men had died in action, 87 were wounded,
five subsequently died of wounds, and the rest were wiser.8

The official historian, Gavin Long, saw a larger influence on the 2nd AIF:

For the Australian soldiers the experience was of special value because it
would seep so quickly through the whole of the growing Australian force
assembled in the Middle East. Leaders and staffs had gained in confidence
and wisdom. Fears expressed by Australian staff officers in Palestine and
Alexandria that the division would be spoiled by easy victories not only
underestimated the strenuousness of the campaign and the bitterness of some
of the fighting but underrated the leaders...Success gave them increased
confidence in their officers, in themselves and their training, and from
among the younger men were emerging outstanding leaders.9

The Giarabub campaign had some influence on the morale of the 2nd AIF; however, the
experiences of 2,219 men at Giarabub, compared with the experiences of 30,000 Allied
soldiers who confronted and defeated the Italian 10th Army, endured daily attacks
during the siege of Tobruk, and then later fought other desperate battles against
Rommel need to be kept in proper perspective as regards to scale and duration.10

Meanwhile, following the Italian capitulation at Giarabub, the 6th Cavalry,

fighting as a complete regiment and now mounted on Vickers light tanks handed over
from the 7th Division Cavalry, were pursued east to Egypt during the aptly named

7
‘18th Aust Inf Bde Int Sum No. 19.’, Appendix E, 11 April 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/8.
8
Dickens, Never Late, p. 71.
9
Long, To Benghazi, pp. 303-304.
10
Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 144.
100
Operation Brevity which was cancelled on its second day. This unit continued desert
operations when they crossed the Suez Canal on 27 May heading into Palestine in
preparation for Operation Exporter, the invasion of Syria, which took place from
8 June, 1941. The long months spent by this regiment patrolling around Giarabub all
enhanced self confidence, team work, navigation, survival skills and built leadership
ability – all vital for the ensuing battles. How large this influence was on their later
conflicts is again difficult to quantify, and the fact that only two squadrons were
involved at Giarabub needs to be kept in mind. In time, the 2/9th Battalion was likewise
despatched to Syria, where their hard–earned battle skills proved useful. After resting
and refitting in Australia, the 2/9th Battalion went on to fight fierce battles on the north
coast of New Guinea against the Japanese. As with the 6th Cavalry, the 2/9th’s
experience at Giarabub could only have added to their preparation for their later battles
requiring team work, resilience and good leadership, as at the battles of Milne Bay, the
Northern Beaches and Shaggy Ridge in Papua New Guinea.11

The final element of this investigation concerns the impact of the Giarabub
campaign on the Italian 10th Army. Conversely, the effect of the 10th Army’s demise on
the Giarabub garrison provides an interesting contrast. Lastly the disproportionately
large effect of the Giarabub story, which can fairly be described as a very minor battle
in the scheme of World War II, on the Italian national morale is examined.

Firstly, where the Giarabub siege, then Operation Galley fit into the chronology
of the 10th Army’s existence is important. Mussolini declared war on Britain and France
on 10 June, 1940. Only one month later the British 1 KRRC infantry company stationed
at Siwa mounted an unsuccessful operation to capture Giarabub, giving another
indication of the strategic importance O’Connor placed on the oasis. Graziani
reluctantly advanced into Egypt on 9 September, 1940 with the 10th Army occupying
the Egyptian coastal town of Sidi Barrani on 13 September, where the Italian
commanders then halted to consolidate their huge but poorly equipped force. Whilst
stationary around Sidi Barrani the Italians constructed forts, complete with trenches,

11
Shawn O’Leary, To the Green Fields Beyond: The Story of The 6 th Australian Divisional Cavalry
Commandos, 6th Divisional Cavalry Unit, History Committee, Sydney, 1975, pp. 117, 120; ‘6 th Div Cav
Reg’t War Diary, May 1941, June 1941’, AWM 52/2/2/7; Johnston, The Proud Sixth, pp.106, 107;
Dickens, Never Late, pp. 135–320.
101
minefields and tank traps, spread across a 50 kilometre arc from the coast. During this
latter part of 1940 Wavell’s forces were outnumbered 6:1 by the 10th Army in North
Africa, limiting him to defensive and skirmishing tactics. Giarabub, being effectively on
the front line at this stage, was one of the key targets of Wavell’s attention.12

The siege of Giarabub commenced on 3 November 1940 continuing until

21 March 1941, with planning for Operation Galley commencing on 10 March.
Operation Compass, started with the westward advance of O’Connor’s force towards
Sidi Barrani on 9 December, 1940. At distant Giarabub, on 11 December, Captain
Brown’s squadron of the 6th Cavalry Regiment was advancing toward Garn el Grein, the
first of the series of isolated Italian frontier posts strung along the Egyptian and Libyan
border. The 6th Cavalry attacked Garn el Grein the next morning, before withdrawing.
As later at Giarabub, Sidi Barrani’s defeat was prefaced by the capitulation of the
widely scattered forts which were spaced too far apart to provide mutual support. The
destruction of the outlying forts or camps came to be known as the Battle of the Camps
with Sidi Barrani falling on 11 December, 1940. The die was already firmly cast when,
two days later Castagna was ordered to withdraw from the strung out Egyptian border
forts under his control as the brittle fortified post strategy rapidly disintegrated.13

It could be argued that the fall of Sidi Barrani and the isolation of Giarabub,
following the destruction of the outlying forts, provided a learning opportunity for the
Italian defenders at Bardia and Tobruk. As at Giarabub, Bardia and Tobruk had isolated
posts sited with little or no defence in depth and little opportunity for vital mutual
support, replicating, albeit on a different scale, the failed strategy of early December.
Given the Italian 10th Army’s lack of mobility due to insufficient transport vehicles, and
a lack of imaginative leadership, this partly explains why this brief opportunity was
lost.14 An example of Graziani’s lack of tactical enterprise, as alluded to by many
historians, was demonstrated at this stage by the method of the advance on Sidi Barrani,
as Wahlert suggests:

12
Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 45–47; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, Castle
Books, New Jersey, 2004, p. 28.
13
Long, To Benghazi, p. 288.
14
Stockings, Bardia, pp. 302–402.
102
 ...advancing at a walking pace in lines of columns. The whole affair resembled
a ceremonial parade rather than a tactical advance. The Italians had not
deployed an effective advance guard or other screening force, allowing the 11th
Hussars to keep a close watch on the advance and attack vulnerable points and
opportunity targets.15

Reinforcing the point, Graziani was in his headquarters 500 kilometres to the rear – in
stark contrast later with the German Commander of Afrika Korps, Rommel, with his,
‘...impetuous urge to be everywhere...’16 which was usually close to the front.

The next key date in the Italian 10th Army’s ill–fated history in North Africa was
to be at Bardia. Bardia was directly north of Giarabub being 25 kilometres west of the
Egyptian/Libyan Border and on the coast. On 3 January 1941, the 10th Army felt the full
force of the 6th Australian Division’s determined attack producing a disaster of
unprecedented scale for the Italians. As at Giarabub, but on a much larger scale,
prepared defences were poorly located, the troops poorly trained and equipped, and their
leaders unskilled in the tactical and strategic requirements of modern warfare. At Bardia
40,000 Italians were captured with Italian morale being shattered as Tobruk, in turn,
awaited impending doom.17

The devastation caused to Italian military pride following Bardia had far–
reaching consequences, as was evidenced in the remaining short lifespan of the Italian
10th Army as they were pursued westward across Cyrenaica. With news of Bardia’s fall,
the Allies attempted to exploit the corresponding blow to Italian morale, when at
Giarabub on 5 January 1941, RAF Lysander aircraft dropped leaflets encouraging the
garrison’s surrender. Even though Mussolini’s grand strategy of an eastward advance
lay in tatters, Graziani’s view of Giarabub’s strategic value was that, at this stage, it was
important, as demonstrated by his despatch of a force to relieve Giarabub on 9 January.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, this force left from Benghazi, only to be intercepted by a 6 th
Cavalry force from Giarabub complete with aerial support, leaving the Italian relief
convoy destroyed.18

15
Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 45.
16
J. Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, Profile Books, London, 2012, pp. 155, 327–343.
17
Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 60–64.
18
S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.
103
 Yet Graziani had still not given Giarabub up as lost. Three Axis aircraft
ineffectively attacked the Giarabub besiegers on 11 January. 19 From this point, however,
Axis air support for Castagna’s garrison became increasingly limited and irregular. The
most likely reason for Graziani’s ongoing, if spasmodic and insufficient, support for
Castagna in this instance lies with events back in Italy. The modern Italian historical
author, Fabio Fattore, wrote an entire book about the visit of five reporters to Giarabub
at this juncture in which they described the appalling conditions of the garrison but
highlighting the defender’s determined stance, and in particular the driven and
unshakable passion of Castagna to never surrender. The reporters returned to Italy
where their stories inspired the birth of a legend, similar, but on a smaller scale, to the
result of Australia’s C. E. W. Bean’s writings about the ANZACs. It is important to
understand the state of the Italian nation’s morale at this stage to appreciate the
significance of the rare good news from the front. Massive military losses were
humiliating Mussolini. At the same time, the Fascist leader was desperate for good news
to bolster public support for an unpopular war and his regime. Mussolini’s imperial and
military causes were less than enthusiastically supported by many senior Italian officers
and much of the population. The same was true of many rank and file. 20 Whilst some
units were loyal Fascists, ‘most Italian conscripts had no political allegiance, saw no
purpose in the Desert War, and only wished to be at home with their families.’ 21 The
reporters’ news about the heroic Lieutenant Colonel Castagna was broadcast frequently
on radio, with updates keeping the siege story alive and in the public eye. Newspaper
and magazine articles carried the story, and then came a movie.22

The broadcasting of news of the heroic stand by Castagna may be one reason
why he persisted for so long in an essentially unwinnable situation. Six movies were
made for propaganda purposes by the Italians during World War II. ‘La saga di
Giarabub’ was one of these, made in 1942, a year after the Battle of Giarabub. The
theme song from the movie remains well known by older Italians today. The striking

19
Probably German but this cannot be confirmed.
20
Duggan, Fascist Voices, p. 379. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 253-256.
21
Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, p. 291.
22
‘La saga di Giarabub’, Argo Films, 1942, www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQeYT4CNKW8, accessed 19
November 2012; Fattore, Giarabub; Correspondence, Fattore with author 15 November, 2011.
104
similarity, although to a much lesser extent, to that of the ANZAC legend is that a battle
lost has become a legend. Interestingly, three Australian reporters also covered the
Giarabub campaign, one of whom was the future Official Historian for this period of
World War II, Gavin Long. It is clear from these examples that positive publicity or
propaganda was an important tool in the waging of war, especially from Rome’s
perspective; however, as with many of the non–physical aspects of this battle, the actual
result of this propaganda on the Italian population is difficult to quantify. Parallels
might be drawn from the effects of the press in other conflicts, with the impact of a
photograph taken during the Vietnam War being a case in point. A photograph of a girl
who had just been napalmed running down Route 1 near Trang Bang, Vietnam, won its
author a Pulitzer Prize in 1973 and created a huge impact on US public opinion.
Interviews with Italian survivors of World War II indicate that Mussolini’s politics
generated a split in Italian society, based on whether or not one supported Fascism.
Those that did were influenced positively by the Giarabub news articles, movie and the
song, and those that were not had their negative sentiments reinforced.23

This chapter has analysed the effects of the siege and capture of Giarabub on the
Italian 10th Army and the 2nd AIF. As the strategic importance of Giarabub ebbed and
flowed, with the Italians’ eastern front creeping towards Egypt, then sweeping back to
Beda Fomm, so too did its relevance to the Allies change with its distance from the
front. With hindsight it can be seen that Giarabub’s strategic importance was never
going to be decisive, yet this is not how events were necessarily perceived at the time.
Whilst Giarabub’s siege was amongst the first Allied operations in North Africa in
World War II, by the time Operation Galley was launched the massive success at Bardia
had vastly overshadowed the Allied experiences at Giarabub. As for the Italians,
Giarabub may have provided learning opportunities for their military leaders; however,
as demonstrated time and again, Italian leadership was not up to the task of rapidly
assimilating lessons from past mistakes. Giarabub’s lasting legacy for the Italians lies in

23
‘La saga di Giarabub’, Argo Films, 1942; www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQeYT4CNKW8, accessed 19
November, 2012; http://www.lyricsmania.com/la_sagra_di_giarabub_lyrics_carlo_buti.html, accessed 19
November, 2012; Interviews Romana and Mario Fior with author, 2012, 2013, Interview Luigina
Pastorelli with author, 2012; Interview Andrea Rafenelli and family with author 2011; Interviews
Giuseppe Veneziano and Lugano Rochelli with author, 2011; http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1973,
accessed 7th June, 2013.
105
the creation of a legend immortalised in a movie that was largely drawn from the story
of the indomitable willpower of one man – Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Castagna.

106
 Conclusion

As has been demonstrated, Giarabub was in many ways a unique battle within
the context of the North African theatre. The standout feature of the battle is that of the
five month siege that Italian Lieutenant Colonel Castagna and his garrison endured, all
the while knowing that they had no realistic chance of rescue or escape. There are few
other records of an Italian force showing such sustained tenacity in World War II and
none within the First Libyan Campaign. A number of probable reasons for this
perseverance have been revealed. Among these was the inability to escape due to the
lack of vehicles, the vast distances involved and the ever increasing distance of the
Italian 10th Army and its transport vehicles from Giarabub. The difficulty of escaping
was compounded by the limiting of air transport by the besiegers, then later by its
complete denial by Wootten Force. As Castagna’s contemporaries and later writers have
described, Castagna’s personal influence, using his strong self–discipline and
determined personal behaviour, could not stop the defection of most of the Libyan
soldiers but was quite likely a central contributing factor for the Italian soldiers to
remain at Giarabub. Publicity in the Italian media about the Giarabub siege is also
likely to have also been a significant influence on the remaining garrisons’ decision to
stay and fight on. In this context this thesis helps forcefully debunk the popularly held
myth of Italian soldiers serving in World War II running up the white flag of surrender
at the slightest hostile threat. It also reinforces the danger of relying on coerced colonial
troops in the North African theatre, in this case realised by the desertion of 715 Libyan
soldiers at Giarabub.1

Further lessons, ignored by the Italian commanders to their later peril during the
remainder of Operation Compass, and subsequent North African operations, included
the outmoded strategy of static defensive positions located lineally with no defence in
depth and beyond the range of mutual support. The strategy of placing an army in a
theatre with massive and unrelenting logistical requirements without adequate land,
aerial and naval transport to service those needs further weakened the Italian defensive
capacity. The tactical use of outdated and worn out artillery using unreliable ordinance

1
Fattore, Giarabub, p. 236; Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, p. 133.
107
incapable of accurate counter battery fire, the use of ineffective grenades and the failure
to seek and use intelligence adequately, all became hallmarks of Italian warfare during
the North African Campaign, and all were flagged at Giarabub.

The first aim of this thesis was to help fill the gap in the historiographical record
surrounding the Giarabub story. The reasons for its strategic importance during the
opening phases of the First Libyan Campaign have formed the underlying narrative for
the thesis. Research has uncovered detail not yet seen in the military history record
describing the long siege with all the difficulties encountered by both the protagonists.
Chapter 2 discusses the final battle in March, 1941 which opened with a disastrous
friendly fire shelling of 8 and 9 platoons of B Company, 2/9th Battalion. As a result of
the research behind this thesis, the number of Allied casualties now accurately stands at
23 killed, contrary to the 17 described in the Australian Official History (see Appendix
A). One of these, Private E. E. Powell, has been further found to have an incorrect date
of death on his headstone and in the Australian War Memorial’s records. Similarly,
Italian casualties have been clarified, with 64 names now attributed (see Appendix B).
Long’s figure of 250 killed is inaccurate. Italian deaths may have been as low as 84;
however, it is impossible to confirm the exact number. Controversial references to
Italian prisoners being shot at Giarabub have been raised; yet conclusive evidence one
way or the other remains elusive, leaving the potential for further research. Lesser issues
such as Italian gun calibres have been identified as being mistakenly recorded, firstly by
the Official Historian, then perpetuated in successive histories. To some degree this
thesis has helped set the record straight.

The second aim of this thesis was to answer seven key questions. The first
sought to ascertain to what extent analysis of Giarabub gave an insight into later battles
in North Africa. In brief, Giarabub demonstrated the superior training, leadership,
equipment and motivation of the Allied forces when compared to the Italians. From the
Italian perspective Giarabub exposed all that was deficient in their military systems,
from archaic defensive planning to poor generalship, from poor logistics and an
insufficient industrial base incapable of manufacturing modern equipment, to poor
training. The second question asked what it was that made Giarabub so different from
other Italian battles in North Africa. It is clear that the Giarabub garrison behaved quite
108
differently from most other Italian forces serving in North Africa. Other than the
tenacity of individuals or specialised units such as artillery, the Italian forces generally
capitulated when faced with a determined, better led, better trained and better equipped
foe, such as at Bardia and Tobruk. This was despite the Italian forces being vastly
superior in numerical terms to their enemy. Giarabub was quite the opposite.

The third question posed in the introduction addressed what it was that kept
Castagna’s force from surrendering; specifically; was it simply their inability to escape?
The lack of a means of escape does not alter the fact that the garrison could have
surrendered at any stage, yet chose not to. Although difficult to quantify, the most likely
reason was Lieutenant Colonel Castagna’s leadership, which was in turn fired by his
passionate support for Fascism and the realisation that the Italian nation was watching,
via the media, in awe of his garrison’s tenacity. Fourthly, what made the conduct of this
battle different from other battles in Operation Compass? To put it bluntly, most battles
in the First Libyan Campaign terminated in a rout for the Italians, where Giarabub was
anything but a rout. On 21 March 1941 only 1,287 weakened defenders faced 2,219
attackers who were far better supported, trained, equipped, fed, led and informed; the
Italians chose to fight on with no hope of reinforcement or escape. All the other
Compass battles occurred with some possibility of access for Italian escape, generally
along the Libyan coastal strip. The fifth question concerned assessing how well the
Australians performed and why. If viewed against the yardstick of performance in later
operations, the Australians at Giarabub performed equally as well, especially given that
Giarabub represented a ‘first test’ in World War II (the Battle of Bardia started and
concluded within Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley time frames). The question
relates to Australians at Giarabub; however, this discussion should not overlook the
important role of the British supporting artillery, which unfortunately, accidentally
caused 48 percent of the British and Australian deaths during the siege and battle.

The sixth question seeks to uncover what Giarabub has to tell us about the early
2nd AIF: its preparation, training and operations. The Giarabub story, in particular the
five–day Operation Galley, provides the modern historian with a compressed version of
Australian battles in North Africa. It was conducted on a much smaller scale than
Bardia, Tobruk or El Alamein, yet demonstrated most facets of modern warfare, with
109
the two exceptions being naval and armoured aspects. The Australians’ precise attention
to thorough training, the detailed and efficient logistics, the depth of intelligence
collected and the energetic and highly skilled leadership all demonstrated at Giarabub
were to be repeated throughout the First Libyan Campaign.

The final question of how Giarabub adds to the understanding of the First
Libyan Campaign in 1941 rests on two points. First, Giarabub adds an atypical
experience within the context of Operation Compass as a whole. The attacking
Australians were not out–numbered, the Italians did not surrender nor attempt to escape,
the Italians withstood the long siege with no hope of rescue, and they fought on till the
last possible moment; all of which contrast starkly with Italian performances elsewhere
in the First Libyan Campaign. The second point is that Giarabub demonstrated features
on both sides that indicated how their desert warfare would continue to be conducted.
The Australians continued to pursue accurate intelligence of their enemy’s weaknesses
and strengths, they continued to train aggressively for the specific requirements of the
next battle; their logistics management was maintained at the same high level and their
leaders generally continued to perform at the highest standards.

For the Italians, poor military procedure continued to be demonstrated with little change
throughout the North African campaigns. Ineffective strategic leadership did little to
make use of outdated and inadequate materiel supplied through ongoing poor logistics
systems (if at all). Inadequate training of all ranks in the Italian army, with the possible
exception of those in the artillery, was the result of long term neglect and failure to
adopt modern military practices, with predictable results continually repeated. To this
end Giarabub’s story highlights many of the Italian military difficulties in World War
II. This thesis has helped further to redress the imbalance in the military historiography
surrounding the First Libyan Campaign. It has delivered an understanding of the Italian
side of this story and uncovered a lasting legacy in Italian culture, under–recognised by
Allied historians until now. It highlights a small but significant part of the evolution of
the early 2nd AIF and rightly recognises the contribution and sacrifice on both sides.

110
Appendix A
23 Allied soldiers killed at Giarabub
(KIA = Killed in Action, DOW = Died of Wounds, MIA = Missing in Action)
Army Rank Surname Other Status Unit Date of
No. Names Death
1 SX2563 Private Batty C. A. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
2 QX5010 Private Casement B.N. KIA 2/9th Bn 19.3.41
3 QX4855 Private Coates W.I. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
4 QX1234 Sergeant Cooke C.F. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
5 QX1249 Private Coote L.J. DOW 2/9th Bn 3.6.41
6 QX318 Private Davis G.G. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
7 2044736 Sapper Dixon A. DOW R.E. 2 21.3.41
8 QX3057 Private Dodds G. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
9 NX509 Trooper Fuller J.S.C. KIA 6th Cav 31.12.40
10 QX2507 Corporal Hansen C.O. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
11 QX4450 Private Lewis T.A.W. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
12 QX1436 Private McDonald L.F. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
th
13 QX1185 Private McDonald E.J. KIA 2/9 Bn 21.3.41
14 QX522 Private McDonald H. DOW 2/9th Bn 22.3.41
15 QX1223 Private McKean T.M. DOW 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
16 QX1256 WO2 Millard J. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
17 QX2096 Private O'Neill D.S. DOW 2/9th Bn 23.3.41
18 QX4805 Private Potter J.V.W. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
19 SX2606 Private Powell E.E. KIA 2/9th Bn 19.3.413
20 QX6076 Captain Reidy R.F. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
21 QX4007 Private Rundle R.L. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
22 QX65 Corporal Smith J.P. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41
23 NX5419 Corporal Trounce E. F. KIA 6th Cav 31.12.40

2
British engineer 2nd Field Squadron.
3
Incorrectly shown as 21 March 1941 in AWM records and on his headstone.
111
 Appendix B
64 Italian soldiers known to be killed at Giarabub
Rank Surname Other Unit or Status
Names Corp
1 Artigliere Afragola Vicenzo 258th Battery KIA
2 Artigliere Amoroso 258th Battery KIA
3 Soldato Armato Caspare MIA
4 Soldato Barbuscio Bruno KIA
5 Soldato Belbruno Leonardo KIA
6 Artigliere Bellavia 258th Battery MIA
7 Artigliere Bevilacqua Orlando 27th Battery KIA
8 Soldato Bubaker Libico KIA
9 1st Cp.
Sergente Maggiore Burrasca KIA
Cannoni
10 Soldato Cacichiodo Giuseppe KIA
11 Soldato Cannizzaro Angelo 3rd G.A.F. KIA
12 Soldato Cappa Alfredo 3rd G.A.F. KIA
13 Sergente Maggiore Carhoni KIA
14 Soldato Carnivale Andrea 10th G.A.F. KIA
15 Sergente Ciaravino Antonio 256th Battery KIA
16 Sotto Tenente Coduti Ennio KIA
17 Artigliere Criscione Giovanni 258th Battery KIA
18 Soldato De Angelis KIA
19 Sotto Tenente Medicale Della Rosa Salvatore KIA
20 Soldato Di Como Andrea 10th G.A.F. KIA
21 Sergente Maggiore Di Falco Binda KIA
22 Soldato Di Fazio Calogero 10th G.A.F. KIA
23 Soldato Di Fina Giovanni 10th G.A.F. KIA
24 Sergente Maggiore Di Giovani Giacono KIA

112
 Rank Surname Other Unit or Status
Names Corp
25 Soldato Di Sano Calogero MIA
26 Sotto Tenente Di Vincenzo Napoleone KIA
27 Sotto Tenente Donati Eugenio KIA
28 Autista Fantin Angelo MIA
29 Tenente Fornasier Aderito MIA
30 Sotto Tenente Guerriero Leonardo Artillery KIA
31 Artigliere Jannotto Nicola 27th Battery KIA
32 Soldato Jarrocci Domenico 10th G.A.F. MIA
33 Caporal Kalifa di Giaeo Libico KIA
34 Soldato La Cagnina Nicola 10th G.A.F. KIA
35 Artigliere La Verde 258th Battery MIA
36 Soldato Loffredi Servio MIA
37 Caporal Maggiore Mancuso Oresta 27th Battery KIA
38 Soldato Manetta 10th G.A.F. KIA
39 Artigliere Manno 258th Battery MIA
40 Sotto Tenente Mattia Giuseppe KIA
41 Artigliere Mazza Filippo 258th Battery KIA
42 Soldato Micliori Calogero MIA
43 KIA
Sotto Tenente Morello Salvatore where -
Medical
abouts
unknown
44 KIA
Soldato Musumeci where -
abouts
unknown
45 Artigliere Nicolo Paelo 27th Battery KIA
46 Soldato Paglia Giuseppe KIA
47 Capitano Perricone Giovanni KIA
48 Soldato Pipitone Benedetto MIA

113
 Rank Surname Other Unit or Status
Names Corp
49 Soldato Prina Salvatore 10th G.A.F. KIA
50 Soldato Prossimo Luigi 10th G.A.F. KIA
51 Soldato Radovieri Antonio KIA
52 Caporal Maggiore Robito Calogero KIA
53 Soldato Sanfilippo Sebastiano 10th G.A.F. KIA
54 Soldato Sautarossi Silvio 3rd G.A.F. KIA
55 Soldato Scarlato Giuseppe 10th G.A.F. KIA
56 Caporal Maggiore Scaturro Salvatore 10th G.A.F. KIA
57 Soldato Troia Filippo 10th G.A.F. KIA
58 Caporal Verahdo Oreste KIA
59 Capitano Verardo KIA
60 Soldato Vitali Giovanni 10th G.A.F. KIA
61 Soldato Volpi Gaspare 10th G.A.F. KIA
62 Soldato Zaffiro Giuseppe 10th G.A.F. KIA
63 Soldato Zeidan Libico KIA
64 Soldato Zummo Baldassarre MIA

114
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UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL RECORDS

AUSTRALIA

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA.

Canberra Reading Room

Series B2458 Service Records GF Wootten

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL, CANBERRA

Official Records

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Series AWM 54 Written Records, 1939–45 War.
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ENGLAND

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115
ITALY

ARCHIVIO DELL’UFFICIO STORICO MAGGIORE ESERCITO (AUSSME),

ROME
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UNPUBLISHED THESES & MANUSCRIPTS

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analysis of the Victoria Cross and the AIF on the Western Front,
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Memorial, Canberra, 1952.

Ministro Della Difesa,

Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, La Prima Controffensiva Italo –
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1941,Ufficio Storico, Tipografia Regionale, Rome, 1974.

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et al (ed), Entanglements of Power-Geographic Domination,
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House, London, 2012.

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Findlayson, D., Green Fields Beyond: A Biographical Honour Roll of the

Australian Light Horse, 1939–47 & Australian Armoured Corps,
1941–1947 & Royal Australian Armoured Corps, Post 1947,
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2013.

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1984.

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London and Sydney, 1975.

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2000.

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Division 1939–1946, Cambridge University Press, New York,
2008.

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1940-46, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005.

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History of the Desert War, Cassell & Co, Great Britain, 2001.

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New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2009.

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Pamphlet
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ent&task=view&id=2677&Itemid=74
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120
Correspondence
Fattore, F., Author of Dai nostri inviati a Giarabub,
With author, July, 2011.

Johnston, M., Author of Fighting the Enemy etc,

With author, June, 2013.

Film
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uti.html
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AWM Collection
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Interviews
Fior, R. and M., World War II survivors under Mussolini,
Interviewed by author, 2011 – 2013.

Moon, F., 2/10 Commando Squadron, Giarabub veteran,

Interviewed by author, 4 May 2012.

Pastorelli, L., Long term Italian resident, Umbia, Italy,

Interviewed by author, 2011, 2012.

Rafenelli, A., Italian academic, Todi, Italy,

Interviewed by author, 2011.

Rochelli, L., World War II survivor under Mussolini,

Interviewed by author, 2011.

Veneziano, G., Italian lawyer and academic, Umbia, Italy,

Interviewed by author, 2011.

121