Axis supply: 1940–1941[edit]

Italian convoy sailing towards North Africa

Axis supplies from Europe to Libya were moved by road and after Operation Compass
(December 1940 – February 1941), only Tripoli remained as an entrepôt, with a
maximum capacity of four troopships or five cargo ships at once and an unloading
capacity of about 45,000 long tons (45,722 t) per month. Tripoli to Benghazi was 600 mi
(970 km) along the Via Balbia and only half way to Alexandria. The road could flood,
was vulnerable to the Desert Air Force (DAF) and using desert tracks increased vehicle
wear. The Axis advance of 300 mi (480 km) to the Egyptian frontier in early 1941
increased the road transport distance to 1,100 mi (1,800 km). Benghazi was captured in
April; coastal shipping there had a capacity of only 15,000 long tons (15,241 t) and the
port was within range of the DAF. About 1,500 long tons (1,524 t) of supplies per day
could be unloaded at Tobruk but lack of shipping made its capture irrelevant. [56]
A German motorised division needed 350 long tons (356 t) of supplies a day and
moving its supplies 300 mi (480 km) required 1,170 2.0 t (2 long tons) lorry-loads.[57] With
seven Axis divisions, air force and naval units, 70,000 long tons (71,123 t) of supplies
were needed per month. The Vichy French agreed to Axis use of Bizerta in Tunisia but
this did not begin until late in 1942. From February to May 1941, a surplus of 45,000
long tons (45,722 t) was delivered; attacks from Malta had some effect but in May, the
worst month for ship losses, 91 per cent of supplies actually arrived. Lack of
transportation in Libya left German supplies in Tripoli and the Italians had only 7,000
lorries for deliveries to their 225,000 men. A record amount of supplies arrived in June
but shortages worsened at the front.[58]
 Indian troops man a Bren gun on an anti-aircraft mounting, Western Desert, 18 April 1941

There were fewer Axis attacks on Malta from June and ship losses increased from 19%
in July, to 25 per cent in September, when Benghazi was bombed and ships diverted to
Tripoli; air supply in October made little difference. Deliveries averaged 72,000 long
tons (73,155 t) a month from July to October but the consumption of 30 to 50 per cent of
fuel deliveries by road transport and truck unserviceability of 35 per cent reduced
deliveries to the front. In November, a five-ship convoy was sunk during Operation
Crusader and ground attacks on road convoys stopped journeys in daylight. Lack of
deliveries coupled with the Eighth Army offensive forced a retreat to El Agheila from 4
December, crowding the Via Balbia, where British ambushes destroyed about half of the
remaining Axis transport.[59]
Convoys to Tripoli resumed and losses increased but by 16 December the supply
situation had eased except for the fuel shortage. In December, the Luftwaffe was
restricted to one sortie per day. Vichy sold the Axis 3,600 long tons (3,658 t) of fuel, U-
boats were ordered into the Mediterranean and air reinforcements were sent from
Russia in December. The Italian navy used warships to carry fuel to Derna and
Benghazi and made a maximum effort from 16 to 17 December. Four battleships, three
light cruisers and 20 destroyers escorted four ships to Libya. The use of an armada for
20,000 long tons (20,321 t) of cargo ships, depleted the navy fuel reserve and only one
more battleship convoy was possible. Bizerta was canvassed as an entrepôt but it was
within range of RAF aircraft from Malta and was another 500 mi (800 km) west of
Tripoli.[60]

1942[edit]
Unternehmen Theseus[edit]
The Eighth Army advance of 500 mi (800 km) to El Agheila transferred the burden of an
over-stretched supply line to the British. In January 1942, the British withdrew from the
front to reduce the supply burden and to prepare for Operation Acrobat, a 1941 plan to
advance west against Tripolitania. Vichy authorities in Tunisia were pressed to allow
British troops and then the Anglo-Americans, after December 1941, into French North
Africa, which made it possible to invade Sicily.[61] The British overestimated Axis losses
during Operation Crusader and believed that they faced 35,000 troops, rather than the
true total of 80,000 men and also misjudged the speed of Axis reinforcement from
Europe. The Eighth Army expected to be ready by February, well before an Axis attack.
[62]
 The 1st Armoured Division held the area around El Agheila and from {28 to 29
December was engaged near Agedabia and lost 61 of 90 tanks, vs. seven German
tanks lost.[61]
Panzerarmee Afrika began Operation Theseus on 21 January and defeated the 2nd
Armoured Brigade in detail.[63] By 23 January, the brigade was down from 150 to 75
tanks, against a German loss of 29 tanks out of 100. Benghazi fell on 28 January
and Timimi on 3 February. By 6 February, the British were back to the Gazala line, a
few miles west of Tobruk, from which the Panzerarmee had retreated seven weeks
earlier. The British had 1,309 casualties from 21 January, had 42 tanks knocked out and
another 30 damaged or broken down and lost forty field guns. [64] The commander of XIII
Corps Lieutenant-General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen resigned over differences with
Eighth Army commander Neil Ritchie.[65]
Battle of Gazala[edit]
Main article: Battle of Gazala

Battle of Gazala, 21 January – 7 July 1942 (click to enlarge)

By February the front was at the Gazala Line, just west of Tobruk. In the spring both
sides prepared for another battle.[66] The British planned Operation Buckshot for June to
destroy the Panzerarmee and re-capture Cyrenaica but in early May defensive
measures on the Egyptian border took priority, as an Axis attack became imminent. [67]
[b]
 Unternehmen Venezia (the Battle of Gazala) from 26 May to 21 June 1942, began
when Afrika Korps and Italian tanks drove south, around the flank of the Gazala line and
were isolated by Free French and other Allied troops at Bir Hakeim, who intercepted
Axis supply convoys.[69]
Rommel retreated to a position abutting the British minefields and Ritchie
ordered Operation Aberdeen, a counter-attack for 5 June. To the north, the 32nd Army
Tank Brigade lost 50 of 70 tanks.[70] The 7th Armoured Division and the 5th Indian
Infantry Division on the eastern flank attacked at 2:50 a.m. and met with disaster when
the British artillery bombardment fell short of the German anti-tank screen. The 22nd
Armoured Brigade lost 60 of 156 tanks and turned away, leaving the 9th Indian
Brigade stranded.[71][72] An afternoon counter-attack by the Ariete and 21st
Panzer divisions and a 15th Panzer Division attack on the Knightsbridge Box overran
the tactical HQs of the two British divisions and the 9th Indian Division. The 10th Indian
Infantry Brigade and smaller units were dispersed and command broke down. The 9th
Indian Brigade, a reconnaissance regiment and four artillery regiments were lost and
the British fled from the Gazala Line on 13 June, with only 70 operational tanks. [73]
Fall of Tobruk[edit]
Main article: Axis capture of Tobruk
 British prisoners go "into the bag", Tobruk, 1942

Gott, now a Lieutenant-General and commander of XIII Corps, appointed Major-

General Hendrik Klopper to the command of the 2nd South African Division, to defend
Tobruk. Along with two South African brigades, were the 201st Guards (Motorised)
Brigade, 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, 32nd Army Tank Brigade and the 4th Anti-Aircraft
Brigade.[74] Tobruk had been besieged for nine months in 1941 but this time the Royal
Navy could not guarantee the supply of the garrison and Auchinleck viewed Tobruk as
expendable but expected that it could hold out for two months. [75] On 21 June, 35,000
Eighth Army troops surrendered to Lieutenant-General Enea Navarini, the commander
of XXI Corps.[76] Auchinleck relieved Ritchie, took over the Eighth Army and stopped the
Axis advance at El Alamein, 70 mi (110 km) from Alexandria; after the First Battle of El
Alamein Auchinleck was also sacked.[77]
Unternehmen Herkules[edit]
Main article: Operation Herkules
Italian plans to invade Malta by sea began during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War (3
October 1935 – May 1936).[78] An opportunity to capture Malta occurred in April 1941
but Operation Mercury (20 May – 1 June 1941), the invasion of Crete, was conducted
first, with such losses of parachute troops and transport aircraft that a second operation
in 1941 was impossible. Luftwaffe units apart from Fliegerkorps X then went east
for Operation Barbarossa and by June 1941, the island air defences had recovered.
Luftwaffe units returned to the Mediterranean in spring 1942 and managed to neutralise
the offensive capacity of the island garrison.[79] In April, Hitler and Mussolini agreed to
mount Unternehmen Herkules, an Italian-German air and sea invasion.
Two Fliegerkorps with hundreds of Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft, gliders (including
24 Messerschmitt Me 321 Gigants) and about 200 Regia Aeronautica transport aircraft
were assembled for the invasion.[80][81]
The Italian navy assembled an armada of Marinefährprahm (MFP), converted civilian
ships and mine layers and 74 smaller boats. German MFPs, Siebel
ferries, Pionierlandungsboote, Sturmboote, large inflatable rafts and
the Seeschlange (Sea Snake a portable landing bridge), were contributed by the
German navy.[82][83][c] Rommel wished to attack, having refitted the force in Libya, to
forestall an Eighth Army offensive, which was agreed by Hitler and Mussolini, with the
proviso that an advance would stop at Tobruk, ready for the invasion of Malta in August.
After the success of Unternehmen Venezia and the capture of Tobruk in June, the
advance by the Panzerarmee kept going after the fall of Tobruk. The pursuit of a
defeated enemy had more appeal than the hazards of the Malta operation. [84] Herkules
was cancelled, in favour of Unternehmen Aïda, an invasion of Egypt to capture the Suez
Canal.[85]
Unternehmen Aïda[edit]
Main article: Battle of Mersa Matruh
Panzerarmee Afrika advanced into Egypt after the victory at Gazala in pursuit of the
Eighth Army, which made a defensive stand at Mersa Matruh. The speed of advance of
the Panzerarmee enabled it to get behind XIII Corps and X Corps but the Axis forces
were too weak to prevent the British from escaping. XIII Corps withdrew on the evening
of 27 June but poor communication left X Corps on its own in the fortress of Mersa
Matruh. X Corps broke out the following night but left 6,000 men and a great deal of
equipment and supplies behind. The Eighth Army continued to retreat eastwards,
colliding with Axis forces several times en route. An attempt to regroup at Fuka was
cancelled and Auchinleck ordered a 99 mi (160 km) retreat all the way to El Alamein,
62 mi (100 km) west of Alexandria. The retreat brought the Eighth Army close to its
base, which made supply much more efficient and the geographical bottleneck of
the Qattara Depression, 40 mi (64 km) to the south, made an Axis outflanking move
much more difficult.[86] By 25 June, the Afrika Korps was down to 60 tanks and the Italian
XX Corps had only 14 operational tanks. Using supplies captured at Tobruk on the
frontier and at Mersa Matruh, the Panzerarmee reached El Alamein on 30 June.
Supplying the Axis forces so far east of Gazala became much harder as most of their
supplies still had to come from Tripoli, 1,400 mi (2,300 km) away.[87]
First Battle of El Alamein[edit]
Main article: First Battle of El Alamein

British troops dig in at El Alamein during the battle, 4 July 1942

An attempt to drive the Eighth Army out of the Alamein position took place in the First
Battle of El Alamein (1–27 July 1942). After four days Rommel called off the attempt
due to the strength of the Eighth Army defence, depleted Axis supplies and dwindling
forces, with German divisions down to 1,200–1,500 men each. By 5 July, the number of
serviceable German tanks fell to around thirty. After a lull, the Panzerarmee planned to
attack again, with about fifty German tanks, 2,100 German infantry, 54 Italian tanks and
1,600 Italian troops but the Eighth Army attacked first, at Tel el Eisa from 10 to 14 July,
which exhausted both sides.[88] The Eighth Army began to attack Italian units, located
with information from Ultra, at Ruweisat Ridge (14–17 July) and from 21 to 23 July,
again at Tel El Eisa on 22 July and Miteirya Ridge (22 and 26 July), after which another
lull fell.[89] The Germans suffered about 10,000 casualties; Italian casualties are unknown
but 7,000 Axis prisoners were taken, against 13,250 Eighth Army casualties. [90][91]
Battle of Alam el Halfa[edit]
Main article: Battle of Alam el Halfa

Knocked out Panzer III near El Alamein, 1942

Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army in mid-

August. Rommel tried to destroy the British and reach Cairo before Allied
reinforcements, due in September, made an Axis victory in Africa
impossible. Panzerarmee Afrika was in poor condition and the physique of many of the
Germans had declined due to climate and battle exhaustion; 19,000 German troops had
been in Africa since March 1941. Reinforcements had brought the four German
divisions up to 90,000 men, 17,000 men below establishment and 12,600 vehicles. Only
34,000 of these men were fighting troops. The Panzerarmee had accumulated about
200 German and 243 Italian tanks, vs. 700 British tanks. In the Battle of Alam el Halfa
(Unternehmen Brandung, 30 August – 5 September), Axis units sought to surround the
Eighth Army by advancing around its southern flank.[92]
The British were forewarned by Ultra (decoded German radio messages) and left only
patrols in the south. The bulk of the British tanks and guns were concentrated at the
Alam el Halfa Ridge, which blocked the Axis advance 20 mi (32 km) behind the front.
The tanks stayed on the ridge and fought a static defensive engagement, rather than a
battle of manoeuvre. Allied aircraft bombed and strafed Axis troops continuously from
30 August to 4 September, which destroyed few tanks but pinned them down and
denied fast maneuvering and concentration to the Panzerarmee. Axis attacks on the
ridge failed, supplies ran short and Rommel ordered a withdrawal on 2 September.
[93]
 Late on 3 September, a New Zealand brigade and a British brigade counter-attacked
to cut off the Axis retreat but Operation Beresford was a costly failure and by 5
September the Axis retreat was complete.[94] The Eighth Army lost 1,750 men and 68
tanks; the Axis lost 2,900 men, 49 tanks, 36 aircraft, 60 guns and 400 lorries.[95]
Second Battle of El Alamein[edit]
Main article: Second Battle of El Alamein
 British tanks moving forwards through gaps in Axis minefields, cleared by Allied engineers and infantry, to
engage German and Italian armour

When the Eighth Army offensive began on 23 October, the Panzerarmee had 104,000

men, including 50,000 Germans, of whom only 24,173 were front line troops. There
were 496 Axis tanks, 290 of which were Italian, 500 guns and 850 anti-tank guns. The
Eighth Army had 195,000 men, 1,029 tanks, another 1,000 under repair, 908
guns and 1,451 anti-tank guns. The Allied troops were well fed and in good health,
whereas the Axis troops were undernourished and susceptible to illness.
The Panzerarmee had only 180 mi (290 km) of fuel per vehicle. By 27 October,
the Panzerarmee was down to 114 German tanks and by 2 November
the Panzerarmee had expended most of its ammunition and had only 32
German and 120 Italian tanks left. Rommel decided to retreat but Hitler ordered
the Panzerarmee to stand fast. On 4 November, the Eighth Army broke through Axis
defences and Rommel ordered the retreat to begin, abandoning the non-motorized
units, particularly Italian formations, in the centre and south. [96]
Panzerarmee Afrika had suffered 37,000 casualties, 30 per cent of the force and had
lost 450 tanks, and 1,000 guns. The Eighth Army suffered 13,500 casualties, a far
smaller proportion of the force and 500 tanks (only 150 of them destroyed) and
about 110 guns (mainly anti-tank guns). The Panzerarmee was reduced to about 5,000
men, 20 tanks, 20 anti-tank guns and 50 field guns.[97] Attempts to encircle the Axis
forces at Mersa Matruh failed and the bulk of the Afrika Korps had escaped by 7
November. The Axis forces retreated along the coast road but lack of tanks and fuel for
a mobile defence of the open southern flank, made a stand at the Halfaya Pass or any
other position impossible.[98] Tobruk was retaken by the Eighth Army on 13 November
and the Axis retreat continued; Benghazi fell on 20 November and the captured ports
were quickly repaired to supply the British advance. [99]
Battle of El Agheila[edit]
Main article: Battle of El Agheila
 Pursuit of the Axis forces through Egypt and Libya (enlargeable)

Panzerarmee Afrika retired to the El Agheila defences (Mersa Brega line) but Axis
supply and reinforcement priority was given to the forces opposing the British First
Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson) and Operation Torch, leaving the Italo-
Germans with no capacity to counter-attack. Hitler ordered the Mersa Brega line to be
held at all costs but Rommel favoured a fighting retreat to the Gabès Gap in Tunisia,
which would increase the supply distance for the Eighth Army to 1,500 mi (2,400 km).
On 24 November, Ugo Cavallero agreed to withdraw 200 mi (320 km) west to Buerat,
50 mi (80 km) beyond Sirte, if the Panzerarmee was attacked by a superior force. The
Eighth Army reached El Agheila on 15 December and the New Zealand Division was
sent to outflank the Mersa Brega line from 14 to 16 December as the 51st (Highland)
Division attacked frontally and the 7th Armoured Division attacked inland at Bir el Auera.
The outflanking move failed with the loss of 18 tanks and the Panzerarmee retreated
behind an obstacle course of deep mine-fields and booby-traps, which slowed the
pursuit.[100][101]
Axis supply: 1942[edit]
El Agheila is 460 mi (740 km) closer to Tripoli than the Egyptian frontier; the arrival of
the second Italian battleship convoy on 6 January 1942 and the discovery of 13,000
long tons (13,209 t) of fuel at Tripoli, eased the supply crisis, despite the delivery of only
50,000 long tons (50,802 t) of supplies in January. The Panzerarmee had room to
manoeuvre and a much shorter supply line against an opponent who now had the
burden of an over-extended supply line. The arrival of the Luftflotte II in Sicily had also
restored Axis air superiority in the region. Rommel asked for another 8,000 lorries but
this utopian demand was rejected and Rommel was warned that an advance would
cause another supply crisis. On 29 January, the Panzerarmee recaptured Benghazi and
next day ammunition supply to the front line broke down. By 13 February Rommel had
agreed to stop at Gazala, 900 mi (1,400 km) from Tripoli.[102]
Until May, monthly deliveries averaged 60,000 long tons (60,963 t), fewer than the
smaller Axis force received from June to October 1941 but sufficient for an offensive.
The 900 mi (1,400 km) advance to Gazala succeeded because Benghazi was open,
reducing the transport distance for about 33 per cent of the supplies of
the Panzerarmee to 280 mi (450 km). The Italians tried to restrain Rommel by
advocating the capture of Malta, which would postpone another offensive in Africa until
autumn but agreed to an attack on Tobruk for late May. An advance would stop at the
Egyptian frontier, another 150 mi (240 km) east and the Luftwaffe would redeploy
for Operation Herkules. The capture of Malta would not alter the constraints of port
capacity and distance; protecting convoys and a large port close to the front would still
be necessary for victory.[103]
The capture of Alexandria would have made Malta irrelevant but a defensive strategy
would be needed while Benghazi was extended, supplies accumulated and substantial
reinforcements brought to Libya. More troops would increase the demand for supplies,
which would exceed the capacities of Tripoli and Benghazi and the transport needed to
move them. On 26 May, Unternehmen Venezia, the Battle of Gazala, began; Tobruk
was captured intact on 22 June and shipping losses barely increased. Deliveries to
Libya fell from 150,000–32,000 long tons (152,407–32,514 t), due to a fuel shortage in
Italy and the supplies were unloaded at Tripoli, which made the position of
the Panzerarmee untenable. Operation Herkules was postponed; the capture of 2,000
vehicles, 5,000 long tons (5,080 t) of supplies and 1,400 long tons (1,422 t) of fuel at
Tobruk enabled the Panzerarmee to advance another 400 mi (640 km) by 4 July, when
lack of supplies, exhaustion and the rally of the Eighth Army ended the advance. [104]

Italian marines disembarking in Tobruk harbour July 1942

Tobruk could only take 20,000 long tons (20,321 t) of supplies a month, was within DAF
bomber range and the railway could carry only 300 long tons (305 t) per day. Small
deliveries could be made to Tobruk, Bardia and Mersa Matruh or be landed at Tripoli
and Benghazi, 1,300 and 800 mi (2,100 and 1,300 km) away. Ship losses in August
rose by 400 per cent and deliveries fell by half, to 51,000 long tons (51,818 t). Supplies
were diverted back to Tripoli and the Battle of Alam Halfa consumed 10,000 long tons
(10,160 t) of fuel. A retreat from El Alamein was forbidden by Hitler and deliveries fell as
far fewer ships were sent from Italy. Shipbuilding, repairs and German replacement
ships, had limited the net Italian loss of merchant ships to 23 per cent since 1940. On
the eve of the Second Battle of El Alamein, the railway from Tobruk flooded and 10,000
long tons (10,160 t) of supplies were stranded, leaving the Panzerarmee with only ten
per cent of the fuel it needed.[105]

1943[edit]
Buerat[edit]
Rommel planned to defend the Gabes Gap in Tunisia east of the French pre-
war Mareth line by holding the port of Buerat, while Army Group Africa
(Generaloberst [Colonel-General] Hans-Jürgen von Arnim), already in Tunisia,
confronted the British First Army, which contained the II US Corps and French troops.
[106]
 The front was 400 mi (640 km) from Tobruk and with such supply difficulties, the
Eighth Army was unable to use all its strength. Buerat was not strongly defended and
despite intelligence on the state of the Axis forces, Montgomery paused until 16 January
1943, when the Eighth Army had a 4:1 superiority in infantry and a 7.5:1 superiority in
tanks.[107] Bombing began on 12 January and XXX Corps attacked on 15 January, picking
its way along the coast road through minefields, demolitions and booby-traps. The 2nd
New Zealand Division and the 7th Armoured Division swung inland via Tarhuna,
supplied by the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) and the New Zealand Army Service
Corps. The Eighth Army needed to capture the port quickly to avoid a supply shortage.
Rommel withdrew from Buerat on 15 January, retreated from Tripoli on the night of
22/23 January, after destroying the port and then conducted a delaying action into
Tunisia. The 7th Armoured Division entered Tripoli on 23 January; the last elements
of Panzerarmee reached the Mareth line, another 200 mi (320 km) west, on 15
February, as LRDG patrols surveyed the defences. [108]
Tripoli[edit]
The main British attack was made along the coast road by the 51st (Highland) Division
and an armoured brigade as the 7th Armoured Division advanced via Tarhuna, Castel
Benito and Tripoli. The 90th Light Division fought delaying actions along the road, which
exacerbated the Allied transport difficulties. From 20 to 21 January, the 90th Light
Division made a stand at Corradini, having made 109 craters in the road from Buerat to
Homs. The vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division reached the vicinity of Aziza on 21
January and next day the 51st (Highland) Division reached Castel Verde. A race
developed and the Germans retired from Tripoli during the night; the 11th Hussars were
the first into Tripoli, 675 mi (1,086 km) west of Benghazi, on the morning of 23 January.
[109]
 Five hours later, a Naval Base Party arrived and surveyed the wreckage of the port.
On 26 January, five ships anchored outside the port and began to unload via lighters;
on 30 January, 3,000 long tons (3,048 t) of stores were landed. In March the Eighth
Army entered Tunisia and on 9 March, Rommel returned to Germany to communicate to
Hitler the realities of conditions in North Africa. Rommel failed to persuade Hitler to
allow the Axis forces to be withdrawn and was not allowed to return to Africa, ostensibly
on health grounds.[110]

Aftermath[edit]
Analysis[edit]
In 1977, Martin van Creveld wrote that Rommel had claimed that if the supplies and
equipment, sent to Tunisia in late 1942 and early 1943, had been sent earlier, the Axis
would have won the Desert War. Creveld disagreed, since only the German occupation
of southern France after Operation Torch made French merchant ships
and Toulon available for dispatch and Bizerta available for receipt, which did not apply
in 1941. The extra distance from Bizerta to the Egyptian border would also have
negated the benefit of using a larger port. Axis supply had always been determined by
the small size of the ports in Libya, a constraint that could not be overcome and attacks
on Axis shipping had compounded chronic supply difficulties. With the German army
bogged down in the USSR, there was never sufficient road transport available for
the Afrika Korps and the Panzerarmee, despite the relatively lavish scale of transport
compared to other fronts.[111]
The cancelled attack on Malta in the summer of 1942 had less influence on events than
the small size of Tobruk harbour and its vulnerability to air attack. Only a railway, similar
to the one built by the British, could have alleviated Axis supply difficulties but lack of
time and resources made it impossible to build one. The influence of Axis ship losses on
the defeats inflicted on the Panzerarmee in late 1942 has been exaggerated, because
lack of fuel was caused by the chronic difficulty of transporting goods overland, rather
than lack of deliveries from Europe. During the Second Battle of El Alamein, 1⁄3 of the
fuel destined for the Panzerarmee, was stranded at Benghazi. Rommel wrote that Axis
supply difficulties, relative to those of the British, determined the course of the military
campaign and were a constraint that was insoluble. [112]
Montgomery has been criticised for failing to trap the Axis armies and bring them to a
decisive battle in Libya. His tactics have been seen as too cautious and slow, since he
knew of the exiguous supply situation of the Panzerarmee and Rommel's intentions
from Axis signals decrypts and other intelligence. [113] In 1966, the British official
historian Ian Playfair wrote that the defensive ability of the Afrika Korps in particular and
British apprehensions of another defeat and retreat, would have constrained the
freedom of action of any commander. Warfare in the desert has been described as a
"quarter-master's nightmare", given the conditions of desert warfare and the supply
difficulties. Montgomery emphasised balance and refrained from attacks until the army
was ready; Eighth Army morale greatly improved under his command. [114] The Axis forces
retreated through Libya into Tunisia and fought the Tunisian campaign, eventually to be
trapped between the Anglo-American forces of the First Army to the west and the Eighth
Army from the east.[115]

See also[edit]

 World War II portal

 Egypt–Libya Campaign
 List of World War II battles
 Military history of Egypt during World War II
 Military history of Italy during World War II
 List of Italian military equipment in World War II
 Military history of the United Kingdom during World
War II
 List of British military equipment of World War II
 Military history of Germany during World War II
 List of German military equipment of World War II
 North African campaign timeline

Notes[edit]
0. ^ The 2nd Armoured Division in Cyrenaica had the 3rd
Armoured Brigade, with an understrength light tank regiment,
a second regiment using captured Italian tanks and a cruiser
tank regiment from mid-March, with worn-out tanks. The 2nd
Support Group had only one motor battalion, a field artillery
regiment, one anti-tank battery and a machine-gun company;
most of the divisional transport had gone to Greece. [40]
1. ^ Since early 1941, Colonel Bonner Fellers, an American
liaison officer, had been free to roam around Egypt and the
Eighth Army. Fellers communicated his findings nightly to
Washington, using a code which had been broken by Axis
 cryptanalysts, who provided Rommel with details of the British
defence scheme.[68]
2. ^ The German army had developed Seeschlange as a
portable landing bridge and floating roadway, from joined
modules which could be towed into place to act as a
temporary jetty.[83]

Footnotes[edit]
0. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Clodfelter 2017, p. 448.
1. ^ Jump up to:a b Playfair 2004d, pp. 38–39, 92.
2. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 19, 93.
3. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 32, 93, 97–98, 375.
4. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 32, 93, 97, 100, 375.
5. ^ Luck 1989, p. 92.
6. ^ Playfair 2004d, p. 116.
7. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 115, 116.
8. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 149.
9. ^ Creveld 1977, p. 183.
10. ^ Cooper 1978, pp. 361–362.
11. ^ Cooper 1978, p. 362.
12. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 39, 60, 64–65.
13. ^ Edgerton 2011, pp. 166, 177–178.
14. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 67–69.
15. ^ Raugh 1993, p. 67.
16. ^ Neillands 2004, p. 35.
17. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 118–119.
18. ^ Christie 1999, pp. 41–43.
19. ^ Playfair 2004d, p. 113.
20. ^ Playfair 2004d, p. 188.
21. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 119, 187, 206.
22. ^ Macksey 1971, p. 33.
23. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 46, 121.
24. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 208–210.
25. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 208–211.
26. ^ Jump up to:a b Playfair 2004d, pp. 210–211.
27. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 207, 46, 121, 211–212, 257–261.
28. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 207, 46.
29. ^ MacGregor 2006, p. 229.
30. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 265–266.
31. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 266–270.
32. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 257–271.
33. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 282–293.
34. ^ Jump up to:a b Playfair 2004d, pp. 358–359.
35. ^ CCIS 1941.
36. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 357–358.
37. ^ Playfair 2004d, pp. 359–362.
38. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 1–2.
39. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 2–3.
40. ^ Bauer 2000, p. 121.
41. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 15–43, 2, 153–159.
42. ^ Hoffman 2004, p. 35.
43. ^ Lewin 1998, pp. 39, 42.
44. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 35–43, 153–159.
45. ^ Raugh 1993, pp. 207–208.
46. ^ Greene & Massignani 1999, p. 70.
47. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 159–163.
48. ^ Rommel 1982, p. 137.
49. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 162–163.
50. ^ Neillands 2004, p. 68.
51. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 163–169.
52. ^ Porch 2005, pp. 233–234.
53. ^ Playfair 2004a, pp. 169–174.
54. ^ Carver 2002, p. 51.
55. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 182–187.
56. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 182–185.
57. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 185–187.
58. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 189–190.
59. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 190–192.
60. ^ Jump up to:a b Carver 2002, p. 54.
61. ^ Hinsley 1981, pp. 334–336, 330.
62. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 135–154.
63. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 139–153.
64. ^ Mead 2007, p. 171.
65. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 197–223.
66. ^ Carver 2002, pp. 60–61.
67. ^ Pitt 1989, p. 194.
68. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 223–231.
69. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 231–235.
70. ^ Hinsley 1994, p. 373.
71. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 232–233.
72. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 233–234.
73. ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 561.
74. ^ Mackenzie 1951, p. 559.
75. ^ Bierman & Smith 2002, pp. 178–213.
76. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 260–277.
77. ^ Greene & Massignani 2002, p. 64.
78. ^ Cooper 1978, p. 368.
79. ^ Bekker 1975, p. 352.
80. ^ Green 1970, p. 648.
81. ^ Marcon 1998, pp. 221–224.
82. ^ Jump up to:a b Schenk 1990, p. 139.
83. ^ Cooper 1978, p. 369.
84. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 277–278.
85. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 277–295.
86. ^ Cooper 1978, pp. 375–376.
87. ^ Cooper 1978, p. 376.
88. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 340–357.
89. ^ Watson 2007, p. 6.
90. ^ Barr 2005, p. 184.
91. ^ Cooper 1978, p. 377.
92. ^ Cooper 1978, pp. 378–379.
93. ^ Playfair 2004b, pp. 379–392.
94. ^ Watson 2007, p. 14.
95. ^ Cooper 1978, pp. 381–385.
96. ^ Watson 2007, p. 27.
 97. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 190.
98. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 81–239.
99. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 215–228.
100. ^ Neillands 2004, pp. 212–213.
101. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 192–193.
102. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 193–195.
103. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 195–197.
104. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 197–198.
105. ^ Neillands 2004, p. 214.
106. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 227–230.
107. ^ Neillands 2004, pp. 218–219, 227.
108. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 235–237, 232.
109. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 254–256.
110. ^ Creveld 1977, p. 199.
111. ^ Creveld 1977, pp. 200–201.
112. ^ Hinsley 1981, p. 460.
113. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 77, 79.
114. ^ Playfair 2004c, pp. 81–101, 137–193, 215–239.

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 Hoffman, K. (2004).  Erwin Rommel. London:
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 Luck, Hans von  (1989). Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of
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March 1943 Defence. Vol. I. London: Chatto &
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 MacGregor, Andrew (2006) [2006]. A Military History of Modern
Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. Santa
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 Marcon, Tullio (1998).  I Muli del Mare [The Sea of Donkeys] (in
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the Key British Generals of World War II. Stroud:
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M. (ed.).  The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Early
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Press. ISBN 978-1-84574-065-8.
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E. (2004a) [HMSO 1956]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.).  The
Mediterranean and Middle East: The Germans Come to the Help
of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United
Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II. Naval & Military Press.  ISBN  978-
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 Playfair, I. S. O.; with Flynn, F. C.; Molony, C. J. C. & Gleave, T.
P. (2004b) [1960]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and
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1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War
United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III. Naval & Military
Press. ISBN 978-1-84574-067-2.
 Playfair, I. S. O.; and Molony, C. J. C.; with Flynn, F. C. & Gleave,
T. P. (2004c) [1966]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.).  The Mediterranean and
Middle East: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa. History
of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Vol.  IV
(pbk. repr. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London:
HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-068-9.
 Porch, Douglas (2005) [2004]. Hitler's Mediterranean
Gamble (Cassell Military Paperbacks ed.). London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-304-36705-4.
 Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A
Study in Generalship. London: Brassey's.  ISBN  978-0-08-040983-
2.
 Rommel, Erwin  (1994). Pimlott, John (ed.). Rommel: In His Own
Words. London: Greenhill Books.  ISBN  978-1-85367-185-2.
 Rommel, Erwin (1982) [1953].  Liddell Hart, Basil (ed.).  The
Rommel Papers. New York: Da Capo Press.  ISBN  978-0-306-
80157-0.
 Schenk, Peter (1990). Invasion of England 1940: The Planning of
Operation Sealion. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 978-0-
85177-548-7.
 Watson, B. A. (2007) [1999].  Exit Rommel: The Tunisian
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8117-3381-6.

Journals[edit]
 Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (January–February 1993).
"The Summer of '42: The Proposed Axis Invasion of
Malta". Command Magazine. Conshohocken, PA
(20). ISSN 1059-5651.
 Jenner, C. J. (2008). "Turning the Hinge of Fate: Good Source
and the UK–US Intelligence Alliance, 1940–1942". Diplomatic
History. London:  Society for Historians of American Foreign
Relations  (Oxford University Press).  32  (2): 165–
205.  doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00688.x. ISSN 0145-2096.
 Wavell, Archibald  (1946). Despatch on Operations in the Middle
East from August, 1939 to November, 1940. London: War
Office. "No. 37609". The London Gazette (Supplement). 13 June
1946. pp. 2997–3006.
 Wavell, Archibald (1946). Despatch on Operations in the Western
Desert From 7th December, 1940 to 7th February 1941. London:
War Office. in "No. 37628". The London Gazette (Supplement).
26 June 1946. pp.  3261–3269.
 Wavell, Archibald (1946). Despatch on Operations in the Middle
East From 7th February, 1941 to 15th July 1941. London: War
Office. in "No. 37638".  The London Gazette  (Supplement). 3 July
1946. pp. 3423–3444.

Reports[edit]
  Roberts, G. P. B.; Bayerlein, Fritz (1956).  Liddell Hart,
Basil  (ed.). Battle Report: Alam Halfa  (Report). Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General
Staff College. OCLC  464601329. Archived from  the original on 21
October 2007. Retrieved  5 November  2007.
 Toppe, Alfred (1990) [~1947].  German Experiences in Desert
Warfare during World War II  (PDF).  The Black Vault  (Report).
Vol. II. Washington: US Marine Corps: Historical Division,
European Command. FMFRP 12-96-II. Retrieved  15
October  2013.

Theses[edit]
 Christie, Howard R. (1999).  Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army
in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940 –
December 1940  (MA thesis). Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Command and General Staff College. OCLC  465212715.
A116763. Retrieved  16 February  2015.

Websites[edit]
 "Appendix E, H.Q. Cyrenaica Command Intelligence Summary
No. 6 (23 Feb 41) WO 169/1258". The National Archives. 23
February 1941. Retrieved 15 March  2015.
 "Engagements, 1942". The History of the British 7th Armoured
Division. 2001. Retrieved  20 February  2015.

Further reading[edit]
Books[edit]
 Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Lord  (2002) [1957]. Danchev, Alex;
Todman, Daniel (eds.). War Diaries 1939–1945  (rev. ed.).
London: Phoenix Press.  ISBN  978-1-84212-526-7.
 Beaumont, Joan (1996). Australia's War, 1939–1945. Melbourne:
Allen & Unwin. ISBN 978-1-86448-039-9.
 Brett-James, Antony (1951). Ball of Fire: The Fifth Indian Division
in the Second World War. Aldershot: Gale &
Polden. OCLC  4275700. Archived from the original  on 27 March
2020. Retrieved  19 February  2016.
 Carver, Field Marshal Lord (2000) [1962]. El Alamein. Ware:
Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 978-1-84022-220-3.
 Carver, Field Marshal Lord (1964).  Tobruk. Pan
Books. ISBN 978-0-330-23376-7.
 Churchill, Winston S. (1986) [1949]. Their Finest Hour. The
Second World War. Vol.  II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 978-0-
395-41056-1.
 Churchill, Winston S. (1985) [1950].  The Grand Alliance. The
Second World War. Vol.  III. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  ISBN  978-
0-395-41057-8.
 Churchill, Winston S.; Gilbert, Martin (1993). The Churchill War
Papers. London: W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-01959-9.
 Clifford, Alexander (1943).  Three against Rommel. London:
George G. Harrap.  OCLC 480338570.
  Dear, I. C. B.; Foot, M. R. D., eds. (2005) [1995].  The Oxford
Companion to World War II. Mazal Holocaust Collection. Oxford
University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-280666-6.
 Glassop, Lawson (1992) [1944].  We were the Rats (Penguin ed.).
Sydney: Angus & Robertson.  ISBN  978-0-14-014924-1.
 Harrison, Frank (1999) [1996].  Tobruk: The Great Siege
Reassessed. London: Brockhampton Press. ISBN 978-1-86019-
986-8.
 Jentz, Thomas L. (1996). Panzer Truppen: The Complete Guide
to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force
1933–1942. Vol.  I. Schiffer Publishing.  ISBN  0-88740-915-6.
 Jentz, Thomas L. (1998). Tank Combat in North Africa: The
Opening Rounds. Schiffer. ISBN 978-0-7643-0226-8.
 Latimer, Jon  (2002). Alamein. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-
7195-6203-7.
 Latimer, Jon  (2000). Operation Compass 1940: Wavell's
Whirlwind Offensive. Campaign. Oxford: Osprey.  ISBN  1-85532-
967-0.
 Latimer, Jon (2004). Tobruk 1941: Rommel's Opening Move.
Greenwood Press.  ISBN  978-0-275-98287-4.
 Long, Gavin (1961) [1952]. To Benghazi.  Official History of
Australia in the Second World War  Series 1 (Army). Vol.  I.
Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC  314648263.
Retrieved 13 December 2015.
 Lucas-Phillips, C. E. (1962). Alamein. London:
Heinemann. OCLC  3510044.
 Maughan, Barton (1966). Tobruk and El Alamein. Official History
of Australia in the Second World War Series 1 (Army). Vol. III.
Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC  954993.
 Mellenthin, Major General F. W. von (1971) [1956].  Panzer
Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armour in the Second
World War (First ed.). New York:  Ballantine Books. ISBN 978-0-
345-24440-6.
 Santoro, G. (1957) [1950].  L'aeronautica italiana nella seconda
guerra mondiale [The Italian Air Force in WWII]. Vol. I (2nd  ed.).
Milano-Roma: Edizione Esse.  OCLC 900980719. Retrieved  17
December 2015.
 Santoro, G. (1957). L'aeronautica italiana nella seconda guerra
mondiale [The Italian Air Force in WWII]. Vol. II (1st ed.). Milano-
Roma: Edizione Esse. OCLC  60102091. Retrieved 17
December 2015.
 Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron hulls, Iron hearts: Mussolini's Elite
Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Marlborough:
Crowood. ISBN 978-1-86126-646-0.
 Walker, Ronald (1967).  Alam Halfa and Alamein. The Official
History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945.
Wellington, NZ: Historical Publications Branch.  OCLC 504337535.

Reports[edit]
 Thompson, D. H. (2002). Discarded Victory: North Africa, 1940–
1941  (PDF)  (Report). USAWC Strategy Research Project. Carlisle
Barracks, PA: US Army War College. OCLC  50872739. Archived
from  the original  (PDF)  on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 9
July  2015.
  Tosch, D. F. (1987).  German Operations in North Africa: A Case
Study of the Link Between Operational Design and
Sustainment  (Report). Command and General Staff College,
School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies US Army
Command and General Staff College. OCLC  17455859. ADA
184732. Retrieved 28 March  2015.

Theses[edit]
 Dando, N. (2014). The Impact of Terrain on British Operations and
Doctrine in North Africa 1940–1943  (PhD). Plymouth
University. OCLC  885436735. Retrieved 25 March  2015.
 LaFace, J. L. (2001).  Tactical Victory Leading to Operational
Failure: Rommel in North Africa  (Monograph). Command and
General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies. Fort
Leavenworth, KS:  United States Army Command and General
Staff College, School of Advanced Military
Studies. OCLC  831724060. Docket ADA 397473. Retrieved  28
March  2015.
 Snead, L. R. (6 May 1994).  Wavell's Campaigns in the Middle
East: An Analysis of Operational Art and the Implications for
Today  (Monograph). Command and General Staff College, School
of Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and
General Staff College.  OCLC 831935679. Docket ADA 284720.
Retrieved 9 March 2015.

External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has
media related to Western
Desert Campaign.

 AFRIKAKORPS.org/AANA Research Group

 Panzer Army Africa Battle Report dated 29 June
1942 K.T.B. 812 page 1
 Panzer Army Africa Battle Report dated 29 June
1942 K.T.B. 812 page 2
 Crusader Project, Axis supply statistics for North
Africa
show

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