Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Belligerents
India Libya
Sudan Germany
Southern Rhodesia
Palestine
Australia
New Zealand
South Africa
Free France
Poland
Greece
Czechoslovakia
220,000[1] 620,000[1]
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North African campaign
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Western Desert Campaign
Contents
1Background
2Prelude
31940
41941
51942
61943
7Aftermath
8See also
9Notes
10Footnotes
11Bibliography
12Further reading
13External links
Background[edit]
Libya[edit]
Cyrenaica (Libya) had been an Italian colony since the Italo-Turkish War in 1911–1912.
With Tunisia, part of French North Africa, to the west, and Egypt to the east, the Italians
prepared to defend both fronts through a North Africa Supreme Headquarters, under the
command of the Governor-General of Italian Libya, Marshal of the Air Force, Italo
Balbo. Supreme Headquarters had the 5th Army (General Italo Gariboldi) and the 10th
Army (General Mario Berti), which in mid-1940 had nine metropolitan divisions of
about 13,000 men each, three Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (Blackshirt)
divisions and two Libyan divisions, each with an establishment with 8,000 men. Italian
army divisions had been reorganised in the late 1930s from three regiments each to
two; reservists were recalled in 1939, along with the usual call-up of conscripts. [2]
Italian L3/33 tankettes
Morale was considered high and the army had recent operational experience. The
Italian navy had prospered under the Fascist regime, which had paid for fast, well-built,
well-armed ships and a large submarine fleet but it lacked experience and training. The
air force had been ready for war in 1936 but by 1939 had stagnated; the British did not
consider it capable of maintaining a high rate of operations. The 5th Army, with eight
divisions, was based in Tripolitania, the western half of Libya, opposite Tunisia and the
10th Army, with six infantry divisions, held Cyrenaica in the east. When war was
declared, the 10th Army sent the 1st Libyan Division to the Egyptian frontier
from Giarabub to Sidi Omar and XXI Corps from Sidi Omar to the coast, Bardia and
Tobruk. The XXII Corps moved south-west of Tobruk to act as a counter-attack force. [2]
Egypt[edit]
The British had based forces in Egypt since 1882 but these were greatly reduced by the
terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The small British and Commonwealth force
garrisoned the Suez Canal and the Red Sea route. The canal was vital to British
communications with its Far Eastern and Indian Ocean territories. In mid-1939,
Lieutenant-General Archibald Wavell was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-
Chief (GOC-in-C) of the new Middle East Command, over the Mediterranean and
Middle East theatres. Until the Franco-Axis armistice, French divisions in Tunisia faced
the Italian 5th Army on the western Libyan border. In Libya, the Royal Army had about
215,000 men and in Egypt, the British had about 36,000 troops and another 27,500 men
training in Palestine.[3]
Cruiser Tank Mk I (A9)
Prelude[edit]
Terrain[edit]
Ghibli approaches
The war was fought primarily in the area known as the Western Desert, which was
about 240 mi (390 km) wide, from Mersa Matruh in Egypt to Gazala on the Libyan
coast, along Litoranea Balbo (Via Balbia), the only paved road. The Sand Sea, 150 mi
(240 km) inland, marked the southern limit of the desert at its widest points at Giarabub
and Siwa. In British parlance, the term "Western Desert" applied to the desert of Egypt
west of the Nile but came to describe the whole area of conflict, including eastern
Cyrenaica in Libya. From the coast, a raised, flat plain of stony desert extends inland
about 150 m (500 ft) above sea level and runs south for 120–190 mi (200–300 km) from
the coast to the edge of the Sand Sea. [6] Scorpions, vipers and flies abound in the
region, which was inhabited by a small number of Bedouin nomads.[7]
Bedouin tracks linked wells and the more easily traversed ground; navigation was by
sun, star, compass and "desert sense", good perception of the environment gained by
experience. When Italian troops advanced into Egypt in September 1940, the Maletti
Group got lost leaving Sidi Omar, disappeared and had to be found by aircraft. In spring
and summer the days are miserably hot and the nights very cold.
[8]
The Sirocco (Gibleh or Ghibli), a hot desert wind, blows clouds of fine sand, which
reduce visibility to a few metres and coat eyes, lungs, machinery, food and equipment;
motor vehicles and aircraft need special oil filters and the barren terrain means that
supplies for military operations have to be transported from outside. [9] German engines
tended to overheat and the life of their tanks' engines fell from 1,400–1,600 mi (2,300–
2,600 km) to 300–900 mi (480–1,450 km) and this problem was made worse by the lack
of standardized spare parts for the German and Italian motor types. [10]
Supply[edit]
Axis[edit]
Goggles and face covering for protection against sun and sand
Italian supply shipments to Libya went about 600 mi (970 km) west around Sicily, then
approached the coast of Tunisia before going on to Tripoli, in order to avoid interference
from the British aircraft, ships and submarines based at Malta. In Africa, supplies had to
be hauled huge distances by road or in small consignments by coaster. The distance
from Tripoli to Benghazi was about 650 mi (1,050 km) and to El Alamein was 1,400 mi
(2,300 km). A third of the Italian merchant marine was in ships berthed in British-
controlled ports and was interned after Italy declared war. By September 1942 half of
the remainder had been sunk, although much was replaced by new shipbuilding,
salvage and transfers of German ships. From June 1940 to May 1943, 16 per cent of
supply shipments were sunk.[11]
Tobruk was pressed into use in June 1942 but Allied bombing and its long approach
route led this effort to be abandoned in August. The Germans assumed that the
maximum distance a motorised army could operate from its base was 200 mi (320 km)
but on average about a third of Axis lorries were unserviceable and 35–50 per cent of
the fuel deliveries were consumed transporting the remainder to the front. Fuel oil
shortages in Italy, the small size of the ports in Libya and the need to meet civilian
demand, required the inefficient dispatch of large numbers of small
convoys. Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, German army high command) concluded
that German forces in Libya could not be supplied for a decisive offensive unless Italian
forces were withdrawn to Italy, which was politically impossible. [12]
British[edit]
The geographical position of Italy made it possible for it to close the Mediterranean if
war came and force the Mediterranean Fleet based in Egypt to rely on the Suez Canal.
In 1939, Wavell began to plan a base in the Middle East to support about fifteen
divisions (300,000 men), six in Egypt, three in Palestine and the rest further afield. Many
of the supplies needed by the British were imported from the colonies and the rest
obtained locally by stimulating the production of substitutes. The plan for a garrison of
nine divisions in Egypt and Palestine was changed to fourteen divisions by June 1941
and then to 23 by March 1942.[13] Once the Italians declared war in 1940 and until 1943,
merchant ships travelled east from Britain around the Cape of Good Hope, which made
Egypt as distant as Australia and New Zealand. The Middle East Supply Centre (MESC)
operated in Egypt, Palestine and Syria to co-ordinate imports and create local
substitutes for civilian rations and promote agricultural efficiencies. By March 1943 the
MESC had replaced about 100 Liberty Ship deliveries' worth of imports with increased
local production of potatoes, cooking oil, dairy products and fish; cattle drives from
Sudan obviated the need for refrigerated shipping. [14]
In 1940, British military forces had a base at the terminus of the Egyptian state railway,
road and the port of Mersa Matruh (Matruh) 200 mi (320 km) west of Alexandria.
Construction began on a water pipeline along the railway and the British surveyed
sources of water. Wells were dug but most filled with salt water; in 1939 the primary
fresh water sources were the Roman aqueducts at Mersa Matruh and Maaten Baggush.
Water-boats from Alexandria and a distillation plant at Matruh increased supply but
rigorous rationing had to be enforced and much water had to be moved overland to
outlying areas. Not enough vehicles were available in 1939 and lorries were diverted to
provide the Armoured Division with a better rear link. Only desert-worthy vehicles could
be risked cross-country, which left tanks unable to move far from Matruh which was
120 mi (190 km) east of the Libyan border.[15] From the border there was no water at
Sollum or for another 50 mi (80 km) east of Sollum to Sidi Barrani, along a very poor
road. An invader would have to move through a waterless and trackless desert to reach
the main British force.[16] In September 1940, the New Zealand Railway Battalion and
Indian labourers began work on a coastal railway, which reached Sidi Barrani by
October 1941 and Tobruk by December 1942, 400 mi (640 km) west of El Alamein,
carrying 4,200 long tons (4,267 t) of water per day.[17]
1940[edit]
Frontier skirmishes[edit]
Main article: Frontier Wire (Libya)
On 11 June 1940, hostilities commenced.
British troops were ordered to dominate the frontier and isolate Giarabub. They crossed
into Libya that night, exchanged fire with Italian troops at Sidi Omar and discovered that
some Italians were unaware that war had been declared. On 14 June, the British
captured Fort Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena, taking 220 prisoners. Two days later, the
British raided a convoy on the Tobruk–Bardia road, killed 21 Italian soldiers and took 88
prisoners, including Generale di Brigata (Brigadier General) Romolo Lastrucci [it], the
10th Army Chief Engineer. At an engagement near the frontier wire at Nezuet Ghirba, a
mixed force of British tanks, artillery and motorised infantry defeated an Italian force of
17 light tanks, four guns and 400 infantry. [18][19]
The British patrolled the frontier area as far west as Tobruk, establishing dominance
over the 10th Army.[20] On 5 August, thirty Italian tanks engaged the 8th Hussars in an
inconclusive action and Wavell concluded that vehicle wear made it impractical to
continue operations when an Italian offensive loomed. Sand wore out equipment
quickly, shortening the track life of tanks. Spare parts ran out and only half the tank
strength could be kept operational. [21] A lull fell from August to early September
as Operation Hats, a naval operation, reinforced the Mediterranean Fleet and helped to
bring an army convoy of tanks and crews via the Cape. The British claimed to have
inflicted 3,500 casualties with a loss of 150 men between 11 June and 9 September.
[22]
Further afield, both sides established scouting groups, the Long Range Desert
Group (LRDG) and Auto-Saharan Company (Compagnie Auto-Avio-Sahariane) which
ranged the desert, raided and observed enemy dispositions. [23]
Operazione E[edit]
Main article: Italian invasion of Egypt
In December 1940, the 10th Army in Egypt had been reinforced with the 1st and 2nd
Libyan divisions and 4th Blackshirt Division, in the fortified camps from Sidi Barrani to
the Tummars and Maktila. The Maletti Group was based at Nibeiwa, the 63rd Infantry
Division Cirene at Rabia and Sofafi, the 62nd Infantry Division Marmarica was on the
escarpment from Sofafi to Halfaya Pass and the 64th Infantry Division "Catanzaro" was
east of Buq Buq, behind the Nibeiwa–Rabia gap, supported by about 500 aircraft of
the 5° Squada (General Felip Porro).[31] The RAF attacked airfields on 7 December and
destroyed 39 aircraft on the ground. Operation Compass (Battle of Marmarica/Battle of
the Camps), began when Selby Force advanced from Matruh to isolate Maktila early on
9 December. The 4th Indian Division and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment (7th RTR)
attacked Nibeiwa at dawn and overran the camp, then moved on Tummar West, which
fell in the afternoon. A counter-attack from Tummar East was repulsed and the camp
taken the next day.[32]
Battle of Sidi Barrani[edit]
Main article: Battle of Sidi Barrani
A 7th Armoured Division screen to the west prevented the reinforcement of Sidi Barrani
and on 10 December, the British cut the coast road and the 7th Armoured Division
mopped up around Buq Buq, taking many prisoners. On 11 December, the Italians were
defeated at Sidi Barrani; Rabia and Sofafi were abandoned and the 7th Armoured
Division pursued along the coast and the escarpment. Late on 14 December, the 11th
Hussars cut the Via Balbia between Tobruk and Bardia, captured Sidi Omar on 16
December and forced the Italians to retreat from Sollum and Fort Capuzzo to Bardia,
leaving garrisons at Siwa Oasis and Giarabub in the south. From 9 to 11 December, the
British took 38,300 prisoners, 237 guns, 73 tanks and about 1,000 vehicles for 624
casualties.[33]
Battle of Bardia[edit]
Main article: Battle of Bardia
See also: Siege of Giarabub and Capture of Kufra
Italian soldiers captured during the Battle of Bardia.
Bardia fell between 14 December and 5 January 1941; the British suffered 456
Australian infantry casualties and lost 17 of 23 tanks, for 40,000 Italian casualties and
prisoners, more than 400 guns, 130 tanks and hundreds of lorries. At dawn on 21
January, Australian infantry broke into Tobruk and made a path for 18 British I tanks.
The Australians pressed on and captured half of the Tobruk defences by nightfall. The
Australians took 25,000 prisoners, 208 guns and 87 tanks, for a loss of 355 Australian
and 45 British troops.[34] The 7th Armoured Division drove 100 mi (160 km)
towards Derna and the Babini Group (BCS – Brigata Corazzata Speciale under
General Valentino Babini), with about 300 tanks, at Mechili. The BCS slipped away and
from 26 to 28 January the British tanks bogged
down in heavy rain; Derna was abandoned next Estimated POW numbers:
day. The 7th Armoured Division sent Combeforce, Western Desert and Cyrenaica
(9 December 1940 – 8 February 1941)[36]
a flying column, to Beda Fomm and cut off the 10th
Army.[35] Place PoW Tanks Guns
1941[edit]
Tobruk[edit]
Main article: British capture of Tobruk
Greece[edit]
Main article: Battle of Greece
A week after the Italian surrender at Beda Fomm, the Defence Committee in London
ordered Cyrenaica held with the minimum of forces and all spare troops sent to Greece.
In the Western Desert Force (now XIII Corps), the 6th Australian Division was fully
equipped and had few losses to replace. The 7th Armoured Division had been operating
for eight months, had worn out its mechanical equipment and had withdrawn to refit.
Two regiments of the 2nd Armoured Division with the WDF were also worn out, which
left the division with only four tank regiments. The 6th Australian Division went to
Greece in March with an armoured brigade group of the 2nd Armoured Division; the
remainder of the division and the new 9th Australian Division, minus two brigades and
most of its transport, was sent to Greece and was replaced by two under-equipped
brigades of the 7th Australian Division. The division took over in Cyrenaica, on the
assumption that the Italians could not begin a counter-offensive until May, even with
German reinforcements.[39][a]
Unternehmen Sonnenblume[edit]
Main article: Operation Sonnenblume
In early 1941, after the big British and Commonwealth victory in Cyrenaica, the military
position was soon reversed. The best-equipped units in XIII Corps went to Greece as
part of Operation Lustre in the Battle of Greece. Adolf Hitler responded to the Italian
disaster with Directive 22 (11 January) ordering Unternehmen Sonnenblume (Operation
Sunflower), the deployment of a new Afrika Korps (DAK) to Libya, as
a Sperrverband (barrier detachment). The DAK had fresh troops with better tanks,
equipment and air support and was led by General Erwin Rommel, who had enjoyed
great success in the Battle of France.[41] The Axis force raided and quickly defeated the
British at El Agheila on 24 March and at Mersa el Brega on 31 March, exploited the
success and by 15 April, had pushed the British back to the border at Sollum and
besieged Tobruk. The new commander of XIII Corps (now HQ Cyrenaica Command)
Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, O'Connor and Major-General Michael Gambier-
Parry, commander of the 2nd Armoured Division were captured. The Western Desert
Force HQ took over under Lieutenant-General Noel Beresford-Peirse, who had been
recalled from East Africa. Apart from an armoured brigade group of the 2nd Armoured
Division, which had been withdrawn for the Greek campaign, the rest of the division had
been destroyed. Several Axis attempts to seize Tobruk failed and the front line settled
on the Egyptian border.[42]
Siege of Tobruk[edit]
Main article: Siege of Tobruk
Men of 2/48th Australian Battalion man a defensive position near Tobruk, 24 April 1941.
Tobruk was defended by a force of some 25,000 Eighth Army troops, well stocked with
supplies and linked to Egypt by the Royal Navy. The garrison had armoured cars and
captured Italian tanks, which could raid Axis supply convoys as they passed through
Tobruk for the frontier, thus preventing the Axis from invading Egypt. [43] Rommel
attempted to take the port but the 9th Australian Division under General Leslie
Morshead, resolutely defended the port. The Italians were slow to provide blueprints for
the port's fortifications and several attacks were repulsed. After three weeks Rommel
suspended the attacks and resumed the siege.[44] Italian infantry divisions took up
positions around the fortress while the bulk of the Afrika Korps maintained a mobile
position south and east of the port. [45]
Operation Brevity[edit]
Main article: Operation Brevity
Operation Brevity (15–16 May) was a limited offensive, to inflict attrition on Axis forces
and secure positions for a general offensive towards Tobruk. The British attacked with a
small tank-infantry force in three columns, Desert, Centre and Coast. Desert Column,
with British cruiser tanks, was to advance inland and destroy tanks found en route
to Sidi Aziz. Centre Column was to capture the top of the Halfaya Pass, Bir Wair and
Musaid, then press on to Fort Capuzzo. Coast Column was to take Sollum and the foot
of Halfaya Pass. Sollum, Halfaya Pass and Fort Capuzzo were captured but then the
fort was lost to a counter-attack. A German counter-attack on 16 May threatened the
force at the top of the pass and a retreat was ordered, covered by Desert Column. The
Germans took Musaid back and a general British retreat began, to a line from Sidi Omar
to Sidi Suleiman and Sollum, which left only the Halfaya Pass in British hands. [46] Brevity
failed to achieve most of its objectives and only briefly held the Halfaya Pass. The
British lost 206 casualties. Five tanks were destroyed and 13 damaged. German
casualties were 258 men, three tanks destroyed and several damaged. Italian
casualties were 395, of whom 347 were captured. [47] On 12 May, the Tiger convoy lost
one ship and arrived in Alexandria, with 238 tanks, to re-equip the 7th Armoured
Division and 43 aircraft. On 28 May, planning began for Operation Battleaxe. [48]
Unternehmen Skorpion[edit]
Main article: Operation Skorpion
During the evening of 26 May, Kampfgruppe von
Herff under Oberst [Colonel] Maximilian von Herff comprising three panzer battalions,
assembled on the coast at the foot of Halfaya Pass and attacked the next morning,
intending to bluff the British into retreat.[49] The pass was defended by the
3rd Coldstream Guards of Lieutenant-Colonel Moubray and supporting units but the
bluff became a genuine attack and secured a commanding position, leaving the British
in danger of being surrounded. Brigadier William Gott authorised a withdrawal and
Moubray extricated the battalion. There were no reinforcements nearby and Gott
ordered a withdrawal from the pass, which Axis forces re-occupied. [50] The Italo-German
positions on the border were fortified with barbed wire and minefields and covered by 50
mm and 88 mm anti-tank guns. Behind the new defences the Axis began to accumulate
supplies and receive the 15th Panzer Division, which began to arrive on 20 May.[51]
Operation Battleaxe[edit]
Main article: Operation Battleaxe
Operation Battleaxe, 15–17 June 1941, was intended to lift the Siege of Tobruk and re-
capture eastern Cyrenaica. The attack was to be conducted by the 7th Armoured
Division and a composite infantry force based on the 4th Indian Division headquarters,
with two brigades. The infantry were to attack in the area of Bardia, Sollum, Halfaya and
Capuzzo, with the tanks guarding the southern flank. For the first time in the war, a
large German force fought on the defensive. The Halfaya Pass attack failed, Point 206
was captured and only one of three attacks on Hafid Ridge had any success. At the end
of 15 June, 48 British tanks remained operational. On 16 June, a German counter-
attack forced back the British on the western flank but was repulsed in the centre.
However, the British were reduced to 21 operational Cruiser tanks and
seventeen infantry tanks.[52]
On 17 June, the British only just evaded encirclement by two Panzer regiments and
ended the operation. Despite British overextension, the Germans failed to turn a
defensive success into an annihilating victory. Intelligence had provided details of British
moves but the RAF had seen German counter-moves and slowed them enough to help
the ground forces escape.[53] The British had 969 casualties, 27 cruiser and 64 I tanks
were knocked out or broken down and not recovered. The RAF lost 36 aircraft. German
losses were 678 men and Italian losses are unknown, with in addition twelve tanks and
ten aircraft lost. The British failure led to the sacking of Wavell, the XIII Corps
commander, Lieutenant-General Noel Beresford-Peirse and Creagh, the 7th Armoured
Division commander. General Claude Auchinleck took over as Commander-in-Chief of
the Middle East Command. In September, the Western Desert Force was renamed
the Eighth Army.[54]
Operation Crusader[edit]
Main article: Operation Crusader