Failure of Cooling Water Circulating

Pump and Remedial Actions

An incident occurred relating to the failure of a cooling water circulating pump f or one of the two
ammonia plants with the capacity of1,350 MT/d in KRIBHCO. Since March 1986, its startup in the
plant had consistently performed well at the capacity of over 110% until the incident of February
1992.

P.P. Singh and D.K. Paul

Krishak Bharati Cooperative Ltd., P.O. Kribhco Nagar, Pin-394 515 Dist: Surat, India

Description of Pumps February 20 to March 13, 1992. On March 13, the

pump was started back and put into service. No abnor-
mality was observed until the 18th when an abnormal

T
here are eight cooling water recirculating
pumps for KRIBHCO's ammonia plants, out of
which six turbine-driven ones have been in
continuous service since 1986 without any problem.
The design specification of the pumps are provided in
Table 1.
Failure of Pump and Gearbox
One of the turbine-driven pumps (No. 2101-JB-2)
intended for circulating cooling water to the
Ammonia plant II broke down on March 20, 1992.
The pump was in continuous operation until February
20, 1992 when it was stopped for overhauling of the
turbine by vendor specialist, M/S. Triveni
Engineering, under a preventive maintenance program
which included inspection of the turbine rotor, gear
box, bearings, main and auxiliary oil pumps, and trip
devices.
The overhauling of turbine was carried out from
noise started coming from the gearbox, and the pump
rotor bearing temperature was quite high at 77°C as
opposed to the normal temperature of 55°C. The plant
operator promptly reported the matter to Mechanical
Maintenance, which advised continued running of the
pump following a checkup of the pump while running.
Two days later, the pump was stopped at 9:15 a.m. to
attend to the tachometer which was not showing cor-
rect rpm. The pump was restarted the same day at 4:30
p.m. and was put on full load at 5:10 p.m. at 5,700
rpm under the abnormal sound condition which was
not considered serious. At 6:00 p.m., however, a low
cooling water pressure alarm appeared in the
Ammonia Plant-II Control Room which promptly
informed the cooling tower area field operator. Almost
simultaneously, a low C.W. pressure alarm appeared in
the cooling water tower field panel. The operator and
shift engineer who immediately rushed to the pump
found that the gearbox and the pump bearing housings

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 101 1996

 Table 1. Design Specification of Pumps

Pump Manufacturer: Mather & Platt, India

Discharge Capacity (Turbine Driven): 5,849 M3/h

Discharge Capacity(Motor Driven): 7,507 M3/h

Discharge Head: 35 MWC

Efficiency: 90%

Pump Speed: 620 rpm

Pump Suction: Flooded Figure 1. Cooling water flowchart: March 20,1992.

Cooling water flow to ammonia plant not affected.
NPSH required: 6.3 MWC

KW Absorbed: 620

Turbine Rating, KW: 1,200

Liquid: Water 7 min by applying DCP extinguisher. The standby

C.W. pump was promptly lined up. The ammonia
Temperature: 45°C plant was not affected and continued to run normally.

Specific Gravity: 1.0 Details of Damage

Manufacturer of the Drive Turbine: M/S. Triveni Eng. The pump and gearbox were dismantled on March
Works, India 22 and several parts were found damaged.

Cooling water pump

The pump shaft sheared off from the edge of cou-

were on fire. It was also observed that the tachometer
indicated a very high speed of 7,400 rpm, well beyond
the trip speed of 6,600 rpm. This indicated that the tur-
bine overspeed trip device was not functioning proper-
ly. The pump was manually tripped and a stand- by
pump was placed on-line within 5 min (Figure 1). The
auxiliary oil system of the damaged pump which was
on fire was stopped, and the fire was extinguished.
However, flames peeped out intermittently from the
bearing housings for some time after stoppage of the
pump. The fire was completely extinguished within 5-
pling side bearing housing (Figure 2); the inboard
bearing housing was badly damaged (Figures 3a and
3b).
Gearbox
The gear and pinion teeth were severely rubbed and
thinned down (Figure 4); the gearbox top cover, bot-
tom half, and bearing shells were badly damaged
(Figures 5 a and 5b); the membranes of coupling

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 102 1996

 Figure 2. Pump shaft broken at drive endbearing.
between the gearbox and the pump were also damaged Sheared shaft
(Figure 6).
Two cut portions of the subject shaft containing each
Steam turbine of the fractured surface were analyzed metallurgically
to find the cause of failure. The following examina-
The main oil pump and bearings of exhaust and front tions were carried out.
ends were damaged. No damage, however, occurred to Visual Observation. Several features were observed
the high-speed coupling between the gearbox and tur- from the samples: (a) rubbing marks, more prominent
bine, and no damage occurred to the turbine internals. on one piece than the other; (b) the plastic nature of
The governor (Model PG-PL) drive worm wheel was the pieces where rubbing marks were seen; (c) irregu-
badly damaged. lar tear off fracture portions, more prominently visible
in one piece than the other (Figure 7); (d) high-tem-
Analysis of the Failure perature oxidation characteristics; (e) diameter of the
sheared-off pieces (125 to 140 mm) larger than the
The sheared pump shaft and overspeed trip device specified value of 120 mm.
were examined in detail. Chemical/Metallurgical Analysis. The material of
shaft was AISI4340 alloy steel. Spot spectrochemical
analysis was carried out on both the machined surface
and the fractured surface. The results are given and

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 103 1996

 Figure 3a. Inboard bearing housing damaged.

Figure 3b. Inboard bearing housing damaged.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 104 1996

 y , ,, y ; ". " 't ». ' 7'<* " ^^ 'sfÇ*/***

Figure 4. Gear wheel rubbed and thinned down.

melting and evaporation of important alloying ele-
Table 2. Chemical Analysis (Wt.%) ments. The nature of the rubbing marks on the fracture
surface visible is an indication of the flow of
plastic/semimolten/molten material. This flow only
Element Specification Machined Fracture has been responsible for the larger diameter of the
Surface Surface pieces. It is inferred from these observations that there
had been intense heat near the fracture surface.
Carbon 0.38 to 0.43 0.43 0.53 Micro examination and Hardness Measurement.
Silicon 0.20 to 0.35 0.25 0.29 From the microstructure of fractured surface at a
Manganese 0.60 to 0.80 0.73 0.72 magnification of 200X, martensitic structure can be
Nickel 1.65 to 2.00 1.96 1.88 seen (Figure 8). This is indicative of quenching from a
Chromium 0.70 to 0.90 0.98 0.92 very high temperature. The microstructure of the por-
Molybdenum 0.20 to 0.30 0.23 0.22 tion at a location far away from the crack shows typi-
Sulfur 0.040 Max. 0.007 0.009 cal quenched and tempered structure. This is represen-
Phosphorus 0.040 Max. 0.021 0.030 tative of alloy steel manufactured for pump shaft.
Hardness measurements taken on the fracture sur-
face and on the backside machined surface give the
compared with the specified values in Table 2. following results: machined surface =19,20,20 HRC;
There is a noticeable reduction in nickel and chromi- fracture surface = 47,44,45 HRC.
um and an increase in carbon and silicon on the frac- The above observations lead to the following infer-
ture surfaces in comparison to the machined back sur- ences: (a) the shaft has been metallurgically sound; (b)
face. This indicates that there has been some localized the shaft has had abnormally high temperature particu-

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 105 1996

 Figure Sa. Gearbox top cover badly damaged.

Figure 5b. Completely womoiit portion of pinion teeth gearbox bearing and other parts.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 106 1996

 Figure 6. Damaged coupling membrane between gearbox and pump.

Figure 7. Closer look at one of the fracture surfaces.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 107 1996


Figure 8. Structure of the ligament B close to the
fracture surface (200X).
larly at the place where fracture has taken place; (c)
crack initiation and final fracture have occurred at a
place where a very high hardness phase has formed.
Overspeed Trip Device
During the reassembly of gearbox and turbine, the
overspeed trip device was found defective. The worn-
out drive wheel on the Woodward governor was also
replaced. The governor was tested before assembly.
The test run for turbine was done independently for
the overspeed trip.
Sequence of Events Leading To Failure
From the investigation results, it is seen that the
pump shaft was of proper design and there was no
material abnormality. The failure most likely occurred
due to malfunction of the overspeed trip device and
governor of the turbine. After overhauling of the tur-
bine, the pump was restarted on March 13, 1992 but
five days later abnormal sound was noticed from the
gearbox. Also, the tachometer was not indicating prop-
er speed.
It may be inferred that abnormal sound from the
gearbox was due to running of the unit at a higher
speed than normal. It is likely that due to operation at
higher speed for about two days during which time
the turbine was stopped for checking and recalibration
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
of the tachometer, the drive wheel of the governor was
damaged resulting in malfunction of the governor dur-
ing operation.
When the pump was stopped on March 20, 1992,
the tachometer was set right. However, the governor
and the overspeed trip device could not be taken note
of for their malfunctioning in spite of due provision
for the overspeed test under the preventive mainte-
nance schedule. Therefore, when the pump was
restarted after rectifying the tachometer the turbine
might have oversped. At higher speed, movement of
the pump rotor caused gear teeth to rub resulting in
their thinning down and generation of high heat lead-
ing to the fire. The pump shaft in the process got mis-
aligned and overheated, and finally sheared off.
From the chemical and metallurgical tests carried
out on the broken shaft, it is inferred that there was no
material/metallurgical defect in the shaft responsible
for the fracture. Hence, it is concluded that the shaft
fracture is an aftereffect of mechanical failure.
Remedial Measures
The following measures have been incorporated to
further improve the built-in safety of the pump:
(1) A single channel vibration monitor with an alarm
strip and a velocity sensor, made by IRD mechanaly-
sis, was installed to measure and monitor the vibration
of the turbine.
(2) A thrust wear trip supplied by Triveni
Engineering Works was installed in a turbine consist-
ing of a nozzle, a nozzleblock, a thrust wear trip relay,
a pressure gauge, and a pressure switch. This system
trips the turbine at a high thrust. The thrust is sensed in
terms of oil backpressure as shown in Figures 9a and
9b. The pressure switch is used as an alarm of back-
pressure of oil before tripping the turbine, i.e., the
alarm is set at 2.0 kg/cm* and trip relay actuators are
set at 2.6 kg/cm* of oil backpressure.
(3) The constant level oiler tube was increased from
1/4 in. (6.35 mm) to 3/8 in. (9.53 mm) size to avoid
chances of clogging.
(4) The level of vigilance by field operator has been
further improved.
(5) After every major overhauling of the turbine, it
has become mandatory to run an overspeed trip test
108 1996
 ranunoH PCT-UP
BOUCHON GEAR

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REF. DESCRIPTION
TUBBIHE COVH. EH1> BRG.
ÏUBBDIB EXHAUST EHP HBO.
PINION SHAFT* BBCk VJS3SSX END.
ronoN SHAFT BBC. ALTESHATOK BID.
GEAE WHKB. SHUT BHQ. TUHBWB BID.
O&IH 1BQBEL SHAfT BRQ. AI3KBN£lYffi £ND.
ILiraOUIDR BBC. DBIVXH BID.
U.TXBMUOR BBS. IK» DSOVHC DB).

VffiRATION MONTTER

0-28 MM/SÏC BUS (AUTO RISST)

OR mm srnnre: IE.O nu/a» BUS
mp sKnma-. IB.O mi/aac aio
BT PANEL PUSH BUTTON)
is ew or TBK SHUTDOWN
SKTTDIG)

Figure 9a. Vibration alarm and trip system.

DISC

HIGH PRESSURE OIL

TO REUT CÏTJNDER

(To b« Sent after

Tripping by Pulling
Out tin Pin)

Figure 9b. Thrust wear trip (oil circuit) (axial displacement).

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 109 1996

before going into operation.
(6) Before the assembly of the governor, testing and
calibration of the governor in a specially available
Woodword governor test stand has been carried out.
Conclusion
Generally, the cooling tower equipment does not get
the same attention as the main plant equipment. Major
damage to a cooling water circulating pump occurred
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
in spite of the fact that KRD3HCO has a very strong
NDT-based, predictive, preventive maintenance sys-
tem. The pump failed, because the maintenance
requirement of the governor and overspeed trip device
was overlooked when the turbine was overhauled after
six years of operation. The turbine was coupled with
the pump without the overspeed test and governor
overhaul, which is a normal practice. If the overspeed
trip device had been overhauled and the turbine over-
speed trip tested, the incident could have been
avoided.
110 1996