PP5198 Term Essay

Vybhav Dhar

Comparative Analysis of Village-level democratic elections in India & China – effects

thereof on political empowerment of the local people

China and India aren‟t just neighbours with ancient civilizations with wide cultural

spheres of influence spread across east and south Asia, with relatively recently established

modern nation states, but they are continuously competing and concomitantly cooperating

socio-economic realms in an increasing flux of reorganizing global world order. While both

countries chose a different socio-economic model for their national development - China

chose an authoritarian communist model, albeit suitably adapted to Chinese sociocultural

matrix, and India – a democratic model; nonetheless, both systems had historically some sort

of local self-government in villages, which had been autonomous to varying degrees across

the historical time line. Notwithstanding the people‟s democratic dictatorship as envisaged in

the PRC constitution, the Chinese authorities, since 1979 have had gradually introduced and

managed the system of local elections, especially at the village level, where „direct elections

with Chinese characteristics‟ for village leaders have been conducted every three years since

1988. The aim of this essay is to attempt a comparative study of village-level democratic

elections in the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) and India in terms of legal framework,

practice and analysis, and the effect of the same on political empowerment of the local

people.

Legal framework of village elections in the PRC

2. Article 1 of the PRC constitution defines that “People's Republic of China is a

socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based

on the alliance of workers and peasants”. Notwithstanding this, the local elections have been

given a constitutional basis in the Chapter III „The Structure of the State‟, under Section 5

„The Local People's Congresses and Local People's Government at Various Levels‟ vide

article 111 [Committees on Grass Roots Level] of the PRC constitution, which reads as “The

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residents committees and villagers committees established among urban and rural residents

on the basis of their place of residence are mass organizations of self-management at the

grass-roots level. The chairman, vice-chairmen and members of each residents or villagers

committee (VC) are elected by the residents. The relationship between the residents and

villagers committees and the grass-roots organs of state power is prescribed by law. The

residents and villagers committees establish sub-committees for people‟s mediation, public

security, public health and other matters in order to manage public affairs and social services

in their areas, mediate civil disputes, help maintain public order and convey residents‟

opinions and demands and make suggestions to the people‟s government.” (PRC

Constitution, as amended on 14.10.2004)1. The „definitive‟ „Organic Law of the Villagers

Committees of PRC‟ 1998 provides specifics for ensuring self-governance by the villagers in

the countryside. Article 8 of the law states that the villagers committee shall be established

on the basis of the residence and population size, and its establishment or dissolution shall be

proposed by the township government and finally approved by the county-level government.

Article 9 describes the composition and provides that the VC shall consist of three to seven

members, including chairman, vice-chairmen and the members, and shall include an

„appropriate‟ number of women and ethnic minorities. According to the articles 12 through

14, the elections shall be „direct‟ through adult franchise by secret ballot and open vote-

counting to elect a VC valid for three years, provided that more than half of the eligible

voters cast their votes. A winner must garner more than 50 per cent polled votes. Articles 17

and 18 provide that a villagers assembly composed of all adult villagers shall be convened

with a simple majority participation of the villagers to supervise and report on VC‟s work.2

The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) is the nodal central state organ to implement and

monitor village self-governance and to monitor village elections, while the Bureaux of Civil

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Affairs in each province are responsible for actually establishing the village committees and

conducting the elections.

Legal framework of village elections in India

3. Meanwhile, article 1 of the Constitution of India defines that “India i.e. Bharat is a

union of states”, (indicating inherent federal structure of its polity) whereas the preamble to

constitution defines it as “sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic.” Part-IX of the

constitution of India, titled „The Panchayats‟, and containing 16 articles - 243 through 243

O3, inserted via 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act 1992 deals with the village-level

self-government. A village-level legislative body called „Gram Sabha‟ constituted of all adult

villagers may be empowered by law by the provincial legislatives (Art. 243A). Article 243 B

mandates constitution of panchayats at village, intermediary and district levels, with a term

of five years (Art. 243E) whose seats shall be filled by „direct elections‟ from territorial

constituencies under the supervision of provincial „state election commissions‟ (Art. 243K).

To ensure adequate representation of weaker sections, article 243 D requires one third of the

total and chairmen seats be reserved for women and seats proportional to their population for

weaker castes and tribes (scheduled castes and scheduled tribes). Article 243G gives the right

to provincial state legislatives to enable the village panchayats to function on the indicative

list of 29 items4 including agriculture, fishery, rural housing, drinking water etc. as given in

Eleventh Schedule of the constitution.

Brief History & Analysis of village-level democracy in China

4. The development of village self-government and their election process was one of the

outcomes of the rural reforms that began in 1978. The introduction of the „household

responsibility system‟ fundamentally transformed the social organization and agricultural

production in the villages. There was tremendous improvement in the rural economy as the

peasants were more willing to produce with their newfound autonomy over production. Thus,

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the production teams set up under the commune system were replaced by households that

became the new accounting unit, and peasants and their families paid various taxes and levies

directly to the state. As expected, they sought better protection of their property rights,

including the lands contracted to them. As peasants became free from the tight control of

production teams and brigades, the latter began breaking down, resulting in a complete crisis

in rural China with chaos, deterioration in social order, spike in crime rate, neglect of public

services including collection of taxes and other levies, and halt to central programmes like

education and family planning. Consequently, National People‟s Congress Standing

Committee (NPCSC) adopted a „provisional law‟ (shixingfa) on village committees in

November 1987. After a full decade‟s implementation of the law, the NPCSC enacted, in

November 1998, a revised definitive law on the village committee. The new law, consisting

of 30 articles, is more elaborate than the provisional law, which consisted of 21 articles. It

consolidates the various practices of the last decade and gives more detailed stipulations in

several important aspects (136-139, Louie, 2001)5.

5. The legislation for the organic law was „literally pushed through‟ during November

1987 by Peng Zhen, then Chairman of NPCSC and actively supported by another party elder

Bo Yibo, who deemed it necessary to reorganize peasants after the dismantlement of earlier

village commune system, and the only way to reorganize peasants in an environment of

decentralizing policy was through elections. They believed that grassroots elections would

strengthen the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership in the countryside and reduce the

risk of rural unrest. The village elections were a compromise between the controlled

commune system and very little control post its abolition. Interestingly, irrespective of the

guidelines for judging „demonstration villages‟ by the central MCA beginning September

1990, the only yardstick for measuring a village‟s performance remained its economic

performance because (i) village elections, were not designed to promote democracy in China

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at first place, and (ii) peasants were better organized under the earlier commune system

before the economic reforms but at the expense of economic growth. Further, from villagers‟

economic perspective, village election process was a secondary concern vis-à-vis their

economic well-being. Villagers had an interest in the village elections so far as they could be

means for promoting their economic growth, overseeing their economic assets, and seeking

economic opportunities, and thus economically well off villages would not care much about

them. In fact, economic management had become the VC‟s most important responsibility.

Politically speaking, the most significant issues concerning village elections is the role played

by the CCP. Undoubtedly, the CPP is the source of all political power and has the prerogative

to legitimize all political actions and organizations in China. Thus, the on ground

implementation of the organic law too squarely fell into CPP‟s domain and was carried out

under its close supervision, with no independent election organization committees at any

level. It can thus be concluded that village elections were definitely not introduced to

promote democracy by the CCP authorities and served as a form of „cooperation between the

state and peasantry‟. (Chen, 1999)6

6. KS Louie further pointed towards several limitations and deficiencies in the village

electoral process, which include (i) limited implementation of VC elections in China‟s vast

countryside, estimated as low as less than 10 % figure (The Paradox of China's Post-Mao

Reforms, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, p.140), (ii) subversion by local

level CCP cadres, who represented more than half the committee members in six of seven

counties/cities, and an even higher percentage of chairs (MCA Study, 1993), and (iii) small

size and related characteristics of the Chinese villages that hinder transplantation into urban

setting. Choice of electoral rules in Chinese villages results from the incentives that rural

party elites face in their efforts to control electoral results, viz. a large proportion of revenue

from village-owned enterprises (VOEs), a large size of electorate, the presence of strong

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social groups, and frequent upper level government interventions.7 Nevertheless, in the

backdrop of 5,000 years of Chinese authoritarianism, this baby step of holding village

election, although not intended to bring in democracy, is indeed significant.8 It can thus be

inferred that like its socialism, economic reforms and liberalization, village elections, too

come with “Chinese characteristics.”

Brief History & Analysis of village-level democracy in India

7. Although the institutional democracy in its modern form is relatively new and

introduced after independence in India, the tradition of public discourse and reasoning is

much older, dating back to Hindu traditions as early as the fifth century BCE. There are

several accounts by erstwhile British colonial administrators of the thriving indigenous

system of village governments (Maine 1876) and panchayati raj formed an integral part of

Mahatma Gandhi‟s vision of independent India. Thus, it was given a place in the constitution

as a „directive principle of state policy‟ under article 40, but remained out of implementation

under central top-down system of Jawaharlal Nehru. The modern gram sabha, pioneered by

the province of Karnataka in 1985 with clearly delineated functions and appropriate budgets,

led to further chorus for local self-government, finally culminating in 73rd Constitutional

Amendment Act 1992 that provided for three-tier local governments at village, intermediary

and district level. The southern state of Kerala, India‟s most literate state devolved 40 percent

of its development budget to gram panchayats thus empowering them (Isaac and Franke

2000). Furthermore, Gibson (2012), examining the data of 72 gram sabhas, identified high

level of women participation as the key for effectiveness of gram sabhas in Kerala. On the

other hand, based on a survey from 5180 households, from 537 villages in the four South

Indian provinces of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, Besley et al. (2005)

concluded that with the exception of Kerala, gram sabhas were often not held as scheduled.

Rao and Sanyal (2009) explored the role the gram sabhas played in empowering the

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disadvantaged groups like lower castes to more freely voice their concerns and demand

dignity because political elites risk votes in the next elections for taking action against a

citizen for something said in a gram sabha. However, limited information and media

coverage often leave citizens at a “disadvantage when negotiating with local governments”

(Bhattacharjee and Chattopadhyay 2011). Ban, Jha, and Rao‟s (2012) quantitative analysis

of the same gram sabha transcripts reveal that in villages with fragmented caste structure and

less political unity on policy matters, the topics discussed in the gram sabhas aligned with

those of relevance to median households. While, interests of the dominant landowners were

more likely to dominate the discourse in villages with less caste heterogeneity, (elite

domination).9 Palaniswamy, Parthasarathy, and Rao (2019) using text-as-data methods of

gram sabha transcripts from the southern province of Tamil Nadu concluded that despite the

relatively high rates of attendance, women were less likely to speak, set the agenda, and

receive a relevant response from state officials, while quotas for women for village

presidencies improve the likelihood that female citizens were heard.10

8. Thus, it can be seen that with the introduction of third tier of governance through a

constitutional amendment of 1992, India has exponentially increased its people‟s

representation level. Thus, today it has 3 million elected representatives at all levels of the

Panchayats, nearly 1.3 million of them women, covering about 96% of India's more than

580,000 villages that covers 99.6% of the rural population. Undoubtedly, the reservation

policy for women and weaker sections has led to a substantial increase in their participation

and inclusion of domestic household issues. The sheer scale of this deliberative democracy is

remarkable despite illiteracy and inequality as they provide a unique platform for

disenfranchised sections of society to seek accountability from elected officials. Nonetheless,

the challenges of rural illiteracy, elite domination and gender bias persist. Reliance on

provincial grants to sustain themselves financially is a challenge that needs bold political

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move at the level of provincial governments. The absence of mandatory gram sabha meetings

or infrequent meetings leads to continued elite dominance. Although India has constitutional

quota for women, however, in most situations, the husbands of the village committee

chairmen become the de facto chairmen in reserved constituencies for women. Besides, like

other elections at national or state level, the electoral malpractices of use of money and

muscle power to influence voting remains a grave threat to the electoral process. Indian

context gets further complicated due to non-uniform legal framework across various

provinces owing to federal structure, which, however, can allow various degrees of political

devolution and financial delegation depending on the political willingness and fiscal health of

the province.

Comparison of village-level voting institution in China & India

9. Having briefly discussed the village-level democratic elections in both countries

including legal framework, history of practice and analysis, now, we compare the two

processes in terms of structure and function. Historically speaking, Chinese began the process

much earlier in their 1982 constitution with article 111, and later the NPC brought out

provisional organic law in Nov 1987 and after a 10 year testing, promulgated the definitive

organic law in Nov 1998. India, on other hand had the concept of local-level self-government

enshrined as article 40 in its constitution as a directive principle of state policy, not legally

justifiable, and it enacted the detailed legal framework by way of 73rd constitutional

amendment in 1992 and inserted a whole part IX consisting of 16 articles. Likewise, while

the first VC elections in China took place, earlier, way back in 1987, India held its first

Village panchayat elections pretty late comparatively, in the tribal arrears of 8 provinces

beginning December 1996. Comparing the legal provisions, the Chinese organic law provides

for a 3 year term for VCs, while the term is longer by 2 years and thus same with other

legislative terms of 5 years in India. In terms of affirmative action by creating a certain quota

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for weaker sections, while Indian constitution mandates (vide Art. 243D) 1/3rd reservation for

women in member and chairmen seats, and population adjusted proportionate reservation for

weaker castes and tribes, further having internal 1/3rd reservation for women belonging to

these sections; whereas in the Chinese law, it‟s an indicative directive (vide Art 9, organic

law) of having „appropriate number‟ of women and ethnic minorities in the VCs. Being a

unitary polity, provinces or subordinate governments/people‟s congresses have no role to

play in the village elections in China, and it is the central Ministry of Civil Affairs and its

bureaux in various provinces that conduct and monitor the village elections, and the organic

law is enforced all across the jurisdiction uniformly. Meanwhile, India, being a federal polity,

it‟s constitutionally mandated for the provincial legislatives to legislate for their respective

jurisdictions the level of empowerment, financial devolution of budgetary funds, details of

reservation, minimum qualifications and disqualification grounds etc. and thus the fine details

of the village-election law varies in India across provinces, besides it is the provincial state

election commissions that oversee the village elections, with no role of central government or

central election commission. The source of revenues for Indian village panchayats is

provincial grant (major source), while in China its central fiscal transfers (major).

Conclusion

10. Today, both countries – China and India, have legally mandated local self-

government systems in place aligned with their respective polity – unitary authoritarianism in

China and federal democracy in respect of India. In practice too, villages in both countries

have seen increased social inclusion in decision making and local political empowerment,

again in congruence with and proportionate to their respective political systems. Yet, village

level institutions face similar kind of challenges in both countries like infrequent meeting of

the village assembly, elite capture of the executive bodies (by dominant castes in India and

party cadres in China), disproportionate gender and weaker section representation, and

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insufficient fiscal resources for financial autonomy. It would be interesting to follow the

trajectory of the local level self-governments in both jurisdictions that constitute about 36 %

of the world population because of the sheer impact it bears on collective human political

experience.

Bibliography

1. http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372989.htm
(Constitution of PRC)
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Committees of PRC)
3. https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf1/Part9.pdf (Constitution of India)
4. https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf1/S11.pdf (Eleventh Schedule)
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OF CHIN POLIT SCI 5, 63–81 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02876892
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