MODES OF DISPOSITION

G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK,
ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG
HOK, petitioners, 
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
 
FERNANDO, J.:p
What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that
their factual support for their pretension to ownership of
such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by
respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning,
they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it
mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far
from persuasive. A grant by the government through the
appropriate public officials 3 exercising the competence
duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on
the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not
otherwise passing into private ownership may not be
disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war
with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot
receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that
of the lower court makes clear that there is no legal
justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano
David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his
favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision
under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to
his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with
which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent
was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958,
covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square
meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga
Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959,
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which
OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October
21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the
filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during
all the proceedings in connection with said application, up
to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or
adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after
the registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent,
the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title
based on fraud should be raised within one year from the
date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the
certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible....
In this case the land in question is not a private property
as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources have always sustained the public
character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the
appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by
defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the
purchase of the land involved through his Miscellaneous
Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the
records of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales]
Entry No. V-9033, because everything was done in the
open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land
were published, the actual sale and award thereof to
Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public
official acts of an officer of the Government. The
application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's
application, and the said deceased occupied the land
since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit
a different conclusion is likely to be attended with
frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion
having taken place, notwithstanding its rejection by
respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard
what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the
disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It
does not therefore call for any further consideration.
Neither of the other two errors imputed to respondent
Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines
preclude a party other than the government to dispute the
validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible
character of a public land patent after one year, is
possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the
outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by
petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the
exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of
the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There
is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only
the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil.
1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R.
No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by said
officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot
claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved
are void since they are not the registered owners thereof
nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their
private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in
point as they refer to private registered lands or public
lands over which vested rights have been acquired but
notwithstanding such fact the Land Department
subsequently granted patents to public land
 5
applicants."  Petitioner ought to have known better. The
above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement
of a principle that dates back to Maninang v.
Consolacion, 6a 1908 decision. As was there categorically
stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the
government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant can not question
it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government." 7 The above citation was
repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of
Appeals. 8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of
ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of
Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v.
Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The
second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of
outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public
law between the government authority possessed by the
state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it
is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The
former comes under the heading of imperium and the
latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with
reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that
existed during the medieval era between such two
concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a
corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes
in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a case of Philippine
origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the concept
of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present
Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state
as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by
Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive
discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v.
Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees
cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias 16 in these words: "We having acquired full
sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to
the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands
which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that
after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys
audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places
which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their
present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in
what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all
the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered
for us to dispose of as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation
is vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that
character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where,
as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that
the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being
correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. 21 What
was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of
Lands  22 finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence
whatever that the property in question was ever acquired
by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition
title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title or by any other means for the acquisition
of public lands, the property must be held to be public
domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government." 24 It is indispensable then
that there be a showing of a title from the state or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most
recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having
failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion
of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and
there being no showing that the same has been acquired
by any private person from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of
the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of
error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this
portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to
the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales
application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings
in connection with said application, up to the actual
issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the 
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or
adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after
the registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent,
the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title
based on fraud should be raised within one year from the
date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the
certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves
to the view that respondent David's title is impressed with
the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an
attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling
precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of 
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated:
"The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and
under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law
are the same in that both are against the whole world,
both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both
the decree of registration issued is conclusive and
final." 30 Such a view has been followed since then. 31 The
latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this
revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said,
and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a
free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent
have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition
the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor
the right to repurchase within a period of five years." 33 It is
quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March
14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-
appellants.
[G.R. No. 58867. June 22, 1984.]

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FO
REST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT 
OF APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO,
GABRIELA VALERIANOVDA. DE LA CRUZ,
LETICIA A. VALERIANO and
MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA
ROSA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Carlos C. Serapio for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LANDS OF THE PUBLIC

DOMAIN; CLASSIFICATIONS THEREOF, A
PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE. — The
classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNCLASSIFIED LAND, NOT SUBJECT
TO DISPOSITION. — In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it
is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition
(Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended; Vide
Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 123 SCRA 441 [1983];
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]. This
should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts.
This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that
alllands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8
& 10, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution, and that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The
recommendation of the District Forester for
release of subject property from the unclassified region is
not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF
Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject
property to be within the unclassified region was not
presented in evidence will not operate against the State
considering the stipulation between the parties and under
the well-settled rule that the State can not be estopped by
the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]), if
omission there was, in fact. Since the subject property is
still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may
have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. (Adorable vs. Director of Lands, 107 Phil.
401; Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1184-1216
[1968];Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5
[1975]; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648, 656
[1979]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL
SURVEY OF MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT
AUTOMATICALLY RELEASE ALL LANDS THEREIN AS
ALIENABLE. — While it may be that the
Municipality ofObando has been cadastrally surveyed in
1961, it does not follow that all lands comprised therein
are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in
a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title
to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties.
Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the
jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the
Torrens System.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVERSION OF UNCLASSIFIED
LAND INTO A FISHPOND DOES NOT MAKE LAND
ALIENABLE. — The conversion of subject property into a
fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties
around it does not automatically render the property as
alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the
release of the property from its present classification.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General,
seek a review of the Decision and Resolution of the
then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the
former Court ofFirst Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private
respondents' favor. The land in question, identified as Lot
2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under Plan
Ap-03-000535, is situated in Obando, Bulacan, and has an
area of approximately 9.3 hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan
River and private respondents have converted it into a
fishpond. LLjur
In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976,
private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that
they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for
partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase
on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or
military reservation; and that the same is assessed for
taxation purposes in their names.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed
the application on the principal ground that the land
applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando,
Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927;
and that areas within the unclassified region are
denominated as forest landsand do not form part of the
disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the
subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed
on appeal by respondent Appellate Court, which found
that "through indubitable evidence (Applicants) and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the
subject parcel ofland under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application"
and are, therefore, entitled to registration. It further opined
that "since the subject property is entirely devoted to
fishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as
part of forest lands."
Before this instance, the principal issues posed are: (1)
whether or not Courts can reclassify the subject public
land; and (2) whether or not applicants are entitled to
judicial confirmation of title.
The parties, through their respective counsel, stipulated
that the land is within an unclassified region of Obando,
Bulacan, as shown by BF Map LC No. 637, dated March
1, 1927. 1No evidence has been submitted that the land
has been released or subsequently classified despite an
Indorsement, dated November 17, 1976, of the District
Forester, to theDirector of Forest Development, containing
the following recommendation:
"Subject area requested for release was verified
and found to be within the Unclassified
Region of Obando, Bulacan per BF LC Map No.
637, certified March 1, 1927. However, on-the-
spot inspection conducted by a
representative of this Office, it disclosed that the
same was devoid of any forest growth and
forms part of a well-developed and 100 percent
producing fishponds. Two houses of light
materials were erected within the area for the
caretakers temporary dwelling.
"In view thereof, and in fairness to the applicant
considering the investment introduced therein
this Office believes that the release is in order.
"Recommended for approval and be
disposed of in accordance with the Public Land
Law." 2
The Government's cause is meritorious.
In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release
the subject property from the unclassified category, which
is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The
classificationof public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it
is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 5
The recommendation of the District Forester for
release of subject property from the unclassified region is
not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF
Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject
property to be within the unclassified region was not
presented in evidence will not operate against the State
considering the stipulation between the parties and under
the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by
the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if
omission there was, in fact. llcd
While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been
cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that
all lands comprised therein are automatically released as
alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely
identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for
adjudication of title to any of the lands upon
claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would
be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register it under the Torrens System.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession Applicants may have had, and, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. 7
The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by
Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it,
does not automatically render the property as alienable
and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the
release of the property from its present classification. In
fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are
titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-
officials should give serious consideration to the
matter of classification of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is reversed and the
application for registration in Land Registration Case No.
N-299-V-76 of the former Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed,
without prejudice to the availment by the applicants of the
proper administrative remedy. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Plana Relova and De la Fuente, JJ ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., * J ., took no part.
||| (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867,
[June 22, 1984], 214 PHIL 606-611)
[G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000.]

SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-
MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-
LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO,
BERSAMIN MENGUITO;
FROILAN MENGUITOand
GENEROSO MENGUITO, petitioners, vs. REP
UBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Atty. Dennis E. Angeles for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners applied for registration of their imperfect title

over a parcel of land located at Usuan, Taguig, Metro
Manila comprising of 2,112 square meters. Petitioners
claimed that their predecessor-in-interest possessed the
land even before the Second World War, that they
possessed the lot in 1968 and that the land has been
declared for taxation purposes in 1943. Petitioners
presented Survey Plan No. SWO-13-000227 which
contained a notation that the survey plan is inside the
alienable and disposable land. They, however, failed to
submit any other evidence to support their claim. The
decision of the trial court was reversed on appeal. The
Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove that
the land applied for was alienable and disposable and that
petitioners or their predecessors had been in possession
of it since June 12, 1945.
It was held that for registration of imperfect titles to lands
of the public domain the applicant must prove that the land
applied for was alienable and disposable and that his
possession thereof for a minimum of thirty (30) years must
be open, continuous, exclusive and adverse. An applicant
who miserably failed to comply therewith is not entitled to
registration.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC

LAND LAW; PUBLIC LAND; REQUISITE FOR
REGISTRATION. — Unless a piece of public land is
shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified
as alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon
presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious
and open possession in the concept of owner for a period
of thirty years. Hence, as observed by the appellate court,
petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal
requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and
disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-
in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
June 12,1945.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION MUST OVERCOME PRESUMPTION
THAT LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED FORMS
PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. — For the original
registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome
such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.

3. ID; ID.; ID ID,; ID,; EFFECT OF SURVEYOR-

GEODETIC ENGINEER'S NOTATION THAT SURVEY
WAS INSIDE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND. —
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OPEN CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS, REQUIRED;
CASE AT BAR. — Even assuming arguendo that
petitioners have been able to prove that the land is
alienable, their Petition for confirmation of their imperfect
titles and registration thereof under the law will still be
denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish
possession of the lots in question — openly, continuously,
exclusively and adversely — in the concept of owner for at
least 30 years, since June 12, 1945.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF PROOF TO
SUBSTANTIATE CLAIM OF PAYMENT OF REAL
ESTATE TAXES IN CASE AT BAR NEGATES
POSSESSION. — Petitioners presented evidence that
they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974. Their
predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been
paying taxes on the land for several years before them,
and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes
in 1943. However, they did not present any documents or
any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this
claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of
law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and
cannot suffice.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF
COURT OF APPEALS, UPHELD ON APPEAL. —
Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate
courts were contrary to each other, we waded into the
records, but found no reason to modify the assailed CA
Decision. Much as we want to conform to the State's
policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of
alienable public lands to spur economic growth and
remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied
by the law's stringent safeguards against registering
imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that
petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their
compliance with the legal requirements for registration of
imperfect titles. aTEHIC

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:
Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been
classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such
land has been classified as alienable, title thereto can be
registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof
of adverse, notorious and open possession in the concept
of owner for a period of thirty years.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the September 30, 1997
Decision 1 and the June 23, 1998 Resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The
decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the appellees' application for
registration is hereby DISMISSED." 3
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City (Branch 157), 4 which was reversed by the appellate
court, granted petitioners' application for registration in this
wise:5
"WHEREFORE, the order of general default
against the whole world heretofore entered in
this case is affirmed, and judgment is hereby
rendered confirming the registerable title of the
applicants to the land described in their
application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its
technical descriptions, situated in the Barrio of
Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
and containing an aggregate area of 2,112
square meters; and individual and separate
certificates of titles to the lots comprising the
said land are hereby ordered registered in the
names of the applicants, as follows: SHCaDA
1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D
— in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal
age, widow, Filipino citizen, with residence and
postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s, Metro
Manila;
2. For Lot 6045-E — in the name of
Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene
Toledo, Filipino citizen, with residence and
postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro
Manila;
3. For Lot 6045-F — in the name of
Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single, with residence and postal address at T.
Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
4. For Lot 6045-G — in the name of
Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino
citizen, single, with residence and postal
address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
5. For Lot 6045-H — in the name of Helen
Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single, with residence and postal address at T.
Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
6. For Lot 6046-I — in the name of
Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Zenaida Carag, with residence and
postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro
Manila;
7. For Lot 6045-J — in the name of
Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Luciano Manalili, with residence and
postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro
Manila; and
8. For Lot 6045-K — in the name of
Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino
citizen, married to Luciano Manalili; and
Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Zenaida Carag, all with residence
and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros,
Metro Manila.
Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be
issued to the Commissioner of Land
Registration Authority for the issuance of the
decree of registration and the corresponding
certificates of title in favor of the applicants
pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.
 SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized
by the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial
Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for
Registration of Title was filed by the following
successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses
Cirilo Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito,
namely: SUSANA MENGUITO,
EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN
MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA,
RENATO MENGUITO,
BERSAMIN MENGUITO,
FROILAN MENGUITO and
GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said
court as LRC Case No. N-10938, the application
reads:
'APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF
TITLE
The above-named applicants hereby apply
to have the land hereinafter described
brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act as amended by
the Property Registration Decree No. 1529
and to have their title thereto registered and
confirmed,
AND DECLARE:
1. That the applicants are the owners in fee
simple of eleven (11) parcels of land
situated in the Barrio of Ususan,
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and
are bounded and described as shown on
plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A,
6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F,
6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-
K) and corresponding technical
descriptions, . . .;
 
2. That said parcels of land are assessed
for taxation for the current year at
P5,910.00 as per Tax Declaration No. B-11-
01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro
Manila;
3. That to the best of applicants' knowledge
and belief, there is no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting the said land nor any other
persons having any estate or interest
therein, legal or equitable, in possession,
remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4. That the applicants acquired the said
parcels of land by inheritance;
5. That said parcels of land are occupied by
the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open,
peaceful, continuous, and adverse
possession, in the concept of owners, of
said parcels of land for more than thirty
years;
6. That the names in full and addresses as
far known to the undersigned, of the owners
of all adjoining properties are as follows:
(a) Pilar Menguito
 Pateros-Taguig Road
 Ususan, Taguig
 Metro Manila
 
b) Andres Filemon
 Pateros-Taguig Road
 Ususan, Taguig
 Metro Manila
 
c) Beatriz Dumagat
 Pateros-Taguig Road
 Ususan, Taguig
 Metro Manila
 
d) Maura Cabanatan
 Pateros-Taguig Road
 Ususan, Taguig
  Metro Manila
 
e) Pateros-Taguig Road
 c/o The District Engineer
 Pasig, Metro Manila
7. That the applicants' full name, age,
citizenship, residence, and postal address,
are as follows:
SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA
M. MANALILI, married to Luciano
Manalili; HELEN MARTA M. LUNA,
married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.;
RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene
Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO,
married to Elvira Salvacion;
FROILAN MENGUITO, married to
Zenaida Carag; and
GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of
legal age, Filipinos, and with residence
and postal address at T. Sulit St.,
Pateros, Metro Manila.
8. That should the Land Registration Act
invoked be not applicable in the instant
case, the applicants hereby apply for the
benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth
ActNo. 141 as amended;
9. That the following documents are
attached hereto and made part hereof:
 (a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-
000227
(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan
Swo-13-000227
(c) Three (3) copies each of the
Technical Description of:
Lot 6045-A
Lot 6045-B
Lot 6045-C
Lot 6045-D
Lot 6045-E
Lot 6045-F
Lot 6045-G
Lot 6045-H
Lot 6045-I
Lot 6045-J
Lot 6045-K
(d) Three (3) copies of Engineer's
Certificate
(e) Four (4) copies of Tax
Declaration No. B-011-01351
xxx xxx xxx
(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).
"Acting on the foregoing application, the lower
court issued a 'Notice of Initial Hearing'
addressed to: the Solicitor General, the Director
of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary
of the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development, and the owners of the
adjacent properties as mentioned in the
application, informing them that the application
is scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989.
The addressees were then ordered 'to present
such claims as you may have to said lands or
any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in
support of such claims and unless you appear at
said court at the time and place aforesaid, your
default will be recorded and the title to the lands
will be adjudicated and determined in
accordance with law and the evidence before
the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be
barred from contesting said application or any
decree entered thereon' (Exhibit 'A').
"Said notice of initial hearing was published in
the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid
(Exhs. 'C', 'C-1', 'C-1-A').
"Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
filed its Opposition to the application for
registration contending: SCHTac
'1. That neither the applicant nor his
predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended
by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniments of title and tax
payment receipts of applicant, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do
not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
lands applied for or his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said
muniments of title do not appear to be
genuine and indicate the pretended
possession of applicant to be of recent
vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple
on the basis of Spanish title or grant
can no longer be availed of by the applicant
who has failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within the period
of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as
required by Presidential Decree No. 892.
From the records, it appears that the instant
application was filed on July 31, 1990.
4. That the parcel applied is part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private
 appropriation.' (Amended Record on
Appeal, pp. 5-6).
"The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the
denial of the application for registration and for
the declaration of the properties subject thereof
as part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines.
"At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on
April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr.
appeared and registered a verbal opposition to
the application. On motion of counsel for the
applicants, the court issued an Order
of General Default against the whole world,
except as against the oppositors Republic of the
Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was
directed to file his written opposition but never
did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
"On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their
'Formal Offer of Evidence,' submitting therewith
the following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan
Swo-13-000227 (Exh. 'F'); (2) technical
descriptions of Lot Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J,
inclusive (Exhs. 'F' to 'F-10', inclusive); (3)
Engineer's Certificate (Exh. 'G'); (4) Extra-
judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the
applicants dated December 12, 1985 (Exh. 'H');
(5) description of the land and the
apportionment thereof among the applicants
(Exhs. 'H-1' and 'H-2', respectively); (6) Tax
Declarations (Exhs. 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N' and 'O')
(7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. 'O', 'O-1', 'P', 'P-1', 'Q'
and 'R'); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated
May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguitoin favor
of Pedro Menguito (Exh. 'S'); and (9) Deed of
Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by
the applicants (Exh. 'T').
"On September 12, 1990, the
oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and
Opposition to applicants' formal offer of
evidence. The said manifestation reads:
'It interposes no objection to the admission
of Exhibits 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', relative to
jurisdictional requirements. It
has no objection to Exhibits 'E', 'F', 'F-1', to
'F-10' relating to the plan and the technical
description of the lots being applied for and
Exhibit 'G' which is the Engineer's
certificate.
It objects to Exhibits 'H', 'H-1' to 'H-2' the
extrajudicial settlement and partition dated
December 12, 1985 for being self serving. It
objects to Exhibits 'I', 'J', 'K', 'L', 'M' and 'N'
for being incompetent and insufficient proof
of possession of the lot in question by
applicants or their predecessors-in interest.
In fact the said tax declarations do not date
back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to
Exhibits 'O', 'P', 'Q', and 'R', the same being
incompetent and insufficient to prove
possession since June 12, 1945. It objects
 to Exhibits 'S' as being self-serving being a
mere photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan
ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989
executed by Cirilo Menguito the same
cannot be accepted in evidence, applicants
not having first laid the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence. It
objects to the first page of Exhibit 'T', being
self-serving and a mere photocopy.
Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where
the supposed acknowledgment of the
instrument appears, refers to different
parcels of land other than those being
applied for.
WHEREFORE, considering that the
applicants have failed to prove their title to
the lands applied for, it is respectfully
prayed that the application for registration
be denied and that the land applied for be
declared as part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Considering the above, oppositor
respectfully manifests that there is no need
for it to submit evidence in support of its
opposition.' (Amended Record on Appeal,
pp. 11-13).
"On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its
decision disposing as follows:
 'WHEREFORE, the order of general default
against the whole world heretofore entered
in this case is affirmed, and judgment is
hereby rendered confirming the registerable
title of the applicants . . .'
"On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic,
through the Solicitor General, moved for a
reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to
which a written opposition was interposed by the
applicants.
"On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an
order denying the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit." 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the
lower court had failed to consider the legal requirements
for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is
alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed
the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely
since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in
question had been classified as alienable or disposable
and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.
Hence, this Petition. 7
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for
our consideration:
 "Whether or not the court a quo erred in
reversing the findings of facts of the trial
court." 8
 
In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in
rejecting petitioners' application for the registration of their
respective titles.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue:
Registration of Petitioners' Titles
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, 9 as
amended, provides for the registration of imperfect titles to
lands of the public domain in this wise:
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest thereon, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) those who by themselves or through their
predecessor in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
 domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. They shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall he entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this Chapter."
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073 10 clarified paragraph
"b" of the said provision by specifically declaring that it
applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. 11
Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners
were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1) the
land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied
and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and adversely since June 12, 1945.
The records show that petitioners failed to establish these
two requisites.
Classification of the Land
To prove that the land in question formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area,
Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by
the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. . . . ." (Italics supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant
(petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.12 Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." 13 To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be shown by the applicant. 14 Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable.
Period of Possession
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able
to prove that the land is alienable, their Petition for
confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration
thereof under the law will still be denied. The reason is
that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in
question — openly, continuously, exclusively and
adversely — in the concept of owner for at least 30 years,
since June 12, 1945.
Petitioners do not claim that they are the original
possessors of the lots in question, which had allegedly
belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son
Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots allegedly
passed down to petitioners.
Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land
from as far back as 1968 only, they would tack it to that of
their predecessors, who had supposedly been in
possession thereof even before the Second World War.
There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support
such claim.
Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying
real estate taxes since 1974. 15 Their predecessors-in-
interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the
land for several years before them, and
Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in
1943. 16 However, they did not present any documents or
any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this
claim. General statements, which are mere conclusions of
law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and
cannot suffice. 17
Cirilo's six children were not presented as witnesses by
petitioners during the hearing of their application for
registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six
children, only Pilar Menguito was personally informed of
petitioners' application. Still, she was not presented as a
witness. ADCIca
There can be no question that Cirilo's children were the
best witnesses, because they could have substantiated
petitioners' claim that indeed the lots in question had been
donated to Pedro Menguito. Moreover, they may even
have in their possession documents that can adequately
support their supposed claim. Instead, petitioners
presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of
Cirilo Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners
built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilo's children nor the
documents that they might have had in their possession
were presented.
Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners' claim
that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and
occupation of the land. Because they are of recent
vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. "I" to "N"), tax receipts
(Exhs. "O", "O'1", "P", and "P-1") and the Municipal
Treasurer's certifications of tax payments (Exhs. "Q" and
"R") presented in evidence are incompetent and
insufficient to prove petitioners' and their predecessors-in-
interest's possession of the lots in question.
Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate
courts were contrary to each other, we waded into the
records, 18 but found no reason to modify the assailed CA
Decision. Much as we want to conform to the State's
policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of
alienable public lands to spur economic growth and
remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied
by the law's stringent safeguards against registering
imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that
petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their
compliance with the legal requirements for registration of
imperfect titles.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. EcDATH
Melo, Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, [December
14, 2000], 401 PHIL 274-290)
[G.R. No. L-14722. May 25, 1960.]

IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff and
appellant, vs. EULALIA PINEDA VDA.
DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants. EULALIA
PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant and
appellee.

Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.

Luis Manalang & Associates for appellee.

SYLLABUS

PUBLIC LANDS; HOMESTEAD PATENTS;

GOVERNMENT GRANT DEEMED ACQUIRED UPON
COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS; LOT
BECOMES PRIVATE PROPERTY AND CONTROL OF
DIRECTOR OF LANDS IS LOST. — Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
are complied with through actual physical possession,
openly, continuously and publicly, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926
(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No.
141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefore
being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of
Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50,
Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by legal fiction, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant
of the State, it follows that the same has ceased to be
part of the public domain and has become private
property and therefore, is beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent
and the original certificate of title covering said lot
issued by the Director of Lands in favor, of other
persons may be said to be null and void having been
issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case
pending before the same court covering the property
described therein be given due course and that
defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of
limitations. The reasons advanced are: the complaint
was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration
or issuance of patent over the property was issued
"sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout", while
the transfer certificate of title covering the same was
issued on September 16, 1953. The present action
which calls for the cancellation of said decree and title
has, therefore, been filed after the lapse of more than
four years, which cannot be done, because the title has
already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The
court sustained this motion and dismissed the
complaint. Hence the present appeal.
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of
Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon, situated in
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has been in actual
possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly,
peacefully and against the whole world and up to the
present time he is the only one who benefits from the
produce thereof; that said lot is at present the subject of
registration proceedings pending in the same court
known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad.
Record No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12,
1953, the Director of Lands, without exercising due
care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had
not complied with the requirements ofCommonwealth
Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as
a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued
in their name by the register of deeds; that said title was
procured by defendants through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged
to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands
has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent
covering said land because it is the private property of
plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff prays that said
decree and title be cancelled.
 Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June
22, 1957 (amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act
141), provides:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interests have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceeding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter."
In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it
was observed that where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical possession
openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending ActNo. 926
(carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No.
141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts - an application therefor
being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of
Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50,
Commonwealth Act No. 141). Thus, the following is
what this Court said on the matter:
"It clearly appears from the evidence that
Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
land in question openly, continuously, adversely
and publicly, personally and through his
predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for
about forty-five years. . . . When on August 15,
1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of
said land, Valentin Susi had already been in
possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is
taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had
already made said land a fish pond when he
sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly be
estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it
is beyond the reach of memory. . . . In favor of
Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the
presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
 So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor
is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47
of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin
Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of
the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right." (Italics supplied)
Such is the situation in which plaintiff claims to be in
his complaint. He alleges that he is the owner in fee
simple of the lot in question, with the improvements
thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that
he has been in actual possession thereof since 1914,
publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world,
and that up to the present time he is the only one who
benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims that
said lot is at present the subject of a registration
proceeding pending in the same court, known as
Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No.
N-12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case,
plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of
the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part
of the public domain and had become private property
and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the
original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the
Director of Lands in favor of defendants can be said to
be null and void, for having been issued through fraud,
deceit and misrepresentation.
Considering that this case was dismissed by the
trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground
that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of
limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory
that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned
on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and
entry of the decree, 1 which theory does not apply here
because the property involved is allegedly private in
nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain,
we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a
chance to prove his claim. It would have been more
proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground
that its object does not appear to be indubitable, rather
than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
 
 Parás, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador,
Concepción, Barrera, and Gutiérrez David, JJ., concur.
||| (Mesina v. Vda. de Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, [May 25,
1960], 108 PHIL 251-255)
[G.R. No. 24066. December 9, 1925.]

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC LANDS; ACQUISITION BY

OCCUPANCY. — An open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain from
time immemorial by a private individual personally and
through his predecessors confers an effective title on
said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public,
to become private, property.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — To acquire a right to a
certificate of title over a land of the public domain, under
the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No. 926, as
amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an open,
adverse, public and continuous possession from July
26,1894, is sufficient, provided the possessor makes
application therefor under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. The possessor under such circumstances
acquires by operation of law, not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the government, and the actual issuance
of a title is not necessary in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY. — As
the possessor of a public land under the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs acquires the
land by operation of law as a grant from the State, the
land ceasing to be of public domain, to become private
property, at least by presumption, it follows that it
can no longer be sold by the Director of Lands to
another person, and if he does, the sale is void, and the
said possessor may recover the land from any person
holding it against his will.

DECISION

VILLA-REAL, J p:
This action was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin
Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and
absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the
second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the
sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private
property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate
of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing
the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages,
with the costs.
 For his answer to the complaint, the Director of
Lands denied each and every allegation contained
therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in
question was a property of the Government of the
United States under the administration and control of
that of the Philippine Islands before its sale to
Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both
parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued
to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this
judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal,
assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case
between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on
the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action;
(2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the
possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the
sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon;
and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the
register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to
Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and
(3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the
Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880,
Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish
pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the
sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same
(Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for
about eight years, and the fish pond having been
destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on
September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum
of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A).
Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi
had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon,
with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the
price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been
open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September
13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said
land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon,
dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her
attempt to obtain possession of the land in question
through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director
of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914
(Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin
Susi filed an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five
years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the
opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon (Exhibit S). By virtue of said grant the
register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921,
issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.
Armed with said document, Angela Razon required
Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he
refused to do so, she brought an action for forcible entry
and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua,
Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the case being one of title to real property (Exhibits F
and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to
consider the questions raised by the appellant in his
assignments of error.
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin
Susi has been in possession of the land in question
openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally
and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that
is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect
the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to
Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in
possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914,
Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four
years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it
on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when
he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time
being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Cariilo vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U.
S., 449 1 ), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi,
there is, more over, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of
Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said
Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in
her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No.
2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land
over which he had no longer any title or control, and the
 sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in
question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-
appellee cannot maintain an action to recover
possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of
which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of
law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only
the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the
right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof
and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found
in the judgment appealed from the same is hereby
affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand,
Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not take part.
 
||| (Susi v. Razon, G.R. No. 24066, [December 9, 1925],
48 PHIL 424-429)
 A. Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title (Judicial Legalization)
B.[G.R. No. 120066. September 9, 1999.]

OCTABELA ALBA VDA. DE RAZ, SPOUSES

MANUEL and SUSANA BRAULIO, RODOLFO,
LOURDES and BEATRIZ all
surnamed ALBA, petitioners, vs. COURT OFAPPE
ALS and JOSE LACHICA, respondents.

C. Ramon N. Casanova and Florentino &

Esmaquel Law Office for petitioners.
Virgilio S. Patricio and Ariel B. Gepty for private
respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondent Jose Lachica filed an application for

title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land
applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz
from one Eulalio Raz. Petitioners filed an opposition to the
application for title contending that they have been in
peaceful, continuous and open possession, under
claim of ownership,of the substantial portion of the land
applied for titling. On the basis of the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the applicant and the
oppositors, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring
the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the
improvements thereon be brought under the
operation of the Property Registration Decree and the title
thereto be registered in the name of Jose Lachica. The
opposition filed by petitioners was dismissed for
lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an
appeal, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal. The
primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the
private respondent/applicant is entitled to the
confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4,845
square meter parcel of land he applied for. HSTCcD
The Court found the petition meritorious. The Court ruled
that both the trial and appellate courts erred in awarding
the questioned land totally to private respondent. A
circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record
revealed that with the exception of 620 square meters,
there had been no satisfactory showing of how private
respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the
subject land. Particularly, respondent did not produce the
alleged deeds of conveyance evidencing the purported
transfers made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his
favor. Instead he relied on secondary evidence to prove
the existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial
and the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary
evidence vis-a-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in this case
rest on infirm legal bases much more so in the fact of the
overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners
arrayed against it. Moreover, there were glaring variances
in the identities and technical descriptions of the land
applied for by private respondent/applicant and the land
purportedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba. Furthermore
both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on
Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering that there
was no satisfactory explanation on how the area of land
covered by said Tax Declaration geometrically ballooned
from a modest 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel
measuring 4,845 square meters. In sum, the Court had
reservation on the propriety of adjudicating to petitioners
the contested portions of the subject land, in viewof their
failure to present the technical descriptions of these areas.
Furthermore, there was no sufficient evidence showing
that petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive,
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, in the
concept of owner, considering that the
testimony of petitioner Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was
stricken off the record. The decision of the trial court was
modified.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; AN APPLICANT FOR

REGISTRATION OF LAND, IF HE RELIES ON A
DOCUMENT EVIDENCING HIS TITLE THERETO,
MUST PROVE NOT ONLY THE
GENUINENESS OF HIS TITLE BUT THE
IDENTITY OF THE LAND THEREIN REFERRED
TO; CASE AT BAR. — Other than the foregoing
transactions involving the subject land which are
borne out by the documentary evidence on record,
private respondent/applicant did not produce the
alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the
purported transfers made by Eulalio Raz and
Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly
on secondary evidence to prove the existence
thereof which was sustained by both the trial and
the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary
evidence vis-a-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in
this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so
in the face of the overwhelming documentary
evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because
— ". . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be
proven by means of witnesses, but must
necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument,
duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent, or by secondary evidence of their
contents. No other evidence, therefore, can be
received except the documentary evidence referred
to, in so far as regards such contracts, and these
are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up
in writing in the manner aforesaid." "An applicant
for registration of land, if he relies on a document
evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the
genuiness of his title but the identity of the land
therein referred to. The document in such a case is
either a basis of his claim for registration or not at
all. If, as in this case, he only claims a
portion of what is included in his title, he must
clearly prove that the property sought to be
registered is included in that title."
2.ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; PUBLIC LANDS;
CLASSIFICATION THEREOF. — Public lands are
broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable
lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public
lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not
susceptible of private appropriation include a.]
Timber lands; and b.] Mineral lands. For
purposes ofadministration and disposition, the
lands of the public domain classified as 'disposable'
or 'alienable' are further sub-classified into a.]
Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial
or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational,
charitable or other similar purposes, and d.]
Reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public purposes. From the foregoing
classifications, public agricultural land may be
defined as those alienable portions of the public
domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
Thus the term includes residential, commercial and
industrial lands for the reason that these lands are
neither timber nor mineral lands.
3.ID.; PROPERTY; TAX DECLARATION BY
ITSELF; IS NOT CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. — A
tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive
evidence ofownership. Tax declarations for a
certain number of years, although constituting
proof of claim of title to land, is not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership unless they are supported
by other effective proof. It was, thus, held in one
case that where realty taxes covering thirty-one
(31) years were paid only a few months prior to the
filing of an application, such payment does not
constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had
a bona fide claim of ownership prior to the
filing of the application. Still in another case, the
claim that the application had been in continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land
was not given credence because it was negated by
the fact that he declared the land for taxation
purposes in October 1959 when he filed his
application for registration although he could have
done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the
land. A belated declaration is, furthermore,
indicative that the applicant had no real
claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the
declaration and where there are serious
discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this
case, registration must be denied. If at all, the
foregoing facts only serves to underscore private
respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to cloak with
judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the
adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at
the expense of its rightful owners. HDTSIE
4.ID.; ID.; NO STATUTE, DECREE, ORDINANCE,
RULE, REGULATION OR POLICY SHALL BE
GIVEN RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT UNLESS
EXPLICITLY STATED SO; CASE AT BAR. — The
law in force at the time an action accrues is what
governs the proceeding consistent with the
fundamental dictum that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
proved. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given
retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.
Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction depends
on the law existing at the time an action is filed and
a law continues to be in force with regard to all
rights which accrued prior to the amendment
thereof.
5.ID.; PRESCRIPTION; PRESCRIPTIVE TITLE TO
REAL ESTATE IS NOT ACQUIRED BY MERE
POSSESSION THEREOF UNDER
CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP FOR A PERIOD OF TEN
YEARS UNLESS SUCH POSSESSION WAS
ACQUIRED WITH COLOR OF TITLE AND GOOD
FAITH; CASE AT BAR. — Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that prescription can be applied in the
manner invoked by the trial court and the
appellate court, it must be pointed out that — ". . .
[W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
'(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years,' this
provision of law must be read in conjunction with
Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that
'. . . (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things
requires possession in good faith and with just title
for the time fixed by law.' Hence, a prescriptive title
to real estate is not acquired by mere possession
thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of ten years unless such possession was
acquired con justo titulo y buena fe(with color of title
and good faith). The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the recognized
modes of acquisition of ownership or other rights
but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right."
 
6.ID.; PROPERTY; NO MAN CAN BE ALLOWED
TO FOUND A CLAIM UPON HIS OWN
WRONGDOING; CASE AT BAR. — It can not be
said that private respondent's possession wascon
justo titulo y buena fe. On the contrary, private
respondent/appellant's act of appropriating for
himself the entire area of 4,845 square meters to
the exclusion of petitioners who have been
occupying portions of the disputed land constituted
acts of deprivation of the latter's rights which is
tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled
that the — ". . . (c)oncealment and
misrepresentation in the application that no other
persons had any claim or interest in the said land,
constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud
supported by competent proof. Failure and
intentional omission of the applicants to disclose
the fact of actual physical possession by another
person constitutes an allegation ofactual fraud.
Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a
fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person." Suffice it to state in this
regard that to allow private respondent/applicant to
benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the
maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio — no man can
be allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals dated August 18,
1992 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in Land
Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K.
15104, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows: LibLex
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1.The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-
161277 and the improvements thereon situated
in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines, with an
area of 4,845 square meters is brought under
the operation of the property registration
decree (PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is
registered and confirmed in the
name ofapplicant Jose Lachica, married to
Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines;
2.A ten (10) meter road width along the
national road mentioned in the application be
segregated for future road widening program
upon payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title;
3.For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the
spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio,
Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED." 1
The factual antecedents of the case as summed by
the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals are as follows: dctai
"Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application
for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim
that the land applied for was purchased by him
and his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio
Raz. The documents attached to the
application are: technical description,
surveyor's certificate, certification by the chief
deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue
printof Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October
31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the
Official Gazette was issued on September 23,
1958. The certification of posting ofthe
notice of initial hearing was issued on October
13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in
the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an
area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the
northeast by the property of the
Municipalityof Banga (Sketch, Exh. "F").
The initial hearing was held on October 31,
1958. An order of general default was issued
but those who presented their opposition,
namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel
and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing
Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and
the Municipality of Banga represented by the
Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to
file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed
their opposition on October 31, 1958. They
opposed the registration of the southeastern
portion of the 240 square meters of the land
applied for alleging that they are the owners in
fee simple and possessors of said portion and
all the improvements thereon for not less than
70 years together with their predecessor-in-
interest deriving their title by purchase from the
original owners. They prayed for the Court to
declare them the true and absolute
owners of the disputed portionof the same in
their names. cdphil
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz
filed her opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November
29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-
fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no special
power of attorney was attached. He opposed
the registration of the northeastern
portion of the land applied for, with an
area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that
his principal is the owner by right of succession
and is in the possession of said portion with all
its improvements for more than 80 years
together with his predecessor-in-interest,
continuously, peacefully and openly under
claim of ownership. He prayed that his principal
be declared the true and absolute owner of the
disputed portion of 43.83 square meters.
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order
allowing the applicant to hire another surveyor
to segregate the non-controversial
portion of the land applied for and to notify the
oppositors and their counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the
order of general default and to admit the
attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a
motion to admit the attached amended
petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed.
The Court in its order dated March 21, 1970
admitted said opposition and set aside the
order of default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba,
represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they
are the co-owners of a portion of the land
applied for with an area of 2,262 square meters
bounded on the north by Januario Masigon,
Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia and
Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz
and on the west by the public market of Banga.
They claimed to have inherited the above-
mentioned portion from their late father,
Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same
from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they
have been in possession continuously, openly
and peacefully under claim of ownership of the
above-mentioned portion for not less 70 years.
They prayed that the disputed portion of 2,262
square meters be registered as their pro-
indiviso property.
In her amended opposition,
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the
registration of the southeastern portion of the
land applied for with an area of 331.44 square
meters. She claimed to have been in peaceful,
continuous and open possession together with
her deceased husband, Eulalio Raz, under
claim of ownership of the above-mentioned
portion for not less than 70 years, by purchase
from its owners. She likewise opposed the
registration of the western portion of the land
applied for, with an area of 676 square meters,
having purchased the same from its original
owners on (sic) her predecessor-in-interest has
been open, peaceful and continuous under
claim of ownership for a period of not less than
70 years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44
square meters be registered in her name and
that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso.,
and the other portion of 676 square meters be
registered solely in her name. cdasia
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose
Lachica filed his consolidated opposition and
reply to the motion to lift order of default stating
that there is no reason to do so under the
Rules of Court, and that the
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended
opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are
without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the
order of general default was granted and the
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
Beatriz Alba, as well as the
opposition ofOctabela Alba Vda. de Raz were
all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant
offered for admission exhibits 'A' to 'I' and the
testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971),
Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose
Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972).
The Court admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order
appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as
Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed
by the three sets of oppositors and submit an
amended approved plan together with the
technical description for each portion.
The Commissioner's report and sketch was
submitted on December 4, 1974. The applicant
filed his opposition to the Commissioner's
report on December 12, 1974. The Court in its
order of December 13, 1974 required the
Commissioner to submit an amended report
and amended sketch. llcd
The Commissioner's corrected report and
sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975
which the Court approved on February 25,
1975 there being no objection from the parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order
whereby the testimony of oppositor
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the
record for her failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the
testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was
stricken off record because the latter was
bedridden and can not possibly appear for
cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
substituted by her heirs filed a formal
offer of exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant
filed his comments thereto on August 29, 1988.
TheCourt admitted said exhibits and the
testimony of their witness on March 1, 1989.
In this application for title to land filed by
applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were
filed by the following:
1.Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia
Rebeco;
2.Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3.Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all
surnamed Alba, represented by
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and
4.Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for
oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he would
file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and
Jose Rago himself declared his conformity
(Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal
motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor
Rago has not presented evidence on his
behalf; hence, his opposition must be
disregarded. LLpr
 
As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio and
Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly
executed by Susana Braulio and
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was
identified by Felimon Raz, a witness for the
oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4).
However, said deed cannot be found in the
records. Even so, the Braulios have not
presented evidence to show that by the time
this application was filed, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, public, peaceful and continuous
possession of the land claimed, in
concept of owner, for at least 10 years
sufficient to acquire title thereto (Arts. 1117,
1118, 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines). As
such, the opposition of Manuel C. Braulio and
Susana Braulio must be dismissed." 2
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the applicant and the
oppositor Raz, the court a quo rendered judgment
in favor of the applicant as stated at the outset. In
dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors
Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba,
represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and
OctabelaAlba Vda. de Raz herself, the trial court in
sum noted that said oppositors have never offered
any explanation as to the non-payment of realty
taxes for the disputed portions ofthe subject
property from 1941 to 1958 while the
respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes under
Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said property
from 1945-1958 when the case was filed per
certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer's
Office of Banga. 3 In rendering judgment in
favor of respondent/applicant, the
trial court stressed that while it is true that tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for tax
purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Unfazed, petitioners now come to
this Court arguing that —
1.The Civil law provisions on prescription are
inapplicable.
2.The applicable law is Section
48[a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141, as
amended. LLjur
3.Private respondent has not acquired
ownership in fee simple, much less has he met
the conditions for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48[a] of Act 141, as amended, except perhaps
for a 620 square meter portion of the land
applied for because:
3.1.There is absolutely no proof of the alleged
sales made by Raz and Alba.
3.2.There is absolutely no reliable proof of the
alleged theft of the deeds of sale.
3.3.The identity of the land has not been
established.
3.4.The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic
rules governing the introduction of secondary
evidence.
3.5.The applicant/respondent's Tax
Declaration No. 14181 is a 'doctored' tax
declaration.
3.6.Applicant/respondent's tax declarations
have no probative value.
3.7.Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the
required quantum of evidence in land
registration cases.
3.8.Petitioners-oppositors have proven their
right over the subject property.
In rendering judgment in favor of private
respondent, the Court of Appeals reasoned, inter
alia, as follows:
"On the basis of the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the
applicant, the trial court did not err in
confirming that the applicant is the absolute
owner in fee simple of the property
subject of the application for registration
entitling him to register the same in his name
under the operation of PD 1529.
It is of no moment that the applicant failed to
produce the originals of those other
deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was
able to present sufficient substantial secondary
evidence, in accordance with the
requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same
Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and
the doctrines in point. cdrep
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817,
explained that when the original writing is not
available for one reason or another which is
the best or primary evidence, to prove its
contents is the testimony of some one who has
read or known about
it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA
148, laid out the foundation before secondary
evidence is introduced, that the due execution,
delivery and reason for non-production of the
original writing must first be
produced. Raylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA
1247, ruled that it is not necessary to prove the
loss of the original document beyond all
possibility of mistake. A reasonable
probability of its loss is sufficient and this may
be shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent
search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where
it is likely to be found. After proving the due
execution and delivery of the document,
together with the fact that the same has been
lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved,
among others, by the recollection of witnesses.
And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126;
and Bogardasvs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch.
(Nn.y.) 639, are of the view that that where the
lost documents are more than thirty (30) years
old and would thus prove themselves if
produced, secondary evidenceof their contents
is admissible without proof of their execution.
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the
property in 1940-1941. He presented the Deed
(Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino
Martirez. While he failed to present the other
deeds of sale covering the other portions of the
property, he has sufficiently established that
they were notarized documents and were
taken by his mother-in-law sometime in 1956.
He reported the loss to the authorities and
even filed a case of theft. He further exerted
efforts and made a diligent search of those
documents from the notary public but in vain.
He presented the clerk of the Municipal
Treasurer's Office of Banga, who testified
having seen those deeds as they were
presented to him by the applicant and which
were used as basis for the preparation and
issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the
name of the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No.
14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court,
proving that the land was declared for tax
purposes in the name of the applicant and his
wife. The applicant has been paying the realty
tax covering the property since 1945 and
beyond 1958, when the application for
registration was filed in court, per
certification of the Municipal
Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the
trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the absolute
owner in fee simple of the land described in his
application for its original registration in his
name. The land contains an area of 4,845
square meters, more or less, situated in
Banga, Aklan, and
"Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by
property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along
line 2-3, by National road; on the SW., along
line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
Government of Banga (Public Market); and on
the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public
Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on
plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from
B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46' E., 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence, S. 56 deg. 42' W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence, N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence, N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the
point of
beginning, . . . All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings
true date of the survey, January 25, 1957, and
that of the approval, October 3, 1957." cdphil
The applicant has been in public, open,
continuous and adverse possession of the
property since 1940-41 up to the present to the
exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the
property by acquisitive prescription, in
accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act
190, otherwise known as the "Code of Civil
Procedure", having been in actual and adverse
possession under claim of ownership for over
ten (10) years, and thus in whatever way his
occupancy might have commenced or
continued under a claim of title exclusive of any
other right and adverse to all other claimants,
resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by
acquisitive prescription (Vda. de
Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).
Indeed, to borrow the apt
words of the ponente in the Delima case, such
proof of ownership of, and the adverse,
continuous possession of the applicant since
1940, strongly ". . . militate against any judicial
cognizance of a matter that could have been
withheld in its ken," hence, whatever right
oppositors may have had over the property or
any portion thereof was thereby also lost
through extinctive prescription in favor of the
applicant who had been in actual, open,
adverse and continuous possession of the land
applied for in the concept of owner for over 10
years when the application for registration was
filed in court." 4
It is a fundamental and settled rule that
findings of fact by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive
on the parties and upon this Court, 5 which will not
be reviewed 6 or disturbed on appeal unless these
findings are not supported by evidence 7 or unless
strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. 8
More explicitly, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are
as a general rule deemed conclusive, may be
reviewed by this Court in the following
instances: llcd
1.]When the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory; 9
2.]When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; 10
3.]When the inference made by
the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd 11 or impossible;
4.]Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts; 12
5.]When the appellate court in making its
findings went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the
submission of both appellant and appellee; cda
 
6.]When the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised
on a misapprehension of facts; 13
7.]When the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; 14
8.]When the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting;
9.]When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; and
10.]When the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record. 15
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or
not the private respondent/applicant is entitled to
the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for
the 4,845 square meter parcel of land he applied
for.
In sum, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals adjudicated and confirmed
private respondent/applicant's title to the land on
the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private
respondent/applicant purchased the land from
Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by
Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private
respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on
the land from 1945 up to the filing of his application
in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has
been in actual, open and continuous
possession of the subject land in the
concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] the private
respondent/applicant has acquired the land by
prescription. cdphil
As stated earlier, a review of the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a
function that this Court normally
undertakes 16 unless the appellate court's findings
are palpably unsupported by the evidence on
record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 17 A thorough
review of the record convinces this Court that
thegeneral rule with regard to the
conclusiveness of the trial court's and appellate
tribunal's factual findings should not be applied
because there are material circumstances which,
when properly considered, would have altered the
result of the case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant
on record reveals that with the exception of 620
square meters, there has been no satisfactory
showing of how private respondent/applicant
acquired the remainder of the subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the
appellate court, as well as the arguments proffered
by private respondent, he acquired the land in
question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A
Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly
executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840 square
meters; b.] 300 square meters allegedly purchased
from private respondent's father-in-law Eulalio Raz,
and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent
allegedly bought in 1940 from Eufrocino Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering
840 square meters, was not questioned by
petitioners as its technical description delineated in
the Escritura De Venta Absolutadated August 13,
1941, 18 to wit:
"Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero
regado, actuado en el casco central del
municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna
mejora, de una extension superficial de
ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840
mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente
por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos
linderos por el Norte con propiedad de
Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con
Eulalio Raz y con la carretera provincial de
Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma
carretera provincial y con terreno del municipio
para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del
mercado municipal de Banga y con propiedad
de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus
mojones de cemento en todos sus cuatro
cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible de
linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta
amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja
declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la
Oficina del Tasador Provincial de Capiz, cuyo
valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos
(P20.00) . . ."
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total
area of 840 square meters as well as its
dimensions of 40 meters in front and 21 meters at
the base. How this parcel was further reduced to
620 square meters is explained by the fact that the
Municipal Government of Banga appropriated 220
square meters thereof for the Banga Public Market
Road. prcd
What, however, is seriously contested are the
alleged purchases of the other two parcels from
Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from
Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters
owing to the questionable circumstances
surrounding their acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was
originally owned by Dionisia Regado under Tax
Declaration No. 802. 19 The records further reveal
that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.]1,850 square
meters of the land to the Municipality of Banga
evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as
a deed of sale dated April 29, 1914; 20 [2.] 1,320
square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced by a
document entitled Escritura de Venta
Absoluta dated September 6, 1918, 21 and [3.]
2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba evidenced
by a deed ofconveyance dated September 6, 1918
written in Spanish. 22
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square
meters from Eulalio Raz on January 15,
1933. 23 Raz retained 480 square meters,
however, he and his wife Octabela Albaconveyed a
240 square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio
on November 5, 1956. 24 Subsequently on May 29,
1969, the heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square
meter portion of the parcel purchased by Eufrocino
to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz. 25 The
deed of conveyance was duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Aklan pursuant to Act No.
334 on June 17, 1969 26 and is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her
husband. 27
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the
subject land which are borne out by the
documentary evidence on record, private
respondent/applicant did not produce the alleged
deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported
transfers made by Eulalio Raz and
Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly
on secondary evidence to prove the existence
thereof which was sustained by both the trial and
the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary
evidence vis-à-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in
this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so
in the face of the overwhelming documentary
evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because
—
". . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be
proven by means of witnesses, but must
necessarily be evidenced by a written
instrument, duly subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent, or by secondary
evidence of their contents. No other evidence,
therefore, can be received except the
documentary evidence referred to, in so far as
regards such contracts, and these are
valueless as evidence unless they are drawn
up in writing in the manner aforesaid." 28 cdrep
"An applicant for registration of land, if he
relies on a document evidencing his title
thereto, must prove not only the
genuineness of his title but the identity of the
land therein referred to. The document in such
a case is either a basis of his claim for
registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he
only claims a portion of what is included in his
title, he must clearly prove that the property
sought to be registered is included in that
title." 29
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities
and technical descriptions of the land applied for by
private respondent/applicant and the land he
purportedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba.
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he
purchased the remainder of the subject land
measuring 3,725 square meters from
Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring that this
parcel is listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit "I" which
is denominated as an "Inventory And
Appraisal Of The Properties Of The Spouses Adela
Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica."
Item No. 5 30 of the said inventory described the
parcel of land mentioned therein as follows:
"5.Una parcela de terreno cocal secano,
amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo
el Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado
en el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda el
Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al
Este con la carretera provincial Banga-
Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al
Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una
extension aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20)
areas y (35) centiareas poco mas o menos.
(Note: Said property was purchased by the
spouses Jose Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica
from Eufrocino M. Alba in the
amount of P500.00 as evidenced by
a Escritura de Compraventa executed on
November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado
Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro
VIII, Serie 1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described
technically per Psu 161277 as —
"A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-
161277), situated in Poblacion,
Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan.
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by
property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along
line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along
line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
Government of Banga (Public Market); and on
the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public
Market). Beginning at a point marked "1" on
plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from
B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;prcd
thence S. 33 deg. 46' E. 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence S. 56 deg. 42" W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the
point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY
FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc.
Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January
25, 1957, and that of the approval, October 3,
1957." 31
 
It will be readily noted vis-à-vis the foregoing that:
a.] the land applied for is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly
purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for
is palayero whereas the land allegedly acquired
from Eufrocino Alba is cocal secano. Palay is
unhusked rice, 32 thus, the term palayero refers to
land devoted to the planting of rice; cocal, on the
other hand, means coconut tree
plantation 33 while secano denotes unwatered land
or a dry sand bank; 34 c.] the land applied for has
an area of 4,845 square meters whereas the land
supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba measures
12,035 square meters; d.] the land applied for is
bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on
the SE by Apolonia Rimate, on the SW by the
Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW by the
Banga Public Market whereas the land allegedly
obtained from Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the N
by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by
the Banga-Libacao Carretera Provincial, on the S
by Bienvenido Alba and on the W by Cirilo Rala and
Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that
a person who claims that he has better right to real
property must prove not only his ownership of the
same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof. 35
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue
reliance on Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering
that there is no satisfactory explanation of how the
area of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181
geometrically ballooned from a modest 620 square
meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,845 square
meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No.
14181 was preceded by 1954 Tax Declaration No.
13578 in the name of private respondent/applicant
and his spouse which shows that the land declared
therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620
square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was
preceded by 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the
name of Adela Raz, private respondent's wife. The
land declared for taxation purposes therein also has
an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No.
134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No.
6528 in the name of private respondent's wife,
Adela Raz. The land declared therein for taxation
purposes likewise measures 620 square
meters. LLpr
It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square
meters in 1947 to 4,845 square meters in 1956
came about on account of an affidavit dated
November 17, 1956 wherein private
respondent/applicant requested 36 the Municipal
Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax
declaration covering 4,845 square meters on the
bare claim that "the area has been decreased" to
only 620 square meters. The timing of the revision
and its proximity to the date of filing of the
application can not but engender serious doubts on
the application more so considering that prior
thereto realty tax payments covering the period
1945 to 1956 covered an area measuring 620
square meters and private respondent/applicant is
banking on said payments to claim possession and
ownership over the same period for an infinitely
larger area of 4,845 square meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive
evidence of ownership. 37 Tax declarations for a
certain number of years, although constituting
proof of claim of title to land, 38 is not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they
are supported by other effective proof. 39 It was,
thus, held in one case 40 that where realty taxes
covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a few
months prior to the filing of an application, such
payment does not constitute sufficient proof that the
applicant had a bona fide claim of ownership prior
to the filing of the application. Still in another
case, 41 the claim that the applicant had been in
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
disputed land was not given credence because it
was negated by the fact that he declared the land
for taxation purposes in October 1959 when he filed
his application for registration although he could
have done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased
the land. A belated declaration is, furthermore,
indicative that the applicant had no real
claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the
declaration 42 and where there are serious
discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this
case, registration must be denied. 43 If at all, the
foregoing facts only serves to underscore private
respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to cloak with
judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the
adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at
the expense of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is
not well-taken given the peculiar facts prevailing in
this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is
what governs the proceeding consistent with the
fundamental dictum that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
proved. 44 Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given
retrospective effect unless explicitly stated
so. 45 Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction
depends on the law existing at the time an action is
filed 46 and a law continues to be in force with
regard to all rights which accrued prior to the
amendment thereof. 47
In this case, the controlling statute when the private
respondent/applicant filed his application for
registration on April 28, 1958 is Section
48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which states that: dctai
"SECTION 48.The following-described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a)Those who prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for
any other cause, not received title therefor, if
such applicants or grantees and their heirs
have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their
applications. 49
(b)Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands ofthe public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c)Members of the national cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision
readily shows that in affirming the ruling of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52in relation to
the Civil Code's provisions on prescription on the
assumption that the subject land is private land.
Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's
postulate. The application for registration of private
respondent is for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title considering that the land is presumed
under the Regalian Doctrine to be partof the public
domain. dctai
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable
or disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-
disposable public lands. Non-disposable public
lands or those not susceptibleof private
appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.]
Mineral lands. 53 For purposes of administration
and disposition, the lands of the public domain
classified as disposable' or 'alienable' are further
sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential,
commercial, industrial or for similar productive
purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other
similar purposes; and d.] Reservations for town
sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
From the foregoing classifications, public
agricultural land may be defined as those alienable
portions of the public domain which are neither
timber nor mineral lands. Thus the term includes
residential, commercial and industrial lands for the
reason that these lands are neither timber nor
mineral lands. 55
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as
amended, permits the registration of private lands
claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple
which refer to:
1.]Lands acquired by various types of titles
from the government during the Spanish
Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown
namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
b.]Concession especial or special grant;
c.] Composicion con el estado title or
adjustment title; d.] Titulo de compra or title by
purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or
possessory information title, which could
become a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title; 56
2.]Lands that are claimed to be owned by
accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion,
formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as
provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the
Civil Code; and
 
3.]Lands which have been acquired in any
other manner provided by law. cdll
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be
registered by private respondent hardly falls under
any of the latter classifications of land referred to
by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing
facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both
courts can not be pleaded to bolster private
respondent/applicant's claim because —
". . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied
from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of title from the state . . . 57
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural
land, however, long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor. 58 The reason, to reiterate our
ruling, is because the statute of limitations with
regard to public agricultural land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant
can prove possession and occupation ofthe
same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State." 59
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that
prescription can be applied in the manner invoked
by the trial court and the appellate court, it must be
pointed out that —
". . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that '(o)wnership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten
years,' this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code.
This article states that '. . . (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for
the time fixed by law.' Hence, a prescriptive
title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership
for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y
buena fe (with color of title and good
faith). 60 The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was
the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. 61 For purposes of prescription,
there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through
one of the recognized
modes of acquisition of ownership or other real
rights but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right." 62 cdasia
It can not be said that private respondent's
possession was con justo titulo y buena fe. On the
contrary, private respondent/applicant's
act of appropriating for himself the entire
area of 4,845 square meters to the
exclusion of petitioners who have been occupying
portions of the disputed land constituted
acts of deprivation of the latter's rights which is
tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled
that the —
". . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in
the application that no other persons had any
claim or interest in the said land, constitute
specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported
by competent proof. Failure and intentional
omission of the applicants to disclose the
fact of actual physical possession by another
person constitutes an allegation ofactual
fraud. 63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit
or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is
obtained to the prejudice of a third person." 64
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private
respondent/applicant to benefit from his own wrong
would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non
oritur actio — noman can be allowed to found a
claim upon his own wrongdoing. 65
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary
acquisitive prescription can not similarly vest
ownership over the property upon private
respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the
Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that —
"ARTICLE 1137.Ownership and other real
rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of good
faith." prcd
Needless to state, private respondent/applicant's
possession of thirteen (13) years falls way below
the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article
1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast
to the secondary proof of private respondent,
adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their
ownership of the portions they claim in the subject
land. The evidence on record clearly points to the
fact that private respondent/applicant's right, if at
all, is confined to only 620 square meters or what
has been left of the 840 square meters he
purchased from Faustino Martirez after 220 square
meters thereof were appropriated by the
Municipality of Banga for the Public Market
Road. 66
The records further bear out that the original
owner of the whole area was one Dionisia Regado
who executed three (3) deeds of sale covering
certain portions of the disputed lands, namely: 1.]
the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914
covering 1,850 square meters executed in
favor of the Municipality of Banga; 67 2.] the
Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering 1,320
square meters executed in favor of Eulalio
Raz; 68 and, 3.] the Deed of Sale dated September
6, 1918 covering the balance with an area of 2,938
square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba. 69
Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square
meter portion of the land by purchase from Eulalio
Raz on January 15, 1933 as confirmed in
paragraph 2 of the Escritura De Venta
Absoluta executed by him on August 13,
1941. 70 After selling 840 square meters to
Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480 square
meters but on November 5, 1956 Eulalio Raz and
his wife Octabela Alba conveyed 240 square
meters to Susana Braulio 71 leaving a
balance of 240 square meters which remained
undisposed. cdasia
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and
Estrella Alba, children of the deceased
Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter
portion of the 2,938 square meter lot purchased by
their father from Dionisia Regado to
petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De
Raz. 72 This Deed was duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Aklan in accordance
with Act No. 3344 on June 17, 1969. 73 The land is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the
name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's husband. 74
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's
ownership of the remaining 240 square meter
portion which she and her husband Eulalio Raz
bought from Dionisia Regado 75and the 676 square
meter portion which they bought from the
heirs of Eufrocino Alba 76 is fully substantiated by
documentary proof. 77 Rodolfo Alba,
Lourdes Alba and BeatrizAlba's ownership of a
portion measuring 1,335 square meters 78 and
another portion measuring 2,262 square
meters 79 is likewise backed by documentary
evidence. Susana Braulio's ownership of a 240
square meter portion 80 which she acquired from
Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on November 11,
1956 81 is also documented, her predecessor-in-
interest having acquired the same from Dionisia
Regado on September 6, 1918. 82
The foregoing only serves to underscore the
paucity of the proof of private respondent/applicant
to support his claim of ownership over the entire
4,845 square meter area. He has not adduced
evidence to show how and when he was able to
acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters
further reduced to 620 square meters on
account of 220 square meters appropriated for the
market road, the bigger area of 3,755 square
meters from anybody let alone the ancestral owner,
Dionisia Regado.
His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax
Declaration No. 14181 which he was able to
procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in
1956 on the basis of a self-serving affidavit which
proffered the lame excuse that there was error in
the statement of the area of the land which he
claimed to be 4,845 square meters instead of 620
square meters — which was the area reflected in
earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax
Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax Declaration No.
13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528.
Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the
propriety of adjudicating to petitioners the contested
portions of the subject land, in view of their failure
to present the technical descriptions of these areas.
Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence
showing that petitioners have been in open,
adverse, exclusive, peaceful and continuous
possession thereof in the concept of owner,
considering that the
testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was
stricken off the record. cdasia
WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in Land
Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-
15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.]The 620 square meter portion on which private
respondent Jose N. Lachica's house is situated,
clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby
ORDERED segregated from the parcel of land
described in Psu-161277 situated in
the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484
square meters, to be registered and confirmed in
the name of private respondent;
2.]A ten (10) meter road width along the National
road mentioned in the application be segregated for
future road widening programs upon the
payment of just compensation to be annotated at
the back of the title.
3.]Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the
subject land is concerned, the case is hereby
REMANDED to the court of origin for the
reception of further evidence for the petitioners to
establish the other requisites for the
confirmation of title and registration in their
names of the areas they respectively claim. dctai
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
||| (Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120066, [September 9, 1999], 372 PHIL 710-742)
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review
the Decision 1 of the Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed
the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit),
the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age
and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the
MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as
Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP-060414-
014779, and contains an area of31,374 square meters.
The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent's
imperfect title over the aforesaid land. aTEACS
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the
heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later
date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995,
the court issued an order of general default against the
whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and
the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject
parcel of land was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945
under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. 4 On July 9,
1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the
heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5 Subsequently, the
heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started
occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr.
as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees,
such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in
addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60
years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the
subject land. At present, there are parcels of land
surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles
by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguitand her predecessors-
in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend
to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to
appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,
1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the
operation of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that
the title thereto registered and confirmed in the
nameof Naguit. 6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied
for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive
Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region VI. 7 However, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998. 8
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the
order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8.
On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal. 9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered
a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and
affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure
question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4,
2000. 10
The OSG assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the
appellate court gravely erred in holding that there
is no need for the government's prior release of the
subject lot from the public domain before it can be
considered alienable or disposable within the
meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in
possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for
the required period. 11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether it is
necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property.
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified
as alienable and disposable before the applicant's
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court 12 in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land
was declared alienable only on October 15,
1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required
by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since
prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the
OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, bears close examination.
It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing
laws. ASEcHI
xxx xxx xxx
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) —
that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land ofthe public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not
borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located. 13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result
if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length ofunchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,
the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding
in Republic v. Court of Appeals. 14 Therein,
the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute." 15 In that case, the subject land had
been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in
1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable
status of the land, compounded by the established fact
that therein respondents had occupied the land even
before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for
registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even
the petitioner admits that the subject property was
released and certified as within alienable and disposable
zone in 1980 by the DENR. 16
 
This case is distinguishable
from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 17 wherein
the Court noted that while the claimant had been in
possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the
lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did
not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his
application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property
was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case,
where the application was made years after the property
had been certified as alienable and disposable,
the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes 19 the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership. 20It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held
in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 21 forestland is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. 22 In the case at bar, the property in question
was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly
held by the Court of Appeals. 23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the
lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file
the application for registration derives from a bona
fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimant's open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but those titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
 least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936,
the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for
at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time
by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at
June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public
Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public
domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the
term "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) ofthe Public Land Act and Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same
type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration
Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced only after
June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. 25 There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years. 26 With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have
the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be local in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old. 27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms
its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.
There is no impediment to the application of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that Naguit had been in possession in the
concept of owner for the required period. The argument
begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion
shown earlier to be unfounded-that there could have
been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when
the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession
by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since
1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual,
and the Court generally respects the factual findings made
by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was
established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year
old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well
as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although
tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
goodindicia of the possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 28
Considering that the possession of the subject
parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to
that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced
since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed
beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any
private person and the government itself makes her right
thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057,
[January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 405-420)
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]

HEIRS OF MARIO
MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:
One main reason why the informal sector has
not become formal is that from Indonesia to
Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not
titled and registered. This is a generalized
phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many
governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to
Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these
people and have not been able to do so
effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather
proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property ownership to
each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own
forms of agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly stated
 in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from
Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after
field — in each field a different dog is going to
bark at you. Even dogs know what private
property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that
there exists a "common law" and an "informal
law" which the Latin American formal legal
system does not know how to recognize.
Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands
currently in possession of persons and entities other
than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court
confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public
Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the
ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands,
as well as the problem of informal settlement it has
spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their
own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon.
Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases
before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal
principles that have developed our public land law,
though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a
blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose
Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart
from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at
the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare property
owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban
— the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it
among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr.
did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further
manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm
the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The
Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any
evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan
during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was "verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the lands described
in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
 containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description
now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of
MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes final and
executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate
court held that under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to
the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be
factored in the computation of the period of possession.
This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on
the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with
the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners,
before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v.
Naguit, 11 which was handed down just four months
prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion
in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is
actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court
therein which had directed the registration of the
property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the
requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the
property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with
respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may
be counted in reckoning the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property
Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en
banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was
heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the
principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as theProperty Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or
is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as
agricultural in character either because of its
use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree in relation to
the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of
the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both? 13
 Based on these issues, the parties formulated their
respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate
that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the
land registration proceedings therein was void ab
initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia, 14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court
applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that
the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1)
was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains
insistent that for Section 14 (1) to apply, the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable as of
12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites
the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic, 15Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation, 17 as well as the earlier case of Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
 
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit
that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into
private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14 (2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously
 classified as agricultural land of the public domain so
long as, at the time of the application, the property had
already been "converted" into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite
extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect
to Section 14 (2) are more extensive. The OSG notes
that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to
"patrimonial property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of
"private lands". It observes that the Court has yet to
decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground
for application for registration, and that the 30-year
possession period refers to the period of possession
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, and not the
concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year
prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land
was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with
respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the
Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time,
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable
and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. 20 Alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or
other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites
and for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in
his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land
Actacknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through
"judicial legalization". 22Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the
 issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its
present wording in 1977 when the law was amended
by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were
introduced byP.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural
lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain". The OSG submits that this
amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may
be registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under
Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are
a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable
or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class
than only "agricultural lands".
 Second, the length of the requisite possession was
changed from possession for "thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier". The Court
in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated
in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title
to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June
12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of
Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14 (1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree
codified the various laws relative to the registration of
property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration of
such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
 (1) those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14 (1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-
in-interest who "have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow
been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public
Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following
described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for
 confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree].
Who may apply. — The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is
more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by
the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-
existence of the right, rather than establishing the right
itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective
25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right
of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the
afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which
provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that
both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land
Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership
of the possessor who has been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of
the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding
original registration procedure for the judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted
under Section 48 (b). Section 47 of the Public Land
Act limits the period within which one may exercise the
right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads
thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next
following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which
to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area
applied for does not exceed twelve (12)
hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in
accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act
shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall
 not be construed as prohibiting any said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any
time prior to the period fixed by the
President. 24
 
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended and Section 14 (a) of
the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted
the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and
his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must
have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following
the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable and
disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree or Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the
alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out
by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945", as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a
bonafide claim of ownership". Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly
or remotely located. 25 Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that
would result if we adopt petitioner's position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of
the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12,
1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
 [T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that
the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve
its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property. EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of
Section 14 (1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The
contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out
inNaguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision
to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to
12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to
establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long
before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than
what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing
fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite
publication of the notice of initial hearing. There
is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Court's acknowledgment that the particular line
of argument used therein concerning Section 14 (1) is
indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case
of Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again
stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. . ." That statement, in the context of Section
14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage
as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered
as obiter. The application therein was ultimately
granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted
by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of
possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby
precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not
even apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14 (1), their position being that they
had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular
ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with
respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14 (1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had
been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's
interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to
the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of
the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor
of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished
from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the
latter, the application for registration had been
filed before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the
two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned
the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a
claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a
public domain land that was declared alienable and
disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from
it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt
at registration inCeniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a
certification dated November 25, 1994, issued
by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the
lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-
I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of private respondents' application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth
noting also was the observation of the Court of
Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of
Lands and Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public
domain. Nor is there any showing that the
 lots in question are forestal
land. . . . IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that mere possession of public land for the
period required by law would entitle its occupant
to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err
in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as
the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able
to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their
application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not
show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same
eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the
registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years
and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference
is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed
nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared
alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to
contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which
the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis
with respect to Section 14 (2). The provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
 
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following
discussion concerning Section 14 (2), which we did
even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter
dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for
further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration
Decree and the amendatory P.D. No.
1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which
 governs and authorizes the application of "those
who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. [ 30 ] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years. [ 31 ] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within
the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14
(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based
their registration bid primarily on that provision, and
where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case
that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the
provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions
on prescription as the possible basis for application for
original registration under Section 14 (2). Specifically, it
is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men
are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of
the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other
hand, among the public domain lands that are not
susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands
and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands. caTESD
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil
Code concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be
acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or
through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith, 34 as well as just title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing
law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial
property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14
(2) does encompass original registration proceedings
over patrimonial property of the State, which a private
person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently
reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet
if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to
how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in
fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in
1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act by granting the right to seek original registration of
alienable public lands through possession in the
concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the
 issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the
enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June
1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could
have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep.
Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D.
1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules
on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two
kinds of prescription under the Civil Code — ordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed
"through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year
period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable
after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the
Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14 (2).
However, there is a material difference between how the
thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No.
1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period
immediately preceding the application for confirmation
of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning
of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty
(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential
basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a
requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding with respect
to the present language of Section 48 (b), which now
sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the
thirty-year possession period as basis for original
registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for
original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is
derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section
14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not
hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers
to the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law
concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in
our interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is no similar
demand on our part in the case of Section 14
(1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription". The identification what consists
of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and
421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of
public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
 public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is
not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion, which
generally includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be
subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public
domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or
not, are property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code
of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and disposability of
lands of the public domain. Would such lands so
declared alienable and disposable be converted, under
the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into
patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired
by prescription. IEcDCa
 
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states
that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property
may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the
national wealth" are public dominion property. For as
long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when * it is "intended
for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant
to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
 It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree limits
its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability
even of lands already declared alienable and disposable
to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or
occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and
its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain
as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter.
The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and
the laws in accordance with their language and intent.
The remedy is to change the law, which is the province
of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decreeand pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be
illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227,
entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is more
commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including
Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law
mandates the President to transfer such military lands to
the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold
and/or administer them. 41 The President is authorized
to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that
the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws
and regulations governing sales of government
properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the
subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to
raise funds for the conversion of the former American
bases at Clark and Subic. 44Such purpose can be tied
to either "public service" or "the development of national
wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the
lands remained property of the public dominion under
Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their status as alienable
and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under
the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such
lands become private property and cease to be property
of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial
because they are declared as such in a duly enacted
law or duly promulgated proclamation that they
are no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public
dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule
in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades
us from ruling that the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial may be
counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive
period. Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls
wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the
time that the land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent
rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2)? There
is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is
extended under the aegis of theProperty
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14 (2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the
Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between
the thirty-year period under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article
1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while
the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year
period of extraordinary prescription. Registration
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty
years of possession alone without regard to the
Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14
(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded
on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription
under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section
14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil
Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes,
neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as
the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch
is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the
Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation.
Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil
Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section
14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we
set forth today is seeing how our land registration
procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,
under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring
ownership over property.
 The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are
within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription", and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The
first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with
just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the
Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose
such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable
requisites — good faith and just title. The ascertainment
of good faith involves the application of Articles 526,
527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires
some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title
for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through
one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
 the owner or could not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino
explains: ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the
transmission of ownership, and which would
have actually transferred ownership if the
grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect
is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale
with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,
and dacion in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title
necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the
owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the
possessor before the completion of the required period
of possession". 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when
it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is
the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the
title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession
or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights. SIEHcA
 
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under
ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the
period of possession preceding the classification of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted
for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the period of
prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal
events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso
jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in
possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil
Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of
the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically
becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode
of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it
is apparent that the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of
patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the
system accommodated was the confirmation of
imperfect title brought about by the completion of a
period of possession ordained under the Public Land
Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or
since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent
on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired
through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code,
though it arguably did not preclude such
registration. 50 Still, the gap was lamentable,
considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who
 have completed the prescriptive periods ordained
therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of
the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section
14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration
in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the
 timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled
to secure registration thereof under Section
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
 ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten
(10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person's uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property
for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at
bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest
that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence — the Tax Declarations
they presented in particular — is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14
(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there
is nocompetent evidence that is no longer intended for
public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the
correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications
cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people
if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether
declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-
standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries.
This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect
between a legal system and the reality on the ground.
The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap.
Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain
lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the
grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties. 52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that
system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable
limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who
have individually or exclusively held residential lands on
which they have lived and raised their families. Many
more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the
State with their hands. They have been regarded for
generation by their families and their communities as
common law owners. There is much to be said about
the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such
virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive
law, as the law itself considered such lands as property
of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress
to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands
which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the
standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for
the conversion of public dominion property into
patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into
every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but
also to the person's family. Once that sense of security
is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for
the political branches to bring welcome closure to the
long pestering problem. caHIAS
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007
are AFFIRMED. Nopronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin,
JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting
Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents — see Opinion.
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987,
[April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 244-326)
[G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013.]

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN

(Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J p:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application
of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient evidence their
right to the registration in accordance with either Section
14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree). SIcEHC
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land
for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title. 1
To prove that the property was an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001
issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which
reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco
located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as
shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952
is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification MapNo.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982. 2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan's application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places
 under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the lands described
in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description
now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of
MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite. aDACcH
Once this Decision becomes final and
executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto(Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under Section
14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and
disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco's possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes
of computing Malabanan's period of possession.
Due to Malabanan's intervening demise during the appeal
in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA's decision of February
23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review
oncertiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under
the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and
the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the
ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the
land subject of the application for registration as alienable
and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, was a mereobiter dictum considering that the land
registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice
of initial hearing. AacCIT
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the
property had been ipso jure converted into private property
by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years. According to them, what was essential was that the
property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without
regard to whether the property sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review
on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings
in Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v.
Republic 8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they
argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or
disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under
the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the
real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title
and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year
period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan
filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998,
he had already been in possession of the land for almost
16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the State. ASTcaE
The Republic's Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
obtain a clarification with reference to the application of
the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of
the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to
ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. 11 Land is considered of public dominion if it
either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the
State, without being for public use, and is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. 12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such
character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership
if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal
concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, 14all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. 15 This means that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. 16 All lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons. 17 HCEcAa
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution, 18 lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral. 19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and
grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks. 20 Agricultural lands may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. 21 The identification of lands
according to their legal classification is done exclusively by
and through a positive act of the Executive
Department. 22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on
the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under Article
425 of the Civil Code, 23 without limitation; and (b) lands
of the public domain, or the public lands as provided
by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified
as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, 25 and the exclusive prerogative to
classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land
isno longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify
or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be
used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable. cEaACD
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides
the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of,
to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles:
 (a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11 (4), in relation to Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires
possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12,
1945, or earlier, viz.:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
 conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis
supplied) cDCEIA
Note that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify
that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or
timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or
private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The
use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and
disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48 (b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth
in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in
mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the
applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order
for his application to come under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree, 28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in
possession and occupation of the property
subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
 4. The possession and occupation must have
taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must
be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is
vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, in relation
to Section 14 (1) of theProperty Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain,
the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that
the classification required by Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land
as agricultural. HcaATE
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June
12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land
prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of
June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by
mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant's
imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. This means that the character of the property
subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title
over it. Alienable public land held by a possessor, either
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by
virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands
of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a
result of satisfying the requisite period of possession
prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason
that the property subject of the application of Malabanan
need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession. HaTDAE
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for
registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may
run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title
being confirmed under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant's
possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where
all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the
courts. 31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public
Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered
lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of
their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of
years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still
prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears
out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No.
10023) 33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and
procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject
to area limitations. 34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified
as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress
or the President, thereby converting such land into
patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable
provision concerning disposition and registration
is no longer Section 48 (b) of thePublic Land Act but
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such, prescription
can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to
the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely: EaIDAT
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to
belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general
rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain
are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of
thePublic Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable
as of the time of the application,
provided the applicant's possession
and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government
grant arises, 36 and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private
property. 37
(b) Lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared
as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth
 are removed from the sphere of public
dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of
the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the
land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a
conditionsine qua non in observance of
the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of
prescription. HaSEcA
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession — possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier — the land
cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relationship to a party.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I submitted my vote joining the
separate opinion of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., in the result: see separate opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting
opinion.

Sep

||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987,

[September 3, 2013])
[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997.]

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD

PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO, RAFFY
SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO
BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other
DOES, respondents.

Kallos Law Office for petitioners.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES;

MODES OF ACQUISITION OF LANDS DURING THE
SPANISH REGIME. — The Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th
century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our
lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish
Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be
acquired through royal concessions which were
documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Royal Grant, (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3)
Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion
Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under
the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal
Decree of January 26, 1889. Unfortunately, no proof was
presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest
derived title from an old Spanish grant.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; LACHES; FAILURE
FOR 83 YEARS TO ASSAIL INCLUSION OF CLAIMED
PROPERTIES TO FOREST RESERVATION. —
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior
to their registration in 1916- 1917, the lands were
surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they
were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously in February
1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for
Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the
area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park
purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were
indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years
prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have
undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties
in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this
point to argue that the government had no right to include
these properties in the reservation when the question
should have been raised 83 years ago.
3. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; DOES NOT OPERATE AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT FOR ACT OF ITS AGENTS. — As
regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they
obtained the titles without government opposition, the
government is now estopped from questioning the
validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals,
the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the act of its agents.
4. CIVIL LAW; LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES;
FOREST LAND, NOT REGISTRABLE. — Assuming that
the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really
issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies
only to alienable lands of the public domain.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TAX DECLARATIONS;
NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP. — There
is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not
alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the
District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show
that the subject lands were never declared as alienable
and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to
1913 up to the present. Moreover, as part of the
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form
part of the forest zone. It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert
it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified
and considered disposable and alienable. Neither do the
tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove
ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the
weight of authority is that tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
6. ID.; CIVIL ACTIONS; ANNULMENT OF TITLE; TITLE
SHOULD BE ANNULLED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO
AREA FALLING WITHIN THE FOREST RESERVATION.
— Since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters
covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT 3913
should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area.
7. ID.; ID.; INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES;
ABSENCE OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES WHERE
BAMBOOS CUT BY THE EMPLOYEES OF THE
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT WERE WITHIN
THE PERIMETER OF THE NATIONAL PARK. — Having
disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the
matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced
on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive
Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in
question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also
apparently knew that the subject lands were covered
under the reservation when they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title
inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work
Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in
1953 as a true and correct copy for the Original Plan No.
II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11,
1948 contains the following note, "in conflict with provincial
reservation." In any case, petitioners are presumed to
know the law and the failure of the government to oppose
the registration of lands in question is no justification for
the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing
improvements on the lots. Inasmuch as the bamboo
groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-
143, were within the perimeter of the national
park, nopronouncement as to damages is in order.

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15
parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as
follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the
Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park
purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in
Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay
pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine
Commission. 1
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
15th Judicial District, United States of America, ordered
the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive
OrderNo. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December
9, 1916; 2 December 28, 1916; 3 and January 17,
1917. 4 Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land
consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly
covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176
and 173 5 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and
Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April
1937. 6
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were
lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed
a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instanceof Albay on May 30, 1950. 7 The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953. 8
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park," under the control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and
Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain and,
therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law (CA141) nor registrable
under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the
property, paid real estate taxes thereon 9 and introduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a
loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura
and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed
Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First
Instance ofAlbay for Injunction with damages against
private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan,
Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other
Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who entered the land covered by TCT No.
3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat,
totally leveling no less than 4 groves worth not less than
P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed
Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and
cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15
parcels of land registered in the name of the petitioners
and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the
petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, Legazpi Branch and the
Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was
dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank
was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted
upon agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the
trial court rendered the following decision:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing
the complaint for injunction and damages, as it
is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
 In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and
effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as
well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos.
153, 10 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913,
and T-3914, all of the
Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions
based on said titles.
 
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government
any and all improvements on the lands in
question that are found therein and introduced
by the defendants;
(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and
4 of Plan II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is
hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and
176, Transfer Certificates of TitleNos. T-3911,
T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered." 12
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic
found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have
established property rights over the parcels of land in
question before the Treaty ofParis which ended the
Spanish-American War at the end of the century.
The court further stated that assuming that the
decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were really
issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the
properties because these were issued only when
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point,
we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the
Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the Commissioners
in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his
reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered
by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within
the reservation area, 13 the RTC ordered TCT 3913
covering the entire Lot 21(sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence this
petition raising the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original
certificates of title and subsequent transfer
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the
properties in question is contrary to law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced
by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the
 government is against our existing law and
jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not
the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to
the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and
the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the
petition for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended
the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century
recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino
citizens and the American government had no inherent
power to confiscate properties of private citizens and
declare them part of any kind of government reservation.
They allege that their predecessors in interest have been
in open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject
lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-
1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial
purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general Forbes was
tantamount to deprivation of private property without due
process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented
copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United
States of America which state that the predecessors in
interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in
continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands
from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by
discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the
Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether
agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence,
private ownership of land could only be acquired through
royal concessions which were documented in various
forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2)
Concession Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de
Compra or Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion
Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under
the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal
Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners'
predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish
grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the
declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record
Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917;
Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated
December 28, 1916; ExpedienteNo. 7, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916;
Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated
December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9868, dated December 9,
1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial
District of the United States of America presided by Judge
Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in
open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject
lands for 20-50 years. 14 The aforesaid
"decisions" of the Court of First Instance, however, were
not signed by the judge but were merely certified
copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the
signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open , adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior
to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed
only in December 1913, the very same year they were
acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or
10 months before the lands were surveyed for
Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the
area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park
purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were
indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years
prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have
undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties
in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this
point to argue that the government had no right to include
these properties in the reservation when the question
should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as
they obtained the titles without government opposition, the
government is now estopped from questioning the
validityof the certificates of title which were granted. As
correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals,
the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the act of its agents. 15
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance
were really issued, the lands are still not
capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were
not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by
the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry
show that the subject lands were never declared as
alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation
prior to 1913 up to the present. 16 Moreover, as part of the
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form
part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property, 17 unless such
lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. cdt
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in
evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch
as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership in land registration
cases. 18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come
to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements
introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time
the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo.
Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands
were covered under the reservation when they filed a
petition for reconstitution of the lost original
certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey
Work Order Number 21781of Plan II-9299 approved by
the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas
in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No.
II-9299 filed in the Bureau ofLands dated September 11,
1948 19 contains the following note, "in conflict with
provincial reservation." 20 In any case, petitioners are
presumed to know the law and the failureof the
government to oppose the registration of the lands in
question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good
faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square
meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation,
TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the
aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in
TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, 21 were within
the perimeter of the national park, 22 no pronouncement
as to damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be
annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area
falling within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Palomo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95608,
[January 21, 1997], 334 PHIL 357-368)
[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000.]

JAMES
R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Pedro D. Diwa Law Office and Patricio A. Ngasso for

petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed an action for

confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of several parcels of land
located at Las Piñas, Metro Manila claiming that he
himself and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject parcels of land from 1908; that
he bought the lots in 1961 from his mother, Maria Cailles,
who acquired the same from the Dalandan and Jimenez
families in 1908. The Director of Lands opposed the
application on the ground that petitioner has no title to
confirm as the said parcels of land were only classified as
alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, hence, the 30
years possession and occupation requirement has not yet
been complied with. Nonetheless, judgment was rendered
in favor of petitioner granting the application. The same
was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals and
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
this petition. TcSCEa
Under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
applicants must prove that the land is alienable public
land.
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands
not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land until released therefrom and open
to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and
until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC

LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE;
LANDS MUST BE CLASSIFIED AS DISPOSABLE OR
ALIENABLE. — Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject
parcels of land were classified as inalienable or
indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject
of confirmation of imperfect title. There can
be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains unclassified public
land until released therefrom and open to disposition.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY TO FOREST
LANDS. — The rules on the confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain. CacEIS

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-
77, 1 which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals
in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
26122. 2 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent court on September 30, 1992. 3
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six
hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located
in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime
in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr.,
acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and
Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which corresponding
Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria
Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said
parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a
Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax
Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued
to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48
of Commonwealth ActNo. 141. 4 The case was docketed
as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the
Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General,
opposed petitioner’s application on the grounds that
neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to
the application, and that the subject land is part of the
public domain. 5
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended
on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo
against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of
by this Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria
Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor
Leonardo. 6
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration
case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial
Court 7 where it was docketed as Land Registration
Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his
opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, 8 this time
alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of
petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to
the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands
applied for. llcd
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting
the application of petitioner. 9 The Solicitor General
promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29,
1992, reversed and set aside the lower court’s Order. 10 It
also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution of September 30, 1992. 11
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following
grounds —
"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in
finding that the commencement of thirty
(30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b
) shall commence only on March 27, 1972
in accordance with the classification made
by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st)
Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed
an ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and
inference that prior to the declaration by the
Bureau of Forestry in March 27, 1972, the
parcels of land sought to be registered by
Applicant was part of the forest land or
forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and
failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of the
applicant-appellant and his predecessors-
in-interest land occupied from 1908." 12
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts
his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and
through his predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the
other hand it is the respondents’ position that since the
subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972,13 petitioner did not have
any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents. LLpr
In Republic vs. Doldol, 14 the requisites to acquire title to
public land were laid down, as follows —
". . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141 provided for possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894.
This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved
on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section
48(b) now reads:
'(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
 and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter." (italicized in the original)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case,
we stated that the Public Land Act requires that
the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same must be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law
are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued."
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant
must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this
score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to
show that the parcels of land subject of his application are
alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was
conclusively shown by the government that the same were
only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27,
1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since
1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such
possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. 15
 
A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 16 where a homestead patent issued to the
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the
ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was
still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court
ruled as follows —
"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State (Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219
SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for
 registration. The applicant must show that the
land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. This petitioners failed to do.
We have stated earlier that at the time the
homestead patent was issued to petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong
to the inalienable and undisposable portion of
the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their
name by mistake or oversight is void ab
initio because at the time the homestead parent
was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-
interest of the original patent applicant, the
Director of Lands was not then authorized to
dispose of the same because the area was not
yet classified as disposable public land.
Consequently, the title issued to herein
petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab
initio." LexLib
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land
were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore,
the same could not be the subject of confirmation of
imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable. 17 In the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and open to disposition. 18 Indeed, it has been
held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain. 19
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject
Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested
rights under which his case may fall. We only find on
record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest
Development 20 from which no indication of such
exemption may be gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his
application for confirmation of imperfect title, we
see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as
to costs. prLL
SO ORDERED.
||| (Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107427,
[January 25, 2000], 380 PHIL 156-163)
[G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987.]

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and
EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO BERNABE,
JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPAROBERNABE,
and ELISA BERNABE, respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a
reversal of the
decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 dated
February 5, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 50076-R, entitled
"EMILIOBERNABE, SR., et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES," affirming the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan dated August 14, 1971 in Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097, which
dismissed petitioner Republic's petition for review of the
decrees of registration issued pursuant to the decision
rendered on December 17, 1968 adjudicating in
favor of the private Respondents herein, the lots applied
for by them, and the
Resolution of Respondent Court dated March 19, 1975
denying herein Petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public
land in a decision rendered before the last war in
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097.
On July 6, 1965, Lot 622 was segregated from the forest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry
as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 7).
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral
Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097,
under Republic Act 931, as amended by Republic Act
2061, concerning a portion of Lot No. 622 — Lot Nos. 792,
793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798 — and a portion of Lot No.
324 — Lot Nos. 791 and 799 — more particularly
identified and delineated in the segregation plans of Sgs-
3343, Sgs-3440, Sgs-3340, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342 and Sgs-
3339, approved by the Director of Lands, to perfect their
rights and register their titles to said lots, having allegedly
acquired ownership and possession of said parcels of land
by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose
possession of the same including that of the herein
Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners
thereof for more than 30 years (Record on Appeal, pp. 3-5
and 11).
On May 17, 1967, the lower court issued an Order setting
the petition for hearing and directing that
the Republic of the Philippines be notified thereof by
furnishing the Solicitor-General, the Director of Lands and
the Director of Forestry, a copy of said Order together with
Respondents' petition by registered mail (Record on
Appeal, p. 6).
On August 24, 1967, the Director of Forestry filed an
opposition to the petition praying for the denial of the
petition once the area involved is found to be within the
timberland and therefore inalienable under the
Constitution (Record on Appeal, p. 7). Upon verification,
however, the Director of Forestry found the area to be the
portion of the timberland already released by the
government from the mass of public forests and promptly
withdrew his Opposition (Record on Appeal, p. 8).
On September 1, 1967, the Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands,
filed his opposition to the petition alleging that the land is
still, in truth and in fact, public land and as such cannot be
the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act
496.
The lower court found that the petitioners have complied
with all the terms and conditions which would entitle them
to a grant. Thus, the dispositive portion of its decision
dated December 17, 1968 (Record on Appeal, p. 19),
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the segregation plans, Sgs-
3340, Sgs-3339, Sgs-3341, Sgs-3342, Sgs-
3343 and Sgs-3340 and their technical
descriptions are hereby APPROVED, and
pursuant to Sec. 11 of Act 2259,
the court hereby adjudicates in
favor of petitioners Emilio Bernabe, Sr., married;
 Emilio Bernabe, Jr., married; Luz Bernabe,
single; Amparo Bernabe, single and
Elisa Bernabe, single, all Filipinos and
residents of Balanga, Bataan, the lots herein
applied for as follows:
Luz Bernabe Sgs-791 82,771 sq. m.
3339
Elisa Bernabe Sgs-793 71.596 sq. m.
3341
Amparo Bernabe Sgs-794 43,399 sq. m.
3342 795 100,439 sq. m.
Josefina Bernabe Sgs-796 69,355 sq. m.
3343 797 75,100 sq. m.
Emilio Bernabe, Jr. Sgs-798 100,183 sq. m.
Sgs-3440 Sgs-799 64,052. sq. m.
and upon this decision having become final, the
Commissioner of Land Registration is hereby
directed to issue the corresponding
decrees of registration therefor."
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos.
N-124813-124818, all dated May 7, 1969 (Record on
Appeal, pp. 20-25).
On May 7, 1979, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
acting in its behalf and in behalf of the Director of Lands
and the Director of Forestry, through the Solicitor-General,
filed a petition for review of the decrees of registration
under Section 38, of Act No. 496, as amended, and the
corresponding decision of the lower court, on the grounds
that the entire proceeding was vitiated by lack of notice to
the Solicitor General of the subsequent hearings of the
petition for re-opening of the cadastral proceedings; that
the parcels of land subject matter of the petition to re-open
cadastral proceedings are portions of the public domain,
admittedly within the unclassified public
forest of Mariveles, Bataan, opened for disposition only on
or about July 6, 1965; that subsequently, respondents do
not have a registerable title to the land subject
matter of the proceedings; and the lower court, without
jurisdiction to decree the confirmation of registerable title
to respondents over portions of the public domain, as
respondents do not qualify under the provisions ofSection
48(b) of CA 141, as amended, and that under the
circumstances, respondents employed actual fraud in
procuring title over the parcels of land (Record on Appeal,
p. 25).
On May 29, 1979, respondents moved to dismiss the
Petition for Review on the grounds that: (1) The
trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action
or suit as there isno fraud to justify the setting aside on
review of a decree of registration. If the
Solicitor General was not notified of the subsequent
hearings, it was because he delegated his appearance to
the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan. Besides the setting aside
or review was filed out of time. (2) The petition
states no cause of action, the parcels of land involved in
the actions having been already transferred to innocent
purchasers for value long before the Solicitor-
General even filed the petition for review (Record on
Appeal, pp. 27-40).
Their motion to dismiss having been held in abeyance until
the hearing of the merits of the case which was set for
August 16, 1970, respondents filed their answer to the
Petition for Review on August 4, 1970. In their answer,
respondents reiterated their grounds in their motion to
dismiss (Record on Appeal, pp. 40-44).
On November 12, 1970, Petitioner filed an amended
Petition for Review, with the additional allegation that after
having fraudulently secured title over the parcels of land
involved, the petitioners executed simulated deeds of sale
purporting to convey various lots composing
portions of the parcels involved to third parties for fictitious
considerations in an obvious attempt to remove the
parcels of land involved from the coverage of Section
38 of Act 496, but in truth, the aforementioned third parties
are not innocent purchasers for value, being mere
dummies of the petitioners, holding the parcels of land
involved only in trust for the petitioners. On November 23,
1970, respondents filed their answer to the Amended
Petition for Review (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On August 14, 1971, the lower court issued its Order
denying petitioner's Amended Petition for Review (Record
on Appeal, p. 56).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals on September 20,
1971, the questioned Order of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I was affirmed (Rollo, p. 33).
On February 25, 1975, Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by
the Court of Appeals for lack of merit, in the
Resolution of a special Division of Five, promulgated on
March 19, 1975.
Hence this petition.
Without giving due course to the Petition, the Court,
through its First Division, resolved on May 5, 1975 to
require the respondents to comment thereon. On May 30,
1975, respondents filed their comment, alleging that the
decision of respondent Court and the questioned
resolution were not rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. Neither was the discretion exercised by
respondent Court arbitrary or despotic.
In its Resolution dated June 4, 1975, the Court resolved to
give due course to the Petition and denied the urgent
motion of respondents for leave to file a supplemental
and/or amended comment. Petitioners filed its Brief on
November 29, 1975; respondents, on March 2, 1976.
Petitioner filed its Reply Brief on March 25, 1976 and on
May 5, 1976, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMI
TTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TOTALLY
DISREGARDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT THE LOTS CLAIMED BY HEREIN
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BECAME
 AGRICULTURAL ONLY ON JULY 6, 1965
WHEN THE SAME WERE RELEASED FROM
THE FOREST ZONE AND THAT
CONSEQUENTLY THEY LACK THE
REQUISITE THIRTY (30) YEARS
POSSESSION TO ENTITLE THEM TO A
GRANT.
II. THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMI
TTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ENTIRE PROCEEDING
FOR REOPENING OF THE CADASTRAL
CASE OVER THE LOTS IN QUESTION WAS
VITIATED BY LACK OF NOTICE TO THE
SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED
TRANSFER OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THIRD
PARTIES WHEN THEIR TITLES WERE STILL
SUBJECT TO THE ONE-YEAR
PERIOD OF REVIEW CONSTITUTES FRAUD
SCHEMED BY THE TRANSFERORS AS A
MEANS OF FRUSTRATING ANY ACTION
AIMED AT NULLIFYING THEIR TITLES
THERETO.
 
The government's cause is meritorious.
I
It is evident from the facts of the case at bar that private
respondents did file a claim for Lot No. 622 of the
Mariveles Cadastre and in fact a decision was rendered
before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19 LRC
Cadastral Record No. 1097, declaring the lot in question
as public land. It must be stressed that said lot was
declared public land by virtue of acourt decision which has
become final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid
decision is res judicata. (Republic v. Estenzo, 120 SCRA
222 [1983]). It is therefore beyond question that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the cadastral
proceeding under R.A. 931 as amended by R.A. 2061 and
the decision therein rendered is null and void ab initio.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that aforesaid Lot No. 622
was released as an agricultural land for disposition under
Public Land Act only on July 6, 1965. The
lower court ordered the issuance of the corresponding
decrees of registration for the lots, pursuant to Sec.
48(b), C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, providing for the
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, which reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
 These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
As pointed out by petitioner, the question is whether or not
the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the
subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the
aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as
amended.
The answer is in the negative.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. They are
incapable ofregistration and their inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued during the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens
system of registration, nullifies the title (Li Seng Giap v.
Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931]; Director of Lands v.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]). Thus, possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
(Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v.
Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960];
Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968];
Director of Landsv. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 [1975]). A
parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral courtto register
under the Torrens System (Republic v. Court of Appeals,
89 SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210
[1983]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
689 [1984].
Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings
was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified
for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141,
the facts being that private respondents could only be
credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession
and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6,
1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio
Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No.
267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had
been segregated from the forest zone and released by the
Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition
under the Public Land Act. (Record on Appeal, p. 19).
Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence,
neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-
interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite
period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.
II
Petitioner argues that the government, being a necessary
party in the cadastral case, as reopened, its counsel, the
Solicitor-General, should have been furnished
copies of allcourt orders, notices and decisions, as in
ordinary cases, in order to bind the government. Failure to
give such notice deprives the State of its day in Court, and
renders the decision void. (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-17).
The records show that the Solicitor-General was duly
notified of the initial hearing on the petition to reopen
Cadastral Case No. 19 but thereafter,
notice of subsequent hearings as well as a copy of the
decision itself promulgated by the lower court on
December 19, 1968 was sent instead to the Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan, admittedly the duly authorized
representative of the Solicitor-General in the cadastral
proceeding as shown in a telegram dated January 19,
1968. (Record on Appeal, p. 47).
In the case of Republic v. Director of Lands (71 SCRA 426
[1976], the Supreme Court, applying the time-honored
principle of agency ruled that the service of the questioned
decision on the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be
service on the Solicitor-General, and added that technical
transgressions relative to the filing and service may be
brushed aside when the adverse party (this time the
Director of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the
Solicitor-General) is aware of the matter which his
adversary would want thecourt to act upon. Once it
appears that the party is already informed by one means
or another of what he is to be notified, the required service
becomes an empty gesture and strict observance thereof
is considered waived. (Citing Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, 28
SCRA 890 [1969]).
In the case at bar, it does not appear that the
Solicitor General was so apprised of the decision of the
lower court in question as there is no proof that the
Provincial Fiscal ofBataan ever sent the Solicitor-
General a copy thereof. Furthermore, after the 3rd
Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a notice of appeal from the
decision of the trial court, the Provincial Fiscal on March
21, 1969 manifested that he was withdrawing the appeal
upon the intervention of the District Forester.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 44).
It will be observed however that later decisions of the
Supreme Court tend to be more strict in the
matter of giving notice to the Solicitor General. In a more
recent case, Republicv. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 161
[1985], it was established that the Solicitor-General is the
only legal counsel of the government in land registration
cases and as such, he alone may withdraw the
Government's appeal with binding effect on the latter. He
is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders,
notices and decisions and as held the reglementary thirty-
day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time
the Solicitor-General's Office is apprised of the 1970
order of denial and not from the time the special counsel
or the fiscal was served with that order. Thus,
representatives of the Solicitor General in the case at bar,
had no power to decide whether or not an appeal should
be made. They should have referred the matter to the
Solicitor-General and without copies of court orders,
notices and decisions, having been provided by either the
trial courtor the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan to the Solicitor-
General, the assailed decision has no binding effect on the
government.
III
The petition for review of Decrees Nos. N-124813 to N-
124818 under Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 as amended was
filed by the Solicitor General on May 7, 1970 in
representation of theRepublic of the Philippines, in the
same Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097, exactly a year after the issuance of aforesaid
decrees of registration, on the ground of actual fraud.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 43-44).
The basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree, are: (1) that the petitioner has real or
dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived thereof
throughfraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree and (4) that the property
has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
(Libudan v. Gil, 45 SCRA 27 [1972]; Rubico, et al. v.
Orellana, 30 SCRA 513 [1969]). It has been held however
that the action to annul a judgment, upon the
ground of fraud would be unavailing unless the fraud be
extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based
have not been controverted or resolved in the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
(Libudan v. Gil, supra). Review of the decree demands a
showing of actual (not constructive) fraud, i.e. actual
malice. (Rublico v. Orellana, supra).
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that private
respondents employed actual fraud in procuring titles over
parcels of land of the public domain as it is a
matter of record that the land in question was opened for
disposition and alienation only on July 6, 1965. The matter
was threshed out in the lower court and the decision of the
latter was affirmed by theCourt of Appeals. Actual malice
is therefore absent.
However, it has been held that, if a decree issued in
pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be
annulled within one (1) year from entry of said decree,
there is more reason to hold that the same is true if
entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a
fatal infirmity, such as want of due process, (Vda. de
Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sangbengoo, 110 Phil. 118 [1960] or
lack of jurisdiction of the court that decided the cadastral
case. (Republic v. De Kalintas, 25 SCRA 720 [1969]).
Thus, on both counts, the case at bar can properly be the
subject of review, it having been shown that the Solicitor-
General was not properly furnished the requisite notices
and copy of the assailed decision but more importantly,
the lower court as previously stated had no jurisdiction to
re-open the cadastral proceeding under Republic Act 931
as amended by R.A. No. 2061.
 
IV
As to whether or not the transferees of the lot in question
are innocent purchasers for value, it is a well settled rule
that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there
was no defect in the title of the vendor. (Leung Yee v. F.L.
Strong Machiner Co., et al., 37 Phil. 651[1918]. Without
the needed verification, he cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser for value in contemplation of law.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a certificate of title is void,
when it covers property of public domain classified as
forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-
disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. (Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung, 89 SCRA 540
[1979]underscoring supplied). In the case at bar, it will be
noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the
lower court counted the period of possession of private
respondents before the same were released as forest
lands for disposition, which release is tantamount to
qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they
were still non-disposable. Thus, under the foregoing
rulings, even assuming that the transferees are innocent
purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived from
the titles of private respondents which were not validly
issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain,
may be cancelled.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals and the
decision of the Court of First Instance are hereby SET
ASIDE and REVERSED, because the lots in question still
form part of the public domain. The certificates of title
issued over them are hereby ordered CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Alampay, J., is on leave.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part as one of the parties was my
former colleague.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40402,
[March 16, 1987], 232 PHIL 444-458)
[G.R. No. 166890. June 28, 2016.]

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. APOLONIO BAU
TISTA, JR., respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J p:
The applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title must trace his possession of the subject land
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Any length of possession
that does not comply with the requirement cannot
support the application, which must be then dismissed
for failure to comply with Commonwealth Act No.
141 (Public Land Act) andPresidential Decree No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree).
The Case
The Government appeals the adverse judgment
promulgated on September 30, 2004, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Subic, Zambales
rendered on November 17, 1998 in LRC Case No. N-
12-10-96 entitled In Re: Application for Land
Registration of Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D, Subic
Cadastre 2 granting the application of respondent
Apolonio Bautista, Jr. for the judicial confirmation of title
of Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D, Subic Cadastre.
Antecedents
After acquiring Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D, Subic
Cadastre, located in Capisanan, Subic, Zambales from
Mario Jardin on February 15, 1971 and Cornelia
Villanueva on May 25, 1973, Apolonio, Sr. had the
property declared for taxation purposes. He had been
the sole and exclusive possessor and occupant from the
time of acquisition until his death, with no party
questioning his possession and ownership, or staking
any adverse claim against him thereon. 3 He died in
1987, and was succeeded by his children, namely:
respondent Apolonio, Jr. and his siblings. Apolonio, Sr.'s
children executed an extra-judicial settlement of their
father's estate, whereby Apolonio, Jr.'s brothers and
sisters waived their rights in his favor. Thus, the
property was declared for taxation purposes in
Apolonio, Jr.'s name under Tax Declaration No. 014-
0432A of the Municipality of Subic, Zambales. There
were no arrears in real estate taxes. 4 The declared
value was P73,040.00. 5 SCaITA
On October 21, 1996, Apolonio Jr. commenced
LRC Case No. N-12-10-96 in the MTC. He later on
testified that his father had been in actual possession
since 1969, and had eventually acquired the land from
Jardin and Villanueva through the notarized Deeds of
Absolute Sale dated February 15, 1971, and May 25,
1973; and that his father had paid taxes on the land.
The Government did not interpose any timely
objection to the testimony of Apolonio, Jr. It did not also
object to the documentary evidence (i.e., the deeds of
absolute sale and tax declarations) offered by him.
Hence, the MTC admitted all the evidence presented by
Apolonio, Jr.
In due course, the MTC granted Apolonio, Jr.'s
application, and declared him as the owner in fee simple
of the land, 6 and confirmed his ownership thereof. 7
The Government appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA), which, on September 30, 2004,
promulgated its assailed decision affirming the ruling of
the MTC. 8The CA pointed out that the Government
did not present evidence against the claim of
Apolonio Jr.; and that the Government did not
timely object to his testimony on the ground of its
being hearsay. 9
Issue
In this appeal, the Government reiterates that the
testimony of Apolonio, Jr. on possession, being
hearsay, had no probative value; that the alienation of
public land should always undergo careful scrutiny; and
that the Court should carefully re-examine the factual
issues that could alter the result of the case. 10
The Government points out that Apolonio, Jr. had
given only general statements pertaining to the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of his
father since 1971; that such statements were mere
conclusions of law, and did not prove the alleged
possession; that because the application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title was filed on October 21,
1996, the applicable law was Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073; that,
accordingly, the required period of possession must be
"since June 12, 1945 or earlier," as stated in Republic v.
Doldol, 11 a more stringent requirement the non-
compliance with which was fatal to his cause. 12
Lastly, the Government points out that tax
declarations or tax receipts did not suffice to prove
ownership of land in fee simple; that although it was the
State's policy to encourage and promote distribution of
alienable public lands as an ideal of social justice,
stringent safeguards must be adopted and applied to
prevent the lands from going to the wrong hands; and
that Apolonio, Jr.'s reliance on hearsay evidence
showed his unfitness to own the land. 13
In response, Apolonio Jr. insists that he had duly
established his lawful occupation of the land as owner in
fee simple; that the Government did not timely object to
his testimony, and did not also controvert his evidence;
that the property had been properly identified; and that
the lower courts had observed the legal safeguards and
guidelines in granting his application for judicial
confirmation of his ownership in fee simple. 14
Ruling of the Court
We reverse.
The Government has correctly insisted that the
requisite period of possession of the property should
conform to that provided for in Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which has limited the right to apply for
judicial confirmation to citizens of the Philippines "who
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. . . ." The provision is reprised by
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (Property Registration Decree), adopting the
length of possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
We note that in its amendment of the Public Land
Act that took effect on January 25, 1977, Presidential
Decree No. 1073 changed the length of the requisite
possession from "thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application" to possession
"since June 12, 1945, or earlier." Republic v.
Naguit 15 has explained this change thusly:
When the Public Land Act was first
promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by
R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona
fide claim of ownership must have been for at
 least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . .
.
Based on the records before us, Apolonio, Jr.
presented only himself to establish the possession and
ownership of his father, Apolonio, Sr., who was his
immediate predecessor-in-interest. He did not present
as witnesses during the trial either of the transferors of
Apolonio, Sr. — that is, Mario Jardin or Cornelia
Villanueva — to establish the requisite length of the
possession of the predecessors-in-interest of the
applicant that would be tacked to his own. His personal
incompetence to attest to the possession of the property
within the time required by law underscored the
weakness of the evidence on possession, particularly as
it has not been denied that the applicant had arrived in
the Philippines only on November 28, 1987. Considering
that the possession and occupation of the property in
question by Apolonio, Jr. and his predecessors-in-
interest were not shown in the records to have been
"since June 12, 1945, or earlier," the application must be
rejected.
We should stress that only the title of those who
had possessed and occupied alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain within the requisite period
could be judicially confirmed. Indeed, alienable public
land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
 exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period. 16
That the Government did not timely object to the
admission of the testimony of Apolonio, Jr., or of the
other evidence presented by him was
of no consequence to the success of the application. If
he had no personal knowledge of the facts establishing
the possession of property for the requisite
period, no court can give any value to his assertion,
particularly as it was conceded by him no less that he
had no personal or direct competence to know the truth
of his assertion. It was one thing for the trial court to
admit the evidence, but quite another to give it any
worth for purposes of judicial adjudication.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 30,
2004; DISMISSES the application of respondent
Apolonio Bautista, Jr. for the judicial confirmation of his
imperfect title in LRC Case No. N-12-10-96;
and ORDERS Apolonio Bautista, Jr. to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Perlas-
Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Bautista, Jr., G.R. No. 166890, [June 28,
2016])