JURISPRUDENCE
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
PRELIMINARIES
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
[G.R. No. 50464. January 29, 1990.]
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS
INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT
CORP., and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF BATAAN, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
4. LAND TITLES; FOREST LANDS; TO
BE ALIENABLE REQUIRE, AN OFFICIAL
PROCLAMATION TO THAT EFFECT. —
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine
subjects all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the State.
Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes,
there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on
confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain. The mere fact
that a title was issued by the Director of
Lands does not confer any validity on
such title if the property covered by the
title or patent is part of the public forest.
FACTS: On April 29, 1963, the Director
of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales
Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels
of land both situated in Mariveles,
Bataan.
An Original Certificate of Title No.
Sp-24 in favour of defendant Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two
parcels of land above-described then it
was cancelled and a new TCT was issued
in the name of Coral Beach.
The Solicitor General in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines
instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, an action for
reversion.
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH
that title issued to SUNBEAM and
CORAL BEACH had become indefeasible
and imprescriptible.
The RTC dismissed the complaint.
According to the Solicitor General, the
Court of First Instance committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint and finding that Lots 1 and 2
are alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under the jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands despite clear and
positive evidence to the contrary. The
Court of Appeals gave due course to the
petition for certiorari, set aside the Order
of Dismissal rendered by the Court of
First Instance.
An important factual issue raised
in the complaint was the classification of
the lands as forest lands. This material
allegation stated in the Republic's
complaint 8 was never denied specifically
9 by the defendants (petitioners herein)
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
the
ISSUE: W/N the transfer to Sunbeam
and Coral Beach is valid? – NO.
RULING: If it is true that the lands are
forest lands, then all these proceedings
become moot and academic. Land
remains unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine
subjects all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the
State. 11 Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes,
there must be a positive act from the
government. Even rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by
the Director of Lands does not confer any
validity on such title if the property
covered by the title or patent is part of
the public forest.
1
 - the fact that Lot 7454 was never
claimed to be public land by the
Director of Lands in the proper
REGALIAN DOCTRINE cadastral proceedings;
[G.R. No. 60413. October 31, 1990.] - the pre-war certification of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, National Library dated August 16,
petitioner, vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. 1932 to the effect that the Estadistica
SAYO, Judge, Br. I, CFI, Nueva Vizcaya, de Propiedades of Isabela issued in
HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS 1896 and appearing in the Bureau of
OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, Archives, the property in question was
and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM registered under the 'Spanish system
PRODUCTS INC., respondents. of land registration as private property
owned by Don Liberato Bayaua,
applicants' predecessors-in-interest;
FACTS: The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and
Luz Marquez, filed an original application for
ISSUE:
registration of a tract of land identified as Lot
1. W/N the land is public A & D land? -
No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago,
NO
BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an
2. W/N the parties have sufficiently
area of 33,950 hectares. The land was
proved the character and classification
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago,
of the land- NO.
Province of Isabela.
RULING:
Oppositions were filed by the
Government, through the Director of Lands
Under the Regalian Doctrine, 2 all
and the Director of Forestry, and some
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
others, including the Heirs of Liberato
within private ownership are presumed to
Bayaua.
belong to the State. Hence it is that all
applicants in land registration proceedings
The case dragged on for about twenty
have the burden of overcoming the
(20) years until March 3, 1981 when a
presumption that the land thus sought to be
compromise agreement was entered into by
registered forms part of the public domain.
and among all the parties, The Heirs of
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by
Casiano Sandoval (as applicants) renounced
clear and convincing evidence that the
their claims and ceded —
property involved was acquired by him or his
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an
ancestors either by composition title from the
area of 4,109 hectares;
Spanish Government or by possessory
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest
information title, or any other means for the
Development, 12,341 hectares;
proper acquisition of public lands, the
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato
property must be held to be part of the public
Bayaua, 4,000 hectares; and
domain. The applicant must present
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao &
competent and persuasive proof to
Farm Products, Inc., 8,000
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on
hectares.
general statements, or mere conclusions of
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the
law other than factual evidence of possession
respondent Judge approved the compromise
and title.
agreement and confirmed the title and
ownership of the parties in accordance with
In the proceeding at bar, it appears
its terms.
that the principal document relied upon and
presented by the applicants for registration,
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the
to prove the private character of the large
Republic of the Philippines, has taken the
tract of land subject of their application, was
present recourse in a bid to have that
a photocopy of a certification of the National
decision of March 5, 1981 annulled as being
Library dated August 16, 1932 (already
patently void and rendered in excess of
above mentioned) to the effect that according
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
to the Government's Estadistica de
Propiedades of Isabela issued in 1896, the
The respondents maintain, on the
property in question was registered under
other hand, that the Solicitor General's
the Spanish system of land registration as
arguments are premised on the proposition
private property of Don Liberato Bayaua.
that Lot 7454 is public land, but it is not.
But, as this Court has already had occasion
According to them, as pointed out in the
to rule, that Spanish document, the
application for registration, the private
Estadistica de Propiedades, cannot be
character of the land is demonstrated by the
considered a title to property, it not being one
following circumstances:
of the grants made during the Spanish
Prepared by

Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod

Department of Environment and Natural Resources
2
regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an
inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in
question.
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
[G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001.]
FELIPE SEVILLE
vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN
DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY,
SYNOPSIS
Leyte Sab-A Basin Development
Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate
government and private sector efforts for a
planned development and balanced growth of
the Sab-A Basin in the Province of Leyte,
empowered to acquire real property in the
successful prosecution of its business.
Respondent Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot
No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of
464,920- sq. m. Original Certificate of Title
was issued for the said property in the name
of respondent LSBDA in 1983. In 1989,
LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject
property to its co-respondent National
Development Company (NDC), as a result of
which a new Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of NDC. Meanwhile also in
1989, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega,
represented by administrator Felipe Seville
filed with the Regional Trial Court an action
for the recovery of real property, rentals and
damages against all the respondents herein.
The Estate claimed ownership by acquisitive
prescription over the real property acquired by
LSBDA and later by NDC, containing a land
area of 735,333-sq. m., which included that
portion sold by Calixtra Yap. The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners
herein and against the respondents.
Respondents herein appealed their case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), which in turn reversed
the decision of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals citing the Regalian doctrine ruled that
the land in question, which did not appear to
be privately owned, should be presumed as
part of the public domain. Hence, petitioners
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the Supreme Court after the CA denied their
Motion for Reconsideration. The Court was
called upon to determine the validity of
LSBDA's title. In resolving the issue, the Court
has to rule on whether the land in question
was private or public before the issuance of
title thereof.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
respondents herein and affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Appeals. According to the Court
there was no showing that the land had been
classified as alienable before the title was
issued to LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
be the owners thereof through acquisitive
prescription. Moreover, LSBDA's title was
derived from a miscellaneous sales patent,
not from Yap. The Court ruled that the
petitioner's challenge to LSDBA's title cannot
be granted since a certificate that had already
became indefeasible and incontrovertible
cannot be challenged by a collateral attack.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN; REGALIAN DOCTRINE;
DEFINED AND CONSTRUED; ACQUISITION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE TO PUBLIC LANDS;
REQUISITES THEREOF; APPLICABLE
ONLY TO ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. — Under
the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. In Menguito
v. Republic, the court held that "[u]nless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, 'occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.' To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable." A person in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of a public land for more than
thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto.
That title may be the subject of judicial
confirmation, pursuant to Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, which provides: "SECTION
48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest thereon, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit: . . . (b) those who by themselves or
through their predecessor-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war orforce
majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter." Under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1073, paragraph "b" of the
aforecited provision applies only to alienable
3
and disposable lands of the public domain.
The provision reads: "SEC. 4. The provisions
of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter
VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945." It should be
stressed that petitioners had no certificate of
title over the disputed property. Although they
claim that their title was based on acquisitive
prescription, they fail to present
incontrovertible proof that the land had
previously been classified as alienable. They
simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA
on this crucial point by saying that it was
"without factual basis." Instead, they
maintain that the private character of the land
was evidenced by various tax declarations,
Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of the trial court
and even the Supreme Court.
FACTS: By virtue of Presidential Decree No.
625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development
Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate
government and private sector efforts for a
planneddevelopment and balanced growth of
the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte,
empowered to acquire real property in the
successful prosecution of its business.
On June 14; 1980, [Respondent]
Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO
08-000047 consisting of 464,920 square
meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario,
Isabel, Leyte
. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA filed a
Miscellaneous Sales Application with the
Bureau of Lands covering said lot together
with other lots acquired by LSBDA.
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353
was issued in the name of [Respondent]
LSBDA on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was
transcribed in the Registration Book for the
[P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983 in the
name of [Respondent] LSBDA.
On November 29, 1988, the Estate of
Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial
administrator Felipe Seville filed with the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc
City, a complaint for recovery of real
property, rentals and damages against the
above-named [respondents.
The trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on
June 14, 1980 in favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit PP
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
and 25) conveying the subject property to
said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab
initio;
Petitioners argue that LSBDA's title to
73 hectares of the 402-hectare Leyte
Industrial Development Estate was void,
having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra
Yap who had no right to it.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the petitioners have sufficiently
established the A & D character of the
land? - NO
2. W/N the title of LSBDA is Valid? - YES
RULING: Under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land. All lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. 8 In Menguito v. Republic, 9 the
Court held that "[u]nless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated
to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
'occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title.' To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable."
It should be stressed that petitioners had no
certificate of title over the disputed property.
Although they claim that their title was
based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to
present incontrovertible proof that the land
had previously been classified as alienable.
They simply brush aside the conclusion of
the CA on this crucial point by saying that it
was "without factual basis." 11 Instead, they
maintain that the private character of the
land was evidenced by various tax
declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of
the trial court and even the Supreme Court.
Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has
been classified as alienable is on the
claimant. 18 In the present case, petitioners
failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their
possession of the disputed property, however
long, cannot ripen into ownership.
ISSUE II:
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of
LSBDA was based, not on the conveyance
made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the
Bureau of Lands. In fact, after LSBDA had
filed an application for patent, the Bureau of
Lands conducted an investigation and found
that the land was part of the public domain.
4
Therefore the title of LSBDA is valid pursuant
to the Miscellaneous Sales Patent.

Prepared by

Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod

Department of Environment and Natural Resources
5
1 REGALIAN DOCTRINE
G.R. No. 73246. March 2, 1993.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND
DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND J. ANTONIO ARANETA,
respondents.
ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN; IN WHOM AUTHORITY
TO CLASSIFY IS VESTED; EFFECT OF
CLASSIFICATION; CAUSE OF
CLASSIFICATION — STATEMENT OF THE
REGALIAN DOCTRINE; EFFECT OF LACK
OF CLASSIFICATION. — Lands of the public
domain are classified under three main
categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and
Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the
Commonwealth Constitution,only agricultural
lands were allowed to be alienated. Their
disposition was provided for
underCommonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7),
which states that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to
classify thelands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are
not subject to private ownership unless they
are first reclassified as agricultural lands and
so released for alienation. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. Courts have no
authority to do so. This is in consonance with
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and that
the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. Under the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Hence, a positive act of the government
is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.
FACTS: The land involved is actually an
island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen
Gulf. Situated in the Municipality of Bani,
Pangasinan, the area consists of 187,288
square meters, more or less. The initial
application for registration was filed for
Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of
the Land Registration Act, Act No. 496, as
amended.
The Director of Forest Development also
entered its opposition alleging that the land
is within the unclassified public land and,
hence, inalienable.
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
The application was granted. Thus
this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the land in question is
registrable and the applicants have
sufficiently proved the public A & D
character of the land?
RULING: Lands of the public domain are
classified under three main categories,
namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or
Alienable Lands. 14 Under the
Commonwealth Constitution,only
agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated. Their disposition was provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-
7), which states that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are
not subject to private ownership unless they
are first reclassified as agricultural lands and
so released for alienation. 15 In the absence
ofsuch classification, the land remains as
unclassified land until released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition. Courts
have no authority to do so.
This is in consonance with the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. Under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a
positive act of the government is needed to
declassify a forest land into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. 17
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of state ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.
18
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by
convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the
proper acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public
domain. The applicant must present evidence
and persuasive proof to substantiate his
claim.
Since the subject property is still
unclassified, whatever possession the
applicant may have had and however long,
6
cannot ripen into private ownership. 23 The that the locator should faithfully and
conversion of subject property does not consistently comply with the
automatically render the property as requirements for annual work and
alienable and disposable. improvements in the located mining
claim.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord

with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973
[G.R. No. 63786-87. April 7, 1993.]
Constitution which states:
UNITED PARACALE MINING
'All lands of the public domain, waters,
COMPANY, INC., AND COCO GROVE,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
INC., petitioners, vs. HON. JOSELITO
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
DELA ROSA, in his capacity as the
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
former Judge of the Court of First
resources of the Philippines belong to the
Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch
State. With the exception of agricultural,
2, et al., respondents.
industrial or commercial, residential and
resettlement lands of the public domain,
FACTS: The heart of these twin petitions
natural resources shall not be alienated,
is the question of constitutionality of P.D.
and no license, concession, or lease for
1214.
the exploration, development, and
exploitation, or utilization of any of the
ISSUE: W/N PD 1214 is
natural resources shall be granted for a
unconstitutional?
period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five
RULING: This question has been resolved
years, except as to water rights for
by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. 11 thus:
industrial uses other than development
of water power, in which cases, beneficial
"(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No.
use may be the measure and the limit of
1214 is not unconstitutional. ** It is a
the grant.'
valid exercise of the sovereign power of
the State, as owner, over lands of the
The same Constitutional mandate is
public domain, of which petitioner's
found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
mining claims still form a part, and over
Constitution, which declares: LLjur
the patrimony of the nation, of which
'All lands of the public domain, waters,
mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
may be underscored, in this connection,
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
that the Decree does not cover all mining
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
claims located under the Phil. Bill of
and fauna, and other natural resources
1902, but only those claims over which
are owned by the State. With the
their locators had failed to obtain a
exception of agricultural lands, all other
patent. And even then, such locators may
natural resources shall not be alienated.
still avail of the renewable twenty-five
The exploration, development, and
year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree
utilization of natural resources shall be
No. 463, the Mineral Development
under the full control and supervision of
Resources Decree of 1974.
the State . . .'"
Mere location does not mean absolute
PD 1214 is not unconstitutional.
ownership over the affected land or the
mining claim. It merely segregates the
located land or area from the public
domain by barring other would-be
locators from locating the same and
appropriating for themselves the minerals
found therein. To rule otherwise would
imply that location is all that is needed
toacquire and maintain rights over a
located mining claim. This, we cannot
approve or sanction because it is
contrary to the intention of the lawmaker
Prepared by

Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod

Department of Environment and Natural Resources
7
2 REGALIAN DOCTRINE
[G.R. No. 73974. May 31, 1995.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Represented
by the Director of Lands), petitioner, vs. THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON, MANUEL G.
ATIENZA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Lucena Branch) and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; ALL LANDS NOT
OTHERWISE CLEARLY APPEARING TO BE
OWNED PRIVATELY, PRESUMED TO BELONG TO
THE STATE. — Under the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-
owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest
lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public
lands, are not subject to private ownership unless
they under the Constitution, become private
properties. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
8. ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF LANDS; TASKED WITH
ADMINISTRATION AND DISPOSAL OF PUBLIC
LANDS. — In our jurisdiction, the task of
administering and disposing lands of the public
domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and
ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources).
9. ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND,
PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE. — of Environment and Natural Resources 17 (now the
Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.
10. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF OVERCOMING
PRESUMPTION OF STATE OWNERSHIP IN
CONTROVERSIES, INVOLVING DISPOSITION OF
PUBLIC LAND LIES UPON PRIVATE CLAIMANT. —
In controversies involving the disposition of public
agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the
presumption of state ownership of lands of the public
domain lies upon the private claimant who, in this
case, is Atienza. The records show, however, that he
failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence
to overcome said presumption and to support his
claim.
FACTS: Sometime in 1968, an investigation was
conducted by the Bureau of Lands in connection
with alleged land grabbing activities in Pagbilao. It
appeared that some of the free patents, including
that of Atienza's, were fraudulently acquired.
In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court
finding that the land covered by the application for
free patent of private respondent was within the
forest zone, declared as null and void OCT No. P-
13840 in Atienza's name and ordered the Register of
Deeds of Quezon to cancel the same.
In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in
question was no longer within the unclassified
public forest land because by the approval of his
application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands,
the land "was already alienable and disposable
public agricultural land." Since the subject land was
a very small portion of Lot 5139 of the Pagbilao
Cadastre, an area which had been declared
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
disposable public land by the cadastral court on
March 9, 1932 in Cadastral Case No. 76 entitled "El
Govierno Filipino de las Islas Filipinas contra Jose
Abastillas, et al., G.L.R.O
On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a
decision with the categorical finding based on "solid
evidence" that "the land in question was found
definitely within the forest zone denominated as
Project 21-A."
On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in
question was not within the unclassified public
forest land and therefore alienable land of the public
domain. The then Intermediate Appellate Court
arrived at the conclusion that "(t)he litigated land is
part ofpublic land alienable and disposable for
homestead and [F]ree Patent."
ISSUE: W/N the land in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain?
RULING: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned
are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands,
like mineral or timber lands which are public lands,
are not subject to private ownership unless they
under the Constitution, become private properties.
In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
In our jurisdiction, the task of administering
and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to
the Director of Lands, and ultimately, the Secretary
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources).
18 Classification of public lands is, thus, an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department
through the Office of the President. 19 Courts have
no authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the
disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden
of overcoming the presumption of state ownership of
lands of the public domain lies upon the private
claimant 21 who, in this case, is Atienza. The
records show, however, that he failed to present
clear, positive and absolute evidence 22 to overcome
said presumption and to support his claim.
Atienza's claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932
decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Tayabas in Cadastral Case No. 76, which was not
given much weight by the court a quo, and for good
reasons.
Apart from his assertions before this Court,
Atienza failed to present proof that he or his
predecessor-in-interest was one of the claimants
who answered the petition filed by the then
Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings.
The document reflecting said cadastral decision, a
xerox copy, indicated the claimants simply as "Jose
Abastillas et al." In support of that decision, Atienza
presented a certification purportedly issued by
someone from the Technical Reference Section of the
Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureauof Lands,
stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139
Pagbilao Cadastre," which evidence is, however,
directly controverted by the sketch plan showing
that the land in controversy is actually outside the
alienable and disposable public lands, although part
of Lot 5139.
8
3 REGALIAN DOCTRINE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128017. January 20, 1999.]
RAMON ITURALDE, petitioner, vs.
ALFREDO FALCASANTOS, respondent.
Petitioner acquired by purchase a 6-hectare
land located at Bañas, Lantawan, Basilan
Province on October 17, 1986. However, said
lot was applied with the Bureau of Lands by
respondent for a free patent. The same was
dismissed by the Regional Director of Lands
for failure to exercise the right to repurchase
and allowed petitioner to file a public land
application for the subject land. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession against
respondent. The trial court rendered judgment
in favor of petitioner who was declared the
owner and possessor of the subject land. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
appealed decision in finding that the land is
within the forest reserve area, hence, not
capable of private appropriation and
occupation. Hence, this recourse, petitioner by
claiming that allowance of the Director of
Lands to file a public land application for said
property is equivalent to a declaration that
said land was no longer part of the public
domain.
Lands within the forest reserve are not
capable of private appropriation and
occupation; that a positive act of the
government is needed to declassify a forest
land into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes; and that
possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; LANDS
WITHIN FOREST RESERVE, NOT CAPABLE
OF PRIVATE APPROPRIATION AND
OCCUPATION. — The Court of Appeals
correctly held that "the evidence is unrebutted
that the subject land is within the Forest
Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557
certified on August 13, 1951." and, hence, not
capable of private appropriation and
occupation. In Republic vs. Register of Deeds
of Quezon, we held that "Forest lands, like
mineral or timber lands which are public
lands, are not subject to private ownership
unless they under the Constitution, become
private properties. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified
public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition." HDTCSI
2. ID.; ID.; DECLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
LANDS; POSITIVE ACT FROM
GOVERNMENT, INDISPENSABLE. — In
Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, we said: "Thus, before any land may
be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules
on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain." Hence, a positive act of the
government is needed to declassify a forest
land into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes."
FACTS: On October 17, 1986, petitioner
acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro
Mana-ay a parcel of land located at Bañas,
Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of
6.0000 hectares. However, on November 3,
1986, respondent applied with the Bureau of
Lands in Isabela, Basilan province, for the
award to him of the same parcel of land
under free patent. On July 24, 1990,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession with preliminary
injunction of the subject parcel of land.
In answer to the complaint, respondent
alleged that the land occupied by him
belonged to the Republic of the Philippines,
and that he had introduced improvements
thereon such as coconut and other fruit
trees.
After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993,
the trial court rendered decision declaring
petitioner the owner and possessor of the
subject parcel of land. On December 20,
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
reversing the appealed decision, and entering
a new judgment dismissing petitioner's
complaint without prejudice to any action
that petitioner may take if the subject land
was declassified from forest land to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the trial court's
decision in his favor and dismissing the
complaint because when the Director of
Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land
application for said property, it was
equivalent to a declaration that said land was
no longer part of the public domain.
ISSUE: W/N the land in question is declared
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain? –
RULING: The Court of Appeals correctly held
that "the evidence is unrebutted that the
subject land is within the Forest Reserve
Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on
August 13, 1951' " 1 and, hence, not capable
of private appropriation and occupation. 2
"Hence, a positive act of the government is
needed to declassify a forest land into
9
alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes."
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
[G.R. No. 195990. August 5, 2015.]
HEIRS OF RAFAEL GOZO represented by
CASTILLO GOZO and RAFAEL GOZO,
JR., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION CORPORATION OF
THESEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH
(PUMCO), SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION OF SDA (SPUMCO) and
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH AT
SIMPAK, LALA, LANAO DEL NORTE
represented by BETTY PEREZ,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the
heirs of the Spouses Rafael and Concepcion
Gozo (Spouses Gozo) who, before their death,
were the original owners of a parcel ofland
with an area 236,638 square meters located
in Sitio Simpak, Brgy. Lala, Municipality of
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. The
respondents claim that they own a 5,000
square-meter portion of the property. This is
based on the deed of sale allegedly executed
by Spouses Gozo in favour of the respondent.
On the date the Deed of Donation is
executed in 1937, theSpouses Gozo were not
the registered owners of the property yet
although they were the lawful possessors
thereof. It was only on 5 October 1953 that
the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
642 covering the entire property was issued
in thename of Rafael Gozo (Rafael) married to
Concepcion Gozo (Concepcion) pursuant to
the Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on 22 August
1953.
ISSUE: W/N the transfer to the respondent is
valid- NO.
RULING: A careful scrutiny of therecords,
however, reveals a significant fact that at the
time the Deed of Donation was executed by
the Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the
subject property was part ofthe inalienable
public domain. It was only almost after two
decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the
State ceded its right over the land in favor of
the Spouses Gozo by granting their patent
application and issuing an original certificate
of title in their favor. Prior to such
conferment of title, the Spouses Gozo
possessed no right to dispose ofthe land
which, by all intents and purposes, belongs
to the State.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is
embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of our
Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to
a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain.
The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and not the
Courts. In the absence of such classification,
theland remains as an unclassified land until
it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. This is in consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of thepublic
domain belong to the State and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, all public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence,
nopublic land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government; and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. To prove that
the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the
Government that the land applied for is
alienable and disposable.
It is beyond question that at the time
the gratuitous transfer was effected by the
Spouses Gozo on 28 February 1937, the
subject property was part of the public
domain and is outside the commerce of man.
It was only on 5 October 1953 that the
ownership of the property was vested by the
State to the Spouses Gozo by virtue of its
issuance of the OCT pursuant to the
Homestead Patent granted by the President
of the Philippines on 22 August 1953. Hence,
the donation of the subject property which
took place before 5 October 1953 is null and
void from the very start.
10
4 IMPERIUM VS DOMINIUM
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE
HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK
and LEONCIO LEE HONG HOK,
petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY
OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Respondent Aniano David acquired lawful
title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application in accordance with which an order of
award and for issuance of a sales patent was
made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958,
covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226
square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of
the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of
award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on
August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to
defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21,
1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since
the filing of the sales application of Aniano David
and during all the proceedings in connection with
said application, up to the actual issuance of the
sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants
did not put up any opposition or adverse claim
thereto. This is fatal to them because after the
registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land covered thereby automatically
comes under the operation of Republic Act 496
subject to all the safeguards provided therein....
Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title
based on fraud should be raised within one year
from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in
question is not a private property as the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the
public character thereof for having been formed
by reclamation.
As there are overtones indicative of
skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-
known distinction in public law between the
government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire
property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the
matter further. The former comes under the
heading of imperium and the latter of dominium.
The use of this term is appropriate with reference
to lands held by the state in its proprietary
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did
speak of the confusion that existed during the
medieval era between such two concepts, but did
note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to
dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a
case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier
decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that
all lands were held from the Crown...." That was
a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14
which was adopted by the present Constitution,
ownership however being vested in the state as
such rather than the head thereof. What was
stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more
extensive discussion of the matter in the leading
case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904.
One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in
these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty
over the Indies and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our
royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still
pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is
our will that all lands which are held without
proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us
according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys
audiences, and governors may seem necessary for
public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in
those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition,
but also their future and their probable increase,
and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming
them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose
of as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano
v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the
unappropriated public lands constituting the
public domain the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to
possess that character until severed therefrom by
state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was
found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed
lot was the result of reclamation, its being
correctly categorized as public land is undeniable.
21 What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v.
Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus:
"There being no evidence whatever that the
property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or
by possessory information title or by any other
means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain." 23
For it is well-settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government." 24 It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a
title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent
restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The
applicant, having failed to establish his right or
title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463
involved in the present controversy, and there
being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, the
property is and remains part of the public
domain." To repeat, the second assignment of
error is devoid of merit.
11
5 IPRA LAW
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies
of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines
the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within
the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right
to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: W/N IPRA Law is unconstitutional- YES.
RULING: After due deliberation on the petition, the
members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice
Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion
sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section
57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation
of natural resources and should be read in conjunction
with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the
petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b),
8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific
cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
OPINION OF JUSTICE KAPUNAN:
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private
title to land must be traced to some grant, express or
implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the
American Colonial government, and thereafter, the
Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown
is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has
persisted because title to land must emanate from
some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere.[68]
In its broad sense, the term jura regalia refers to royal
rights,[69] or those rights which the King has by virtue
of his prerogatives.[70] In Spanish law, it refers to a
right which the sovereign has over anything in which a
subject has a right of property or propriedad.[71] These
were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as
the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all
lands was originally held by the King, and while the
use of lands was granted out to others who were
permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the
King theoretically retained the title.[72] By fiction of
law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of
all lands, and the true and only source of title, and
from him all lands were held.[73] The theory of jura
regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit
of conquest.[74]
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native
title to lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial. In the landmark case of Cario vs. Insular
Government[75] the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the decision[76]of the pre-war Philippine
Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken
against the Government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x.
[77] (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the
existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent of
any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to
the theory of jura regalia.
12
IPRA LAW
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-
appellee.
In Cario, an Igorot by the name of Mateo
Cario applied for registration in his name of an
ancestral land located in Benguet. The applicant
established that he and his ancestors had lived
on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as
far they could remember. He also proved that
they had all been recognized as owners, the land
having been passed on by inheritance according
to native custom. However, neither he nor his
ancestors had any document of title from the
Spanish Crown. The government opposed the
application for registration, invoking the theory of
jura regalia. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that the applicant was
entitled to the registration of his native title to
their ancestral land.
Cario was decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the
U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our
jurisdiction.[78] We applied the Cario doctrine in
the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,
[79] where we stated that [a]ll lands that were not
acquired from the Government either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n
exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish
conquest.
Cario was decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the
U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our
jurisdiction.[78] We applied the Cario doctrine in
the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,
[79] where we stated that [a]ll lands that were not
acquired from the Government either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n
exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish
conquest.[80]
Petitioners however aver that the U.S.
Supreme Courts ruling in Cario was premised on
the fact that the applicant had complied with the
requisites of acquisitive prescription, having
established that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the property
since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners
suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for
by Cario was transferred from the State, as
original owner, to Cario by virtue of prescription.
They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the
basis for decreeing by mere legislative fiatthat
ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to
[indigenous peoples] without judicial
confirmation.[81]
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims
that the Cario doctrine applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain and, as such, cannot
be extended to other lands of the public domain
such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cario would show that
the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to
lands which have always been considered as
private, and not to lands of the public domain,
whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction
must be made between ownership of land under
native title and ownership by acquisitive
prescription against the State. Ownership by
virtue of native title presupposes that the land
has been held by its possessor and his
predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an
owner since time immemorial. The land is not
acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its
successors-in-interest, the United States and the
Philippine Government. There has been no
transfer of title from the State as the land has
been regarded as private in character as far back
as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land
by acquisitive prescription against the State
involves a conversion of the character of the
property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from
the State to a private person. Since native title
assumes that the property covered by it is private
land and is deemed never to have been part of the
public domain, the Solicitor Generals thesis that
native title under Cario applies only to lands of
the public domain is erroneous. Consequently,
the classification of lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks under the Constitution[82] is
irrelevant to the application of the Cario doctrine
because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the
State ownership of lands of the public domain
does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral
domains.
(Excerpt from the Separate Opinion of Justice
Kapunan.)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
13
RESERVATIONS OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN ARE VALID ASSERTIONS OF
REGALIAN RIGHT
[G.R. No. 81564. April 26, 1990.]
ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, PASIG AND
MAKATI, METRO MANILA, petitioners, vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57,
IN MAKATI, METRO MANILA PRESIDED
OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, AND THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL,
represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES,
ADMINISTRATOR, respondents.
FACTS: On November 5, 1985, the private
respondent, Domingo Palomares, as
administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal,
commenced suit with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 132,Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory
relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 192, and cancellation of
entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291.
On June 2, 1986, the private respondent
filed a motion to admit amended complaint
impleading the Republic of the Philippines and
the registers of deeds of Pasig, Makati, andPasay
City as parties-respondents, and alleging, among
other things, that:; (6) the State itself, by
placing 27,213,255 square meters thereof
under a military reservation (Fort McKinley,
now Fort Bonifacio), byProclamation No. 423,
and fifty hectares thereof pursuant to
Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of
landgrabbing; (7) any and all holders of any and
all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No.
192, are null, void, and of no force and effect; and
(8) as a consequence thereof, the heirs of Dolores
Casal suffered various damages and attorney's
fees.
ISSUE: W/N the government is guilty of land
grabbing by issuing Proclamation 423? NO.
RULING: Is OCT No. 291 still valid and
subsisting?
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the
hectarage embraced by TCT No. 192 (OCT No.
291) consists of Government property. Three
things persuade the Court: (1) the decrees of
Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the
incontrovertible fact that OCT No. 291 has been
duly cancelled; and (3) the decision of the Court
of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming
the decision of Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Judge of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI,
in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484, Case No. R-1467
thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's
Duplicate of Certificate of Title No. 291," as well
as our own Resolution, in G.R. No. 69834,
entitled "Domingo Palomares, et al., v.
Intermediate Appellate Court".
(a)
Proclamation No. 192 ("RESERVING FOR THE
VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON") and Proclamation No. 423
("RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES
CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG,
TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY") have the character
of official assertions of ownership, and the
presumption is that they have been issued by
right of sovereignty and in the exercise of the
State's dominical authority. We take not only
judicial notice thereof 6 but accept the same
as a valid asseveration of regalian right over
property.
With respect to the premises occupied by the
Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, the
Population Commission, National Science and
Development Board, and the National Housing
Authority, we do not have the slightest doubt that
they stand on Government property by sheer
presumption that, unless otherwise shown, what
the Government occupies is what the Government
owns.
While there is no presumption that
property is Government property until otherwise
shown, because the law recognizes private
ownership, thus:
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides
the patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either individually
or collectively. 7
we find hard evidence on record that: (1) the
property covered by OCT No. 291 had been
conveyed to the United States of America; (2) it
had been later ceded to the Republicof the
Philippines, and (3) as a consequence, OCT No.
291 was cancelled upon final order of Judge
Ostrand.
Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R.
No. 81564 is pressed hard to establish the fact
that portions of the property, especially the open
spaces referred to in the lowercourt's writ of
injunction and the private respondent's
manifestation of December 14, 1989, and which
open spaces it claims to be outside Maricaban,
are indeed outside Maricaban (or OCT 291). With
respect, however, to parts thereof on which Fort
Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population
Commission, National Science and Development
Board, and National Housing Authority sit, the
hands of the private respondent are tied.
14
CARINO VS INSULAR GOVT (1909- US FULL
TEXT)
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the
court:
This was an application to the Philippine court of
land registration for the registration of certain
land. The application was granted by the court on
March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the court
of first instance of the province of Benguet, on
behalf of the government of the Philippines, and
also on behalf of the United States, those
governments having taken possession of the
property for public and military purposes. The
court of first instance found the facts and
dismissed the application upon grounds of law.
This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court
(7 Philippine, 132 ), and the case then was
brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The
applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the
province of Benguet, where the land lies. For
more than fifty years before the treaty of [212
U.S. 449, 456] Paris, April 11, 1899 [30 Stat. at
L. 1754], as far back as the findings go, the
plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as
owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and
had maintained fences sufficient for the holding
of cattle, according to the custom of the country,
some of the fences, it seems, having been of much
earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and
had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had
used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been
recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had
inherited or received the land from his father, in
accordance with Igorot custom. No document of
title, however, had issued from the Spanish
Crown, and although, in 1893-1894, and again in
1896-1897, he made application for one under
the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to
have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that
lands in Benguet could not be conceded until
those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had
been designated,-a purpose that has been carried
out by the Philippine government and the United
States. In 1901 the plaintiff filed a petition,
alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and
the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is
said.
We come, then, to the question on which the case
was decided below,- namely, whether the plaintiff
owns the land. The position of the government,
shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted,
and had title to all the land in the Philippines
except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to
be acquired; that there was no prescription
against the Crown, and that, if there was, a
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration
within a limited time to make the title good; that
the plaintiff's land was not registered, and
therefore became, if it was not always, public
land; that the United States succeeded to the title
of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights
that the Philippine government is bound to
respect.
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
If we suppose for the moment that the
government's contention is so far correct that the
Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this
land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which
the United States succeeded, it is not to be
assumed without argument that the plaintiff's
case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its
earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown,
and perhaps the general attitude of conquering
nations toward people not recognized as entitled
to the treatment accorded to those [212 U.S. 449,
458] in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that, in legal theory,
sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against
foreign nations, the United States may assert, as
Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not
follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain
had such power. When theory is left on one side,
sovereignty is a question of strength, and may
vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall
insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects
to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe
that the Solicitor General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was
brought under the civil or military government of
the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not
certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the
registration to which formerly the plaintiff was
entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would
have made his title beyond question good.
Whatever may have been the technical position of
Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the
United States, he had lost all rights and was a
mere trespasser when the present government
seized his land. The argument to that effect seems
to amount to a denial of native titles throughout
an important part of the island of Luzon, at least,
for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the power
to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the
settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to
the North American Indians, the dominant
purpose of the whites in America was to occupy
the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the
reason for our taking over the Philippines was
different. No one, we suppose, would deny that,
so far as consistent with paramount necessities,
our first object in the internal administration of
the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the
organic act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 12, 32
Stat. at L. 691, all the property and rights
acquired there by the [212 U.S. 449, 459] United
States are to be administered 'for the benefit of
the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to
suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the
United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in
deciding what it will claim for its own. The same
statute made a bill of rights, embodying the
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It
15
provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.' 5. In the light of the declaration that we
have quoted from 12, it is hard to believe that the
United States was ready to declare in the next
breath that 'any person' did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by
'property' only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of
the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association,-one of the
profoundest factors in human thought,-regarded
as their own.
It is true that, by 14, the government of the
Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public
lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions
had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives
for not more than 16 hectares of public lands
actually occupied by the native or his ancestors
before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps
might be satisfied if confined to cases where the
occupation was of land admitted to be public
land, and had not continued for such a length of
time and under such circumstances as to give
rise to the understanding that the occupants were
owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that
it was intended to declare every native who had
not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the
claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It is true
again that there is excepted from the provision
that we have quoted as to the administration of
the property and rights acquired by the United
States, such land and property as shall be
designated by the President for military or other
reser- [212 U.S. 449, 460] vations, as this land
since has been. But there still remains the
question what property and rights the United
States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and
we mean to go no further than the necessities of
decision demand, every presumption is and ought
to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held
in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.
Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give
the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether
justice to the natives and the import of the
organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle
examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even
beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane
though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a
tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes of
the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power
and inclination of the conqueror might dictate,
Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course
as the proper one 'for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof.'
Prepared by
Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of
Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it
was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does
not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees
and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the
natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words,
Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or
even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4,
title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in
Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine, 537, while it
commands viceroys and others, when it seems
proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs
them to confirm those who hold by good grants or
justa prescripcion. It is true that it [212 U.S. 449,
461] begins by the characteristic assertion of
feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in
the King or his predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted
to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain
beyond this recognition in their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal
cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine,
546: 'Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title
by prescription.' It may be that this means
possession from before 1700; but, at all events,
the principle is admitted. As prescription, even
against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws
of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the
Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain
had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of
June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual
theoretic assertion that, for private ownership,
there must have been a grant by competent
authority; but instantly descends to fact by
providing that, for all legal effects, those who have
been in possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated,
thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into
effect, the applicant's father was owner of the
land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is
said, the object of this law was to require the
adjustment or registration proceedings that it
described, and in that way to require every one to
get a document of title or lose his land. That
purpose may have been entertained, but it does
not appear clearly to have been applicable to all.
The regulations purport to have been made 'for
the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied
by private individuals.' (We follow the translation
in the government's brief.) It does not appear that
this land ever was royal land or wrongfully
occupied. In Article 6 it is provided that
'interested parties not included within the two
preceding [212 U.S. 449, 462] articles [the
articles recognizing prescription of twenty and
thirty years] may legalize their possession, and
thereby acquire the full ownership of the said
lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be
16
conducted in the following manner.' This seems, was his property, through a refined interpretation
by its very terms, not to apply to those declared of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
already to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8
provides for the case of parties not asking an Judgment reversed.
adjustment of the lands of which they are
unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one
year, and threatens that the treasury 'will
reassert the ownership of the state over the
lands,' and will sell at auction such part as it
does not reserve. The applicant's possession was
not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was
made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural
construction of the decree is confirmed by the
report of the council of state. That report puts
forward as a reason for the regulations that, in
view of the condition of almost all property in the
Philippines, it is important to fix its status by
general rules, on the principle that the lapse of a
fixed period legalizes completely all possession;
recommends in two articles twenty and thirty
years, as adopted in the decree; and then
suggests that interested parties not included in
those articles may legalize their possession and
acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain
price.

It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5

attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time, and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove
in registration proceedings. It may be that an
English conveyancer would have recommended
an application under the foregoing decree, but
certainly it was not calculated to convey to the
mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called
upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of
it, ownership actually gained would be lost. [212
U.S. 449, 463] The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law. The royal decree of February
13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were
capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880,
for which adjustment had not been sought,
should not be construed as a confiscation, but as
the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact,
the applicant never was disturbed. This same
decree is quoted by the court of land registration
for another recognition of the common-law
prescription of thirty years as still running
against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant

under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a different legal
tradition. We have deemed it proper on that
account to notice the possible effect of the change
of sovereignty and the act of Congress
establishing the fundamental principles now to be
observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case
we are of opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks,
and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived,

Prepared by

Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod

Department of Environment and Natural Resources
17