Property Final Case Brief2

Digested by: Dave Abby M.
Alano
JUAN BENGZONvs.THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN

G.R. No. L-41941, January 9, 1936, BUTTE, J.:
Facts:
Juan Bengzon owns a two-story house made out of wood and covered with nipa
and constructed on a lot in Avenida Rizal, Province of Pangasinan. Adjacent to their lot
was a reinforced concrete standpipe twenty-eight meters high, and nine in diameters,
with electrical, gasoline, and oil machines attached to its base. On March 1927, plaintiff
protested to the governor of the province the manner in which the plant was being
operated, and requested that he may be indemnified for the value of his house and lot
so that he may move his family, away from the effects of the nearby plant. The trial
court concluded that although the operation of the pumps and the tank creates some
annoyance and discomfort to the plaintiff, these are but ordinary and incidental to the
reasonable conduct of the defendant's water system. The trial court also held that
plaintiff was barred by laches, hence his petition.

Issue:
Should the plaintiff be indemnified for the nuisance?

Held:
Yes. The location of the pumping station within 3.8 meters from the house of the
plaintiff causes the noise, vibrations, smoke, odor and sparks coming from the plant
during its operation, not only during the day but during the night as well. Such causes a
constant annoyance, discomfort and danger both to the property of the plaintiff and the
health and comfort of himself and his family.
The chimney which is just opposite the plaintiff's house at a distance of only 3.4
meters emits smoke, gases of crude oil and gasoline and occasionally sparks well. The
plaintiff testified that at times the smoke blinds him and his family affecting their lungs
and their eyes and that the noise and vibrations affect their sleep. The Supreme Court
held that the construction and operation of this pumping plant in such close proximity to
the plaintiff's residence has rendered the same practically uninhabitable without
exposing to risk the comfort, health and, in case of fire, even the live of the plaintiff and
his family.
Finally, the maintenance of the nuisance is practically tantamount to an

expropriation, and the Supreme Court concluded that the Province of Pangasinan
should be required to pay plaintiff the present fair value of the house and lot, a valid
conveyance of the premises, free of liens and encumbrances.
Digested by: Dave Abby M. Alano
TRINIDAD DE AYALA, ET AL. vs.ANTONIO M. BARRETTO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-9966, February 14, 1916, TRENT, J.:
Facts:
The twenty two (22) plaintiffs are a mix of residents and lessees on Calle General
Solano, and had filed a suit was filed for a permanent injunction against the erection
and operation of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano in the city
of Manila, on the ground that it will be a nuisance.
General Solano has long been a fashionable residence street and the dwellings
located upon it are large and expensive. However, some of these residence lots were
being used for other purposes. The street also houses a coal yard, a warehouse, and a
cigarette factory, all very near the proposed location of the defendant's brewery. Just
across the river is located the large power plant of the electric railroad and light
company, consuming about 50 tons of coal per day. To the north of this street are
located some sawmills and lumberyards and to the west, across the river, are located
large warehouses and a large tobacco factory.
Issue:
Will the proposed brewery and ice plant cause a nuisance to the residents?
Held:
No. It is clear that the street is not purely nor strictly residential, due to the
numerous businesses near it and in every direction of it. There was clear reason why
the proposed plant was situated on the said street.
After a careful consideration of all the evidence of record, the Supreme Court
held that the locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently
justified itself as a residential district as to justify the incongruous effect of it on the
locality’s surroundings. This conclusion is supported with the fact that another brewery
is in fact closer to several of the plaintiffs than that of the defendants will be. The fact
that this latter brewery is not on the same street is immaterial. Distance is what counts
in a matter of this kind. Noise, smells, and smoke are no respecters of streets.
Furthermore, multiple testimonies from experts, such as engineers and factory
consultants, assured that the machinery will produce very little noise, and will not emit
smoke as to cause massive disruption to the locals.
RAMCAR, INC. vs.EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-17760, October 31, 1962, REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Ramcar Inc., operates and maintains an auto repair and body building
shop at No. 1241 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila, while the seven private
respondents reside near or around the shop. The nature of the corporation's activities
actually engaged in consists in repairing and building bodies of motor vehicles, and
involves the use of tools and machinery that give rise to much noise and annoyance
during all hours of the day up to nighttime; and its employees oftentimes work on
Sundays and holidays. Hence, Respondents brought an action before the Court of First
Instance of Manila to abate the said establishment as a nuisance. That Court, after trial,
dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs (respondents
now) appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Is petitioner’s business considered a nuisance?
Held:
Yes. Ramcar Inc. argues that it is only the City, under its Charter, that can
determine whether a business, occupation, act, or building is a nuisance or not, and
suggests that the remedy is an action against the City of Manila only for a determination
of whether or not the subject matter thereof is a nuisance. This contention is incorrect.
Petitioner also asserts that the award of damages has no sanction in law. This is also
incorrect, for Article 697 of the Civil Code states that “The abatement of a nuisance
does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover damages for its past
existence”.
However, it must be taken note of that the business of the petitioner is not a
nuisance per se. It is only on account of its location that it is a public nuisance. To abate
it, it is not necessary, as the appealed decision decrees, to remove all building and
structures built in the place where it is presently located as these, or parts thereof, may
be utilized for pursuit that are not forbidden by law or ordinance.
THE ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANYvs.

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7012, March 26, 1913, TRENT, J.:
Facts:
Plaintiff Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Company is the owner of an ice and cold
storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the plant
emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant
Municipal Council of Iloilo made investigations and later on passed a resolution which
demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory
operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.
Issue:
Is the resolution alone issued by the municipal council sufficient to label and
abate the supposed nuisance in this case?
Held:
No. There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The
former are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are
such only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The
former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs
a determination of the facts which is a judicial function.
The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the
established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards
organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision.
City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a
nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged
by judicial determination.
In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a
nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to
their health and comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of
the plaintiff.
VICTORIANA ESPIRITU, ET AL.vs.THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MUNICIPAL

MAYOR and THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF POZORRUBIO, PANGASINAN
G.R. No. L-11014, January 21, 1958, MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Facts:
During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozorrubio was
destroyed, and after Liberation, the market vendors began constructing temporary and
make-shifts stalls, even small residences, on a portion of the town plaza. In time, the
whole municipal market was rehabilitated, but the owners of the structures on the plaza
failed and refused to transfer to said market place.The Municipal Council of Pozorrubio
received petitions from civic organization for the removal of the market stalls on the
plaza, which were being used not only as stalls, but also for residence purposes.
As a result, the Municipal Council of Pozorrubioissued a resolution stating that

the public market had already been rehabilitated, and ordering the occupants and
owners of the structures on the plaza to remove their buildings within sixty days from
receipt of the resolution. In answer to this resolution, eight of the market stall building
owners filed a petition for prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
against the Municipal Council, the Municipal Mayor, and the Chief of Police of
Pozorrubio. The CFI dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Are the market vendors who are situated in the plaza considered a nuisance?
Held:
Yes. The occupation of the plaza and the construction of temporary buildings

thereon by appellants mostly for market, even residence purposes, was merely
tolerated by the municipality, because of the destruction of the public market during the
war. The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, especially of
residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement
according to law.
Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.While in
case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by
private individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio,
when the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease,
and the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to
the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions.
ARSENIO L. CANLAS AND ADENA GONZALES-CANLAS vs. HON. BERNABE DE

AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-16815, July 24, 1961, CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Arsenio L. Canlas and Adena Gonzales-Canlas, who were doctors of

medicine by profession, were granted a permit for the construction of a house in the
barrio of San Jose, province of Tarlac. Their purpose was to establish, operate and
maintain in said house a private hospital. They applied from the Director of Hospitals for
authority to operate and maintain the aforementioned hospital, which was subsequently
approved. Meanwhile, respondent Jaime Tayag had obtained a permit to construct a
ricemill in front of the Canlas Clinic, just across the street. Although Tayag was informed
that his permit was revoked due to the lack of a sanitary permit, he proceeded with the
construction of the rice mill. This prompted petitioners Spouses Canlas to file a
complaint against Tayag, contending that the smoke, vapor, and constant noise
generated by the operation of the rice mill will be conducive to the wholesome
atmosphere needed in the hospital area, and would eventually lead to the cancellation
of their permit for the hospital. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against Tayag, enjoining him from constructing the rice mill.
Tayag filed an unverified motion for the dissolution of said writ, which was subsequently
granted by the respondent judge Hon. Bernabe de Aquino. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Did the respondent judge err in granting the motion for the dissolution of the writ
of preliminary injunction?
Held:
Yes. The operation of a hospital is a matter that, not only concerns its owners or
operators, but also, if not more particularly affects the health and welfare of the
community, and that the damage sustained by the latter, in consequence, either of the
obstruction to the proper operation of said hospital or of its closing, can not possibly
compensated in full.
The main action was filed by petitioners for the purpose of joining and prohibiting
Tayag from the constructing a ricemill, so that, upon the construction thereof, said
action would become futile. The intention of respondent Judge to prohibit the
continuance of the operation of said ricemill, should it later be found to be a nuisance, is
not sufficient to offset the harm already done to the operation of the hospital, especially
the injury suffered by the patients therein and the public in general, which are hardly
susceptible of estimation or compensation. By permitting Tayag to construct his
building, and purchase and install the machinery for the operation of the ricemill,
respondent Judge exposed him to much greater damage than that which could possibly
have resulted had the writ of preliminary injunction been maintained until the final
disposition of the case.
SAN RAFAEL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and JACINTO C. LEAÑO vs.

THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-26833 and L-26834, July 28, 1972, MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts:
The City of Manila advertised for and received bids for the construction of the
garbage and refuse disposal plants plant in accordance with Ordinance No. 5274. The
Committee on Awards held hearings in order to study and evaluate for itself the various
bids submitted. However, the Committee on Awards decided to reject all the bids on the
ground that none of them complied with the requirement in the ordinance that the
garbage and refuse disposal plant should be capable of being operated on a self-
liquidating basis.New specifications were drawn up, including the condition that the
incinerator plant must be pollution free and must never be a nuisance. An "Invitation to
Bid" was then published in the Official Gazette. Two civil cases were filed, which were
eventually consolidated, and a restraining order was issued to stop the scheduled
bidding, but was subsequently lifted. The lower court dismissed the prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, which led to this appeal, primarily contending that the advertised
bidding for an incinerator was in excess of the respondents' authority because an
incinerator is a nuisance per se.
Issue:
Is the prayer for writ of preliminary injunction proper against the bidding for the
supposed plants?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the petition is premature. It cannot rule on a
theoretical basis that the bid submitted should not be opened, or if opened should not
be accepted, because not one of the plants therein offered would serve the purpose
envisioned and it is automatically assumed that the plants will pollute the environment
as to constitute a nuisance. If and when such a result becomes a reality, or at least a
threat, then can the petitioners come to court.It is even a possibility that none of the bids
submitted to the respondents will be accepted for failure to come up to the standards
required by the specifications, and should an award be made notwithstanding such
failure, demonstrable in court, then a suit for prohibition would be proper.
Digested by: Eunice L. Ambrocio
PEDRO J. VELASCO V. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

GR. No. L-18390. August 6, 1971.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
In 1948, Pedro Velasco bought from the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
three (3) adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman,
Quezon City. He subsequently sold two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot,
which was farthest from the street-corner, where he built his house. In September 1953,
Meralco started the construction of the sub-station in question and finished it the
following November.It was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the
Velasco’s house. And it is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the
substation.
Issue:
Whether there is actionable nuisance in the present case.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held stated that as a general rule, everyone is bound to bear
the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and
so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the
prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the
neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage,
being guilty of causing nuisance.
In several jurisprudence, it has been held that, a noise may constitute an actionable
nuisance, but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort of
ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in
a peculiar position or of specially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance. In the absence of statute, noise becomes actionable only when it
passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the
needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of
quantity or quality. They depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They
may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning ordinances.
In this case, the Supreme Court relied on quantitative measurements shown by the
records. Samplings of the sound intensity were taken and the impartial and objective
evidence points that the sound emitted by the substation transformers are at a much
higher level than the ambient sound of the locality. Thus, the noise continuously
emitted, day and night, constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the Velasco is
entitled to relief. And Meralco must adopt the necessary measures to deaden or reduce
the sound at the Velasco’s house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition
made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is manifestly
impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who
are being serviced from the substation.
RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97477. May 8, 1992.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
The Municipality of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur is the owner of a parcel of
residential land located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur with an area of
5,894 square meters and such was reserved for public plaza under Presidential
Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968. the municipality leased an area of 1,350
square meters to Vicente Medina and FortunataRosellonsubject to the condition that
they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes. In time, they were
asked to vacate but they refused to do so. Thus, the planned construction of a municipal
gymnasium within the public plaza could not continue due to the presence of buildings
constructed by Medina and Rosellon. Therefore, the appropriation for the construction
of the gymnasium might be reverted back to the national government which would result
to “irreparable damage, injury and prejudice” to the municipality and its people who are
expected to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project.
Issue:
Whether there is cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under Article 694.
Ruling:
Yes. The complaint filed by the petitioners alleges factual circumstances of a complaint
for abatement of public nuisance. The complaint states: that municipality is the owner of
a parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 365 which is reserved for a
public plaza; that the private respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by
the former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land constructing buildings thereon;
that the private respondents refused to vacate the premises despite demands; that the
municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the area financed by
appropriations provided by the national government; and that the appropriations are in
danger of being reverted to the national treasury because the construction had to be
stopped in view of the refusal of the private respondents to vacate the area.
Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies against a public
nuisance:
1. (1)A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
2. (2)A civil action; or
3. (3)Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon can be
abated summarily by the municipality.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. VS. JAC LINER, INC.

G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Facts:
JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from
Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City of
Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as
unconstitutional on the ground that it is an invalid exercise of police power, an undue
taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies. The said ordinances provide that an exclusive franchise for twenty five
years, renewable for another twenty five years, will be granted to one entity for the
construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena
City. The aim of such is to alleviate the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused
by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.JAC Liner, who
maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.
Issue:
Whether there is cause of action for abatement of public nuisance.
Ruling:
No.Bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. The Supreme
Court held that the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from
that franchised to petitioner, cannot be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem. If terminals lack adequate space and bus drivers are compelled to load
and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals must be instituted, and deny permit to operate for
those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, the scope
of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all.
Terminals are not public nuisances because their operation is a legitimate business
which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort
of the community.
If terminals are indeed nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of
traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. And unless a thing is
nuisance per se, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as
what was done in the case at bar.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. V. GUILLERMO BALANDAN,

G.R. No. L-3422. June 13, 1952
BENGZON, J.:
Facts:
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo,
Laguna. In its premises two tanks full of water was installed. The tanks was used as
cooling purposes of its engine. Thetanks were not covered by any kind of fence or top
covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
Its entrance was continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said
commodity passed, and anyone could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased.
There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, Guillermo
Balandan’s son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, while playing with and in
company of other boys of his age, entered the factory premises through the gate, to
take a bath in one of said tanks; and while bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank
and died of drowing.
Issue:
Whether the tanks are classified as attractive nuisance.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s tanks cannot be claimed as attractive nuisance.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play,
and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the
child is technically a trespasser in the premises.”
The Indiana Appellate Court held in the case of Anderson vs. Reith-Riley, "Nature has
created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that
they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature
without adding any new danger, * * * (he) is not liable because of having created an
'attractive nuisance.'
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question
whether Hidalgo Enterprises had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial.
CITY OF CEBU V. JUDGE IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111. May 7, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
An administrative complaint filed by the City of Cebu against retired Judge Ireneo Lee
Gako, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Among the charges filed against him
was willful violation of rules and laws in Civil Case No. CEB-26066: Roy Feliciano, et al.
vs. City of Cebu, et al.This case is one for injunction against City of Cebu’s issuance
and implementation of a Demolition Order against the houses/structures of Feliciano, et
al., for having physically and publicly occupied a road lot and sidewalk at the North
Reclamation Area in Cebu City. During hearing, Felicianoadmittedin open court their
occupancy of the sidewalk.Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which, among
others, obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street. The
law allows the summary demolition or removal of the structures considered as public
nuisance. Thus, due to such admission, a motion to dismiss the complaint was filed.
The respondent judge however, instead of dismissing the complaint, proceeded with the
trial. Thus, City of Cebu claims that there is willful violation of foregoing laws and rules.
Issue:
Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss constitutes an administrative offense.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court finds no merit in this case.
The complainant have failed to clearly prove error or ill will on the part of the respondent
judge in denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-26066. Judge Gako may
have erred in denying the motion, however, the City of Cebu have appealed or
petitioned for the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
It has been held that it is a fundamental rule that where the remedies of appeal and/or
certiorari are available, recourse to an administrative complaint for the correction of
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety is improper.
ELISEO F. SORIANO V. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m, Eliseo Soriano, host of the program Ang
Dating Daanmade obscene remarks against the minister of Iglesiani Cristo (INC). Two
days after, two complaints was lodged against him in connection with the said
broadcast. The Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)
conducted a hearing on the matter and issued an order of preventive suspension of the
TV Program.
Issue:
Whether the utterances made by Soriano is a protected form of speech.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement,
insulting or “fighting words,” i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.
And Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, with respect to the average child.
Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. And the suspension MTRCB imposed
was a permissible restriction.
In agreement with the MTRCB, the court cited excerpts from the case, Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation, “This case does not
involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a
telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in
either setting would justify any sanction. x xxThe [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a
nuisance rationale under which context is all important. The concept requires
consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC]. The
content of the program in which the language is used will affect the composition of the
audience x xx. As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a right thing
in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.’ We simply hold that
when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory
power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.”
The utterances made are the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative,
nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling
state interests.One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television when
unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a “pig in
the parlor.” Public interest would be served if the “pig” is reasonably restrained or even
removed from the “parlor.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RUFINO V. MIJARES

G.R. Nos. 170615-16. July 9, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
The controversy involved a parcel of land owned by the Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) located in Barangay Pinugay, Baras, Rizal. There
was a dispute between PHILCOMSAT and members of Southern Pinugay Farmers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (SPFMPCI) on whether the subject land is covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). During pendency of the
proceedings, respondent Mayor Roberto G. Ferrera issued an order directing
respondent Engr. Romeo Querubin to demolish the houses and improvements
introduced by the members of the SPFMPCI. And Commissioner Rufino V. Mijares
issued an order stating no objection to the order of demolition. FerreradirectedQuerubin
to implement the order. He also sought police assistance. Thus, the houses and
improvements on the subject land were demolished and destroyed.
Issue:
Whether the summary demolition of the houses and improvements introduced by the
SPFMPCI members was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The parcel of land involved in this case hosts the Philippine Space
Communications Center which consists of a satellite earth station that serves as the
communications gateway of the Philippines to more than two-thirds of the world. It was
declared by P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, as a security zone to ensure
its security and uninterrupted operation considering the vital role of the earth station in
the country’s telecommunications and national development.
The SPFMPCI members occupied and introduced improvements in the parcel of land
under no right, title or vested interest whatsoever. The parcel of land involved in this
case is asecurity zone whose operations must be protected from any form of disruption.
It must be protected from all types of squatters, including the SPFMPCI members, who
might create danger to a very important national telecommunications facility.
Thus, respondentsacted within the limits of the law when they implemented the
demolition.
Digested by: Kareen Mae B. Baucan
GUILLERMO M. TELMO vs. LUCIANO M. BUSTAMANTE
G.R. No. 182567 July 13, 2009

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Luciano M. Bustamante is a co-owner of a real property

known as Lot 952-A. PetitionerGuillermo Telmo who was the Municipal Engineer of
Naic, Cavite, and ElizaldeTelmo are the owners of the two parcels of land denominated
as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of the lot of respondent.
When his lot was transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay
Road, respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused
because they said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by
the road’s 10-meter easement.
Respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, the Telmos and their men
allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. As a result, respondent filed administrative
charges against petitioner. Petitioner contends that the property claimed and enclosed
with concrete posts by respondent was validly taken by the National Government
through its power of eminent domain, for the creation of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay
Road. In this context, petitioner contends that the concrete posts erected by respondent
were a public nuisance under Article 694 (4) of the Civil Code, more particularly a
nuisance per se, which may be summarily abated under Article 699 (3) of the same
Code.
ISSUE: Are the concrete posts nuisance per se?
RULING: No, the concrete posts are not nuisance per se. A nuisance per se is that
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts summarily
removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and
properties, which would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What
they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free
passage of people to and from the national road.

EMILIO GANCAYCO vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011
SERENO, J.
FACTS: In 1950’s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land

located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue EDSA, Quezon City. On 1956, the
Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, an ordinance requiring the
construction of arcades for commercial buildings. At the time Ordinance No. 2904 was
passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the Congress.
Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created
by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from
the property line. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-
storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No.
2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City
Council acted favorably on the request of Justice Gancayco, subject to the condition
that upon notice by the City Engineer, he will demolish the enclosure of said arcade at
his own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority conducted

operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City. The MMDA
was authorized to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other
public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. The MMDA sent
a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated
the National Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice
Gancayco fifteen days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an
arcade along EDSA. Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the
lapse of the fifteen days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or the wing
walls, of the ground floor structure. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of
the building was being used as a restaurant.
Justice Gancayco filed a Petitionwith prayer for a temporary restraining order

and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to prohibit the
MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. The
Regional Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of Justice Gancayco. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction
against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. However, it also ruled
that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property and
stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate
nuisances.
ISSUE: Is the wing wall of the building of petitioner a public nuisance?
RULING: No, the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The fact that in
1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an
arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The
wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and
property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily
make that structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs
the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is
that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be
abated under the undefined law of necessity.
When Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city
council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be
a threat to the safety of persons and property.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. MMDA illegally
demolished the property of Justice Gancayco. The authority to order the demolition of
any structure lies with the Building Official.
JAIME S. PEREZ vs. SPOUSES FORTUNITO L. MADRONA and YOLANDA B.

PANTE
G.R. No. 184478 March 21, 2012
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: Respondent-spouses FortunitoMadrona and Yolanda B. Pante are

registered owners of a residential property. Respondents built their house thereon and
enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. Respondents received a letter from
petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office, stating that the
construction of their house violated the National Building Code of the Philippines, Anti-
Squatting Law, and Republic Act No. 917 as amended by Section 23, PD. No. 17, DO
No. 4 Series of 1987 (Illegally occupied/constructed improvements within the road right-
of-way). Respondent Madrona sent petitioner a letter stating that the letter of petitioner
has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish
their structure.
More than a year, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents and gave
the respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly
protruding to the sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint for injunction
before the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court issued a temporary restraining
order against petitioner. It also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is
a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is
there basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to
justify its summary demolition. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed decision affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Is the fence of respondents a nuisance per se?
RULING: No, the fence of respondents is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is
not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure
the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly
pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that
respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a
nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is
unwarranted.
If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the

sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to
heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents’
supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a
nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention.In the
abatement of nuisances, Article 694 until Article 707 of the Civil Code must be observed
and followed.
AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID

HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA
G.R. No. 104769 March 3, 2000
PARDO, J.:
FACTS: Investco, Inc. was the owner of six (6) parcels of raw land, located in
Quezon City and Marikina. Investco, Inc. agreed to sell the six (6) parcels of land to
Solid Homes. The contract of sale to Solid Homes was not registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Marikina nor annotated on the original titles issued in the name of Investco,
Inc. After paying the amount of the downpayment, and the first four (4) semi-annual
installments and a portion of the fifth installment, Solid Homes made no further payment
to Investco, Inc. The postdated checks issued by Solid Homes to Investco, Inc. intended
for the remaining installments were dishonored, leaving a balance of P4,300,282.91 due
under the contract in Investco, Inc.'s favor. Investco, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial
Court an action for specific performance and damages against Solid Homes, Inc. In the
complaint, Investco, Inc. sought to collect from Solid Homes, Inc. the sum of the
balance on the purchase price due under the contract. Solid Homes filed with the
Register of Deeds of Marikina a notice of lispendens with reference to Civil Case No.
40615 requesting that the same be annotated on the titles in Investco, Inc.'s name. The
notice of lispendens was recorded as Entry No. 117191 of the Primary Entry Book,
Volume 14 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. However,
the notice of lispendens was not actually annotated on the titles in the name of Investco,
Inc. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Investco, Inc. ordering Solid Homes to
pay Investco, Inc. the balance of the purchase price.
Investco, Inc. offered to sell the property to AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.
Investco, Inc. furnished AFP MBAI with certified true copies of the titles covering the
Marikina property. The AFP MBAI verified the titles with the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila and found that copies of the titles that Investco, Inc. gave were
genuine and faithful reproductions of the original titles on file with the Register of Deeds.
AFP MBAI noted that there were no liens or encumbrances annotated on the titles. After
determining that the Investco property was suitable for the housing project of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and that the titles covering the same were clean and genuine,
AFP MBAI agreed to purchase the same from Investco. Investco, Inc. executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale conveying the property to AFP MBAI. The Register of Deeds of
Marikina issued Transfer Certificates of Titlein the name of AFP MBAI. The titles issued
were clean and contained no annotation of any lien, encumbrance, or adverse claim by
a third party. Solid Homes commenced action before the Regional Trial Court against
the Register of Deeds, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. for annotation of lispendens and
damages with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The trial court
rendered decision ordering the Register of Deeds to annotate the Notice of Lis
Pendens, on the titles registered in the name of defendant AFP MBAI, and declaredAFP
MBAI as a buyer in bad faith. The Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.
ISSUE: Is Solid Homes entitled to the annotation of its notice of lispendens on the
titles of Investco, Inc. and AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc?
RULING: No, Solid Homes is not entitled to the annotation of its notice
of lispendens on the titles of Investco, Inc. and AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. Lis
pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation while
a notice of lispendensis an announcement to the whole world that a particular real
property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the
said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over the said property.
Notice of lispendens may be annotated only where there is an action or

proceeding in court which affects title to or possession of real property. Here, the
Register of Deeds of Marikina denied the annotation of the notice of lispendens on the
ground that the complaint in Civil Case No. 40615 was for collection of a sum of money
and did not involve the titles to or possession of the subject property. Investco's
complaint was an action for collection of sums of money, damages and attorney's
fees to recover from Solid Homes unpaid installments on the purchase price of the
subject property. The case was an action for collection of unpaid installments on the
purchase price of subject real property. In such case, the annotation of a notice
of lispendens on the titles of the property was not proper as the action was
in personam. The doctrine of lispendens is inapplicable to this case. The Register of
Deeds of Marikina correctly denied the annotation of the notice of lispendens on the
titles of Investco, Inc. and the AFP MBAI.
The rule that all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate of
Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title applies in this
case. In the absence of anything to excite suspicion, the buyer is not obligated to look
beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the
certificate.
Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part
of a possessor rests the burden of proof. Here, Solid Homes alleged that Investco, Inc.
and AFP MBAI confederated with each other in entering into the aforementioned sale in
order to deprive Solid Homes of its rights over subject properties under the Contract to
Sell and to Buy. However, Solid Homes adduced no evidence to prove such allegation
of bad faith.
Therefore, contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, AFP MBAI was a
purchaser in good faith and for value, and, consequently, acquired valid and
indefeasible titles to the Investco, Inc., property.
FELICITACION B. BORBAJO, vs.HIDDEN VIEW HOMEOWNERS, INC., SPS.

MARCELINA A. SARCON, ELY D. SARCON, ROBERTO ALVAREZ, CORAZON
NOMBRADO, and GILBERT ANDRALES
G.R. No. 152440 January 31, 2005
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: Jose C. Bontuyan, Lucy Solon, Georgina Solon, Helen Solon and Vicente
Solon, Jr. were the registered owners of a parcel of agricultural land denominated as
Lot 10183-A. At the instance of Bontuyan, the property was surveyed to convert it into a
subdivision. The corresponding subdivision plan, showing three (3) road lots as such,
was submitted to the Cebu Office of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. Meanwhile, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the Solons and
following the subdivision scheme in the plan, Bontuyan sold the resulting lots to different
individuals. Among the lots sold are the ones which later became the subject of this
case, the three (3) road lots. The road lots were sold to petitioner Felicitacion B.
Borbajo, and Prescillana B. Bongo. Bontuyan proceeded to develop a subdivision which
was later named Hidden View Subdivision I by its residents and homeowners.
Borbajo also decided to develop into a subdivision the other properties adjacent
to Hidden View Subdivision I which she acquired. She named this new subdivisions ST
Ville Properties and Hidden View Subdivision II. The two new subdivision projects were
located at the back of Hidden View Subdivision I. The residents and homeowners
of Hidden View Subdivision I heard reports that Borbajo had purchased the entire
subdivision from Bontuyan. They also heard that they have no right to use the road lots,
since the lots have already been registered in Borbajo’s name. When confronted by the
homeowners about her claim that she had bought the subdivision from Bontuyan,
Borbajo confirmed her claim of ownership over the subdivision and the road lots. She
also told them that they have no right regarding the road right-of-way.
The homeowners caused the construction of a guardhouse at the entrance

of Hidden View Subdivision I and hired the services of a security guard to prevent
unauthorized persons and construction vehicles from passing through their subdivision.
The measures adversely affected the residents of the subdivisions at the back, as well
as Borbajo herself since her delivery trucks and heavy equipment used in the
construction of her housing projects then on-going had been effectively prevented from
passing through the road lots. As a result, Borbajo filed before the Regional Trial Court
an action for damages and injunction against Hidden View Homeowners, Inc. The trial
court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective for seventy-two (72) hours. After
due hearing, it also granted Borbajo’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision.
ISSUE: Can the respondents legally prevent Borbajo from using and passing
through the three (3) road lots within Hidden View Subdivision I?
RULING: No, respondents cannot legally close the road lots because these are
intended for public use.As a registered co-owner of the road lots, Borbajo is entitled to
avail of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code–jus utendi, fruendi, abutendi,
disponendi et vindicandi. Article 428 of the New Civil Code is explicit that the owner has
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. A co-owner, such as Borbajo, is entitled to use the property owned in common
under Article 486 of the Civil Code. Therefore, respondents cannot close the road lots to
prevent Borbajo from using the same.
With Borbajo as a registered co-owner of the road lots, it is pointless to discuss whether
she is entitled to the easement of right of way. From the text of Article 649 of the Civil
Code, the dominant estate cannot be the servient estate at the same time. One of the
characteristics of an easement is that it can be imposed only on the property of another,
never on one’s own property. An easement can exist only when the servient and the
dominant estates belong to different owners.
SOLID MANILA CORPORATIONvs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The
same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private
respondent corporation. The title of private respondent came from a prior owner, and in
their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way, a portion thereof
measuring nine hundred fourteen square meters (914 s.q.), more or less, had been
converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates. The petitioner
claims that ever since, it had, as well as other residents of neighboring estates, made
use of the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until in 1983,
when the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
The petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to
have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo
shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates.
Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted on the grounds that the
easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the
dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner;
and the petitioner has another adequate outlet. The trial court rendered judgment
against the private respondent. The private respondent appealed to the respondent
Court of Appeals.In reversing the trial court decision, the Court of Appeals held that the
summary judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the
defense set up by the private respondent that the easement in question had been
extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere limitation on
ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the
private respondent had acquired title to the property, merger brought about an
extinguishment of the easement.
The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the
very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of
the property excluded the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the alley as an easement notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement exists on the property.

RULING: Yes,an easement exists on the property in this case. An easement, as
described in the deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the seller,
had been constituted on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title. The act of respondent, therefore,
of erecting steel gates across the alley was in defiance of these conditions and a
violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude of way. The injunction prayed
for by the petitioner was and is proper in this case. It is hardly the point that the private
respondent is the owner of the portion on which the right-of-way had been established
and that an easement cannot impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the
easement or any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the
private respondent respect the easement already existing thereon. The petitioner is
moreover agreed that the private respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it
has failed to observe the limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same.
It is true that the sale did include the alley.As a mere right-of-way, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. Servitudes are
merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot,
however, be alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately. The fact, however,
that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no
argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it
operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his
right to use (jus utendi).
Albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property ––
including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right
to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in
favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general
public.
SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ vs. OLGA RAMISCAL
G.R. No. 137882 February 04, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land

located at the corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City.
Petitioners Spouses Elizabeth and Alfredo De La Cruz are occupants of a parcel of
land, located at the back of Ramiscal’s property, registered in the name of Concepcion
de la Peña, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz.The subject matter of this case is a
1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent which is being
used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public
highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and
roof. Respondent leased her property to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also
owned a property adjacent to that of respondent’s. Phil. Orient Motors sold its property
to San Benito Realty. After the sale, relocation survey and location plan were prepared
for both contiguous properties of respondent and San Benito Realty. It was only then
that respondent discovered that the pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her
property.
Respondent immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the structure

constructed by them on said pathway without her knowledge and consent. As her letter
to petitioners went unheeded, the former referred the matter to the Barangay for
conciliation proceedings, but the parties arrived at no settlement. Hence, respondent
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, seeking the demolition of the structure
allegedly illegally constructed by petitioners on her property. Respondent asserted in
her complaint that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other
than the current one they are using, which she owns.On the other hand, petitioners
contend that respondent knew all along of the 1.10-meter pathway and had, in fact,
tolerated their use thereof.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondent. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners.
ISSUE: Did respondent voluntarily accord petitioners a right of way?
RULING: No, respondent did not accord petitioners a right of way. Petitioners failed
to show by competent evidence other than their bare claim that they and their tenants,
spouses Manuel and Cecilia Bondoc and CarmelinoMasangkay, entered into an
agreement with respondent, through her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the pathway to
18th Avenue, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide
easement by the owner of another adjacent estate.
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document evidencing such
agreement. Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the foreman, Mang
Puling, who talked with them regarding said pathway on the northern side of
respondent’s property. The petitioners did not talk to the respondent about said
arrangement. The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on respondent’s property
was constructed at a distance of 1.10 meters away from the property line, does not by
itself bolster the veracity of petitioners’ story that there was indeed such an
agreement.The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on respondent’s property was
constructed at a distance of 1.10 meters away from the property line, does not by itself
bolster the veracity of petitioners’ story that there was indeed such an agreement.
Furthermore, it was the counsel of Phil. Orient Motors who wrote petitioners advising
them that his client would close the pathway along 18th Avenue, thereby implying that it
was Phil. Orient Motors, respondent’s lessee, which tolerated petitioners’ use of said
pathway.
The contention of petitioners that they are legally entitled to the pathway under
Article 649 of the Civil Code, is also untenable.Article 649 states that the owner, or any
person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to
proof of the following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is
not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.31 The first
three requisites are not obtaining in the instant case.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, Concepcion de la Peña provided petitioners

with an adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue.Inasmuch as
petitioners have an adequate outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano Avenue), they
have no right to insist on using a portion of respondent’s property as pathway towards
18th Avenue and for which no indemnity was being paid by them.
Digested by: Ezer Ivan Bacayo
Spouses Valdez vs. Tabisula
G.R. No. 175510, July 28, 2008
CarpioMorales, J.
Facts:
Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad
Tabisula a parcel of land. Contained in the deed of sale is a stipulation that the Sps. Valdez ‘shall be
provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not
included in this sale. Sps. Tabisula then built a concrete wall on the subject property. Feeling betrayed by
said act of Sps. Tabisula based on the deed of sale’s intended road right of way, Sps. Valdez reported the
matter the brgy. Lupon but it was in vain which constrained Sps. Valdez to file a case for specific
performance against the Tabisulas with the RTC. The Sps. Tabisula contended that :1: Sps. Valdez and
family also are the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining properties
have access to two public roads ; and 2: they could not have agreed to providing petitioners an
easement “on the western side of their lot” as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot
where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected long before the subject property was
sold to the Valdez’s; thus , the easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject
property and not from theirs.
RTC dismissed the Sps. Valdez’s complaint. On appeal, Sps. Valdez were again turned down.
Issue:
Are the Sps. Valdez are entitled to the right of way as provided for in the deed of sale?
Held:
No. To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites
must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of
the dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites
lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein Sps. Valdez.
Since the Sps. Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no
right to demand the grant by the Sps. Tabisula of an easement on the “western side of the Tabisula’s
lot.”; it appearing that the Sps. Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining
the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways.
Unisource vs. Chung
G.R. No. 173252,July 17, 2009
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of

which contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement carried over from the OCT of
Encarnacion S. Sandico declaring that Francisco Hidalgo has the right to open doors in the course of his
lot and to pass through the land of EncarnacionSandico, until the bank of the estero that goes to the
Pasig River, and towards the right of a Callejon. The annotation does not expressly provide that it will be
binding to the heirs and assigns of the parties. Furthermore, the property of Hidalgo was already
subdivided.
The memorandum of encumbrance was consistently annotated at the back of every title
covering Sandico’s property until it was acquired by the petitioner. Hidalgo’s property, on the other
hand was eventually transferred to respondents Joseph, Kia and Cleto all surnamed Chung.
Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on
the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street
which was granted but the trial court but eventually reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Can the easement be cancelled by the petitioners who own the servient estate on the ground
that that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road?
2. Is the easement binding only between Hidalgo and Sandico since the annotation did not
expressly provide the intention to bind their heirs and assigns?
Held:
1. No. Petitioner itself admitted that the existing easement is voluntary. The opening of an
adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity. This easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Art.
631,NCC)
2. A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract that is generally effective
between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
EmetriaLiwag vs. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 189755,July 4, 2012
Sereno, J.
Facts:
Marcelo acquired several parcels of land in a subdivision from FGR Sales. In a certain lot, there
was a water facility. It was being used by the residents of the subdivision for 30 years. Marcelo then sold
the lot to petitioner’s late husband. When petitioner’s husband died, she wrote a letter to respondent
demanding the removal of the water facility. Respondent filed an action with the HLURB arbiter to annul
the sale of the lot. The action was ruled in favor of respondent and the lot was declared open space. The
HLURB reversed the decision. Upon appeal to the OP, the decision of the HLURB Arbiter was affirmed.
The CA also affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Was there an easement for water facility that existed on the subject lot?
Held:
Yes. In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11, Block 5 of the Subdivision for
the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used incessantly without
human intervention, and because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which
reveals its use to the public.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the existence of the water tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is
merely tolerated, we find that the easement of water facility has been voluntarily established either by
Marcelo, the Subdivision owner and developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-in-interest and the
original developer of the Subdivision. For more than 30 years, the facility was continuously used as the
residents’ sole source of water. The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years. It is therefore clear that an easement of
water facility has already been acquired through prescription.
LeogarioRonquillo, et al. vs. Jose Roco
G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958
Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Petitioners LeogarioRonquillo has been in continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or

passage way in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land
and back, for more than 20 years. Said road or passage way traversed the land of Vicente Roco y
Dominguez.
The respondents, who were successors-in-interest of the late Vicente Roco had long respected
the private legal easement of road right of way of Ronquillo. However, in 1953, respondent Jose Roco,
with malice constructed a chapel in the middle of the road right of way.
In 1954, respondent Natividad Roco, with their man violently placed wooden posts, barbed
wires which totally closed the road.
Ronquillo then filed a complaint before the CFI, but it was dismissed. Hence, this
appeal.Ronquillo alleged that they had acquired the right of way over the land of the Rocos by
prescription by their uninterrupted and continuous use of the narrow strip of land for 20 years.
Issue:
Has Ronquillo acquired an easement of right of way by prescription?
Held:
No. They have not acquired an easement of right of way. An easement of right of way, although
apparent is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent and therefore, cannot be acquired through
prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under the New Civil Code(as well as the old), easements may
be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or
less long intervals and which depend upon acts of men(then art 532 and 615). Continuous and apparent
easements are acquired either by title or prescription. Continuous non-apparent ones and discontinuous
ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (then art 537 and 539 of the Old
Civil code and art 620 and 622 of the NCC).
Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion that the easement of right of way is a
discontinuous one. It is evident therefore that no vested right by a user from time immemorial had been
acquired by the Ronquillo for no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event.
National Power Corporationvs. Sps. Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Ma. Clara Lopez-Campos
G.R. No. 143643, June 27, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
Facts:
Respondent was the owner of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1970, Dr. Paulo Campos, President
of Cavite Electric Cooperative, requested respondents to grant petitioner a right-of-way over a portion
of the subject property. Electric posts and transmission lines would be installed along the way.
Respondents acceded to the request provided that it would only be temporary. However, petitioner
continued to use the subject property without compensating the respondents therefor. They discovered
that the subject property was to be expropriated. Respondents then filed an action for sum of money
and damages against petitioner. The petitioners claim that, under Article 620 of the Civil Code, it had
already acquired by prescription the easement of right-of-way over that portion of the subject property
where its wooden electric posts and transmission lines were erected. The RTC ruled in favor of
respondents and the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Did petitioner acquire a right-of-way through prescription?
Held:
No. In this case, the records clearly reveal that the petitioner’s possession of that portion of the
subject property where it erected the wooden posts and transmission lines was merely upon the
tolerance of the respondents. Accordingly, this permissive use by the petitioner of that portion of the
subject property, no matter how long continued, will not create an easement of right-of-way by
prescription.
Possession is the fundamental basis of prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary. The

petitioner never acquired the requisite possession in this case. Its use of that portion of the subject
property where it erected the wooden poles and transmission lines was due merely to the tacit license
and tolerance of the respondents. As such, it cannot be made the basis of the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way by prescription.
Fe P. Velascovs. Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.and The City Of Davao
G.R. No. L-33507, July 20, 1981
De Castro, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Fe Velasco alleged when she bought Lot 77-B2 from the original owner in 1965. Then,
Bolton Street was already exiting. Without ascertaining the monuments along Bolton Street, she had her
house constructed on her said lot and built a fence along said Bolton Street which she believed to be the
boundary between her lot and said street and in line with other fences already existing when she bought
said lot.
In 1970, after a relocation of the monuments of her lot, Velasco discovered that the Bolton
Street of the Respondent Davao City had encroached at least 25 sq. m. with dimension of 10meters by
47.5 meters.
She then filed a complaint with the CFI of Davao in order to quiet her title to the said portion.
She alleged that because of the continued illegal occupation of the said portion by the City of Davao, it
had cast a cloud on her title over the potion occupied that was valued at P400 per sq. m.
The CFI ruled in favor of the City of Davao ruling that the continuous possession did not cast a
cloud on her title. The lower court declared that such is an easement or burden on the property and
must stay there.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
1. Was the property of Velasco subject to an easement?
2. Should the mode of acquisition of the easement that Bolton Street only be by virtue of a title?
Held:
1. Yes, it was subject of an easement of a public highway.It appears on the face of the complaint
that Bolton St. has been where it is from since time immemorial. When the mother title of petitioner’s
TCT, which was an OCT issued in 1911, it was issued subject to the provisions of Section39 of Act 496:
Section 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance to a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchasers of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith
shall hold the same free of all encumbrances, except for those noted on said certificate, and any of the
following uncumberances which may be subsisting namely:
XXXthird, any public highway, way, private way, or any government irrigation, canal, or lateral
thereof…”
From the foregoing provision, Bolton highway which is a public highway was already subsisting
when the OCT was issued in 1911. This fact was deemed to have attached as a legal encumberance to
the lot originally registered, Lot 77-b2, notwithstanding the lack of an annotation thereof in the OCT.
Velasco, therefore, could not rely, as she almost entirely did for the relief she sought, on the
aforequoted provision, which she had repeatedly cited but without making mention, perhaps
conveniently, of the exception as expressly provided in the later part of the legal provision invoked.
2. No. Once indubitably appears as it does, from the allegations of the complaint itself that
Bolton St. constituted an easement of public highway on the lot of Velasco when the lot was originally
registered, it remained such an encumbrance as if it had been duly noted on the certificate of title, it
being admitted that the public highway was already subsisting at the time of registration.
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF

MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR.
G.R. No. 124699. July 31, 2003
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents, Sergio Valdez, Angelina
Valdez-Novabos, Teresita Argawanon-Mangubat and Daylinda Argawanon-Melendres
(heirs of Valdez), purchased from Feliciana Santillan in 1935, a parcel of unregistered
land covered by a tax declaration with an area of 1 hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares,
located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu. He took possession of the property and
declared it for tax purposes in his name. Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of
the land from north to south was already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks
owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (Bomedco).
The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to Bomedco’s sugar mill.
When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, private respondents Heirs of
Valdez inherited the land. However, unknown to them, Bomedco was able to have the
disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the
Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire subject land was divided into 3,
namely, Cadastral Lot Nos. 953, 954 and 955. The 1st and 3rd lots remained in the
name of the heirs of Valdez while the 2nd however, the narrow lot where the railroad
tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its
name. It was not until 1989 when the heirs of Valdez discovered the aforementioned
claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands.
Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's claim
over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went
unheeded, as was their subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of
the land. Hence, the heirs of Valdez filed a “Complaint for Payment of Compensation
and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages with Application for
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction” against Bomedco before the RTC of Cebu.
They alleged that, before Santillan sold the land to Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan
granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years. When
Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the grant. The right of way expired
sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the land
because one of them was then an employee of the company. On the other hand,
Bomedco’s principal defense was that it was the owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot
No. 954, having allegedly bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the
sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. in 1935.
It also contended that the heirs of Valdez’s claim was already barred by prescription
and laches because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the property for
more than 50 years. The trial court rejected Bomedco's defense of ownership on the
basis of a prior sale citing that its evidence which is a xerox copy of the Deed of Sale
dated 1929 was inadmissible and had no probative value.
Nonetheless, the trial court held that Bomedco had been in possession of Cadastral Lot
No. 954 in good faith for more than 10 years, thus, it had already acquired ownership of
the property through acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code. It
declared that in view of the Bomedco’s uninterrupted possession of the strip of land for
more than 50 years, there was clear continuity of defendant’s possession of the strip of
land it had been using as railway tracks.
Thus, Bomedco’s apparent and continuous possession of said strip of land in good faith
for more than ten (10) years had made defendant owner of said strip of land traversed
by its railway tracks. The heirs of Valdez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
which found that Bomedco did not acquire ownership over the lot. It consequently
reversed the trial court. In its decision dated 1995, the appellate court held that
Bomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed and continuous use
of the land, but not ownership, under Article 620 of the Civil Code.
Bomedco contended that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the subject land, it
nevertheless became legally entitled to the easement of right of way over said land by
virtue of prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code where continuous and apparent
easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Bomedco acquired the easement of right of way by

prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code.
(2) Whether or not Bomedco was entitled to a conferment of a legal easement

of right of way.
Ruling:
(1) NO, it had not because it was a discontinuous easement and under Article
622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by title and not by prescription.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that the
railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in nature. The
more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and they continuously
occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement granted by
Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired).
Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969, Bomedco supposedly
acquired the easement of right of way over the subject land. Following the logic of the
courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of persons is permanently
cemented or asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes continuous in nature. The
reasoning is erroneous. Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either
continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according
to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such
easements.
Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the
intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it
is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if
a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of
vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous
because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes
over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon
the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the
nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather
the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into
apparent or non-apparent.
Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to
light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent. In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a
permanent railway does not make the right of way a continuous one; it is only apparent.
Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription. In Louisiana, it has also been held that
a right of passage over another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this
easement is discontinuous and can be established only by title. In this case, the
presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the existence
of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, BOMEDCO never acquired any title
over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary
succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its
acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of
a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not by prescription. To be sure,
beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way given to petitioner
BOMEDCO expired, its occupation and use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by
mere tolerance of the heirs of Valdez. Thus, upon demand by said heirs in 1989 for the
return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks, or, in the alternative,
payment of compensation for the use thereof, petitioner Bomedco which had no title to
the land should have returned the possession thereof or should have begun paying
compensation for its use.
(2) NO, it was not entitled for a conferment of a legal easement. But when is a
party deemed to acquire title over the use of such land (that is, title over the easement
of right of way)?
In at least two cases, we held that if: (a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual
right of way with the heirs for the continued use of the land under the principles of
voluntary easements or (b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a
legal easement of right of way under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title over the use
of the land is deemed to exist. The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under
Article 629 is subject to proof of the following: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3)
the isolation is not the result of its own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to the highway is the shortest. None of the above
options to acquire title over the railroad right of way was ever pursued by petitioner
despite the fact that simple resourcefulness demanded such initiative, considering the
importance of the railway tracks to its business. No doubt, it is unlawfully occupying and
using the subject strip of land as a railroad right of way without valid title yet it refuses to
vacate it even after demand of the heirs.
Furthermore, it tenaciously insists on ownership thereof despite a clear showing to the

contrary.
JUAN GARGANTOS vs. TAN YANON and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-14652. June 30, 1960
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
Facts:
The late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888
square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion
of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into 2 and then sold each portion to different persons.
One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio, who subsequently sold it to Vicente
Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927
to respondent Tan Yanon. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows
overlooking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building
thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by petitioner Juan
Gargantos. In 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor of Romblon for a permit
to demolish the roofing of the old camarin.
The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. Later,
Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order
to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon
opposed approval of this application. Later, the permit to build by Gargantos was
granted. Tan Yanon then filed an action with the CFI to restrain Gargantos from
constructing a building as should the construction proceed, the building would prevent
Tan Yanon from receiving light and enjoying the view through the windows of his house,
unless such building was erected at a distance of not less than 3 meters from the
boundary line between the 2 lots. The case as against the members of the Municipal
Council was subsequently dismissed with concurrence of plaintiff's council. The CFI
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Romblon and enjoined defendant from constructing his building unless he erects the
same at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line of his property,
in conformity with Article 673 of the New Civil Code. So, Gargantos filed this petition for
review of the appellate Court's decision. Gargantos argued that Tan Yanon has not
acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally forbidden Tan
Yanon from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement, hence the
prescriptive period never started.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view
against the property of Gargantos.
Ruling:
YES, the property of Tan Yanon had acquired an easement of light and view
against the property of Gargantos.
The two estates, now owned by Gargantos and Tan Yanon, were formerly owned by
just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both
properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in
such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the
portion now belonging to Gargantos. On said northeastern side of the house, there are
windows and doors which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and
doors were in existence when Tan Yanon purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The
deed of sale did not provide that the easement of light and view would not be
established.
This then is precisely the case covered by 624, which provides that the existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both,
shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a “title” so that the easement will
continue actively and passively unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is
made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and
windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title,
for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its
existence. It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is
to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either
estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but
one owner of both estates (Article 613). Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light
and view against Gargantos' property. By reason of this easement, Gargantos cannot
construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than 3
meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.
EDUARDO C. TAÑEDO vs. HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, ET AL.
GR No. L-66520. August 30, 1988
PADILLA, J.:
Facts:
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of

drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Tañedo. Nor did Cardenas stop
the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold said
lot to Tañedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank was continued by operation of law.
Private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2 contiguous parcels of land,
Lot A (140 sq. m.) and Lot B (612 sq. m.) situated in Cebu City which he had inherited
from Lourdes Cardenas. On Lot A, an apartment building was constructed. On the other
hand, the improvements on Lot B consisted of (1) a 4-door apartment of concrete and
strong materials, (2) a 2-storey house of strong materials, (3) a bodega of strong
materials and (4) a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots A and B. A
small portion of the apartment building on Lot A also stands on Lot B. In 1982,
Cardenas sold Lot A to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tanedo. Cardenas, on that same
day, also mortgaged Lot B to Tanedo as a security for the payment of a loan in the
amount of P10,000.00. Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot B only to Tanedo
in case he should decide to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot B services Lot A and the
apartment building on Lot A has a part standing on Lot B.
Cardenas, however, sold Lot B to the co-private respondent Spouses Romeo and
Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the sale, Tanedo offered to redeem the property from
Romeo Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Romeo Sim blocked the sewage pipe
connecting the building of Tanedo built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also
asked Tanedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching on Lot B. As a result,
Tanedo, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an action for legal
redemption and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, before the RTC of Cebu against the Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim,
Antonio Cardenas and his wife Mae Linda Cardenas, the Register of Deeds Cebu city,
and Banco Cebuano, Cebu city Development Bank.
Spouses Sim claimed that they are the absolute owners of Lot B and that Tanedo had
no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be
redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo. Cardenas, upon the other
hand, admitted that he had agreed to sell Lot B to Eduardo Tanedo and claimed by way
of cross-claim against the spouses Sim, that the Deed of Sale he had executed in favor
of said spouses was only intended as an equitable mortgage, to secure the payment of
amounts received by him from said spouses as petty loans. In answer to the cross-
claim, spouses Sim insisted that the sale executed by Cardenas of Lot -B in their favor
was an absolute one. In 1983, the spouses Sim filed motions to dismiss the complaint
and the cross-claim, for lack of cause of action. Acting upon these motions and other
incidental motions, the respondent judge Juanito Bernad dismissed both the complaint
and cross-claim. Hence, the present recourse by Tanedo.
Issue:
Whether or not easement in favor of Tanedo ceased.
Ruling:
NO, it did not. The use of the easement was continued by operation of law.
Article 624 of the Civil Code provides: The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be
considered should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision
shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
persons. In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of
drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Tanedo.
Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot
A before he sold said lot to Tanedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank was continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, spouses Sim, the new owners of the servient estate (Lot
B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT

CORP.
G.R. No. 165952. July 28, 2008
REYES, R.T. J.
Facts:
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land
in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39)
lots. It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen
(17) lots to respondent. Landex constructed a concrete wall on one of its lots. To
restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC in
Quezon City. Petitioner later filed supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the
newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for damages.
Landex claimed that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction
of the concrete wall. Landex also stated that Aneco has its own entrance to its property
along Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del Monte
Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible
when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold
ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed
of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
Issue:
Whether or not Aneco can claim easement rights against Landex.
Ruling:
No. Aneco does not have the right of easement against Landex.
The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner
(Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) sold it to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and
without the intention of pursuing the subdivision project.The law in point is Article 624 of
the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,

established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of
them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and
passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
Appellant Aneco knew from the very start that at the time of the sale, the 22 lots sold to
it were not intended as subdivision units, although the titles to the different lots have yet
to be consolidated. Consequently, the easement that used to exist on the subject lot
ceased when appellant Aneco and the former owner agreed that the lots would be
consolidated and would no longer be intended as a subdivision project.
Anent the issue of compulsory easement of right of way, the CA held that Aneco failed
to prove the essential requisites to avail of such right, thus:
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property of the servient owner and

is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient owner and is regarded as a
charge or encumbrance on the servient estate (Cristobal v. CA, 291 SCRA 122). The
essential requisites to be entitled to a compulsory easement of way are: 1) that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; 2) that proper indemnity has been paid; 3) that the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; 4) that the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
(Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122).

An in depth examination of the evidence adduced and offered by appellant Aneco,
showed that it had failed to prove the existence of the aforementioned requisites, as the
burden thereof lies upon the appellant Aneco.
GOLDCREST REALTY CORP. vs. CYPRESS GARDENS CONDOMINIUM CORP.
G.R. No. 171072. April 7, 2009

QUISUMBING, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of

Cypress Gardens, a tenstorey building located at Herrera Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of
Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and
incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to
manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the
land on which the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-67513. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level
penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under
Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the
management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to

the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas
pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in
1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the latter to vacate the
common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it built thereon.
Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between
the 8th and 9 th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby,
and the removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed
that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the said areas and for its refusal to
remove the questioned structures.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof deck’s
limited common area by Section 4c of the condominium’s Master Deed. It likewise
argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and
that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable
and inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.

Issue:
Did Goldcrest’s act impair the easement rights of Cypress?
Ruling:
Yes, Goldcrest impaired the easement granted to Cypress and it also illegally
altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in
any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it
which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter
or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of
its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose
the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate.
Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement. A careful scrutiny of
Goldcrest’s acts show that it breached a number of the aforementioned restrictions.
First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure were neither
necessary for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s limited area. Second, the weight
of the office structure increased the strain on the condominium’s foundation and on the
roof deck’s common limited area, making the easement more burdensome and adding
unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of
the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of the easement since it
illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and violated Section 4c of the
condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE vs. LEGASPI TOWERS 300

INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 147957. July 22, 2009
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land along the stretch

of Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Among them were contiguous lots covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 120311, 120312, 120313, and 127649 (now TCT No.
200760). Sometime in December 1975, Caruff obtained a loan from the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) to finance the construction of a 21-storey condominium
along Roxas Boulevard. The loan accommodation was secured by a real estate
mortgage over three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 120311, 120312, and
120313,[3] where Caruff planned to erect the condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the mortgaged parcels of

land. Along with the other appurtenances of the building constructed by Caruff, it built a
powerhouse (generating set) and two sump pumps in the adjacent lot covered by TCT
No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760). After the completion of the condominium project, it
was constituted pursuant to the Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), as the
Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
However, for Caruffs failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage
and acquired some of the properties of Caruff at the sheriffs auction sale held
on January 30, 1985. Through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the National
Government became the assignee and transferee of all its rights and titles to and
interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the properties it acquired from the
foreclosure of Caruffs mortgage.
On July 5, 1989, Legaspi Towers 300 filed a case for Declaration of the existence of an
easement before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 89-
49563. Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of constructing the powerhouse and
sump pumps on its property constituted a voluntary easement in favor of the
respondent. It prayed, among other things, that judgment be rendered declaring the
existence of an easement over the portion of the property covered by TCT No.
127649 (now TCT No. 200760) that was being occupied by the powerhouse and the
sump pumps in its favor, and that the Register of Deeds of Manila annotate the
easement at the back of said certificate of title. In its Answer with Counterclaim and
Cross-claim, APT alleged that Legaspi had no cause of action against it, because it was
but a mere transferee of the land. It acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 85-2952, free from any liens and/or
encumbrances. It was not a privy to any transaction or agreement entered into by and
between Caruff, Legaspi Towers, and the bank. It further alleged that the continued use
of the subject property by Legaspi Towers and the condominium owners without its
consent was an encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner and for which it should
be properly compensated.
Privatization Management Office (PMO), formerly APT, argues that the presence of the
generator set and sump pumps does not constitute an easement. They are mere
improvements and/or appurtenances complementing the condominium complex, which
has not attained the character of immovability. They were placed on the subject
property as accessories or improvements for the general use and comfort of the
occupants of the condominium complex.
PMO maintains that, as the generator set and sump pumps are improvements of the
condominium, the same should have been removed after Caruff undertook to deliver the
subject property free from any liens and encumbrances by virtue of the Decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 85-29512 approving the parties Compromise Agreement. It adds
that, in alienating the property in favor of APT/PMO, Caruff could not have intended to
include as encumbrance the voluntary easement.
PMO posits that respondent failed to present any evidence to prove the existence of the
necessary requisites for the establishment of an easement. There is no concrete
evidence to show that Caruff had a clear and unequivocal intention to establish the
placing of the generator set and sump pumps on the subject property as an easement in
favor of Legaspi Towers.
Lastly, PMO contends that Legaspi Towers is a squatter for having encroached on the
formers property without its consent and without paying any rent or indemnity. Petitioner
submits that respondents presence on the subject property is an encroachment on
ownership and, thus, cannot be properly considered an easement. It adds that an
easement merely produces a limitation on ownership, but the general right of ownership
of the servient tenement must not be impaired so as to amount to a taking of
property. When the benefit being imposed is so great as to impair usefulness of the
servient estate, it would amount to a cancellation of the rights of the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not Legaspi Towers 300 should be granted easement.

Ruling:
No, there is no true easement in this case.
Article 624 of the Civil Code is controlling, as it contemplates a situation where there
exists an apparent sign of easement between two estates established or maintained by
the owner of both. The law provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,

established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of
them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and
passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties alienates
one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates,
entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that
the easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed.
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE INC. (BAPCI) vs.

EDMUNDO O. OBIAS et al.
G.R. No. 172077. October 9, 2009
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
The Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at

Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO constructed a road
measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was
used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site
(Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations. BAPCI
acquired the assets of BISUDECO and filed a complaint against Obias et al for
unjustifiably barricading the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and
stones across it, preventing petitioner’s and the other sugar planter’s vehicles from
passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to
petitioner.
BAPCI alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an

agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides
that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange
for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner contends that through
prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way
over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it
when it bought BISUDECO’s assets. BAPCI prayed that Obias et al be permanently
ordered to restrain from barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free
passage.
Obias et al denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the
construction and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO,
surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the disputed road
on their properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously used the
disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents
claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the road since
BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire
country was then under Martial Law. Obias et al likewise denied that the road has
become a public road, since no public funds were used for its construction and
maintenance.
The RTC ruled that BAPCI failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there
was an agreement between BISUDECO and Obias et al for the construction of the
disputed road. Moreover, it held that petitioner did not acquire the same by prescription.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently
establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents
regarding the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, the CA also declared that an
easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by
prescription.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not there is an existing agreement between BISUDECO and

Obias et al leading to the right of easement claimed by BAPCI.
(2) Whether or not prescription had set in.
Ruling:
(1) BAPCI failed to prove the alleged agreement between BISUDECO and Obias et al.
For its part, the CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the said
agreement, to wit:
Like the lower court, we found no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence
of an agreement between BISUDECO and the defendants-appellants regarding the
construction and the use of the disputed road. The lower court correctly disbelieved the
plaintiffs-appellants contention that an agreement existed because there is simply no
direct evidence to support this allegation. BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial
evidence that are not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than an agreement
existed. By themselves, the circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited i.e., the
employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the defendants-appellants; the defendants-
appellants unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of the agreement is known to
everyone, etc. are events susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not necessarily
lead to BAPCIs desired conclusion. Additionally, the testimonies that the plaintiffs-
appellants presented are mainly hearsay, as not one among the witnesses had personal
knowledge of the agreement by reason of direct participation in the agreement or
because the witness was present when the agreement was concluded by the parties.
Thus, given the defendants-appellants categorical denial that an agreement existed, we
sustain the lowers conclusion that no agreement existed between BISUDECO and the
defendants-appellants.
Based on the foregoing, the inability of petitioner to prove the existence of an

agreement militates its allegations in herein petition. On this score, both the RTC and
the CA are one in ruling that petitioner had failed to prove the existence of the
agreement between BISUDECO and the respondents for the construction of the
road. Also, well-established is the rule that "factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the
factual findings of the trial court. Hence, this Court finds no reason to reverse such
findings.
(2) No. In order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an easement of
right-of-way, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an
agreement with the owners of the lands that said road traversed.
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit

of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by will of the parties (a
voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or
discontinuous. The easement of right of way – the privilege of persons or a particular
class of persons to pass over another’s land, usually through one particular path or linen
– is characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and
depends on the act of man. Because of this character , an easement of a right of way
may only be acquired by virtue of a title.
Art. 622 provides: Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones,

whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there
was such an agreement between BISUDECO and defendants. The lower court correctly
disbelieved the plaintiffs-appellants’ contention that an agreement existed because
there is simply no direct evidence to support this allegation. BAPCI submitted purely
circumstantial evidence that are not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than
an agreement existed. By themselves, the circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited
– i.e., the employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the defendants-appellants; the
defendants-appellants’ unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of the agreement
is known to everyone, etc. – are events susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not
necessarily lead to BAPCI’s desired conclusion. To stress, discontinuous easements
can only be acquired by title.
Digested by: MigrioVina O. Cagampang
CATALINO VALDERRAMAv. THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.

G.R. No. 23810, December 18, 1926
VILLAMOR, J.
Facts:
Several hacienda owners inManapla, Occidental Negrosentered into a milling contract with
Miguel J. Osorio. Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons,
for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners. The latter on the other
hand bound themselves to furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for
30 years from the execution of the contract. North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. (North Negros) later acquired
the rights and interest of Osorio in the milling. Later, on different dates, CatalinoValderrama, Emilio
Rodriguez and Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi made with Osorio
other milling contracts identical with the first one. Urra thereafter transferred to Auzmendi, and the
latter to Lorenzo Echarri, their interest in the milling contract.The hacienda owners, however, could not
furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so the North Negros made other
milling contracts with the various hacienda owners. This prompted Valderramaet. al. to each file a
complaint against North Negros. Valderramaet. al. alleged that the easement of way, which each of
them has established in his respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda
of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport
to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane
harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. It was
their contention that the North Negros had no right, under the easement or otherwise, to cause its
locomotives and wagons to run across the estates of the plaintiffs for the purpose of transporting sugar
cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros.
North Negros on the other hand asserted thatValderramaet. al respectively granted them, for
the period of 50 years from the date of the aforesaid contracts, an easement of way 7 meters wide upon
the lands of the plaintiffs for the construction and operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar
cane; that said easement of way was established without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the
ownership of the cane to be transported over the said railroad; that said contract was then in full force
and effect and had never been annulled or modified.
Issue:
Was the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar came from the
hacienda owner’s land?
Ruling:
No. The easement of way established was not restricted to transporting only sugar came from
the hacienda owner’s land.
There can be no doubt about what the contracting parties have agreed upon in the contract was
that the plaintiffs have created upon their respective haciendas at a suitable place an easement of way 7
meters wide and for a period of fifty years, in order to enable the defendant to build and maintain a
railroad for the transportation of sugar cane to the central. It is clear that the cane of the plaintiffs was
to be transported upon the railroad to the central. To limit the use of the road exclusively to the cane of
the plaintiffs and within their respective haciendas would make the contract in question ineffective,
except as to the hacienda which is contiguous or nearest to the central.
It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was established in favor of the
servient estates, because it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership
and not by reason of easement. It is evident that the cane of the plaintiffs is to be transported to the
central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the easement was created for the benefit
of the corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as
it may deem fit, according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to
cover the capacity of the central, it would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation the
burden of maintaining a central, prohibiting it to obtain from another source sufficient cane with which
to maintain its business; this is specially true here, because in the milling contract with the plaintiffs,
there is nothing to prohibit the defendant from making milling contracts with other planters, and obtain
in that way all the cane necessary to cover the capacity of the central.
It is true that the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate the necessary
works for the use and preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more burdensome; but
this does not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the railroad other
cane than that of the plaintiffs. What is prohibited by the legal provision above cited is that the
defendant, in extending the road or in repairing it, should occupy a greater area of land of the servient
estates, or deposit excavations or building materials outside of the area of 7 meters, because in the first
case, the easement will be altered, and in the second it would become more burdensome. But nothing
of the kind happens when the defendant transports on the railroad, crossing the servient estates, the
cane of the planters of Cadiz; the railroad continues to occupy the same area on the servient estates,
and the encumbrance resulting from the easement continues to be the same, whether the tractors
traverse the line 10, 20 or 30 times-a day transporting cane for the central.
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 165952; July 28, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.
Facts:
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots and later sold
twenty-two (22) lots to Aneco Realty and Development Corporation (Aneco) and the remaining
seventeen (17) lots to Landex Development Corporation (Landex). Aneco filed a complaint for injunction
when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. It sought to demolish the
newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages. Landex alleged that Aneco
was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall. It claimed that Aneco
has its own entrance to its property along Resthaven Street and 2 other streets. The Resthaven access,
however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also
claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in
the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project
Issue:
Does Anecohave the right to prevent Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own
property?
Ruling:
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right
of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and
restrictions provided by law. Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain,
Landex from fencing its own property.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at
the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from
the deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested in
pursuing its own subdivision project. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project,
it must make its own provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct
subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the CA correctly
dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.
Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag

G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013
Peralta, J
Facts:
Pilar Development Corporation (PDC)filed a Complaint for accionpubliciana against Dumadaget.

al. for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent in itssubject property.It
claims that said parcel of land was designated as an open space for village recreational facilities and
amenities for subdivision residents.PDC, anchoring on Article 630 of the Civil Code,arguesthat although
the portion of the subject property occupied by Dumadaget. aliswithin the 3-meter strip reserved for
public easement, it still retainsownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public
dominion.
Issue:
1. What laws or regulations must govern overeasements established for public or

communal use?
2. Does the respondents have any right or title over the subject portion?
Ruling:
1. While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that theowner of the
servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on whichthe easement is
established, and may use the same in such a manner as not toaffect the exercise
of the easement, Article 635 thereof is specific in sayingthat “all matters
concerning easements established for public orcommunal use shall be governed
by the special laws and regulationsrelating thereto, and, in the absence thereof,
by the provisions of this Title VII on Easements or Servitudes”.
In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 which superseded DENR A.O.
No. 97-0519 and prescribed the revised guidelines in the implementation of thepertinent
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and PresidentialDecree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067,
cannot be doubted. Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of thePhilippines.
Thus, PDC’s right of ownership andpossession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-
meter strip/zonealong the banks of MahabangIlog Creek.
2. No. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it

preciselybecause it is public land. Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters
have nopossessory rights over the land intruded upon.The length of time that
theymay have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed
tohave entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession
ispresumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.
EUFROCINA HIDALGO CABACUNGAN, AURELIA HIDALGO ROLDAN, and TERESA HIDALGO IGLESIASv.
QUINTIN CORRALES and CATALINA V. CORRALES
G.R. No. L-6629; September 30, 1954.
REYES, A., J.:
Facts:
Cabacunganet. alalleges that in January, 1950, Corrales et. al, being owners of a lot contiguous
to the land here in question, constructed a building on said lot with balcony and windows less than three
meters distant from said land and with roof that drains rain water into it in violation of Article 670 and
674, respectively, of the New Civil Code. Petitioners therefore, pray that the said balcony and windows
be ordered closed and the roofs constructed in such a way that rain water would not fall on their land.
Issue: Does the ownership of the dominant and servientestates been merged in the same person
pursuant to Article 631 of the New Civil Code?
Ruling:
No. As defendants have not become sole owners of the servient estate, for they have acquired
only a part interest therein, it cannot be said that in this case ownership of the dominant and servient
estates has been merged in the same person for the purposes of the article cited. Manresa observes
that under that article the easement is not extinguished by the acquisition of a share in property held in
common.
SALVADOR BENEDICTO (deceased). ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO vs.COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE A.

HERAS
G.R. No. L-22733 ; September 25, 1968
CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
The adjoining properties of the Heras and the Benedicto formerly belonged to one owner,
Miriam R. Hedrick, consisting of Lots Nos. 8, 9, 10, 22, 23, and 24.On September 29, 1917, Hedrick sold
Lot Nos. 8, 9, 22 and 23 to Claro M. Recto and retained for herself Lots Nos. 10 and 24.At the time of the
sale, the buildings were located on the respective properties of Recto and Hedrick. The sale to Recto was
subject, among others, to the condition that they would equally share in providing a 3-4 meters
easement for vehicles for both at the sides of their properties. Both parties agree that the dividing line
between the portion sold to Recto remains in the domain of Hedrick fall and that line will be
perpendicular to the San Marcelino street.
After several series of transfers, Recto’s properties eventually ended up with Salvador
Benedicto.Hendrick’s property on the other hand ended up with Heras.Sometime in 1941, the Hera’s
demolished the entire building situated on his property.Benedicto argued that the easement was
originally constituted because the buildings then erected on the respective properties could be reached
by their owners from San Marcelino street was through the passageway. He claims that when the
respondent Heras has his building demolished in 1941 the property gained direct access to San
Marcelino street since then there has been no need for the passageway.
Issue: Whether or not the easement has been extinguished by non-user.
Ruling:
Article 631 of the Civil Code provides in part:
(2) By nonuser for ten years, with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be
used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again
permit its use, unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has
elapsed, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number; . . . .
For the purposes of this decision we do not find it necessary to determine whether the
appropriate period of nonuser in this case is 20 or 10 years. For one thing, there is no indubitable proof
of nonuser. The petitioner merely assumes that the passageway in question had not been in use since
1941 because the property of Heras has since gained direct access to San Marcelino street with the
demolitionof his house. For another, even if we assume that the period of prescription based on
nonuser is 10 years, the very testimony of the petitioner Benedicto shows that it was only in 1946 that
he had the passageway walled in by constructing a fence, and since the present action was filed in 1955,
granting that article 631 of the Civil Code is applicable, the prescriptive period has not yet elapsed.
Nor can presumptive renunciation by Heras of the use of the said passageway be inferred. It
would appear from the record that Heras started the construction of an apartment building on his parcel
of land after the demolition of his house in 1941, and that although interrupted by World War II,
construction was continued in 1955. Since it is patent from the stipuation of facts that the easement in
question is mainly a vehicular passageway, the obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion of
the projected apartment building negates any presumptive renunciation on the part of Heras.
Moreover, the easement in this case is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the
transfer certificates of title issued in the series of transfers from Miriam R. Hedrick through to the
respondent Heras, and in the transfer certificates of title issued in the series of transfers from Claro M.
Recto through to the petitioner Benedicto. Since there is nothing in the record that would point to a
mutual agreement between any of the predecessors-in-interest not between the petitioner and the
respondent themselves with respect to the discontinuance or obliteration of the easement annotated
on the titles, the continued existence of the easement must be upheld and respected.
The fact that the easement here is one of necessity does not detract from the conclusion we
have reached. For even assuming that with the demolition of the house on Heras' property the necessity
for the passageway ceased (a point traversed by Heras who claims that he demolished his house
precisely in order to build an apartment building in its place), still, as was held in one case"the fact that
an easement [by grant] may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity." Indeed, when the
easement in this case was established, the parties unequivocally made provisions for its observance by
all who in the future might succeed them in dominion, and this is the reason the permanent character of
the easement was annotated on each and all of the transfer certificates of title.
EDUARDO C. TAÑEDOvs.HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, SPS.ROMEO SIM ET. AL

G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988
PADILLA, J.
Facts:
Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated in Cebu City (Lot
7501-A and Lot 7501-B). On Lot 7501-A is constructed an apartment building, while the improvements
on Lot 7501-B consist of one four-door apartment of concrete and strong materials, one two-storey
house of strong materials, a bodega of strong materials, and a septic tank for the common use of the
two lots.
Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo C. Tanedo.He further agreed that
should he decided to sell Lot 7501-B,he would sell it to Tanedo. Cardenas however sold it to Lot 7501-B
to Sps. Sim. Upon learning of the sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim. But the
latter refused. Instead, Romeo Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo
built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his
building encroaching on Lot 7501-B.
Issue:
Does the right to continue to use the spectic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the land and
its subsequent sale to different owners?
Ruling:
No. The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the
grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law as provided in Article 624. In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing
the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did
Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before
he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law.
Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and PacitaSim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B),
cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Digest by: MigrioVina O. Cagampang
SPS.MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON vs. SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN
G.R. No. 185240; January 20, 2010
ABAD, J.
Facts:
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion, Mandaue
City. Twenty years later, his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an
extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the parcel land. Lots A, B, and C
were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E werenot, they being interior lots. To give these interior
lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way
consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on
to the street. The partition that embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual
titles issued to the heirs.Realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the
heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and
in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the
southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.
Victoria later swapped lots with Benedictamaking the former the owner of Lot A, one of the
three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a
residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. One garage abutted the street while the other,
located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the
street. Victoria had this alley cemented and gated. Later, respondent Sps. Santos and Erlinda Tan (Sps.
Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled
into the easement area and also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right
of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action
against the Salimbangons for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with
application for preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Does the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the heirs for
the benefit of Lot A has been extinguished?
Ruling:
Yes.
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a strip of 1.5
meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to
the street. To the extent that Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they
contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the
common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and
E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the street.
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of
way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law. The existence of a dominant estate and a servient
estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.
Although the cancellation document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed location of
the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons
but also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if
the Salimbangon’sinsist that their right as dominant estate under the original partition agreement
remains, then that would be partly on a 1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent
1.5-meter strip on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.
In establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to abandon the old one.
Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that only
the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now
consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be
said to have been extinguished by operation of law.
Digested by: Gretchen B. Canedo
G.R. No. L-27296 October 8, 1927

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE B. BANZON,
represented by TRINIDAD GONZALEZ, judicial administratrix, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARIANO B. BANZON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Marciada, Capili and Ocampo for appellant.
Alberto Aquino for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Mariano B. Banzon, Ursula Banzon and the latter's
husband, Alberto Aquino, without her knowledge or consent, opened 2 canals across
estate of Jose B. Banzon from east to west, for the purpose of drawing water from the
Talisay River to irrigate their lands with water from the aforesaid river. That in
consequence of the opening of said canals she has suffered damages from loss of
crops, disintegration and unlevelling of land, and therefore prays that the said
defendants be ordered to close and refill said canals and to indemnify her for damages.
The defendants set up the special defense that Jose B. Banzon had aided in the
construction of the first canal in the year 1905, as well as in the maintenance of the
same, as an integral part of an irrigation system connected with conduit No. 9, and that
he benefited therefrom during his life. However, the plaintiff-appellant argues that
inasmuch as the two canals in question do not appear in the original certificate of
Torrens title No. 2502 to lot No. 362, said lot is free of said easements and the
defendants have no right to continue using them.
ISSUE:
Whether an easement exists, and if there were, what kind of easement
HELD:
Yes, there were easements for the two canals. Pursuant to Section 39 in relation to
Section 79 of Act No. 496 as amended by Act No. 2011, these canals have voluntary
and not legal easements duly constituted since the provisions of the same Act do not
affect rights created by law. Moreover, the text of article 557 of the Civil Code is as
follows:
ART. 557. Any person who wishes to use upon his own land any water of which
he may have the control is entitled to take it through the intervening estates,
subjects to the obligation of indemnifying the owners thereof, as well as the
owners of any lower estates upon which the water may filter or descend.
To enjoy the right granted by the above quoted article 557 of the Civil Code, the
requisites established in article 558 of the same Code must be complied with, which are
as follows:
ART. 558. Any person desiring to make use of the right granted in the foregoing
article shall be obliged —
1. To prove that he has a right to dispose of the water, and that it is sufficient for
the use to which it is destined;
2. To show that the right of way he requests is the most convenient and least
onerous to third persons;
3. To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner prescribed by the
laws and regulations.
In the present case, Mariano B. Banzon has complied with these requirements. It has
been proved that he was granted the use of 50 liters of water per second from the
Talisay River, a sufficient amount to irrigate his land; that the passage opened by him is
the most convenient and least onerous to third parties, and that he is willing to
indemnify the intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon, owner of the servient estate, as the
courts may determine.
But it does not appear that the first canal was opened in accordance with the provisions
of article 558 in connection with article 557 of the Civil Code above quoted, and of
article 118 of the law of Waters if August 3, 1866. Nor has a counterclaim been filed
with respect to it. Consequently, the judgment appealed from is reversed with respect to
the first canal and said judgment is affirmed as regards the second canal.
G.R. No. L-3099 May 21, 1951

CIPRIANA GONZALES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PURIFICACION, GUILLERMO, EUSTACIO AND FAUSTINA, all surnamed DE DIOS,
assisted by their guardian CARLOTA INDUCIL defendants-appellants.
Celestino de Dios for appellants.
Rosendo Tansinsin for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of a fishpond situated in the barrio of Bambang, Bulacan, adjacent
to the fishpond of defendants. The only source of water of her fishpond is Kay Pateng
River, to which it has neither ingress nor egress, because it has been completely cut off
from it by the fishpond of the defendants. After the several attempts made by her to
obtain from the defendants a right of way to and from said river to furnish a source of
water to her fishpond proved futile, she filed the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.
Upon agreement of the parties, the court designated one Felipe Asuncion, a surveyor,
to investigate the premises and study the most convenient place through which an
aqueduct may be constructed for the supply of water needed by the fishpond of the
plaintiff, who accordingly investigated the property and submitted his report. After the
parties have presented their evidence, the court rendered judgment in favor of
Gonzales.
Not satisfied with this judgment, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
latter court affirmed the lower court’s judgment
ISSUE:
Is there a law which justifies the grant to Gonzales an easement of water over the land
of the appellants in order to give to the appellee a source of water to irrigate her
fishpond.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that articles 557 and 558 of the Civil Code can be
invoked in support of the claim of the appellee.
Article 557 provides that "any person who wishes to use upon his own land any water of
which he may have the control is entitled to take it through the intervening estates,
subject to the obligation of indemnifying the owners thereof." The phrase "of which he
may have the control" should be interpreted in connection with article 558 (1) which
means that he has a right to dispose of the water. This was interpreted to mean one
who has obtained from the government a grant to use water from a river
(Gonzales vs. Banzon, 51 Phil., 15). The use to which the water may be applied must
also be interpreted in the same way: that the water be sufficient for the use intended
(558[1]). In fact these article were applied to a grant to use water from a river for
irrigation purposes in the case mentioned above.
If a person who has obtained from the Government a grant to use water a river from
irrigation was given the right to construct a canal over the intervening lands of other
private owners upon payment of indemnity, no valid reason is seen for not granting the
same privilege to the herein appellee who desires to draw water from a river for the use
of her fishpond. A fishpond comes within the classification of agricultural land and is
regarded as an important source of revenue (Molina vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167).
Therefore, there can be no doubt with regard to the right of the appellee to draw the
water she needs for her fishpond through the land of the defendants if she has obtained
the necessary permit to use the water from the Government.
G.R. No. L-37409 May 23, 1988

NICOLAS VALISNO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FELIPE ADRIANO, defendant-appellee.
Honorio Valisno Garcia I for plaintiff-appelant.
Felipe K Medina for defendant-appellee.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Nicolas Valisno is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a 557,949-square-meter

parcel of land particularly described in his Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-16281.
The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other
vegetables adjoins that of Felipe Adriano. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
Honorata Adriano Francisco and her brother, Felipe Adriano, from their father, Eladio
Adriano. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water
from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long, traversing
the Adriano’s land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the
appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-
hectare land. The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered on March 22, 1960
ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal but the appellee asked for a
reinvestigation of the case. Pending reinvestigation, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation
canal at his own expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields
was urgent. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's
decision by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held
that Eladio Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed
by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed.
In a decision dated April 21, 1966, the trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to
pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil
Code apply to this case.
HELD:
As indicated in the decision dated March 22, 1960 of the Bureau of Works "the principal
issue involved in this case falls under the subject of servitude of waters which are
governed by Article 648 of the new Civil Code and the suppletory laws mentioned in the
cases of Lunod vs. Meneses 11 Phil. 128) and Osmena vs. Camara (C.A. 380 62773)
which are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
specifically Article 122 thereof.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water
rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded,
conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and
participations over the parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely Model
6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No.
5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples,
flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining
to the property subject of this sale. According to the appellant, the water right was the
primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a
water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is
supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371 19 C.J. 868-897). The fact
that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the
necessity.
G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991

COSTABELLA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., AURORA BUSTOS
LOPEZ, MANUEL S. SATORRE, JR., JOSEFA C. REVILLES, FELIX TIUKINHOY,
JR., PERFECTA L. CHUANGCO, and CESAR T. ESPINA,respondents.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan & Migallos for petitioner.
Albano, Garcia & Diaz Law Offices for Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.
Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner owns the real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the
Opon Cadastre on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents,
on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties more particularly known as
Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the Opon Cadastre.Before the petitioner began the
construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which
traversed the petitioner's property.
In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the
construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property
through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. Later, or
sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of
its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative
passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it.)
As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was
filed against the petitioner by the private respondents before the CFI. The trial court
rendered a decision finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right
over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use
and enjoyment not only by the private respondents, but also by the community at large.
Both parties elevated the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, with the petitioner
questioning the alleged "vested right" of the private respondents over the subject
passageway, and the private respondents assailing the dismissal of their complaint
insofar as their prayer for the demolition of the petitioner's "dike" is concerned. I n its
decision, the respondent Appellate Court held as without basis the trial court's finding
that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in
question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of
right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may
only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription.
ISSUE:
Was the decision of the respondent appellate court grossly erroneous and not in accord
with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
HELD:
Yes. Article 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide that the owner of the dominant estate
may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence
of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables
and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden
of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the
dominant estate.
Here, there is no showing that the private respondents had established the existence of
the four requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to prove that there is no
adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway. Further, the private
respondents failed to indicate in their complaint or even to manifest during the trial of
the case that they were willing to indemnify fully the petitioner for the right of way to be
established over its property. Neither have the private respondents been able to show
that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-
interest's own acts.
Finally, the private respondents failed to allege, much more introduce any evidence, that
the passageway they seek to be re-opened is at a point least prejudicial to the
petitioner. Considering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach resort in its
property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises.
Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be
compromised. Hence, the Private respondents' properties cannot be said to be isolated,
for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate
Court declared the case to be proper as a controversy for a compulsory right of way,
this Court is constrained to hold that it was in error.
Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept, which date back to the iter,
actus, and via of the Romans. They are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable
owners of isolated estates to make full use of their properties, which lack of access to
public roads has denied them. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory
and hence, legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the concurrence of the other
conditions above-referred to. But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner
of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under
Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least
prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be
the shortest.
G.R. No. L-63996 September 15, 1989

EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, respondents.
Arturo Agustines for petitioner.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
The Malinta estate was co-owned by Cornelia and Francisca Dila who later donated 1/3
of the property to their niece Epifania Dila, 1/3 to the heirs of their deceased sister
Anacleta Dila, and 1/3 was solely conveyed to Cornelia. Adjoining this estate was
property of Fransisco, fronting the Paradas road. The new co-owners then partitioned
the lot. All the frontage went to the niece. Cornelia subsequently sold her property to
Eugenio sisters who then sold it to Ramos. Ramos wanted a right of way through
Fransisco’s property.
Some months later, in March, 1972, after having set up a piggery on his newly acquired
property, Ramos had his lawyer write to Eusebio Francisco — owner, as above
mentioned, of the adjoining lot, Lot 266- to ask for a right of way through the latter's
land. Negotiations thereafter had however failed to bring about a satisfactory
arrangement. Later that year, 1972, Ramos succeeded, through the intercession of
Councilor Tongco of Valenzuela, in obtaining a three-meter wide passageway through
Lot 860-B of Epifania Dila. Later, he inexplicably put up a ten-foot high concrete wall on
his lot and thereby closed the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B.
It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely through
Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to
keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted.
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence
on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco was served
with summons and a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 66-V-73 of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, instituted by Ramos.
ISSUE:
Is Francisco's Lot 266 may not be considered a servient estate subject to a compulsory
easement of right of way in favor of Ramos' Lot 860-A?
HELD:
No. In Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Capital Subdivision, Inc., this Court held that a
compulsory easement of way cannot be obtained without the presence of four (4)
requisites provided for in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which the owner of the
dominant tenement must establish, to wit:
(1) That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
and
(4) That the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Art. 650).
The evidence shows persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been
granted an adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent
estate of Epifania Dila even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with
petitioner Francisco for another passageway through the latter's property. If at the time
he filed suit against the petitioner, such access (through the property of Epifania Dila)
could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off by erecting a stone
wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no reason to which the
record can attest except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his
complaint.
But the law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his
own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way
through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right
of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met indeed
the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated
his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway
through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and
that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been
held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not
justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.
G.R. No. 75723 June 2, 1995

SIMEON FLORO, petitioner,
vs.
ORLANDO A. LLENADO (Deceased), substituted by his wife WENIFREDA T.
LLENADO, in her own behalf as Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A.
Llenado and as Legal Guardian of Minors Ma. Bexina, Avelino and Antonio, all
surnamed Llenado, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
ROMEO, J.:
FACTS:
Simeon Floro was the owner of a subdivision. Here comes Llenado who bought the
adjoining subdivision lot, which was formerly Emmanuel Homes. A creek separates the
property of Llenado from Floro. On the west side of Llenado’s property was a rice land.
On the subdivision plan of Llenado’s property, there was a plan to construct an access
road to McArthur Highway but no construction was made. With the two subdivisions, it
was Floro’s which only had an access road. Floro allowed usage of his access road
pending negotiations but later on closed the property.
Their request for the reopening of Road Lot 5 having been denied, Orlando Llenado
instituted on April 13, 1983, a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, against Simeon Floro for Easement of Right of Way with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages. In the
meantime, Orlando Llenado died and was substituted by his wife Wenifreda T. Llenado
as administratrix of his estate and its legal guardian of their four (4) minor children. The
trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction previously issued.
ISSUE:
Are the Llenados entitled for a compulsory right of way?
HELD:
No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the
Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be
established. These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2)
after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of
way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory
right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. The court found that private
respondents have failed in this regard.
Significantly, when Orlando Llenado filed the complaint for legal easement under
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, he focused his argument on the absence of any
road, other than the closed road of the Floro Park Subdivision, as his means of ingress
and egress to and from his property. However, he omitted to state that there is a
proposed access road through the Ipapo property. There being an existing right of way
over the Ipapo property, the first requirement for a grant of a compulsory easement of
right of way over the Floro Park Subdivision has not been met.
In the case at bench, no proof was presented by private respondent Llenado that he
complied with this requirement. The complaint for easement of right of way filed by him
in the lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay
Floro in the event that the easement of right of way be constituted. Thus, the existence
of the second requisite has likewise not been established.
Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way
over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.
G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996]

ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q.
OLIVEROS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO,J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. In February 1982
Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt
Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when
petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access
to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that
she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square
meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia s property. But when Yolanda
finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her
property. In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No.
1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a
pathway gratis et amore between their house. Incidentally, petitioner denies having
promised private respondent a right of way. She claims that her agreement with private
respondent was to provide the latter with a right of way on the other lot of Antonio
Quimen under her administration when it was not yet sold to private respondent.
Petitioner insists that passing through the property of Yolanda’s parents is more
accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the
avocado tree standing thereon. She strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is
not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that, moreover,
she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year
from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an
average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it
ISSUE:
Is Yolanda entitled to an easement?
HELD:
Yes. Applying Article 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared
that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least
prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property
of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong
materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual
support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts
them.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide
egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be
preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the
evidence presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration
of the whole evidence considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and the
probabilities of the situation.
Digested by: Cesar John Dela Serna
[G.R. No. 127549. January 28, 1998]
SPOUSES CESAR and RAQUEL STA. MARIA and FLORCERFIDA STA.

MARIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES ARSENIO and
ROSLYNN FAJARDO, respondents.
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.
Facts:
On February 17, 1992, plaintiff spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants
Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an
easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by
properties belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that since
plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way
passing through either of the alternative defendants properties which are directly
abutting the provincial road would be plaintiffs only convenient, direct and shortest
access to and from the provincial road; that plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest have
been passing through the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot; that
defendants mother even promised plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter
an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from their
property to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs request for a right
of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an
easement.
The trial court found that based on the Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way
through which the private respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach
the provincial road except by traversing directly the property of the petitioners. It further
found that (a) no significant structure, save for a wall or fence about three feet high,
would be adversely affected; (b) there was sufficient vacant space of approximately 11
meters between petitioners houses; and (c) petitioners property could provide the
shortest route from the provincial road to the private respondents
property. Consequently, the trial court granted the easement prayed for by the private
respondents.
The petitioners a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a compulsory right of way can be granted to private respondents who
have two other existing passage ways other than that of petitioners which can be used
in going to and from private respondent’s property
HELD:
Yes, Thefollowing requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory

servitude of right of way under the Civil Code are as follows:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no

adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
(Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
Anent the first requisite, there is no dispute that the plaintiffs-appellees property is
surrounded by other immovables owned by different individuals.
Plaintiffs-appellees property is likewise without adequate outlet to a public highway. The

existing passage way for people at the back of plaintiffs-appellees property leading to
the provincial road cannot be considered an adequate outlet for purposes of
establishing an easement. Article 651 of the Code provides that the width of the
easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant
estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time.So in an age when motor
cars are a vital necessity, the dominant proprietor has a right to demand a driveway for
his automobile, and not a mere lane or pathway
The second requisite for the establishment of an easement of right way, i.e., payment of
indemnity, is likewise present in this case. Plaintiff-appellee spouse Roslynn Fajardo
testified on direct examination that they are willing to pay the corresponding damages
provided for by law if granted the right of way
The third requisite is that the isolation of plaintiffs-appellees property should not have
been due to their own acts. In the case under consideration, the isolation of their lot is
not due to plaintiffs acts. The property they purchased was already surrounded by other
immovables leaving them no adequate ingress or egress to a public highway.
In the fourth requisite of least prejudice and shortest distance,there is sufficient vacant
space between defendants’ houses of approximately 11 meters.
Therefore, petition is denied.
[G.R. NO. 130845. November 27, 2000]
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
Ponente:QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land.
- He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property.

- The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a
public auction on March 19, 1983.
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern
portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed
the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement.
Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley
Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement, damages
and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against the
spouses Gabriel. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce
the contract of easement.
On May 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August 1991, it
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to provide the
right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On August
1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus, they
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On March 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and upheld the RTC's
issuances. The decision became final and executory on July 1992.
On January 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City issued an Alias Writ
of Demolition. On June 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the small house pursuant to
the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of
Demolition.
- He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he
was not a party to the civil case.
- His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was denied for
lack of merit
- The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration were denied
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed

asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not annotated in his
title and that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract
of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas could not be enforced
against him.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied the
reconsideration
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
HELD:
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is

both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by
necessity or a legal easement.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of
said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on
this Court.
- The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs

the entry of private respondents' cement mixer and motor vehicle.
- One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents.
- It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the width of
the easement.
- Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs
the easement in view of the needs of private respondents' estate.
Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract
of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice
of lispendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.
- As already explained, it is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate

(of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the dominant estate (of private
respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case
No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991, against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and
Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds on
March 24, 1995, after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from
the Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For,
although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 137882. February 04, 2005]
SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. OLGA

RAMISCAL represented by ENRIQUE MENDOZA, respondent.
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the
corner of 18th Avenue and BoniSerano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City. Petitioner-
spouses are occupants of a parcel of land located at the back of Ramiscal’s property
owned by Concepcion de la Pena, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz. The subject
matter of this case is a 1.10m wide by 12.60m long strip of land owned by respondent
which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18 th Avenue, the nearest
public highway from their property. Petitioner had enclosed the same with a gate, fence
and roof. In 1995, a relocation survey and location plan for the respondent’s properties
were prepared and it was only then that respondent discovered that the pathway being
occupied by petitioners is part of her property. Respondent immediately demanded that
the petitioners demolish the structure constructed by them on said pathway without her
consent but such demand was unheeded.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of
right of way.
(2) Whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of way
being used by petitioners.
Held:
(1) Petitioners are entitled neither to a voluntary nor legal easement of right of
way. Petitioners failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare
claim that they and their tenants entered into an argument with the
respondent. Likewise futile are petitioners attempt to show that they are
legally entitled to the pathway under Art. 649 of the Civil Code. The
conferment of a legal easement of right of way under this article is subject to
proof of the following: 1) It is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of proper indemnity; 3) the
isolation is not the result of its own acts; 4) the right of way claim is at the
point that least prejudicial to the servient estate; and 5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway be the shortest. The first three requirements are
not present in the instant case.
(2) Respondent is not barred by laches from closing the right of way being used
by petitioners. Laches is not applicable here since there was no knowledge
on the part of the respondent’s act for it was only in 1995 that she found out
that the pathway being used by the petitioners was part of her property.
Further, delay in the filing of suit is not a valid contention in this case for
respondent immediately demanded petitioners to demolish their property and
reasonably filed in complaint.
G.R. No. 157285, February 16 2007
WOODRIDGE SCHOOL, INC., and MIGUELA JIMENEZ-JAVIER, Petitioners, v. ARB

CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Respondent.,
Ponente: Corona, R.C.J., (First Division)
FACTS:
Petitioner Woodridge School is the usufructuary of a parcel of land in the name of

spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela
Jimenez–Javier, is the registered owner of the adjacent lot to that of Woodridge.
Respondent ARB Construction is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision
in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of four phases. Phase 1 of the subdivision was
already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue.
To provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the subdivision, ARB
constructed the disputed road to link the two phases. Petitioners’ properties sit right in
the middle of several estates: Phase 1 of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the north, a creek
in the east and Green Valley Subdivision in the farther east, a road within Soldiers Hills
Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west, and Phase III of
Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the south.
Petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of the road. ARB
refused the offer and fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the properties of
petitioners, thus, cutting off petitioners’ access to and from the public highway. After
failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly filed a complaint in the RTC to
enjoin ARB from depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision road and to seek
a compulsory right of way after payment of proper indemnity.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners relying on the ruling of the
Supreme Court in White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi (193 SCRA 765) stating
that the government automatically becomes the owner of the subdivisions’ roads the
moment the subdivision plan is approved, and thus is open to public use without any
need for compensation. Respondent ARB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court reversed the Trial Court’s decision and stating that the ruling of the
Supreme Court the 1991 case of White Plains Subdivision is not applicable as it was not
similarly situated as in the present case. However the appellate court went on to rule
that a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as there is no other existing
adequate outlet to and from petitioners’ properties to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue other
than the subject existing road lot belonging to ARB.
In addition, it awarded P500,000 to ARB as compensation for the wear and tear that
petitioners’ use of the road would contribute to. Unsatisfied with the ruling of the
appellate court, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court arguing that ARB
is not entitled to be paid any indemnity since the contested road lot is a property of
public dominion pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code because the disputed road falls
under the category of “others of similar character” which is the last clause of Article 420
(1). Hence, it is a property of public dominion which can be used by the general public
without need for compensation. Petitioners also assert that their initial offer of P50,000
should be sufficient compensation for the right of way. Further, they should not be held
accountable for the increase in the value of the property since the delay was attributable
to the stubborn refusal of ARB to accept their offer.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the disputed road is a property of public dominion pursuant to the last clause
of Article 420 (1), and, as such, is not a valid subject for legal easement.
2. Whether the offer of petitioners amounting to P50,000 is a sufficient compensation for

their use of the road.
HELD:
With regard to the first issue, The Supreme Court says, no. The Court held that the road
lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should
first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a
public road (Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals).
Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner developer. The use of the
subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private character. The road
is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the
public's passage through it. The local government should first acquire them by donation,
purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road. In the present
case, since no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the title to
the road lot is still registered in the name of ARB, the disputed property remains private.
With regard to the second issue, the Supreme Court again says, no.
In order to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) The isolation
was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate and; (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
In the present case, all of the requisites are present except for number two. The
appellate and trial courts found that the properties of petitioners are enclosed by other
estates without any adequate access to a public highway except the subject road lot
which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue. Although it was shown that the shortest
distance from the properties to the highway is toward the east across a creek, this
alternative route does not provide an adequate outlet for the students of the proposed
school.
The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity
may be computed. Under Article 649, paragraph 2, it is stated: “Should this easement
be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the
dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient
estate.”
Having settled the legal issues, the Supreme Court ordered the remand of the case to
the trial court for the reception of evidence and determination of the limits of the
property to be covered by the easement, the proper indemnity to be paid and the
respective contributions of petitioners. The petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED.
G.R. No. 149125
RESURRECCION OBRA, Petitioner,

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
SPS. VICTORIANO BADUA &
MYRNA BADUA, SPS. JUANITO
BALTORES & FLORDELIZA
BALTORES, SPS. ISABELO Promulgated:
BADUA & PRESCILA BADUA,
SPS. JOSE BALANON &
SHIRLEY BALANON, SPS. August 9, 2007
ORLANDO BADUA & MARITA
BADUA and SPS. LEONCIO
BADUA & JUVY BADUA,
Respondents.
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS: Respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot

commonly owned by them situated in La Union, were located west of the
properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas. Their only access to the
national highway was a pathway traversing the northern portion of petitioners
property and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases and
Baduas. The pathway was more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long.
They claimed that this pathway had been established as early as 1955.In 1995,
however, petitioner Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of
their property; thus, blocking respondents access to the national highway.
Respondents demanded the demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused.
(The spouses Badua and Bucasas failed to file an answer; consequently, they
were declared in default.)
On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the

complaint. It held that respondents were not able to satisfy all the requisites
needed for their claim of an easement of right of way. It observed that when
petitioner fenced the northern portion of her property, respondents were able
to use another pathway as ingress and egress to the highway. It stated further
that the new pathway is more than adequate for respondents use .Thus, the
applied easement of right-of-way on the northern portion of petitioners
property was not allowed. The said Decision became final and executory.
It must be noted that the new pathway used by respondents, however,

traversed the southern portion of petitioners property. Sometime in 2001,
petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again restricted
the use of respondents new pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioners
action, respondents filed a Motion to Enforce the July 7, 2000 Decision of the
RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the RTC dismissing the case was based
on the existence of a new pathway which they had been using since 1995.
Thus, they asserted that petitioner was prohibited from closing said passage.
On March 20, 2001, the RTC granted the said motion. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was rejected by the trial courts.
Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001
Order, held that the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioners
representation that she was allowing respondents to use the southern
portion of her property as an alternative pathway. Since the southern portion
was an agreed pathway, petitioner could not reduce its width; thus, the trial
court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking the passage.
Hence, we have this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
ISSUE:
1. WON the Court can motuproprio declare a compulsory right of way on a
property not the subject of a pending case.
2. WON there was a voluntary easement over the southern portion of Obra’s
property
HELD: the petition is GRANTED.The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001
Orders of the RTC are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
1. NO; Essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial courts
issuance of an order clarifying its final and executory decision and effectively
establishing an easement on petitioners property without proper adjudication.
An order of execution must conform to the terms of the dispositive portion of

the decision.
[A court that issues an order of execution in contravention of its final

judgment exceeds its jurisdiction and renders its order invalid.
The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive

part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of
the parties. Thus, where there is a conflict between the fallo and the ratio
decidendi or body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the
theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a
statement ordering nothing. The rule applies when the dispositive part of a
final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal, and can wholly be
given effect without need of interpretation or construction.
The amended complaint filed by respondents revealed that their cause of
action was the recognition of their easement of right-of-way of more than one
(1) meter wide and more than sixteen (16) meters in length [which] traversed
the northern portion of the property of defendants spouses Obra. As prayer,
respondents asked for the demolition of the concrete fence constructed by
petitioner and her spouse, that closed the pathway on the northern portion of
Obras lot; the declaration of right-of-way over said area in favor of
respondents; and the payment of damages and attorneys fees. When the RTC
dismissed the case in its July 7, 2000 Decision, it ruled that respondents had
no cause of action against petitioner and her husband because they failed to
satisfy one of the four requisites for the entitlement of a right-of-way, namely
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway. The trial court took note of the fact that
the new pathway which incidentally traversed the southern portion of
petitioners lot is an adequate outlet to a public highway. While its body
mentioned the existence of an alternative pathway located south of petitioners
lot, such was made only to emphasize that respondents failed to satisfy the
requirements for an easement of right-of-way. As held by the trial court:
The insistence of the plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore without
basis considering that there is another outlet adequate enough as an access
route for them in their passage to the public highway and the alleged
inconvenience cannot be a ground for the opening of said old pathway.
Apparently, no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and

legality of this new pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the
Court on petitioners’ property. Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the
southern portion had no basis.
The parties and even the trial court were confined to the averments of the
complaint, and the answer and the issues joined by the major pleadings .It
could not be disputed by respondents that there was no mention at all of any
right-of-way on the southern portion of petitioners lot in the complaint nor
any claim or prayer for the declaration of respondents entitlement to a right-
of-way over the said area. Thus, there was no joinder of issue on this matter
and, therefore, the dismissal of the case cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be construed to encompass any grant of right-of-way to respondents relating
to the southern portion owned by petitioner.
Moreover, the construction of the fence on the southern portion was done by
petitioner after the rendition and finality of the July 7, 2000 Decision
dismissing the case. It is plain to see that such act of constructing the fence
was subsequent to the Decision and could not have been covered by said
judgment. The dispute that arose from the blockade of the pathway on the
southern portion could be the subject matter of another complaint but
definitely was not an issue in the case. In the new case, respondents are
obliged to prove all the essential elements of the easement of right-of-way a
requirement which they failed to satisfy in the prior civil case.
2. NO; The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of
an easement of right-of-way over the pathway located south of petitioners
property, nevertheless, concluded that the said passage was an agreed or
voluntary easement of right-of-way which petitioner should respect.
The trial court was in error.
It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes

immutable and unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend,
modify, or alter a final judgment and is left only with the jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it. Any amendment or alteration which substantially
affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
To recapitulate, the dismissal of the Civil Case meant that no easement was
ever established on petitioner’s property. However, the trial court, by issuing
its March 20, 2001 Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that limited
respondents passage, effectively created a right-of-way on petitioners property
in favor of respondents allegedly on the basis of a voluntary agreement
between the parties. This directive was in contravention of its July 7, 2000
Decision; thus, it was null and void for having been issued outside of the
courts jurisdiction.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of
right-of-way, subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper,
relevant, and material to the issue of right-of-way as averred in the complaint
in the Civil Case, still, the conclusion that there was an agreed or voluntary
easement of right-of-way had no basis. The records of the Civil case do not
reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-way.
Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by
the parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity. The
evidence is not ample enough to support the conclusion that there was a
verbal agreement on the right-of-way over the southern portion.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating
it should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real
estate, and ordinarily must be in writing. No written instrument on this
agreement was adduced by respondents.
[G.R. NO. 166301 : February 29, 2008]
ST. MICHAEL SCHOOL OF CAVITE, INC. and SPOUSES CRISANTO S. CLAVERIA

and GLORIA M. CLAVERIA, Petitioners, v. MASAITO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC., Respondents.
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc. is owned by petitioners-spouses Crisanto S.

Claveria and Gloria M. Claveria. Respondents Masaito Development Corporation
(Masaito) and Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon) own, operate, and manage Citihomes
Molino IV, Bacoor, Cavite (Citihomes). St. Michael is located outside the northern
perimeter fence of
Citihomes. Its passageway occupies a portion of the 61-square meter lot described as
Lot 4, Block 7, Phase 1 of Citihomes. The gate to the school is located at the
subdivision’s northern perimeter fence and is the only entrance and exit for the entire
school
population.
In 2001, Masaito advised petitioners to purchase Lots 1-9, Block 7, Phase 1, fronting
the school at Php 3,579,000. On April 6, 2001, Masaito sent another offer to sell Lot 4,
Block 7 of the subdivision with the right-of-way through the private roads/drainage
facilities of Citihomes at the price of PhP 2 Million. Petitioners refused both proposals,
reasoning that the school did not need the entire area mentioned in the first proposal.
St. Michael also said that the second offer was grossly overpriced.
Petitioners, with four other homeowners, filed a complaint against respondents before
the Bacoor, Cavite RTC, for easement of right-of-way with damages and preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). The RTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action the complaint as to four homeowners and with respect to St.
Michael, on the ground that it is not a registered owner of any property that is the
subject matter of the easement case, hence not a real party-in-interest.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred when it ruled that the school, not being the registered owner
of the subject lot, is not a real party-in-interest

HELD:
The trial court erred when it ruled that the school, not being the registered owner of the
subject lot, is not a real party-in- interest. It will suffice under Art. 649 of the Civil Code
that “any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable which
is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way.” Clearly, the school is a
real party-in-interest since it has established a right to use the passageway for the
benefit of its students. More importantly, the records reveal that petitioners-spouses are
the owners of the lot where the school is located and they are the incorporators,
trustees, and officers of St. Michael. They are also authorized to represent the
corporation in the complaint and subsequent actions. Thus, petitioners are real parties-
in-interest and we rule that the dismissal of the complaint is patently erroneous and
bereft of any legal basis. Petitioners must be allowed to pursue their case before
the trial court.
Digested by: Leo B. Escalante Jr.
FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST ENTERPRISES, INC.
GR. No. 158141 (July 11, 2006)
QUISUMBING, J.
Facts:
Petitioner FaustoPreysler, Jr. and his wife owned lots in the Tali Beach Subdivision and also
twoparcels of land adjacent to the subdivision. The subdivision was owned by respondent Far
EastEnterprises, Inc.To gain access to the two parcels petitioner has to pass through private
respondent'ssubdivision. Petitioner offered P10,000 for the easement of right of way but
private respondent refusedit for being grossly inadequate. Hence, the latter barricaded the
front gate of petitioner's property toprevent petitioner and his family from using the
subdivision roads to access said parcels.Petitioner then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Right
of Way with prayer for preliminaryprohibitive injunction against private respondent. The trial
court issued an Order for private respondent to remove the barricade and refrain from
hindering petitioner’s entryand exit from the subjectproperties and for the free passage of
petitioner in the subdivision of private respondent pending thelitigation.Sometime thereafter,
petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment andconstruction materials
to develop his property. Consequently, private respondent moved to dissolve thewrit of
preliminary injunction claiming that the petitioner violated its right to peaceful possession
andoccupation of Tali Beach Subdivision when petitioner brought in heavy equipment and
constructionmaterials. On the other hand, petitioner prayed that his contractors, visitors, and
other representativesbe allowed access and persons he has authorized be allowed to install
power lines over private respondent's property. The trial court amended the writ granting
petitioner’s prayer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the amended writ and reinstated
the original writ.
Issue:
Whether the right of passage allowed in the uncontested original writ applies not only to the
petitioner and his household, but also to his visitors, contractors, construction workers,
authorized persons, heavy equipment machinery, and construction materials as well as the
installation of powerlines.
Held:
The Court partially granted the petition. It held that the writ issued by the trial court is to
preserve status quo. Necessarily, it does not cover the use of the subdivision roads for ingress
and egress of construction workers, heavy equipment, delivery of construction materials, and
installation of powerlines since there were no improvements introduced then. But under Article
656 of the New Civil Code, if the right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair,
improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted after
payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate. In the present case, the
trial court found that irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his
property, he has to pass private respondent's subdivision. Thus, petitioner may be granted a
temporary easement after the payment of the proper indemnity. Hence, the court ordered
private respondent to allow the right of passage thru the subdivision by the petitioner's
visitorsandguests, contractors, construction workers, heavy equipment vehicles, and delivery
construction materials. But the Court did not allow the installation of electric power lines
because it is a permanent easement which is not covered by Article 656.
EDWIN CASE vs.

THE HEIRS OF TUASON Y SANTIBAÑEZ
GR. No. L-5044 (December 1, 1909)
TORRES, J.
Facts:
The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and LeocadiaSantibañez alleged that the parties
whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner
Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of
the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibañez. They alleged that the true dividing line
between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the
respondents, and that about two years ago, when Case made alterations in the buildings
erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion ofthem to rest on the wall owned by the
respondents.
Issue:
Whether the wall is the property of the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez.
Held:
The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez for the reason,
among others, that in the public document by which one of their original ancestors acquired on
the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed by them, it appears that property was then
already in closed by a stone wall. The wall supports only the property of the respondents and
not that of the petitioner, cannot be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length
would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to
sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected thereon disproves the pretension of the
petitioner. Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless
there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls
adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.
DOMINGO LAO and ALBINA DE LOS SANTOS vs.

THE HEIRS OF LORENZA ALBURO
GR. No. L-10372 (December 24, 1915)
TORRES, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Lao owned four parcels of land (Lot1‐4). Spouses Lao filed an application for the
registration of the four lots. The Heirs of Alburo objected the application with respect to the lot
no. 2, which they alleged that the registration of lot no. 2 included the wall which according to
them belonged to LorenzaAlburo.
ISSUE:
Whether the wall is a party wall?
Held:
The wall in question is NOT a party wall. The Supreme court cited articles 572 and 573 of the
old Civil Code (now article 659 and 660). In this case it was proven that; the wall is higher than
the building of the Alburo’s; on the top of the wall, there is a gutter which catches the water
rain from the roof of the building of Spouses Lao; that here is a pipe connected from the gutter
and attached from the wall, it carries the water rain to the street; the roof of the bldg. of
Spouses Lao covered the one half of the portion of the top of the wall and the supports of the
wall were positioned on the lot of Spouses Lao. These exterior signs shows that the wall is not a
party wall but an exclusive property of the spouses Lao. Heirs of Alburo failed to prove that
portion of the wall was erected on their land. Further, the exterior signs cannot be defeated by
the fact that the wall extends to the street 74m farther than spouses Lao building. nor by the
facts that the face of the wall is on the same street line as the building of alburo.
MARGARITA VALENZUELA, ET AL. vs.

PEDRO UNSON, ET AL.
GR. No. L-10266 (October 20, 1915)
JOHNSON, J.
Facts:
On December 11, 1912, the plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of 34 parcels of land in Pagsanjan, Laguna. With such registration, respondents
Pedro Unson and Felix Unson presented their opposition to the registration of a portion of Lot
No. 1 which portion is known as Lot No 1-A representing a stone wall, simply constructed
between Lot no. 1 and the lot belonging to the said objectors. This wall extends from the street
running in front of the lots owned by the plaintiffs and defendants, between said lots, for a
distance of about 30 meters. It is about 38 cms wide and separates the lots claimed by the
parties. At intervals along the wall, there are buttresses which are constructed on both sides of
the wall.
Issue:
Whether the said wall belongs to the petitioners and registrable in their name.
Held:
Yes. Considering the fact that the wall is supported by buttresses on both sides, and considering
that both parties have used the wall for the purpose of supporting the structures on their
respective lots, and considering the fact that the plaintiffs have a wall joined to the wall in
question as a partial support for the kitchen, and considering the conflicting character of the
testimony with reference to the ownership of the wall, together with the exterior signs of the
same, we are of the opinion that the said wall is a party wall — that it belongs to he petitioners
and objectors jointly.
MAXIMO CORTES vs. JOSE PALANCA YU-TIBO
GR. No. 911 (March 12, 1903)
MAPA, J.
Facts:
The house No.65 Calle Rosario, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows
therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house,
No. 63 of the same street; that these windows have been in existence since the year 1843, and
that the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the
view to raising the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of one of the windows in
said house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and
light formerly received through the window. The court practically finds the preceding facts, and
further finds that the plaintiff has not proven that he has, by any formal act, prohibited the
owner of house No. 63 from making improvements of any kind therein at any time prior to the
complaint. The contention of the plaintiff is that by the constant and uninterrupted use of the
windows during a period of fifty-nine years he acquired by prescription an easement of light in
favor of the house No.65, and as a servitude upon house No.63, and, consequently, has
acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvements in the latter house which might
in any manner be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the easement. He contends that the
easement of light is positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the purposes of
the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin from the date on which the enjoyment of the
same commenced, or, in other words, applying the doctrine to this case, from the time that
said windows were opened with the knowledge of the owner of the house No.63, and without
opposition on his part. However, the defendant contends that the easement is negative, and
that therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition thereof must begin from the date on
which the owner of the dominant estate may have prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the
servient estate from doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the
easement.
The court ruled that the easement of light is negative.

Issue:
Whether the easement of light in the case of windows opened in one’s own wall is negative.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the case involves windows opened in a wall belonging to the
wife of the plaintiff and it is of their opinion that the windows opened in one’s own wall is of
negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under Art.538 of the Civil
Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate may, by a formal act, have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which it would be lawful for him to do were it not for the easement. That, in
consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the
right of the owner of house No.63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make
therein improvements which might obstruct the light of house No.65 of the same street, the
property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the court
below in the judgment assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by
prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a time might have elapsed since the
windows were opened in the wall of the said house no.65, because the period which the law
demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run, the act with
which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.
When a person open windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an act of
ownership inherent in the right of property with no limitations other than those established by
law. By reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the
property of the one opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because
the property is used by its owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the exercise of an
easement. It is that the use if the windows opened in a wall on one’s own property, in the
absence of some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an act of mere
tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property and does not create any right to
maintain the windows to the prejudice of the latter. The mere toleration of such an act does
not imply on the part of the abutting owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as
high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the owner of the windows for the effects of possession
according to Art.1942 of the Civil Code, because it is a mere possession at will. From all this it
follows that the easement of light with respect to the openings made in one’s own edifice does
not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using them. The easement really consists in
prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or
interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the obligation of not impeding the light.
SEVERINA and FLORA CHOCO vs.

ISIDRO SANTAMARIA
GR. No. 6076(December 29, 1911)
MAPA, J.
Facts:
From the evidence presented at the trial, I find that the defendants is in possession of a parcel
of land on the corner of Calles Pescadores and P. Rada, in the district of Tondo, city of Manila,
and that he was erected a house thereon flush with the boundary line of the adjacent property;
that the plaintiffs are the owners of the land on both sides of the defendant's house, erected as
stated, both on Calle Pescadores and Calle P. Rada; that the defendant in the building of his
house has made several openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides
overlooking then property of the plaintiff; that at the time the defendant was building his
house, and the windows and the openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later
on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the defendant, and the
defendant received the written protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence,
appears to have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was
not made.
Issue:
Can windows be made projecting over the estate of a neighbor.
Held:
No. Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over the estate
of a neighbor, can not be made if there is not a distance of at least 2 meters between the wall
in which they are built and the said estate. Neither can side nor oblique views be opened
oversaid property, unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters.
MANUEL SORIANO vs. OSCAR STERNBERG
GR. No. L-15628 (November 18, 1920)
MALCOLM, J.
Facts:
Oscar Sternberg owns a parcel of land with a two storey-house which was built in 1905. The
said house has windows overlooking the adjacent lot belonging to Soriano. The windows were
built on the wall of the house which has a 1.36 m. distance from the dividing line between the
two lots. Thereafter, Soriano filed an action to compel Sternberg to close the windows because
it is less than 2 meters from the division line between the two lots and hence, a violation of
Article 582 (now Article 670) of the Civil Code. The law provides that "No windows or balconies
or other similar projections which directly overlook the adjoining property may be opened or
built without leaving a distance of not less than 2 meters between the wall in which they are
built and such adjoining property. Stenberg argues that the action of Soriano has already
prescribed. It must be noted that there is no annotation in the Torrens title of the parties
involved. (No easement of view in the title of Soriano and no right to easement on the title of
Sternberg.)
Here, there is no question of easement.
Issue:
Whether a right of action to enforce Article 582 of the Civil code may be lost by failure to
prosecute within the prescriptive period fixed by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held:
Yes. In this case, Sternberg has never prohibited Soriano from building any wall on his own land.
Soriano’s cause of action only arose in 1905 when Sternberg built the offending edifice
(building).
Nevertheless, the windows complained of were permitted to be open for thirteen years (1918)
without protest from Soriano. Soriano must, consequently, by reason of his own laches, be
considered to have waived any right which he may have had to compel the windows to be
closed.
It is our holding that plaintiff right of action under article 582 of the Civil Code accrued in 1905
when the windows in defendant's house were opened, and that, in accordance with Chapter III
of the Code of Civil Procedure, his action has prescribed.
The argument of Soriano that it was only in 1917, when he bought the land in question, that the
statute of limitations began to run, is not convincing, for the general rule is, that once the
statute begins to run, it never stops, and the transfer of the cause of action does not have the
effect of suspending its operation.
Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct
view upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance
of two meters between the wall in which they are made and such contiguous property. Neither
can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be
a distance of sixty centimeters. The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to
prescription.
Digested by: Alfred Gene B. Lacandula
MASONGSONG vs. FLORES

G.R. No. 36048, September24, 1932
Malcolm, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Alejandro Masongsong is the owner of a registered land in Manila

while Respondent Victoria Flores, is the owner of an adjoining lot where a house has
windows overlooking the adjoining property of Masongsong, leaving a distance of less
than two meters between the two houses. Separating the two houses is public alley.
The title of petitioner extends over such alley.
Issue:
Whether an alley constructed in accordance with the Revised Ordinances of the

City of Manila, and open to the public, falls within the provisions of the Civil code
concerning the easements of light and view inapplicable to buildings separated by a
public thoroughfare.
Held:
The Court held that a private alley open to the public, under the circumstances of
this case, falls within the exception provided by article 584 of the Civil Code to article
582 thereof, and that accordingly the plaintiff has no legal cause of action.
Article 582 of the Civil Code provides that “no windows or balconies or other similar projections
which directly overlook the adjoining property may be opened or built without leaving a distance of not
less than two meters between the wall in which they are built and such adjoining property.” Article 584
of the Civil Code makes the provisions of article 582 inapplicable “to buildings separated by a public
thoroughfare”. Article 584 must be harmonized with municipal ordinances.
CABACUNGANvs. CORRALES
G.R. No. L-6629, September 30, 1954
Reyes, A., J.
Facts:
The complaint alleges that in January, 1950, defendants, being owners of a lot contiguous to
the land here in question, constructed a building on said lot with balcony and windows less than three
meters distant from said land and with roof that drains rain water into it in violation of Article 670 and
674, respectively, of the New Civil Code.
Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the said balcony and windows be ordered closed and the roofs
constructed in such a way that rain water would not fall on plaintiffs' land.
Taking the view that, with the acquisition by defendants of a share in the land in question, the
easement of light, view and drainage was extinguished "by merger in the same person of the
ownership of dominant and servant estates" pursuant to Article 631 of the New Civil Code, the lower
court ruled out this cause of action.
This view is patently erroneous. As defendants have not become sole owners of the servient
estate, for they have acquired only a part interest therein, it cannot be said that in this case
ownership of the dominant and servient estates has been merged in the same person for the
purposes of the article cited.
Thus, commenting on the corresponding article of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 546), Manresa
observes that under that article the easement is not extinguished by the acquisition of a share in
property held in common.
Issue:
Whether the acquisition by defendants of a share in the land in question, the easement of
light, view and drainage was extinguished "by merger in the same person of the ownership of
dominant and servant estates" pursuant to Article 631 of the New Civil Code.
Held:
No. As to the matter of drainage, Article 674 of the New Civil Code specifically provides "that
the owner of a building shall be obliged to construct its roof or covering in such a manner that the rain
water shall fall on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his
neighbor, even though the adjacent land may belong to two or more persons, one of whom is the
owner of the proof."
PURUGGANANvs. PAREDES
G.R. No. L-23818, January 21, 1976
Martin, J.
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of lot subdivided as

Lot 1 and Lot 2, situated at Abra, adjacent to and bounded on the North by the lot of
defendant-appellant Felisa Paredes. The lots of the plaintiff-appellee are subject to an
easement of drainage in favor of the defendants-appellants fully quoted in the Decree of
Registration.
In or about March 1951, the defendants-appellants constructed a house on their

lot adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in a manner that the southern side of
their house is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of which is the demarcation
line between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendants-appellants, demolishing said brick
wall and built thereon the southern wall of their house with 3 windows. The house
constructed by the defendants-appellants is 2-1/2 meters longer than the length of
roofing allowed in the Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing if 1.20 meters,
protruding over the property of the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meters wider than that
allowed in the same Decree of Registration, and the rain water from GI roofing falls
about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the plaintiff-appellee. The defendants-appellants
also placed 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house on the side
facing lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee. From the time the defendants-appellants started
to construct their house, the plaintiff-appellee has repeatedly and continuously been
demanding from the defendants-appellants that the construction of their house be in
accordance with the easement, but the defendants-appellants refused to observe the
easement and to close their windows. They also prohibited the plaintiff-appellee from
constructing a party wall between points 1 and 2 of Lot 1 and between points 2 and 3
and 4 of Lot 1.
Defendants-appellants alleged that the plaintiff-appellee was the private surveyor

who surveyed their lot in 1925 and that in the course his survey he had acted in bad
faith when he excluded the portion of their land, which was the subject, matter of their
opposition to the registration of plaintiff-appellee’s lots; that they constructed their house
in 1950 without any protest from the plaintiff-appellee and was almost complete when
the Decree of Registration was issued by the court; that the plaintiff-appellee knew fully
well that the defendants-appellants were merely reconstructing a house which had been
existing prior to the bombing of Bangued in 1945; and that the brick wall standing along
the house is exclusively owned by them.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants; ordering the defendants to reconstruct the roof and eaves of their house on
the southern side now existing on their lot such that the falling water shall not fall on
curve into the lots of the plaintiff beyond one meter from the boundary line and by 8-1/2
meters in length and to remove the said protruding eaves and roof.
Issue:
Whether the failure to have easement annotated on title extinguishes the

easement of light and view.
Held:
Defendants-appellants also blamed the trial court for ruling that they have not acquired an
easement of light and view of the property of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court’s ruling that
defendants-appellants have not acquired and easement of light and view on the property is based on
Sec.39 of the Land Registration Act, which states that if there are easement or other rights appurtenant
to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easement or rights
shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate or in any other manner. An easement is
cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System without the
easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Land
Registration Act (Act 496).
NGO SIN SINGvs. LI SENG GIAP

G.R. No. 170596, November 28, 2008
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and TiciaDy Ngo owned a lot at 745 Caballero St., Binondo. In
1978, they decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this
project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation
(Contech) as their General Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li
Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap& Sons, Inc. (respondent).
During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent, through its general manager, John
T. Lee, received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks
appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart.
An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners’
land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building. As a gesture of
goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be undertaken by
their contractor. In December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG
Building. Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors,
cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames.
Apparently, the LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no
longer safe to occupy the building. In 1981, the respondent was constrained to consult engineers, E.S. de
Castro Ph.D. and Associates, through Control Builders Corporation, to investigate the cause of the
damages in the LSG Building and to determine its present structural integrity. the consultants concluded
that the structural failure of the LSG Building resulted from the differential settlement caused by the
excavation during the construction of the NSS Building. Since the building had undergone large
differential settlements beyond safe tolerable limits, the consultants recommended the complete
demolition of the LSG Building.
The demolition and reconstruction of the building was estimated to cost the respondents about
P8,021,687.00. The respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay the cost
of the same, which the petitioners refused.
Thus, a complaint for sum of money was filed against Ngo Sin Sing, TiciaDy Ngo and Contech
Construction Technology Development Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, alleging
that: (1) the respondent’s building had been structurally unstable and deficient since incipiency, having
been constructed in 1966 without the appropriate provision to vouchsafe its structural integrity
including differential settlements during its economic life; and (2) the structural defects and failure were
traceable not necessarily due to soil erosion but to a number of external forces constantly working upon
the building including earthquakes and improper maintenance. Petitioners filed a cross-claim against
Contech averring that pursuant to their construction contract, all claims of third parties should be
answered by said corporation.
After due hearing, the trial court ruled that the defendants were negligent. the trial court
rendered judgment rendered ordering defendants Ngo Sin Sing, TiciaDy Ngo and [Contech] Construction
Technology Development Corp. jointly and severally, liable to pay plaintiff Li Seng Giap& Sons, Inc. the
sum of P4,010,843.50.
The CA refuted the findings of the trial court imputing contributory negligence to the
respondents Li Seng Giap& Sons, Inc., and ruled that the spouses
Ngo Sin Sing and TiciaDy Ngo together with Contech, were solidarily liable for the whole
amount. Aggrieved, the spouses Ngo Sin Sing and TiciaDy Ngo now come to this Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent LSG’s own negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to its
building, or at least, amounted to contributory negligence warranting reduction of the award.
Held:
These requisites for Quasi-delict are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the
excavation done without observing the proper safeguards. Although the TC stated that petitioner as
land owner had every right to excavate on his own land, such right is not absolute as to deprive the
adjacent owner sufficient lateral support pursuant to Article 684 of the New Civil Code, which states
that:
“No proprietor shall make such excavation upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient or subjacent support.”
For the damage caused to the respondent, petitioners and Contech are jointly liable as they are
joint tort-feasors.
CASTROvs. MONSOD
G.R. No. 183719, February 2, 2011
Nachura, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes,
Pamplona, LasPiñas City. Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot
of petitioner, located on Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, LasPiñas City.
In 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of
the property of petitioner. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the
property. Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support
at the rear portion of his estate.
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994, there was
no annotation or existence of any easement over the property.
The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable
considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered
owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that while respondent’s
adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it did not fall under the requisites for registering an
adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal
easement of subjacent and lateral support. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent petitioner
from making injurious excavations.
Issue:
Whether or not the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent
properties and, if it does, whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient
estate.
Held:
CIVIL LAW: Easement
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his
land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by
virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that
he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two
adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil
of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his
neighbor’s land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or
slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable. Here, the residential house and lot of respondent
is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioner’s property; hence, an
easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent.
However, respondent’s assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sq.m. property of
petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of
an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 requires a claim on
the title of the disputed land. Therefore, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral
support is no longer necessary.
NORTH NEGROS SUGARvs. HIDALGO

G.R. No. L-42334, October 31, 1936
Recto, J.:
Facts:
Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known as “mill site”) and also its adjoining plantation
Hacienda “Begona”. He constructed a road adjoining the “mill site” and the provincial highway. Plaintiff
allows vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15 for each one; pedestrians are allowed free
passage.
Defendant owns the adjoining “Hacienda Sangay” wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba
saloon (as in drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the only means of access to get to Hacienda
Sangay.
At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the said road. Hence, instead of taking the
road to get to his Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda Begona in a passageway used
by the carabaos.
Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant from entering/passing through his
properties (road & Hacienda).
Issue:
Whether the injunction should be granted.
Held: NO.
Ratio:
For injunction to be granted, it must be established that the right sought to be protected exists,
but also that the acts against which the injunction to be directed are violative of said right.
In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right and that the defendant has
committed/attempts to commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint does not state how and
why the mere passage of defendant over plaintiff’s estate conveying “tuba” to his Hacienda has caused
damage to plaintiff’s property rights. The real damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid is the fact that
tuba is disposed of at defendant’s hacienda in which the plaintiff’s laborers have access (apparently, the
plaintiff hates that his laborers are getting drunk in the tuba saloon of the defendant). This however, is a
nothing more than an exercise of legitimate business on the part of the defendant. What the law does
not authorize to be done directly, cannot be done indirectly (if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant from
selling tuba, neither can it obtain injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to transport
tuba).
(TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements):

The road was constructed by the plaintiff on his own land and it made this road accessible to the
public, regardless of class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary easement constituted in favor of
the community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at its pleasure as no period has been fixed when
the easement was constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not capriciously exclude
defendant from its use. Having the road devoted to the public in general, the road is charged with public
interest and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any
private person. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing its use, but so long as he maintains it, he
must submit to the control.
Furthermore there exists a forcible right of way in favor of the defendant (CC 564) because
those living in Hacienda Sangay have no access to the provincial road except through the road in
question.
TRIASvs. ARANETA
G.R. No. L-20786, October 30, 1965
Bengzon, J.:
Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements and restrictions as conditions for contracts of
sales; the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the ground that it impacts dominical rights.
Facts:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker AranetaInc
(of Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition
that said lot should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms.
RafaelaTrias. She was dismayed with the annotation that stated “5. That no factories be permitted in
this section.”
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal and existed
as mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in the
vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised the
issue to the court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition resulted from
a valid sales transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no
authority to overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to contract.
Issue:
Whether the imposition was valid.
Held:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art 594 which
provides that “every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not in
contravention to the law, public policy and public order”
The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of neighboring
residents. The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy,
the easement may not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime,
allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original intent to bar
factories remains binding.
Digest submitted by: Jhon Dave L. Macatol
Apolonia Ocampo vs. FidelaOcampo

G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 547
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the petitioners and
respondents to this case. In the celebration of their marriage, they acquired several properties, all of which
are owned in common by their children. However, the residential/commercial lot in Nabua, Camarines
Sur is ostensibly owned by FidelaOcampo, although the latter acknowledges that the same is co-owned by
her and her siblings.
Aside from the first complaint that they have filed before the trial court, petitioners also filed a
supplemental complaint where they allege that FidelaOcampo cancelled the first TCT of the lot in Nabua
and issued a new one in the form of Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and
her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both the donor of the doneeare notoriously aware that the lot is still under
dispute in the petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation. Petitioners also
allege that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen, daughter of another defendant Felicidad, is
tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as
they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein.
Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the absolute owner of the property
since 1949, and that its title is free from all encumbrances and adverse claims. In 1984, Fidela conveyed
the property to Belen via a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and since September 13, 1987, Belen has been
the absolute owner of the same property.
In its decision, the Appellate Court said that other than the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership
executed by Respondent FidelaOcampo, no documentary evidence was offered to establish petitioners’
claim of co-ownership. It also said that respondents were able to give clear proof of their ownership of the
property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela,
and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.
Issue:
Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary
shares, is said deed valid?
Held:
No, the deed was not valid.
Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed on January 13, 1984, between herself
as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole
ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the

property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-
ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the
time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were
proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior
document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s
ratiocination:
"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written
acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this case, the
same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest since the alleged acknowledgement
was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the property as the
year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her properties to defendant Belen
Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an interest to
declare against."
Tan Queto v. CA
G.R. No.L-35648. February 27, 1987
PARAS, J.
Facts:
RestitutaTagalinarGuangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the Cadastre
Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental) either as a purported donation or by way of
purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged consideration thereof. The transaction took place
during her mother’s lifetime (her father having predeceased the mother) and consummated while Restituta
was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. On 22 January 1935, Juan filed an application of
Torrens title over the land for himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a
decision was promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as
the owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into between
Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent of her husband) for a period of 10 years.
Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease
contract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City.
On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in Juan’s name. On
10 October 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the
owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of land with the house
constructed thereon previously owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto
constructed on the disputed land a concrete building, without any objection on the part of Restituta.
The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in the CFI,
the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by Juan and Tan Queto.
Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but
disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The CFI and the
Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan Queto was a builder in bad faith.
These findings were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive
upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated 16
May 1983.
Issue:
Was the donation valid?
Held:
No, the donation was not valid.
The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation interviews because it was not executed in a
public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will
were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her
hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual
transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a
consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount)
as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the
spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that
RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own). The contention that the sale was fictitious or simulated
(and therefore void) is bankrupt. Firstly, there was a valid consideration therefor. Secondly, assuming that
there had indeed been a simulation, the parties thereto cannot use said simulation to prejudice a stranger
to said stratagem (like petitioner herein).
Lagazo vs CA
G.R. No. 112796 March 5, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded a
60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants
under its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob
executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him to
execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney
granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada. Simultaneous
with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor
plaintiff-appellee.
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-
appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out
that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining
balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob.
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate the
premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel to defendant. However, defendant-
appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted
the complaint for recovery of possession and damages against defendant-appellant.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be
stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any charge,
burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid
for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous
donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil
Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of
the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against private respondent clearly
indicate his acceptance of the donation.
Issues:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the expressed
consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually paid charges
imposed on the property like land taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous
and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts?
2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally
communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting?
Held:
1. No, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts.
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while
an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in
value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall
be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not
applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment
of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed
by the donor as a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee.
The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the
payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his
testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by his
grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by
Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the
fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in
the donation.
2. No, the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting.
As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The donation, following the
theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.”
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the
donation null and void.
Liguez v. CA
GR No. L-11240, Dec 18, 1957
REYES, J.B.L., J.
Facts:
Petitioner-appellant complaintagainst the widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to
recover a parcel of 51.84 hectares of land, situated in Barrio Bogac-Linot, of the municipality of Mati,
Province of Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land,
executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943. The defense interposed
was that the donation was null and void for having an illicit causa or consideration, which was plaintiff's
entering into marital relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been
adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the Court of First Instance, since 1949.
The deed of donation was prepared by the Justice of the Peace of Mati, Davao, before whom it
was signed and ratified on the date aforesaid. At the time, appellant Liguez was a minor, only 16
years' of age. While the deed recites
"That the DONOR, Salvador P. Lopez, for and in consideration of his Jove and affection for
the said DONEE, Conchita Liguez, and also for the good and valuable services rendered to the
DONOR by the DONEE, docs by these presents, voluntarily give, grant and donate to the said donee,
etc." (Paragraph 2, Exhibit "A") the Court of Appeals found that when the donation was made, Lopez had
been living with the parents of appellant for barely a month; that the donation was made in view of the
desire of Salvador P. Lopez, a man of mature years, to have sexual relations with appellant Conchita
Liguez; that Lopez had confessed to his love for appellant to the instrumental witnesses, with the remark
that her parents would not allow Lopez to live with her unless he first donated the land in question;
that after the donation, Conchita Liguez and Salvador P. Lopez lived together in the house that was built
upon the latter's orders, until Lopez was killed on July 1st, 1943, by some guerrillas who believed
him to be pro-Japanese.
It was also ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter had met and
berated Conchita for living maritally with her husband, sometime during June of 1943; that the widow
and children of Lopez were in possession of the land and made improvements thereon; that the land
was assessed in the tax rolls first in the name of Lopez and later in that of his widow; and that the
deed of donation was never recorded.
Issue:
Was the donation valid?
Held:
No, the donation was not valid.
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation regular on
its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea
on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez himself, if living, would be barred from
setting up that plea; and his heirs, as his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights
than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor", being thus precluded from pleading the defense
of immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be
decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez
could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo,
because said property was conjugal in character, and the right of the husband to donate community
property is strictly limited by law (Civil Code of 1889, Arts. 1409, 1415, 1413; Baello vs. Villanueva,
54 Phil. 213).
"ART. 1409. The conjugal partnership shall also be chargeable with anything which may have
been given or promised by the husband alone to the children born of the marriage in order to
obtain employment for them or give them a profession or by both spouses by common
consent, should they not have 'Stipulated that such expenditures should be borne in whole
or in part by the separate property of one of them."
"ART. 1415. The husband may dispose of the property of the conjugal partnership for the
purposes mentioned in Article 1409."
"ART. 1413. In addition to his powers as manager the husband may for a valuable
consideration alienate and encumber the property of the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife."
The text of the articles makes it plain that the donation made by the husband in contravention of law is
not void in its entirety, but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife. In this regard, as
Manresa points out (Commentaries, 5th Ed., pp. 650-651, 652-653), the law makes no distinction
between gratuitous transfers and conveyances for a consideration.
City of Angeles vs CA
G.R. No. 97882. August 28, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
In a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1984, subsequently superseded by a Deed of Donation

dated September 27, 1984, which in turn was superseded by an Amended Deed of Donation dated
November 26, 1984, private respondent donated to the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in
Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles, with an aggregate area of 50,676 square meters, more or less, part of a
bigger area also belonging to private respondent. The amended deed provided, among others, that:
6. The properties donated (which is more than five (5) percent of the total land area of the
DONORs subdivision) shall constitute the entire open space for DONORs subdivision and all
other lands or areas previously reserved or designated, including Lot 1 and Lot 2A of Block 72
and the whole Block 29 are dispensed with, and rendered free, as open spaces, and the DONEE
hereby agrees to execute and deliver all necessary consents, approvals, endorsements, and
authorizations to effect the foregoing.
7. The properties donated are devoted and described as open spaces of the DONORs subdivision,
and to this effect, the DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases the DONOR and/or
assumes any and all obligations and liabilities appertaining to the properties donated.
8. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos shall entitle the DONOR to revoke or rescind
this Deed of Donation, and in such eventuality, the DONEE agrees to vacate and return the
premises, together with all improvements, to the DONOR peacefully without necessity of judicial
action.
On August 8, 1988, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
56, in Angeles City against the petitioners, alleging breach of the conditions imposed in the amended
deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the donation and damages, with preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order to halt the construction of the said center.
Petitioners argue that since the private respondent is required by law to donate the parks and
playgrounds, it has no right to impose the condition in the Amended Deed of Donation that the properties
donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. It cannot
prescribe any condition as to the use of the area donated because the use of the open spaces is already
governed by P.D. 1216. In other words, the donation should be absolute. Consequently, the conditions in
the amended deed which were allegedly violated are deemed not written. Such being the case, petitioners
cannot be considered to have committed any violation of the terms and conditions of the said amended
deed, as the donation is deemed unconditional, and it follows that there is no basis for revocation of the
donation.
Issue:
Whether private respondent as subdivision owner/developer may validly impose conditions in the
Amended Deed of Donation regarding the use of the open space allocated exclusively for parks and
playgrounds.
Held:
Yes, private respondent as subdivision owner/developer may validly impose conditions in the
Amended Deed of Donation regarding the use of the open space allocated exclusively for parks and
playgrounds.
There is no prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such
donation. Any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation
should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the
donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. To rule that it should be so
is tantamount to unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree.
In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation is that the
donee should build a sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5%
to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is non-buildable, then the obvious question
arises whether or not such condition was validly imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the
non-buildable character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess land over
and above the 3.5% to 9% required by the decree, which is also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds
and recreational purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-buildability
restriction. In the instant case, if there be an excess, then the donee would not be barred from developing
and operating a sports complex thereon and the condition in the amended deed would then be considered
valid and binding.
To determine if the over 50,000 square meter area donated pursuant to the amended deed would
yield an excess over the area required by the decree, it is necessary to determine under which density
category the Timog Park subdivision falls.
If the subdivision falls under the low density or open market housing category, with 20 family
lots or below per gross hectare, the developer will need to allot only 3.5% of gross area for parks and
playgrounds, and since the donated land constitutes more than five (5) percent of the total land area of the
subdivision, there would therefore be an excess of over 1.5% of gross area which would not be non-
buildable. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged (and private respondent did not controvert) that the
subdivision in question is a medium-density or economic housing subdivision based on the sizes of the
family lots donated in the amended deed, for which category the decree mandates that not less than 7% of
gross area be set aside. Since the donated land constitutes only a little more than 5% of the gross area of
the subdivision, which is less than the area required to be allocated for non-buildable open space,
therefore there is no excess land to speak of. This then means that the condition to build a sports complex
on the donated land is contrary to law and should be considered as not imposed.
Del Rosario v Ferrer

G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010
ABAD, J.
Facts:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled
“Donation Mortis Causa” in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter,
Jarabini. Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the
deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however,
signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document. Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in
September 1968. A few months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a
deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo
died in June 1972.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and
Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
Held:
It is a donation inter-vivos.
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not
controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered
by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of
the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the
"distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said
that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality
a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration
of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held
that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they
lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of
a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance
should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Villanueva vs.Branoco
G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
CARPIO, J.
Facts:
Gonzalo, here represented by his heirs, sued spouses Froilan and LeonilaBranoco in the RTC of
Naval, Biliran for the recovery of a parcel of land in Leyte. He claimed ownership over the property
through purchase from Vere who in turn purchased the property from Rodrigo in 1970. The respondents
in this case claimed ownership in their answer through purchase in 1983 from Rodriguez to whom
Rodrigo donated the property in 1965.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that by the time Rodriguez sold the property
to the respondents in this case she had no title to transfer because the donation to her by Rodrigo was
deemed cancelled when Rodrigo decided to sell the property to Vere instead.
The respondents brought the case up to the Court of Appeals, which granted their appeal. It found
the following factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as donationintervivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in
possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the produce
toApoyAlve; (2) the Deeds consideration was not Rodrigos death but her "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in
case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguezs estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted
the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donationsintervivos, not
devises.Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found
the sale between Rodrigo and petitioners predecessor-in-interest,Vere, void for Rodrigos lack of title.
Issue:
Whether petitioners title is superior to that of respondents.
Held:
The petition is unmeritorious.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donationintervivos.
First.Rodrigo stipulated that "if the hereinDonee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be
reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of xxxRodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of
the passage of title to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident
from Rodriguezs undertaking to "give one [half] xxxof the produce of the land toApoyAlveduring her
lifetime." Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to
reserve partialusufructuaryright over it.
Third.The existence of consideration other than the donors death, such as the donors love and
affection to thedoneeand the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless
"corroborates the express irrevocability of xxx[intervivos] transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in
giving weight to Rodrigos statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for
the gift, to underscore its finding.
Pajarillo v. IAC
G.R. No. 72908 , August 11, 1989
CRUZ, J.
Facts:
Perfecta baleen died in 1945 leaving a 28-hectare lot. Perfecta was survived bysisterJuana and
brother Felipe.May 1946 Juana and Felipe executed an Extrajudicial Sale of the Estate of Perfecta, which
states that Felipe and Juana agreed to carryout the requests of perfecta that in consideration of her love
and affection it be donated to Salud whois the daughter of Juana.June 1946 Salud executed the following
public instrument which states:
“that I Salud the only done do hereby receive and accept this donation and further express my gratitude
for the kindness and liberality of the donors, Felipe and Juana.1951, acceding to the request of her mother
Juana, Salud transferred possessionof the lot to her mother who was them living with Claudio Salud’s
brother and hisfamily. During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes.May 25,
1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land toClaudio for P12,000. Claudio had the
land registered in his name and was issue TCT. In 1963, Juana died. In1965, Salud filed a complaint for
reconveyance on the ground that deed of sale infavor of Claudio was fictitious and its registration was
null and void.Claudio argues that the fact that acceptance was made in separate instrumentwas not noted
in both instruments as required by the civil code.
Issue:
Whether the donation is valid.
Held:
Yes, the donation is valid.
It is true that there is nothing in either of the two instruments showing thatauthentic notice of the
acceptance was made by Salud to Felipe. And while thefirst instrument contains the statement that “the
done does hereby accept thisdonation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality
of the donor” the only signatories thereof were Felipe and Juana. That wasin factthe reason for separate
instrument of acceptance signed by Salud a month later.
A strict interpretation of art 633 of the old civil code, can lead to no other conclusion that on the
annulment of the donation for being defective in for. Thiswould be in keeping with the unmistakable
language of art. 633.
A literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to theparties but
conversely a distortion of their intentions it is also a policy of the courtto avoid such an interpretation.The
purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of thedonation is duly communicated to
the donor. Here it is not even, suggested thatJuana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact
confirmed it later andrequested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud.
The donation cannot be declared ineffective just because there is no notation inthe EJS of donees
acceptance that would be placing too much stress on mereform over the substance. It would also be
disregard the clear reality of theacceptance of the donation as manifested in this separate instrument and
aslater acknowledge and as latter acknowledged by Juana.
Digested by: Louie Ivan Maiz
Ma. Estela Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002, 383 SCRA 6)
FACTS:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½)
portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu. Four (4) other deeds of donation
were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners
Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in
the deeds are as follows:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does
hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described
property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and
effect."
When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,
respondents filed an action to annul the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that
petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita
Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents
are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents'
allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the
preparation of the instruments. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, while the
ISSUE:
Whether the donations to the petitioners are donations mortis causa or inter vivos.
HELD:
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing
in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.
In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken
into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no
other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis
causa in the Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed of Donation.
That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not qualify
the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason.
URSULINA GANUELAS, et al. v. HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, et al.
G. R. No. 123968, 24 April 2003, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio-Morales, J.)
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
FACTS: Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of
petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in
consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful services
the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and
convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the
present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.
However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document revoking such donation.
After her death, Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private
respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share in the produce of the properties
despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the San Fernando, La
Union Regional Trial Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such
donation is void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a
disposition mortis causa.
On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments because such donation was inter vivos.
The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to comply
with the formalities of wills and testaments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
HELD: Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation inter vivos differs
from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or
acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership
of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that
time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last
will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the
donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then
the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation
of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted
with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in
which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a
will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title
or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but
that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during
her lifetime.
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the
donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a
postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the
transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed contains an
attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: To classify the donation as inter
vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the
donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the
latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos
or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other words, love and affection may also
underline transfers mortis causa.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under
Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and
produces no effect.
GESTOPA VS. CA FACTS
FACTS:
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a
donation mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving
donor's rights to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such
properties. Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter vivos, to six
parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land
during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties
donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses
Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title,
stating that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled
in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa
RULING:
It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two
donations, and that they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since
it has a different application to a donation mortis causa. Also, the court stated four
reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and
affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the reservation of a lifetime
usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the intention
to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of
donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for
officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.
DE LUNA VS. JUDGE ABRIGO
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain
terms and conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would
automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the
conditions, de Luna “revived” the said donation by executing a Revival of Donation
Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years
from the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT.
By a Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated
while the remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a
complaint with the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms
were violated. The Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and
substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite
extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4
years). The heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of
revocation of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 –enforcement of a written
contract)
RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are
governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the
general rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as
provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion
which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in
view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are
governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on
donation applies in the case at bar.
C-J YULO & SONS, INC vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC.
[G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005]
FACTS: On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at
Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on the condition that it shall be used for the construction
of a home for the aged and infirm and for other charitable purposes and cannot be used
for any other purposes without the consent of the former said land with all real
improvements thereon shall revert in otherwise trust to the Donor for prompt disposition
in favor of some other charitable organization that Donor may deem best suited to the
care of the aged.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build
the perimeter fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building
for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin
Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease
agreement was entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of the donor,
as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended in 1985.
The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the
donee, this time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained
by the donee, it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from
vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and
in the infirm, which was named as “Casa dela Merced.” As before, however, the donee
executed the lease contract without the prior written consent of the donor.
After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased
a portion of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for
fattening cattles. The donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also
for the purposes of generating funds for the completion of “Casa dela Merced.” Again,
however, the donee did not secure the prior written consent of the donor.
Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its
president Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was
revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee’s non-
compliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.
ISSUE: W/N revocation is proper?

HELD: NO. In Republic vs. Silim, where the donor sought to revoke the donation on the
ground that the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for
school purpose only, the Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated
when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation
remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the
purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger
one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the release of funds for the construction of
Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area
of the donated lot.
As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the
sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact,
such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation,
albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering that
the donee’s acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made
but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would
only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the
donation.
Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the
donor for all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground
for revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the
purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the donee’s right of
ownership over the donated property.
Enrique Ma. Barretto vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 3148, February 6, 1907, 7 Phil 416)
FACTS:
Enrique Ma. Barretto donates his lot in front of Malacanang Palace to the City of Manila, on the
condition that "no structures shall be erected upon the land and that it will not be devoted to any
purpose other than the beautifying of the vicinity, and for this purpose the city should acquire such of
the adjoining land as may be necessary to form with mine a public square with gardens and walks." The
Ayuntamiento and the Corregimiento of the City declared its acceptance over Barretto's offer, both
requesting for its documents and necessary deeds of conveyance. Barretto thereafter sent to the
Ayuntamiento the necessary documents, and until the month of February, 1903, appears to have had
the idea that a formal transfer of the plot had been executed by him; in fact, it had not been.
However, the city entered into possession of the land, building a railing separating it from the adjoining
property, and ever since that time the ground has been used as part of the public street, increasing the
width thereof opposite the exit from the Palace and substantially improving the appearance of the
locality. Barretto brought the action to recover possession of the land on account of the failure of the
city to comply with the conditions of the donation.
HELD:
Although a formal conveyance of the property appears to have never been made, yet the taking
possession of the land by the city upon the terms contained in the offer and acceptance give effect to
the latter.
The whole negotiation must be taken into consideration in order to determine what was in the minds of
the parties at the time. The plaintiff's proposition was unmistakable. If the city designed to reject any
part of it while accepting the rest, such rejection should have been in express terms. Not only do we fail
to find any such rejection, but in the letter of June 19 there appears to be in its concluding words an
express recognition of the terms imposed, when it is provided that the deed of cession shall be drawn
"with the restrictions indicated by you." This is a reference to the restrictions in the letter of the plaintiff
and operates of necessity as an acceptance of them.
SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs ROQUE

G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented
by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe
C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land in the name of Roque. Petitioner issued
to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000.00 by way of “reservation payment.” Simultaneously,
petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the
property. Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another
P250,000.00 “downpayment” to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized,were never
annotated on the Certificate of title because of the untimely demise of Roque. Roque’s
death constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the
surviving children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some
disagreements. In a letter, respondent advised petitioner “to desist from any attempt to
enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and memorandum of agreement”. On 15
February 1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the
memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
before the RTC alleging that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject
property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents,
Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority
to enter into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a
public instrument duly acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and
duly accepted on the same day by respondent before the notary public in the same
instrument of donation. The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr.
Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of respondent sixteen
years later.
Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father
the mere administration of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed
contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the
Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement.
ISSUE: W/N there was valid donation to respondent?

HELD: YES. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is
undisputed. The trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the
non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode
of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee. In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its
validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code
provides, however, that “titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property,
which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of
Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons.” It is enough, between the
parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in a public
document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the
registry of Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Digested by: Vienna Mae J. Miranda
EUFEMIA PAJARILLO, CLAUDIO SUTERIO, JR., NYMIA SUTERIO and MARILYN

SUTERIO, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION,
SALUD SUTERIO and PEDRO MATIAS
G.R. No. 72908 August 11, 1989
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Perfecta died leaving inter alia 28 hectares of land who was survived by Juana and
Felipe who then executed a public instrument entitled "Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate of
the Deceased Perfecta Balane de Cordero”. In it theydisposed that in according to Perfecta’s
wishes and in consideration of love andaffection, the said property be donated to private
respondent Salud Suterio de Matias,Perfecta’s niece, who will assume the
encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine NationalBank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same
document, the land was donated to Salud who then accepted the donationin a public
instrument.
In 1951 Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother, who was then
staying with Claudio and his family. During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio
paid the realty taxes thereon. Juana then executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land
to Claudio for a consideration and latter had the land registered.
Salud filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed
of sale in favor of Claudio was fictitious and its registration in his name was null and void.That
Salud was unaware until later of the supposed sale of the land to Claudio. She faulted it as
having been procured through fraud and improper influence on her sick and aged mother.
For their part, the defendants assailed the donation to Salud as legally inefficacious and
defective that the intrinsic validity of the extrajudical settlement and submit that it is not really a
donation an is defective in form because of non-compliance with the requirements of the law
regarding its acceptance, that such acceptance was not "noted in both instruments," meaning
the extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
CFI rendered judgment upholding the donation to Salud and annulling the deed of sale
and the registration of the land in favor of Claudio. On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Is Salud a valid donee of the subject property?
RULING:
Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of
the property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever. Hence, if they
chose to respect Perfecta's wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to Salud,
there was no legal impediment to their doing so. In fact, that was not only the legal but also the
moral thing to do. In her acceptance of the donation, Salud referred to 'the donors Felipe Balane
and Juana Balane de Suterio," and not Perfecta.
.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to annulment of the donation for being
defective in form. However, the Court finds that under the circumstances of the present case, a
literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the parties but
conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such an
intepretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is
duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was
unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land
be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot
in conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial
settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form
over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as
manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20,1946, and as later acknowledged by
Juana.Registration was not necessary to make the donation a binding commitment insofar as
the donors and the donee were concerned.
TITO R. LAGAZOvs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO CABANLIT
G.R. No. 112796. March 5, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
An action for recovery of Monserrat Estate was filed by Lagazo against Cabanlit and
claims to have acquired it from his grandmother by donation. Cabanlit in defense said that when
the alleged donation was executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of
Assignment from a transferee of Lagazo’s grandmother, Catalina.
The Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for
sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless program. Before Catalina left for
Canada, she executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo
authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of the lot.Eduardo
failed to accomplish so Catalina revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada
and executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor Lagazo.
On January 30, 1985, Catalina executed in Canada a Deed of Donation in favour of
Lagazo who later sent a demand letter to Cabanlit asking him to vacate the premises but
refused to
Lower court decided in favor of Lagazo rationalizing that his version is more credible. On
appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision ruling upon the absence of any
showing that Lagazo accepted his grandmother’s donation of the subject land citing
jurisprudence that the donees failure to accept a donation whether in the same deed of donation
or in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation was simple or onerous?
RULING:
The Court ruled that the donation was simple, not onerous.
Even conceding that Lagazo’s full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been
a burden to him; such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation. The Court agrees with the appellate court that the payments made by Lagazo were
merely his voluntary acts.
As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the Civil Code are applicable:
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and the donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
instrument, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only
upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. Furthermore, if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. Acceptance of the donation by the donee
is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void.
The deed of donation does not show any indication that Lagazo accepted the gift. During
the trial, he did not present any instrument evidencing such acceptance despite the fact that
Cabanlit already raised this allegation in his supplemental pleading to which Lagazo raised no
objection.
True, the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the
donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on
appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the
donor and noted in both the deed of donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of
donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by petitioner. For this reason, the subject lot cannot
be adjudicated to him.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT
G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Silim and Mangubat, donated a 5,600
square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the
said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. This donation
was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of
Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated land could not be released
since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. District
Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated
lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan
school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the school building previously
erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a house on
the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner
of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house
on the donated property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court.
Silim filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment
of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with
damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and
the BPS. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit that the exchange is proper
since it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and for the expansion and improvement
of the school facilities within the community. The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the
desired purpose of the donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds that the
donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation should be declared null and void?
RULING:
No. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and
void for the reason that the acceptance was not allegedly done in accordance with Articles 745
and 749 of the New Civil Code.
The Court holds that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person
with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the
donation shall be void.
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charge which the donee
must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document,
but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was
executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the
donated lot but was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to
know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and
existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the
donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in exchanging the donated lot with a
bigger lot, violated the condition in the donation that the lot be exclusively used for school
purposes only.
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey? "School" is simply
an institution or place of education. "Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets before him to
accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan, project. Term is synonymous with
the ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc. "Exclusive" means "excluding or
having power to exclude (as by preventing entrance or debarring from possession, participation,
or use); limiting or limited to possession, control or use.
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when
the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the
same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered
or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and
enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for
the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
RICKY Q. QUILALA vs. GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES
and JOSE REYES
G.R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in
favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of
94 square meters, and registered in her name. The Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos
consists of the deed of donation itself and the second page contains the Acknowledgment,
which states merely that Catalina personally appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the
left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the
witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness.
Catalina and Violeta died then the petitioner, Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving
son of Violeta. Meanwhile, respondents claim to be Catalina’s only surviving relatives, executed
a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the
above-described property. And later filed an action for declaration of nullity of the donation inter
vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT in the name of Violeta.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and
Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently,
there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the
donation null and void.Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalinas SSS records
does it appear that Violeta was Catalinas daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as an
adopted child, but there was no positive evidence that the adoption was legal. On the other
hand, the trial court found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However,
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that respondents deed of
extrajudicial settlement can not be registered.
Petitioner appealed and the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action
without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalinas alleged last will and
testament.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation executed in favor of Violeta is valid?
RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of
title as well as the technical description as the real property donated. That the donation was
made for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity is a sufficient cause for a donation. Indeed,
donation is legally defined as an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a
thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
The donees acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate
paragraph of the deed. However, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the
Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin,
and by the donee and the other witness on the right-hand margin.Surely, the requirement that
the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument
is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification
of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Simply put, the
specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties
signs on the wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate the document.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public
does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety.
It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety
a public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make a determination
of whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of Violeta.
These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings
affecting the respective estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the donation,
which we declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under
Article 771, in relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil Code.Moreover, property
donated inter vivos is subject to collation after the donors death, whether the donation was
made to a compulsory heir or a stranger, unless there is an express prohibition if that had been
the donors intention.
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, vs. BENITO A.
LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and
the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN,
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO
G.R. No. 122134. October 3, 2003
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation
propter nuptias consisting four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a
male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house which was written in the Ilocano
dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito and his
prospective bride, respondent Tomasa in consideration of the impending marriage of the
donees.
The donees took their marriage vows and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the
back of O.C.T. No. 18383.
Herminigildo and Raymunda died leaving as heirs their six (6) children, including Benito
and petitioner Romana who took possession and cultivated the land with Benito’s permission.
Romanas’s daughter Constancia took over, and has been in possession of the land.
Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Register of Deeds and the
original title was cancelled and TCT No. 84897 was issued in the name of Benito and Tomasa.
Subsequently, the heirs of the Spouses Loquiao executed Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only 3 of them, the 12 parcels of land left
by parents, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
earlier. The Deed contained a statement that Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the
heirs of Lucio Locquiao, have already received our shares in the estates of their parents, and
because of that the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed. All the living
children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including Valencia, confirmed the previous
dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of
partition were adjudicated. Later, Romana disagreed as to the distribution of the 2 lots covered
by the deed of partition. So they again executed Deed of Compromise Agreement which
redistributed the land. Benito also signed the compromise agreement, all of them confirmed the
stipulations in the compromise agreement. Constancia filed an action for annulment of title
against the respondent spouses alleging that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was
fraudulent; that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and;
that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance
on the document itself or in a separate public instrument.
ISSUE:
Whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required in donation inter vivos.
RULING:
No. The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying the
requirements on ordinary donations to the present case instead of the rules on donation propter
nuptias.
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage
are those made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both
of the future spouses. The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not
governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in
which the property donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same
Code provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. In otherwords, the
celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil
Code. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the
form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403,
paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned
thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129,
express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations. Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The
Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in
force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the
validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted
the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied. However, they
invoked the wrong provisions thereof. Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be
applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied
acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code. With the
genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and compliance with the applicable mandatory
form requirements fully established, petitioners hypothesis that their action is imprescriptible
cannot take off.
SHOPPERS PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. EFREN P. ROQUE
G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
On 23 December 1993, Shoppers Paradise Realty & Development Corporation,
represented by its president, Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Roque, now
deceased, over a parcel of land, in Quezon City, with TCT in the name of Dr. Roque. Petitioner
issued to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000.00 by way of reservation payment. Simultaneously,
petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property.
Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for another P250,000.00
downpayment to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be
annotated on TCT within 60 days but were never made because of the untimely demise of Dr.
Roque. Petitioner had a deal with respondent Efren, one of the surviving children of Dr. Roque,
but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. Efren then filed a case for
annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, before the RTC. Efren alleged that he had long been the
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his
favor by his parents and that the Dr. Roque had no authority to enter into the assailed
agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly acknowledged
by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by respondent
before the notary public in the same instrument of donation. The title to the property, however,
remained in the name of Dr. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of
respondent sixteen years later. Efren came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only
after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.
RTC dismissed the complaint of stating that ordinarily, a deed of donation need not be
registered in order to be valid between the parties. Registration, however, is important in binding
third persons. Thus, when Dr. Roque entered into a leased contract with defendant corporation,
plaintiff Efren Roque (could) no longer assert the unregistered deed of donation and say that his
father, Felipe, was no longer the owner of the subject property at the time the lease on the
subject property was agreed upon.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be
invalid the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement. While it shared the view
expressed by the trial court that a deed of donation would have to be registered in order to bind
third persons, the appellate court, however, concluded that petitioner was not a lessee in good
faith having had prior knowledge of the donation in favor of respondent, and that such actual
knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as petitioner was concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid donation in favor of Efren.
RULING:
Yes. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is
undisputed. The trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-
registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring
ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee. In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be
contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code provides, however, that titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in
the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third
persons. It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the
donation be made in a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the registry of Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
A person dealing with registered land may thus safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefore, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property but, where such party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right thereto, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest would have the effect of registration as regards to him. The appellate court
was not without substantial basis when it found petitioner to have had knowledge of the
donation at the time it entered into the two agreements with Dr. Roque. During their negotiation,
petitioner, through its representatives, was apprised of the fact that the subject property actually
belonged to respondent. It was not shown that Dr. Roque had been an authorized agent of
respondent.
Digested by: MALAICA NINA MALOLOY-ON
Imuan vs. Cereno
G.R. No. 167995, Sept. 11, 2009
Facts:
Pablo contracted two marriages and all his children on both are already dead. The
petitionersin the case are his grandchildren while the respondent is the husband of his daughter
from hissecond marriage. Juana, Pablo’s second wife, together with her children continued to be
inpossession of the parcel of land owned by Pablo after his death. A joint affidavit was executed
attesting that Pablo ceded the property in favor of Juana in the occasion of their marriage but the
document was lost. Juana sold said parcel of land to the respondent which was registered in the
register of deeds. The land area sold to respondents was divided by a barangay road. They built a
house on one side and planted fruit-bearing trees on the other side. It is on the latter’s side where
the petitioners took possession and built a nipa hut thereon. An ejectment case was filed by the
respondents against petitioners but was later dismissed when the petitioners left the area.
Petitioners now brought an action for reconveyance, damages, and annulment of deed of sale
by Juana to the respondents. They contend that it was through their tolerance that Juana and her
children constructed their house on the lot in dispute, that Pablo have not partitioned among his
heirs his property and the sale made by Juana to respondents are null and void. Respondents
invoke the ground that when Pablo married Juana the property was his exclusive property and
donated such through propter nuptias when they married.
Thus Juana, being the owner of saidlot, validly made the sale to respondents who
immediately took possession over the land and paidits realty tax. MTC ruled in favor of
thepetitioners however upon appeal CA ruled in favor ofthe respondents as it held that the
respondents are in peaceful possession of said lot for 29 yearswhich suffice to meet the
requirement of 10-year period of open, public, and adverse possessionin the concept of owner
that the law on prescription requires. It ruled that petitioners are barred by latches from claiming
ownership of the disputed property.
The CA and the RTC found that there was no partition of the property and no valid
donation propter nuptias was made by Pablo to Juana, the rule on co-ownership among Pablos
heirs should govern the property.When Juana sold the property to respondents Cerenos, the
rights of petitioners as co-owners should not have been affected. The CAs finding that the joint
affidavit attesting to the donation propter nuptias can be the basis of a belief in good faith that
Juana was the owner of the disputed property is erroneous, since Juana had knowledge from the
time she got married to Pablo that the property was acquired during the latter's first marriage.
Respondents Spouses Cereno could not be considered in good faith since Soledad is the
daughter of Juana with her marriage to Pablo and could not be considered a third party to the
dispute without knowledge of the nature of the property. Being co-owners, neither prescription
nor laches can be used against them to divest them of their property rights.
Issue: Was there a valid donation propter nuptias?
Held: YES.
Ratio:
The requirement of just title and good faith are also satisfied in this case by the joint
affidavit that the defendants-appellants presented, attesting to the donation propter nuptias of
the disputed property by Pablo to Juana. It is undisputed that Pablo and Juana had lived in the
disputed property from the time of their marriage in 1919, and Juana continued to live and to
possess this property in the concept of an owner from the time of Pablo's death in 1936 up to
the time she sold it to spouses Cereno in 1970. These circumstances are sufficient bases for
the belief that Juana was the owner of the property she conveyed by sale, and therefore, the
spouses Cereno had the good faith that acquisition by prescription requires when they
became the purchasers in the contract of sale with Juana.
Notably, one of the affiants in the joint affidavit which was executed in 1970 was
Alfredo, Pablo's son by his first marriage. Not one among Alfredo's children had ever come
out to assail the validity of the affidavit executed by their father. In fact, not one of Alfredo's
heirs joined petitioners in this case. Moreover, not one among the children of the first
marriage when they were still alive ever made a claim on their successional rights over the
property by asking for its partition. Such joint affidavit could constitute a legal basis for
Juana's adverse and exclusive character of the possession of the property and would show the
Spouses Cereno's good faith belief that Juana was the owner of the property. Thus, when
petitioners filed the instant case, more than 29 years had already elapsed, thus, the ten-year
period for acquisitive prescription has already been satisfied.
Art. 750 – What May be Donated
Soledad Calicdan v. SilverioCendaña
[GR 155080. Feb 5, 2004.]
1st DIVISION: YNARES-SANTIAGO
This case involves a parcel of unregistered land formerly owned by SixtoCalicdan, who died
intestate on Nov 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and children, Soledad, Jose and
Benigno.
On Aug 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed
the land to SilverioCendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence
around the land and constructed a 2-storey house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided
until his death in 1998.
On Jun 29, 1992, Soledad [daughter of Fermina], filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Ownership, Possession and Damages" against Silverio, alleging that the donation to Silverio was
void on the ground that Fermina was not the owner of the land, considering that it was inherited
by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses
Sixto and FerminaCalicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when
Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the
deceased spouse. Consequently, Silverio, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the
right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey.
Silverio alleged that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947 and that he had been
publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45
years
Issue:
W/N the donation inter vivos is valid.
Held:
No. Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, is void for having been executed by
Fermina who was not the owner of the property donated.
Issue:
W/N Soledad lost ownership of the land by prescription.
Held:
Yes. Despite the invalidity of the donation, Silverio has become the rightful owner of the
land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring
ownership and other real rights over immovable property
Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the case at bar as
it demands that the possession be "in good faith and with just title," and there is no evidence on
record to prove Silverio's "good faith", nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more
than 45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
Art. 737 – Capacity of Donor
HEIRS OF SEVILLA v. SEVILLA

[G.R. No. 150179. April 30, 2003.]
1st DIVISION: YNARES-SANTIAGO
Facts:
1. Felisa is the owner of ½ of Lot 653.

2. Aug 8, 1986 - Felisa executed a document denominated as "Donation Inter Vivos" ceding to
Leopoldo her ½ undivided share in Lot 653, which was accepted by Leopoldo in the same
document
3. July 6, 1988 – Felisa died
4. June 21, 1990 – The other children of Filomena [Felipe et al], filed a case against Leopoldo,
for annulment of the Deed of Donation
5. Felipe et al alleged that the Deed of Donation is tainted with fraud because Felisa, who was
then 81 years of age, was seriously ill and of unsound mind at the time of the execution
thereof
6. Leopoldo alleged that Felisa was of sound mind at the time of the execution of the assailed
deeds and that she freely and voluntarily ceded her undivided share in Lot 653 in
consideration of Leopoldo's and his family's love, affection, and services rendered in the past.
7. Dec 16, 1994 - RTC upheld the validity of the Deed of Donation and declaring the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition unenforceable
8. Felipe et al contended that the Deed of Donation should be declared void and that Lot 653
should be divided equally among them.
Issue:
W/N the Donation Inter Vivos is valid.
Held:
Yes. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or

right in favor of another who accepts it.
Under Art. 737 of the Civil Code, the donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time of
the making of the donation. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential, and
the attendance of a vice of consent renders the donation voidable.
There is no question that at the time Felisa executed the deed of donation she was already
the owner of ½ undivided portion of Lot 653 which is considered a present property which she
can validly dispose of at the time of the execution of the deed of donation.
Felipe et al, however, insist that Leopoldo employed fraud and undue influence on the
person of the donor.
In the instant case, the self-serving testimony of Felipe et al are vague on what acts of
Leopoldo constituted fraud and undue influence and on how these acts vitiated the consent of
Felisa. Fraud and undue influence that vitiated a party's consent must be established by full, clear
and convincing evidence, otherwise, the latter's presumed consent to the contract prevails.
Neither does the fact that the donation preceded the partition constitute fraud. It is not
necessary that partition should first be had because what was donated to Leopoldo was the ½
undivided share of Felisa in Lot 653.
Moreover, Felipe et al failed to show proof why Felisa should be held incapable of exercising
sufficient judgment in ceding her share to respondent Leopoldo. As testified by the notary public
who notarized the Deed of Donation, Felisa confirmed to him her intention to donate her share in
Lot 653 to Leopoldo. He stressed that though the donor was old, she was of sound mind and
could talk sensibly. Significantly, there is nothing in the record that discloses even an attempt by
Felipe to rebut said declaration of the notary public.
PACITA ORTIZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES BASADA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-7307 May 19, 1955
Facts:
The parcel of land in question belonged originally to the spouses BonifacioYupo and Vicenta
de Guerra. On April 19, 1940, the owners donated the lot (among others) to their grandchildren,
petitioners Ortiz, by public document acknowledged before Notary Public LiberatoCinco.
The donors were duly notified of donee's acceptance. Alejandro Ortiz died without issue in
Capas, Tarlac, as a prisoner of war, during the last occupation by the Japanese.
It appears further that on August 14, 1941, the donor spouses executed another notarial deed of
donation of the same property, in favor of Andres Basada, nephew of the donor Vicenta de
Guerra, subject to the condition that the donee would serve and take care of the donors until their
death. This donation was also duly accepted by the donee in the same instrument.
In 1947, the first donee (Ortiz) filed revindicatory action against the second donee (Basada)
alleging that in 1946, the latter entered and usurped the land donated to and owned by them, and
refused to vacate the same. Basada claimed ownership of the land on the ground that the
donation in favor of the Ortizes had been revoked. The Court of First Instance of Samar upheld
Basada's claim and dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the donees Ortiz had abandoned
the donors "to public mercy", with" most base ingratitude and highly condemnable heartlessness"
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter correctly held that the donation in favor of
appellants Ortiz had been duly perfected in accordance with law, and it should "stand until after
its revocation should have been asked and granted in the proper proceedings," citing our decision
in Ventura vs. Felix, 26 Phil. 500-503. It added that the subsequent donation of the property to
Basada" is not, certainly, the way a prior donation should be revoked."
Issue:
Whether the DONEE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF DONATED

PROPERTY.
Ruling:
Yes. From the time the public instrument of donation is simultaneously executed and
acknowledged by donors and donees in 1940, the latter acquired not only the ownership but also
the possession of the donated property, since the execution of a public instrument of conveyance
is one of the recognized ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made(Civ. Code of
1889, Art 1463; new Civil Code, Art. 1498), unless the contrary is expressed or inferable from
the terms of the deeds.In the present case, the the donation is on its face absolute and
unconditional and nothing in its text authorizes us to conclude that it is limited to the naked
ownership of the land donated, the absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in
favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever intended considering that under the
law, a donation of land by public instrument is required to express the charges that the donee
must assume.(old Civil Code, Art. 633; new Civil Code, Art. 749), the absence in the deed of any
express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors is proof that no such reservation was ever
intended.
The mere fact that the donors remain in the property after donating it is susceptible of
varied explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded
from the donation. And the donees Ortiz having been vested with ownership and attendant
possession since 1940, it is clear that the subsequent donation of the property in f avor of
respondent Basadaconfered on the latter no right whatever over the property as against the
former donees, Thus, the respondent Andres Basada is sentenced to restore possesion to
petitioners Cresencia and Pacita Ortiz.
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, respondents

G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render
military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano
married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes
one-half of the real property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of
Donation”.
On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order
of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance
of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank
and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979,
Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus
Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if
Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he
was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997,
Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of
insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano
was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of
Mercedes Catalan.
Issue:
1.)Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
2.)Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally
in possession of the latter
3.)Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals and denied the petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites:
(1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be
free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.
The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the
existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the
lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this condition
continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid.
Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has
been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted
with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The
Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the
court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation
was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a
proper action in court within four years.
Art. 748. Formalities
VICTORIA MOREÑO-LENTFER v. HANS JURGEN WOLFF
[GR 152317. Nov 10, 2004.]
FIRST DIVISION: QUISUMBING, J p:

Facts:
Wolff alleged that:
1. The Lentfer spouses were his confidants who held in trust for him, a time deposit
account in the amount of DM200,000 at Solid Bank
2. Apprised of his interest to own a house along a beach, Lentfer urged him to buy Cross'
beach house and lease rights in Puerto Galera.
3. He agreed to the proposal and through a bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the
amount of DM 221,700 as total consideration for the sale and assignment of the lease
rights.
4. Cross and Lentfer surreptitiously executed a deed of sale whereby the beach house was
made to appear as sold to Lentfer. The assignment of the lease right was likewise made
in favor of Lentfer.
5. Upon learning of this, he filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of
property.
Lentfer insists that Wolff made a donation to her under Art. 1238 which provides: “Payment
made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a
donation, which requires the debtor's consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the
creditor who has accepted it.”
Lentfer posits that in a contract of sale:
1. the seller is the creditor [Cross],

2. the buyer is the debtor [Lentfer]
3. the third person who paid the consideration on behalf of the debtor [Lentfer] is Wolff
Lentfer insists that Wolff did not intend to be reimbursed for said payment and debtor
Lentfer consented to it. Thus, by virtue of Art. 1238, payment by Wolff is considered a
donation.
Issue:
Was there a valid donation made by Wolff to Lentfer in relation to Art. 1238?
Held:
No. Trying to apply Art. 1238 to the instant case is like forcing a square peg into a round
hole. The absence of intention to be reimbursed, the qualifying circumstance in Art. 1238, is
negated by the facts of this case.
Wolff's acts contradict any intention to donate the properties to Lentfer. When Wolff learned
that the sale and lease of the beach house were in favor of Lentfer, he immediately filed a
complaint for annulment of the sale and reconveyance.
Lentfer at that time claimed the beach house, together with the lease right, was donated to
her. Noteworthy, she had changed her theory, to say that it was only the money used in the
purchase that was donated to her. But in any event, Wolff actually stayed in the beach house in
the concept of an owner and shouldered the expenses for its maintenance and repair.
Lentfer's claim of either cash or property donation rings hollow. A donation is a simple act
of liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
But when a large amount of money is involved, equivalent to P3,297,800, we are constrained to
take Lentfer's claim of liberality of the donor with more than a grain of salt.
Lentfer could not brush aside the fact that a donation must comply with the mandatory
formal requirements set forth by law for its validity. Since the subject of donation is the purchase
money, Art. 748 is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money equivalent to P3,297,800 as
well as its acceptance should have been in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for
non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law.
Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag

G.R. No. 181132 , June 5, 2009
FACTS:
The case stems from a petition filed against respondents with the RTC for revocation
and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious. The petition alleged
that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de GuzmanMaramag (Eva) was a
concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive
any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular)
and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto
—Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the
legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian
and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not
be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first. Insular admitted that
Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as
his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the
insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s share as she was
of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending
submission of letters of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state
a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary,
because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified
her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the shares
of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate had
been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating
the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that
the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was
ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on
December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September 2001;
that the case was premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate family of Loreto; and
that the law on succession does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries
is clear.
ISSUE:
Whether illegitimate children can be beneficiaries in an insurance contract.
RULING:
Yes. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states that the insurance proceeds shall be applied
exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made
unless otherwise specified in the policy. Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons
entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if
the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.The exception to this rule is a
situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties
to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may
directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and,
thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife
have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva
as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance
policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the
children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be
awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of
petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when
the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the
insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
Digested by:Nenaria, Janine Louise Mae E.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO v. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA DE

LEON
G.R. No. 149570
March 12, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.
Facts:
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed
the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property
and stay therein without any rentals therefor.
De Leon, died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo
Florencio to continue staying in the property. Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the
respondents, remained in the property. On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through
counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate the property.
The latter refused and failed to vacate the property.
Florencio's heirs contend that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them,
as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said
parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the
donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page one of the
deed.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florenciohave a better right to the

possession of the property over the respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon?
Held:
No, as a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment
the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not
disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to
comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.
The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor
and the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,
and the donee’s acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor. In order that the
donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document.
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the
Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration
does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are
affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their
predecessors-in-interest.
J.L.T. AGRO, INC. v. ANTONIO BALANSAG

G.R. No. 141882
March 11, 2005
Tinga, J.
Facts:
The controversy involves a parcel of land registered in the name of conjugal

partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died an action for partition of
properties including the said land was filed. A compromise agreement was reached in
which in the event of death of Don Julian the properties adjudicated to JosefaTeves and
Emilio Teves shall be understood as including not only their ½ share which they
inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which
would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father.
On the other hand the second wife took possession of the same land in
controversy and entered a lease agreement with the spouses respondent which
subsequently bought the same. While trying to register the deed of absolute sale,
respondent discovered that it was registered in the name of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his
lifetime?
Held:
The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The
appellate court disagreed holding that the supplemental deed is not valid, containing as
it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.
Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention
is well-founded. Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos making it premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to
the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime.
Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage
could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. However, on the facts involving the
proper transfer of title thru the supplemental deed, the appellate court was upheld in
taking into consideration the process done in registering the land in the petitioner’s
name where even if it be considered a donation inter vivos and the deed was in a public
instrument, the absence of the acceptance by the done in the same deed or even in a
separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE v. SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S.

MAGLUNOB
G.R. No. 178906
February 18, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
Elvira Arangote acquired the subject parcel of land from Esperanza

Maglunob,who is grand aunt of respondents Martin Maglunob and Romeo Salido. In
June 1986,Esperenza executed an affidavit in which she renounced her rights, share
and participationin the land in favor of Elvira and her husband. It appears that the lot
was not exclusive property of Esperanza but also of the other heirs of Martin I whom
sherepresented in the partition agreement.
Elvira and her husband, Rayconstructed a house on the land in 1989 and in
1993, OCT was issued in her name bythe DAR. However, respondents with the help of
hired persons entered the property and built a wall behind and in front of Elvira’s house.
Elvira and Ray suedrespondents for quieting of title and declaration of ownership.
Respondentsaverred that they were co-owners of the land with Esperanza who
allegedly inherited the land from Martin together with Tomas and Inocencia. They
argued that Esperanza could not have validlywaived her rights in favor of Elvira and
Ray.
Issue:
Whether petitioner and her husband’s title to the subject property null and void?
Held:
Yes, the affidavitexecuted by Esperanza wherein she renounced, relinquished

and waivedall her rights, share, interest and participation in the subject property infavor
of Elvira and Ray is in fact a donation. Thus, it should have complied with
therequirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code.
A simple donation of real property to be valid:1) Must be made in a public

instrument;2) It must be accepted, which must be in the same deed of donation or in a
separate publicinstrument;3) If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor must be notified inauthentic form and the same must be noted in both
instruments.
The affidavit executed by Esperanza, however, suffered from legal infirmities. In

Sumipat vs.Banga, the Court ruled that title to immovable does not pass from the donor
to the done byvirtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a
public instrumentand the donor duly notified thereof. In this case, the acceptance of the
donationwas not made by Elvira either in the same affidavit or in a separate public
instrument. Neither was there notice of acceptance given to the donor, therefore the
donation is void.
MARISSA R. UNCHUAN v.ANTONIO J.P. LOZADA

G.R. No. 172671
April 16, 2009
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and PeregrinaLozadaSaribay were the registered

co-owners of 2 lots in Cebu City.The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold
the lots to their nephew Antonio J.P. Lozadaunder a Deed of Sale. Dr.Lozada agreed to
advance the purchase price for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later
notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office and new TCTs were
issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the

annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an
undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of Donation. Antonio and
Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title with application for preliminary
injunction and restraining order. Marissa filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void
and to cancel the new TCTs.
Issues:
Whether the deed of donation executed in favor of the petitioner is void?
Held:
No, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is
absolute and indispensable. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party producing a
document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He
may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was
made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the
instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in
evidence.
GUTIERREZ v. MENDOZA-PLAZA
G.R. No. 185477
December 4, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
On 25 March 1916, Ignacio acquired the subject property by way of purchase

from Luis Custodio for P200.00, which sale was contained in a notarized document
entitled EscrituraPublica.
Thereafter, Ignacio executed a deed of donation inter vivos,whereby the subject

property was donated to the children whom he begot with Ignacia, his second wife.
Ignacia accepted the donation in the same instrument on behalf of her children.
Dominador and Victoria were also signatories to the deed of donation inter vivos as
instrumental witnesses. The deed was likewise duly notarized, but the same was not
recorded in the Registry of Deeds. Respondents filed a Complaint for
AccionReivindicatoria, Publiciana and Quieting of Title against petitioners
Respondents alleged that after the execution of the deed of donation inter vivos,
the subject property was assigned to Flora and her sister Felisa, who then possessed
and occupied the same as owners. Ponciano took over and exercised the rights of his
mother Felisa after the latter died in 1988. On or about late January or early February of
2006, petitioners took possession of the southern portion of the subject property and
constructed a house of strong materials therein, despite the vigorous objection and
opposition of the respondents. As the parties were close relatives, respondents exerted
efforts to compromise and amicably settle the case, but petitioners refused.
Issue:
Whether the donation was valid?
Held:
Yes, Petitioners seem to have overlooked the fact that the deed of donation inter
vivos is a notarized document. According to Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a
prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. A notarial
document is evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a
prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing
evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption.
The non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect the validity
thereof. Registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the
parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal
purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a
transaction involving the property has been entered into.
HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126996
February 15, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
Facts:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in

1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by
her sisters Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman. During the existence of
their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties.
The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a
conference, in that said meeting, Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de
Guzman and CesarioVelaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she
and her husbandearlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention
to give away allthe properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who
is one of hersisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his
motherallegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-
half(1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to ½ of each of all the properties in question
beingthe children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman.
Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering theproperties in question since
they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquinospouses, to order the partition of
the properties between plaintiffs and defendants inequal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of theland in question from the time
defendants forcibly took possession until partition shallhave been effected.
Issue:
Whether the action for partition be sustained?
Held:
No. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The
court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.
Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action
to state in his complaint the “nature and the extent of his title” to the real estate. Until
and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect
a partition of the properties.
In this case, the properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have
already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary
estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists between
private respondents and petitioners, the court found no reason to discuss the other
arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition.
Digested by: Julie Ann A. Salcedo
HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ, namely: ANASTACIA VELASQUEZ, SOFIA VELASQUEZ, ELISEO

VELASQUEZ, JOSE VELASQUEZ, CORAZON VELASQUEZ, LEONORA VELASQUEZ, and NIEVES
VELASQUEZ
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANATALIA DE GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES,
ANDRES MENESES, FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO MENESES
GR. No. 126996(February 15, 2000)
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Facts:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and
1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters
Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and TranquilinadeGuzman (grandmother
of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to
acquire real properties.
The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with
the plaintiffs’ mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and
Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the
conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario
Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband
earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all
the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her
sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother
allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half
(1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to ½ of each of all the properties in question being
the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman.
Plaintiffs alsio claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took

possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs’ repeated demands for partition,
defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the
properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino
spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in
equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the
land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall
have been effected.
Issue:
Should the action for partition be sustained?
Held:
No. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.
Thecourt must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for
partition.
Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action
to state in his complaint the “nature and the extent of his title” to the real estate. Until
and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect
a partition of the properties.
In this case, the properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have

already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary
estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists
between private respondents and petitioners, the court found no reason to discuss the
other arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition.
RICKY Q. QUILALA
vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES
and JOSE REYES
GR. No. 132681 (December 3, 2001)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in
favor of VioletaQuilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of
94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of
the Register of Deeds for Manila. The deed of donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the
name of VioletaQuilala. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. VioletaQuilala likewise
died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of
VioletaQuilala. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both
Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.
Issue:
Does the signing on the wrong side of the page of the document invalidates it and thus made
the donation by Catalina to Violeta invalid?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of
title as well as the technical description as the real property donated. It stipulated that
the donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity." This was sufficient cause for
a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that
one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page, does not invalidate the document. The
purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted
provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does
not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It
cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in
the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS
vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch
29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF
ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator
GR. No. 123968 (April 24, 2003)
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts:
CelestinaGanuelasVda. deValin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of

petitioner UrsulinaGanuelas. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for
and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the
faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by
these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
further force and effect.However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a
document revoking such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed ownership over the
donated properties and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of
Celestina any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus,
prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the San Fernando, La Union Regional Trial
Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such donation is
void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a
disposition mortis causa.
On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of
wills and testaments because such donation was inter vivos. The RTC ruled that the Deed of
Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to comply with the formalities of
wills and testaments.
Issue:
Is the donation inter vivos or mortis causa?
Held:
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation inter
vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative
even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death,
then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which
should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nudaproprietas) of the donated properties
passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the
deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or
revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be
executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa,
the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills,
otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any
right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the
death of Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of
no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties
to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the
donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that
the donation is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is
that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. More. The
deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: To
classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and
affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the
donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining
whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an
identical motivation. In other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis
causa.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will
under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation
is void and produces no effect.
RICKY Q. QUILALA
vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES
and JOSE REYES
GR. No. 111904 (October 5, 2000)

QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a donation
mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend,
cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such properties.
Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter vivos, to six parcels of land in favor
of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for
prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold
2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation.
Respondent filed a petition to quiet title, stating that she had already become the owner of the
parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.
Issue:
Is the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa?
Held:
It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two
donations, and that they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a
different application to a donation mortis causa.
Also, the court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the parcels of
land out of love and affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the reservation of
a lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the
intention to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of
donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for
officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT
GR. No. 140487 (April 2, 2001)
KAPUNAN, J.
Facts:
Silim and Mangubat donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools,
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur, on the condition that said land shall be
used exclusively and forever for educational purposes. However, as the said parcel of land was
too small for the construction of the planned BagongLipunan School Building, the Province of
Zamboanga, through its division superintendent, executed a deed of exchange in favor of a new
and suitable location. Consequently, whatever was built on the donated lot was dismantled and
transferred to the new fitting location.
The issue arose when the donators found out that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma took the land for
himself and constructed his house thereon. Silim and Mangubat sought to have the donation
declared null and void on the ground that the condition of the donation was violated.
Issue:
Is the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school, which it was conditioned on, was
never built thereon?
Held:
Yes. The Court upheld the validity of the donation. Firstly, it ruled that there was a valid
acceptance in accordance with Arts. 745 and 749 of the Civil Code: it was made personally or
through an agent, and it was made in a public document. Anent the second contention
concerning the non-fulfillment of the consideration, the Court ruled that contrary to Silim and
Mangubat’s argument, the parcel of land was used precisely for school purposes. The exchange
of the donated lot for a bigger lot was done in pursuance with the condition that they (Silim and
Mangubat) imposed. Remember: the lot was exchanged with a bigger lot to give way for the
construction of BagongLipunan Elementary School and for no other reason.
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a
much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The
acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of
BagongLipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the
donated lot.
EDGARDO D. DOLAR
vs.
BARANGAY LUBLUB (now P.D. Monfort North) of the Municipality of Dumangas, herein
represented by its Punong Barangay, PEPITO DUA, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, DUMANGAS WATER DISTRICT, 4th ILOILO MOBILE GROUP, ILOILO PROVINCIAL
POLICE, ILOILO REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 68
GR. No. 152663 (November 18, 2005)
GARCIA, J.
Facts:
Petitioner and SerafinJaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6 hectares,
identified as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06-000744 (Lot No. 1, for brevity), situated in Brgy. Lublub,
Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the
DumangasCadastre. Then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of
Brgy. Lublub.
Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed [5] donating to Brgy. Lublub,

represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and SerafinJaranilla had
earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the same
conditions expressly set forth in the first. On May 6, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
Iloilo City, petitioner filed against Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession With Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area he had earlier donated. Basically,
petitioner claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be effective, the donee
barangay having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
Issues:
1. Should his action be considered as one for revocation of donation instead of for quieting of
title and does the action for quieting has prescribed?
2. Is the deed of donation in question (a) valid for defective acceptance and/or (b) no longer
effective by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the donation being valid and effective, virtually forecloses any
claim which petitioner may have over the donated property against the donee and other
occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title has no merit. Militar was clothed with authority
to accept the donation for respondent barangay.
On this point, petitioner cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 [16] - the law then in force
- and Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 1991. In gist, these provisions
empower the punongbarangay to enter into contracts for the barangay upon authorization of
the Sangguniang Barangay, or, in the alternative, theSanggunian may authorize the barangay
head to enter into contracts for the barangay.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and
not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy,
we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is
valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act. In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid
that respondent barangay denied or challenged the purported revocation of the donation
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and DR. BENITO TUMAMAO, Schools Division Superintendent
of Isabela
vs.
HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY, SR., represented by IGNACIA VICENTE, RUFINO DULAY, JR., SUSANA
DULAY, ADELAIDA DULAY, LUZVIMINDA DULAY and CECILIA DULAY
GR. No.164748 (January 27, 2006)
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Facts:
On August 3, 1981, the spouses RufinoDulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente Dulay executed a
deed of donation over a 10,000-square-meter portion of their property in favor of the
Ministry of Education and Culture.The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983, a
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Ministry of Education and
Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the Superintendent of Schools of Isabela.
However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary, started construction of the Rizal
National High School building on a parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano.
The school site was about 2 kilometers away from the land donated by the spouses
Dulay.
In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994, the spouses Dulay requested
that the property be returned to them considering that the land was never used since
1981, or a period of more than 13 years. On August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of
Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No. 397 recognizing the right of the donors to
redeem the subject parcel of land because of the DECS’ failure to utilize it for the
intended purpose. It further resolved that the Rizal National High School no longer
needed the donated land "considering its distance from the main campus and [the]
failure to utilize the property for a long period of time."
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein respondents, filed a complaint for
the revocation of the deed of donation and cancellation of the title, alleging that (1) there
was a condition in the deed of donation: that the DECS, as donee, utilize the subject
property for school purposes, that is, the construction of a building to house the Rizal
National High School, (2) the DECS did not fulfill the condition and that the land
remained idle up to the present, and (3) the donation inter vivos was inofficious, since
the late RufinoDulay, Sr. donated more than what he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the following
defenses: (a) the DECS complied with said condition because the land was being used
by the school as its technology and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation was
not inofficious for the donors were the owners of five other parcels of land, all located at
Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the DECS acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase
made on December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in the amount of
P18,000.00 as certified by its former Barangay Captain, Jesus San Juan;11 and (d) the
action of the respondents had prescribed.
The OSG also claimed that students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany
seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees; the produce would then be sold and the proceeds used for
the construction of a school building on the subject property.
Issues:
(1) Has the DECS complied with the condition imposed on the the deed of donation?
(2) Does the respondents' have the right to seek the revocation of the deed of donation
is already barred by prescription and laches?
Held:
The contention of petitioners has no merit.
As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to prove that the donated property
was used for school purposes as indicated in the deed of donation:
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants have complied with the
condition of donation. It is not amiss to state that other than the bare allegation of the
defendant-appellants, there is nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the
condition of donation has been complied with by the defendant-appellants. In the same
breadth, the planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could
not have been the "school purposes" referred to and intended by the donors when they
had donated the land in question.
Also, the posture of the defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as
technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far from
being the truth considering that not only is the said school located two kilometers away
from the land donated but also there was not even a single classroom built on the land
donated that would reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted
therein. These observations, together with the unrebutted ocular inspection report made
by the trial court which revealed that the land donated remains idle and without any
improvement thereon for more than a decade since the time of the donation, give Us no
other alternative but to conclude that the defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to
comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation.
The right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed when respondents
filed their complaint. Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG that
respondents’ cause of action is already barred by prescription under Article 764 of the
New Civil Code, or four years from the non-compliance with the condition in the deed of
donation. Since such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for
school purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another
property for the construction of the school building, the four-year prescriptive period did
not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply
with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage. It must be
stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with
the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the
New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus
governed by the rules on contract.

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